

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 October 2006

TO: MADNI, HAFES QARI MOHAMMED SAAD IQBAL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MADNI, HAFES QARI MOHAMMED  
SAAD IQBAL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee has admitted traveling to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Afghanistan and many times to Pakistan.

2. The detainee asked an unidentified confidant where and with who a United States government official would be on New Year's Eve.

3. The detainee wanted to know if there were protective officers with the government official and if they were American.

4. The detainee claimed to be an al Qaida operative.

b. Connections/Associations

1. An acquaintance of the detainee failed an attack on an American commercial airline in 2001.

2. The detainee met with al Qaida members and observed machine guns, weapons, and bombs at their residence.

3. In mid-December 2001, the detainee speculated that something big was going to happen during a meeting with other al Qaida operatives.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MADNI, HAFES QARI MOHAMMED SAAD IQBAL**

4. The detainee had visited with members of al Qaida in Jakarta, Indonesia.

5. The detainee met an individual who claimed to be the Secretary General of the Islamic Defenders Front. The individual discussed the details of his failed attempt to conduct a car bombing of the United States Embassy in Jakarta, Indonesia.

c. Intent

The detainee stated that it was better to kill one United States Government Official than 100 Americans.

d. Other Relevant Data.

The detainee stated that because of his ability to memorize and sing the Koran at the age of twelve he became famous in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, he was introduced to presidents, kings, and princes. The detainee stated that he has won approximately five million dollars in prize money from Koran competitions.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he did not want to return to Pakistan because he would be labeled a terrorist.

b. The detainee stated that with regard to his relationship to an al Qaida operative, he made a mistake when he got involved with bad people at a young age.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

25 January 2006

TO: NAJI, AZIZ ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NAJI, AZIZ ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. In 2000 the detainee decided to travel to Mecca, Saudi Arabia and fulfill his Muslim obligation of Omra, a pilgrimage to Mecca that is mandated by Islam for all Muslims.
    2. While in Mecca, Saudi Arabia the detainee stayed at a mosque. He stayed there for a full year and was afforded food and incidentals free of cost.
    3. The detainee confided in one individual and related his desire to fight a jihad. According to the detainee, this individual is a member of the Lashgar-e-Taiba. This organization assists and funds those who are willing to fight a jihad.
    4. The detainee's priority was to fight the jihad in Chechnya, but he learned that the borders were well guarded and difficult to penetrate. Instead, he decided to volunteer to fight the jihad in Kashmir.
    5. The detainee stated that he walked approximately ten hours to within the border of colonized Kashmir. It was here that he began disarming mines in an effort to safely enter Kashmir. As he was disarming one mine, he accidentally detonated a second mine, thus losing his right leg. He was then taken to Lahore, Pakistan where he was admitted to the hospital for 25 days.
    6. The detainee recovered from his injuries. He decided that he would not go back to Algeria, not only because of the unrest, sin, corruption and adultery in the country, but he also

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did not want his family to see him without a leg. He thought he would find a wife and settle in Pakistan.

7. The detainee was identified as a member of the Jemaah Islamiah Muqatilah.

### b. Training

1. In 1995 the detainee volunteered and joined the Algerian army. He claimed he wanted to fight against the terrorism that was pervasive in his country by Muslim extremists known as Takfiri. He received four months of training, which consisted of physical training, the use of a Kalashnikov rifle and the use of a fully automatic, ammo belt-fed weapon, known as a Bikan. After basic training the detainee was assigned guard duties and was part of a rapid response unit that assisted the local police in restoring order.

2. At the Lashgar-e-Taiba camp there was light weapons training to include the use of Kalashnikov rifles. The detainee added that since he was already trained in light weapons during his service in the Algerian army, it was decided that he would instead train and specialize in demining.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee received 400 Riyals, the necessary visa and an airline ticket to Karachi, Pakistan from a representative of the Lashgar-e-Taiba.

2. The detainee was provided transportation by the Lashgar-e-Taiba to a training camp in a mountainous area near Kashmir.

3. Lashgar-e-Taiba arranged to have the detainee driven from the hospital to a house where he spent ten months recovering.

### d. Intent

1. The detainee stated that before he was arrested he never thought about the United States. He related if he wanted to fight the United States, he would go back to Algeria and fight the Americans there.

2. The detainee stated that with his disability, it would be impossible for him to actually fight. He did say that he would only fight against those who fight against Islam. He did make the comment that it seems the United States is fighting against Islam and not terrorism.

### e. Other Related Data

The detainee was arrested at the home of a man affiliated with the Islamic Relief Society in Peshawar, Pakistan and the Wafa Humanitarian Organization in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NAJI, AZIZ ABDUL**

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee denied ever being in Afghanistan.
  - b. The detainee denied ever killing anyone, even when he was affiliated with Lashgar-e-Taiba. He stated he was uncertain if he could ever kill anyone, saying he is a coward.
  - c. The detainee does not want to go back to Algeria since he wishes to stay away from the bad things. He would like to get asylum in Europe after he is released.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 September 2006

TO: AZIZ, AKHMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZIZ, AKHMED

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he traveled to Afghanistan in September 1999.

2. The detainee said he was in support of the Taliban's resistance against the Northern Alliance.

3. A source stated the detainee was a member of al Qaida and that the detainee pledged bayat to Usama bin Laden.

4. The detainee was arrested on 25 June 2002 after a raid on a safe house in Pakistan. During a search of the house, a cell phone, several empty cell phone boxes, several short-wave radios, a volt/ohm meter and other small electronic components were found. A subscriber identity module card was found hidden inside a flashlight.

5. The detainee stated he could not change his beliefs, as he was a fundamentalist, an extremist and an al Qaida member. The detainee said he supported the acts by Usama bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri and was glad America was attacked the way it was.

b. Training

The detainee went to the front line in Kabul, Afghanistan in the summer break of 2000. The detainee spent about 6 weeks training at the front line with an artillery unit. The detainee was trained on 82mm and 120mm mortars, Kalashnikov, and the rocket-propelled grenade.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZIZ, AKHMED**

c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee said he became a friend of the Libyans and started to establish ties with them while he lived in Mauritania as early as 1992. The detainee said that he was never a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group. The detainee agreed with the ideologies of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and joined the Libyans to actively fight and die to overthrow the Libyan government.

2. The detainee admitted he was forced to find support from the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members because they shared a common bond of not agreeing with the government and its officials.

3. The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. They declared the government of Libyan leader un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members organized against Libyan Government interests, where as others aligned with Usama bin Laden's al Qaida organization or are active in the international Mujahedin network. The group was designated for asset freeze in September 2001.

4. The detainee believed his direct supervisor was more affiliated with the Taliban than with al Qaida. The detainee said that he visited supervisor's house but never discussed things such as al Qaida.

5. The detainee stated a man he worked for told him that al Qaida needed a good administrator and approached him on al Qaida's behalf.

6. A source stated that a personal adviser of Usama bin Laden, who leads the Mauritanian al Qaida cell, recruited the detainee.

7. The detainee attended the wedding of Usama bin Laden's son sometime towards the end of 1999 or the beginning of 2000.

8. The detainee spoke with Usama bin Laden about the Institute, where the detainee worked as an Arabic language teacher, for approximately five minutes in October 2000.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee said that he is not a member of al Qaida.

b. The detainee said he never pledged bayat to Usama bin Laden.

c. The detainee stated that the 11 September 2001 attacks were wrong and were not in keeping with the teachings of Islam.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AZIZ, AKHMED**

d. The detainee state he had no prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

19 October 2006

TO: AL JOABOURI, SHAKER

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JOABOURI, SHAKER

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he served as a fighter for the Taliban, and possibly al Qaida, from 1994 to 2001 in eastern Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated the only interaction he had with the al Wafa organization was when he went to its office in Kabul, Afghanistan to try to receive money. After three to four unsuccessful attempts to gain money, the detainee stated he did not go back to al Wafa. In addition, the detainee stated that in 2001 while in Kabul, Afghanistan, he saw an al Wafa member whom he recognized from the al Wafa office give money to an al Qaida member.

3. The detainee is an admitted Taliban fighter and claims to have been a close associate of Usama bin Laden and Mullah Omar.

4. The detainee claimed his role was to be a fighter and occupy the front lines for the Taliban against the resistance of the Northern Alliance.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that as an infantryman he was trained on the mortar and the rocket propelled grenade, and served in the 842nd Brigade of the Iraqi military.

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ISN 758

## UNCLASSIFIED

### **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JOABOURI, SHAKER**

2. The detainee stated that in November 2000 he joined the Taliban in Mazar-e Shariff, Afghanistan. The detainee was issued a Kalashnikov rifle and joined more than 50 other soldiers on the front line.

3. The detainee stated he visited the Derunta Training Camp twice. The detainee stated that one section of the camp was used primarily for basic training and taught the use of explosives and hand to hand combat such as karate and judo.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated he pledged a bayat to Mullah Omar to help him and the Taliban to take over all of Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated that on 11 September 2001 he was in Kabul, Afghanistan, visiting Abu Bassam, a famous Arab poet, who is known to be an associate of Usama bin Laden.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee had originally explained his decision to go to Afghanistan was made out of religious fervor and to fulfill his religious obligation to fight a jihad. Later, however, the detainee admitted he is not a religious man. The detainee also cited his desire to become financially successful as a reason for traveling to Afghanistan, claiming he was told there would be good jobs there for an Arab.

2. The detainee stated he served in the Iraqi Army during the Gulf War and he was taken prisoner by American forces at al Salman, Iraq.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated if released, he would like to return to Diwani, Iraq, now that Saddam Hussein has been removed from power. The detainee also stated if released, he would attempt to find employment as a traffic cop.

b. The detainee stated although he is anxious for his case to be resolved, he holds no animosity towards the United States. The detainee added he has been treated very well since being detained. The detainee lastly stated he would never harm the United States because they are good people, and consequently, if ever given an opportunity to help them, he would be very happy to do so.

c. The detainee stated he did not agree with how the Taliban governed Afghanistan, but since the Taliban represented the only form of government he had no other choice but to work with them. The detainee further insisted that he never would have joined the Taliban if not for the fact he was poor and needed money.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL JOABOURI, SHAKER**

d. The detainee believes the Americans did not receive a letter which he had in his possession at the time of his arrest. The letter, signed by a Taliban official, acknowledged the detainee was not sympathetic to the Taliban cause and therefore was to leave Afghanistan.

e. The detainee claimed to have expressed his desire to turn himself over to the American officials. The detainee wanted to provide the Americans with what he knew about Usama bin Laden and the Taliban.

f. The detainee stated that in June 2001 he was arrested for criticizing the Taliban.

g. The detainee stated there were no good attributes of the Taliban because they did not care about who they killed during the fighting.

h. The detainee claimed to have expressed his disdain for the Taliban and al Qaida and was subsequently turned into Pakistani police at the end of March 2002.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

3 October 2006

TO: SLAHI, MOHAMEDOU OULD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SLAHI, MOHAMEDOU OULD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In 1992, the detainee traveled to Afghanistan to fight and was assigned to clean mortar batteries.

2. The detainee actively recruited for jihad from 1992 to 1997 while in Germany. The detainee felt spreading propaganda for jihad was an important function. The detainee would often speak of jihad while he preached at mosques in Germany.

3. A source stated the detainee influenced an individual to travel to Afghanistan for weapons training and to join the armed Taliban forces. The detainee facilitated this individual to meet with Usama bin Laden where the individual swore allegiance to al Qaida.

4. The detainee stated that he attended a mosque in Germany where the director was the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad in the area.

5. An al Qaida operative identified the detainee as an al Qaida facilitator who played a part in recruiting jihadists to fight in Afghanistan and Chechnya and to become suicide hijackers in the West. The detainee convinced the al Qaida operative and three future world trade center suicide hijackers to undergo al Qaida basic military training in Afghanistan.

6. The detainee stated that while he was in Germany he worked with a friend to recruit people to go fight jihad in Afghanistan.

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**000810**

ISN 760

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### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SLAHI, MOHAMEDOU OULD

7. In December 1999, the detainee became the Imam at a mosque in Montreal. The detainee thought that the Algerian Armed Islamic Group and the Salafist might have a presence at the mosque.

8. An al Qaida operative stated that the detainee facilitated his initial travel to Afghanistan and his initial introduction to Usama bin Laden.

9. An Islamic extremist stated that he attended meetings in the detainee's house on occasions with a future suicide bomber and an al Qaida operative.

#### b. Training

1. The detainee stated he was trained in the use of weapons and terrorist tactics in Usama bin Laden's training camps in Afghanistan.

2. In January 1991, the detainee trained for six weeks at camp al Farouq, located near Khost, Afghanistan. The training consisted of physical exercises and weapons training on the Kalashnikov rifle, Uzi, M-16, Makarov pistol and rocket propelled grenades.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee admitted he swore loyalty to Usama bin Laden in 1990.

2. The detainee was tasked by an individual to set up a radio broadcasting station in Sudan, to assist in counterfeiting money, especially United States currency, in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and to help establish greater internet connectivity between Sudan and Kandahar. The detainee denied taking part in any of these taskings.

3. The detainee admits being involved in money laundering activities. The detainee wired United States currency three times to one of Usama bin Laden's operatives.

#### d. Intent

The detainee stated his goal while in Afghanistan was to become a martyr by dying for Islam.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied ever helping anyone travel to Chechnya or Afghanistan.

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 as well as denying knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SLAHI, MOHAMEDOU OULD**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**000812**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

6 July 2006

TO: MAHDY, IBRAHIM

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHDY, IBRAHIM

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to live a good Muslim life under the Taliban.

2. The detainee was at al Farouq when the USS Cole was attacked in October 2000. The detainee appeared in a movie about the attack on the USS Cole that al Qaida made at al Farouq.

3. The detainee was arrested for anti-government activities in Jordan before joining his brother in Afghanistan.

4. In late 2001, a senior al Qaida operative saw the detainee with a group from the Khaldan Camp defending a city in Afghanistan.

b. Training

1. The detainee received training at al Farouq.

2. The detainee attended a three-week mandatory military training course in Jordan. The training consisted of marching and some weapons training.

3. In late 2000 or early 2001, the detainee took two weeks of training at a series of Egyptian guest houses. The training included courses on surveillance, counterintelligence, report writing, observation and inspection.

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ISN 761

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHDY, IBRAHIM**

4. The detainee received three months of weapons training at the al-Ghuraba camp in Afghanistan.

5. After weapons training, the detainee attended religious classes in Afghanistan.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee has a suspected relationship with an associate of a senior al Qaida operative.

2. One of the detainee's brothers was a member of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The detainee's brother was killed in 1998 by Jordanian police while trying to illegally cross the Jordanian-Syrian border.

3. According to a foreign government source, the detainee was once kidnapped by members of an Afghan tribe in Afghanistan. One of the detainee's brothers arranged the money for the detainee's ransom of at least 240,000 United States Dollars with the assistance of a senior al Qaida operative.

4. The detainee attended the wedding of the sister of a senior al Qaida operative.

5. A large number of Mujahedin fighters, particularly Jordanians, and the senior al Qaida operative attended the wedding.

6. A few weeks before the 11 September 2001 attacks, a senior al Qaida operative gave the detainee three passports and approximately 300 United States dollars for a class on making fake passports.

### d. Intent

The detainee felt that the attacks on America were God's wrath against America for their treatment of Muslims around the world.

### e. Other Relevant Data

A few months before the 11 September 2001 attacks, the detainee was told that the United States was on alert for something that was going to happen.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that if he is released and is ever approached by a group to commit jihad, he will not affiliate with them.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF MAHDY, IBRAHIM**

b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

c. The detainee denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

d. The detainee claimed that he is not a member of al Qaida or any other Islamic organization.

e. A senior al Qaida operative commented that he did not think the detainee had sworn bayat or allegiance to al Qaida.

f. The detainee denies attending training in any training camps, receiving counter-intelligence training or false passport making.

g. The detainee denies ulterior motives for his travel.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

11 August 2006

TO: OBAYDULLAH, BAIDULLAH/BERTOLA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OBAYDULLAH,  
BAIDULLAH/BERTOLA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated that he joined Jamaat al-Tabligh when eight to ten men who belonged to Jamaat al-Tabligh came to his village of Mulani, located near Khowst, Afghanistan. The Jamaat al-Tabligh members stayed in the detainee's village for approximately three days and discussed prayer and the Koran.

2. Jama'at Al Tablighi is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.

3. A source stated that the detainee was a coordinator for al Qaida. During the time of Taliban rule, he helped coordinate the movement and activities of various foreign al Qaida members.

4. A source stated that the detainee actually emplaced two Soviet anti-tank mines on a road. The mines were to be command detonated but the detainee had difficulties emplacing the devices. The detainee subsequently removed the mines after no United States forces passed by on the road and then a rain shower washed the dirt covering off the devices.

5. A source stated that the detainee continued to experiment in order to devise a means to detonate the mines. As of mid-July 2002, the detainee had at least 18 anti-tank mines hidden inside his compound.

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ISN 762

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OBAYDULLAH, BAIDULLAH/BERTOLA**

6. The detainee was captured while carrying a notebook containing electronic and explosives schematics.

b. Training

The detainee stated that he was drafted by the Taliban and attended Taliban anti-tank mine school for two days then left to go into hiding from the Taliban.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A source stated that following the beginning of the allied forces campaign against al Qaida and the Taliban, the detainee used his compound to hide and subsequently relocate about 18 Arab al Qaida members to Pakistan.

2. A source stated that the detainee hid six additional al Qaida members in his residence subsequent to the Shahi Kot campaign.

3. A source stated that the detainee received orders from an Arab in Pakistan, approximately one month after the conclusion of the Shahi Kot fighting to begin preparing command detonated mines to use against United States forces.

4. A source stated that the detainee also had received cash and additional explosives at his residence and traveled fairly frequently to Pakistan to receive instructions or to carry messages between Arab al Qaida members in Pakistan and their Afghan subordinates.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee stated that he never attended training camps related to Jamaat al-Tabligh, jihadists or the military.

c. The detainee stated that the information contained in the notebook was obtained when he attended a mechanical school in Khowst, Afghanistan, that the Taliban forced him to attend. The purpose of the school was to provide explosive and firearms training. The detainee described the contents of the notebook as directions on how to use the anti-tank mines not as electronic/explosive schematics.

d. The detainee stated that he took the training course to learn how to dispose of the mines.

## **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OBAYDULLAH,  
BAIDULLAH/BERTOLA**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**000818**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

1 August 2006

TO: GUL, AWAL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GUL, AWAL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. In 1981, the detainee enlisted with the local commander of the Mujahaddin.

2. The detainee traveled from Peshawar, Pakistan, where his family was living as refugees, to jihad with a commander.

b. Connections/Associations

1. In 1995, the detainee met Usama bin Laden when the detainee's commander invited him when Usama bin Laden was being hosted by Gulbudeen Hekmatiar of the Islamic movement of Afghanistan. The detainee and commander were able to talk with Usama bin Laden for about 15 minutes.

2. The Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin, a faction of the Hizb-I-Islami party, was founded in 1977 and was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. Hizb-I-Islami has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden.

3. In 1996, the detainee went to Camp Shamshato in Pakistan for two months.

4. The Hizb-I-Islami Gulbuddin headquarters and operations center is located in Shamshato near Peshawar, Pakistan.

5. During Taliban rule, the detainee was the commander of Military Base #4 with two hundred and fifty people under his command.

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UNCLASSIFIED

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ISN 782

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GUL, AWAL**

c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee tried to resign from the Taliban twice but his resignation was rejected.
2. Following the Battle of Tora Bora, Usama Bin Laden reportedly visited the detainee's house in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
3. The detainee reportedly fought against the Northern Alliance in Kabul, Afghanistan on the Gul-Da-Da-Ra front lines and was a commander in charge of ten men.
4. The detainee reportedly worked with al Qaida and Usama bin Laden and helped many of them. The detainee was a commanding emir in Jalalabad and vicinities. The detainee held the office until arrested.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee was asked his feeling towards Usama bin Laden. The detainee stated that Usama bin Laden and countries like Pakistan used Afghanistan for their own personal purpose. They used the Afghan people. They hid their crimes and criminals and used Afghanistan for their own benefit instead of building Afghanistan and they brought their problems with them.
  - b. When asked his feelings towards the United States, the detainee stated that all people are different and have different religions which makes them different. We should not step on each others rights.
  - c. When asked of his opinion about the United States entering into Afghanistan, the detainee thought it was good that the Americans came and got involved and helped free them.
  - d. The detainee's hopes and wishes are for a better economy and a legitimate government. No one would interfere if there were a legitimate government. The Taliban did not establish a legitimate government or one that the people would support.
  - e. The detainee said that if released, he would return to his country and work for the government since they invested so much in him.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**000820**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 September 2006

TO: ROHULLAH, MULLAN HAJI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ROHULLAH, MULLAN HAJI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. A source stated the detainee was responsible for members of the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin having access to a cache of light and heavy weapons in Afghanistan. The Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin members were planning to attach time-detonated magnetic mines to vehicles of local government officials, United Nations officials and United States coalition forces.

2. The detainee stated he is a member of the Jamiat al-Dawa al Quran.

3. The detainee stated he knew and traveled with the leader of Jamiat Ul-Dawa who openly supported Muslims in the international jihad against non-believers, such as Americans. The detainee stated the Sheik believed in promoting Islamic values worldwide through armed struggle. The detainee stated the Sheik worked with many leaders including the Hezbi Islami Gulbuddin. The detainee stated he would meet with the Sheik on a weekly basis to discuss activities within the Jamiat Ul-Dawa.

4. The detainee stated he and the leader of the Jamiat Ul-Dawa opened a joint bank account at al Falah bank in Peshawar, Pakistan. The Saudi Arabian al-Haramain Islamic Foundation and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate deposited monetary funds into the joint account to financially support the Jamiat Ul-Dawa.

5. The detainee's uncle founded Jamiat al-Dawa al Quran in the early 1980's. The detainee believes the warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and people who follow Usama bin Laden had his uncle killed. The detainee stated that Samiullah took over and he worked for Samiullah for 10 years.

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ISN 798

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ROHULLAH, MULLAN HAJI**

6. The detainee stated nobody influences Jamiat al-Dawa al Quran, they are not affiliated with the Taliban, Inter Services Intelligence Directorate or al Qaida. The detainee stated he and his cousins follow an organization called Shura Ta Foum.

7. A source stated the detainee shared power equally in Jamiat al-Dawa al Quran and made operational decisions. The individual also stated that the detainee was involved in various illegal activities including weapon smuggling, prostitution and bribery.

8. When the detainee was captured he had approximately 600 United States dollars, 2,500 Rials from Dubai, 1,000 Pakistani Rupees, and 100 Rials from Saudi Arabia. The detainee stated he obtained this money by buying precious stones and selling them in Pakistan.

## b. Training

An individual stated the detainee was actively involved in two Jamaat Ud Dawa Il al Quran Training Camps in Afghanistan. The individual stated the detainee commanded the first camp and financed the second camp.

## c. Connections/Associations

1. A source stated the detainee provided the Commander of Afghan Border Forces in Konar Province with money and instructions to smuggle Arabs into Pakistan.

2. A source stated the detainee attended a meeting with the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate to develop a plan to conduct double agent operations against the United States to support a foreign government's strategic interests of undermining a stable Afghan government.

3. According to another individual, the detainee maintained excellent relations with Inter Services Intelligence Directorate and was believed to have received substantial financial support from them in the past. According to the source the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate reportedly provided the detainee with a license plate which allowed him to freely travel from Afghanistan to Pakistan and return without stopping at the border checkpoints.

4. A source caught with a pocket litter letter mentions that the detainee and another person are part of the primary individuals in the fighting against the Konar's Wahabes to support Islamic Movement in Pakistan and Konar. The document further states that the movement will continue the mission and that they have already executed one of the Wahabes. The letter stated the detainee is involved in bribing officials for support and that the detainee is a nephew of Jamilurathman. The letter requests three Kalashnikov rifles and a vehicle. The letter also stated that they are working for Ustad Rabani in Pakistan.

5. The detainee's home telephone number was found in the personal phone book of a suspected Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin commander.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ROHULLAH, MULLAN HAJI**

6. The Jamiat al-Dawa al Quarn is an Islamic extremist group with ties to the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence Directorate consisting of Afghan refugees from camps in the Peshawar, Pakistan area.

7. According to a source, the detainee is a Wahhabi member who was part of an alliance between the Taliban, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin and Wahhabi groups in Afghanistan. The source also stated the purpose of the alliance was to coordinate efforts to drive out the United States presence in Afghanistan, reverse Afghanistan Transitional Administration reforms, and to return Afghanistan to an Islamic fundamentalist state.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he was a refugee for 24 years. During the Taliban times, the detainee claims he was not in Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated that one to two months after 11 September 2001, he met with foreign government forces in Peshawar, Pakistan. The representative from the foreign government met with the detainee three to four times. The representative from the foreign government provided the detainee cash and cellular phones in support of the anti-Taliban, anti-al Qaida operations and drug eradication.

3. A source stated that in December 2001, small groups of Arabs escaped from the Tora Bora area of Afghanistan and were initially resettled to the Konar province village of Marah Warrah, Afghanistan. The detainee moved the Arabs for their safety.

4. According to a source, in Mid-October 2003, Wahabbi and Taliban leaders planned to kidnap a United States citizen in order to trade for the detainee, a former Taliban official. According to the source, the meeting to plan for the kidnapping was held in the house of the detainee in Patac Village, Pakistan.

5. A source stated the detainee paid for a 12-meter tall radio antenna and directed it to be installed to facilitate the Arabs communication.

6. A source stated the detainee received weapons and supplies from al Qaida on trucks returning from Pakistan.

7. A source stated the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence Directorate allegedly provided the detainee money to hire a group of men to fire a rocket from Afghanistan into a United States compound in Afghanistan.

8. The detainee advised that he was attending a tribal meeting in Kabul, Afghanistan, when the attack on the United States Forces occurred in Asadabad, Afghanistan.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ROHULLAH, MULLAN HAJI**

9. The detainee stated the Afghan tribal leaders were provided a letter that was used to identify them when crossing the border. The detainee stated he was never issued the letter.

10. A source stated the detainee was a greedy man that would sell intelligence to foreign government services and anyone else that is willing to pay him for information. The individual stated the detainee has no loyalties to any groups.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated when they captured Arabs, they would turn them over to American Forces.

b. The detainee stated he supported the Northern Alliance in their efforts to defeat the Taliban, al Qaida and Usama bin Laden.

c. An individual stated the detainee does not have an extreme Islam background and that the detainee's knowledge about Islam is very limited.

d. The detainee stated he never worked with the Arabs or against the Americans.

e. The detainee claims he is a friend of the Americans and was glad to see the Northern Alliance come and get rid of the Taliban.

f. The detainee stated he never smuggled drugs and was against drugs. The detainee stated he was destroying drugs with the coalition forces.

g. The detainee stated he never collected any money for the Jamaat Ul Dawa al Quarani.

h. The detainee stated he has no ties with Inter Services Intelligence Directorate.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 May 2006

TO: OMARI, MOHAMMAD NABI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OMARI, MOHAMMAD NABI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee took a job with the Taliban so he wouldn't be labeled as part of the opposition.

2. The detainee was appointed by the Taliban as Chief of the Border Department in Kabul, Afghanistan. His duties included controlling smuggling but due to the shortage of soldiers he was unsuccessful. He also held positions as Chief of Communications and Chief of Security.

3. The detainee attended weekly al Qaida planning meetings in Khowst, Afghanistan.

4. The detainee was identified as a fundamentalist connected to the Taliban who opposed Coalition Forces and was active in organizing anti-coalition efforts.

5. The detainee is suspected of being a member of the al Qaida Karim bomb-making cell.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee answered to the Minister of Border Department who reported directly to the supreme Taliban commander.

2. The detainee met with senior Taliban officials. One official was from the Department of Intelligence and the other was a facilitator for al Qaida.

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ISN 832

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OMARI, MOHAMMAD NABI**

3. The detainee knows an anti-coalition militant who was responsible for attacks on American and Afghan Forces.

4. The detainee received support from an anti-coalition bomb maker.

5. A senior Taliban commander asked the detainee to take a message to the former Taliban Minister of Frontiers and Tribal affairs.

### c. Intent

The detainee considers Americans his enemy and expresses hatred toward Americans.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was arrested at the Khowst, Afghanistan airport on 14 September 2002.

2. The detainee fought in the jihad against the Russians.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee states that he does not know why the American Forces arrested him.

b. The detainee claims to have had no prior knowledge of the attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001 or any future attacks.

c. The detainee states that he has no knowledge of any illegal shipments of materials used for weapons of mass destruction. He does not believe that al Qaida is involved in narcotics.

d. The detainee claims to have no knowledge of al Qaida training procedures.

e. The detainee claims to have no knowledge about bomb making of any kind.

f. The detainee stated that he did not fight the Russians and found the allegation that he had fought them silly. He related that he was a child and was just reaching puberty at the time the Russians pulled out.

g. The detainee denied he ever assisted al Qaida or Taliban members move across the border.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF OMARI, MOHAMMAD NABI**

continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 October 2006

TO: SALIH, AYUB MURSHID ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALIH, AYUB MURSHID ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he was recruited in June 2000 in Yemen by a well-known jihad recruiter. The recruiter told the detainee it was his obligation as a Muslim to learn to fight and to defend Muslim children.

2. After the detainee agreed to join the jihad and go to Afghanistan for training, the recruiter bought the detainee a plane ticket to Karachi, Pakistan and obtained a legal Yemeni passport for him. The individual also gave the detainee 200 United States Dollars for incidental purchases.

3. The detainee stated he flew with a group of four Yemenis from Sanna, Yemen, to Dubai, United Arab Emirates, and then on to Karachi, Pakistan. In Pakistan the detainee traveled to Quetta, where he stayed in a house that also contained Taliban people. The detainee and his group of four were then taken across the border along with five Saudi men into Afghanistan.

4. The detainee stated he stayed for one week in a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, prior to attending an al Qaida training camp. The individual running the guest house was in charge of in-processing and preparation for the training camp.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he attended the al Farouq Training Camp in Kandahar, Afghanistan for two months.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALIH, AYUB MURSHID ALI**

2. The al Farouq Training Camp was funded by al Qaida.

3. The detainee stated that while at al Farouq he completed most of the basic training course, including training on the Kalashnikov rifle, BEKA, Molotov cocktails, rocket propelled grenades, topography, crawling, signals and explosives.

4. The detainee stated he attended a one month artillery course in Kabul, Afghanistan.

## c. Connections/Associations

1. While in Kabul, Afghanistan, the detainee stated he stayed in several guest houses.

2. One of the guest houses was identified as being owned and operated by al Qaida and served as a safe house for Saudi Arabian and Yemeni al Qaida members.

3. Following 11 September 2001, the detainee stated he left Kabul the night before it fell in a convoy of vehicles that carried Arabs, Uzbeks, Turks, Tajiks, and Afghans. The detainee stayed in Khowst for one month and traveled to Zurmat, Afghanistan, where he stayed for two days before crossing the border into Pakistan.

4. A senior al Qaida operative attempted to smuggle the detainee from Karachi, Pakistan, to Yemen via Iran and Oman. The detainee traveled from Karachi to Quetta to the Kuh-I-Taftan border crossing into Iran. The detainee then traveled to Iranshahr, Iran, and on to Chabehar, Iran. The detainee returned to Karachi after learning the Iranian police were arresting all Arabs they could find.

5. On September 11, 2002, the detainee was arrested by Pakistani police at an apartment in Karachi, Pakistan, with five other Arabs. The detainee was arrested following a firefight between the Arabs and the Pakistani police.

6. The apartment the detainee was arrested in was a suspected al Qaida safe house. The apartment was located in Karachi, Pakistan.

## d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he brought a computer to the apartment in which he was arrested. The detainee stated the computer was given to him by a Yemeni he lived with in Lahore and Karachi, Pakistan.

2. The computer was found to contain flight navigation maps, a flight simulator program, procedures for kidnapping and documents related to smuggling money, weapons, ammunition and personnel into countries and states.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALIH, AYUB MURSHID ALI**

3. The detainee stated he could not finish the training at al Farouq because he became sick with malaria and had to miss the last few weeks of training. The detainee went back to the guest house in Kandahar to a clinic that was part of the guest house.

4. The detainee stated that shortly before 11 September 2001, he desired to return to Yemen after completing his one year obligation to the jihad recruiter. The detainee stated that following 11 September 2001, he decided to wait in Pakistan because he heard the Yemeni government was arresting anyone returning to Yemen from Pakistan and Afghanistan.

5. The detainee stated that while waiting in Karachi, Pakistan, he heard on the news that Yemeni president Ali Abdallah Salih was allowing all Yemenis to return without being arrested. The detainee stated that he was preparing to return to Yemen when he was arrested.

6. The detainee stated he did not resist the Pakistani police when they entered the apartment. The detainee stated he was handcuffed with a Pakistani policeman by his side for the entire duration of the firefight.

7. The detainee stated he did not know how to use the computer he brought with him to the apartment. The detainee stated he wanted to play video games on the computer but could only get it to play Pakistani songs.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that while at the al Farouq Training Camp he never heard any mention of al Qaida.

b. The detainee stated he never fought at the front line and waited in Kabul, Afghanistan, until after the bombing started.

c. The detainee stated that he is not a member of al Qaida and has never planned any attacks, prior or pending.

d. The detainee denied being recruited by anyone to go to Afghanistan to learn how to fight. The detainee stated he left Yemen to help other Muslims and religious people by calling them to Islam.

e. The detainee denied ever being in the al Farouq Training Camp and stated he received training at a camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan.



# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SALIH, AYUB MURSHID ALI**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 October 2006

TO: AL MARWALA, BASHIR NASIR ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MARWALA, BASHIR NASIR ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he originally intended to fight in Palestine and later in Chechnya.

2. The detainee stated he had originally left Yemen to go to Afghanistan to receive training so that he could go to Chechnya and help the Muslim brothers fight.

3. The detainee stated he went to Afghanistan to fight jihad, nothing else and that he fought for religious reasons.

4. The detainee stated he was not recruited but rather he talked to a person whom he had met in June or July 2000 about the jihad.

5. The detainee stated he made his first trip to Afghanistan in 2000 and that he left Sanaa, Yemen in approximately September 2000 with three other Yemeni individuals whom he had never met prior to going to Afghanistan. The detainee stated he and the three Yemeni individuals traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. After a layover in Abu Dhabi, the detainee stated he and the three individuals went on to Karachi, Pakistan and stayed in Karachi for two days.

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ISN 837

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MARWALA, BASHIR NASIR ALI

6. The detainee stated he stayed at the Bak Kantor International Hotel in Karachi, Pakistan where after two days a person came to take them to Afghanistan. The detainee stated that a group of them went to Quetta, Pakistan where they stayed in a guest house called Dafter Taliban run by the Taliban.

7. The detainee stated a person met him and the three other individuals at Dafter Taliban and guided them to Kandahar, Afghanistan.

8. The detainee stated he and the group of three traveled to the Pakistan-Afghanistan border where they had some smugglers take them on across. The detainee stated that the group was met by a person on the other side of the border and they went to Spin Buldak, Afghanistan, where they were dropped off and traveled on to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he stayed at a guest house called Hage Habash for about three days, after which time he went on to al Farouq, Afghanistan.

9. The detainee stated that two or three days after the USS Cole incident, the al Farouq Camp was moved to Kabul, Afghanistan and that he was taken in a convoy of trucks to a guest house in the Karty Barrawan district of Kabul. The detainee stated that after two weeks in Kabul, Afghanistan he was taken to the Malek Center, located outside Kabul, to complete his basic training.

10. The detainee stated he left the Malik Camp for Kabul, Afghanistan, where he stayed about a week at a hotel. The detainee stated that he went to Kandahar, Afghanistan, to the Hage Habash house and stayed two to three weeks waiting for arrangements to be made for his return to Yemen. The detainee stated he gave his airline ticket to a person who was in charge of travel at the house and who made the arrangements via the same route he came into Afghanistan and Pakistan.

11. The detainee stated he decided to go to Afghanistan a second time to receive training so he could go fight in Chechnya.

12. Detainee stated he left by himself around 13 August 2001 and traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan through Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The detainee stated he was met by a person at his hotel in Karachi and was given a bus ticket to Quetta, Pakistan which he used. The detainee left from Quetta, Pakistan for Kandahar, Afghanistan with two other people. The detainee stated he stayed at al Nibrass guest house in Kandahar for three days, before his second tour at al Farouq Camp, Afghanistan.

13. A source stated that the Nibras guest house was located in Kandahar, Afghanistan, and that the guest house was for the new people going to al Farouq camp.

14. The detainee stated he met a person at the Dafter Taliban guest house in August 2001 and that he was taken with a group of Arabs in a taxi to the border near Chaman, Pakistan.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MARWALA, BASHIR NASIR ALI**

15. The detainee stated his al Farouq training was interrupted because of the 11 September 2001 attacks and that on 12 September 2001 everyone was evacuated from Camp Farouq to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he was then taken in a bus to a safe house, referred to as Dar el Aman in Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he stayed there for one week and then went to Omar Saif Center in Bagram, Afghanistan where he stayed for one week.

16. An al Qaida member stated that the Dar al Iman was a guest house for non-Afghan nationals in Kabul, Afghanistan.

17. A source stated that Umar al Saif was a Taliban center located on the outskirts of Kabul, Afghanistan.

### b. Training

1. The detainee stated he trained for two weeks at al Farouq, receiving basic weapons training, including familiarization training on the Kalashnikov rifle, RPK machine gun and Semenov rifle.

2. The detainee stated he trained for about six weeks at Malik Center, located outside Kabul, Afghanistan, and finished his training just prior to Ramadan in November 2000. The detainee stated he was trained on the following weapons at Malek Center: Makarov pistol, referred to by the detainee as Abu Nigma, Dragonov sniper rifle, PK machine gun, rocket propelled grenade, and hand grenades. The detainee stated he was also taught how to read a map.

3. The detainee stated that during his second tour at al Farouq he trained for about one month receiving advanced infantry training.

4. A source stated that the detainee was a trainee in the Khalden instruction program that he attended.

5. A source stated that the Khaldan Camp was located in Khowst, Afghanistan.

6. A source stated that the detainee attended the Jihad-Wal training course. The source stated that the Jihad-Wal training camp was near Khowst, Afghanistan, and that his Jihad-Wal training program lasted about two months and concentrated on shooting and self-defense tactics and skills.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that he was told the route to Afghanistan by three people.

2. The detainee stated he was assisted in travel to Afghanistan by two people. The detainee stated that one of them arranged his visa and provided him with a plane ticket and 500 Saudi Riyals.

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MARWALA, BASHIR NASIR ALI

3. The detainee stated that a support network of fellow Arabs facilitated their departure from Afghanistan and their transit through Pakistan en route to their final destination.

4. The detainee stated that a smuggler helped him from Pakistan into Afghanistan on his second trip to Afghanistan.

5. The detainee stated that he knew a man who had fought in Bosnia and who prepared people to fight in the Mujahedin. The detainee stated that he believes that this person is under arrest in connection with the USS Cole bombing.

6. The detainee stated a person he met at the Malik Center arranged for his visa and gave him a plane ticket and 200 United States dollars to travel to Afghanistan as second time.

7. The detainee stated that about two weeks before 11 September 2001 the al Farouq Camp was visited by Usama bin Laden.

8. The detainee stated that the person in charge of the Dar al Aman guest house, which he stayed in for a week, was also the commander of the frontlines in the Bagram, Afghanistan area.

9. An al Qaida member positively identified the detainee as one of the Sonia Apartment raid detainees and claimed he knew the detainee for approximately six months.

10. The detainee stated that he was arrested in a residence with a man who was the younger brother of a senior al Qaida operative.

11. A source stated he knew the detainee from their time at a safe house, and that the detainee only stayed at the house for approximately 10 to 15 days prior to their arrest. The source stated that another person brought the detainee to stay because there were no other places available that were safe to house him until the detainee's travel documents were available. The source stated that the detainee had stayed with the other person prior to moving to the source's safe house.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he borrowed money from his family with a promise to pay them back. The detainee told his family he was going to Saudi Arabia to look for a job but did not tell them he was going to Afghanistan because he knew they would not approve of his plans.

2. The detainee stated they stayed in Zurmutt, Afghanistan for one week, where they dropped off their weapons and got out of Afghanistan through Brumal Wazirestan, Afghanistan on mini buses.

## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MARWALA, BASHIR NASIR ALI

3. The will of the detainee, given before a suicide operation, says goodbye to his family and friends and leaves them instructions and words of advice and the detainee makes arrangements to pay his debts.

4. The detainee stated he stayed in about six other locations in Karachi, Pakistan before he was captured in an apartment during a raid on 11 September 2002 in the Defense Housing Area.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

b. The detainee stated he has never volunteered for a martyrdom mission.

c. The detainee stated that while at Omar Saif Center in Bagram, Afghanistan for one week, he did not fire his weapon.

d. The detainee stated he never went to the front lines but did stay in the rear near Bagram, Afghanistan.

e. The detainee stated he was not a criminal, nor a terrorist and insisted that he knew within himself that he had committed no crimes and had killed no one.

f. The detainee stated he does not know why he was imprisoned, that he had not committed any crimes and that he had just been trying to get home.

g. The detainee stated that he regrets ever going to Afghanistan and that it was a stupid decision.

h. The detainee stated he has no allegiance to Usama bin Laden or al Qaida.

i. The detainee stated he was sorry he got involved in Afghanistan, that he did not want to go back to al Qaida and that he did not want anything to do with them.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

24 October 2006

To: BA ZAHIR, SHAWQI AWAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BA ZAHIR, SHAWQI AWAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he was recruited to join the jihad in April 2001.
2. The detainee left for Afghanistan around April or May of 2001.
3. The detainee stated he had gone to Afghanistan for jihad in the summer of 2001.
4. The detainee decided to go to Afghanistan because of a video he saw on television about Chechnya. He was also concerned about the Palestinian struggle for independence.
5. The detainee traveled to Afghanistan to train at al Farouq.
6. The detainee was given 20,000 Yemeni Rials to pay for a passport.
7. The detainee gave his passport to an individual. The passport and identification card were then given to another individual who gave the detainee 500 Saudi Rials and arranged for his travel visa and plane ticket.
8. On 6 June 2001, the detainee was on his way to Karachi, Pakistan via Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
9. The detainee departed Yemen with three other Yemenis and flew from Sana, Yemen to Dubai, United Arab Emirates to Karachi, Pakistan.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BA ZAHIR, SHAWQI AWAD

10. On 9 June 2001, the detainee traveled by bus to Quetta, Pakistan, where he stayed for one day at the Daftar Taliban Guest House.
11. The detainee was smuggled across the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and then traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan.
12. The detainee arrived in Kandahar, Afghanistan and checked into the admission center for al Farouq.
13. In Kandahar, Afghanistan the detainee stayed at the al Nebras Guest House for roughly one week before training at al Farouq.
14. The Nebras Guest House was the place where new students attending al Farouq Training Camp gathered before deploying via bus to al Farouq for basic training.
15. Prior to entering the training camp, the detainee turned in his passport and valuables to an individual.
16. After completing his training, the detainee went back to Kandahar, Afghanistan and stayed at a guest house for about two weeks prior to returning for training.
17. After training, the detainee went to Kabul, Afghanistan. The detainee stayed at a guest house for four to five days, then traveled to the Said Center at the Bagram line for two days and then on to the front line in Bagram.
18. The detainee was sent to the front lines. He stopped at the Malik Military Center for one night and continued on.
19. The detainee returned to Kandahar, Afghanistan for training but it was interrupted by the 11 September events. The detainee then returned to a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan until he and other Mujahedin eventually were ordered to scatter and hide in the mountainous areas near Khowst, Afghanistan.
20. The detainee stated he went with a group of about 20 individuals from Kabul to Jalalabad to Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee stayed in Khowst, Afghanistan area for approximately six weeks.
21. A group of fighters, including the detainee, fled from Kabul, Afghanistan to Jalalabad, Afghanistan, from Jalalabad to Khowst, Afghanistan, from Khowst to Kandahar, Afghanistan, and from Kandahar to a valley near Zormott, Afghanistan.
22. The detainee stated he arrived at a safe house about one month prior to his arrest.

#### b. Training

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### SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BA ZAHIR, SHAWQI AWAD

1. The detainee trained at al Farouq for about 2 months, during the summer of 2001. Sometime during this initial training, the detainee stated, Usama bin Laden, visited the camp and gave a speech to encourage the trainees.
2. While at the al Farouq Training Camp, the detainee received training on the Kalashnikov, Uzi, PK machine gun, pistol, rocket propelled grenade, RPK rifle, dynamite, and hand grenades.
3. The second training period the detainee received, while at al Farouq, was for one month. He trained on the 82 mm mortar, 75 mm mortar and SBG9. After completing training, the detainee went to the front line in Bagram.
4. The detainee left the front line of Bagram to receive more training at al Farouq on infantry tactics for about three months.
5. The detainee also received topography, light weapons and physical education training while attending al Farouq.

#### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated on two occasions that Usama bin Laden visited the al Farouq Training Camp, once in June 2001 and again in August 2001.
2. During the detainee's period of training at al Farouq, the detainee stated that Usama bin Laden, accompanied by Abu Hafs al Mauritan and another al Qaida operative came to the camp on two separate occasions and gave speeches.

#### d Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was identified as a Yemeni al Qaida member.
2. After the coalition bombing campaign began, the detainee fled to Pakistan. The detainee was moved through multiple al Qaida associated safe houses in Pakistan and Iran before he was captured in a raid on an apartment complex in Karachi on 11 September 2002.
3. The detainee was one of six men who were arrested by Foreign Government Authorities in Karachi, Pakistan.
4. The detainee was one of the al Qaida members detained by Foreign Government following a fire at an apartment in Karachi Pakistan, on 11 September 2002.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF BA ZAHIR, SHAWQI AWAD**

5. The detainee and other personnel arrested at the apartments on 11 September 2002 were heavily armed and part of a special terrorist team deployed to attack targets in Karachi, Pakistan.
  6. A source stated that the personnel in the apartment were armed with rifles and hand grenades, which they proceeded to fire and throw at the Foreign Government when the officials were approaching the safe house.
  7. A computer acquired during the detainee's arrest on 11 September 2002 contained a flight simulator and flight navigation maps of United States military facilities and the layout of the exterior and interior views of various United States Navy ships.
  8. The detainee stated he fabricated material and has admitted to lying during interrogations.
  9. The detainee did not deny that he had gave incomplete information on past interrogations.
  10. The detainee stated he hates Americans because he feels he is being detained unjustly.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
- a. The detainee stated that he was not involved in armed resistance to the Foreign Government who attempted to arrest the group of Arabs living on the apartment. The detainee also stated that he was one of six men who lived in the apartments in Karachi, Pakistan.
  - b. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on September 11, 2001 and also has denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or their interests. The detainee was also queried regarding any knowledge or planning of internal uprisings at the Guantanamo detention facility, with negative results.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

9 November 2006

TO: AL MUDWANI, MUSAB OMAR ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUDWANI, MUSAB OMAR ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was recruited to go to Afghanistan in his hometown of al Hudaida, Yemen.
2. The detainee stated he wanted the opportunity to train in Afghanistan because it was his duty as a Muslim to be trained.
3. The detainee gave one of the recruiters his passport in order to get a visa for Pakistan.
4. The detainee left for Pakistan from Yemen in July, 2001. The detainee flew to Karachi, Pakistan and was then taken to a guest house in Karachi.
5. The detainee traveled to Quetta, Pakistan where he stayed at a Taliban guest house briefly, and was then taken across the border to a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
6. This guest house was used by fighters heading to the al Farouq Training Camp and used by Usama bin Laden.
7. The detainee traveled to al Farouq Training Camp and trained for 25 days until the camp closed due to U.S. bombing.

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ISN 839

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUDWANI, MUSAB OMAR ALI**

8. After the camp closed due to U.S. bombing, the detainee left al Farouq and went to Kabul, Afghanistan with a group of 25 others from al Farouq. When they arrived in Kabul, they were told to go to Khowst, Afghanistan because it was safer there. The detainee spent two and one half months in Khowst and then returned to Kabul three days before the city fell.

9. From Kabul, Afghanistan the detainee fled and crossed over the border to Lahore, Pakistan, then traveled to Karachi, Pakistan where he was hidden in several places. When things got dangerous in Karachi, he then left with a group of people to Chabehar, Iran.

10. While the detainee was en route to Yemen via Chabehar, Iran, he was detained and questioned by Iranian police at a roadside checkpoint. The detainee claims he was beaten. The detainee claims he did not speak throughout the encounter with the Iranian police because he had been instructed not to reveal that he was an Arab.

11. The detainee was in Chabehar, Iran for two weeks, but left because he was told the Iranian government was arresting Arabs. The detainee then traveled back to Quetta, Pakistan, onto Lahore, Pakistan and eventually, Karachi, Pakistan, where he stayed until his arrest on 11 September 2002.

### b. Training

1. The detainee was at the al Farouq Training Camp until 11 September 2001, when the trainee's were informed of the attacks on the United States and transported to a guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee had no intentions of fighting in Afghanistan, he just wanted to be trained. The detainee felt he needed military training and used the Yemeni Civil War and Communist influence as reasons he desired this training.

3. While at al Farouq Training Camp, the detainee received training on the assembly, disassembly, loading and cleaning of the Kalashnikov rifle. Additionally, the detainee received training on the Rocket Propelled Grenade, the machine gun and camouflage.

4. A source identified the detainee as having taken part in explosive training.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed at a guest house in Afghanistan where Usama bin Laden would come to greet fighters before they went to training.

2. A known al Qaida member, Hamza al Zubair, lived in the apartment across the hall from the detainee. Hamza al Zubair would visit the detainee and other men in the apartment. Another man who lived with Hamza al Zubair would bring the detainee and others in the apartment food and clothing.

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## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUDWANI, MUSAB OMAR ALI**

3. Hamza al Zubair was described by a source as being an important al Qaida member. Al Zubair had spent the past 12 years in Afghanistan and was an instructor at al Farouq Training Camp.

4. The detainee stated he saw Usama bin Laden once at al Farouq where he gave a lecture on the war with Russia, and twice in Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he saw Usama bin Laden on three other occasions giving lectures or answering questions.

5. The detainee stated he was present at a religious speech being given by a senior al Qaida member to al Qaida operatives. This took place in late September 2001 at a farm in Khowst Province, Afghanistan.

6. The detainee stated that while staying at the guest house in Karachi, Pakistan, he and others from al Farouq were instructed to seek the assistance of someone who was a known al Qaida member, in matters related to their return to Yemen and other support issues.

7. During the detainee's stay at the apartment where he was arrested, a known al Qaida member would visit from time to time. This individual would take or leave behind weapons and equipment in a common room inside the detainee's apartment. Additionally, he would bring money to the detainee and could provide visas and passports for travel. This al Qaida member told the detainee and others to leave Karachi, Pakistan and go to Iran because it was safer.

8. While detainee was fleeing Afghanistan, he stayed at a school in the vicinity of Barmal, Afghanistan, where a senior al Qaida operative was working.

#### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was taken into custody on the morning of 11 September 2002, at his apartment, during a raid by the Pakistani Police.

2. The detainee stated that in the apartment where he was arrested, there were two or three grenades, one Kalashnikov rifle and two pistols kept in a small suitcase in a common room. The detainee stated that on the morning of the raid by Pakistani Police, 11 September 2002, there were several explosions, grenades, tear gas and semi-automatic gunfire.

3. A laptop seized during the raid on 11 September 2002 in Karachi, Pakistan, contained flight navigation maps and a flight simulator. It also contained several files that discussed kidnapping, hijacking, smuggling money, weapons, ammunition and lectures and essays on terrorist training, executions, assassinations, gorilla warfare and United States Special Operations Forces. Also found were al Qaida documents about artillery and different types of mortars.

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MUDWANI, MUSAB OMAR ALI**

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee expressed some anger about sheikhs who issue fatwas, then recant. The detainee stated that clerics make you believe you will burn in hell if you do not participate in fatwas and jihad.

b. The detainee emphatically denied he trained on explosives. The detainee insisted that whoever claimed that he had explosives training is either lying or mistook his identity.

c. When detainee was confronted with the fact that high level al Qaida members had identified him and the others he was arrested with as having been cell members involved in terrorist plots against the United States, the detainee stated that whoever made those statements is lying so that they can point blame away from themselves.

d. When the detainee was confronted with the fact that a high level al Qaida member had identified his group in a letter as being part of a terrorist plot, the detainee stated that he did not believe such a letter existed.

e. The detainee stated he never used the computer that was seized during the 11 September 2002 raid and he did not know what else was on it.

f. The detainee stated he had no information regarding imminent terrorist attacks worldwide.

g. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 October 2006

TO: AL MAYTHAL, HAIL AZIZ AHMAD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MAYTHAL, HAIL AZIZ AHMAD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee stated he traveled from Sanaa, Yemen to Karachi, Pakistan and his travel was arranged in Yemen by another person.
    2. The detainee stated that while in Quetta, Pakistan he stayed for approximately 15 days at the Daftar al Taliban Guest House.
    3. The detainee stated that in Kandahar, Afghanistan he spent about ten days at a guest house located in the Haji Habash area of Kandahar near an Islamic Institute.
    4. The detainee stated he turned in his passport, money and possessions to the administrators at the guest house in the Haji Habash area of Kandahar, Afghanistan.
    5. The detainee stated he traveled to Kabul, Afghanistan in late February or early March 2001 and resided at the Number Ten Guest House and was encouraged to join the fight with the Taliban.
    6. The detainee stated he was sent to the front lines of the fighting between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance and was there for about two months.
    7. The detainee stated he served as a guard for about 25 days at the Kandahar Airport Compound in Afghanistan.

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000845

ISN 840

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MAYTHAL, HAIL AZIZ AHMAD**

8. The detainee stated he fled after the fall of Kandahar, Afghanistan in November 2001, to Loghar Province, Afghanistan, then onward to Khowst Province, Afghanistan to Gardez, Afghanistan and Zormat, Afghanistan and finally into Pakistan.

9. The detainee stated that after fleeing Afghanistan he traveled and moved through a set of three different safe houses in Lahore, Pakistan for a one month period.

10. The detainee stated he was ordered to travel to Quetta, Pakistan in preparation for onward travel to Iran due to the unstable security situation in Pakistan.

11. The detainee stated he fled from Pakistan to Iran but was forced back to Pakistan because of pressure from the Iranian Police.

12. A source stated the detainee and four other individuals were taken into custody on 11 September 2002 and were reportedly part of a special terrorist team deployed to attack targets in Karachi, Pakistan. The team resisted for two and a half hours during which those detained threw four hand grenades, fired hundreds of rounds and wounded several of the Pakistani forces before the five were detained.

## b. Training

1. The detainee stated he received basic training at al Farouq in Afghanistan in December 2000 and learned how to use an AK-47, rocket propelled grenade, PK and Makarov pistol. Additionally he was taught how to dig trenches, escape and evade, use disguise, orienteer and read map features.

2. The detainee stated he returned to the al Farouq Camp in Afghanistan for the tactical course.

3. The detainee stated that during advanced training at al Farouq in Afghanistan, he learned how to be more independent in the field and perform reconnaissance.

4. The detainee stated he received additional light weapons training at the Malik Center outside Kabul, Afghanistan.

5. The detainee stated he received two weeks of refresher weapons training at Kandahar Airport in Afghanistan.

6. The detainee stated he took a security course at the Kandahar Airport in Afghanistan and was trained in personal security, survival skills, how to obtain a passport without drawing attention to yourself and how to get through customs by having knowledge of local hotels and attractions.



# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MAYTHAL, HAIL AZIZ AHMAD**

7. The detainee changed his story to say that he never participated in security training at the Kandahar Airport in Afghanistan. The detainee claims he made up his involvement in the course because he was forced to tell interrogators something after his capture in Pakistan.

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated his travel was facilitated in Pakistan by a man who he met upon arrival in Karachi, Pakistan.

2. The detainee stated he stayed in the Madalfa Guest House prior to attending advanced training at al Farouq in Afghanistan.

3. The detainee stated he saw and heard Usama bin Laden lecture on three separate occasions while he was at al Farouq in Afghanistan.

4. The detainee changed his story to say that he never saw Usama bin Laden while the detainee was at al Farouq in Afghanistan. The detainee stated that he was pressured into saying that he had seen Usama bin Laden at al Farouq by interrogators in Pakistan.

5. The detainee stated he returned in April 2001 to Kandahar, Afghanistan where he retrieved his passport from a Saudi national who was in charge of arranging travel documents and itineraries for al Qaida operatives in Kandahar.

6. The detainee stated he stayed with a group of Yemenis at the Number Ten Guest House following the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001.

7. A source stated the Number Ten Safe House is also known as the Ashara Guest House that was used by people going back and forth from the front lines.

8. A source stated the Ashara safe house was in Kabul, Afghanistan and was owned and operated by al Qaida.

## d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee claimed everyone staying at a guest house in Kabul, Afghanistan had an AK-47 and that some people had rocket propelled grenades, grenades and PKs.

2. The detainee was arrested at a terrorist safe house in Karachi, Pakistan where two laptop hard drives were acquired with files of flight navigation maps of various locations in the United States, images of the United States Navy ships, manual on kidnapping, smuggling, lectures on terrorist training, a 63-page al Qaida document about artillery and mortars and numerous documents on Mujahideen training techniques.

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL MAYTHAL, HAIL AZIZ AHMAD**

3. The detainee admitted the house where he was apprehended was an al Qaida house.
4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
  - a. The detainee claims he never became a member of al Qaida even though he attended al Farouq Training Camp in Afghanistan.
  - b. The detainee claims he was in Karachi, Pakistan waiting for assistance in traveling back to his country and was being hidden in the apartment to avoid arrest by Pakistani authorities.
  - c. The detainee claims he was not involved in hostile action in the firefight during the raid on 11 September 2002 by Pakistani authorities on the apartment in Karachi, Pakistan where he was living.
  - d. The detainee denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 and also denied having knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

20 October 2006

TO: SAID, SAID SALIH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SA ID, SALIH SAID

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he was recruited by his neighbor to travel to Afghanistan for basic training, and that his neighbor paid for the detainee's travel to Afghanistan.

2. The detainee stated that he was present and was very inspired by a speech that Usama bin Laden gave at al Farouq Training Camp.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he was at the al Farouq Camp from July 2001 until September 2001.

2. The detainee stated he was trained at the al Farouq Camp to use the Kalashnikov rifle, rocket propelled grenades, hand grenades, land mines, Composition-3 and Composition-4 explosives.

3. The detainee stated he received weapons training, including the Kalashnikov, pistol, and grenades, and that he also received training in reading maps at the al Farouq Camp. The detainee stated he was shown dynamite, but was not trained in the use of any explosives.

c. Connections/Associations

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ISN 841

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, SALIH SAID**

1. The detainee stated he stayed in a Taliban guest house in Quetta, Pakistan, and the Nebras Guest House in Kandahar, Afghanistan, on the detainee's way to the al Farouq Training Camp.

2. A source identified the person who recruited the detainee as a Yemeni jihadist in Afghanistan.

3. The detainee stated he saw Usama bin Laden on two occasions at al Farouq. The detainee stated that in August 2001, Usama bin Laden gave a speech and talked about jihad, fighting America, possible attacks on America, the USS Cole, and the embassies in Africa.

4. The detainee stated that after he completed his training at the al Farouq Camp, he returned to the guest house in Kandahar, Afghanistan, for approximately one week.

5. The detainee stated that after the 11 September 2001 attacks on America, he was issued a Kalashnikov rifle and told by al Qaida members to guard the Kandahar, Afghanistan airport.

6. The detainee stated he stayed at the airport in Kandahar, Afghanistan, until 3 December 2001, when the Taliban took over the guard positions.

7. The detainee stated he guarded a big, one-story building next to the airport in Kandahar, Afghanistan, which belonged to Usama bin Laden.

8. The detainee stated he knew the group leader of about ten people at the airport area in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where the detainee was a guard from September 2001 until November 2001.

9. The person who the detainee knew as the group leader at the airport area in Kandahar, Afghanistan, was a veteran Afghan fighter who was the head of the Kabul, Afghanistan, guest house named Khan Ghulam Bashah, and took charge of the Northern Front in Kabul in 2000.

10. The detainee stated that after withdrawing from the airport in Kandahar, Afghanistan, he traveled to a valley between Zurmut and Khost, Afghanistan, where he stayed in the caves for a period of approximately ten days, during which time food was provided by the Taliban.

11. The detainee stated that once he was back in Karachi, Pakistan, after leaving the airport in Kandahar, Afghanistan, he moved into a house with an individual whom the detainee believed was a member of al Qaida.

12. The detainee stated he saw a senior al Qaida operative on two separate occasions. The detainee first saw the senior al Qaida operative at an apartment where the detainee was staying and the next time was when the detainee traveled to another person's house in Karachi, Pakistan, to acquire money for travel from the al Qaida operative.

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SAID, SALIH SAID**

13. The detainee stated that the al Qaida operative gave him 1,000 United States Dollars for travel expenses to return to Yemen.

d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee stated that the airport south of Kandahar, Afghanistan, was not in use at the time he was guarding it; the purpose for guarding the airport was to prevent the United States from using it.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

- a. The detainee stated he would not harm an American if he happened to see one in Yemen.
- b. The detainee stated he would never kill innocent women and children in the United States because it is against his religion, and that those who kill innocents should be killed.
- c. The detainee denied having any prior knowledge of the 11 September 2001 attacks on America.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

28 September 2006

TO: NASRULLAH, FNU

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASRULLAH, FNU

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee is identified as joining a 40-man group after the end of the Taliban regime.

2. A source identified the detainee as part of the 40-man unit. The detainee reports to his cousin who is a sub-commander in the 40-man unit. The 40-man unit is an organization supported by al Qaida.

b. Training

The detainee received training on the Kalashnikov rifle and a pistol while he was at Mazar-e-Sharif.

c. Connections/Associations

The detainee is identified as having been a member of the Taliban four years before the United States attacked Afghanistan.

d. Intent

The detainee told another individual that when he got back to Afghanistan he would get even with the interviewers.

e. Other Relevant Data

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UNCLASSIFIED

000852

ISN 886

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF NASRULLAH, FNU**

1. The detainee was conscripted into the Taliban around 1997 or 1998 where he worked for approximately 60 days as a clerk and a guard.

2. The detainee claimed that he was a tailor and was conscripted into the Taliban for only two months.

3. The detainee told another individual that he lied to his interviewers and actually did fight for the Taliban against United States forces while at Mazar-e-Sharif.

4. The detainee told another individual he was part of the uprising at the compound that was surrounded by United States and Northern Alliance Forces and later used as a prison.

5. The detainee told another individual he retreated with Taliban forces to the compound and he was able to escape with approximately 80 others after the uprising.

6. The detainee was captured delivering a letter to a former Taliban Brigade Commander. The letter was from a high-ranking Taliban Commander who requested the Brigade Commander to report to Quetta, Pakistan to fight and avoid capture by the Americans.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied being involved with any extremist groups.

b. The detainee denied knowledge of a 40-man unit, that weapons were found at his home, or that he had any further association with the Taliban other than the two months he was a conscript.

c. The detainee denied that he had ever heard of Jamat-al-Islamia or al Qaida. The detainee also stated that he had never heard of the al Farouq Training Camp.

d. The detainee stated he was a soldier and did not know the political or military issues.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000853

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

15 September 2006

TO: ESMATULLAH, (FIRST NAME UNKNOWN)

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ESMATULLAH, (FNU)

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he received advice that he should visit a Taliban Commander and ask him for a letter stating that the detainee worked for him. The detainee received the letter but, in exchange, the detainee had to serve as a reservist in the Taliban Military. The detainee stated he was required to serve three or four rotations.

2. The detainee stated that during his approximate one year with the Taliban, he was part of the 40-man team that served on the front line against the Northern Alliance.

3. The detainee stated he was a Taliban soldier but not a commander, or anyone in charge.

4. The detainee admits to delivering a letter to a Taliban leader in Afghanistan. The detainee stated the Taliban leader read the letter, tore it up and threw it on the ground. The detainee retrieved the letter and threw it in the river.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated that his team carried Kalashnikov AK-47 rifles. The detainee stated that the Taliban taught them how to use the weapons in Dara Sufe, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee has been identified as knowing how to use rockets, heavy machine guns, rifles, and being a good driver.

DMO Exhibit 1  
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000854

ISN 888



# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ESMATULLAH, (FNU)**

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee has been identified as being affiliated with an Egyptian terrorist who was involved in the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat.

2. The detainee has also been identified as being affiliated with a member of Hezb-E-Islami and al Qaida. The member gave instruction on interrogation resistance tactics, was involved in a terrorist training camp near Kandahar, Afghanistan, and was directly involved in assassination attempts. The member was also high in the al Qaida hierarchy and acted as a smuggler and facilitator.

3. The detainee stated he joined the Taliban because he wanted the same rights as the others who lived in that location.

## d. Other Relevant Data

1. A source stated the detainee was tasked to deliver four letters to an individual from high level Taliban leaders in hiding. Three of the letters were of high importance. The fourth letter was not that important and was a simple invitation for the individual to visit with him in Quetta, Pakistan. The source stated that the detainee told him that he read the three important letters and destroyed them before he met with the individual. The sourced stated only the last letter was given to the Taliban leader.

2. The detainee has been identified as being a member of the Taliban for six years and had been a member of the unit since its creation in 2001.

3. A source stated he saw the detainee in a white taxi that the detainee was using for official Taliban travel for transporting Taliban personnel.

4. A source stated the detainee was a Taliban Commander and was issued a station wagon by the Taliban. The source stated the detainee had a pistol and an AK-47 rifle in the car when approached by United States Forces. The detainee managed to throw the pistol out of the car before he was captured, but still had the AK-47 rifle when caught. The source stated the detainee, along with five others, were backed by al Qaida and fought against United States Forces.

5. A source stated the detainee had a satellite telephone to stay in contact with other unit commanders.

6. The detainee was arrested by local authorities outside the Chinartoo, Afghanistan.

7. The detainee has been identified as being part of Usama bin Laden's main security escort detail assisting Usama bin Laden out of Afghanistan to Pakistan.

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ESMATULLAH, (FNU)**

8. A source stated that the detainee had planned to kidnap the Urozgan Province Governor's son in exchange for releasing prisoners in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee also talked about killing the governor by bombing his office.

9. A source stated that the detainee primarily operated against the United States personnel in three different areas of Afghanistan. The intent was to bomb or strike soft targets using AK-47s.

10. A source stated the detainee told other detainees not to provide any information during interrogations.

11. The detainee stated he was never asked to be a courier, was not aware of any training, and did not remember specific people or messages sent. The detainee stated he never received any training in covert message coverage and never knew any spies.

12. The detainee denied ever having a satellite phone and driving a Taliban vehicle.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied being part of a team that escorted Usama bin Laden out of Afghanistan and knowing anything about Usama bin Laden.

b. The detainee carried a Kalashnikov AK-47 but stated that he never engaged in physical fighting against the Northern Alliance.

c. The detainee denied having any knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks in the United States or United States interests.

d. The detainee maintains he has been honest with his interrogators since his initial capture.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

20 November 2006

TO: SANGARYAR, RAHMATULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SANGARYAR, RAHMATULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he was the Supreme Commander in Kabul, Afghanistan when he fought the Russians. After he finished fighting the Russians he also fought against the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. The detainee stated he was Kabul's defender during the civil war in Afghanistan and that he was not allied with any particular group. The detainee stated he simply defended Kabul's interests against any group that attacked it and he had shifting alliances with the Northern Alliance and the Taliban.

2. As of November 1999, the detainee was on the senior staff in the Taliban's Ministry of Defense as the Commander of the Tagab, Kabul Province front-line division in Afghanistan.

3. The detainee was the Taliban's National Guard Commander and was one of the Taliban commanders who deployed to the frontlines in June 2000 to supplement existing Taliban forces readying to participate in a summer offensive against the United Front in Afghanistan.

4. The detainee became the director of Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin cell operations in Kandahar, Afghanistan in November 2002.

5. Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin is described as a foreign terrorist organization that was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets, has long-established ties with bin Laden, and has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration, and establish a fundamentalist state.

DMO Exhibit 1  
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UNCLASSIFIED

000857

ISN 890

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SANGARYAR, RAHMATULLAH**

6. The detainee was the Taliban Commander of the Tagab and Nejrab Divisions with an estimated 1,500 soldiers including six Arab posts along the line through the Tagab and Nejrab District in Afghanistan.

7. A source stated the detainee was once a Taliban leader but became a soldier in the 40-Man unit. The source stated the detainee primarily operated against United States personnel in the Urozgan Province, Lashkar Gah, and Helmand in Afghanistan. The source stated the intent was to bomb or strike soft targets, primarily using AK-47s.

8. The detainee was a Taliban commander of over 500 Taliban soldiers in Kabul, Afghanistan.

### b. Training

The detainee stated he joined the Mujahedin to fight the Soviet Union when he was very young and was trained in the use of hand grenades, rocket propelled grenades, AK-47, and machine gun.

### c. Connections/Associations

The detainee stated he met the Supreme Leader of the Taliban in Kandahar, Afghanistan in approximately 1997 when the Taliban began organizing.

### d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was one of the Taliban military commanders involved with the Taliban deputy leader in the coup planning against the Taliban leader.

2. The detainee was planning biological and poison attacks on United States and Coalition forces in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee was in possession of anthrax powder and an unspecified liquid poison that he planned to distribute to al Qaida and Taliban operatives in preparation for future attacks on United States and Coalition forces. The poison attacks were to target water sources, to include reservoirs.

3. The detainee stated a letter inviting and requesting him to travel to Quetta, Pakistan, was delivered to him to create a bad name for him in his province so he would get arrested.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated when he received a letter he believed was a request to come to Pakistan and fight the new government of Afghanistan. The detainee stated he had no intention of doing so.

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF SANGARYAR, RAHMATULLAH**

b. When detainee was captured, he turned over a signed receipt, by the district counsel members and the commission, listing the weapons he had turned in to the Governor of the Oruzgan Province in Afghanistan. The following weapons had been turned in: six small cars, one truck, two mounted anti-aircraft weapons, 39 Kalashnikovs, two RPG-7s, four PK', 2 82-series machine guns, and six radios.

c. The detainee stated he was told by a governor that he needed to provide information about enemies of the Afghanistan government and that he was then turned over to the United States. The detainee stated he knows he must cooperate, and he is not upset at the United States government.

d. The detainee stated he was innocent of any wrongdoing and that he was handed over to the United States government to provide intelligence information and not for suspicion of being a terrorist.

e. The detainee stated he led many troops before the United States arrived in Afghanistan. The detainee turned over all his weapons to the United States and a governor, dismissed his troops, and sent them home. After turning in his weapons and dismissing his troops, the governor told the detainee to go home and to report any attempts to recruit him. The detainee reported to the government the letter he received requesting he come to Pakistan and fight the new government of Afghanistan.

f. The detainee stated that if he were released he would go home to Uruszza District of Afghanistan and work as a laborer.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

000859

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 January 2006

To: AL HAMI, RAFIQ BIN BASHIR BIN JALUD

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAMI, RAFIQ BIN BASHIR BIN  
JALUD

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee traveled from Tunis, Tunisia, to Frankfurt, Germany using a Tunisian passport with his true name. Once in Germany, the detainee applied for asylum by using the name Ayman Bin Nasro.

2. In late 1999, while in Frankfurt, Germany, the detainee used documentation in the name of Aiman Ben Nasru. The detainee claimed he was born on 20 December 1979 and his nationality was Libyan. The nationality and date of birth were false.

3. The detainee earned money or a commission by arranging for Germans, French and other nationalities to meet with Arabs who were selling drugs.

4. The detainee was arrested more than 50 times by the German Polizei, but never charged because he never carried drugs on his person.

5. The detainee attended a Turkish mosque in Frankfurt, Germany. The detainee met an Algerian at the mosque who suggested the detainee go to Pakistan in order to get his life straight.

6. The Algerian contact at the Turkish mosque put the detainee in touch with a different Algerian who provided the detainee with a fraudulent Italian passport and tourist visa for his travel to Pakistan.

UNCLASSIFIED

DMO Exhibit \_\_\_\_\_  
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000860

ISN 892

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAMI, RAFIQ BIN BASHIR BIN JALUD**

7. The detainee paid 200 German Marks for the Italian passport, which was under the name Marinelle Escalu. The detainee also purchased his own airline ticket with money he made from selling drugs.

8. The detainee traveled alone and did not have any trouble entering Pakistan with his false documents.

9. The detainee and another individual traveled from Islamabad, Pakistan to Peshawar, Pakistan, then to the border of Afghanistan. They dressed like Afghans and crossed the border into Afghanistan without having the guards check their identification.

10. From Khalden Camp, the detainee traveled to Kandahar, Afghanistan, to attend the Institute to study the Koran. The detainee stayed at the Institute for eight months studying.

11. The detainee traveled to Lahore, Pakistan, where he joined the Lashkar al Tayibah Organization.

12. During an interview in March 2002 the detainee reported that in January 2002 he traveled to Quetta, Pakistan and onward to Zahedan, Iran, for a religious trip sponsored by the Lashkar Organization. The Iranians subsequently arrested the detainee on 29 January 2002.

13. During an interview in February 2003 the detainee reported that he fled Pakistan because he was afraid he would be arrested after the attacks on America. The detainee traveled to Zahedan, Iran, using a guide. The Iranians stopped the detainee when he reached Zahedan and he was arrested because he did not have any identification.

### b. Training

1. During an interview in March 2002 the detainee reported that he attended Khalden camp in approximately December 2000. The detainee received light weapons training (Kalishnikov rifle, PK and rocket propelled grenades), along with combat training, for three months.

2. During an interview in March 2003 the detainee reported that he received light weapons training, heavy artillery and anti-aircraft weapons training from three separate instructors. The detainee stated he trained at Khalden camp for ten days.

### c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stayed with a Tunisian while in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. This man was a member of Al Nahdah, an extremist Islamic party in Tunisia.

UNCLASSIFIED

## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAMI, RAFIQ BIN BASHIR BIN JALUD**

2. The institute the detainee attended in Kandahar, Afghanistan was called the Shari'a Institute. The institute was closely associated with Usama Bin Laden and located near Usama Bin Laden's family residence.

3. The detainee was a former Usama Bin Laden bodyguard.

d. Other Relevant Data

1. During an interview in June 2004 the detainee clarified that he did not attend Khalden training camp. The detainee advised that all previous information he provided about training at the Khalden camp and weapons use is not true.

2. In January 2005 the detainee was questioned about his travel to Italy prior to his arrival in Germany. The detainee indicated he did not recall how he entered Italy from Tunisia and denied having a place to stay once he was in Italy. During further questioning about Italy the detainee refused to speak.

3. The detainee advised he will have a problem if he is returned to Tunisia. The Tunisian Government believes that anyone who went to Afghanistan went there to fight so they could come back to Tunisia and overthrow the government.

4. During an interview in July 2005 the detainee chanted during the entire interrogation and did not respond to the interrogator.

5. During an interview in September 2005 the detainee did not talk at all during the session and was uncooperative.

6. The detainee sees jihad as necessary only when non-Muslims attack Muslims and/or for defending a Muslim country from assault on their religion.

7. Per the detainee, the killing of innocent civilians is not allowed in the Muslim religion.

8. The detainee denied knowing of any extremist groups at Khalden camp. The detainee reported he is a normal guy with no extremist affiliations.

9. The detainee stated that the idea that al Qaida calls non-Muslims "infidels" is wrong. The detainee stated suicide bombers are not martyrs; they are just committing suicide, which is wrong.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee was encouraged to attend a religious training school in Pakistan. The detainee was not shown any training videos or provided with any written documents about the religious school, but was told that it would be a good way for him to recover from his drug use.

UNCLASSIFIED



## UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL HAMI, RAFIQ BIN BASHIR BIN JALUD**

b. When the detainee left Germany, he did not have any desire or thought of going to Afghanistan. The detainee was only going to Pakistan so he could study Islam.

c. The detainee never heard any discussion of jihad while attending the Islamic Law Institute in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

d. When the detainee heard that Muslims were involved in the aircraft flying into the World Trade Center in New York City, he was surprised that Muslims would be responsible for killing innocent people. The detainee had no previous knowledge that this incident would happen.

e. The detainee reported he is not al Qaida and does not know anyone who belongs to al Qaida.

f. The detainee denied going to Afghanistan in order to learn to fight and overthrow the Tunisian government.

g. The detainee has never belonged to any armed or fighting Tunisian or Algerian Islamic groups. The detainee has heard of the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, but he does not belong to it.

h. The detainee has never thought about harming the United States and stated that he never would. When the detainee heard about the 11 September 2001 attacks, it made him sad.

i. The detainee stated he never saw any propaganda videos about jihad. His intention was not to go to fight Americans or U.S. Allies, but to study the Koran.

j. The detainee stated he had no association with Usama Bin Laden and therefore, no opinion of the man. The detainee related any information pertaining to him being a bodyguard for Usama Bin Laden was false.

k. The detainee denied seeing Usama Bin Laden or other top al Qaida leaders when he was in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee denied that any of the people he had stayed with during his travels talked about jihad or future attacks.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

UNCLASSIFIED

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

23 June 2006

TO: AL BIHANI, TOLFIQ NASSAR AHMED

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BIHANI, TOLFIQ NASSAR AHMED

1. (U) An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. (U) The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. (U) The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. (U) Commitment
    1. The detainee stated that he was a member of Jamaat al Tabligh. He stated that he went on a tabligh, which is basically doing a dawa or going to mosques or small towns and answering questions about Islam or speaking in the mosques.
    2. Jamaat al Tabligh is a Pakistan based Islamic missionary organization used as a cover to mask travel and activities of terrorists, including members of al Qaida.
    3. The detainee stated that he traveled to Karachi, Pakistan by plane, stayed in Karachi for four to seven days in cheap hotels without associating with anyone. The detainee then traveled by bus to the Raywan Mosque in Lahore, Pakistan. The detainee stated that he paid for his plane ticket and travel expenses with his own money.
    4. The detainee stated that he stayed at the Raywan Mosque for approximately six months. He stated that he did not know how the mosque got its funding.
    5. The detainee stated that he began to hear rumors that the Americans were coming to Afghanistan and Pakistan to arrest all Arabs in retaliation for the attacks on 11 September 2001. He stated that he decided to escape to Pakistan and return to Yemen. The detainee stated that he took a train from Lahore, Pakistan to Quetta, Pakistan, then a bus to a border town and was then smuggled into Iran by walking across the border with a guide. The detainee stated that he was arrested by the Iranian Police in Zahedan, Iran for entering the country without a visa. He stated

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UNCLASSIFIED

000864

ISN 893

# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BIHANI, TOLFIQ NASSAR AHMED**

that he was in various prisons in Iran and Afghanistan, for approximately one year in total, before being transported to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

6. In March 2002, the detainee was one of fifteen al Qaida operatives transferred from Iranian custody to the government of Afghanistan. The government of Afghanistan then transferred ten of these individuals, including the detainee to the United States government.

7. Another source stated that he saw the detainee and two of his brothers at a guest house for jihadists in Qandahar, Afghanistan.

8. The detainee was identified as having gone to the front lines near Kabul, Afghanistan upon completion of his training.

9. The detainee was identified as an al Qaida operative.

## b. (U) Training

1. An individual stated that the detainee and one of his brothers received basic training and mortar training at al Farouq training camp in 2000.

2. The detainee received training on the use of SA-7 and ZSU-23 anti-aircraft weapons in a bunker on top of the Saber Mountains near Qandahar, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee received training on building improvised explosive devices (IEDs) utilizing tank shells, mortars, and land mines.

## c. (U) Connections/Associations

1. The detainee stated that one of his brothers fought jihad in Chechnya, was injured, and returned home to Yemen.

2. The same brother of the detainee is a self-confessed al Qaida member who was a member of the Usama bin Laden and Mujahedin facilitation network in Yemen. He fought in jihad in Tajikistan and Bosnia for five years and trained operatives on the fabrication and use of explosives, including remotely detonated explosives and explosive belts in Jalalabad, Afghanistan in order to conduct suicide operations against the United States Embassy and United States military bases in Yemen.

3. A senior al Qaida operative identified the same brother of the detainee as someone who regularly resupplied Chechen Mujahedin fighters with food and money during the final days of the late-2001 battle for Qandahar, Afghanistan.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BIHANI, TOLFIQ NASSAR AHMED**

4. A senior al Qaida operative stated that the detainee and several brothers fought with al Qaida during their final days in Afghanistan.

5. The detainee stated that a second brother went to Afghanistan, was captured, and is a detainee at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

6. The same second brother of the detainee was captured at Mazar al-Sharif and is described as a low ranking al Qaida rifleman.

7. The name of a third brother of the detainee was found on an application to attend Afghanistan-based military training camps.

8. Two of the detainee's brothers are in custody of a foreign government service. One of the brothers is described as a Yemen-based al Qaida connected facilitator, financier, operational planner, and explosives expert. The other brother is described as a Yemen-based al Qaida connected operative.

d. (U) Intent

The detainee stated that after being unjustly imprisoned all of this time by the Americans, once he is released he is going to go to Afghanistan, join the freedom fighters again, and kill Americans.

4. (U) The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he knows of the al Qaida terrorist network, but has never met or spoken to anyone belonging to al Qaida.

b. The detainee denied being associated with al Qaida or any other extremist group. He stated that he heard of the attacks on America on 11 September 2001 and vehemently disagrees with suicide and killing of innocents.

c. The detainee stated that he was not doing anything wrong when he was caught. He stated that he was captured, sold to other authorities that finally sold him to the United States.

d. The detainee stated that if he were released he would return to Yemen, where he has several family members and work in one of the family's stores.

5. (U) You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against

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REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL BIHANI, TOLFIQ NASSAR  
AHMED**

continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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**000867**

# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

29 April 2006

TO: KHAN, SHAWALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, SHAWALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee claims that the Taliban took him from his land and forced him to perform duties as a guard and general laborer.

2. The detainee was directed by a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) commander to carry out a terrorist operation targeted at United States military personnel located at Gecko Base, Kandahar, Afghanistan.

3. The detainee was identified trying to purchase two rockets through an intermediary source for an unknown reason.

4. The detainee has served as a communicator between cell members of a small Hezb-e-Islami, Gulbuddin (HIG) cell operating in Kandahar, Afghanistan. The detainee acted as a messenger between cell operatives and the facilitator and command element of that cell.

5. The detainee delivered a radio-controlled binary detonation device and two blasting caps to an operative working within his organization. The devices were to be used in conjunction with two mines, possibly Chinese-made Type-72 antitank mines. The intended use for the devices was to target American civilians or United States-led coalition military patrols.

6. The detainee was appointed by Hezb-e-Islami, Gulbuddin (HIG) leadership as a leader of a HIG propaganda group in the Chardehi district of Kabul, Afghanistan. The group planned to

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, SHAWALI**

incite the local populace in the area to stage demonstrations and protests against the Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan (TISA).

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee is a former facilitator for the Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) operations cell in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. In December 2002, a Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) terrorist cell entered the city of Kandahar, Afghanistan. This cell intended to target Americans with grenade attacks at various choke points around Kandahar. The detainee has been associated with the leader of this cell.

3. The detainee had a notebook at his home when he was captured that contained Arabic writing and pictures of Usama bin Laden.

c. Other Relevant Data

The detainee was captured by United States Forces from the Kandahar, Afghanistan area on 13 November 2002.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee states that the only time he shot the Taliban-supplied Kalashnikov rifle was for target practice.

b. The detainee claims that four men who worked for the governor of Kandahar, Afghanistan wrongfully arrested him. He states that they stopped him as he was preparing to leave his shop on his motorcycle.

c. The detainee claims that he's not a member of Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) and has no affiliations with the organization.

d. The detainee denies ever serving in al Qaida.

e. The detainee has stated that no one ever found anything on him or his brother that shows that they are guilty of anything.

f. The detainee has denied having any knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001.

g. The detainee has denied having knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, SHAWALI**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 October 2006

TO: KHAN, AMIR

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, AMIR

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he trained with the Hizb-1 Islami Gulbuddin for approximately one and a half days in Khowst, Afghanistan. The detainee trained with grenades.

2. The Hizb-1 Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. The Hizb-1 Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghanistan Transitional Administration and to establish a fundamentalist state.

3. A source stated he saw the detainee in a jihad Madrassas preparing to fight on the front lines.

4. The detainee stated he and an associate were ordered to position themselves near a mosque and wait for an American target to pass by. According to the detainee, as an American vehicle passed, the associate ordered the detainee to throw a grenade into the vehicle. The detainee further stated as he threw a grenade which exploded at the front passenger's feet, the associate fled the scene; while the detainee was caught by a local police officer.

5. The detainee stated he and an associate left a mosque and while on the street, the associate threw two grenades into a car.

6. The detainee stated although he was at the scene when an associate threw the grenade, he was innocent and not involved.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, AMIR**

7. The detainee stated originally he was not supposed to be the one to throw the grenade; the grenades were passed to him at the last minute.

8. According to the Afghanistan police who witnessed the attack, there was only one suspect involved.

9. According to a member of the Afghanistan National Security Council the detainee stated none of the people who trained him were around and he acted alone in the grenade incident. The detainee also stated he was trained to target Americans and the Afghanistan government. During the Afghanistan police interrogation, the detainee admitted to throwing the grenade at the two United States soldiers. The detainee spoke English and had approximately four grenades in his possession when he was arrested.

## b. Training

1. The detainee claimed he did not serve in any military army and never received any military or terrorist training.

2. The detainee claimed while he was in the caves of Afghanistan, he was trained on how to use AK-47's, rocket launchers, machine guns and hand grenades.

## c. Intent

1. The detainee stated an associate asked him if he would be willing to kill anyone, and the detainee said yes.

2. The detainee stated an associate approached him with an opportunity to make extra money in a job that would involve killing Americans.

3. When questioned by the police regarding the detainee's grenade attack against United States soldiers, the detainee stated he was proud of what he did and if he were let go he would do it again.

4. The detainee made a written confession to this attack, signed it and marked it with his fingerprint.

## d. Other Relevant Data

The detainee claimed to have some knowledge of the attacks in the United States prior to their execution on 11 September 2001 but denied knowledge of any rumors or plans of future attacks on the United States or United States interests.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF KHAN, AMIR**

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he had no prior knowledge of the attacks on 11 September 2001 in the United States and he has no knowledge of future attacks against the United States citizens.

b. The detainee stated he never fought with the Taliban.

c. When the detainee was asked how he went from a job of clearing mines to involvement in a grenade attack on United States military soldiers, the detainee said he was tricked.

d. The detainee claims that he could not recall any of the specifics regarding his involvement during the grenade attack. The detainee claims that he vaguely remembers what actually happened during the grenade attack because he claims he was drugged.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

21 November 2006

TO: ELBANNA, ABDUL LATIF

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ELBANNA, ABDUL LATIF

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.
2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.
3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:
  - a. Commitment
    1. The detainee stated he left Afghanistan, traveled to the Maldives and Bombay, India then to Katmandu, Nepal and then traveled to England. The detainee arrived in London, England on 24 February 1994.
    2. The detainee stated he began working for a known London, England based extremist in 1994. The detainee collected donations and deposited the donated money in his personal bank account. The detainee would later transfer the money to the extremist when it accumulated or when requested.
    3. The detainee stated he had a conversation with a London, England based extremist regarding the total destruction of Great Britain using explosives. The detainee stated he had bombs made and stored at his residence in London, England.
    4. In early November 2002, the detainee and four others, all associates of a London, England based extremist, were detained upon arrival in Banjul, Gambia.

b. Training

The detainee stated he was drafted into the Jordanian military in 1980. The detainee attended a two to three month basic training course and learned to use the M-16 rifle. The detainee was discharged in 1982.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ELBANNA, ABDUL LATIF**

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee is linked to al Takfir Wal Hirja members in Spain. Al Takfir Wal Hijra is an Islamic group that is in favor of a world Islamic state formed principally by Mujahedins who have been trained in Afghanistan. This group has links with al Qaida.

2. In January 2006, the detainee stated he planned to use his eldest son to send a message to Abu Musab al Zaraqawi in Iraq to prevent the killing of four kidnapped Western peace activists. The detainee believed he could positively influence al Zaraqawi because he had known al Zaraqawi for nearly 16 to 18 years.

## d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated that from the age of ten until 1985 or 1986, he associated with a gang of criminals and participated in a variety of crimes including rape, assault, gambling, robbery, and armed robbery. The detainee stated he was arrested many times by the Jordanian police.

2. In 1994, the detainee entered England with a false passport. The detainee stated he told British immigration officials that he and his wife were seeking asylum. Then the detainee and his wife enrolled in welfare.

3. It is the United States Government's understanding that the detainee has been charged by Spanish judicial authorities with participation in a terrorist organization.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied any association with al Qaida. The detainee stated he lived in Afghanistan for a while but left there in approximately 1992. The detainee denied ever receiving military training in Afghanistan.

b. After his release from prison, the detainee stated he stopped collecting donations for the London, England based extremist because the detainee did not want to get into trouble again.

c. The detainee stated he had no prior knowledge concerning the 11 September 2001, attacks on the United States. The detainee denies any involvement with terrorists or terrorism. The detainee claims no knowledge that any of the money he collected was used to fund terrorism.

d. The detainee denied being a threat to the United States.

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# **UNCLASSIFIED**

**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ELBANNA, ABDUL LATIF**

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

**Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba**

22 August 2006

To: AL RAWI, BISHER

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAWI, BISHER

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee has been identified as an Iraqi Islamic extremist and a member of a prominent spiritual cleric's close circle of associates.

2. The prominent spiritual cleric was the leader of the London, England, al Qaida cell.

3. The detainee was identified as a high-ranking member of the London, England, al Qaida cell and had trained in Bosnia and Afghanistan.

4. The detainee was involved in al Qaida recruiting operations in the United Kingdom.

5. The detainee was arrested at Gatwick Airport, London, England around the beginning of November 2002. He was stopped because of a suspicious item in his luggage. The detaining officials arrested the detainee under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The detainee was held for several days and released.

6. Literature about weapons, making explosives and detailing how one could hide his or her identity and disappear was found during a search of the detainee's and his friend's residences.

7. Prior to his second attempted departure for Gambia on 8 November 2002, the detainee asked to have his luggage searched to avoid problems. The detainee advised that his luggage was searched and he was able to board the flight.

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ISN 906

# UNCLASSIFIED

## SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAWI, BISHER

8. The detainee traveled to Gambia on 8 November 2002. Upon arrival, the detainee and his associates were taken to a Gambian police agency. The detainee was in Gambian custody for thirty days before he was sent to Afghanistan.

### b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee knew of an Islamic Non-Governmental Organization in London, England, controlled by the prominent spiritual cleric. Some of the money raised went to the prominent spiritual cleric, and the detainee suspected some was diverted to militant Islamic individuals or groups.

2. The detainee identified a telephone number and name from his address book. The detainee claimed the person had links to North African Islamic extremist groups, most likely the Armed Islamic Group (GIA).

3. An Islamic extremist group, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) aims to overthrow the secular Algerian regime and replace it with an Islamic state. The Armed Islamic Group (GIA) began its violent activity in 1992 after Algiers voided the victory of the Islamic Salvation Front, the largest Islamic opposition party, in the first round of legislative elections in December 1991.

4. An activity hall in London, England was rented every month, from 1996 to 1997, for prayer, collection of money and conducting anti-American speeches. The detainee is listed as one of the many individuals who attended prayer at the rented mosque every Friday night.

5. The detainee handled various financial transactions for the prominent spiritual cleric at London, England banks, including transferring money to the Middle East and potentially to the families of Palestine suicide bombers. The detainee was aware that the prominent spiritual cleric traveled to Afghanistan and speculated that he met with Usama bin Laden.

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee never worked with explosives or detonators in his life, but he was interested in the chemistry of explosives.

2. The detainee considers himself a fundamentalist. He attempts to live according to the guidelines of the Koran. The detainee stated that during his time in London, England, he felt at war with the United States.

3. The detainee stated that he participated in a scheme where stolen credit cards were used to purchase merchandise around the greater London, England area.

4. The detainee stated that he did not have a problem with the terrorist attack on the USS Cole because it was a military target. The detainee stated that it should be expected by those in the military that they could be killed at any time.



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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF AL RAWI, BISHER**

5. The detainee considered Saddam Hussein an enemy of the Iraqi people. The detainee also considered all enemies of Iraq as his enemies too. The detainee said that, theoretically, the United States would fall into the latter category.

6. After several meetings, the foreign government authorities suggested the detainee help them, and he agreed to provide any assistance.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee pleaded to be allowed to return to England. He claimed to adore England, stating that he wanted to only bring peace to his community of Muslims in London, England.

b. The detainee claimed he has no desire to fight anyone.

c. The detainee said that the prominent spiritual cleric did not approach him to provide financial support for terrorism.

d. The detainee stated that the prominent spiritual cleric asked him to transfer money from the Arab Bank, London, England to other branches of the Arab Bank in Jordan and Palestine. The detainee thought that the money was going to the poor in Jordan and surrounding areas, but he has no proof of that, just a feeling.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

8 May 2006

TO: GUL, KHI ALI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GUL, KHI ALI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee is a former Mujahedin soldier and fought in the jihad against the Russians from 1984 to 1989. He was a farmer until he was hired as a security guard for a government intelligence division in Khowst, Afghanistan in 2002.

2. The detainee was identified as an agent for Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate.

3. The detainee was imprisoned by the Najibullah Communist regime due to his ties to the Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate.

4. At the time of his capture, the detainee worked as Chief of Intelligence for the Gorbaz Medani Jihadi Battalion. His duties included recruiting and collecting information on Afghans working or cooperating with United States Forces.

5. The Gorbaz Medani Regiment was located in the Khowst area of Afghanistan.

6. The detainee was said to have met Usama bin Laden in Khowst, Afghanistan during the Mazir-I-Sharif bombing campaign.

b. Intent

1. The detainee was identified as having been on an assassination team for the Taliban.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GUL,KHI ALI**

2. The detainee was identified as being an intelligence chief that harassed and assassinated Afghan intellectuals for the Taliban regime.

3. The detainee was identified as having helped plan the 1 December 2002 rocket attack against Forward Operating Base Salerno. Six rockets were fired at Forward Operating Base Salerno from the bed of a pickup truck, but none impacted the base.

4. The detainee was a member of the Union of Mujahedin. The group detonated an explosive device in a Khowst, Afghanistan bazaar.

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was captured at an Afghan Military Forces checkpoint, while riding in a minibus near the Khowst Bazaar on 23 December 2002. He was reportedly concealing his face.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he had no animosity toward United States Forces and no desire for jihad or revenge.

b. The detainee plans to return to Afghanistan, re-unite with family, and work on a farm.

c. The detainee denies working for the Taliban.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

26 October 2006

TO: GHANI, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHANI, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee stated he joined the Taliban voluntarily but was not sure when he joined.

2. The detainee stated Americans did not have any business in Afghanistan and fighting against them was every Muslim's duty. The detainee further stated they fought against Shah Masood because he was an infidel and that the way Shah Masood was killed was acceptable because in war trickery was allowed.

3. The detainee stated he served with the Mujahedin until president Najib was ousted.

4. The detainee stated he only fought against Najib's soldiers.

b. Training

1. A source stated the detainee's military expertise was in missiles.

2. The detainee stated everyone in Afghanistan knows how to use a gun and he could operate any weapon a soldier could carry in his hands.

c. Connections/Associations

1. A source stated he knew the detainee's boss was a Taliban commander and did not want to assist the detainee for that reason and that the detainee's boss wanted to fight Americans.

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ISN 934

# UNCLASSIFIED

## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHANI, ABDUL**

2. A source stated the detainee was paid by al Qaida for the attack against a United States aircraft near Kandahar Airfield.

3. A source stated the detainee was also a part of a 40-man training team that taught hand grenade techniques, use of plastic explosives and automobile explosive device use for deployment outside of Afghanistan.

### d. Intent

1. The detainee stated he had the right to defend his country.

2. The detainee stated if he had the power to kill Shazai, Governor of Kandahar, he would. The detainee considered Shazai a slave of the Americans.

3. A source stated the detainee would do anything for money.

### e. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee stated he was offered 1000 Pakistani Rupees to help carry rockets.

2. The detainee changed his story and stated that he was never paid.

3. The detainee stated he carried two rockets into the desert near the Kandahar Afghanistan Airfield.

4. The detainee admitted to being a lookout but refused to admit he knew the rockets were going to be fired at that time.

5. The detainee further stated that he knew the rockets were going to be fired at the Americans at Kandahar Airfield.

6. The detainee stated he did not fire any of the rockets.

7. The detainee stated Shah told the villagers that the detainee fired the rockets at United States troops.

8. Information received states that the detainee retrieved two batteries, a long length of wire and two missiles and took them approximately one hour away by foot to an area overlooking the Kandahar Airfield.

9. Information received states the detainee then carried the missiles approximately 20 to 30 meters away where they concealed themselves behind a large rock and the detainee fired the missiles against United States Forces at the airfield.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHANI, ABDUL**

10. A source stated the detainee told him they had to fight against the United States.

11. A source stated he knew the detainee was involved in fighting the United States but couldn't provide any specifics.

12. The detainee was captured by United States and Afghan forces in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated that he accepts that he did something wrong and he has no motivation to lie further.

b. The detainee took the Pakistan Army soldiers to where the other two rockets were still buried.

c. The detainee stated if he knew that Shah was going to fire the rockets at the airport he would not have helped him.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

2 May 2006

TO: DIN, JUMA

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF DIN, JUMA

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was identified as a bodyguard for a Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) leader who, as of mid-November 2002, continued to control Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin activity in the Kantiwa area of Nuristan Province, Afghanistan and had taken measures to strengthen the Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin position in the area.

2. The detainee was identified as a main advisor to the Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin leader in the Kantiwa area.

3. Among Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the leader operating in Kantiwa, Nuristan Province, commanded approximately 150 fighters and had approximately 500 unarmed men in reserve.

4. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin was one of the major Mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden. Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration, and establish a fundamentalist state.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's brother-in-law said he went to Afghanistan with the intent to fight with the Taliban but his relationship with the Taliban never worked out. The detainee's brother-in-law admitted that he attended training at the Daruntah Camp near Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

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2. Daruntah is one of Usama bin Laden's most important bases in Afghanistan. It became known after many captured terrorists admitted they were trained in the use of explosives there.

3. The detainee and his family lived with his brother-in-law for three months.

4. The detainee's brother-in-law owned a used car and allowed the detainee to use the car as a taxi to earn money. The detainee earned 150 to 400 Pakistani Rupees a day driving the car and gave his brother-in-law half of what he earned with the car.

5. According to a Foreign Government Service, the detainee's brother-in-law is a member of the Tunisian Combatant Group. He is a terrorist known for his calls for jihad and who has received military training in Afghanistan. He participated in the Bosnian war in 1995 and he was a member of the Bologna Network, which was dismantled in Italy in 1997. He is based in Jalalabad, Afghanistan where he is in charge of receiving and lodging Tunisian volunteers for onward travel to al Qaida training camps.

6. The Tunisian Combatant Group reportedly is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and targets United States and Western interests. The loosely organized group has come to be associated with al Qaida and other North African extremist networks that have been implicated in terrorist plots during the past two years.

7. A senior al Qaida lieutenant described the detainee's brother-in-law as a document forger al Qaida once used.

8. A senior al Qaida lieutenant felt that the detainee's brother-in-law was a good candidate to become an operative who could potentially be used by al Qaida for operations in the United States.

### c. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee was arrested by Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) personnel while attempting to flee the scene of detention.

2. The detainee was captured for suspicion of working for al Qaida and was captured with four counterfeit 100 United States Dollar bills.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee denied any knowledge of Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin.

b. The detainee denied that he had four 100 United States Dollar bills in his possession when he was captured. He denied ever having possession of a weapon such as a Kalashnikov rifle.



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c. The detainee admitted he has heard of al Qaida, but he is unsure what the group does. He believes that the people involved in the 11 September 2001 attacks should be captured, punished, or controlled to make sure they are unable to do anything like that again.

d. The detainee claimed he does not know what a fatwa is.

e. The detainee has heard the word jihad before and knows it is part of Islam. When asked if he would follow a trusted Imam's order to attack someone in the name of God, the detainee stated he would not and that such orders are not for men to give.

f. The detainee was never interested in the Taliban. He would like to return to his home country of Afghanistan someday.

g. The detainee stated he did not hate Americans and was not angry about his incarceration. The detainee believes his incarceration is the will of God and has nothing to do with men.

h. The detainee's brother-in-law said the detainee should be released because the detainee had done nothing wrong and had 4-5 children at home that he needed to take care of.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

5 Aug 2006

TO: RAZZAK, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZZAK, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee said he was forced to serve the Taliban three months out of every year since they came to power in 1992.

2. The detainee was a driver and fought in the Russian jihad for a commander of approximately 800 to 1000 soldiers. The commander became a military commander in Afghanistan after the jihad.

3. A source stated that Taliban fighters go to the military commander's compound in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. The fighters receive money, supplies and orders at the compound.

b. Training

1. A source stated that the detainee was involved in a terrorist training camp near Khotal-e-Morcha mountain pass outside of Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. A source stated that the detainee was directly involved in assassination attempts. The source stated that the detainee also attempted to have other personnel participate in suicide missions. The detainee provided training on how to use explosive vests.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF RAZZAK, ABDUL**

## c. Connections/Associations

1. A source stated that the detainee was originally a freedom fighter against the Soviets, a member of Hezb-e-Islami, the Taliban and al Qaida. The detainee is currently instructing others on how to resist interrogation tactics.

2. The Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state. Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden.

3. A source stated that the detainee was part of the main security escort for Usama bin Laden.

4. A source stated that the detainee was paid to smuggle 50 Arab family members out of Afghanistan and into Zabul, Iran through Afghanistan's Nimroz Province.

5. A source stated that the detainee was high in the al Qaida hierarchy and acted as a smuggler and facilitator. The detainee received money and weapons from Syria. The source stated that al Qaida's operational leader provided weapons to the detainee.

6. The detainee provided details of weapons shipments and weapons smuggling routes of Jamiat Islami.

7. The Jamiat Ulema e Islami is a radical Sunni religious-political party best known for its anti-United States threats, vocal support of Usama Bin Ladin and sponsorship of some 3,000 religious schools.

8. The detainee was identified as a senior leader of a 40-man unit for the Taliban in Afghanistan. A source stated that the unit receives money, weapons and support from al Qaida and continually plans to kill Americans.

9. A source stated that the detainee was the number two commander of the unit and also the Taliban Supreme Commander in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.

10. The detainee stated that the 40-man unit's commander gave the detainee his satellite phone number so President Karzai could contact the 40-man unit's commander and order him to turn in the rest of his weapons if President Karzai desired it.

11. A source stated that the 40-man units' leaders stayed in contact through satellite telephones.

12. The detainee was detained as a suspected member of a Taliban organization.

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d. Other Relevant Data

1. The detainee helped an individual escape from a Ministry of Intelligence Prison in Kandahar, Afghanistan.

2. The individual is an exiled Afghan commander.

3. In early 2004, the exiled Afghan commander was known to have distributed approximately 40,000 small arms of unknown origin to former mujahedin fighters and personal associates located in Herat Province, Afghanistan.

4. A source stated that the detainee received weapons shipments, plastic explosives, night-vision equipment, missiles, small arms and ammunition from Syria. The weapons come from Syria to Zahedan, Iran and were smuggled into Afghanistan.

5. A source stated that military weapons were delivered to the detainee who aided in its distribution to a terrorist team. The source stated that the detainee also had a night vision and telescoping optical device to use during mission preparation and for surveillance on United States Forces.

6. A source stated that the detainee was knowledgeable of an assassination plot against President Karzai the day before it occurred.

7. On 2 November 2001, sources indicated that senior Taliban officials were extremely concerned about stopping opposition leader Hamid Karzai. During conversations between the detainee and a senior Taliban leader, they discussed the fact that Karzai had escaped a Taliban attack.

8. A source stated that the detainee attempted to have two other individuals kill the Kandahar, Afghanistan Governor.

9. A source stated that in 2002, the detainee claimed that there were still suicide pilots in the United States who could carry out their missions.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee claims he is not a Taliban member.

b. The detainee vehemently denies that he is currently associated with the Taliban.

c. The detainee states that the Taliban is a stupid organization.

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- d. An individual that was part of a 40-man team was under the command of Abdul Razaq.
  - e. The individual described Abdul Razaq as having dark eyes, a full beard, and taller than himself. The individual claims this Abdul Razaq is not the same person as the detainee.
5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

16 November 2006

TO: ABDUL, GHANI

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDUL, GHANI

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. Pocket litter found on the detainee during capture describes the detainee as a most trustworthy and very good Mujahedin.

2. A source stated that they had several reports which indicated that a senior Taliban leader and the detainee entered various villages, held individuals at gunpoint and preached jihad against the illegitimate Afghanistan government and the Americans.

3. A source stated the detainee and the same senior Taliban leader traveled to various towns on motorcycles attempting to recruit or force people to fight jihad.

4. A source stated the detainee had been identified as being the assistant to the senior Taliban leader responsible for facilitating recruiting.

5. The detainee admitted that the maddrassa that he attended taught jihad against Americans.

6. The detainee stated he was Taliban, and was in the mountains with approximately 80 other Taliban.

7. A source stated the detainee was a member of a formal group that was responsible for invigorating and spreading Taliban propaganda.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDUL, GHANI**

8. A source stated the detainee was a Taliban member and saw him in Speenboldak, Afghanistan.

## b. Connections/Associations

1. Three separate sources identified the detainee as the executive assistant to a senior Taliban leader.

2. An additional source identified the detainee as the assistant to the same senior Taliban leader.

3. Pocket litter found on the detainee during capture directly linked him as a courier for the senior Taliban leader.

## c. Other Relevant Data

1. A source stated he received information that a reward was made by the senior Taliban leader offering 2.5 million Rupees for the detainee's release. The source also indicated that he had not heard of any rewards offered for low-level individuals.

2. The detainee stated he knows the Taliban leader as being in charge of the compound in Adi Ghar, Afghanistan. The detainee stated he knows the individual because the Taliban leader is from his village.

3. A United States Armed Forces member stated the detainee directed them to the exact location in the Adi Ghar Mountains, Afghanistan where the terrorist cell was operating, and added the location would not have been found if the detainee had not taken them there.

4. The detainee admitted he had been living with his brother in the mountain complex for two to four weeks and that various training had been underway up there. The detainee provided extensive detail regarding the mountain complex.

5. A source stated the complex was exactly how the detainee laid it out, including locations of food and supplies, weapons caches, tunnels and storage areas and defensive positions.

6. When captured, the detainee was found to be in possession of a strip map and a supply list.

7. When captured, the detainee said: please do not kill me, the rest are in the mountains, I will show you where they are at.

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## **SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF ABDUL, GHANI**

8. A translation of four letters found on the detainee and his brother were signed by the senior Taliban leader requesting assistance for food, clothing and supplies. The letters stated to give the detainee the money and supplies.

9. Documents found on individuals killed in the caves had the detainee's name on them with various Rupee amounts.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee stated he told the truth in Bagram, Afghanistan and would continue to tell the truth in Cuba.

b. When describing the circumstances behind his brother's death, the detainee stated he had no weapon, however, his brother had a rifle and two hand grenades.

c. The detainee stated he wants to go home to help his family on the farm and continue to study the Koran.

d. The detainee stated during his capture no weapon was ever pointed at United States Forces and no attempt to utilize a hand grenade was made when they encountered United States Forces.

e. The detainee claims he never knew or heard of Usama bin Laden until the detainee was in United States custody in Bagram, Afghanistan.

f. The detainee stated that as a student studying in the madrassa in Pakistan, he and others were not at any time preparing for jihad against the Americans. The detainee claims he does not know the definition of jihad.

g. The detainee stated he knows of no individuals associated with his madrassa that have ties to the Taliban, al Qaida, or Hezb-E Isalmi Gulbaddin and knows of no instances when the school has been approached by such persons.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.



# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

30 April 2006

TO: (LNU), SHARIFULLAH

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF (LNU), SHARIFULLAH

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee claimed that he obtained his counterfeit student identification from Karachi, Pakistan while he worked there for one month as a guard. He asked the dean of the school for the identification, which lists him as a Pakistani national, so that the Karachi police would not detain him due to his Afghanistan citizenship.

2. The detainee, his brother, and two others decided to join Haji Qadir's campaign in Afghanistan fighting the Taliban.

3. The detainee stated he assisted Haji Qadir in Afghanistan for approximately three years.

4. After the fall of the Taliban, Haji Qadir became the Governor of Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan. Subsequently, the detainee became a soldier for General Said Agha in Jalalabad, Afghanistan for approximately three months.

b. Training

1. The detainee stated he completed two months of training at the Gund Talimi Military School in Kabul, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee's training for the Presidential detail involved two months of special training. During the two months the detainee and approximately forty others were trained by foreign government services on the Kalashnikov, physical training, low crawl, and the use of riot gear such as helmets and shields.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF (LNU), SHARIFULLAH**

3. The detainee and other bombers studied how to use bombs in a madrasa in Pakistan where the bombs were made.

4. The detainee was identified by name as having attended the Zakar Khel training camp in Pakistan.

## c. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee's brother is a captain at General Said Agha's compound in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. The detainee stated that the day prior to his arrest he was in the city. When the detainee returned to the compound, his brother was with two men. The detainee stated he knew one of the men from the 22 days the detainee spent at the compound; however, this was the first time the detainee met the other man. The detainee stated the first individual was a soldier under the command of General Said Agha. However, the detainee said the other man (who goes by the name Ajmal) was not a soldier for General Said Agha.

2. The detainee stated that he was sleeping at one of General Agha's military compounds with his brother, Ajmal, and another man at the time of a raid and the detainee's ensuing arrest.

3. The third man present during the raid was known as Ghorzang.

4. The detainee stated that the night prior to the detainee's arrest Ghorzang had rotated back to the compound. The detainee stated he knew Ghorzang previously when they both worked as soldiers for General Agha.

5. The brother of the detainee was identified as a senior Taliban member and has initiated amnesty talks with the Afghan Army. As a condition of the amnesty talks, he desires the release of two men from prison. One individual was formerly a platoon commander under Qari Naqib identified as Ghorzang.

6. The detainee worked under the command of General Mohammad Karim for seven months. The detainee's direct supervisor for the detail was Major Abdul Manan.

## d. Detainee Actions and Statements

During initial questioning the morning of their capture, the detainee and Ghorzang admitted that they were going to place the bombs the previous night but were convinced to wait until morning.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee was questioned on 8 February 2003 and denied any knowledge of the plan to use explosives.

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF (LNU), SHARIFULLAH**

b. The detainee was asked where he would go if released from Cuba. The detainee stated he would probably go home to Pakistan where most of his family lives or would work with one of his other brothers in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.

c. The detainee stated he has never, nor would ever, fight the Americans because the Americans came to Afghanistan to help the people, not to hurt or kill them.

d. The detainee stated he holds no resentment toward Americans and will not harbor any bad will to Americans if released and returned to Afghanistan. The detainee stated he would not hurt Americans even if he believed he could get away with it and no one would see or know about it.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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# UNCLASSIFIED

Department of Defense  
Office for the Administrative Review of the Detention of Enemy  
Combatants at US Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

27 April 2006

TO: GHAFOUR, ABDUL

SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE  
REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHAFOUR, ABDUL

1. An Administrative Review Board will be convened to review your case to determine if your continued detention is necessary.

2. The Administrative Review Board will conduct a comprehensive review of all reasonably available and relevant information regarding your case. At the conclusion of this review the Board will make a recommendation to: (1) release you to your home state; (2) transfer you to your home state, with conditions agreed upon by the United States and your home state; or (3) continue your detention under United States control.

3. The following primary factors favor continued detention:

a. Commitment

1. The detainee was the commander of a group of 50 former Taliban in Neka, Paktika province, Afghanistan.

2. The detainee's group was part of Saifullah Rahman Mansour's troops. In late July 2002, the group attacked locations in Gardez and Zormat including the United States' compound in Gardez.

3. The forces that participated on the raid to apprehend the detainee stated that they repeatedly identified themselves clearly in Pashto then in English. They also stated that the detainee was firing well-aimed and very effective shots and was throwing grenades at them.

b. Connections/Associations

1. The detainee was the former district officer for the Taliban in Zormat and was part of the leadership for the Zormat district Taliban network under Saifullah Rahman Mansur.

2. Saifur Rahman was the deputy commander of the Kargha garrison west of Kabul during the Taliban rule. He returned to his native Zormat district in Paktia after the Taliban defeat.

3. The detainee regularly met with Mansur and protected him when he was in the Zormat area. He met with Mansur on 2 December 2002 and during the battle of Sahi Kot. They met to

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**SUBJECT: UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD IN THE CASE OF GHAFOUR, ABDUL**

discuss United States tactics and how to defeat United States Forces. He ordered Ahmed Shah to place weapons caches in the Zormat district for use against United States Forces.

4. The following primary factors favor release or transfer:

a. The detainee advised that he did not fight with the Mujahedin against the Soviet Union. He claims that he was wounded by chance during the shelling of his village. The detainee advised that he has never had any weapons or military training. He said that almost everyone in Afghanistan has a rifle and they are commonly fired at weddings and celebrations.

b. The detainee advised that he fired his Kalashnikov on the night of his arrest in an effort to scare away what he thought were thieves and alert his neighbors. The detainee related it was far too dark to see anything at that time, and that he wouldn't have shot at American soldiers even if he could have seen them.

c. The detainee is upset with Americans for putting him in jail, but pleased because he says he has been well treated by everyone. The detainee has no desire to avenge his incarceration because he has told his feelings to God, and he has taken the anger away.

d. When asked about the Taliban, the detainee stated he didn't like them because they put pressure on people about things like beard length, and that they generally bothered people.

e. When asked if he would follow a fatwa to fight given by a Mullah he respected, the detainee replied that he would not fight for anyone. The detainee stated if he had wanted to fight he would have fought the Russians, and that he didn't believe in fighting.

5. You will be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard and to present information to the Board; this includes an opportunity to be physically present at the proceeding. The Assisting Military Officer (AMO) will assist you in reviewing all relevant and reasonably available unclassified information regarding your case. The AMO is not an advocate for or against continued detention, nor may the AMO form a confidential relationship with you or represent you in any other matter.

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