

**REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER/BOARD OF OFFICERS**

*For use of this form, see AR 15-6; the preparing agency is DTJAG.*

**IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS**

**SECTION I - APPOINTMENT**

Appointed by MG Walter Wojdakowski, Deputy Commanding General, CTF-7, Camp Victory, Iraq, APO AE 09342  
*(Appointing authority)*

on 23 Jan 2004 *(Date)* *(Attach Inclosure 1: Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data.) (See para 3-15, AR 15-6.)*

**SECTION II - SESSIONS**

The investigation (board) commenced at Camp Victory, Iraq at 0900  
*(Place) (Time)*  
on 24 Jan 2004 *(Date)* *(If a formal board not for more than one session, check here . Indicate in an inclosure the date each session began and ended, the place, persons present and absent, and explanation of absence, if any.) The following persons (members, respondents, counsel) were present: (After each name, indicate capacity, e.g., President, Recorder, Member, Legal Advisor.)*

The following persons (members, respondents, counsel) were absent: *(Include brief explanation of each absence.) (See paras 5-3 and 5-8a, AR 15-6.)*

The investigating officer (board) finished gathering/hearing evidence at 1500 on 19 Feb 2004  
*(Time) (Date)*  
and completed findings and recommendations at 2200 on 23 Feb 2004  
*(Time) (Date)*

**SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS**

A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES	YES	NO	NA <sup>2</sup>
1. Inclosures (para 3-15, AR 15-6)			
Are the following inclosed and numbered consecutively with Roman numerals: (Attached in order listed)			
a. The letter of appointment or a summary of oral appointment data?	X		
b. Copy of notice to respondent, if any? (See item 2, below)			X
c. Other correspondence with respondent or counsel, if any?			X
d. All other written communications to or from the appointing authority?	X		
e. Privilege Act Statements (Certificate, if statement provided orally)?			X
f. Explanation by the investigating officer or board of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered (e.g., absence of material witnesses)?	X		
g. Information as to members of a formal board not included on page 1 of this report?			X
h. Any other significant papers (other than evidence) relating to administrative aspects of the investigation or board?	X		

**FOOTNOTES:**  
1. Include all original answers on an attached sheet.  
2. Use of the "NA" column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation.

2 Exhibits (para 3-16, AR 15-4)		YES	NO	NA
a. Are all items offered (whether or not received) or considered as evidence individually numbered or lettered as exhibits and attached to this report?		X		
b. Is an index of all exhibits offered to or considered by investigating officer or board attached before the first exhibit?				
c. Has the testimony/statement of each witness been recorded verbatim or been reduced to written form and attached as an exhibit?		X		
d. Are copies, descriptions, or depictions (if submitted for real or documentary evidence) properly substantiated and is the location of the original evidence indicated?		X		
e. Are descriptions or diagrams included of locations visited by the investigating officer or board (para 3-6b, AR 15-6)?		X		
f. If each witness deposition included in the exhibit, did it state oral depositions either reduced to writing and made an exhibit or recorded in a verbatim record?		X		
g. If official copies of any matter was taken over the objection of a respondent or counsel, is a statement of the matter of which official copies was taken attached as an exhibit (para 3-16d, AR 15-6)?				X
3. Was a quorum present when the board voted on findings and recommendations (para 4-1 and 5-2b, AR 15-6)?				
B. COMPLETE ONLY FOR FORMAL BOARD PROCEEDINGS (Chapter 5, AR 15-6)				
4. At the initial session, did the recorder read, or determine that all participants had read, the letter of appointment (para 5-2b, AR 15-6)?				
5. Was a quorum present at every session of the board (para 5-2b, AR 15-6)?				
6. Was each member of any member properly sworn (para 5-2b, AR 15-6)?				
7. Were members, witnesses, reporter, and interpreter sworn, if required (para 3-1, AR 15-6)?				
8. If any members who voted on findings or recommendations were not present when the board resolved some evidence, does the recorder describe how they familiarized themselves with that evidence (para 5-2d, AR 15-6)?				
C. COMPLETE ONLY IF RESPONDENT WAS DESIGNATED (Section II, Chapter 5, AR 15-6)				
9. Notice to respondent (para 3-1, AR 15-6):				
a. Is the method and date of delivery to the respondent indicated on each letter of notification?				
b. Was the date of delivery at least five working days prior to the first session of the board?				
c. Does each letter of notification indicate --				
(1) the date, hour, and place of the first session of the board concerning that respondent?				
(2) the matter to be investigated, including specific allegations against the respondent, if any?				
(3) the respondent's rights with regard to counsel?				
(4) the name and address of each witness expected to be called by the recorder?				
(5) the respondent's right to be present, present evidence, and call witnesses?				
d. Was the respondent provided a copy of all unclassified documents in the case file?				
e. If there were relevant classified materials, were the respondent and his counsel given access and an opportunity to examine them?				
10. If any respondent was designated after the proceedings began (or otherwise was absent during part of the proceedings):				
a. Was he properly notified (para 5-3, AR 15-6)?				
b. Was record of proceedings and evidence received in his absence made available for examination by him and his counsel (para 5-4c, AR 15-6)?				
11. Counsel (para 5-4, AR 15-6):				
a. Was each respondent represented by counsel?				
Name and business address of counsel:				
(If counsel is a lawyer, check here <input type="checkbox"/> )				
b. Was respondent's counsel present at all open sessions of the board relating to that respondent?				
c. If military counsel was requested but not made available, is a copy (or, if oral, a summary) of the request and the action taken on it included in the report (para 5-4b, AR 15-6)?				
12. If the respondent challenged the legal adviser or any voting member for lack of impartiality (para 5-7, AR 15-6):				
a. Was the challenge properly denied and by the appropriate officer?				
b. Did each member essentially challenged cease to participate in the proceedings?				
13. Was the respondent given an opportunity to (para 5-8a, AR 15-6):				
a. Be present with his counsel at all open sessions of the board which deal with any matter which concerns that respondent?				
b. Examine and object to the introduction of real and documentary evidence, including witness statements?				
c. Object to the testimony of witnesses and cross-examine witnesses other than his own?				
d. Call witnesses and otherwise introduce evidence?				
e. Testify as a witness?				
f. Make or have his counsel make a final statement or argument (para 5-9, AR 15-6)?				
14. If requested, did the recorder assist the respondent in obtaining evidence in possession of the Government and in arranging for the presence of witnesses (para 5-8b, AR 15-6)?				
15. Are all of the respondent's requests and objections which were denied indicated in the report of proceedings or in an inclosure or exhibit to it (para 3-11, AR 15-6)?				
FOOTNOTES: 1 Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet. 2 One of the MAI column contains a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or hearing.				

2

**SECTION IV - FINDINGS (para 3-10, AR 15-6)**

The *Investigating officer* (board), having carefully considered the evidence, finds:

- I find that the conditions at the Camp Cropper Corps Holding Area (CHA) facility was established in accordance with doctrine but was not of sufficient size to adequately contain the number of persons that were ultimately detained.
- I find that there is inadequate information to consistently evaluate the control of movement, activities, and interaction of EPWs/RVDs at the Camp Cropper CHA and HVD facility.
- I find that the military personnel, including MP and MI soldiers, had appropriate MOS designation, training, and qualifications, although in many cases they had limited practical experience in actual war-time detention operations (see Exhibits 12 and 13).
- I find that CFLCC and CJTF-7 took an active interest in developing, reviewing, and revising guidance for detainee operations (see Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11).
- I find that there is no evidence to support the allegation that detainees were mistreated or interrogated in violation of applicable policies, regulations, or the Geneva Convention.
- I find that there is no supporting evidence that reports of mistreatment of detainees or inadequate facility conditions were raised to superiors. It is evident that the inadequacy of the facilities was acknowledged by the continued movement of detainees to other facilities to ease the overcrowding and poor conditions of the CHA (see Exhibits 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 11).
- I find that the limited number of MP Inasmment and Resciment trained soldiers and MI Interrogation trained soldiers is a result of the decision to maintain these forces exclusively in the Reserve Component.
- I find that there is not a standard procedure for the authority and process of removing detainees from the detainee population for the purposes of interrogation.

- See also Amplifying Data at Encl V.

**SECTION V - RECOMMENDATIONS (para 3-11, AR 15-6)**

In view of the above findings, the *Investigating officer* (board) recommends:

**SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION (para 3-17, AR 15-6)**

**THIS REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE.** (If any voting member or the recorder fails to sign here or in Section VII below, indicate the reason in the space where his signature should appear.)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Recorder)



\_\_\_\_\_  
(Member)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Member)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Member)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Member)

**SECTION VII - MINORITY REPORT (para 3-13, AR 15-6)**

To the extent indicated in Inclosure \_\_\_\_\_, the undersigned do(es) not concur in the findings and recommendations of the board. (In the inclosure, identify by number each finding and/or recommendation in which the dissenting member(s) do(es) not concur. State the reasons for disagreement. Additional/substantive findings and/or recommendations may be included in the inclosure.)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Member)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Member)

**SECTION VIII - ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY (para 3-8, AR 15-6)**

The findings and recommendations of the (investigating officer) (board) are (approved) (disapproved) (approved with following exceptions/ substitutions). (If the appointing authority removes the proceedings to the investigating officer or board for further proceedings or corrective action, attach their correspondence (or a summary, if oral) as a numbered inclosure.)

See attached document


Section VIII Action by Appointing Authority (DA Form 1574 - Conditions and Procedures in the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center)

1. The findings of the Investigating Officer are approved.

2. The recommendations of the Investigating Officer are accepted and substituted with:

The investigation is referred to the PMO, CJTF-7, and the Commanders, 16<sup>th</sup> and 89<sup>th</sup> MP BDEs and 504<sup>th</sup> MII BDE for their review and evaluation, with direction to incorporate, where appropriate, corrective or preventative procedures to prevent potential detainee abuse at facilities under their control.

The Staff Judge Advocate, III Corps, is directed to provide a response to the individuals whose concerns about conditions at Camp Cropper Corps Holding Area and the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center served as the basis for the investigation.



THOMAS F. METZ  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Deputy Commanding General

MR 10-200

**INDEX of TABs and Exhibits**

**TAB A - Appointment Orders with 2 requests for extension**

**TAB B - Chronology of Investigation**

**TAB C - MFR, Subject: Allegation of Mistreatment of EPW, dated 28 Nov 03**

**TAB D - Amplifying Data to the Findings with Exhibits**

**Exhibit 1 - FRAGO 445M (EPW/Blacklist Handling Guidance) to V Corps OPORD 0303-343, DTD 172020ZAPR03**

**Exhibit 2 - FRAGO 006T (Engineer Support to V Corps High Value Detainee Holding Area) to V Corps OPORD Final Victory, DTD 28073ZAPR03**

**Exhibit 3 - FRAGO 158MM (Internment/Resettlement Battalions to 4ID and 3ID (18<sup>th</sup> MP Bde)) to V Corps OPORD Final Victory, DTD 110940LMAY 03**

**Exhibit 4 - FRAGO 267M (Detention Facility Support) to V Corps OPORD Final Victory, DTD 211835DMAY03**

**Exhibit 5 - FRAGO 312M (Guidance on TTP to Improve Evidence Preservation) to V Corps OPORD Final Victory, DTD 252148DMAY03**

**Exhibit 6 - FRAGO 16 (Transfer of Detainees from CHA to CAMP Bucca) to CJTF-7 OPORD 03-036, DTD 160300DJUN03**

**Exhibit 7 - FRAGO 209 (Criminal Investigations ISO Final Victory, Detention Facility Operations, EPW, Criminal Detainees and Security Internee Status Determinations, and Handling of Suspected War Criminals) to CJTF-7 OPORD 03-036, DTD 282021DJUN03**

**Exhibit 8 - FRAGO 380 (Transfer of Detainees from the CJTF-7 Corps Interrogation Facility) to CJTF-7 OPORD 03-036, DTD 112159DJUN03**

**Exhibit 9 - FRAGO 415 (Preservation and Collection of Evidence, Detention Operations, and Release Procedures for Detainees) to CJTF-7 OPORD 03-036, DTD 151950DJUL03**

**Exhibit 10 - FRAGO 455 (Classifying and Processing Enemy Prisoners of War/Detained Persons/Civilian Internees) to CJTF-7 OPORD 03-036, DTD 200415DJUL03**

**Exhibit 11- FRAGO 749 (Intelligence and Evidence-Led Detention Operations Relating to Detainees) to CJTF-7 OPORD 03-036**

**Exhibit 12 - Excerpts from FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations, including**

**Chapter 1 - Interrogation and the Interrogator**

**Chapter 3 - Interrogation Process**

**Chapter 5 - Direct and Supervise Interrogations Operations**

**Chapter 6 - Operational Environment**

**Chapter 7 - Strategic Debriefing**

**Chapter 8 - Joint Interrogation**

**Appendix H - Approaches**

**Appendix I - Interrogation Guides**

**Appendix J - 1949 Geneva Conventions**

**Exhibit 13 - Sworn Statement from [REDACTED]**

**Exhibit 14 - Email between investigator and [REDACTED]**

INDEX of TABs and Exhibits (continued)

Exhibit 15 - Copies of representative pages from MP Log Book #5

Exhibit 16 - Results of representative sampling of detainee files

Exhibit 17 - Email between investigator and [REDACTED]

Exhibit 18 - Email response to questions posed [REDACTED]

Cdr. 115 MP Bn.



REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

**HEADQUARTERS**  
**COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN**  
**BAGHDAD, IRAQ**  
**APO AE 08303**

CJTF7-DCG

23 January 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR LTC Natalie Lee, III Corps (CJTF-7)

SUBJECT: Appointment of Procedure 15 Investigating Officer

1. Pursuant to AR 381-10, Procedure 15, you are hereby appointed as an investigating officer to conduct an investigation under the procedures of AR 15-6 into all the relevant facts and circumstances surrounding alleged mistreatment of Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs) or civilian internees considered High Value Detainees (HVDs) that were held at the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) facility at Camp Cropper.
2. Your Report of Investigation will address the following issues:
  - a. Whether conditions at the JIDC facility and the procedures for controlling the movement, activities, and interaction of EPWs/HVDs at the facility were consistent with DoD policy and doctrine;
  - b. Whether JIDC facility administrative personnel (e.g., Military Police) and interrogators had appropriate MOS designation or other requisite qualifications and had the training and experience prescribed by applicable standards;
  - c. What policies and procedures were promulgated to address the treatment of EPWs/HVDs during the period of their initial apprehension to receipt by the JIDC and during any period of time that they were temporarily transferred by the JIDC to another activity or agency;
  - d. Whether any EPWs/HVDs assigned to the JIDC were mistreated or interrogated in violation of applicable policies during the period of time covered in paragraph 2.c., above;
  - e. Whether any allegations or reports of mistreatment or inadequate JIDC facility conditions were made to superiors of JIDC staff or superiors of any other activity or agency involved in interrogation or movement of EPWs/HVDs, and if so what action was taken as a result of the report; and,
  - f. Recommendations on any appropriate corrective or disciplinary actions.
3. Your duties as an investigating officer will take priority over other duties. You will use informal procedures under AR 15-6, paragraph 4-1. You will coordinate with the Investigating Officer conducting the 15-6 investigation on the above incident. You will make specific findings of fact and recommendations on all relevant issues you identify in the course of your investigation. If, during your investigation, you suspect that persons you intend to interview may



CJTF7-DCG


SUBJECT: Appointment of Investigating Officer

have violated any provision of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or any other criminal law, you must advise them of their rights under the UCMJ, Article 31, or the Fifth Amendment, as appropriate. Rights warnings and waivers will be documented on DA Form 3881. All witness statements should be sworn and recorded on DA Form 2823.

4. Prepare the report of proceedings on DA Form 1574. Include with your report all documentary evidence, sworn statements, and other information or evidence you considered as a basis for your findings and recommendations. Submit the original report to me no later than 2 weeks from the date of receipt of this memorandum. Any requests for extension must be made to me, in writing.

§ [REDACTED] from the CJTF-7 OSJA, will serve as your legal advisor during the investigation. Before proceeding with the investigation, contact [REDACTED] for an initial legal briefing. He may be contacted at [REDACTED]

Encl  
as

  
WALTER WOJDAKOWSKI  
Major General, USA  
Deputy Commanding General



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN  
CAMP VICTORY, IRAQ  
APO AE 09342-1490

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

CJTF-7-C2OPS

7 February 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCG, CJTF-7, Camp Victory, Iraq APO AE 09342

SUBJECT: Request for Extension to Procedure 15 Investigation

1. I request a 10-day extension to the submission of findings for the Procedure 15 investigation of Camp Cropper.
2. Due to the scope of the investigation, from the inception of Camp Cropper to present, several of the key individuals involved have departed theater. I am currently in the process of identifying and contacting these individuals. This investigation has been hampered by it's assignment during right seat/left seat rides and TOA, creating gaps in personnel availability for interviews.
3. Currently, I have identified [REDACTED] as the Commander of the 115<sup>th</sup> MP Bn who previously was responsible for the control of the prison and it's population. Also identified to date are [REDACTED] Commander of C Co, 519<sup>th</sup> MI Bn, and [REDACTED] chief of interrogations for C CO, 519<sup>th</sup> MI BN. Both the 115<sup>th</sup> MP Bn and 519<sup>th</sup> MI Bns have already left theater. I am still attempting to gain contact information for these individuals.
4. All attempts and results to identify, locate, and contact persons with knowledge of events at Camp Cropper will be annotated. In order to facilitate contacts, as well as conserve funds and time, contacts with persons external to Theater will be conducted primarily via email and/or telephone.

  
NATALIE G. LEE  
LTC, GS  
Investigating Officer



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN  
CAMP VICTORY, IRAQ  
APO AE 09342-1400

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF

CJTF-7-C2OPS

17 February 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR: DCG, CJTF-7, Camp Victory, Iraq APO AE 09342

SUBJECT: Request for Extension to Procedure 15 Investigation

1. I request an additional 5-day extension to the submission of findings for the Procedure 15 investigation of Camp Cropper.
2. Since 7 Feb, when I requested the initial extension, I received background information that helped narrow the scope and define the time period in question to the period between inception of the facility and mid-July.
3. Subsequently, I have visited obtained contact information for the previous MP Bn Cdr [REDACTED] charged with running the facility and have emailed him a list of questions. I have yet to receive his response. Additionally, I have toured the current HVD and former Corps Holding Area (CHA) location and discussed operations from Nov 03 to the present with the current MP Bn Cdr [REDACTED].
4. During my discussions with [REDACTED], we found MP log books for two of the compounds from inception through 20 Aug 03. I have spent approximately 12 man-hours reviewing these logbooks and mining them for data that might either corroborate the allegations, or provide additional avenues for investigation. The results of this review include a list of partial names that I am attempting to track through various organizations. It also led me to discovery of the files of the detainees that were transferred from the CHA to Abu Gharaib, which are currently located at Abu Gharaib.
5. My next step is to review a statistical sampling of the files at Abu Gharaib, as well as several specific files I identified during my review of the logbooks. I will visit Abu Gharaib on Thursday. Upon completion of the file review, I will begin preparation of my findings, to be complete NLT 22 Feb 04.

  
NATALIE G. LEE  
LTC, GS  
Investigating Officer

## Investigation Chronology

24 Jan 04, 0900-1000, Received the Investigation Appointment Orders, initial coordination with SJA representative [REDACTED]

24 - 26 Jan 04, Document/Frago research and printing

26 Jan 04, Informal background discussion with [REDACTED] C2 Operations

27 Jan 04, developed initial investigative plan, informal background discussion with [REDACTED] PMO Operations

28 Jan 04, requested contact information from 800<sup>th</sup> MP Bde for LTC [REDACTED] CDR 115<sup>th</sup> MP Bn, coordinated interview with CW2 [REDACTED] previous Interrogation Operations chief at CHA), began attempts to conduct AKO search for [REDACTED] AKO issues prevented search of email addressees

29 Jan 04, continued daily AKO search efforts with no success until 7 Feb 04

1 Feb 04, 1000 - 1630 traveled to Abu Gharaib, current CJTF-7 Joint Interrogation and Detention Center, conducted interview with CW2 [REDACTED]

2 Feb 04, began initial attempts to locate/contact intelligence personnel identified during interview with [REDACTED] prepared statement from notes of interview with [REDACTED]

3 Feb 04, continued research of Camp Cropper documentation, looking for maps, facility plans, additional FRAGOS, logs and files.

6 Feb 04, prepared initial request for extension

7 Feb 04, revised initial request for extension after discussions with [REDACTED] SJA representative, succeeded in AKO search for a [REDACTED] sent email initiating contact

8 Feb 04, met with [REDACTED] to review and swear the statement prepared from interview on 1 Feb 04, met with PMO and 89<sup>th</sup> MP Bde for information relating to any other related investigations of Camp Cropper

9 Feb 04, Met with [REDACTED] DCO of 89<sup>th</sup> MP Bde for assistance in files, logs, investigations and contacts. Established points of contact with the 744<sup>th</sup> MP Bn, currently in charge of the HVD facility at Camp Cropper, received additional background information (TAB 1) from [REDACTED] SJA

10 Feb 04, met with [REDACTED] CDR, 744<sup>th</sup> MP Bn, coordinated for visit to HVD and his Bn AO, received response from [REDACTED] drafted and emailed initial questions regarding CHA during his tenure.

11 Feb 04, 1000-1700 traveled to Camp Cropper, vic West BIAP to 744<sup>th</sup> MP Bn, conducted informal discussions with Bn Cdr, toured the HVD, found and began review of 2 MP log books from Camp Cropper with time periods 1930 27 Apr 03 to 1600 21 Aug 03, signed for log books, conducted short informal discussion with members of B Co, 325 MI Bn including [REDACTED]

12 Feb 04, reviewed logbook #5, received email from [REDACTED] attached response, sent follow on email requesting response attachment, never received, requested assistance from [REDACTED] at Abu Gharaib to find detainee files

13 Feb 04, continued review of logbook #5, coordinated for contacts at ISG, TF-121, and 202<sup>nd</sup> MI Bn, made contact with [REDACTED] at ISG and [REDACTED] at 202 MI Bn.

14 Feb 04, reviewed logbook #4, attempted to gain contact with [REDACTED] no success, drafted and sent emails of names identified in logbooks 4 and 5 to the ISG and 202 MI Bn for identification of any known persons

15 Feb 04, continued review of logbook #4, conducted email discussions with [REDACTED]

16 Feb 04, follow up review of items from both logbooks, coordinated to travel to Abu Gharalb to review detainee files

17 Feb 04, prepared and submitted second request for extension, began organization of data

19 Feb 04, 1000-1430, traveled to Abu Gharalb, reviewed 14 detainee files, reviewed all data

20 Feb 04, reviewed, organized, and consolidated data

21 Feb 04, began initial draft of findings

22 Feb 04, submitted initial draft of findings

23 Feb 04, revised initial draft of findings, prepared and packaged data, turned in Investigative Findings Package

USA

26 November 2003

Memorandum for the Record

Subject: Allegation of Mistreatment of HVT

1. Background: On 24 November 2003, [redacted] advised [redacted] and [redacted] from [redacted] who once worked for me in the early 80's. [redacted] is the last of my assignments. On 23 November, I called [redacted] to discuss [redacted] of our discussion. Subsequently, [redacted] was [redacted].

[redacted] informed me that he had information on the situation in Iraq concerning the handling of HVT prisoners that he felt I needed to be aware of, since I was preparing to depart for Iraq as a consultant, with a mission of looking at and evaluating interrogation operations. He told me he had read the DCSINT/DA mission statement but had brought it to me and felt he needed to speak with me. We spoke for a period of approximately 30 minutes. [redacted] was passionate about the issues and still stated it was he had observed in Iraq and described to me [redacted].

[redacted] explained that he was an original member of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) in June 2003. His job was to establish and run the interrogation operation, called the JOC (Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center). This organization was located on Bagdad International Airport. [redacted] described the usual difficulties in setting up such a Center, such as the shortage of resources, linguists, interpreters, suitable structures, and qualified interrogators. He added, however, that an additional serious problem, brutality directed against prisoners, plagued the effort. [redacted] added that he was trying to set up a professional Center to interrogate high value targets (HVT), much as he knew I had done in Panama and Gulf War I. However, by 9 July 2003, [redacted] recalled, he was so fed up and disillusioned with his inability to get the job done the way he knew was called for that he "gave up and asked to leave."

## 2. Specific Allegations

- a. Trained interrogators were almost unavailable. "GIs" were assigned to interrogate high value political targets, including cabinet level officials such as former Deputy Prime Minister Tarik Aziz. These soldiers were from the interrogation company of the supporting MI Brigade, and lacked the experience and training for the mission.
- b. Personnel handling prisoners had little knowledge of the Geneva Conventions. There was no lawyer in [redacted] at the time.

- c. Although "tan or so" relations were maintained, more often prisoners were not segregated, which allowed them to communicate, collect, and frigate attempts to segregate them.
- d. There was not an effective back channel with prisoners relating to the handling and disposition of prisoners. [redacted] stated that he did not believe that there was any effective communication channel between the JIDC and the EPW camp. [redacted] also stated that he did not believe that there was any effective communication channel between the JIDC and the EPW camp.
- e. Some [redacted] things were wrong, and [redacted] things were wrong, and [redacted] things were wrong. [redacted] stated that he did not believe that there was any effective communication channel between the JIDC and the EPW camp.
- f. The population of the Center at this time was about 40 EPW prisoners. Elsewhere, [redacted] recalled, there were hundreds of prisoners in what was called "the pit," a large open-air [redacted].
- g. Tents used by the JIDC were [redacted] tents. Some a few trailers were obtained that had heating and air conditioning.
- h. Prisoners were being beaten and tortured. This conduct was not carried out on site at the JIDC, but by [redacted] who were checking out prisoners without [redacted] and by "Army guys" from the capturing Task Force, [redacted] which would do the same thing. [redacted] stated that these prisoners would be taken off site, and [redacted] they would show obvious signs that they had been beaten. [redacted] stated that he had even taken a picture of one prisoner, which he stated he still has in his possession. [redacted] recalled that the JIDC was guarded by MC's, that the small [redacted] interrogators, members of the JIDC, were not a party to the beatings, but knew about it. [redacted] specifically stated that Task Aziz had been treated improperly, and was "laying in his own feces." (Although he does not claim that he personally saw this, or any other brutality. What he saw were "the effects" of the treatment when "checked out" prisoners were returned to the JIDC.)
- i. Normal practices of tugging and keeping back of pocket litter were out of control, forfeiting the advantage to interrogators to confront sources with documents and items in their possession when captured.

3. Clarification during follow-up phone call:

[redacted] stated that "The trouble was not in the actual JIDC. I was head of [redacted] and was trying to stop it. Bad things were happening in the 72 hours that the capturing unit (the TF) had to turn prisoners over to the EPW confinement facility; or, once a prisoner was turned over to the EPW camp, they were being "checked out" of the facility and taken to places where the mistreatment occurred." [redacted] emphasized that he had not personally witnessed any abuse, only the results, but that he spoke to JIDC interrogators, who had learned from their contacts with the prisoners about the mistreatment.

15

I asked [redacted] about [redacted] and he said [redacted] away on his allegations. [redacted] is a GS-13 collection manager in the JDC. [redacted] worked in the JDC. [redacted] and the [redacted] done to him. [redacted] is a former WMAO inspector who knew Azis from the [redacted].

A [redacted] officer who worked in the JDC, [redacted] is well aware of the problems with brutality.

Concerning others with knowledge of this situation, [redacted] stated "everyone GS-13 or above who were with me knows about it," and "the people in DC all know about it." The MPs have copies of the admitting photos of the prisoners, which show the results of mistreatment.

4. Did [redacted] report the matter?

[redacted] stated that he reported the matter to numerous people, but that since he returned to Washington, no one has contacted him or wants to talk about it. He has not been contacted by any investigator or investigating officer that would tell him that action has been taken to address his allegations and correct the problem.

[redacted] stated that he had not told the Army about this, but that the Army needs to know what happened. He didn't tell the local command in Iraq and DIA officials in Washington. [redacted] since he reported this situation multiple times, as follows:

-In Iraq, he complained to MG Dayton, Commander Iraq Survey Group. [redacted] believes Dayton brought the matter to the attention of the CENTCOM Chief of Staff and to CENTCENT General Franks. At this time, the International Red Cross [redacted] CENTCOM position on this is [redacted]. He also believes that General Franks [redacted] and told them to "knock it off." [redacted] aware of no investigation that followed.

-At this point, [redacted] recalls telling MG Dayton and Dr. David Kay to the JDC and showing them the poor conditions, telling them "look, they're not going to tell you anything, be confident like me." [redacted] also recalls that when General [redacted] and former POW John McCain visited, Kay's assignment was that McCain would ask to visit the prisoners. Allegedly, the command [redacted] up McCain's itinerary so he wouldn't have time to visit prisoners. [redacted] noted that ultimately, before he departed Iraq, the TF came to the JDC and said, "You'll have to work with these people. We can't get anything from them."



MG Dayton, whom [redacted] describes as an honorable man, told [redacted] in an email after [redacted] complained about the brutality that the situation was even worse than what [redacted] alleged. Dayton allegedly told [redacted] that he had information that one of the prisoners was mistreated and killed. [redacted] told me he has saved Dayton's email, and the photo he has of one mistreated prisoner (a bomber who was turned in by his son-in-law and arrested at his home, who showed up at the JDIC showing signs that he was beaten).

[redacted] also states that he reported the brutality problem to [redacted] GS-16, ISG operations officer, but nothing came of this that he knows about.

He also states that he reported the problem to DIA IG [redacted] who was visiting Iraq. Stone told [redacted] that subsequently "he went to someone about it."

Roeding states that he reported the problem to the DIA chain of command in Clarendon after his return to Washington. He specifically told DIA General Counsel [redacted] and [redacted] who told him the matter was being investigated.

5. What does [redacted] wish to see happen? [redacted] stated that he wants to correct a major problem so that it never happens again. He did tell me that he had not told the Army, and feels a loyalty to his service, and asked that I do this. He specifically told me that he would be comfortable with me telling BG Fast. "DIA people were not doing this. [redacted] Army people were doing it—SOF."



From: [REDACTED]

Sent: Monday, November 24, 2003 4:30 PM

To: [REDACTED]

Subject: Contact

[REDACTED] talked about. His email is [REDACTED]. Mention my name and he will talk to you. He's ISG and will be difficult to find. [REDACTED] is your best bet, but he may be back here for the holidays. He is the one who gave me the info that broke the chain's back. ISG SOC chief is due to return back here in a few weeks. He may still be there when you get in-country. He knows about the problem, but will probably not talk about it. If you mention it, he will know right away where it came from. I can give Army a list of names who are knowledgeable, don't know how many will discuss the issue. MG D is an honorable man and will do the right thing. He tried, but didn't get anywhere with the Command. My office phone is [REDACTED]. If you get there and need to talk secure. At this point in my career, I just want to correct a major problem so it never happens again. People were never trained in the Geneva Convention which I find hard to believe in today's Army. No one had a copy. I had to email someone back in the States to send me a copy of that and the Army regulation on the confinement and treatment of EPWs. I also had to find a JAG officer to help me set up guidelines. How can we complain about the treatment of our people if we condone this? I was totally disillusioned with the Army. Good luck in Baghdad. [REDACTED]

**Amplifying Data:**

1. In conducting this investigation, I attempted to keep an open mind. As I indicated to the SJA when I was assigned this investigation, I was deployed for OIF I as the G2 of the 4<sup>th</sup> ID, Task Force Ironhorse from 1 Mar to 15 Jul 04. As such, I was involved in detainee operations at the Division/TF level and have a personal knowledge of the challenges and inadequacies of detainee operations.

2. This investigation was initiated by an MFR (TAB C) recounting the allegations of a third party [REDACTED] who worked at Camp Cropper for approximately 5 weeks. The MFR, and an attached email from [REDACTED] acknowledges that he blames "the Army" for the problems he saw, but he never reported the problems/issues to Army personnel.

3. Within the MFR, there are a variety of allegations which I either could not substantiate, or which I believe are endemic to Army Operations. Some of these include:

a. The limitations of the interrogation capability. The MFR discusses the unavailability of trained interrogators due to the use of soldier interrogators. Within the last decade, the Army inactivated and moved all interrogation units (as well as MP internment and resettlement units) to the Reserve force. Many of our military interrogators, although MOS qualified, have limited practical experience in real world interrogations. Although a significant number of them have now been activated and deployed on one or more operations, few have the level of competency that our non-uniformed DoD or government agency interrogators have. All said and done, these soldiers are what the Army has available, and are competent to conduct detainee operations from screening to interrogations in support of the OIF operations.

b. The lack of knowledge of Geneva Convention requirements. I can find no data to substantiate this allegation, but I find it interesting that [REDACTED] states in the attached email that although he deployed to participate in the development of the JIDC and ISG, he had to email to the rear for a copy of the Geneva Convention and Army regulations on confinement and detention operations.

c. Segregation of Detainees. This can be substantiated (see Exhibit 13). It is well documented that there was significant overcrowding at the CHA and the HVO. There were minimal facilities available for the segregation of intelligence detainees, which was a function of the availability of facilities, rather than a purposeful neglect of the basic foundations of detainee operations.

d. Screening and timeliness of interrogations. Again, this can be substantiated (see Exhibit 13). The sheer volume of detainees compared to the number of interrogators and/or translators were the major inhibitors to timely screening, identification of key detainees, and interrogations. This issue was evident at all

echelons, beginning with the initial detention to the movement of detainees from the capturing unit, through the Division Detention Facilities, to the CHA or HVD.

e. Shortcomings in supplies for detainees. This is primarily true, although not documented to substantiate, especially in the early stages of detainee operations. Detention facilities strived to provide adequate blankets, water, food, etc to detainees, but items of personal apparel (underwear, shoes, etc) were not readily available within the supply system.

f. The population of the CHA and HVD were excessive to the capability of the facility. This is substantiated. The CHA was initially constructed to hold several hundred detainees. At times, the numbers of detainees exceeded 1000. The Command made efforts to reduce the population, but the options initially were limited due to the lack of an Iraqi civil prison system, as well as the need to continue to detain personnel who were not of intelligence value, but were a risk to the well being of Coalition Forces. The significant overcrowding of all detention facilities, as well as the poor living conditions was exacerbated by the extreme heat, limited facilities, and large detainee populations necessitated by the ongoing conduct of combat operations

g. Detainees were allegedly beaten and tortured, either prior to arrival or during periods where they were removed from the facility by SOF forces. The MFR claims photographic proof of these allegations but was not included in the MFR. I can find no substantiation of these allegations. Between a review of 2 MP log books (Exhibit 15) and a screening of a representative sample of detainee records (Exhibit 16), I did not find information that would lead to a finding that there was a systematic problem. I am sure that there were isolated incidents where detainees arrived in less than pristine conditions. I would attribute some of these to the results of combative detentions at the time of capture. Regardless, I can find no proof to substantiate the allegations against the SOF or Army community.

4. In attempting to answer the allegations that drove this investigation, I held informal conversations with [REDACTED] the outgoing C2 Operations Officer, and [REDACTED] the outgoing PMO Operations Officer. Between the two of them, I gained the names and units of several individuals who had already redeployed from the AOR. These included [REDACTED] the Commander of the 115<sup>th</sup> MP Bn, responsible for the operation of the CHA at Camp Cropper. I succeeded in gaining contact with him and sent him a list of questions. Unfortunately I have not yet received responses to my questions. I also attempted to find contact information for [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] without success. I then turned to current units and made contact with the Commander of the 744<sup>th</sup> MP Bn [REDACTED] who is responsible for the HVD at Camp Cropper, the CHA having been dismantled and the detainees from there sent to either Camp Bucca in Uhm Qsar or the detention facility at Abu Gharaib. [REDACTED] provided a tour of the HVD as well as two MP log

books from the original CHA facility (for excerpts see Exhibit 15). After reviewing the log books, I identified various names (mostly first names only) of personnel involved in detainee interrogations at the facilities, to include notations of personnel from 202<sup>nd</sup> MI Bn, FBI, Customs, and [redacted]. I gained contact with the current 202<sup>nd</sup> MI Bn Commander, [redacted] (see Exhibit 17). I also gained contact with [redacted] of the Iraq Support Group (ISG) for any information he could provide (see Exhibit 14). I was unable to gain contact with the former [redacted] to review the limited information and provide any insights.

5. Finally, in conducting this investigation, I asked several organizations, to include the CJTF-7 PMO, the 89<sup>th</sup> MP Bde, and the 744<sup>th</sup> MP Bn for copies of any investigations related to Camp Cropper. There was no knowledge of any other such investigations [redacted] was aware of at least 2 ICRC inspections of Camp Cropper, one early on and a recent one of the HVD. He had requested, but had not received copies of the inspection reports for either visit.

**Tab D**

**Exhibits 1 through 11**

**Denied in Full**

**Exemptions 1 and 2**

**Tab D**

**Exhibit 12**

**Not Released—Public Document**

SWORN STATEMENT			
For use of this form, see AD 100-46; the reporting agency is ODCMOPF			
LOCATION Abu Gharaib Prison Facility, Iraq	DATE 1 Feb 2004	TIME 1300	FILE NUMBER
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	SOCIAL NUMBER	GRADE/STATUS	
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS CJTF-7, JIDC Abu Gharaib, Iraq			
<p>I, _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:</p> <p>In response to questioning by _____ reference activities at Camp Cropper, the Corps Detention Facility during OIF, the answers to the following questions are provided:</p> <p>Q. What period of time did you serve at Camp Cropper? A. From about 12 May through about 12 Sep 03.</p> <p>Q. Who was in charge of the facility prior to your arrival? A. A Co. 519th MI BN, the company commander was _____ and the Ops Chief was _____</p> <p>Q. When did you actually take over control of the interrogation operations? A. About 1 Jul 03</p> <p>Q. Part of my investigation deals with the adequacy of training of our soldiers who were involved in detainee operations. What level of training would you say the interrogators had who worked for you at Camp Cropper? A. There was a mix of experience. They all had the text book training, but for some of them, this was the first time they got to put it into practice. I had three or four though who had a lot of experience, some from Afghanistan, others who are experienced veterans, but this is their first operational deployment.</p> <p>Q. I have been reviewing FM 34-52, Intelligence Interrogations, to better understand the methods that we use to gather intelligence information from detainees. Can you tell me what type of pressure or techniques your interrogators used to get the detainees to break? A. It was hard to use some of the standard techniques like sleep deprivation or solitary confinement because we didn't have the facilities to isolate them, and there was no way to control it in the general population. We mostly used repetitive interrogations and played on their desire to go home.</p> <p>"The smarter ones, we would not respect and even kindness. We found that most of these people, if you treat them OK, they will tell you what they know"</p> <p>Q. How many interrogators did you have during the period you were at Camp Cropper. A. About 15. 13 working the cage and two to three doing the planning and operations. At the high point of personnel, I had about 29 people, including interpreters and admin people.</p> <p>Q. What kind of process did you have for the detainees? Did you talk to all of them? A. Every detainee was "pre-screened", which meant that an interrogator and interpreter sat down with them and got their basic information and any initial intelligence they might have. We then would make a determination of whether they were of intel value or not. If they were, we would then set up interrogations for them, some of them were interrogated many times until we determined that they did not have anything more to tell us.</p> <p>Q. That's a lot of work for the interrogators. How did you make sure they did not get burned out or too intense with the interrogations? A. We would watch them, and if they had a day or two of difficult interrogations, we would move them to pre-screen or what we believed would be an easy interrogation. We also had a pretty regular rotation, where they would do 3 days of interrogations, then a day of pre-screen.</p> <p>Q. What else did the interrogators have to do besides interrogations? A. They have to develop the plan for the interrogation, and then afterwards, they must do the interrogation reports. The administrative portion can take a lot of time. They would typically work 12 - 14 hour days, including both cage time and the paperwork time.</p>			
AGENT	TITLES OF	PAGE 1 OF <u>2</u> PAGES	
<p>ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ WHEN AT A G. I. E. BATH" YES CONTINUED."</p> <p>THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE _____ OF _____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE COMPLETED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.</p>			



STATEMENT *Continued*

Q. Did your soldiers interrogate all the prisoners, or was there a separate group who interrogated High Value Detainees?  
A. HVDs were interrogated by the ISG. The operations chief was CW2 Brian Searcy [REDACTED]

Q. What did you do with detainees that you determined were a security risk to Coalition Forces, but were not of intel value, or you were done interrogating?  
Most of those were going to be long-term detainees and we sent them to Camp Bucca in the south [REDACTED]

Q. Can you tell me about the physical conditions at the camp?  
A. It was tough, on everyone. It was meant to be a Corps Holding Area, to hold a few hundred or so. It was sweltering in the summer. There were tents and litter bags, and we gave them blankets. But conditions were harsh. Initially, the latrines were outside the wire, so the detainees had to be escorted, but that was fixed. There were barracks and concertina, and a few towers for the guards. But the population was so much larger than it could really hold [REDACTED]

Q. In your opinion, were the MPs properly trained in their duties to run the prison?  
A. Yes, but they were overwhelmed. There was just so much overcrowding that there were not enough MPs to do their job properly. But they did the best they could [REDACTED]

Q. Was the over crowding reported to higher?  
A. Yes, but there was nowhere else to send them, and we could not just let them loose. We also had common criminals in there because the Iraq civil system was not working and they had no prisons to keep them [REDACTED]

Q. Did you hear of any reports of abuse of the detainees, either by interrogators or MPs?  
A. No. [REDACTED]

Q. Is there anything else you would like to add?  
A. NOTHING FOLLOWS.

APPENDIX

I, [REDACTED], HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

[REDACTED]  
*Signature of Person Making Statement*

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 1 day of Feb 2009 at ABU GHURAYB, IRAQ.

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[REDACTED]  
*Official Title of Person Administering Oath*  
*Authority To Administer Oath*

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

[REDACTED] LTC CJTF7-C2 operations

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Monday, February 23, 2004 12:27 PM  
To: [REDACTED] CJTF7-C2 operations  
Subject: RE: Investigation Help

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CAVEATS: FDUO

TERMS: NONE

[REDACTED]

Please see below for my responses to your questions. Please let us know if there is anything else I can do to assist.  
Kanyon

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: RE: Investigation Help

[REDACTED]

I am attempting to wrap up my investigation. Your info was helpful and led me to a couple more questions, as follows:

1. Were there any reports or indications of abuse of detainees that you were aware of during the Jun/July timeframe? I am not aware of any reports or indications of abuse of detainees in the SCF at Camp Cropper at any time.
2. Did you see any indications or reports of improper detention or interrogation techniques at the JIDC or MVDP? I never saw indications or received any reports of improper detention or interrogation techniques at either the JIDC or MVD SCF.
3. Do you have any knowledge of why [REDACTED] left the JIDC after only 6 weeks? My understanding is [REDACTED] departed due poor health. He really should not have deployed due to heart problem, I believe. Given the heat and the stress at the time, he physically broke down one evening. The next day is when he told the ISG leadership he needed to return to the States for health reasons.

Again, thanks for your time and help.

[REDACTED]

-----Original Message-----  
From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Sunday, February 15, 2004 1:49 PM

To: [REDACTED] CJTF7-C2 operations  
Subject: RE: Investigation Help

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED  
CAVEATS: FOOO  
TKNS: KOXK

[REDACTED]  
Sorry I didn't get back with you sooner; too much going on. Now it's time to play catch up with all the email.

Regarding the list of names below, I can't help with any of the OCA, JIDC, FBI, or Customs names listed.

Under ISG, [REDACTED] GS15, came out to Baghdad same time I did but he only stayed about six weeks. Arrived 2 June and departed about mid-July, if I remember correctly. [REDACTED] was the Chief of the JIDC during the time he was here. As you probably know, the ISG JIDC is responsible for the intelligence collection operations of the detainees held at Camp Cropper.

[REDACTED] GS14, was the Chief of the JIDC before [REDACTED]. He returned to COMUS about the end of June, maybe the first part of July. He was not part of the ISG; rather, he was with COB-South, which was here before the ISG.

[REDACTED] was a member of the JIDC under both [REDACTED]. She returned to COMUS about mid-August, I think.

The only name I recognize in the list of unknowns is [REDACTED]. He was one of our lead interrogators and was in the JIDC prior to the ISG arrival and departed in either November or December. He is a specialist in one of the reserve units that still supports the ISG, but want home for demobilization early since he was mobilized early, I think.

The current Chief of the JIDC is [REDACTED]. He can be reached at [REDACTED] via Deputy for collection operations at the SCF at Camp Cropper is GS14 [REDACTED]. Believe [REDACTED] number is [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] arrived here in early November and [REDACTED] arrived in January.

The JIDC headquarters is at Camp Slayer near the ISG Headquarters. ISG Headquarters is in the domed palace at Camp Slayer. If you want to get together, please let me know. I have meeting today at 1500 with my boss, who is departing for a couple of weeks tomorrow, so I must spend some time with him. I could also put you in touch with [REDACTED] via email, but will wait for you to decide on that.

Don't hesitate to let me know if there is anything else I can do.

[REDACTED]  
Deputy Chief  
Survey Operations Center, ISG

-----Original Message-----

2/23/2004

27

From: [REDACTED]  
Sent: Saturday, February 14, 2004 2:21 PM  
To: [REDACTED]  
Subject: Investigation Help

[REDACTED]

Thanks for returning my call today. I look forward to coming out and meeting you tomorrow. As a bit of background, I have been tasked to do a Procedure 15 into allegations of abuse at Camp Cropper and the MVD, with a time period focused on the early summer period.

I have managed to find a copy of the MP log for King 4, I think of the MVD, but am not certain, and have reviewed it for what info I could glean. Fortunately, at the outset, the MPs were very good about writing down a lot of details about activities there. I have copied quite a list of names, some of which you may be able to help me with. Unfortunately, most of the names are first names only. I would like to toss out what I have that are id'd as either JIDC, OGA, other agencies, or unknown and see if you can link me up with any of them, or give me any background on them that I can use to find them.

Here is what I have based on the log. I recognize that some of the agency IDs may be incorrect.

[REDACTED]

Again, I know that first names don't give a lot, but if you can give me any ideas of where to go with this. If 1400 is a good time for you, I will call tomorrow about noon to ensure that you are available and then come on out to see you.

Thanks for your time!

[REDACTED]

2/23/2004

18



CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED  
CAVEATS: FOO  
TERMS: NONE

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

CAVEATS: FOUO

TERMS: NONE

15- #78 escorted to latrine by [redacted] and back to cell: 0500  
 16- Meds distributed to detainees [redacted] 0530  
 17- #28 escorted to latrine & back to cell [redacted] 0600  
 18- #25 escorted to latrine & back to cell [redacted] 0630  
 19- #05 escorted to latrine & back to cell [redacted] 0700  
 20- #06 #14 escorted to latrine and back to cell [redacted] 0730  
 Meds distributed Meds to detainees # [redacted] 0800  
 #28, #29, #06, #78, #23, #05 [redacted] 0830  
 21- #29 escorted to latrine and back to cell [redacted] 0900  
 22- # [redacted] from compound 4 being interviewed by [redacted] 0930  
 3230 JIF [redacted] 1000  
 23- #23 escorted to latrine & back to cell [redacted] 1030  
 Meds responded to put dressing on #78 [redacted] 1100  
 24- 8 present 9 assigned End of Tour [redacted] 1130  
 25- Shift Change [redacted] 1200  
 26- 9 Assigned - 8 present #029 C.M.I. [redacted] 1230  
 27- 026 out to latrine [redacted] 1300  
 28- #28 out to latrine [redacted] 1330  
 29- #28 in from latrine [redacted] 1400  
 30- [redacted] in to assess lock on [redacted] 1430  
 C cell [redacted] 1500  
 31- 006 out to latrine [redacted] 1530  
 32- 006 in from latrine [redacted] 1600  
 33- 070 out to latrine [redacted] 1630  
 34- 078 in from latrine [redacted] 1700  
 35- 078 requests to speak with the Camp Commander [redacted] 1730  
 36- 001 out to latrine [redacted] 1800  
 37- 001 in from latrine [redacted] 1830  
 38- 001 out to latrine [redacted] 1900  
 39- 001 return from latrine [redacted] 1930  
 40- 006 out to latrine [redacted] 2000  
 41- 006 return from latrine [redacted] 2030  
 42- 006 out to M.I. interrogation [redacted] 2100  
 43- 006 out to latrine [redacted] 2130

2003 #018 escorted ~~back~~ Back to Bldg 4  
 2010 =BI + LEFT The compound  
 2029 Light Cigarette For C #008  
 2043 Escorted #024 to the Latrine + Back  
 2057 Escorted #004 to the Latrine + Back  
 2100 [redacted] site visit  
 2127 Escorted #025 to the Latrine + back  
 2135 New detainee processed and put in FI #026  
 he also said that he is Diabetic and is asking  
 For some sugar WAF gave him one blanket writing  
 For medical. - 8 EPW  
 2200 [redacted] pass out meds to  
 006 and 023 also to check on 026  
 2205 [redacted] site visit  
 2250 [redacted] and interrogators here to see #026  
 2325 [redacted] LEFT the site  
 2345 Escort #026 to the Latrine + Back  
 2348 Interogators LEFT the site  
 2355 [redacted] site visit out side the wire  
 30 April  
 0904 Team 4 assumed duties. - 3 EPW, 12 MP's  
 0915 Chaplain visits #25 (left 0920)  
 0920 [redacted] advises new detainee coming  
 0925 New detainee US91Z-115027 DP brought into  
 compound, processed, banded, fed + watered  
 and placed in B-I. (See log B)  
 1012 Detainee in 5G transferred to ST #024.  
 1032 New detainee #US91Z-115028 DP brought  
 into compound, processed, banded, fed + watered  
 and placed in 5G.  
 1140 Medical [redacted] arrived  
 DC rounds left @ 1140. [redacted] 31

1959 Interrogators with 026 LEFT  
2019 Escort 006 to the Latrine  
2025 Call medic 2nd time for 006 and also for new EPW  
2031 Escort 026 to the Latrine  
2039 LOU here to see 026 Give him a ~~fringe~~ <sup>new</sup> Poncho Liner  
2043 Escort 004 to the Latrine  
2105 Escort 006 to the Latrine  
2133 Escort 040 from Tent 8 to Bldg 5 For interrogation  
2156 [redacted] +/Nase to see 025 note 3 meals in cell  
not touched

2205 [redacted] to pass on look for EPWs. Fasting or not eating  
2208 [redacted] pass med to 006  
2348 040 Escorted back to Tent Interrogators LEFT

2400 Team 3 assume duty 5 EPWs 8MPS 2 Mynall's  
2546 #005 escorted to latrine & back to F.  
0623 #002B escorted to latrine and back to F  
0626 #006 ESCORTED TO LATRINE AND BACK TO F  
0727 #002B ESCORTED TO LATRINE AND BACK TO F  
0747 #002B escorted to latrine and back to F  
0800 #004 ESCORTED TO LATRINE AND BACK TO F  
0840 #005 ESCORTED TO LATRINE AND BACK TO F  
20858 #008 ESCORTED TO LATRINE AND BACK TO F

20877 All detainees were Fed daily Rations  
1928 #025 Escorted to latrine and shower back to E

[redacted] ...  
[redacted] ...  
[redacted] ...  
[redacted] ...  
[redacted] ...  
[redacted] ...  
[redacted] ...  
[redacted] ...  
[redacted] ...  
[redacted] ...  
[redacted] ...



#### Results of Review of Representative Sample of Detainee Files

On 19 Feb 04, I visited Abu Gharaib prison to view a small sample of the detainee files transferred from Camp Cropper when it was closed and the detainees transferred. I worked in the Magistrates Office and was provided access to the files by [REDACTED]

I reviewed 12 files, chosen at random, of detainees who were captured in the May-Jul 03 timeframe. Some of these detainees have subsequently been released. I specifically reviewed two files of detainees I identified during my review of the MP logbooks. One of these, Detainee [REDACTED] was of particular interest due to multiple notations within the logbook of pain, requests for the doctor, and indications of injuries. It is impossible to know at this point if the injury reportedly diagnosed in the logbook (dislocated shoulder) occurred prior or during his capture. It is my finding that the injury did not occur during his detention in the CIA.

During my review of the files, it was apparent that the data provided at the time of detention was minimal and lacking in detail. Some of the files had photographs taken of the detainee at the time of capture. Some did not. In those files that did have photos, the photos did not show any injuries or indications of abuse at the time of capture. Throughout all the files, the information available was insufficient to determine abuse or improper interrogations of the detainees.

[REDACTED]

From  
To  
Date

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Has this by any chance been done before?

[REDACTED]

What  
Date

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Look for people  
in the area

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Good to talk to you today. I appreciate your time and knowledge of your soldiers who may be able to help us with this investigation. For your background, I am doing a Procedure 15 on allegations of prisoner abuse at Camp Cropper during the early summer. I have found a copy of an ME log book for one of the buildings and have done some data mining to try to find people to talk to. Unfortunately, most of the names I have are only first names. But let me give you what I have and you can tell me if any of these ring a bell, and are available for contact. I also recognize that some of the names are probably the interpreters. Again, these are the names of folks from April through about July of '01.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

If you have any of these folks, or ever  
coordinate with them, please let me know  
days.

Finally, if you have any information  
any link finding the source of the  
transferred from Cabbot to the general public, please let me know.

I hope you all are well out there and that things quiet down. Keep  
your head down!

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I appreciate your taking the time to assist me with my investigation. I have been appointed a Procedure 15 Investigating Officer, under the procedures of AR 15-8 into "all relevant facts and circumstances surrounding alleged mistreatment of Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs) or civilian internees considered High Value Detainees (HVDs) that were held at the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) facility at Camp Cropper".

I am attempting to contact all who might be able to shed light on the allegations which I have not seen. As you can imagine, it is a challenge with many of those who were here during the early part of OIF already gone. I am hoping that you will be able to assist in wrapping this up. I would like to use this document as a TAB in my write up so some of the questions might seem a bit academic. Please bear with me.

Q: How long have/did you command the 115<sup>th</sup> MP BN?

A: I assumed command of the 115<sup>th</sup> MP Bn on 7 FEB 03, and I am still in that position.

Q: What was the mission of your Bn in Iraq during OIF?

A: The 115<sup>th</sup>'s mission was to establish the Special Prison/Confinement Facility (SP/CF). The battalion was later tasked to establish the Corps Holding Area and assume that mission from the 3d MP Bn.

Q: Is the 115<sup>th</sup> MP Bn an Internment and Resettlement Bn or a Combat Support Bn?

A: The 115<sup>th</sup> is an Internment/Resettlement Battalion.

Q: Were/are your soldiers specifically trained in internment operations?

A: Yes

Q: Did you have any additional forces assigned or attached to your Bn for the purpose of augmenting or supporting internment operations?

A: Elements of 13<sup>th</sup> PSYOPS, 529<sup>th</sup> MI Bn, and 325<sup>th</sup> MI Bn were assigned in support of the Corps Holding Area. We also worked with ISG in the SP/CF.

Q: I understand that your Bn was responsible for the detainee population at Camp Cropper, Baghdad, Iraq. For what period of time was the 115<sup>th</sup> in control of Camp Cropper?

A: The 115<sup>th</sup> was in control of Camp Cropper from approximately 25 APR-3 to 26 NOV 03. These dates may be off by a few days

**Q: What was the initial, and then any subsequent missions, of Camp Cropper?**

**A: The initial mission was to establish the SP/CF. The subsequent mission was to establish the Corps Holding Area (CHA). The CHA initially held EPW, then became the de facto Baghdad city jail, as there were no confinement facilities operational under Iraqi control. The EPW population was eventually replaced by common criminals.**

**Q: What were the physical conditions at Camp Cropper? Can you describe or draw the physical layout of the facility?**

**A: The CHA was constructed of concertina wire and tents, perimeter lighting (portable light sets), and guard towers. Guard towers started out as HMMWVs and were eventually improved to portable scaffolding, then wooden guard towers. The tent floors were initially dirt, then carpet, then plywood. The perimeter was dirt berms on three sides, with the fourth side facing the troop area. An ig-processing tent and medical tent were also inside the wire. Water was distributed from a 3,000 tanker from which the detainees filled 5 gallon water cans. Meals initially consisted of Humanitarian Daily Rations, then transitioned to MREs.**

**Q: What was the planned population density of the facility?**

**A: The CHA was designed to detain 250 persons.**

**Q: What was the largest population density that you experienced at the facility?**

**A: The highest population was approximately 1100.**

**Q: Did you have any significant issues (riots, escape attempts, threats to guards or other detainees) during the 115th's tenure at Camp Cropper?**

**A: All of the above events occurred at one time or another.**

**Q: If so, to what do you ascribe those events?**

**A: Several factors combined to precipitate the events, but the overriding complaint from the detainees was the length of time they were interned until their cases could be reviewed and adjudicated. This was primarily due to the slow pace at which the Iraqi courts could handle cases. Other factors included overcrowding, personal disputes between detainees, and poor documentation of alleged offenses by capturing units.**

**Q: Did you ever receive reports or allegations of mistreatment of detainees, either by guard or interrogator personnel?**

**A: I recall two occasions.**

**Q: If so, what actions were taken, either by you, your chain of command, or other chains of command?**

**A: In each case I conducted a commander's inquiry and informal AR 15-6 investigation. The 800<sup>th</sup> MP Bde conducted an AR 15-6 investigation on one of the cases. In each case the soldiers responsible were given Field Grade Article 15s.**

**Q: Were issues of concern (such as over population, poor sanitation, allegations of abuse, etc) were forwarded up the chain of command?**

**A: Yes.**

**Q: If so, to whom?**

**A: The brigade headquarters, whether the 18<sup>th</sup> or 800<sup>th</sup> MP Bde were notified. Additionally, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) visits were regularly conducted, and the results were given to the 800<sup>th</sup> MP Bde and the 115<sup>th</sup>. All concerns were also voiced in weekly meetings at CJTF-7 and weekly ICRC meetings, both of which involved representatives from CJTF-7 JAG and the 800<sup>th</sup> MP Bde.**

**Q: If so, did you ever receive a response or see evidence of changes to improve/prevent future occurrences?**

**A: In every case the 115<sup>th</sup> took immediate measures. The 18<sup>th</sup> and 800<sup>th</sup> MP Bde headquarters and CJTF-7 also provided as much support as was available to rectify deficiencies. Where appropriate, operating procedures were modified, additional training was conducted, and disciplinary measures were taken by the 115<sup>th</sup>.**

**Q: What else can you tell me about Camp Cropper?**

**A: The CHA portion of Camp Cropper was a very difficult and demanding operation that was conducted exceptionally well in light of the austere conditions under which it was forced to operate. The soldiers were professional, creative, compassionate, and proactive in terms of improving conditions and procedures. The 115<sup>th</sup>'s higher headquarters, initially the 18<sup>th</sup> MP Bde and finally the 800<sup>th</sup> MP Bde, worked diligently to support the 115<sup>th</sup> throughout. All issues were presented**

and addressed openly, with the goal of providing the most doctrinally correct treatment of detainees possible. The detainees received the best possible medical care, and often benefited from improvements in living conditions before the soldiers did. The ICRC recognized Camp Cropper's accomplishments and continuous improvements, as did higher headquarters up to and including CJTF-7.



UNCLASSIFIED  
HEADQUARTERS  
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE SEVEN  
BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APO AE 09053

April 2, 2004

REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

Office of the Staff Judge Advocate



Dear

This letter responds to your concerns about the operations at the Joint Interrogation and Debriefing Center (JIDC) in Iraq in June of 2003. In conversations with [REDACTED] Stuart A. [REDACTED] you explained to him what you knew of abuses and irregularities in interrogation procedures occurring at the JIDC. [REDACTED] passed this information along to authorities at the Command Joint Task Force - 7 (CJTF-7) Headquarters. As a result, an investigation was conducted at the direction of Lieutenant General Thomas Metz, Commanding General, III Corps, and Deputy Commanding General, CJTF-7.

Unfortunately, the passage of time and the change-over of units reduced the Investigating Officer's ability to make decisive findings and recommendations. The Investigating Officer found no evidence to support the allegation that detainees were mistreated in violation of applicable policies, regulations, or the Geneva Convention. Neither did the Investigating Officer find evidence that the issue was constructively raised to superiors nor addressed at the time. In reviewing historical data, the Investigating Officer did find that the facility was not of sufficient size to handle the number of detainees and the types of operations ongoing at the facility. She also found a lack of practical experience on the part of the Military Police and Military Intelligence soldiers charged with the administration of war-time detention interrogation and operations. The Investigating Officer also found there was a limited number of Military Police Internment and Resettlement trained soldiers and Military Intelligence trained soldiers within the Active Component. The Investigating Officer made recommendations for improvements to JIDC Operations.

Many of the measures recommended by the Investigating Officer have already been put in place. Camp Cropper, where the JIDC formerly operated, has closed and the detainees who were located there were transferred to other facilities. There are committees in place working on a

UNCLASSIFIED

40



theater-specific Standard Operation Procedure concerning detainee operations. Commanders are emphasizing the necessity to treat all individuals with dignity and respect.

Thank you for coming forward with your concerns. It is extremely important that we maintain accountability for our actions. Whenever there is a doubt as to whether our operations are being conducted in accordance with standards, those concerns should be examined in the clear light of day. Your concerns helped us to examine a very important operational matter.

Please feel free to contact [redacted] or [redacted] if you have any further concerns. [redacted] or me directly at [redacted]

Sincerely,

[redacted signature block]

CF [redacted]