

(b)(2)

4. (FOUO) SOP table (b)(2)
(b)(2)

5. (FOUO) SOP (b)(2)
(b)(2) (b)(2) (X) Not violated.

6. (FOUO) SOP (b)(2)
(b)(2) (XXXII) Not violated.

7. (FOUO) SOP (b)(2) (b)(2)
(b)(2) (XXXII) Not violated.

8. (FOUO) SOP table (b)(2)
(b)(2)
(b)(2)

9. (FOUO) SOP (b)(2)
(b)(2) (b)(2) (XIII)

10. (FOUO) SOP (b)(2)
(b)(2) (XI, XII)

11. (FOUO) SOP (b)(2) (XII)
Not violated.

12. (FOUO) SOP (b)(2)
(b)(2) (b)(2) (XVI, XVII)

13. (FOUO) SOP 18-8g (b)(2)
(b)(2) (b)(2) (XV, XVI, XVII)

14. (FOUO) SOP ¶32-9o: (b)(2)
(b)(2)

15. (FOUO) SOP ¶8-6f: (b)(2)
(b)(2) (XIV)

16. (FOUO) SOP (b)(2)
(b)(2) (XI)

17. (FOUO) SOP (b)(2)
(b)(2) (XX)

18. (FOUO) SOP (b)(2)
(b)(2) the discipline matrix. (XX)

19. (FOUO) Per SOP (b)(2)
(b)(2) (XV)

20. (FOUO) SOP (b)(2)
(b)(2)

IV. Detainee Information Management System

1. (FOUO) The Detainee Information Management System (DIMS) is the primary system for Camp Delta guards to record everything related to detainees and events that occur in the blocks, as well as the primary system employed by the JDG staff in performance of staff duties.

2. (FOUO) DIMS generates and transmits numerous reports or messages, to include guard messages concerning policy changes, important events, rosters to inform Block NCOs about present detainees, Significant Activities Sheets that inform the JDG S2 about major events such as assaults, meal refusals, and the like.⁹⁰

3. (FOUO) At the cell block level, guards enter log entries into DIMS at the beginning of each shift, and throughout the shift. These entries are reviewed by Platoon Leaders, Sergeants of the Guard, Block NCOs, and sometimes the FGTW officer, before and during the watch. Because DIMS entries are mandatory,

⁹⁰ SOP *passim*.

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continually updated, and thorough, they provide a significant source of information as to the events that occurred on 9 June 2006.

4. ~~(FOUO)~~ I used the following types of DIMS documents in this report:
 5. ~~(FOUO)~~ Block Blotter;⁹¹
 6. ~~(FOUO)~~ Guard Messages, aka Guard Mount Messages;⁹² and
 7. ~~(FOUO)~~ Random Headcounts.⁹³

⁹¹ Alpha Block Blotter, 9 June 2006 to 10 June 2006 (TAB J5)

⁹² Guard Messages, aka Guard Mount Messages, 7 December 2005 to 10 June 2006 (TAB A3).

⁹³ Tab J-6, Tab J-7

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(U) Findings of Fact: Manner and Time of Death

V. (U) Manner of Death: Armed Forces Medical Examiners' Opinions

1. (FOUO) The three deceased detainees each died of asphyxiation due to hanging, and the manner of death was suicide in each case.
2. (FOUO) The Final Autopsy Report for ISN 093 states that "This 21 year-old detainee died of hanging." The report further states that "After an extensive investigation there is no evidence to suggest that anyone else was involved in this death. Based on the information available, the manner of death is suicide."⁹⁴
3. (FOUO) The Final Autopsy Report for ISN 588 states that "This 30 year-old detainee died of hanging." The report further states that "Based on the information available at this time, the manner of death is Suicide."⁹⁵
4. (FOUO) The Final Autopsy Report for ISN 693 states that "This 37 year-old detainee died of hanging." The report further states that "Based on the investigative information of this date, there is no evidence of anyone else being involved with this death." The report concludes that "Based on currently available information, the manner of death is suicide."⁹⁶
5. (FOUO) Medical examiners' estimated the time of death for ISN 588 and ISN 693. The medical examiner did not estimate time of death for ISN 093.
6. (FOUO) The Final Autopsy Report for ISN 093 does not include an estimated time of death.⁹⁷
7. (FOUO) The Final Autopsy Report for ISN 588 states that "The description of the body during the attempted resuscitation indicates that the death occurred at least a couple of hours before he was discovered."⁹⁸
8. (FOUO) The Final Autopsy Report for ISN 693 states that "based on the medical documentation of the remains during the attempted resuscitation, the

⁹⁴ Final Autopsy Report for Yasir T. al Zahrani (ISN 093), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 2 August 2006 (TAB H1).

⁹⁵ Final Autopsy Report for Mani Shaman Turki Alutaybi (ISN 588), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 2 August 2006 (TAB H2).

⁹⁶ Final Autopsy Report for Ali Abdullah Ahmed (ISN 693), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 1 August 2006 (TAB H3).

⁹⁷ Final Autopsy Report for Yasir T. al Zahrani (ISN 093), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 2 August 2006 (TAB H1).

⁹⁸ Final Autopsy Report for Mani Shaman Turki Alutaybi (ISN 588), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 31 July 2006 (TAB H2).

decedent had been dead for at least a couple of hours prior to the discovery of his body.⁹⁹

VI. (U) Medical Evidence from Subject-Matter Expert Regarding Strangulation

1. (FOUO) On 15 August 2006, CPT (b)(3):10 USC spoke with Professor (b)(3): (b)(7)(C) (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Professor (b)(7)(C) is an expert in the field of strangulation and asphyxiation deaths. Professor (b)(7)(C) has performed consultation work for the Navy and for the Department of Defense. With regard to self-inflicted strangulation, Professor (b)(7)(C) offered the following:¹⁰⁰

2. (U) In the "typical jail house hanging" (self-inflicted strangulation) the individual is unconscious within two minutes and dead within four minutes.
3. (U) The two-minute/four-minute time frame is applicable even if the individual strangled himself or herself lying down using a ligature wrapped around the neck.
4. (U) Most self-inflicted strangulations are not full-suspension hangings; that is to say, there is some contact between the floor or another object and the body.
5. (U) Death will occur much quicker in a full-suspension hanging.
6. (U) Autopsies are generally unhelpful in determining how long it took any particular person to die from strangulation.
7. (U) Foreign airway obstructions in the throat may cause death faster than asphyxiation without foreign matter in the throat.

VII. (U) Estimated Time of Death: Discovery of the Bodies

1. (FOUO) Alpha Block guards discovered the body of ISN 093 in cell A8 at about 0030 on 10 June 2006.

2. (FOUO) CTM1 (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) notified him of the problem in A8 around 0025 to 0030.¹⁰²

⁹⁹ Final Autopsy Report for Ali Abdullah Ahmed (ISN 693), Office of the Armed Forces Medical Examiner, Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, dated 1 August 2006 (TAB H3).

¹⁰⁰ Summary of (b)(7)(C) interview, Tab I-3

¹⁰² NCIS (b)(3):1 6/14/2006 (TAB C6.a)

3. (FOUO) MA3 (b)(3):1 USC stated that he went to Alpha Block at about 0027 and saw other guards looking into cell A8.¹⁰³

4. (FOUO) MA1 (b)(7)(C) stated that he saw Alpha Block guards running around at 0030. By that time the guards already had carried ISN 093 to the medical clinic and returned.¹⁰⁴

5. (FOUO) MA2 (b)(3) stated that he returned from chow around 2345. He began his rounds at midnight, and then traded almost immediately with MA3 (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b) estimated that approximately 15 to 30 minutes later (i.e., between 0015 and 0030), MA3 (b)(3):10 USC spotted the problem in cell A8.¹⁰⁵

6. (FOUO) MAC (b)(3):10 USC stated that he was notified of the problem sometime after midnight.¹⁰⁶

7. (FOUO) MA1 §13 stated that MA3 (b)(3):1 noticed a problem with cell A8 while MA3 (b)(3):1 was walking the tier from 0030 to 0100 on 10 June 2006.

8. (FOUO) MA (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) s tier shift as starting before MA3 J §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) rned from chow.¹⁰⁷

9. (FOUO) MASN (b)(3):10 USC stated that he "went to chow at approximately 2345."¹⁰⁸

10. (FOUO) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that she went to chow with MASN (b)(3):10 USC and returned from chow about 2340.¹⁰⁹

11. (FOUO) MA3 (b)(3):10 USC stated that he returned from chow at about 2355, and that he remembers taking over MA2 (b)(3):10 USC s tier shift at about 0036.¹¹⁰

12. (FOUO) MASN (b)(3):10 USC thought that he heard the (b)(2) alert for ISN 093 at approximately midnight.¹¹¹

13. (FOUO) MA1 (b)(3):10 USC thought he heard the (b)(2) alert for ISN 093 approximately five to ten minutes before midnight.¹¹²

100	NCIS	(b)(3):10	2006 (TAB C13.a)
101	NCIS	USC	5/2006 (TAB C16)
102	NCIS	§130b,(b)(006 (TAB B3.a)
103	NCIS	6),(b)(7)(C	006 (TAB C1.a)
104	NCIS)	006 (TAB B2.a)
105	NCIS		1/2006 (TAB B6.a)
106	NCIS		7/2006 (TAB B4.a)
107	NCIS		2006 (TAB B5.a)
108	NCIS		1/14/2006 (TAB C2.a)
109	NCIS		2006 (TAB C5.a)

14. (FOUO) MASN (b)(3):10 USC did not provide an approximate time for the discovery of ISN 093.

15. (FOUO) Camp 1 guards discovered the body of ISN 588 in cell A12 at about 0035 on 10 June 2006.

16. (FOUO) MA1 (b)(3):1 USC stated that he saw Alpha Block guards running around at 0030. By that time the guards already had carried ISN 093 to the medical clinic and returned. When he walked up to Alpha Block he heard "(b)(2) Alpha 12."¹¹³

17. (FOUO) Camp 1 guards discovered the body of ISN 693 in cell A5 at about 0040 on 10 June 2006.

VIII. (U) Estimated Time of Death: Pronouncement of Death

1. (FOUO) Findings of fact regarding the pronouncement of death for ISN 093 (cell A8) include the following:

2. (FOUO) JDG escort team members who accompanied ISN 093 to the Naval Hospital Guantanamo Bay stated that medical personnel at the hospital declared ISN 093 to be dead at 0150 on 10 June 2006.

3. (FOUO) MA3 (b)(3):10 stated that "ISN 093 was pronounced dead at 0150."¹¹⁴

4. (FOUO) MA2 (b)(3):10 stated that "At about 0150, a doctor at the Naval Hospital pronounced ISN 093 dead."¹¹⁵

5. (FOUO) Findings of fact regarding the estimated time of death for ISN 588 (cell A12) include the following:

6. (FOUO) Camp Delta medical clinic personnel report that the Senior Medical Officer, Dr. (b)(3):10 USC (S130b, (b)(6), (b)(7)(C)) pronounced ISN 588 dead at 0115 on 10 June 2006.

7. (FOUO) (b)(3):10 USC stated that "The SMO came back in [to exam room #11 in the Camp Delta medical clinic] at 0115 and asked how long we have been administering CPR. We told him

¹¹³ NCIS (b)(3): 6/13/2006 (TAB C16)
¹¹⁴ NCIS 10 6/14/2006 (TAB C4, a)
¹¹⁵ NCIS USC 6/15/2006 (TAB C9)

for about half an hour. The SMO (b)(3):10 USC §130b.(b)(6).(b) pronounced the detainee dead at that time [0115].”

8. (FOUO) (b)(3):10 USC stated that ISN 588 “was pronounced dead by the Senior Medical Officer [Dr. (b)(3):10 USC] at about 0115-0120.”¹¹⁷

9. (FOUO) (b)(3):10 USC stated that “At 0115 the doctor [Dr. (b)(3):10 USC] pronounced the second detainee [ISN 588] dead.”¹¹⁸

10. (FOUO) HM3 (b)(3):10 USC stated that “Both of the detainees [ISN 588 and ISN 693] in the two exam rooms were pronounced dead about 0115—0116.”¹¹⁹

11. (FOUO) HN (b)(3):10 USC stated that “At 0115, Dr. (b)(3):10 USC made the decision that the detainee was dead.”¹²⁰

12. (FOUO) Findings of fact regarding the pronouncement of death for ISN 693 (cell A5) include the following:

13. (FOUO) Camp Delta medical clinic personnel report that the Senior Medical Officer, Dr. (b)(3):10 USC §130b.(b)(6).(b)(7)(C) pronounced ISN 693 dead at 0115 on 10 June 2006.

14. (FOUO) HM2 (b)(3) stated that “CDR (b)(3):10 USC “called it” meaning that he was pronouncing the time of death. I looked [my] watch and it was 0115.”¹²¹

15. (FOUO) HM3 (b)(3):10 USC stated that “Both of the detainees [ISN 588 and ISN 693] in the two exam rooms were pronounced dead about 0115—0116.”¹²²

16. (FOUO) HN (b)(3):10 USC §130b.(b)(6).(b)(7)(C) detected no signs of life [in ISN 693] and called the time of death at 0116.”

116	NCIS	(b)(3):10	5/2006 (
117	NCIS	USC	5/2006 (TAB F3)
118	NCIS	§130b.(b)(7/2006 (TAB F6)
119	NCIS	6),(b)(7)(C	16/2006 (TAB F7)
120	NCIS)	5/16/2006 (TAB F9)
121	NCIS		006 (TAB F4)
122	NCIS		16/2006 (TAB F7)

IX. (U) Estimated Time of Death: Medical Examiners' Final Autopsy Reports

1. (FOUO) The final autopsy report for ISN 093 does not include an estimated time of death.
2. (FOUO) The final autopsy report for ISN 588 states that "The description of the body [of ISN 588] during the attempted resuscitation indicates that the death occurred at least a couple of hours before he was discovered."¹²³
3. (FOUO) The final autopsy report for ISN 693 states that "The description of the body [of ISN 693] during the attempted resuscitation indicates that the death occurred at least a couple of hours before he was discovered."
4. (FOUO) The medical examiner's estimate of a couple of hours narrows the range of possible times for the deaths of ISN 588 and ISN 693.

5. (FOUO) If a couple of hours equaled two hours, then ISN 588 and ISN 693 would have died between 2230 and 2300, during the tier watch of MASN (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(

6. (FOUO) (b)(3):10 USC §130b,(b)(6),(b)(7) was the guard whose attention was drawn to cell A12 (ISN 588) during his 2230-2300 tier watch. MASN (b)(3):10 USC stated that: "When I arrived at A12, I saw a blue blanket on the floor. The blanket appeared to have something or someone under it so I proceeded on. I interpreted this to be the detainee lying underneath it. I did not visually scan the cell to see if anything or anyone was hanging inside. I proceeded past (b)(2) but I didn't look in any of the cells because I was thinking about the blanket on the floor in A12."¹²⁴

7. (FOUO) MASN (b)(3):10 USC also stated that "I feel that the guards and myself on Alpha block did an inadequate job monitoring the detainees that night to make sure that they were following the rules as to show[ing] some kind of skin while sleeping. I feel this happens with everyone on every block, everyday. We see and do the same things every day, and it gets old and boring. I wish I would have been more attentive and could have done something to save the detainees. I don't know if the detainees died on my watch, but I somehow feel responsible for their deaths."¹²⁵

¹²³ NCIS (b)(3):1 /16/2006

¹²⁴ NCIS 0 USC 6/14/2006 (TAB B6.a)

¹²⁵ NCIS §130b,(/14/2006 (TAB B6.a)

8. (FOUO) If a couple of hours equaled more than two hours, then the next earlier tier watch on which ISN 588 and ISN 693 may have died would be the 2200—2230 shift by (b)(3):10 USC

9. (FOUO) MA3 (b)(3):1 was the guard who discovered the initial detainee suicide, in cell A8.¹²⁶

10. (FOUO) MA3 (b)(3):1 is a brig MA; he told me that “in a brig, ‘The SOP is how it goes.’”¹²⁷

11. (FOUO) Later in the same interview, in response to my question “How did you check detainees for a head count?” MA3 (b)(3):10 said he “Looks at one at a time; also looks for contraband, but doesn’t take it until detainee wakes up. It takes 6--10 minutes to view sleeping detainees; sometimes you have to watch several minutes [to detect movement].”

12. (FOUO) If a couple of hours was more than two and a half hours, then the detainees hanged themselves while the tier was fully illuminated.

13. (FOUO) MA3 (b)(3):1 stated that “I am positive that all three detainees were alive when I completed sweeping. This would have been shortly before 2130.”¹²⁸

14. (FOUO) MA3 (b)(3):1 0 USC stated that after assuming the 2200—2230 tier watch, he mopped up some puddles and then reminded the other guards to turn (b)(2)²⁹

¹²⁶ (b)(3):10
¹²⁷ USC
¹²⁸ §130b,(b)(6)
¹²⁹ (b)(7)(C)

6/14/2006 (TAB B5.a)
iew 7/26/2006 (TAB B5.c)
6/15/2006 (TAB B4.a)
6/14/2006 (TAB B5.a)