

Tab D-2

(b)(3) (b)(5) (b)(7)(C)

Statement, 14 August 2006

When did you assume the Deputy CO duties? What guidance did she receive about SOPs?

I arrived for duty in August 2005 and assumed command of the Navy Expeditionary Guard Battalion (NEGB)(then known as the Navy Provisional Guard Battalion) on 27 August 2005. In February 2006 I was appointed the Deputy Commander, Joint Detention Group in addition to my duties as the Commander, NEGB.

What were the rules regarding hanging things on the cell walls?

Although not articulated in the form of a direct order, I understood my guidance from (b)(3) (b)(5) (the Commander, Joint Detention Group) to be that the SOP was the policy for the conduct of business in the camps and that, while not perfect, it was not a 'guideline' but more a 'regulation' to be adhered to. I, in turn, put this out to the camp leadership, from (b)(2) but also told them to exercise good judgment so that guards did not become 'heavy handed' or be accused of taunting/baiting detainees.

There were differences in the way that the camp chains of command operated based on the interpretation of the SOP by the camp leadership, the dynamics of the individual

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The guards in Camp 1 felt there was too much negotiation going on with detainees and that the camp leadership was interpreting the SOPs too liberally with the intent of keeping a quiet camp. In April I conducted a Command Climate Survey to assess the command's morale and feelings on their quality of life and working conditions. While the survey itself is a standardized survey, I also included questions that the individuals could answer freely. When I received their responses and noticed that many of them addressed their concerns with 'interpretation of the SOP', I conducted CAPT's Calls with all personnel by pay grade to find out what was causing their frustration. The general complaints centered around the camp leadership not enforcing the SOP so that the detainees would stay calm and not cause problems, telling them to be 'flexible' in what parts of the SOP were strictly enforced, that there were too many changes to the SOP that

were coming out too quickly, and that they were losing their ability to control the detainees with all the negotiating that was taking place.

With each subsequent group that I met with, up to and including the officers, I reiterated that the SOP was not merely guidance, but the policy that I expected them to adhere to when running the camps and dealing with detainees.

The SOP rules concerning hanging things on cell walls was vague. While it allows for

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would enforce the rules for good order and discipline.

If you had walked on the block that night and seen sheets & blankets hanging up, what would you have done?

If I had been on the blocks that night, as someone with a different perspective since I did not spend 12-14 hours a day on the block, I would probably have noticed the blankets and

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Generally, when I (or any senior leadership) came into the camps, the word would be passed that I was in the camps and headed to a certain block. Block operations would always be running smoothly when I arrived and normally I would only find minor corrections that would be needed.

What are strengths & weaknesses of Alpha Block guard team on night of 9/10 June?

The leadership on the block and in the camp on 9/10 June was proficient at their jobs. The night AOIC was (b)(3) (b)(6) While quiet and reserved, he has solid leadership skills and a good grasp of camp operations. (b)(3) (b)(6) is also reserved, and while not the strongest Chief (in terms of leadership) in the command, I had never had complaints or heard of any deficiencies in his performance from the camp leadership or the Sailors assigned to the camp. I did not know the junior Sailors individually as that is the responsibility of the camp leadership. I would normally only know the Sailors individually if they had been brought to my attention for something they had done extremely well or if they had encountered an issue or problem (such as NJP).

How was turnover conducted between AOICs?

Turnover between off-going and on-going shifts is done in the camps as part of guard mount. While I (or the CMC) would occasionally go by guard mounts to either give a coin or share some info, it was not on a routine basis in May as I had been conducting CAPT's Calls during the month. Turnover between the Camp AOICs was normally done in the Camp offices or in the Camp OICs office in the NEGB HQ trailer. It was not done in front of me since I may or may not have been in the building at the time. If I needed to ask a question, I would call the AOIC on the cell phone.

How were random headcounts conducted?

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Why do you think the Alpha Block guards didn't spot the bodies earlier?

On the night of 9/10 June I think the guards did not see the bodies earlier because they were not thinking that the detainees would commit suicide. The recent attempts had been from (b)(2) and when they did encounter a detainee making a suicide gesture by hanging, it was usually a fake gesture and they were not in real danger of hurting themselves because of quick guard force reaction. On that night it was hot and dark on the block and when the detainees went to sleep earlier than usual for a Friday night, I think the guards were grateful that there had not been any problems on their shift that night. They were complacent since there had not been any recent problems in the camp or on that block.

What sort of intelligence was being briefed on the threat of suicide?

There had not been any concrete intel passed on to the guards about how a detainee might commit suicide, and the only real attempt that some of them had seen was when 261 cut himself a few months earlier. I don't think their minds were able to grasp the concept of suicide, jihad and martyrdom and the self-discipline it would take a person to commit an act like this.

(b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)



Place: Camp America, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

Date: 28 July 2006

I, (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) make the following free and voluntary statement to (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) whom I know to be appointed by RADM Harry B. Harris, Jr., to conduct an informal investigation into whether (1) the Camp Delta SOP was followed by relevant Joint Detention Group personnel during the overnight hours of 9-10 June 2006; and, (2) if the SOP was not followed, whether this failure contributed to the ability of the detainees to commit suicide on that night. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of the death of three detainees in Alpha Block.

(b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

At the time of the suicides, the night of 9-10 June 2006, my assignment at JTF-GTMO was AOIC for the Camp 1 Detention Facility. The Camp 1 Detention Facility includes Blocks (b)(2). My duties include ensuring the safe and humane treatment was provided to all detainees assigned to Camp 1, ensuring the health and welfare of the Sailors assigned to Camp 1 was maintained and various administrative duties for the Sailors assigned. My subordinates include the Platoon Leader, Sergeant of the Guard, down to the Alpha Block NCO on the night of 9-10 June 2006, (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C).

Describe your role on the night of the suicides, 9-10 June.

I was assigned as the daytime AOIC from 10Feb06, I was not on duty the night of 9-10 June however I am always on call.

What are the rules on hanging things in cells?

At the time the incident occurred detainees were allowed to hang items in their cells as long as guard force personnel were able to maintain continuous line of sight of the detainee.

How frequently did you attend guard mount? Walk cell blocks?

I attended guard mounts randomly to address the guard force or to ensure the time allotted for guard mount was being utilized effectively. I walked the cell blocks daily and was present in the causeway when not in the camp to tour the blocks.

What was your understanding of the level of threat of suicide in the weeks before 9-10 June?

There was always a general level of threat of suicide in the camp however, the weeks before the Alpha Block incident the threat level was HIGH. This was due to intelligence leading the command to believe an incident of a mass self harm was eminent.

What guidance did you give the guard force about that threat?

I advised my guard force of the intelligence received regarding the threat on numerous occasions to ensure they took it seriously. I also had my PL's/SOG's hold guard mount training on (b)(2) procedures on each shift's first day on after having two consecutive days off to ensure the procedures were fresh in their minds...also to reiterate the seriousness of the threat.

Why do you think it took the Alpha Block guards so long to find the bodies?

I don't know, I wasn't present on the shift so I cannot provide a clear answer on that.

What are the procedures for a random headcount? Were you aware of guards not visually confirming the headcount via sighting of skin or movement?

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Do you recall the name of the officer giving training on random headcount procedures at guard mounts in the weeks before 9-10 June, and do you recall the substance of those procedures?

I do not recall any such training.

When there were changes in procedure directed by your superiors, how did you communicate those changes to the guard force?

Most changes came out via the BUB, our daily morning meeting and were usually verbal orders directed to us by the CJDG. I normally communicated those orders directly to my PL and SOG verbally directly after the morning meeting.

How did you verify that those changes were clearly understood by the guard force?

I would ask the guard force operational/procedural questions when touring the blocks. I also had my PL's maintain a pass down log to ensure we maintained continuity

throughout the shifts. Also, when procedural changes are made they were usually put in a Guard mount message in DIMS for the PL's and SOG's to brief at guard mounts.

What sort of guidance were you given by your superior officers regarding enforcement of rules?

I was told by the CJDG to go by the SOP however, it was a guideline and us as OIC's and AOIC's need to think outside the box at times to assist in preventing incidents from occurring. Sometime after this conversation when (b)(3) (b)(6) became the DCJDG we were told to follow the SOP verbatim. Sometimes our guidance seemed to be conflicting because there were times we (OIC's/AOIC's) would make decisions in accordance with the SOP and get counseled on using common sense at the morning meetings. For some time there were conflicts between DOC and the camps because personnel from DOC would call directly to the blocks and order the guards to do things without the OIC's or AOIC's knowledge....one incident in particular was a call that came from DOC (The Chief of Discipline) to Alpha block telling the guards to take a detainee out to the recreation yard to allow him to cross camp talk to a detainee in Camp 2/3 (I believe the

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What sort of guidance did you give the guard force about enforcing the SOPs?

I instructed my guard force to follow the SOP and any guard mount messages that came out.

Did you find it necessary to tell guards to ease up on enforcement?

No, I never directed guards to "Ease Up" on enforcing the SOP.

(b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

TAB D -- (U) Joint Detention Group Leadership

1. (U) (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) [redacted] Statement, 17 June 2006 [NCIS exhibit 48]
2. (U) [redacted] 14 August 2006
3. (U) [redacted] Statement, 8 August 2006
4. (U) [redacted] Statement, 28 July 2006