



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**Battlefield Interrogation Techniques Desired - But Not in Use -**  
**by CJTF-180 as of January 24, 2003 (U)**



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


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Bagram Collection Point Techniques In Use by CJTF-180 as of January 24, 2003 (U)



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
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(U) Finally, in addition to these locally developed techniques, the January 24, 2003 memorandum tacitly confirmed that "migration" of interrogation techniques had occurred separately. During December 2002 and January 2003, according to the memorandum, interrogators had employed some of the techniques approved by the Secretary of Defense for use at GTMO. Use of the Tier II and single Tier III technique ceased, however, upon the Secretary's rescission of their approval for GTMO on January 15, 2003.

(U) The CJTF-180 Assistant SJA submitted this memorandum to CENTCOM on January 24, 2003, but received no response from CENTCOM or from the Joint Staff. According to a brief provided by the Deputy Commander, CJTF-76 to VADM Church on June 24, 2004, the CJTF interpreted this lack of response as "silence is consent" with regard to the techniques already being employed (which, again, no longer included the tiered GTMO techniques). From CJTF-180's perspective, they had submitted a summary of techniques used in the field to their operational commander for further transmittal to the Joint Staff, and in the

absence of any negative feedback, the CJTF legal staff concluded that the techniques described as being currently employed in the January 24, 2003 memorandum were unobjectionable to higher headquarters and that the memorandum could be considered an approved policy. There is no indication, however, that any of the additional desired techniques requested in the memorandum (i.e., those listed above for BI, plus deprivation of light and noise at BCP) ever received any official sanction, whether from LTG McNeill or higher authority. (In fact, LTG McNeill stated that he did not recall approving any specific techniques at all up to this point.)

(U) Why was there no response to CJTF-180's January 24, 2003 request for approval of techniques? According to Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), General Peter Pace, USMC, "The USCENTCOM Deputy Commander [then Lt Gen M. P. DeLong, USMC] sent a letter to me dated 11 Apr 03 requesting OSD approval of a list of CJTF-180 prepared interrogation techniques for the Bagram Collection Point. The request was coordinated within the Joint Staff and CJCS determined that the CENTCOM request was inconsistent with the guidance provided SOUTHCOM on interrogations. On 15 May 03, CJCS forwarded a memo recommending the same interrogation guidelines [i.e., those approved for GTMO] be issued to CENTCOM. I have no evidence that CENTCOM was provided any formal response to their 11 Apr 03 memo."

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
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BCP Techniques Listed in Deputy CENTCOM's April 11, 2003  
Memorandum to VCJCS (U)



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(U) Development of the March 2004 CJTF-180 Interrogation Policy

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

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
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
**March 2004 Afghanistan Interrogation Guidance (U)**

(U) Because the March 16 memorandum governed the conduct of the primary interrogation facility - BCP - we have considered this guidance to be effective as of that date. Additionally, the March 16 memorandum provides the most detailed discussion of the techniques approved. In the discussion that follows, we will reference the March 28 SOP where it provides additional relevant information, or where it differs from the March 16 memorandum.

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
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
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purpose of all interviews and interrogations is to get the most information from a detainee with the least intrusive method; always applied in a humane and lawful manner with sufficient oversight by trained interrogators or investigators."


(U) The memorandum concludes with a caution labeled "Safety First:" "Remember, the

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Additional Techniques Approved in the March 16, 2004 CJTF-180 Policy (U)



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
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