


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
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
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
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


(U) June 2004: Adoption of the May 2004 CJTF-7 (Iraq) Interrogation Policy

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Techniques Approved in the May 13, 2004 CJTF-7 Policy Memorandum (U)

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reported to our interviewers.

(U) Investigative Procedure

(U) From June 19 to July 8, 2004, 24 Interrogation Special Focus Team members deployed to Afghanistan. These personnel were divided into a team that focused on CFC-A, CJTF 76 and CENTCOM headquarters, traveling to each of those locations; a team that focused on the Bagram detention facility; a team that focused on the Kandahar detention facility and outlying FOBs; and a team that focused on the operations of forces in the field, including SOF, which also traveled to several FOBs. The teams reviewed records, visited facilities, observed all aspects of detainee operations - including interrogations - and conducted approximately 315 interviews, most resulting in sworn statements.

(U) Our interviews covered the entire spectrum of personnel involved in detainee and interrogation operations, from flag and general officers to junior enlisted interrogators and troops who participated in the capture of detainees. In addition, our team in Washington conducted an extensive review of the documentary evidence gleaned from responses to our data requests to commands and agencies throughout DoD, as well as data collected during previous investigations. We also took advantage of previous reports, including the Jacoby report (described previously in our summa-

Interrogation Techniques Employed (U)

(U) As in the previous section covering GTMO, this section begins with a brief summary of our investigation, followed by a comparison of the techniques approved for use in Afghanistan (i.e., the CJTF-180 and CFC-A interrogation policies) with those techniques actually employed, as

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ry of existing reports).

**(U) Comparison of Interrogation Techniques
Approved and Employed**


(S) The chart on the following page presents the comparison between interrogation techniques approved for use in Afghanistan and the techniques that were actually employed, as determined through our interviews and document reviews. Readers are invited to refer to the description of the chart format presented in the GTMO section, as the same explanatory information and qualifications apply here.



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(U) As in the GTMO section, the chart depicts the use of many techniques coded white or orange, indicating techniques employed without specific approval that nonetheless are not necessarily problematic. These two colors indicate that the applicable policy memoranda did not specifically discuss the techniques in question; therefore, it is by no means certain that interrogators would categorize the techniques' application as distinct from other, approved techniques. For example, though the current (1992) edition of FM 34-52 does not specifically authorize Mutt and Jeff, nothing in the FM, the Geneva Conventions, or other policies

or doctrine inherently prohibits it. Similarly, interrogators in Afghanistan often opined that Yelling was inherent to Fear Up Harsh, which is a doctrinal technique, and that Deception was inherent to many, if not most of the doctrinal techniques. In these instances, X marks in orange blocks may not be a matter for concern, since neither interrogators nor the drafters of the policies might presume the technique to be outside the bounds of doctrine. (We will of course discuss exceptions below.)



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(U) A final qualification regarding the chart bears repeating: as in the GTMO section, the absence of an X does not mean conclusively that a technique was never employed; rather, that we found no evidence or allegations indicating its employment. Nevertheless, based on our exhaustive interviews we are confident that the chart presents an accurate picture of the techniques

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
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
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employed in Afghanistan, and that any abuse incidents or improper employment of techniques unknown to us would have been isolated events.

(U) First, the initial column reveals that numerous techniques not specified in FM 34-52 were in use in Afghanistan prior to the January 24, 2003 CJTF-180 *de facto* interrogation policy (which affirmed that many of those techniques were already in use). The most likely explanation for this fact (which we will revisit in this report's section discussing migration of interrogation techniques) is that interrogators used a variety of techniques that they believed - based on a broad interpretation - to be in accordance with FM 34-52 doctrine.



(U) Next, dissemination of approved interrogation policies to forces in the field was poor prior to the implementation of the CJTF-7 policy in June 2004. For example, BG Jacoby found with regard to the March 2004 policy that "only one-third of the bases had the SOP...it was generally not guidance known or relied upon in the field." (Of course, it should also be noted that the March 2004 policy actually added techniques that had previously been prohibited by LTG McNeill.) In short, up until the adoption of the CJTF-7 policy in June 2004, it is likely that many units in Afghanistan were simply conducting interrogations as they always had: based on their interpretation of FM 34-52, rather than any theater interrogation policy. This finding is supported by the general left-to-right continuity of X marks representing techniques employed, including some in techniques that had been prohibited by LTG McNeill (e.g., stress positions).

(U) Overall Compliance with Approved Techniques

(U) A broad look at the chart illustrates several findings regarding overall compliance with approved techniques. Our general findings are summarized here to provide background for our examination of techniques employed.

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(U) Third, as BG Jacoby found, dissemination of the CJTF-7 policy in June 2004 was more effective (possibly because its shorter length - five pages as opposed to the March policy's 22 - permitted easier transmission over tactical satellite systems to FOBs that did not have secure e-mail capability). Our interviews reflected this finding: as the fourth column of the chart demonstrates, interrogators complied with the policy's prohibitions (there are no X marks in techniques coded red within the range 1-50). (There are, however, X marks with no brackets in techniques coded orange, indicating that they were improperly used without CJTF-76 permission; again, this was most likely due to interrogators' belief that those techniques fell within the bounds of FM 34-52.)

(U) Finally, an examination of the techniques always prohibited by law or policy (51 through 58) reveals few incidences of their use, as will be described fully in the section that follows.

(U) We now turn to a discussion of specific interrogation techniques employed in the course of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Previous sections have described legal and humanitarian concerns surrounding the use of certain techniques; with some exceptions, we have not reiterated those concerns in this section, which simply describes the techniques employed. Nevertheless, the aforementioned concerns should be borne in mind.

(U) Our discussion is divided into six parts: first, doctrinal techniques contained in FM 34-52; second, techniques introduced by the January 2003 CJTF-180 interrogation policy; third, techniques introduced by the March 2004 CJTF-180 interrogation policy; fourth, techniques introduced by the adoption of the May 2004 CJTF-7 interrogation policy; fifth, additional techniques not specifically mentioned by any policy; and sixth, techniques prohibited by law or policy.

(U) FM 34-52 Techniques

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(U) Techniques Introduced by the
January 24, 2003 CJTF-180
Memorandum

(S/NF) [Redacted]

(S) [Redacted]

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
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

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