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policy was promulgated and then revised respectively; and in May 2004, the current policy was issued. We now turn to a discussion of this policy evolution.

(U) The evolution of approved interrogation techniques in Iraq was heavily influenced by the fact that most initial planning focused on defeating the Iraqi military forces, rather than on the subsequent occupation. LTG Sanchez, in his statement to LTG Jones, outlined the problem: "Remember the war had ended and we did not envision having to conduct detention operations of this scope and for this length of time. It was go to the FM [Field Manual] and figure out how you are going to do it based on the FM. We did not envision continuing to conduct operations and increase the numbers of detainees at the levels that we wound up having to do. The same thing happened with interrogations. Let's go to the FM and you do it according to the FM. It clearly was not sufficient."

(U) OPORD 1003V and Major Combat Operations

(U) CENTCOM's war plan for the invasion of Iraq, OPORD 1003V, gave no specific interrogation guidance, and little guidance on detainees beyond that which could be found in governing doctrine. Appendix 1 to Annex E to CENTCOM OPLAN 1003V, "Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW), Retained Persons, Civilian Internees, and Other Detainees," echoes the familiar distinctions

between EPW, RP and CI found in GPW and GC, as codified for the military through AR 190-8 and CENTCOM Regulation 27-13. The Appendix provides no specific guidance with relation to interrogation policy. Dated September 25, 2002, the Appendix runs only nine pages, and appears to be drawn directly from AR 190-8; nowhere in the annex do the words "Iraq" or "Iraqi" appear. It is virtually indistinguishable from the same annex to the Operation ENDURING FREEDOM war plan.

(U) In light of the absence of specific guidance governing interrogations in the OPORD, as LTG Sanchez indicated, interrogators initially relied on the techniques outlined in FM 34-52. There is little record of interrogation operations during the major combat phase of the war; indeed, given the coalition forces' speed of advance and overwhelming air supremacy it seems likely that coalition forces may have had a more complete operational picture of friendly and hostile force disposition than most captured Iraqis, minimizing the importance of interrogations of EPWs.

(U) The Iraq Survey Group

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
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
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(U) Although the ISG did not report to CJTF-7 (with the exception of at least one brief period as the command structure evolved), but to CENTCOM, and thus was not bound by CJTF-7 interrogation guidance, we found that the guidance promulgated by MG Dayton was more explicit (and conservative) than any put forth by CJTF-7 at this early stage of the operation. MG Dayton confirmed to us his doctrinal foundation: "The ISG did not use any interrogation/debriefing techniques beyond those in FM 34-52. Debriefing techniques primarily consisted of direct questions and incentives (cigarettes, coffee, and so forth)."

(U) April-September 2003

(U) The defeat of Saddam's regime and disbanding of the Iraqi army left a vacuum in the provision of Iraqi government services. Free from the ubiquitous presence of Saddam's security forces and secret police for the first time in over 30 years, criminal elements of Iraqi society began wide-

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

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
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spread looting and crime. (This was compounded by Saddam's release of tens of thousands of criminals from Iraqi prisons shortly before the war.) At the same time, other elements began an insurgency campaign against coalition forces, attacking supply lines, sabotaging public infrastructure such as electric power generation and distribution facilities, and assassinating Iraqi citizens who cooperated with coalition forces. Coalition forces found themselves in the unaccustomed position of performing basic police and detention duties at the same time they were engaged in combat operations against a growing insurgency.



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
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
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(U) MG Fay's report has provided a comprehensive description of the evolution of interrogation policy in Iraq. In the paragraphs that follow, we review the key points of that evolution, adding our observations and data from our interviews where appropriate.

(U) Development of the September 2003
CJTF-7 Interrogation Policy




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(U) As planning for Operation VICTORY BOUNTY continued, CJTF-7 began to shut down the Camp Cropper corps holding area, transferring first hundreds, then thousands of detainees to Abu Ghraib. The A/519 Company Commander requested that the 519th MI Battalion transfer Captain Carolyn Wood, USA, who had served as Officer-in-Charge of the battalion's interrogation operations in Bagram, Afghanistan, from battalion headquarters to Abu Ghraib to head the growing interrogation mission there. CPT Wood arrived at Abu Ghraib in early August 2003 to assume responsibility for what was coalescing into the Saddam Fedayeen Interrogation Facility (SFIF).



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

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(U) Shortly thereafter, from August 31 to September 9, 2003, the JTF GTMO commander, MG Geoffrey Miller, led a team to assess interrogation and detention operations in Iraq. (MG Miller's visit was the result of an August 18, 2003 message from the Joint Staff's Director for Operations [J-3], requesting that the SOUTHCOM commander provide a team of experts in detention and interrogation operations to provide advice on relevant facilities and operations in Iraq. The need for such assistance in light of the growing insurgency had originally been expressed by CJTF-7 and CENTCOM, and the Joint Staff tasking message was generated following discussion with both CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM.) A key observation by the team was that CJTF-7 had "no guidance specifically addressing interrogation policies and authorities disseminated to units" under its command. This observation was closely related to the assessment team's central finding that CJTF-7 "did not have authorities and procedures in place to effect a unified strategy to detain, interrogate and report information from detainees/internees in Iraq."



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
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
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

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
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
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
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(U) October 12, 2003 CJTF-7 Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policy

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