

Message

up and running.

b6-1
b7C-1

CTD / Fly Team

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

You have been identified as having conducted an assignment at GTMO, Cuba since 9/11/01. The Inspection Division has been tasked with contacting those employees who have served in any capacity at GTMO and obtain information regarding the treatment of detainees. Employees should immediately respond to the following:

1) Employees who observed aggressive treatment, interrogations or interview techniques on GTMO detainees which was not consistent with Bureau interview policy/guidelines, should respond via email for the purpose of a follow-up interview. Positive email responses should be directed to:

Inspection Division **b6-1**
b7C-1

2) Employees who served at GTMO and observed no aggressive treatment of detainees, should respond via an EC documenting a negative response. The EC should include the employee's official Bureau name, title, and tenure of assignment at GTMO.

The EC should be titled "Counterterrorism Division, GTMO, Inspection Special Inquiry", file # 287-HQ-A1327668-A. The EC should not be uploaded, but only serialized, with a hard copy forwarded to:

Inspection Division
Office of Inspections
Room 7837 **b6-1**
b7C-1

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4/19/06 BY 65175 DMH/RB/JAK

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

FBI E-Mail - Employees Identified as Having an Assignment to GTMO - 9 Jul 04

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AR 15-8 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 1 of 76 Exhibits

SEARCHED
SERIALIZED
INDEXED
FILED

b6-1
b7c-1

Original Message
From: [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, July 14, 2004 2:38 PM
To: [REDACTED] (INSD) (FBI)
Cc: [REDACTED] (CTD) (FBI)
Subject: RE: GTMO

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/19/06 BY 63179 DMH/PUB/JAC

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

b6-1
b7c-1

[REDACTED]
I was the Case Agent for the first 14 months of GTMO. I spoke with Valerie Caproni two months ago when I was in Iraq and the Abu Gharib fallout was just breaking. At that time, it seemed the Bureau's focus was identifying any liability in the form of direct involvement. I would be happy to sit down with you and walk you through what I saw as the predictable onset of aggressive treatment, interrogations or interview techniques. In short, the Bureau personnel there had no direct participation. But I think I may be able to assist in describing the landscape for you and giving you the details about where some things went off the tracks. I just moved to TAC (redacted) and am phone-less, but I have this e-mail

UNCLASSIFIED

2/14/2004

~~SECRET//NOFORN//X1~~



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
3311 NW 91ST AVENUE
MIAMI, FL 33172-1217

SCCC

2 June 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR Major General Geoffrey Miller, Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

SUBJECT: ~~(S//NF)~~ Letter of Promulgation Regarding Secretary of Defense Guidance On Interrogation
Techniques

1. ~~(S//NF)~~ This memorandum provides amplification on the 16 April 2003 guidance from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) regarding Joint Task Force Guantanamo's implementation of interrogation techniques.

2. (S//NF) The SECDEF's memorandum directs that Techniques B, I, O, and X be used only when required by military necessity, and that the SECDEF be notified in advance. Prior to applying these techniques against a specific detainee, I direct you to submit a memorandum for approval pursuant to the detainee's initial interrogation strategy (or when that strategy changes).

[REDACTED]

3. ~~(S//NF)~~ To clarify other matters raised by the SECDEF's memorandum:

(a) Reference Technique B, the Working Group was most concerned about removal of the Koran from a detainee—something we no longer do. Because providing incentives (e.g., McDonald's Fish Sandwiches or cigarettes) is an integral part of interrogations, you will notify me in writing when the provided incentive would exceed that contemplated by interrogation doctrine contained in Army FM 34-52, or when the interrogators intend to remove an incentive from a detainee.

(b) Reference Techniques I and O, you will notify me in writing when use of these standard interrogation techniques goes beyond the doctrinal application described in Army FM 34-52. When use of the technique is consistent with FM 34-52, you do not need to notify me.

(c) I define "sleep deprivation," referenced in Technique V, as keeping a detainee awake for more than 16 hrs or allowing a detainee to rest briefly and then repeatedly awakening him, not to exceed four days in succession.

(d) Reference Technique X, I do not consider the use of maximum security units as isolation. A detainee placed in a maximum security unit is segregated, but not truly isolated.

(e) I define the "least intrusive method" as the technique that has the least impact on a detainee's standard of treatment, while evoking the desired response from the detainee during interrogations.

~~SECRET//NOFORN//X1~~

Memo to CDR JTF-GTMO Ref Letter of
Promulgation Re SECDEF Guidance on Interrogation

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 18 of 76 Exhibits

DOD JUNE

3736


~~SECRET//NOFORN//X1~~

SCCC

SUBJECT: ~~(S//NF)~~ Letter of Promulgation Regarding SBCDEF Guidance On Interrogation Techniques

(f) Except in the case of Techniques B, I, O, and X, I have determined that the first O-6/GG-15 in the chain of command or supervision, is the "appropriate specified senior approval authority," unless approval authority is withheld from that individual by higher authority.

4. ~~(S//NF)~~ Lastly, I have told the Secretary of Defense his 16 April guidance applies to all Interagency elements assigned or attached to JTF GTMO.


JAMES T. HILL
General, USA
Commander

Derived From: Multiple Sources
Reason: 1-5(c)
Decl on: X1

~~SECRET//NOFORN//X1~~

2

**SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF MG (RETIRED) MIKE
DUNLAVEY**

MG Mike Dunlavey, FORMER COMMANDER, JTF-170, was interviewed and made the following statement on or about 1007 hours, 17 March 2005, at WFO, Arlington, VA:

Appointment memos were shown to this witness. The witness went over the allegations.

Witness sworn by LtGen Schmidt. The witness provided the following testimony:

BACKGROUND:

How I became the JTF-170 Commander? I was working at the National Security Agency. On 14 February 2002, I was contacted to meet with the SECDEF. I received a joint service billet description. I met with the SECDEF on the 20th or 21st of February 2002, along with the Deputy SECDEF, Wolferwitz and a number of other personnel.

The SECDEF told me that DoD had accumulated a number of bad guys. He wanted to set up interrogation operations and to identify the senior Taliban and senior operatives and to obtain information on what they were going to do regarding their operations and structure.

The SECDEF said he wanted a product and he wanted intelligence now. He told me what he wanted; not how to do it.

Initially, I was told that I would answer to the SECDEF and USSOUTHCOM. I did not have to deal with USCENTCOM. Their mission had nothing to do with my mission. Everything had to go up to USSOUTHCOM then to JCS. The directions changed and I got my marching orders from the President of the United States. I was told by the SECDEF that he wanted me back in Washington DC every week to brief him.

I have 35 years of Intelligence experience. I am a trial lawyer and between interrogations in Vietnam, being a CI Commander, and as a trial lawyer, I have done over 3,000 interrogations. The SECDEF needed a common sense way on how to do business.

The mission was to get intelligence to prevent another 9/11.

GTMO Situation:

Mike Lehnert did a miraculous job of getting Camp X-ray set up.

When I got to GTMO the facility consisted of literally a dangling fence. Detainees were right next to one another. In the Seabee hut for example, everyone saw who was being interrogated.

DoD photographers were taking pictures for historical purposes. They published them with no regard for security. My job was to establish it.

B6 [redacted] was the Assistant J2. He worked up the JMD and tried to fill it with bodies to accomplish the interrogation mission.

We have not fought a real war since Vietnam. Except for DHS, our interrogators were virtually inexperienced. It was an OJT situation on the ground at GTMO.

When I arrived, I met the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) for the FBI. He was a SAC out of Miami. Interrogations had started but there was no system. For example, the interrogators thought [redacted] was the big dog. He made a lot of noise in the prison grounds but he was not the big guy. There simply was no process in place to assess who the real leaders were. B 6

JTF-160 was losing control of detainees. There was a major riot with the detainees. They were shaking out their blankets and throwing food.

I tried to set up a process that would work for the FBI. [redacted] worked the U.S.S. Cole incident. He was the best interrogator. He was a native speaker and was very, very good. B 6

The military linguists were worthless. They came out of school and could order coffee, but they were getting smoked by the detainees.

The guards were living no better than the detainees.

The standard was to treat them humanely.

Frankly, the 1992 version of FM 34-52 had a problem with it. It was 18 years old and it was how interrogations were done for POWs. [redacted] B1

[redacted]

[redacted] B1

My people, the interrogators, got briefed on what my task force rules were.

The Geneva Conventions applied. I treated them as human beings, but not like soldiers. They had a significant culture. The rugs and beads were significant to me. I let them practice religion. [redacted] B1

The detainees do not control the environment.

Everyday we had undercover FBI agents on [redacted] interrogating. We did want to protect the identity of the people. We had news media almost continuously on the island.

B1
B3

[redacted]

We eventually got good information on who the leaders were and then we surprised them with a response team. We grabbed them and took them out to the Brig where the ICRC could see them, but they could not talk to them.

We had detainees that jumped the guards. There was a guy that took the MRE spoon, shaved it down and made a scalpel. We changed their sheets to the sheets in the federal prison system so they can't be torn or tied. They took magnets, welding rods, and fashion them into weapons. We collected a footlocker full of weapons.

INTERROGATIONS:

We built Tiger Teams [redacted]

B1

The Combined Investigative Task Force (CITF) brought to the staff and the Joint Commander, a capability to collect evidence to criminally prosecute cases.

Our mission was to stop Americans from being killed. We were trying to work through the [redacted] I moved out smartly and met with the CINC.

B1

CITF [redacted] They had good investigative skills and had experience dealing with these people. We had mass murderers.

The FBI SAC came every two weeks. They could not decide what to do. They never built up any type of rapport. We had problems from the get go with the FBI. They had the best interrogators. Interrogations were done in my facilities. Any intelligence they got they would share with us.

We had an SOP on how we did business. We knew from the Manchester document that they would accuse us of torture and inhumane treatment [redacted]

B1
B5

Exhibit 12

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Denied in full

Exemption 1

31 B6 33

b1 [REDACTED] B1

b1 [REDACTED] B1

[REDACTED] B3

DETAINEE B6

B6 [REDACTED] B7

B6 [REDACTED]

ABUSE ALLEGATIONS:

I would show up unannounced to see what was going on in the interrogations. Someone being out of line is very possible. I won't equate it to NYPD Blue. There were situations where a guy would urinate or jack off on a female interrogator. He did it to offend her. I would not allow them to use religion as a shield. The detainees threw feces at the guards.

An Article 15 was given to a guard for hosing down a detainee. The detainee threw a bucket of urine on him.

If something was going wrong, the climate in the command was comfortable for self-reporting.

We all knew the rules; and we followed them period.

I fell on my sword for the guy that was 100 years old. He was 90 to 105 years old and in his 4th lifetime. He had no real good information. If he died we could not do a forensic study. I would violate Sharia. He was not an American soldier that would not come out in one piece. There were two other guys in their 70s to 80s. One was a cab driver that took Al Qaeda to the border. We got him out of there in October. We released 211 detainees. Only Al Qaeda reported abuses. None were abused. If a guy had information, we would focus on him.


The duct tape incident, I remember that. It was in June or July 2002. I did an internal investigation. They sat and screamed at us. I think the MPs helped the interrogators. I don't know if the guard was directed to restrain the detainee from doing something. As a judge if they screamed in court, I would tape them to a chair and tape their mouths. In a legitimate detainee facility, you would do it. If we did not, they would do it.

The detainees were treated humanely. They had a high status of care. They were not EPWs. They refused to identify themselves. On the postcards they gave us the wrong name.

Humane is who we are as the American military.

My first lesson was in Vietnam. I went out in the field and the South Vietnamese had two POWs. They got screamed at and kicked around. I watched what was going on. I was a graduate of DLA. There was a big plate of boiled rice with flies on it. I asked one of POWs when he had last eaten. He said, "four days ago and water two days ago". They chained him to a .50 cal and said he would kill him if he ran away. I had a canteen. I drank and gave him a drink. It worked. I got his name.

I employed what worked and did not work.



b6 [REDACTED]

B6

B1

Regarding the use of dogs. The dogs would be used to escort movement of personnel from detention to interrogation facilities. Dogs were there to intimidate. There were only four dogs in the whole facility. They were there to prevent riots and for security

The dogs were under control of the MP handler. They would have the dogs look at the detainees. On the other side of the coin, we do use the dogs as prisoner control in the federal system. We did not let the dogs bark or bite detainees. If [REDACTED] brought dogs to my attention, I probably would have approved it. We did not use the dogs on the prisoners.

B6

Keep in mind, they don't like dogs. Unless the dogs are on patrol, they would be in an interrogation room. Using dogs is equal to the Fear Up technique. It breaks their concentration in their response to the interrogation techniques. They would be thinking about that dog. Is the dog a real threat? Absolutely not.

[REDACTED]

B1

We physically removed an FBI agent when he went across the desk at a detainee. It happened in my first three months. He was a big kind of guy. The detainee said something like he knows his family and that he was going to kill them. I think it happened during my tenure.

FBI impersonation? No, not on a normal course of business. We did not identify who people were. The names and rank were covered. The FBI wore polo shirts and their badge. The CITF did the same thing. It was part of the deception technique. Maybe there was a complaint. I never knew or heard about it. Would CITF and FBI act as DoD? It could have been a technique.

Interfering with FBI; we had a significant difference of opinion. There was a management issue where [REDACTED] would come in and did not coordinate for a detainee because they wanted to talk to the detainee right away. FBI had interrogation plans.

They did not brief DoD. CITF was going in without telling us. Every IP had to be coordinated for facilities and linguists.

Loud music and yelling was part of a sequence of events to disrupt the detainees thought process.

Chaining the detainee in a fetal position is not a normal procedure to be used in interrogation. If the detainee leaped at an interrogator, it might have been used for security. It is not a normal procedure. The interrogators were instructed not to touch the detainees. They were to leave it to the guards.

If short shackled, the detainee had done an offensive action.

Food and water deprivation I find incredibly hard to believe. BG Baccus would not have tolerated that. Short rations were a disciplinary process. ICRC was there everyday. The Chaplain was there everyday. The average detainee gained 16 pounds. They got medical attention everyday.

The detainees went on a hunger strike. When weight metabolism decreased they went down to the medical facility. They had to give the detainees forcible IVs. They wanted Ensure. We made a joke about it.

There was no lap dance or rubbing up on detainees. There is no doubt the interrogators took off their BDU tops. They wanted to be comfortable. The hardcore detainees did not respond to women. They would not look at women. I did not approve it under any circumstances. It was stupid and offensive under the Geneva Conventions. It does not serve any useful purpose. If that occurred, I want to see the FBI report.

Red ink used as menstrual fluid? I've never heard of that technique. It would disrupt the intelligence and prosecution gathering operations.

Ghost detainees...every person that landed on the island was processed through the MP cycle.

JTF-160 was in disarray when I took over. They had 60 outstanding Inspector General complaints. We tried to clean up as much as we could before MG Miller came.

JTF-170 served two Article 15s to two individuals for personal misconduct. It was not detainee related.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

B6

Other than the incident with FBI contractor that physically went after the detainee, I don't recall any other problems with FBI agents and detainees. LTC [REDACTED] and LTC [REDACTED] might have counseled someone for wrong or inappropriate behavior.

B6

I counseled people on the lack of preparation. I did it as a group. I counseled FBI. I never had information from the IG or JAG that we had a problem. It would stick out.

[REDACTED] FBI did separate interviews. I have faith that the [REDACTED] was not abusing detainees. I had a high degree of faith. I had access to anything I wanted.

I also had high faith that the FBI was conducting proper interviews. Physical abuse just does not work. Successful prosecution was their goal. They did not want to jeopardize that.

We had four to six guys in Camp X-Ray. To put a detainee in X-Ray required that we notify USSOUTHCOM and JCS and we would have done a report in writing.

I was interviewed for the Church report.

Virtually no one had a degree of expertise to deal with these people. They do not subscribe to our values legally and morally. We did benefit from some great young people. We had a native Pakistani that was fluent in Arabic.

[REDACTED]


B3

FBI's approach was that you would stay in jail if you did not talk to us.

66 Was [REDACTED] tortured? No.

B6

I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, MG (ret) Mike Dunlavy. Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.


RANDALL M. SCHMIDT
Lieutenant General, USAF
AR 15-6 Investigating Officer

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT LT CDR [REDACTED]

LCDR [REDACTED] who was interviewed on 24 March 2005 at a conference room in the Hilton Hotel located at the O'Hare Airport, Chicago, Illinois. Also present was [REDACTED] legal representative (Navy Lieutenant). The follow-on interview took place telephonically on 14 April 16, 2005 at 1254 hours. His combined statement was substantially as follows:

I arrived at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) on or about 13 December 2002. I was deployed from European Command (EUCOM) on temporary duty status to act as the Liaison Officer for EUCOM. While acting as the LNO for EUCOM I observed some interrogations and even reviewed documents concerning [REDACTED] however I did not actively participate in interrogations or conversations concerning interrogation procedures. On or about 28 June 2003, I was released from my obligations to EUCOM and placed in the capacity of Special Projects Team Chief for Joint Task Force GTMO (JTF-GTMO). I held that position until I re-deployed on 24 September 2003.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

The only time I recall a military working dog (MWD) near a detainee was in the movement operations for [REDACTED]. At no time was a MWD used during any interrogations of [REDACTED].

I can say with certainty that none of my interrogators impersonated FBI agents during their interrogations because to do so would have been counterproductive. The mission for the JTF-GTMO interrogators was obtaining actionable intelligence from the detainee. Most of the detainees assigned to the Special Project Team were very intelligent, English-speaking men who were educated (at least partially) in the United States of America and understood our criminal justice operation. The detainees knew the FBI represented the law enforcement community. As a branch of law enforcement, the detainee's knew that the FBI had the power to incarcerate them for years. With the above being said, it wasn't shocking to learn that the detainees did not like opening up to the FBI. Therefore, it would have been stupid for me to encourage my interrogators to impersonate FBI agents.

I did authorize a couple of my interrogators [REDACTED] [REDACTED] to impersonate Department of State agents during a few interrogations of ISN 760. The impersonation approach implemented by the interrogators was approved.

~~SECRET~~

AR 15-6-GTMO Investigation
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My team never used "music" as an interrogation technique. However I know that music was used as a technique by some of the other teams (however even the other teams started to use the technique less and less over time).

Yelling was a common tool used during interrogations. Why not! My interrogators (on the Special Projects Team) didn't yell to the point of losing their cool, but they would raise their voice if the detainee was being an obstinate ass. Yelling was never used to obtain information – it was a means to make a point.

One of the key components of the new parameters was the restriction of interrogation sessions to 15 hours. The detainee was allowed 5 hours of uninterrupted sleep. Therefore, interrogations of [REDACTED] were limited to no more than 15 hours. I can't remember any interrogator setting up a 15-hour interrogation.

I never witnessed a detainee being "short shackled." However I do recall reading MFRs that described the practice (I can't recall the detainee, but it was sometime in December 2002). I made a mental note of the practice for two reasons: First, the use of stress positions, in an interrogation, isn't an effective approach for obtaining reliable information. Second, the MFRs were blunt and I feared that if "folks" not on the "team" read the reports that the contents could either be misconstrued or make the interrogators look bad (if taken in context). In fact, I even asked the interrogators about the practice and counseled him about stress positions and drafting MFRs.

As head of the Special Projects Team I was the supervisor for the implementation of the Special Interrogation Plan for [REDACTED] (the plan was submitted sometime in May 2003 and approved in late August 2003). The lead interrogator on the IP was [REDACTED]




hooded during the movement) have conversations in Arabic to further confuse the detainee.

I also posed as a White House representative (counsel to the President). I was a "Navy Captain Collins." I presented 760 with an "official" letter (a five paragraph document) detailing how his family had been captured by the Coalition Forces and was in danger if he [REDACTED] didn't cooperate. I vetted the letter through the JTF-GTMO SJA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] when he told his guard "he wanted to speak to CAPT [REDACTED] because he was unwilling to protect others at the detriment of himself and his family").

I don't know anything about someone describing a dream to a detainee about seeing a coffin with the detainee's ISN on it, or the description of the detainee being buried in Christian soil.

The approval process for a Special IP: Team produces the product, team chief presents to ICE Chief, who forwards to the JIG Chief, who forwards it to CDR JTF-GTMO. The CDR then submitted it to SOUTHCOM and SECDEF for approval. The chain of command when they executed the second Special IP was ICE Chief [REDACTED] JIG Chief [REDACTED] and JTF-GTMO CDR MG Miller



~~SECRET~~



I did not approve (i.e. review) all of the MFRs. [REDACTED] had approval authority, as did [REDACTED]. Both had approved MFRs, most especially when I was on leave.

I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the statements given by the witness, [REDACTED]. Executed at Miami, Florida on 16 April 2005

LTC GLENN CROWTHER
Investigating Officer

~~SECRET~~

B 7

B 6

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF [redacted] who was interviewed on 03 March 2005 at a conference room in the National War College Building, Fort McNair, [redacted] Department of National Security Strategy, accompanied [redacted] during the interview. [redacted] was interviewed a second time on or about 17 March 2005 at the Washington Field Office for US Southern Command in Arlington, Virginia. His statement was substantially as follows:

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from the end of July 2002 to December 2002. At the time I was the Interrogation Control Element (ICE) Chief for Joint Task Force 170th (JTF-170th)/JTF-GTMO. I was working for [redacted] when I was deployed to GTMO.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

B 1 / B 6

A military working dog (MWD) was brought into the interrogation booth of a high value detainee [redacted] on or about October 2002. The MWD was brought to the entrance of the interrogation booth by the dog's handler and directed to bark and growl at the detainee. The use of a MWD in an interrogation was unusual; and therefore, was mentioned in the interrogation plan submitted to the JTF-170th Commander. Once approved, the interrogation plan for [redacted] was implemented. The use of a MWD was one of many techniques approved and executed during the interrogation cycle. It is important to note that the MWD was not ordered to attack or harm the detainee. The MWD was only used as a means to intimidate the detainee. [redacted]

When I read the redacted Federal Bureau of Investigation documents on the ACLU website (the documents provided to the ACLU as part of a Freedom of Information Act request), I remember coming across the statements regarding "duct tape" and thinking the statements were about me. I recall, very vividly an incident involving duct tape that occurred during November 2002 and I am glad I have the opportunity to explain the circumstances surrounding the incident.

There was one time when I directed a couple of MPs to keep a detainee quite in the interrogation booth. I did not direct the MPs to use duct tape as an interrogation technique nor would I ever direct a guard or an interrogator to use duct tape as part of a formal interrogation. I authorized the use of duct tape as a control measure - to prevent a detainee from inciting a riot. After an interrogation session was complete (I was not involved in the session), the detainee began to yell (in Arabic): "Resist, Resist with all your might..." I stepped out of my office when I heard the commotion and walked to the interrogation booth where the yelling was coming from. When I arrived at the booth, I saw a detainee screaming and an interrogator, translator and a couple of

~~SECRET~~

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation Exhibit 21 of 76 Exhibits

guards standing there frozen. The soldiers didn't know what to do so I directed the MPs to keep the detainee quite. One of the MPs mentioned he had duct tape. After a consultation with the Joint Interrogation Group (JIG) Chief, I approved the MP's use of duct as a means to keep the detainee quite. The MPs placed a single strand of duct tape across the detainee's mouth. The single strand proved ineffective because the detainee was soon yelling the same resistance slogan again. This time the MPs wrapped a single strand of duct tape around the mouth and head of the detainee. The detainee removed the duct tape again. Fed up and concerned that the detainee's yelling might cause a riot in the interrogation trailer (there were at least eight other interrogations occurring at this time), I ordered the MPs to wrap the duct tap twice around the head and mouth and three times under the chin and around the top of the detainee's head. Just as the MPs were finished wrapping the duct tape around the detainee's head, an FBI special agent appeared in the hallway. Without inquiring why the detainee's head was wrapped in duct tape, the special agent exclaimed that he wasn't going to stand by and witness this type of abuse and stormed out of the trailer. Later that day I received a call from Major General (MG) Miller asking for my presence in his office. When I arrived, MG Miller "chewed me out." I never received a formal reprimand or any other type of punishment, but it wasn't necessary. MG Miller's conversation with me was sufficient to get the point across: even if the reason for using the duct tape was valid, it was not the interrogation section's jurisdiction to direct the guards to act. The guards were not under my control and I was not to order them to act again.

A formal investigation was never conducted regarding the "duct tape" incident and an investigation wasn't necessary. I admitted that I directed the use of duct tape and MG Miller told me not to do it again.

B6
I never instructed or authorized the impersonation of FBI agents as part of an approved interrogation plan. However I do remember when an interrogator (I believe the interrogator was [REDACTED]) told me he impersonated an FBI agent during an interrogation. I immediately told [REDACTED] that the impersonation of any government agent was authorized and that he was to stop using the approach. In fact, I even held a "town hall" meeting and told the interrogators that impersonation of non military US governmental officials was prohibited (this "town hall" meeting occurred before MG Miller took over command of JTF-GTMO). For the record, I don't believe the impersonation of FBI agents is against the law or violates any other standing interrogation policy.

The use of loud music and yelling was used during the interrogation of certain high value detainees. However the techniques were not "stand alone" techniques. The techniques were always wrapped up in other approaches (i.e. Fear Up Harsh) and would be enumerated in the interrogation plans sent to MG Dunlavey or Miller for approval.

I define "sleep deprivation" as keeping a detainee awake continuously for five or six day's straight. Based on my definition of sleep deprivation, I never authorized or witnessed the use of "sleep deprivation" in an interrogation session or approved interrogation plan. I recall having a meeting with the JIG Chief [REDACTED] the JTF-170th SJA [REDACTED] and myself regarding the maximum length an interrogation session could last. After some discussion and research, we determined that it was acceptable to interrogate detainees for a maximum of twenty hours in a twenty-four hour period. However the detainee was required to have four hours of uninterrupted sleep between interrogation sessions. We came to that number after reading about the United

B 6

States Army Ranger Course. During the Ranger Course, our soldiers are subjected to twenty-hour days and are apparently only required to have four hours of sleep. If it was okay to subject our soldiers to twenty-hour days, then in our mind's it was okay to subject the terrorist to twenty-hour interrogations. If a detainee were kept awake for 5 days straight - that would be sleep deprivation.

As the ICE Chief I was never part of any interrogations. However it was my responsibility to monitor the interrogators and interrogation sessions. I would periodically monitor interrogations to watch my interrogators in action. During one of my monitoring sessions, I noticed that an interrogator had left the air conditioner "cranked down" to 60 degrees and left the detainee alone in the interrogation booth.

I can only remember directing a female interrogator to touch a detainee one time. The interrogator, I believe her name was [REDACTED] was having difficulty interrogating a detainee. Specifically, the detainee refused to stop praying during the interrogation session (i.e. the detainee would stare at the floor and softly chant passages from the Koran). After an especially difficult and frustrating session, [REDACTED] and a native translator approached me with a suggestion to break the detainee's concentration. The plan was simple. According to the native translator, devote Muslims cannot continue to pray if they are "unclean." Therefore, if the detainee were made "unclean" he would have to stop praying. One way to make a Muslim male unclean is to be touched by a female. Based on this plan, I instructed [REDACTED] to purchase cheap perfume at the PX (rose oil). When [REDACTED] returned with the rose oil, I instructed her to put the perfume on her hands and rub her hands over the detainee's arms. The plan worked just as anticipated. The detainee stopped praying. However the detainee became violent and attempted to attack [REDACTED]. In the process, the detainee hit his mouth on the chair and chipped his tooth. Detainee was immediately taken to the hospital for treatment.

Many of the "aggressive" interrogation techniques we [REDACTED] myself requested during October 2002 was a direct result of the pressure we felt from Washington to obtain intelligence and the lack of policy guidance being issued by Washington.

I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness [REDACTED]. Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

[REDACTED]
Investigating Officer

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF Supervisory Special Agent In-Charge [REDACTED] who was interviewed on 11 January 2005 at a conference room in the Commissions Building, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). Mr. [REDACTED] an attorney for the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), was also present for the interview. His statement was substantially as follows:

B6
B6

I was originally assigned to GTMO from 25 June 2002 to August 2002. I was then re-deployed to GTMO for a two-year tour from August 2003 to May 2005. During my first deployment I was working as a Special Agent for the FBI and I am currently the Supervisory Special Agent in Charge for FBI operations at GTMO.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

The FBI conducts separate interviews from the Joint Interrogation Element (JIG) interrogators at GTMO. There are times when we will conduct interviews with the Criminal Investigation Task Force since we have similar law enforcement missions.

I know that [REDACTED], a member of the Special Projects Team, posed as an FBI agent during an interrogation. Other agents mentioned that interrogators from other agencies also posed as FBI agents. I discussed the "impersonation issue" with [REDACTED] and he said it wouldn't happen again without FBI approval. It was not an aggravated event and it was handled on the ground level. You could ask 500 agents and 400 would tell you that they posed as other people during interviews. It just requires prior coordination. The handling of this situation was an example of proper inter-agency coordination and cooperation.


B6
B6

It is my understanding that short shackling was authorized. I have never personally seen it done. [REDACTED] told me that he witnessed this.

B6

I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, Agent [REDACTED] Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

B6


BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 22 of 76 Exhibits

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/19/06 BY 65179 DMP/LS/JAC BG

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF [redacted] who was interviewed on 21 January 2005 at a conference room at a Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) facility, Tyson's Corner, Virginia. Mr. [redacted] was also present for the interview. His statement was substantially as follows: b6-1 b7C-1

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from February 2002 to February 2003. I left the island periodically during the year to conduct other FBI business. At the time I was working as a Special Agent for the FBI. BG

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

I heard about military interrogators impersonating FBI agents but the allegation didn't alarm me. Interrogators are in the business of lying to individuals that we are interviewing in an attempt to accumulate information and intelligence.

[Large redacted block of text]

I can confirm that short shackling did occur. I witnessed a detainee placed in a "catcher's stance" during an interrogation. I confronted the two military interrogators. The detainee may have also been on his knees. I reported this to Capt [redacted] the CJTF JAG, and we reported the incident to LTC [redacted] the SJA for JTF-70. b6-2 b7C-2

There were times that the air conditioner would be turned down to make the detainee uncomfortable. The Commander later said "knock it off" and I believe the practice was stopped.

I did see "SGT [redacted]" touching and holding a detainee's hand during an interrogation session. She was invading his space. It was clearly upsetting the detainee. b6-2 b7C-2

I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness [redacted]. Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005. b6-1 b7E-1

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 21 of 76 Exhibits

[Signature]
BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

UNCLASSIFIED

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/19/06 BY 65179 DMH/PAB/STW

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] was interviewed telephonically on 20 Jan 05 at a conference room at the NACAVC, Tyson's Corner, Virginia. Those present besides the witness were BG Furlow, LTC(P) [REDACTED] CPT [REDACTED] SGM [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. His statement was substantially as follows:

b6-1
b7c-1

B6

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from 21 October 2002 to 07 January 2002. At the time I was working as a Behavioral Specialist for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. My partner was [REDACTED].

B6

b6-1
b7c-1

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

I did not see the use of military working dogs (MWD) in interrogations.

b6-3
b7c-3

B2/
B6

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

b6-3
b7c-3

B2/B6

[REDACTED]

B2/B6

Use of heat/cold - Yes. Detainees would mention the cold interrogation booths when they were interrogated by the military. In fact, [REDACTED] stated that if the Torture Statute stated "80 degrees was bad, we will set the thermostat at 79 degrees or 79.9 degrees" (Mr. [REDACTED] attributed the quote to MG Miller)

B6

b6-2
b7c-2

I witnessed SGT [REDACTED] placing lotion in her hand and touching a detainee. She was whispering in the detainee's ear as her hand traveled to the detainee's lap. I didn't see her hands (because her body obstructed my view) touch the detainee's groin, but the detainee started to grimace in pain. Later, a Marine told me that SGT [REDACTED] bent the detainee's thumbs back. He went on to say that "if you think that is bad, she has done worse." I believe this incident occurred during the last week of November 2002 or the first week of December 2002.

B6

B6

b6-2.3
b7c-2.3

[REDACTED]

B6/
B2

[REDACTED] became enraged (he perceived the FBI as obstructing the military's mission) and stated "lead, follow, or get the fuck out of the way." Then he proceeded to get in my face, moments later he took the plan and stormed out of the room.

B6

AR 15-8 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 32 of 78 Exhibits

~~SECRET~~

I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the statement given by
the witness [REDACTED] Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29
March 2005.

b6-1
b7C-1

B6


BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] (INSD) (FBI)

From: [REDACTED] (CV) (FBI)
Sent: Wednesday, July 14, 2004 2:17 PM
To: [REDACTED] (INSD) (FBI)
Subject: GTMO

66-1
b7c-1

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED
NON-RECORD

TYPE
20:17 ?

I was TDY to GTMO from the dates of June 2, 2003 to July 17, 2004. During that time I did not observe aggressive treatment, interrogations or interview techniques on GTMO detainees which was not consistent with Bureau interview policy/guidelines by any FBI personnel or the interrogators from Ft. Belvoir consisting of Air Force OSI, Naval Investigative Service and possibly a few other services although I can't recall which ones. However, I do recall seeing some techniques utilized by other interrogators not associated with the FBI or the Ft. Belvoir interrogators. I occasionally saw sleep deprivation interviews with strobe lights and two different kinds of loud music. I asked the one of the interrogators what they were doing they said that it would take approximately four days to break someone doing an interrogation 16 hours on with the lights and music and four hours off. The sleep deprivation and the lights and alternating beats of the music would wear the detainee down. There was a time period where the interrogations were obtrusive enough that the interview rooms for an entire trailer were not available if one of these techniques were being utilized.

I heard many rumors about things that I did not observe. I spoke with one interrogator (not sure if military or contractor or other) that bragged about doing a lap dance on one Detainee (possibly #114). Another interrogator (not sure if military or contractor or other) bragged about making Detainee #114 listen to satanic black metal music for hour and hours. Then the interrogator dressed as a Catholic Priest and baptized the detainee in order to save him.

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 6/19/06 BY 65196 DAH/PB/STK

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 34 of 76 Exhibits

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

DATE: 6/19/2006
CLASSIFIED BY: 65179 DMH/PLB/SAK
REASON: 1A(C)
DECLASSIFY ON: 6/19/2031

Date of transcription 09/17/2004

66-1
b7c-1

[redacted] Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Special Agent (SA) [redacted] Cleveland Division, EOD 12/06/1998, was advised of the identity of the interviewing Agent and the nature of the interview. [redacted] provided the following information in regard to his temporary duty (TDY) assignment to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO):

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted] was assigned to GTMO in the position of interviewer/interrogator for 45 days from 06/02/2003 to 07/17/2003, as part of a "Special Projects" team which consisted of FBI SA [redacted] (Charlotte Division) and a task force officer whose name he could not recall.

66-1
b7c-1

[redacted] did not witness or observe aggressive treatment, interrogations or interview techniques utilized on GTMO detainees conducted by FBI or other law enforcement personnel which were not consistent with FBI or DOJ policy/guidelines, but did observe such behavior by non-law enforcement Department of Defense (DOD) personnel on at least two occasions. On these occasions the DOD personnel utilized sleep deprivation by playing loud music for 16 hours at a time with four hours between sessions. [redacted] and others brought these instances to attention of SSA [redacted] who was his Acting Supervisor (Atlanta Division) at GTMO.

66-1
b7c-1

[redacted] was not familiar with DOD policy/guidance regarding what interview/interrogation techniques were authorized. During conversations with unidentified DOD employees regarding interview techniques, [redacted] recalled being asked if he used "fear up" or "family compassion" techniques. [redacted] did not know the identities of the DOD interviewers or detainees involved in the activity. The aggressive interviews [redacted] witnessed occurred at Camp Delta in either the Yellow, Brown or Gold areas. Most interviews conducted by law enforcement and DOD personnel occurred in interview rooms located in trailers in these areas. Often DOD personnel would reserve an entire trailer when employing aggressive interview techniques.

b1 >

[redacted] (S)
[redacted] had no substantive contact with DOD personnel regarding the condition or treatment of detainee's other than regularly held briefings by the DOD Command which provided general updates of activity and the number of detainees at GTMO.

66-1
b7c-1

Investigation on 09/15/2004 at Washington, D.C. (telephonically)

File # 282 - NEW

Date dictated 09/17/2004

by SSA [redacted]

66-1
b7c-1

~~SECRET~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI.

CONFIDENTIAL

XB4

~~SECRET~~

282 - NEW

b6-1
b7C-1

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

On 09/15/2004 Page 2

and others were provided a tour of the cell area at GTMO and he characterized the cells as small but acceptable. He recalled that the detainees were switched from Meals Ready to Eat (MREs) to regular food because the detainees were becoming overweight due to the calories contained in the MREs.

b6-1
b7C-1

[REDACTED] could not recall any allegation of mistreatment brought to his attention by detainees, other than the detainees referring to techniques employed by DOD personnel as "games." [REDACTED] indicated most of the interviews conducted by the his Special Projects team were negative. Special Projects was tasked with interviewing the most hardened detainees.

b6-1
b7C-1

[REDACTED] was not in possession of pictures, video, audio, notes or other documentation which depicted or described aggressive treatment. He indicated the interviewers were searched for contraband each time they entered or exited the compound.

b6-1
b7C-1

[REDACTED] heard many rumors about aggressive or inappropriate interrogation techniques by DOD which were unsubstantiated. Among the rumors he heard were that a female DOD interrogator did a lap dance on a detainee, that a DOD interrogator forced a detainee to listen to satanic black metal music for hours, and that a DOD interrogator dressed as a Catholic Priest and baptized a detainee in order to save him. [REDACTED] had no first hand knowledge of these events and was unsure as to if they actually occurred.

b6-1
b7C-1

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SECRET

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF Agent [REDACTED] He was interviewed on or about 1030 hours, 20 January 2005, at Conference Room, NACAVC. [REDACTED] was also present during Agent [REDACTED] interview.

His statement was substantially as follow:

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from mid September 2002 until the end of October 2002. I was deployed to GTMO as part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Behavioral Science Division. During my time at GTMO I was partnered with Agent [REDACTED]

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

When I first arrived at GTMO, I was asked to participate in the planning and implementation of an interrogation plan for a high value detainee – ISN [REDACTED] ISN [REDACTED] was being housed at the Navy Brig and interrogated at Camp X-Ray. Agent [REDACTED] and I were asked to observe interrogations of ISN [REDACTED] and offer guidance to the military interrogators, based on ISN [REDACTED] behavior, on the best approaches to use in obtain reliable information. After observing a few interrogation sessions, it became clear to me that the military interrogators were using more aggressive interrogation approaches than the FBI. In fact, during one interrogation session, Agent [REDACTED] and I witnessed a dog inside the room where ISN [REDACTED] was being interrogated. Once inside the room, the dog was ordered to growl and show teeth at the detainee.

Agent [REDACTED] and I were watching an FBI interrogation in one of the interrogation trailers when [REDACTED] came into the observation booth. He was excited and stated that he had something to show us. I was curious, so I followed [REDACTED] down the hallway to an interrogation room. When I arrived at the interrogation room, I observed six or seven soldiers (or persons I believed were soldiers) laughing and pointing at something inside the room. When I looked inside the room I noticed a detainee with his entire head covered in duct tape (except for his eyes and maybe mouth). I asked [REDACTED] why the detainee's head was covered with duct tape? [REDACTED] stated because he (the detainee) refused to stop "chanting the Koran" during an interrogation session. When I asked [REDACTED] how he planned to take the tape off without hurting the detainee (the detainee had a beard and longer hair), [REDACTED] just laughed. I immediately informed Agent [REDACTED] and proceeded to notify the Criminal Investigation task Force attorney (either [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]). I don't think [REDACTED] personally put the duct tape on the detainee's head, but I believe from his actions he directed the soldiers to do it.

I recall observing two interrogations when the detainee appeared to be short shackled. The first incident caught my attention because I heard loud yelling emanating from an interrogation room. The voice I heard was speaking English and was yelling in an abusive manner. As I approached the interrogation room, I heard a thump. I observed a detainee short shackled (hands shackled to

~~SECRET~~

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 26 of 76 Exhibits

the eyebolt) to the floor when I looked inside the room. I do not remember the interrogators name or the exact date of the interrogation.

11.4.05

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, Agent [REDACTED] Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

B6


BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF [REDACTED] former Staff Judge Advocate, 170TH JTF and JTF-GTMO. She was interviewed on two separate occasions: the first interview occurred on or about 1350 hours, 21 January 2005, at the Pentagon and the second interview occurred on or about 1500 hours, 17 March 2005. [REDACTED] was also present during [REDACTED] interview, at the interviewee's request. B6

I was stationed at GTMO from June 2002 to June 2003.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

I would like to say at the outset of this interview that I am proud of the soldiers of Joint Task Force GTMO (JTF-GTMO) and the job we did under the most trying of circumstances.

I never reviewed a plan authorizing the use of military working dogs (MWD) during interrogations. I personally observed between three and four hundred interrogations and I never witnessed the use of a MWD. The MWDs are controlled and used by the Joint Detention Operations Group (JDOG). Therefore, authorization for the use of MWDs during an interrogation session would need the JTF-GTMO Commander's approval (or Major General Dunlavey's approval during the brief time period in October 2002 when he was in command of both JTF-170th and JTF-160th).

I am aware of one incident when duct tape was used during an interrogation. However the duct tape was not used as an interrogation technique; instead the tape was used as a force protection measure. According to [REDACTED] he directed the guards present at one of the interrogation rooms to duct tape a detainee's mouth shut when the detainee started yelling resistance messages. [REDACTED] was afraid that if the detainee weren't shut up his actions would incite a riot in the interrogation trailer. I first heard about the incident from [REDACTED] the Criminal Investigation Task Force (CITF) attorney. Shortly after my conversation with [REDACTED] I was ordered by MG Miller to look into the incident and take care of it. I immediately called [REDACTED]. When I spoke with [REDACTED] he admitted to duct taping of the detainee's mouth (or ordering the guards to duct tape the detainee's mouth shut). I never got into the details of the incident (i.e. whether the detainee suffered any pain when the tape was removed or exactly how much duct tape was used). After our conversation, I told [REDACTED] that the use of duct tape was not an approved technique and never do it (duct tape a detainee's mouth) again. That was the extent of the "investigation" and the command response. [REDACTED] "don't do that again." B7/
B6

UNCLASSIFIED

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 38 of 76 Exhibits

I understand that an alleged "lap dance" occurred during the early months of 2003. [REDACTED] the Joint Interrogation (JIG) Chief, conducted an investigation into the incident and determined that something inappropriate occurred. I don't recall if the report was committed to writing, but if it was, a copy should be retained at the office of the Staff Judge Advocate at GTMO. After the investigation, I believe the female interrogator involved was removed from conducting interrogations for thirty days, re-trained and returned to the fight (purely an administrative action and punishment). It is important to note: the female interrogator's actions/technique was not approved prior to implementation. B6

I am unaware of any instances of "short shackling." When we first spoke I stated I was unaware of the practice being used in interrogation and I am still unaware that the practice was used (other than hearing about the practice in this investigation and the Church investigation).


The SECDEF approved twenty-hour interrogations with four hours of sleep for certain high value detainees. I was involved in submitting the request for additional techniques in October 2002. Within that request: [REDACTED] B6

[REDACTED] Once proposed, MG Dunlavey forwarded the request to GEN Hill and ultimately to the SECDEF. [REDACTED]

Yelling was a valid interrogation technique that was used by our interrogators to obtain information.

Initially I believe interrogators would adjust the air conditioner in the interrogation rooms. MG Miller found out about this practice and directed the interrogators to stop the practice. I am not sure when this was exactly.

I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness [REDACTED] Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005. B6


LTC GLENN A. CROWTHER
Investigating Officer B6

UNCLASSIFIED

2

~~SECRET~~

b6-1
b7c-1

[REDACTED] (INSD) (FBI)

To: [REDACTED] (BS) (FBI)

Subject: RE: GTMO

Thank you. I will print out your response and once the responses are completed, a determination will be made reference the interviews.

~~Original Message~~

b6-1
b7c-1

From: [REDACTED] (BS) (FBI)

Sent: Monday, July 12, 2004 10:10 AM

To: [REDACTED] (INSD) (FBI)

Subject: RE: GTMO

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~
~~NON-RECORD~~

b6-1
b7c-1

Mr. [REDACTED]

I am responding to your request for feedback on aggressive treatment and improper interview techniques used on detainees at GTMO. I did observe treatment that was not only aggressive, but personally very upsetting, although I can't say that this treatment was perpetrated by Bureau employees. It seemed that these techniques were being employed by the military, government contract employees [REDACTED] (S)

b1-

b2-1
b6-1

My name is SA [REDACTED] Boston Division, EOD [REDACTED] currently assigned to Squad C-9, telephone (781) [REDACTED]

b7c-1

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

DATE: 6/19/2006
CLASSIFIED BY: 65179 DMH/PLB/JAC
REASON: 1.4(C) 6/19/2031
DECLASSIFY ON: 6/19/2031

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

~~SECRET~~

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AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 39 of 76 Exhibits

7/12/2004



FD-302 (Rev. 10-6-95)

~~SECRET~~

DATE: 4/19/2006

CLASSIFIED BY: 65179 DMH/PUB/STC

REASON: 1A (C) 6/19/2003

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date of transcription: 09/09/2004

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66-1
b7c-1

[redacted], Boston Division, EOD: [redacted] was telephonically contacted concerning her knowledge of any aggressive treatment, interrogations, or interview techniques at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). After being advised as to the identity of the interviewing Agent and the purpose of the interview, [redacted] provided the following information to thirteen specific special inquiry questions:

66-1
b7c-1

[redacted] described her two month TDY assignment at GTMO as an interrogator of detainees. During February and March 2003, [redacted] was teamed with two different Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) Agents and several contract translators for detainee interviews. [redacted] initially worked with one NCIS Agent for roughly the first three weeks of her assignment, then a second Agent the last five weeks of the TDY. [redacted] noted a slight work overlap between the two NCIS Agents during their training transition. The primary questioning responsibility for the interrogations was alternated each interview between the Agents. [redacted] also noted the interview assignment for the translators varied daily based on the spoken language of the detainees.

66-1
b7c-1

[redacted] never witnessed or was aware of any aggressive treatment, interrogations, or interview techniques employed on detainees at GTMO inconsistent with FBI or DOJ policy/guidelines. [redacted] had no knowledge or understanding of Department of Defense (DOD) authorization for the permitted use of harsh/aggressive interrogation techniques. Furthermore, [redacted] was unaware of DOD authorized interview techniques.

66-1
b7c-1

[redacted] had no substantive contact with Military Police at GTMO regarding detainee conditions or treatment and was unaware of any specific allegations of misconduct or mistreatment by U.S. personnel alleged by interviewees or others. [redacted] stated she had no pictures, video, audio, notes, or other documentation which depicted or described aggressive treatment, interrogations or interview techniques employed at GTMO or knowledge of anyone else who was in possession of such items.

61

66-1
b7c-1

Investigation on 09/09/2004 at Washington, D. C. (telephonically)

File # 297-HQ-A1327669-A

Date dictated N/A

by SSA [redacted] 66-1
b7c-1

~~SECRET~~

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EXHIBIT 39

FD-302a (Rev. 10-6-95)

~~SECRET~~

297-HQ-A1327669-A

Continuation of FD-302 of [REDACTED]

On 09/09/2004 Page 2

b6-1
b7c-1

b6-1
b7c-1

[REDACTED] witnessed the consequences of perhaps questionable treatment of detainees on two different occasions. The two separate incidents occurred at the interrogation trailers named "Delta Camp." However, [REDACTED] was unable to recall the specific dates or provide any knowledge of the two detainees' identities. In both incidents, the detainees were chained hand and foot in the fetal position and laying on the floor of the interview rooms. The rooms were without furnishings, to include any chairs. [REDACTED] also recalled the rooms were without evidence of any food or water. Furthermore, the temperature control of the rooms was regulated to be either extremely cold or hot. [REDACTED] noted one occasion where excessively loud rap music played in the detainee's interview room. [REDACTED] believed the detainees were kept in such conditions for periods of time more than 18-24 hours, and longer. The detainee had urinated and/or defecated on themselves.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FBI00062

b6-1
b7c-1

B36
B36

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF Supervisory Special Agent In-Charge [redacted] who was interviewed on 11 January 2005 at a conference room in the Commissions Building, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). Mr. [redacted] an attorney for the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI), was also present for the interview. His statement was substantially as follows:

I was originally assigned to GTMO from 25 June 2002 to August 2002. I was then re-deployed to GTMO for a two-year tour from August 2003 to May 2005. During my first deployment I was working as a Special Agent for the FBI and I am currently the Supervisory Special Agent in Charge for FBI operations at GTMO.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of actual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

The FBI conducts separate interviews from the Joint Interrogation Element (JIG) interrogators at GTMO. There are times when we will conduct interviews with the Criminal Investigation Task Force since we have similar law enforcement missions.

b6-2
b7c-2

I know that [redacted] a member of the Special Projects Team, posed as an FBI agent during an interrogation. Other agents mentioned that interrogators from other agencies also posed as FBI agents. I discussed the "impersonation issue" with [redacted] and he said it wouldn't happen again without FBI approval. It was not an aggravated event and it was handled on the ground level. You could ask 500 agents and 400 would tell you that they posed as other people during interviews. It just requires prior coordination. The handling of this situation was an example of proper inter-agency coordination and cooperation.

B6
B6

b6-1
b7c-1


It is my understanding that short shackling was authorized. I have never personally seen it done. [redacted] told me that he witnessed this.

B6

b6-1
b7c-1

I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, Agent [redacted] Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

B6


BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

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AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 22 of 76 Exhibits

b6-1
b7c-1

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF Agent [REDACTED] He was interviewed on or about 0930 hours, 20 January 2005, at Conference Room, NACAVC. [REDACTED] was also present during Agent [REDACTED]'s interview. His statement was substantially as follow:

b6-1
b7c-1

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from 13 Sept 02 to 29 Oct 02. I was deployed to GTMO as part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Behavioral Science Division. During my time at GTMO I was partnered with Agent [REDACTED]

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

b6-1,2
b7c-1,2

On or about 05 Oct 02, Agent [REDACTED] and I witnessed a military working dog being used during an interrogation of ISN 063 at Camp X-Ray. The dog was brought into the interrogation room. After witnessing this unorthodox interrogation technique, Agent [REDACTED] and I left the observation room. When we discussed the event with [REDACTED], he just stated the technique was approved and he didn't see anything inappropriate about the use of a dog in an interrogation.

b6-2
b7c-2

I remember the interrogation vividly for two reasons. First, I had never seen a dog used in an interrogation and I believed it was inappropriate. Second, earlier in the evening, I had a conversation with two military dog handlers (one of the handlers was an Army soldier and the other was a Navy sailor) about the best methods for training a German Shepard. I was interested because I had just recently acquired a German Shepard puppy and thought the handlers could provide valuable information. We talked to him (Mr. [REDACTED]) several different times to let him know that we objected to the use of dogs and that we did not do business that way. It was an inappropriate measure. He told us that we [REDACTED] and I) were guests and we should act accordingly.

b6-1
b7c-1

b6-1,2
b7c-1,2

There was one occasion when [REDACTED] approached [REDACTED] and me. [REDACTED] was laughing and asked us to follow him to another interrogation booth to "see something funny." I didn't go, but [REDACTED] did. [REDACTED] returned and told me that he had observed a detainee's head and face completely wrapped in duct tape.

b6-1
b7c-1

I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, Agent [REDACTED] Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.


BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

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AR 15-8 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 41 of 76 Exhibits

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF MA [REDACTED] Former Psychiatrist with the Behavioral Science Consultation Team (BSCT), sent in an e-mail response on 28 February 2005. His statement was substantially as follows: B6

I was stationed at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) from July to December 2002.

During the course of the interview I was asked about what I knew about detainee abuse at Guantanamo. I was specifically asked about the following acts: Inappropriate use of military working dogs, inappropriate use of duct tape, impersonation of or interference with FBI agents, inappropriate use of loud music and/or yelling, sleep deprivation, short-shackling, inappropriate use of extreme temperatures during interrogation, and inappropriate use of sexual tension as an interrogation technique, to include use of lap dances and simulated menstrual fluids.

I have personal knowledge of the following:

B6
B1 I witnessed military working dogs being used in interrogation of a detainee [REDACTED] B1
[REDACTED] The intensive interrogation of this detainee lasted for the better part of a month in November/December timeframe of 2002. We were told the use of dogs was an approved part of the interrogation plan. Dogs were used to intimidate the detainee by getting the dogs close to him and then having the dogs bark or act aggressively on command. I never saw a dog allowed to bite or otherwise injure a detainee. I never saw dogs used except in the interrogation of this sole detainee. One dog that was used regularly for this was a dog named, "Zeus". I do not recall the name of the handler. Z

B1
B6 It was common to observe and hear about military interrogators "yelling" at detainee's during interrogations. However I only saw loud music used in the interrogation sessions of [REDACTED] Z
[REDACTED] During those interrogations, loud music was commonly employed and was used within the framework of the interrogation plan designed to confuse, disorient, and overwhelm the defenses of this detainee. S

B1
B6 [REDACTED] Z
Sexual tension was one of many interrogation procedures approved for use in interrogations of detainees (if approved in the interrogation plan). One example of sexual tension: an interrogator rubbing against a detainee. It was felt that this sort of shocking behavior and might "rattle" the detainee. It would be culturally taboo, disrespectful, humiliating, and potentially unexpected. I did see female interrogators use scented perfumes or oils on their fingertips so that when the interrogator touched a detainee that the oil or scent would be hard to wash off. It was hoped, would be frustrating, disconcerting, embarrassing to the detainee. It was done again to enforce a commonly used "futility approach".

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 43 of 76 Exhibits

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


11.4cc)

All things considered, I am proud as hell at the restraint demonstrated by the interrogators I worked with.

I declare under penalty that the foregoing in a true and correct summary of the statement given by the witness, MA [redacted] Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 29 March 2005.

B6


BG JOHN FURLOW
Investigating Officer

~~SECRET~~

SUMMARIZED WITNESS STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL GEOFFREY D.
MILLER

MG Miller was interviewed on 18 March 2005 at WFO, Arlington, Virginia. The witness was sworn by LtGen Schmidt. His statement was substantially as follows:

I was the Commanding General for the Joint Task Force, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba from 4 November 2002 to 26 March 2004.

My overall responsibility was interrogation and detention at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. JTF-160 was set up for detention and JTF-170 was set up for interrogation. My task was to integrate them so that they were in synchronization. USSOUTHCOM wanted to improve intelligence and detention. I was told to fix it. It was broken. I did not perceive that I worked for the SECDEF. General Dunlavey and I had four days of overlap. We had a change over from 4-9 November 2002. We did not have a conversation about whether he had authority beyond GTMO. JTF-180 in Afghanistan was not in my command relationship. It was a coordination and information relationship. The detainees did come from JTF-180. Detainees and interrogators all came through JTF-180. There were no detainees that came from IRAQ or Operation IRAQI FREEDOM when I was there.

The command climate at GTMO was dysfunctional when I arrived. There were two separate organizations with senior leadership that was at odds with each other regarding how they would integrate their missions. My first job was putting that together. The leadership had a single mission focus that was separate. Single unit disparity did not allow the units to be successful. There was no abuse or torture going on. The organization was not working together efficiently. It did not affect the detainees. SOPs needed to be updated. The basic standard was going on. The detainees were treated in a humane manner.

I did receive FM 34-52. The additional techniques that were requested went up to GEN Hill. I was uncomfortable with Category III. I was not comfortable using Category III techniques in interrogations. We were going towards incentives. Category III would not help develop intelligence rapidly and effectively from the detainees there. I did not intend to use them. They were approved, but not directed. I had the latitude to use them. It was an order that came down through the SECDEF. I did not question them about not using the techniques in interrogation. They wanted to do aggressive techniques. Special Interrogation Plans (IPs) had to be done in detail and sent to a higher authority. The purpose of the techniques was to support the nation's effort. There were two Special IPs; they were enormous documents. The IPs were the way to set standards. Everyone understood where the limits were.

How controlling was I? I'll be frank with you, when you put an organization together you say here are the new standards. Some thought they were more aggressive. I would state how to do and what to do. It is part of team building for success. You win the battle one day at a time. Senior leadership got on board right away. That is why GEN Hill asked me to come down to GTMO.

~~SECRET~~

AR 15-6 GTMO Investigation
Exhibit 45 of 76 Exhibits

We had incidences of good faith mistakes. We stopped them. I would do a Commander's Inquiry and corrective action was done on an interrogator. Retraining was done. The interrogator would go back under the supervisor and then interrogate again. A junior interrogator needed oversight. It was a handful of occurrences. The occurrences did not rise to torture, maltreatment, or inhumane treatment. I had an interrogator that exceeded the bounds. It was a female interrogator who took off her BDU shirt and inappropriately rubbed on the detainee. The female rubbing was brought to my attention by a contract interrogator. We pulled her out. We found she did cross boundaries. She was given an administrative Letter of Reprimand and retained her. One incident, the interrogator asked the MP to help in an interrogation and the MP was actively involved. I got it fixed. We continued to refine the policy. We built the SOPs. It was a continuously evolving operation. We had a weekly meeting that had enormous leadership involvement about staying within standards. Whoever violated the standards received appropriate action. In another incident an MP could not control his temper. He struck a detainee. He was a pretty good soldier. It occurred in the cell block. The standards were well known. If any standards were violated, appropriate action would be taken. When a mistake was made we took appropriate action.

The detainees are ruthless, murderous people. We had to teach interrogators and MPs not to hate. I spent a lot of time with the chain of command and how to control them professionally. We had to talk about this to all interrogators.

There was a high leader touch. We had to lead the led. I was down there engaged at the Camp. I spent enormous amount of time going through the cell block. It was difficult keeping that balance. We had weekly meetings. The lawyer went over the standards. The lawyer would tell the interrogators that if you cross the line call me. It got to be a joke sometimes. I said call [REDACTED] Do not cross those standards.

B 6

General Hill told me that you are the Commander. Here are the basic guidelines, go ahead, and go forward.

We had numerous actions routed through the J2 [REDACTED] I worked for General Hill. A direct line to him would interrupt his command authority. I was very clear of my chain of command. I talked to OSD almost every day. There was lots of talk. I understood for whom I worked for. I had informal conversations with OSD. I sent a report to DEPSECDEF through USSOUTHCOM.

B 6

I have known General Hill for 20 years. If I had a problem, I would call him. We talked once or twice a week. I got guidance and all the support I needed.

The contractors probably made up roughly 50% of the personnel. There were a higher number of contract analysts that supported the interrogation mission. I gave the same talk to the contract analyst, their supervisor, and contract interrogators. I told them they were soldiers without the uniform.

The FBI was at the established weekly meeting. I had an FBI agent come down. They had opportunity to come to the meeting every week. We had a meeting and I gave the FBI Special Agent (SA) an hour. I told him it was anything he wanted to talk about. They had a different perspective. They had a law enforcement perspective. There was significant friction between the FBI, CITE and JTF on how interrogations were done. It was the first one and then SSA [redacted] came later. I said here are the standards. No FBI SA questioned interrogation methodology. For segregation, we had to go to General Hill for 30 days. No one from the FBI came to talk to me about that. One of the Doctor's of CITE came to talk to me about interrogations. B6

I am not an expert on detention or interrogation. I spent an enormous amount of time to help me understand how I can do this business better. I had a talk with every leader, CITE, FBI and the JTF and told them that they would follow the standards. We would come in on occasion and look at interrogations.

[redacted]

Nothing placed me in a compromising situation.

There was an interrogation SOP in place when I got there. I split the JIG, ICE, and J2. They were counterproductive. It was the most dysfunctional I've ever seen. I could not believe it. It was senior leader's squabbling on personal matters. It was debilitating to the organization. The JIG did normal 2 stuff.

Military working dogs- No, not in interrogations. They were [redacted] B6
They were used for detention, not interrogation.

Duct tape - Not that I knew of. After I left I was told that a senior interrogator duct taped someone's mouth. I was told it was [redacted] but that is only speculation. I was surprised. I don't know when it happened or the dates. B6/B7

I knew about the false flag. I don't know any instance. It was an authorized technique in the IP.

Impersonating FBI- No.

Yelling at detainee and loud music [redacted] It was an approved technique. The interrogator was authorized to do that.

Interference with FBI - There was an FBI and CITE focus on law enforcement on DoD guidance to develop intelligence. Their focus was on evidence. We were developing intelligence. They had a different focus. We followed DoD. FBI followed public law.

Sleep deprivation [redacted] B6/B1

Short shackling. While I was there the detainees were chained to the eye-bolt for security. Every interrogator saw the detainee's legs and feet. I saw hundreds of interrogations. There were no stress positions. I gave guidance.

Food and water we do not use as a weapon. [REDACTED] gained 30 pounds. ~~bx~~

B 6

Hot and cold temperature – Not to my knowledge.

Inappropriate touching is not authorized. It was brought to my attention and we took care of it. The touching was done by a [REDACTED] ~~bx~~

B 6

SGT [REDACTED] ever came to my attention.

B 6

Ink and menstrual fluid – No.

There were no ghost detainees that were under the control of JTF-GTMO.

What humane treatment means to me are adequate food, shelter, medical care, and an environment that would not cause physical or mental abuse.

Some interrogation techniques that SECDEF granted authority for was beyond what I was comfortable with.

I never saw a memo or received a memo from the FBI that commented on SIPs.

It was clear to all the standards. The boundaries were for all. FBI and CITF had the same boundaries for all DoD included. In our discussions, everybody understood the standards. We have the same guidance. Everybody was formally notified that the superior commander made the guidance for interrogations.

I recognize the CITF memo objecting to the Special IP. I sent the interim plan up and it was approved by higher headquarters.

My focus was on the relationship between the CITF and the JTF. My focus was to improve it. They were at odds professionally and personally to the detriment of the mission. I called the CITF commander personally. We discussed that they were trying to develop evidence and the JTF position is not to develop evidence, but intelligence. The meeting was attended by General Ryder (the CID Commander), the CITF commander, and myself. We talked about an effective relationship about doing the mission. Subordinates are to work together effectively. An interrogation plan was approved and we followed the plan.

I directed the Director of the JIG to conduct an investigation into the lap dance allegation. I agreed with his recommendations and findings. The Director of the JIG was [REDACTED] was an effective leader and did a good over watch. He was a senior leader down there that would execute the mission.

B 6

The standards were known across the mission. I found out about the duct tape later. It never came to my level. I believe it came to [redacted] attention took appropriate action.

I had several counseling sessions with [redacted] He is very fine man. He did o manner that demonstrated what the standards are.

I am a standards guy. If you don't follow the standards, I'll take the appropriate action. When honest mistakes are made, you counsel, coach, and mentor.

I came to a dysfunctional organization not with mission success. I spent a large amount of time fixing it.

1.4/103

[redacted]

B6

I am aware of the 2 May 2003 memo I signed. It was in response to the up and down incident. The letter was signed in response to an AR 15-6. It was a Fear up. The MPs were told not to do it anymore. This particular incident was a single incident. There were some cases of the MPs being actively involved in interrogation; that was not my guidance.

The ICRC brought several general statements for review [redacted]

[redacted]

B3

The guidance every week revalidated the guidance. It was very important.

The FBI and CIA representative came every 30 days.

Interrogations require that we would restate the standards every time. I knew the contract interrogators. I gave them the same speech for standards.

There was fairly large friction between JTF and ICRC. One of my focuses was to make it effective. It was producing unnecessary friction.

1.4/103
b6

[redacted]

B6/
B1

1.4(c) [REDACTED]

B1
B6
~~B7C~~

I have not been through SERE. I don't believe to my knowledge that the interrogators went through SERE. The Psychologist, Forensic Psychologist, and Clinical Psychologist were trained through SERE.

Most interrogators were school trained on tactical interrogation. Tactical debriefing in strategic interrogation, some were trained. It was a small number. Some picked up training while there at GTMO.

1.4(c) We established the Tiger Team [REDACTED]

I have seen several hundred interrogations now. When I showed up at GTMO I had never before witnessed one.

I believe one of the things we found out holistically. Unity of command for success and standards demonstrated success on a regular basis.

JTF-160 and JTF-170 was an ad hoc organization that started from a cold start that we normally would have in our institution. There were a lot of developmental operations and procedures for strategic interrogation on how things should be done.

Abuse problems are simply about discipline setting, standards and developing these standards. You need leadership involvement that clarifies and focuses on the importance of the mission.

GTMO and Iraq are different. I have had a year and a half to look at GTMO. GTMO used standards, how to treat detainee that are not combatants, how to interrogate, and incentive based interrogations. GTMO was successful.

1.4(c) [REDACTED]

Those interrogations did not involve torture.

GTMOize inappropriately reads bad information. I have heard of it. If you apply a leader and standard there is adherence to the standards. In another context, it brings discredit to all the leaders.

On 26 March 2004, I departed the island and went to Iraq three days later.

MG Geoffrey Miller was interviewed, via secure telephone, a second time on 31 March 2005 at 1843 EST. At that time Lieutenant General Schmidt advised MG Miller of his rights under Article 31 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.

Lt Gen Schmidt asked MG Miller several questions regarding events that have been documented in the interrogation logs obtained from GTMO. Lt Gen Schmidt asked MG Miller if he had ever read the interrogation logs and MG Miller responded that he had not. MG Miller responded that he was unaware of the following events:

- on 21 and 23 Dec 02, MPs held down a detainee while [redacted] straddled the detainee without placing weight on the detainee
- on 4 Dec 02, SGT [redacted] massaged the detainee's back and neck over his clothing

B6

B6

1/B6

2/B6

B1/

b2

1

b1

B1

1.4 (a)
B6/
B1

~~SECRET~~

B6/B1/B7

that [redacted] showed [redacted] fake letter from the White House that spelled out his authorization to make [redacted] disappear

B1

MG Miller stated that had he known of the threats to [redacted] his family, he would never have allowed it.

B1/B6/B7

1.4(a)
(c)

MG Miller stated that he was aware of the following:

B6/B1

- that detainees were yelled at and that music was used in interrogations


that [redacted] was interrogated for 20 hours a day with 4 hours of sleep from 23 November 2002 until 15 January 2003

- that [redacted] was separated from the detainee population from 8 August 2002 until 15 January 2003

B6/B7

- that [redacted] impersonated a Navy Captain from the White House

I declare under penalty that the foregoing is a true and correct summary of the statements given by the witness, MG Geoffrey Miller. Executed at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, on 31 March 2005.


RANDALL M. SCHMIDT
Lieutenant General, USAF
AR 15-6 Investigating Officer

SECRET