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INFO MEMO

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Michèle Flournoy, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy *MAX* MAY 7 - 2009

SUBJECT: 2 May Afghanistan Civil-Military Coordination Session with Ambassador Holbrooke and General Petraeus

**Background:** I attended an all day workshop on Afghanistan hosted by Ambassador Holbrooke and General Petraeus at National Defense University on 2 May.

The discussion covered a wide range of topics relevant to implementation of the President's new strategy but resulted in few specific tasks. Detailed notes are at Tab A; the slides presented at the session are at Tab B.

My main take away was that several follow-up tasks remain if we are to get a good framework for the war in place this year. A summary of those tasks follows.

**Developing and Operationalizing the Campaign Plan**

- POTUS should direct NSC to develop an integrated political-military plan by 1 June 2009; Embassy Kabul and USFOR-A should be tasked to develop a single civil-military campaign plan by 1 July 2009.
- CENTCOM addressed the need for an operational headquarters in Afghanistan, similar to the MNC-I model in Iraq. We should ask General Petraeus to develop a specific proposal for your consideration (see the slides he presented on this at Tab C).
- New guidance is required to clarify the military's role in supporting and sustaining the increased civilian presence and enabling civilians to do their jobs.
- Additional guidance is necessary to clarify how USG military and civilian personnel should address corruption when they find it.


**Civilian Requirements**

- Embassy Kabul should be tasked to develop a more comprehensive assessment of civilian requirements for Afghanistan. Current US Embassy requirements were



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developed in late 2008 and reflect what the Embassy thought it could get, not necessarily all that it needs. The new assessment should include not only U.S. requirements but Afghan government requirements for mentors as well. The bulk of technical assistants need to arrive by late summer to take advantage of the lull in fighting that generally occurs in the fall and winter months.

- Plans for civilian technical assistance need to be developed for 2010 and 2011. The programs need to include outreach, language and cultural training, and development of teams that can begin working together prior to deployment.
- Right now, several competing systems managed by different departments and agencies are used for staffing civilian requirements. A single organization should draw on all sources (State 3161 positions, USAID Personal Services Contractors, DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, etc.) to meet requirements from the field. Someone needs to become the civilian force provider.

#### **Rule of Law, Police and Prisons**

One key takeaway was the need to integrate these missions. Focused District Development (FDD) improves the police in specific districts but is not coordinated with Rule of Law (RoL) programs or prison reform efforts. Embassy and USFOR-A should ensure that the campaign plan integrates these missions sets. Tasks for follow up include:

- Maj. Gen. Stone is conducting a prison assessment and is working with State INL to develop a detailed plan.
- State representatives were resistant to using more JAG capabilities to fill advisory roles for RoL in Afghanistan. Many JAGs now have significant expertise in such roles and we should continue to offer them as part of the pool of RoL advisors.
- USFOR-A and CSTC-A need to develop plans and identify resources required to expand the Afghan Public Protection Force, FDD and Border Police Development, Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), and growth of ANA and ANP.
- The JCMB approved an increase of 15,000 ANP. While additional police are necessary, it is unclear if we have enough FY09 and FY10 Afghan Security Forces Funding (ASFF) to support this. Further analysis on the costs of this proposal is necessary before approving the full 15k increase.
- The DoD Financial Management Regulation dated January 2009 (Volume 12, Chapter 27, Annex A, para 16 Rule of Law and Governance) needs to be changed to re-authorize DoD to build Rule of Law facilities, instead of repair only. The June 2008

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Regulation had previously given that authority. The current Regulation inhibits efforts to construct necessary facilities to develop RoL capacity. Under OGC guidance, CENTCOM staff will draft a memo to change CENTCOM's interpretation of the regulation to include construction. I will review that effort and update you.

- The counternarcotics campaign requires adjustment. There was considerable discussion of the extent to which eradication should remain a part of it. SRAP wants it de-emphasized with the Afghan Poppy Eradication Force eliminated and all eradication left to provincial authorities (governors). ISAF and DEA think the national eradication capability is important to the overall effort but has been the only one of the five pillar U.S. CN strategy to get adequate attention and resources.
  - A comprehensive counternarcotics effort with eradication playing a well-defined supporting role needs to be implemented and appropriately resourced. My Counternarcotics office will review DoD CN spending on eradication vice other pillars of the strategy.

#### **Agriculture**

- Funding for agricultural sector development requires analysis. CERP is one mechanism, but it can be problematic as a primary source based on available resources, supplemental appropriations, and competing priorities. Embassy Kabul/USAID and COMUSFOR-A should develop a plan for using CERP and non-military development assistance in a complementary fashion to support the agricultural sector.
- The National Guard Agribusiness Development Teams have been effective in Afghanistan. We need to assess whether additional teams are required.

#### **Other Areas**

- A program for training Afghan governors and civil servants at provincial and district levels needs to be developed and supported by the increase in USG civilians.
- Paul Brinkley's Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) has been an effective mechanism for Iraq. They will conduct an assessment for Afghanistan next month at the request of General Petraeus and Ambassador Eikenberry.
- Ideally, civilian mentors and members of Provincial Reconstruction Teams should undergo pre-deployment training with their partnered tactical units. An integrated plan should be developed by DoD, State and other agencies to ensure that such training takes place here and at the COIN academy in Kabul. The COIN academy

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should be given the resources and authorities required to accommodate all incoming civilians.

- Strategic Communications needs particular attention. Embassy and COMUSFOR-A should develop a new strategic communications plan.

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**Notes on 2 May 2009 Afghanistan Civil-Military Coordination Session  
Hosted by Ambassador Holbrooke and General Petraeus**

**Civil-Military Cooperation and Inter-Agency Coordination**

- DSS Lew briefed the current civilian surge plan to increase staffing by 421 personnel. State has been given broad hiring authority to recruit these personnel and has received a large number of applications. The first group of 56 would arrive in Afghanistan in July and the rest will be phased in from August to March 2010.
- GEN Petraeus and USDP said it was critical to get people in country quickly to make an impact in the next year. They offered assistance through DoD mechanisms to fill the gaps including the Civilian Expeditionary Work Force and active duty/reserve military personnel. DSS Lew did not think that DoD assistance would be required as there were enough State/USAID/USDA applicants for the positions.
- USDP and GEN Petraeus questioned if the number 421 was based on an unconstrained look at what was actually needed as other numbers had been put out by COMISAF and the Afghan Government. DSS Lew, Val Fowler (Embassy Kabul) and MG Macdonald (Deputy COMUSFOR-A) felt the 421 number was correct, saying there were limits to absorbing more civilians as well as sequencing issues of getting them into the field. They stressed that they would look at additional requirements over time.
- AMB Holbrooke believed the numbers needed to be relooked to ensure they addressed the actual requirements. He stressed the need to look at what the International Community is doing in terms of mentoring as our plan needs to be fully coordinated with their efforts.
- To help oversee the process, AMB Wayne will be going to Embassy Kabul to be the coordinator for all civilian assistance.
- AMB Eikenberry stressed that the USG must not push civilians forward without proper training and resources. For example, they will need mobility and security (which GEN Petraeus assured they would get) in order to have the access they need. The USG needs to plan ahead and start training more personnel now in language and other skills to prepare them for future deployments to Afghanistan.
- AMB Eikenberry closed the session by urging everyone not to be constrained in their thinking. Afghanistan has been underfunded and a second priority for years, but now we need to be bold in our analysis.

**Strategic Communications**

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- Ashley Bommer (Special Advisor to SRAP) briefed that the insurgents were winning the propaganda war on both sides of the border. Their message is that the Coalition and the Afghan Government are infidels and corrupt. The militants threaten and intimidate citizens who support the Government.
- Bommer stated that a new approach, focused on technology, was needed to counter the Taliban propaganda. This included jamming Taliban radio stations and providing the Afghan population with cell phones which could be used to send information and strategic messages.
- BG Ryan (COMUSFOR-A) briefed efforts in country to provide our Strat Comm messages to the population. He stressed the need to engage the population and make them see that our cause was their cause.
- Sherard Cowper-Coles (UK Envoy to Afg-Pak) said the real issue is that the Pashtuns do not believe in our product. The people believe the Afghan Government is corrupt and incompetent. The Coalition needs to show they are on the side of the people. GEN Petraeus agreed the problem is we may be trying to "sell a product the public does not buy".
- USDP Flournoy stressed the need to build Afghan Capacity to take the lead in messaging. Petraeus agreed and questioned if ISAF, the Embassy, and the Afghans had the right structure and practices in place to do this.
- AMB Holbrooke questioned the effectiveness of any American Strat Comm plan as "no U.S. outlet will have an effect on the war." The Afghans must be the lead in communicating this message and we need to figure out what the message should be. He tasked the Embassy to do this.
- Sarah Chayes (COMUSFOR-A) disagreed with the idea that there was no U.S. role in Strat Comms. The Afghan Government is not trusted in many cases and the U.S. should not use corrupt ministries to send out our message.

**Rule of Law/Justice**

- John Dempsey (USIP) presented the Rule of Law slides. He said the National Justice Program is a "laundry list" of things that need to be done. The U.S. and the international community should decide what the priorities are within the list and focus our efforts on them.
- Mr. Dempsey said the government of Afghanistan has little credibility in Rule of Law as corrupt top officials are never prosecuted. The government needs to pick one or two officials and make an example of them.

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- GEN Petraeus said State-INL has good programs but can not implement them on the scale needed. He suggested this was a good area where active duty and reserve JAGs could be used to increase efforts. USDP added that Afghan-Americans in the U.S. would also be willing to go back and assist in Afghanistan and would have real knowledge of the culture.
- DSS Lew said the U.S. should look for concentrated areas where implementing Rule of Law would make a large difference. MG Macdonald suggested targeting the same areas that Focused District Development (FDD) police training is going into around the ring road.
- Mr Rubin said people in the provinces and districts complain that the government is not enforcing Islamic and Sharia law. Because of this, the rule of law institutions we are creating for the Government are not seen as legitimate. Sarah Chayes disagreed, saying that the Afghan population is very practical and wanted to see equality, not necessarily strict Islamic law. If Taliban shows equality, people will support their law, if the Government can show equality, then people will turn to government institutions.

**Corrections and Prisons**

- MG Stone (Commander USMCR) led the discussions. He said corrections, police reform and rule of law need to be looked at holistically as they are all part of the same system. The corrections side has been severely underfunded. We need much greater resources to tackle this problem.
- The prisons in Afghanistan do not isolate hard-core criminals from others and are a prime recruiting ground for the insurgents.
- Tom Williams (INL) said there is no case management system within the prisons so no one knows who is in the prisons or how long they are in there for.
- INL and MG Stone agreed to do an assessment of the prisons in Afghanistan and come up with a prioritized plan of action. Mr. Williams suggested that the Embassy have an Ambassador level appointee focused on prison reform to ensure it gets the proper attention. GEN Petraeus suggested that MG Stone try to identify some requirements more quickly so we could start looking at getting resources in country.
- MG Stone said the key is to train Afghan Police or other corrections personnel on how to gather intelligence in the prison and figure out who is in the prison system and who needs to be isolated.
- AMB Eikenberry stressed the political issues associated with the detention facility at Bagram. The US needs to turn these personnel over to the Afghans but the MOI,

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MOJ, and President Karzai do not want this responsibility as it will pose a political problem for them.

**Police**

- COL Yackley (CSTC-A) discussed current efforts to train the Afghan National Police (ANP). The current size of 82K is not enough and both EUPOL and CSTC-A are doing assessments on what the end strength should be. GEN Petraeus said we should move forward with the increase of 15K in the near term and in the longer term CENTCOM will respond to the SecDef's request for analysis on total ANSF end strength.
- GEN Petraeus said a key lesson from Iraq was that individual police will not survive in high threat areas. You need deployed units, such as the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP), in each province to support the individual district police. The assessment should focus on the mix of police and if we need more ANCOP.
- Tom Williams said there is a need for better police, not simply more police. Afghans do not trust that the police will make them safer and there is currently a 20% attrition rate within the ANP. He suggested programs to professionalize the police and create career paths as important next steps.
- COL Yackley discussed the way ahead for the FDD program. The lack of PMTs had constrained the program in the past but with the second training BCT and the dual-purpose BCTs in the South, FDD will be able to quickly accelerate. He also discussed the Afghan Police Protection Program (APPP) which could be accelerated if the pilot goes well.
- GEN Petraeus said the ANP curriculum needs to be examined. The ANP should be taught survivability training and not things such as marching. He stressed the importance of retaining the police once trained and supported ideas such as combat pay.
- GEN Petraeus discussed a program in Anbar province that focused on building police intelligence capabilities. This took several years to implement but created an invaluable capability within the police. We need to implement a similar program in Afghanistan.

**Corruption**

- AMB Tony Wayne said that corruption in the Afghan Government was one of our largest problems and it was important to find an acceptable level of corruption within the government. Additionally, the Afghan people need to see meaningful results in combating corruption.



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- Mr. Rubin said the U.S. plays a role in corruption as well. By providing funding directly to projects and bypassing the Government of Afghanistan, we are reconfirming that the Afghan people cannot trust their government institutions. The USG must do more to build the legitimacy of the Afghan government.
- COL Kolenda discussed the need to extend the reach of the government by using local shuras. The U.S. military can engage key leaders in districts and empower them to take the lead in developing projects and distribute money. This will allow them to gain credibility with the Afghan people build a connection between the people and the government. GEN Petraeus agreed to take this on.
- Sarah Chayes suggested that we pick a "test" province and look at the salaries of officials. A border province may be the best one to do this in as officials make large amounts of money by taking illegal revenues at border crossing points.

**Counter-Narcotics**

- Dr. Beth Dunford (Special Advisor to SRAP) said we need a district based agriculture program that provides alternative livelihoods to farmers. This should include looking at alternative crops, providing them security to get products to market, and funding.
- AMB Holbrooke stressed the need for better CN metrics and for including CN metrics within other programs due to the cross-cutting nature of CN issues.
- AMB Holbrooke asked for opinions on eradication saying he felt it was not useful and our eradication efforts merely destroying the livelihoods of low level farmers. DEA reps agreed that eradication was not helpful.
- MG Macdonald said eradication was useful if we have specific intelligence on mid-to-high level farmers. Special Envoy Cowper-Coles suggested the creation of a small vetted eradication force trained to take on these specific missions. Holbrooke agreed that targeted eradication was likely the best way ahead.
- John Wood (NSC) proposed a rebalancing of all five pillars of the CN strategy. GEN Petraeus concurred and remarked that the USG could decrease funding in the eradication pillar and increase resources to the alternative livelihood pillar.
- AMB Holbrooke proposed that AMB Wayne serve as the in-country coordinator for all CN operations as well as corruption efforts, civilian assistance, rule of law and agriculture. He commented that all areas were interrelated requiring one coordinator to synchronize efforts.

### **Agriculture**

- **Otto Gonzales (USDA)** discussed the need for coordination among the different agencies providing funding and resources to the agriculture sector (USAID, USDA, DOD, etc.) He recommended bringing together provincial level players and their assets to lay out the needs for each district.
- **Many agriculture programs** take several years before farmers are able to make enough money to support themselves. We need to provide them financial support while they are in the early stages so they do not have to decide each year whether or not to plant poppies.
- **GEN Petraeus** said commanders on the ground should use CERP funding to support agriculture programs and **MG Macdonald** provided examples of how this is already happening on the ground.

### **Wrap Up**

- **GEN Petraeus** ended the conference with side by side comparisons of the structure of command in Iraq and Afghanistan. He said there was a need for a much larger staff in Afghanistan and cited areas such as DIA, Stat Comm, and the Army Corps of Engineers as areas where more personnel are essential.
- **GEN Petraeus** suggested that there was a need for an operational Headquarters much like the structure in Iraq. The HQ would require ISAF leadership to be successful.
- **AMB Holbrooke** said that the group should meet twice a year to continue these discussions. Individuals should also meet on specific topics to continue the follow up.
- **AMB Holbrooke** stated that we still need to address Pakistan, which will be even more difficult. They will do a similar conference in June on Pakistan.

# ***Afghanistan/Pakistan Civilian-Military Coordination Session I May 2, 2009***

## ***Discussion Topics for Building Afghan Government Capacity (cont.)***

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- **Police Training**

- Mr. Tom Williams, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau, U.S. Department of State
- Colonel Stephen Yackley, Deputy for Afghan National Police Development, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan

- **Policy & Practice for Civ-Mil Assistance to Afghan Efforts to Combat Corruption**

- Ambassador Tony Wayne, U.S. Department of State

- **Counternarcotics**

- Mr. Tom Williams, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau, U.S. Department of State
- Dr. Beth Dunford, Senior Development Advisor to the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan

- **Agricultural Development**

- Mr. Otto Gonzalez, U.S. Department of Agriculture

## ***Expected Outcomes***

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- **Review current objectives for each topic**
- **Review current guidance for each topic**
- **Review current implementation plans**
- **Identify issues requiring resolution/guidance**
- **Recommend actions to achieve a more coordinated and fully integrated civil-military effort**

## ***Conference Rules of Engagement***

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- **Turn off cell phones/PDAs in conference room**
- **Expansive thinking encouraged, look beyond your area of expertise**
- **Focus on solutions, not problems**
- **Focus on actions, not just "good ideas"**
- **Take ownership of the way ahead**
- **Non-attribution**
- **Time management will be a priority**



# Afghanistan





## **Joint Effort with Obligations on Both Sides**

### **State-Led Civilian Agencies:**

- expedited hiring of skilled professionals
- training
- timely deployment
- minimum one-year commitment
- properly equipped

### **Military:**

- prioritize security for civilian-led governance and development (mobility)
- provide operational support and a field-platform (combat life support)

### **Coordinated deployments:**

- Civilian deployments are coordinated to track arrival of US troops.
- Whole of government increase: three agencies (State, USAID, USDA) in the field; ten agencies in Kabul
- 421 new civilian positions (270 additional civilians in the field, 151 in Kabul) focused on southern and eastern Afghanistan (Pashtun belt)





### **Multiple, Simultaneous Recruitment Streams:**

- Identifying State and USAID employees, with knowledge and skill sets, rapid mechanism to curtail and reassign
- Meeting weekly with other agencies to identify skills sets and share information
- Positions developed and posted to USAJobs and State website

### **Candidate Pool:**

- Foreign and civil service; State, USAID, DOD special temporary hires (including former FSOs) and other agencies
- Minimum one-year commitment, civilian attire
- Subject matter experts in local governance and public administration, rule of law, agriculture and economic growth
- Significant interest, impressive resumes... many with prior Afghanistan experience. Some government retirees interested in returning

***Will consider need for further civilian increases as plan evolves***



### **Phase One: Now through June-July 2009**

- Carney Team (S/CRS) already deployed to support elections
- 56 personnel deploy to RC-East and RC-South, with new US troops, prior to elections
- Represents 50% increase in current civilian staffing outside Kabul
- Establish new District Support Teams, strengthen civilian provincial, regional teams
- Piloting six District Support Teams: learning lessons, adapting further planning

### **Phase Two: August 2009–November 2009**

- Tranches of civilians deploy in coordination with arrival of military units
  - New military units will be clearing areas to prepare for arrival of civilians
  - Phased approach ensures we hire the right people, allows tailoring of training, and accounts for limited (but growing) absorptive capacity on military platforms and at Embassy
- Newly identified staff being cleared, in-processed, and trained (with military)

### **Phase Three: All in Place by March 2010**

- Doubles current civilian staffing
- Increase is proportionally bigger in the field
- Geared to planned military deployment and prior to start of fighting season



- **Arrival of civilians coordinated with military's deployment schedule**
- **Integrating with Afghan proposal:** Afghan government last week proposed 650 Afghan and international civilian specialists – identify overlaps and gaps (determine how request corresponds to the 650+ US direct hire or financed advisors *currently* working in Afghanistan)
- **International coordination:** Urging UN to coordinate international civilian deployments, reinforced by Munich "Action Team" of Special Reps



## Kabul

	Current	June/July 2009	Aug-Nov 2009	Dec 2009- Mar 2010
<b>STATE</b>				
Executive	6	2	0	0
Political, Pol/Mil, INL, Econ, RoL, PD	62	0	0	0
Consular	3	0	0	0
Refugee Affairs	1	0	0	0
Management/Security	129	4	18	13
<b>USAID</b>	129	0	40	3
Border Management	10	0	0	0
<b>DHS</b>	0	0	0	11
EOI	10	0	0	0
<b>DEA</b>	67	0	15	0
ERAT	3	0	0	7
<b>TREAS</b>	3	0	2	2
DNO	10	0	4	3
<b>FAA</b>	2	0	1	2
<b>SIGAR</b>	12	0	0	0
<b>HHS/CDC</b>	0	0	1	1
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>447</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>42</b>

**Note:** Chart reflects current approved positions and those in the FY09 Supplemental.

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## **Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)**

<b>Agency</b>	<b>Current</b>	<b>June/July 2009</b>	<b>Aug-Nov 2009</b>	<b>Dec 2009- Mar 2010</b>
State - Field	46	27	40	52
NSA - Field	0	4	0	0
USAID - Field	33	17	77	31
USDA - Field	12	1	18	6
State - Kabul	10	3	4	0
USAID - Kabul	7	4	4	2
USDA - Kabul	1	0	1	1
<b>Sub-Total</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>144</b>	<b>92</b>


**Note:** Chart reflects current approved positions and those in the FY09 Supplemental.

# RC-CAPITAL: Kabul

## DEA ENFORCEMENT GROUP - KABUL

(TOTAL: 19)

- ✓ 1 SES Regional Director: 30-Sept-09
- ✓ 1 Asst Reg Director: Arrived
- ✓ 1 IOCC Director: Arrived
- ✓ 1 ATFC Dir: 15-Jun-09
- ✓ 1 Group Supervisor: 15-Jun-09
- ✓ 1 SOD Group Supervisor: 1-Jul-09
- ✓ 1 Pilot Group Supervisor: 10-Oct-09
- ✓ 9 Special Agents: 30-Sept-09
- ✓ 1 ATFC Group: 30-Sept-09
- ✓ 2 ATFC Agents: 30-Sept-09



## FLYAWAY TEAMS

- ✓ 2 DOS: TBD
- ✓ 2 USAID: TBD
- (Personnel will be ready to deploy based on needs/conditions on the ground)

## TBD POSITIONS:

- ✓ 24 USAID: Nov-09
- ✓ 12 FBI/Legatt: TBD

## EMBASSY KABUL (TOTAL)

### Executive Office

- ✓ 2 DOS Ambassadors: May-09/Jun-09
- ✓ 1 DOS Chief of Staff: Jun-09
- ✓ 6 DOS Additional Positions: May-09/Jun-09
- ✓ 1 DOS OMS: May-09/Jun-09

### PRI

- ✓ 2 USAID ICMAG Planners: Jul-09
- ✓ 1 USAID Civ-Mil DevAd: Jul-09
- ✓ 2 ICMAG Planners/Best Practices: Jul-09
- ✓ 2 DOS Management: Jul-09
- ✓ 2 USDA: TBD

### Diplomatic Security

- ✓ 27 Assistant RSO/Security: Mar-10

### INL

- ✓ 1 CN Program Manager: Mar-10
- ✓ 1 GSO: Mar-10
- ✓ 1 Corrections Program: Mar-10
- ✓ 1 Construction Engineer: Mar-10
- ✓ 1 Architect: Mar-10

### DEA

- ✓ 1 Intel Research Supervisor: 30-Sept-09
- ✓ 2 Intel Research Specialists: 30-Sept-09
- ✓ 2 Program Analysts: 30-Sept-09
- ✓ 1 Telecom Specialist: 30-Sept-09
- ✓ 1 Accountant: 30-Sept-09
- ✓ 1 Admin Officer: 30-Sept-09
- ✓ 1 Admin Support Spec: 30-Sept-09
- ✓ 7 Secretaries: 30-Sept-09

### DHS

- ✓ 11 Border Management Officers: TBD

### LEGATT

- ✓ 7 Positions: TBD

### TREASURY

- ✓ 4 Advisors: TBD

### DAO

- ✓ 6 Positions: TBD
- ✓ 1 Intel Analyst: May-09

### FAA

- ✓ 3 positions: TBD

### HHS/CDC

- ✓ 2 positions: TBD

## EMBASSY KABUL (CONTINUED)

### USAID

- ✓ 2 Management/Support: Jul-09
- ✓ 3 OTI (country rep, cross border, ACAP): Jul-09
- ✓ 1 Infrastructure Specialist: Nov-09
- ✓ 7 Ag Specialists: Nov-09
- ✓ 7 Economic Growth Specialists: Nov-09
- ✓ 5 Education Specialists: Nov-09
- ✓ 3 Health Specialists: Nov-09
- ✓ 5 Contract Management: Nov-09
- ✓ 2 Admin Management Executive: Nov-09
- ✓ 2 Financial Specialist: Nov-09
- ✓ 2 Property Management: Nov-09
- ✓ 1 RC-Capital DevAd: Jul-09
- ✓ 1 USAID USFOR-A DevAd: TBD
- ✓ 2 TBD

## KEY

- ✓ Existing: 19
- ✓ By June 2009: +24 (43)
- ✓ By Nov 2009: +74 (117)
- ✓ March 2010: +186 (203)

# RC-EAST: Task Force Warrior and Task Force

## DUGS

### TF WARRIOR

(Becomes TF Cyclone

September 2009)

- ✓1 DOS Regional (Staff Lead): TBD
- ✓1 DOS Governance (Deputy): TBD
- ✓1 DOS Econ: TBD
- ✓1 DOS StratCom: TBD
- ✓1 DOS Rule of Law: Jun-09
- ✓1 USAID DevAd: TBD
- ✓1 USAID (Deputy): Mar-10
- ✓1 USDA: Mar-10

### PRT Kapisa

- ✓1 DOS: Jun-09
- ✓1 USAID: TBD
- ✓1 USDA: TBD

### DST Charikar-Mahmood Razi (Kapisa)

- ✓1 DOS Local Governance (Team Lead): Oct-09
- ✓1 USAID OTI: Nov-09
- ✓1 USAID Development: Oct-09
- ✓1 DOS Local Governance: Nov-09
- ✓1 DOS Community Engagement: Nov-09
- ✓1 USAID Development: Nov-09

### PRT Parashir

- ✓1 USAID: TBD
- ✓1 USDA: TBD
- ✓1 DOS: Nov-09
- ✓1 USDA: TBD
- ✓5 USAID: TBD

### PRT Parwan (TF Gladiator)

- ✓1 DOS: Jun-09
- ✓1 USAID: Jul-09
- ✓1 USDA: Jun-09

### PRT Samangan

- ✓1 DOS: TBD
- ✓1 USAID: TBD
- ✓1 DOS: TBD
- ✓2 DOS: Nov-09
- ✓1 USDA: Nov-09
- ✓5 USAID: Nov-09

### REGIONAL COMMAND EAST HQ (BAGRAM)

- ✓1 DOS StratCom: Jun-09
- ✓2 DOS: Mar-10
- ✓1 USAID DevAd: TBD
- ✓1 OTI Country Rep: Jul-09
- ✓1 USDA Senior Ag Advisor: Mar-10



## KEY

- ✓ Existing Position: 42
- ✓ By Jun/Jul 2009: +13 (66)
- ✓ By Nov 2009: +23 (78)
- ✓ By March 2010: +31 (109)

### RC-EAST USDAO HUB

- ✓1 Senior Development Officer: TBD
- ✓1 Technical Officer: TBD
- ✓5 Technical Officer: TBD
- ✓1 USDA Senior Ag Officer: TBD

### TF COBRA

(BECOMES TF COBRA JUNE 2009)

- ✓1 DOS Regional (Staff Lead): TBD
- ✓1 DOS Econ: TBD
- ✓1 DOS Political: TBD
- ✓1 DOS StratCom: TBD
- ✓1 USAID DevAd: TBD
- ✓1 DOS Rule of Law: Jun-09
- ✓1 USAID DevAd: Mar-10
- ✓1 USDA: Mar-10

### PRT Nangarhar (Jalalabad)

- ✓1 DOS PRT: TBD
- ✓1 AID PRT: TBD
- ✓1 USDA PRT: TBD
- ✓1 INL: Mar 10

### DST Jalalabad (Nangarhar)

- ✓1 DOS Local Governance (Team Lead): Oct-09
- ✓1 USAID OTI: Oct-09
- ✓1 USAID Development: Oct-09

### PGDO Jalalabad (Nangarhar)

- ✓3 DOS: TBD
- ✓1 USDA: Nov-09
- ✓5 USAID: Nov-09

### DST Kopyan (Nangarhar)

- ✓1 USAID Development: Jul-09
- ✓1 USAID OTI (Team Lead): Jul-09
- ✓1 DOS Local Governance: Jun-09

### DEA ENFORCEMENT GROUP - JALALABAD AIRFIELD

- ✓1 Group Supervisor: Sept-09
- ✓9 Special Agents: Sept-09
- ✓1 Intel Research Specialist: Sept-09

### TF DUKET (Ghorizai)

#### PRT Nuristan

- ✓1 DOS: TBD
- ✓1 USAID: TBD
- ✓1 USDA: TBD

#### PRT Laghman (Meharidam)

- ✓1 DOS: TBD
- ✓1 USAID: TBD
- ✓1 USDA: TBD

#### PRT Kunar (Asadabad)

- ✓1 DOS (Team Lead): TBD
- ✓1 USAID: TBD
- ✓1 USDA: TBD

- ✓1 DOS (Deputy): Mar-10
- ✓1 USAID: Mar-10

#### DST Sarani (Kunar)

- ✓1 DOS Local Governance: Jun-09
- ✓1 DOS Community Engagement (Team Lead): Jul-09
- ✓1 USAID OTI: Jul-09

## RC-EAST: Task Force Yukon, Spartan, and White Eagle

### TASK FORCE WHITE EAGLE

#### PRT Qazvin

- ✓1 DOS: Mar-10
- ✓1 USAID: Mar-10
- ✓1 USDA: TBD
- ✓1 DOS: TBD
- ✓1 USAID: TBD

#### DST Mojar

- ✓1 DOS Local Governance: Oct-09
- ✓1 USAID OTI: Oct-09
- ✓1 USAID Development (Team Lead): Oct-09

### TF YUKON (KAZAKHSTAN)

- ✓1 DOS Regional Officer (staff lead): TBD
- ✓1 DOS Governance (Deputy): TBD
- ✓1 DOS StratCom: TBD
- ✓1 USAID DevAd: TBD
- ✓1 USDA: TBD
- ✓1 DOS Rule of Law: Jun-09
- ✓1 USAID DevAd: Mar-10
- ✓1 USDA: Mar-10

#### PRT Paktia (Shurana)

- ✓1 DOS: TBD
- ✓1 USAID: TBD
- ✓1 USDA: TBD
- ✓1 DOS: Mar-10

#### DST Ormuz-East (Paktia)

- ✓1 DOS Local Governance (Team Lead): Jul-09
- ✓1 USAID OTI: Jul-09
- ✓1 USAID Development: Jul-09

#### PRT Paktia (Gardaz)

- ✓1 DOS: TBD
- ✓1 USAID: TBD
- ✓1 USDA: TBD
- ✓1 DOS: Mar-10

#### DST Waza Zedran (Paktia)

- ✓1 DOS Local Governance (Team Lead): Oct-09
- ✓1 DOS Community Engagement: Oct-09
- ✓1 USAID Development: Oct-09



### TASK FORCE SPARTAN

- ✓1 DOS Regional (Staff Lead): Mar-10

- ✓1 DOS Pol: Mar-10

- ✓1 USAID DevAd: Mar-10

- ✓1 USAID: Jul-09

#### TF Spartan Battalion 1 and 2

- ✓2 DOS (1 per battalion): Jun-09

#### PRT Logar

- ✓1 DOS: Mar-10

- ✓1 USAID: TBD

- ✓1 USDA: Mar-10

#### DST Baraki Baraki (Logar)

- ✓1 DOS Local Governance (Team Lead): Dec-09

- ✓1 DOS Community Engagement: Dec-09

- ✓1 USAID Development: Dec-09

#### PRT Wardak

- ✓1 DOS: Mar-10

- ✓1 USAID: TBD

- ✓1 USDA: Mar-10

#### DST Sayad Abad (Wardak)

- ✓1 DOS Local Governance: Dec-09

- ✓1 USAID OTI (Team Lead): Dec-09

- ✓1 USAID Development: Dec-09

### TF YUKON (KAZAKHSTAN) (CONTINUED)

#### PRT Khost

- ✓1 DOS: TBD

- ✓1 USAID: TBD

- ✓1 USDA: TBD

- ✓1 DOS: Mar-10

- ✓1 USAID: Mar-10

#### DST Spira (Khost)

- ✓1 DOS Local Governance (Team Lead): Mar-10

- ✓1 DOS Community Engagement: Dec-09

- ✓1 USAID Development: Dec-09

### KEY

- ✓Existing Position: 20
- ✓By June 2009: +7 (27)
- ✓By Nov 2009: +6 (33)
- ✓By March 2010: +15 (48)



# IRC-SOUTH: HQ, Battalion, KAF, Helmand, and Nimroz

## BACKGROUND

### PRT Lashkar Gah

- ✓1 DOS (Team Lead): TBD
- ✓1 DEA PRT: Mar-10
- ✓1 DOS (Deputy): TBD
- ✓1 DOS Rule of Law: Jun-09
- ✓1 USAID: TBD
- ✓1 DOS Ch-Mil: TBD
- ✓1 USDA: Aug-09
- ✓1 DOS/INL PRT Officer: Mar-10
- ✓1 DOS Governance Ch-Mil: Jun-09
- ✓1 DOS Planning: Ch-Mil: Jul-09

### MC-8 MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE CAMP BASTION

- ✓1 DOS TF Regional (Staff Lead): Jun-09
- ✓1 DOS StratComms: Jun-09
- ✓1 DOS TF Governance (Deputy): Jun-09
- ✓1 DOS Ch-Mil officer, coordination with PRT Helmand: Jun-09
- ✓1 USAID Development Officer: Jul-09

### MC-South MEB Battalion 1 and 2

- ✓1 DOS DST Coordinator (at each battalion): Jul-09
- ✓1 USAID DST Coordinator (at each battalion): Jul-09

### MC-South MEB Battalion 3

- ✓1 DOS DST Coordinator: Jul-09
- ✓1 USAID DST Coordinator: Jul-09

### DST Garsink (MEB)

- ✓1 DOS Local Governance (Team Lead): Jul-09
- ✓1 USAID OTI: Jul-09
- ✓1 USAID Development: Jul-09

### DST Rahm Chah (Helmand)

- ✓1 DOS Local Governance (Team Lead): Dec-09
- ✓1 USAID Development: Dec-09
- ✓1 DOS Community Engagement: Dec-09

### DST Nawa (Helmand)

- ✓1 DOS Local Governance (Team Lead): Oct-09
- ✓1 USAID Development: Oct-09
- ✓1 DOS Community Engagement: Oct-09

### DST Nawa (Helmand)

- ✓1 DOS/INL TF Officer: Mar-10

## REGIONAL COMMAND SOUTH HQ (KAF)

- ✓1 DOS Senior Civilian Representative: Jun-09
- ✓1 DOS: INL PRT Officer: Mar-10
- ✓1 DOS Rep (Deputy): TBD
- ✓1 USAID Development Advisor: TBD
- ✓1 USAID Agribusiness Specialist: Jul-09
- ✓1 USAID Water Specialist: Jul-09
- ✓1 USAID Power Specialist: Jul-09
- ✓1 DOS Management: Jun-09
- ✓1 USAID OTI Stability Officer (Team Lead): Jul-09
- ✓1 USDA Senior Ag Advisor: Aug-09
- ✓1 USDA Regional Programs Advisor: Aug-09
- ✓1 DOS ICMAG Planner (Ch-Mil Cell): Jun-09
- ✓1 DOS Governance Officer (Ch-Mil Cell): Sept-10
- ✓1 DOS Rule of Law (Ch-Mil): Mar-10

## MC-SOUTH USAID TEAM

- ✓1 Ag/Livelihood Specialist: Sept-09
- ✓1 Infrastructure Specialist: Sept-09
- ✓1 Democracy/Governance Specialist: Sept-09
- ✓1 Economic Growth Specialist: Sept-09
- ✓1 Social Sector Specialist: Sept-09
- ✓1 Executive Officer: Sept-09
- ✓1 Admin/HR Specialist: Sept-09
- ✓1 Financial Specialist: Sept-09
- ✓1 Development Advisor (Ch-Mil): Sept-09

## MC-SOUTH CECIS/STATE

- ✓1 DOS/INL Rule of Law - Jul-09
- ✓1 DOS/INL Counternarcotics - Jul-09



## DEA ENFORCEMENT GROUP - KAF

- ✓1 Group Supervisor: Sept-09
- ✓9 Special Agents: Sept-09
- ✓1 Intel Research Specialist: Sept-09

## KEY

- ✓Existing Position: 15
- ✓By June 2009: +25 (40)
- ✓By Nov 2009: +15 (55)
- ✓By March 2010: +10 (65)

# IRC-SOUTH: Stryker Brigade , Kandahar, Uruzgan, Dai Kundi, Zabul

**IRC-SOUTH**  
**PRT Kandahar**  
 ✓2 DOS: TBD  
 ✓1 USAID: Aug-09  
 ✓1 DOS POL: Aug-09  
 ✓1 DOS Civ-Mil: Sept-09  
 ✓1 USDA: Aug-09  
**Stryker Battalion 1, 2, and 3**  
 ✓2 DOS (for each battalion): Sept-09  
 ✓1 USAID (for each battalion): Sept-09  
**RC-South Stryker Brigade**  
 ✓1 DOS TF Regional (Staff Lead): Jun-09  
 ✓1 DOS TF Governance (Deputy): Jun-09  
 ✓1 DOS Civ-Mil officer, coordination with PRT Helmand: Jul-09  
 ✓1 DOS StratCon: Jul-09  
 ✓1 USAID Reconstruction/Development: Jul-09  
**DST Spin Boldak**  
 ✓1 DOS Local Governance (Team Lead): Jul-09  
 ✓1 USAID OTI: Jul-09  
 ✓1 USAID Development: Jul-09  
**DST Shah Wali Kot**  
 ✓1 USAID OTI (Team Lead): TBD  
 ✓1 USAID Development: TBD  
 ✓1 DOS Local Governance: TBD  
**DST Marand**  
 ✓1 DOS Local Governance: Oct-09  
 ✓1 DOS Community Engagement: Oct-09  
 ✓1 USAID Development (Team Lead) : Oct-09  
**TF Kandahar**  
 ✓1 DOS/INL Task Force Officer: Mar-10



**TF Kandahar**  
**PRT Zabul (Dai Kundi)**  
 ✓3 DOS: Mar-10  
 ✓1 USAID: TBD  
 ✓2 USDA: Aug-09  
**DST Shah Joy (Zabul)**  
 ✓1 DOS (Team Lead): Oct-09  
 ✓1 DOS Local Governance: Oct-09  
 ✓1 USAID Development: Oct-09  
**DST Sher-e Noh/Tarnak vs Jaldak**  
 ✓1 DOS Community Engagement: Dec-09  
 ✓1 DOS Local Governance: Dec-09  
 ✓1 USAID Development (Team Lead): Dec-09  
**DST Suni/Shinay (Zabul)**  
 ✓1 DOS (Team Lead): Dec-09  
 ✓1 DOS Local Governance: Dec-09  
 ✓1 USAID Development : Dec-09  
**TF Zabul**  
 ✓1 DOS/INL Task Force Officer: Mar-10

**IRC-SOUTH**  
**PRT Tarni Kandi**  
 ✓1 DOS: Mar-10  
 ✓1 USAID: TBD  
 ✓1 DOS Civ-Mil: TBD  
 ✓1 USDA: Aug-09  
**DST Uruzgan #1**  
 ✓1 DOS Community Engagement (Team Lead): Mar-10  
 ✓1 DOS Local Governance: Mar-10  
 ✓1 USAID Development: Mar-10  
**DST Uruzgan #2**  
 ✓1 USAID Community: TBD  
 Engagement (Team Lead): TBD  
 ✓1 DOS Local Governance: Mar-10  
 ✓2 USAID Development: Mar-10  
**TF Uruzgan**  
 ✓1 DOS/INL Task Force Officer: Mar-10

**KEY**  
 ✓Existing Position: 12  
 ✓By June 2009: +11 (23)  
 ✓By Nov 2009: +12 (35)  
 ✓By March 2010: +17(52)

# IRC-NORTH

## CONSULATE KANDAHAR

(Covers Jowzjan, Ser-e Pol and Samangan)

- ✓1 Principal Officer: Jun-09
- ✓1 OMSL: Jun-09
- ✓1 POL: TBD
- ✓1 POL: TBD
- ✓1 DOS Officer: TBD
- ✓1 PAS: Jun-09
- ✓3 DOS RSO: Jun-09
- ✓1 DOS Management (ICASS): Jun-09
- ✓1 Information Management: Jun-09
- ✓1 USAID: TBD
- ✓1 USAID: Jun-09
- ✓1 USDA: Jun-09

## IRC-NORTH USAID RUC

- ✓1 Senior Development Officer: TBD
- ✓1 Technical Officer: Sept-09
- ✓9 Technical Officer: Sept-09
- ✓1 USDA Senior Ag Officer: Mar-10

## PRO KUNDUZ

(Covers Takhar)

- ✓1 DOS (Staff lead): TBD
- ✓2 USAID: Jul-09/TBD
- ✓1 USDA: Mar-10
- ✓1 DOS (Deputy): Mar-10
- ✓1 USAID (Deputy): TBD

## MAJAKHIAN (PEYZA) RUC

- ✓1 DOS: Mar-10
- ✓1 USAID: TBD
- ✓1 USDA: Mar-10

## KANDAHAR (KANDAHAR)

- ✓1 DOS: Mar-10
- ✓2 USAID: Jul-09/TBD
- ✓1 USDA: Mar-10
- ✓1 USAID (Deputy): TBD



## DEA ENFORCEMENT GROUP

### KUNDUZ

- ✓1 Group Supervisor: 30-Sept-09
- ✓9 Special Agents: 30-Sept-09
- ✓1 Mail Research Specialist: 30-Sept-09

## PRO KUNDUZ (POL: KUNDUZ)

- ✓1 DOS: Mar-10
- ✓2 USAID: Jul-09/TBD
- ✓1 USDA: TBD
- ✓1 USAID (Deputy): TBD

## KEY

- ✓Existing Position: 24
- ✓By June 2009: +10 (34)
- ✓By Nov 2009: +9 (43)
- ✓By March 2010: +13 (56)

# IRC-WEST

## CONSULATE HERAT

- ✓1 Principal Officer: Jun-09
- ✓1 OMS: Jun-09
- ✓1 POL: TBD
- ✓1 POL/ECON: Jun-09
- ✓1 INL: Jun-09
- ✓1 PAS: Jun-09
- ✓3 DOS RSO: Jun-09
- ✓1 DOS Management (ICASS): Jun-09
- ✓1 Information Management: Jun-09
- ✓1 USAID: Jun-09

## PKT HERAT

- ✓ USAID: Jul-09

## REINFORCEMENT GROUP - HERAT

(TOTAL: 11)

- ✓1 Group Supervisor: 30-Sept-09
- ✓9 Special Agents: 30-Sept-09
- ✓1 Information Specialist: 30-Sept-09

## PKT FARAH

- ✓2 DOS (Staff lead): Mar-10
- ✓1 USAID: TBD
- ✓1 USDA: TBD
- ✓1 DOS (Deputy): Oct-09
- ✓1 USAID (Deputy): Aug-09

## IRC-WEST USAID HUN REGIONAL

### PLATFORM

- ✓1 Senior Development Officer: TBD
- ✓9 Technical Officer: Sept-09
- ✓1 USDA Senior Ag Officer: Aug-09

## PKT BALKH (QAL-E KAW)

- ✓2 DOS: Mar-10
- ✓1 USAID: TBD
- ✓1 USDA: TBD

## PKT GURTOR (CHAGHARAN)

- ✓1 DOS: TBD
- ✓1 USAID: TBD
- ✓1 USDA: TBD



## KEY

- ✓ Existing Position: 22
- ✓ By June 2009: +11 (33)
- ✓ By Nov 2009: +12 (45)
- ✓ By March 2010: +3 (48)



## Strategy for Afghanistan USG for Civilian Assistance

- **Chain of command:**
  - Identify military counterpart to Amb Wayne, Embassy's new coordinator for civilian assistance
  - Create unified civilian command and control at each level in the field (military reservists would fall under COM authority)
- **Security and Mobility:** establish policies and resources to ensure maximum freedom of movement
- **Training:** ensure integrated and tailored training for all field positions, including with military, stateside and in Kabul
- **Joint civ-mil campaign plan:** develop a USG civ-mil action plan for executing the President's strategic objectives in Afghanistan. Plan must establish framework for:
  - ✓ Regional and provincial USG civ-mil plans
  - ✓ How the USG utilizes its resources
- **Integrate with Afghan proposal:** Afghan government just proposed 650 Afghan and international civilian specialists – identify overlaps and gaps (estimated 650+ USG/USG-paid advisors currently working in Afghanistan)
- **International coordination:** urge UN to coordinate international civilian deployments, reinforced by Munich "Action Team" of Special Reps
- **More/faster:** consider further civilian increases or speed up arrival of planned increases
  - Establish an interagency group in Kabul to identify obstacles to and propose solutions for filling vacant positions; S/SRAP to support group in DC.

# ***Strategic Communication / Information Operations: Objectives***

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## **Agreed Objectives**

- Increase the legitimacy and capacity of the GIRoA and Afghan civil society through information, security, and development, in order to defeat Al Qaeda's influence in the region and provide an acceptable alternative to the insurgency

## **Current Civ-Mil Guidance**

- US Interagency Strategic Communication Plan: The Way Forward in Afghanistan (2008); ISAF Strategic Communication Strategy (2008); [REDACTED] (15APR09); DOS/DOD developing Draft Strategic Communication Planning Guidance (SC White Paper)

## **Current Activities**

- **Planning and Analysis:**
  - Establishing a Regional Strategic Communication Community of Interest (DOS/DOD)
  - Media/Internet mapping for targeted engagement (USFOR-A)
  - Establishing atmospherics, media monitoring and assessment contracts (USFOR-A)
- **Filling Personnel Requirements:**
  - Military Public Affairs (Requirement/Boots on Ground/Sourced/Gap – 156/26/106/24)
  - Information Operations (Requirement/Boots on Ground/Sourced/Gap – 59/11/39/9)
  - DOS Public Diplomacy: 10 US officer positions (3 US Embassy Kabul, 7 PRTs)
- **Communication/Outreach:**
  - Leveraging tribal communication and increasing radio reach / programs (USFOR-A, MIST, US Embassy)
  - Conducting rapid reaction / risk mitigation to counter insurgent messaging and actions (USFOR-A)
  - Expanding Government Media and Information Centers outside Kabul (US Embassy/Coalition)
  - Training in literacy, English, technology, journalism, and professionalism (US Embassy)

# **Strategic Communication / Information Operations: Actions**

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## **Questions/Issues Requiring Resolution**

- Afghans perceive host nation and Coalition deeds not matching words
- Under resourced and unbalanced Strategic Communication civilian-military resourcing
- Varied regional information environment—one region, two distinct information environments

## **Recommended Actions and Resources**

- Develop comprehensive Regional Strategic Communication strategy under DOS lead to ensure strategic objectives are nested with operational and decentralized tactical execution and effects:
  - Develop compelling new strategic narratives (DOD, DOS)
  - Improve our ability to deliver narratives while denigrating the insurgent's ability to do the same (US Embassy, USFOR-A)
  - Work with partners to utilize new technology and build enduring mobile communications network
- Develop, implement an interagency collaborative planning and execution process (DOD, DOS)
- Resource PA/IO/PD requests that will allow for execution of:
  - Expanded regional Afghan-Coalition Media Information Centers to support rapid reaction (DOS, ISAF, USFOR-A)
  - Support GIRoA request for communicator expertise (training, personnel, education) (DOS, USFOR-A)
  - Real-time coordination and planning between US Embassy Kabul, ISAF, USFOR-A and GIRoA
- Establish a counter-insurgent Strategic Communication cell and a joint SC monitoring / assessment / analysis cell (USCENTCOM, USFOR-A, US Embassy Kabul)

## ***Rule of Law / Justice System: Objectives***

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### **Agreed Objectives**

- Build Afghan confidence in the legitimacy of state and traditional justice mechanisms so people are not forced to turn to the Taliban
- Build accountable and accessible justice institutions delivering services with integrity nationwide
- Create a justice system that produces prompt, just results consistent with Afghan and international law
- Promote greater understanding among Afghans of US/international role in Rule of Law (RoL) assistance and increase trust
- Tackle culture of impunity
- Develop a comprehensive and culturally sensitive US military RoL doctrine to ensure counterinsurgency unity of effort

### **Current Civ-Mil Guidance**

- Draft USG RoL Implementation Plan (based on Deputies guidance from previous Administration)
- Afghanistan National Justice Sector Strategy and National Justice Program
- Afghanistan National Development Strategy

### **Current Activities**

- Supporting the Courts, Ministry of Justice (including prisons), Attorney General's Office, Law Faculties, and Bar Association
- Building Afghan RoL infrastructure
- Promoting public awareness of legal system, legal rights, and obligations
- Strengthening traditional justice systems and links to the state system



## ***Rule of Law / Justice System: Actions***

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### **Questions/Issues Requiring Resolution**

- Balancing support of traditional justice systems with capacity building of state justice system
- Building confidence in the state and restoring confidence in traditional justice systems
- Mitigating human rights concerns to ensure continued donor support (e.g., response to Shia' Law)
- Civilian-military guidance to ensure unity of effort across civilian and military RoL efforts

### **Recommended Actions and Resources**

- Prioritize RoL activities (e.g., narcotics, kidnapping, property disputes, and corruption); high profile actions
- Enable Afghan efforts by sharing intelligence and providing improved financial/physical security for judicial and legal professionals; press for action
- Enhance civilian technical assistance and monitoring efforts:
  - Expedite civilian increase to provinces (DOJ, DOS/INL)
  - Provide experts and liaisons to Afghan courts, Ministry of Justice, Attorney General's Office
- Enhance and reprogram assistance:
  - Increased funding via the Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund
  - Finalize new USAID justice sector development contract; start informal justice survey
- Link Afghan government and traditional justice; regular dialogues with influential figures (Khost CCM)
  - Expand mobile courts pilot to extend reach of state to the district level
- Develop civilian-military RoL guidance for use in the field to: clarify roles and authorities, address traditional vs. state issues, and ensure unity of effort

## ***Prisons / Corrections: Objectives***

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### **Agreed Objectives**

- Improve Afghan Ministry of Justice professional integrity, performance, and infrastructure
- Strengthen Afghan capacity (detention, prosecution, rehabilitation, and reconciliation of detainees)
- Combat radicalization in prisons

### **Current Civ-Mil Guidance**

- 2008 Afghanistan National Justice Sector Strategy (agreed justice priorities, but no guidance on corrections)
- Establish a functioning justice system with judges, police, and the Central Prison Directorate (CPD) through capacity building (organic and infrastructure) and training
- Establish coordinating mechanisms for police, prosecutors, the penitentiary police, and courts
- CJTF-101's Rule of Law strategy: infrastructure, professional capacity, legal awareness/confidence

### **Current Activities**

- UNAMA overall lead (Prison Working Group); Embassy Kabul leads US efforts
- DOS/INL Corrections System Support Program (CSSP) Team works directly with the CPD on human capacity, training, and infrastructure needs nationwide
- Building/rehabilitating facilities (Pol-i-Charkhi); developing case administration system, vocational and educational opportunities
- ISAF and US forces provide prison construction support and advisory roles through PRTs, task forces
- FY 2010 DOS/INL Budget Request: \$65M for corrections, \$8M for counternarcotics and anti-corruption, \$82M for justice sector development

## ***Prisons / Corrections: Actions***

### **Questions/Issues Requiring Resolution**

- Priority: Is Corrections the weakest link, undermining the counterinsurgency effort or should the priority be other RoL areas?
- Separating the desirable from the achievable
- De-radicalization: Best practices? Lessons learned from Task Force 134's program in Iraq?
- Focus of US assistance: nationally, or in target areas (Kabul, Regional Commands East and South)

### **Recommended Actions and Resources**

- Counterinsurgency Focus:
  - Establish interagency Task Force; Lead to conduct assessment and recommendations
  - Employ Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures to separate the irreconcilable from the others by using counterinsurgency concepts
  - Ensure continuous and close coordination with police and military intelligence in order to understand the larger network issues surrounding the incarceration
  - Engage to teach, train, and co-implement all phases of corrections, from initial detention, assessment, categorization, case planning, and rehabilitation
  - Conceptualize detention as the "battle field of the mind" beyond the domain of care and custody, and work with all members of the coalition and GIRoA to defeat the insurgency from the inside out and the outside in
- Improve Current Efforts:
  - Conduct nationwide assessment of prison needs; possible springboard for donor support
  - Develop a US/UNAMA/Afghan strategy prioritizing needs and including all requirements:
    - UNAMA-led outreach/coordination with donors to enable USG focus on South and East
    - Agreed US civ-mil implementation plan to support strategy and ensure unity of effort
    - Develop protocol for the transfer of detainees into Ministry of Justice custody; must identify provinces to accept detainees, adapt laws, and enhance security of buildings and equipment
    - Utilize existing US/Afghan model of sustainable, hybrid prisons
    - Implement via prison reform checklist to be used by PRTs or ISAF forces (Reform Working Group to coordinate)
  - Prioritize development of professional skills in Central Prison Directorate

## ***Police Training: Objectives***

### **Agreed Objectives**

- Establish a fully constituted, professional, functional and ethnically balanced ANP to meet the security needs of the country effectively and will be increasingly fiscally sustainable (2006 Afghanistan Compact)
- Continue to reform and grow beyond 82,000 ANP to a force size that creates security in Afghanistan
- Strengthen the ANP as the primary source of law and order for the Afghan population
- Reform and strengthen border policing

### **Current Civ-Mil Guidance**

- USFOR-A, with policy guidance from Chief of Mission, directs all USG efforts to organize, train, and equip Afghan National Security Forces

### **Current Activities**

- Nearly 82,000 ANP assigned; JCMB agreed to increase of up to 15,000 by August elections
- Police mentor teams operate at the district and provincial level (including US, DEU, GBR, NLD, POL)
  - USG is adding 4,000 troops and nearly 300 civilian police
  - Additional 300 European gendarmerie forces expected in summer 2009
- Focused District Development (FDD) is a sound program but progressing slowly
- DOS is synchronizing prosecutorial and judicial training with FDD districts and incorporating other rule of law institutions (e.g., courts, prosecutors, prisons, judges) into police training/reform
- Afghan Civil Order Police is a positive model for operations (i.e., longer training, mobile force, more counterinsurgency capable) but shortage of "quality" recruits even to fill remaining slots
- Afghan Border Police remain far short of a credible force element (i.e., training, equipment, infrastructure, oversight, incentive and support remain critical challenges)
- GIRoA pilot Afghan Public Protection Program in Wardak province; effectiveness/applicability to be determined

## ***Police Training: Actions***

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### **Questions/Issues Requiring Resolution**

- How many ANP are needed and where?
- Role of ANP as counterinsurgency or community policing force or both? Is this a regional or urban/rural question?
- Alternatives to civilian contractors? Does type of training determine best provider?
- Are the police a truly national force and, if not, should they be in order to be effective?
- What should be done to diminish high attrition rates in police?
- Should the Afghan National Civil Order Police be expanded? How do we attract high-skill recruits?
- How do we improve the effectiveness of border police?
- What steps can we take to mitigate corruption, illiteracy, and drug addiction?
- Coordination of Focused District Development (FDD) with other enhanced Rule of Law elements?
- Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3): Sufficient resources/capacity to rapidly expand pilot? What criteria should be used? Long-term plan for integrating AP3 with ANP and state structures?

## ***Police Training: Actions (cont.)***

### **Recommended Actions and Resources**

- **Afghan National Police:**
  - Conduct detailed analysis on ANP expansion and sustainment (e.g., size, force structure, location)
  - Offer incentives (literacy training) and hazard pay to combat 20% attrition
  - Enhance training effort:
    - Fulfill requirements for high-quality US liaisons/advisors (civ and mil)
    - Implement longer training (16 weeks) and specialized/advanced leadership programs
    - Emphasize counterinsurgency skills for units in South/East and community policing for units in North/West
    - Ensure time commitment for sustained partnering/training (6-12 months per ANP unit)
  - Expand district level focus beyond FDD
- **Enhance international contribution and improve unity of effort:**
  - Establish NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan with proper resources and authorities and link to US efforts
  - Invigorate/institutionalize International Police Coordination Board for effective EUPOL/CSTC-A/ISAF coordination according to a common plan
  - Solicit international police advisor teams
- **Pilot mandatory regional/national rotation for Afghan Uniform Police and Afghan Border Police**
- **Prioritize use of qualified ANP leadership to train other units in formal and field training environments**
- **Increase Ministry of Interior oversight of field-based units, capacity for quick response**

## ***Policy & Practice for Civ-Mil Assistance to Afghan Efforts to Combat Corruption: Objectives***

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### **Agreed Objectives**

- Improve transparency, reduce corruption and the perception of, to increase Afghans' confidence in their government. Demonstrate visible gains to advance counterinsurgency efforts in the short-term, and to build the foundation of a functioning government in the longer-term

### **Current Civ-Mil Guidance**

- Efforts must be Afghan-led and in accordance with the Afghanistan National Development Strategy at the national and sub-national levels

### **Current Activities**

- Efforts are relatively nascent and inadequate; overshadowed by focus on security and reconstruction
- GIRoA efforts to create anti-corruption momentum include:
  - Ratification of UN Convention Against Corruption
  - Creation of the High Office of Oversight
  - Anti-Corruption Investigative Unit in the office of the Attorney General
- USG Interagency Working Group on anti-corruption (led by DOS/INL in DC, and Deputy Ambassador in Kabul)

## ***Policy & Practice for Civ-Mil Assistance to Afghan Efforts to Combat Corruption: Actions***

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### **Questions/Issues for Resolution**

- Perception of endemic corruption undermines confidence in government and international effort
- Actual corruption undermines efficacy of efforts and foundation of long-term growth
- Perception of corruption and its negative impact is aggravated by accompanying lack of benefit to Afghans

### **Recommended Actions and Resources**

- Anti-corruption activities should be Afghan led; US personnel are to support, promote, and advocate for use of existing procedures and mechanisms, while building and strengthening others
- Ensure enforcement of existing administrative processes within government institutions
- Focus on entities that Afghans frequently interact with: justice, police, licenses and permits
- Public education and media campaigns necessary—but must not raise unrealistic expectations
- Demonstration of commitment by GIRoA (e.g., non-politically motivated prosecutions)
- Improve capacity/transparency of Ministry of Finance and line ministries in areas of revenue generation and expenditures—build incentives for performance
- Demand standards of accountability and transparency in the use of international community funds
- Increase support for joint civ-mil mechanisms to combat illicit finance and integrate with counternarcotics and anti-corruption efforts
- Create a cross-cutting position at the US Embassy to work full-time on corruption issues
- GIRoA efforts to reinforce anti-corruption momentum through additional support to the following:
  - Supreme Court led Anti-Corruption Strategy
  - High Office of Oversight—part of the Office of President; currently has a staff of 3 persons
  - Anti-Corruption Investigative Unit in the office of the Attorney General—currently vetting, training prosecutors
  - Fraud Investigating Unit and Complaints Office within Ministry of Finance



## ***Counternarcotics: Objectives***

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### **Agreed Objectives**

- Break the link between drugs, corruption, insurgency, and criminality
- Sustain a transition from poppy to a licit agriculture economy
- Build Afghan capacity and unity of effort among US entities and partner nations

### **Current Civ-Mil Guidance**

- Eight pillars of 2008 Afghan National Drug Control Strategy outline counternarcotics incentives and disincentives
- Expanded ISAF rules of engagement to integrate counternarcotics efforts into counterinsurgency; ISAF counternarcotics fragmentary order

### **Current Activities**

- Public Information: Campaigns reached approx. 80,000 Afghans in 2008; limited by lack of media infrastructure, capacity, security and coordination
- Poppy Elimination: Displaced cultivation into the South/Southwest
- Alternative Development: Limited impact in insecure areas where Afghan ministries are not present
  - Enhanced agribusiness opportunities; need more flexibility, integration with broader assistance
- Interdiction/Justice Reform:
  - Despite US and UK efforts with vetted/mentored Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA) units, overall Afghan interdiction capacity (to include independent operational and intelligence-gathering) almost non-existent at the provincial level
  - DEA force uplift and additional US military enablers (i.e., rotary wing) may increase operational tempo, ISAF participation facilitated by expanded rules of engagement

## ***Counternarcotics: Actions***

### **Questions/Issues Requiring Resolution**

- Correct mix of incentives and disincentives?
- How to target the narco-insurgency without alienating pro-government elements?
- Can we negotiate the exit of narco-traffickers tied to the insurgency?
- Can we pursue a district-based approach to mainstream counternarcotics efforts across assistance, governance, and security strategies in the South and East? What architecture is necessary to support this?
- Is the USG counternarcotics strategy (e.g., eradication, interdiction, and agricultural development) effectively coordinated and integrated?

### **Recommended Actions and Resources**

- Build agriculture-based livelihood security at district level: increase civilian field presence; build Afghan implementing capacity; ensure stronger civ-mil coordination down to district level
- Increase incentives for local officials and farmers not to grow poppy. Condition National Solidarity Program payments upon counternarcotics performance? Streamline incentive delivery to show impact prior to the next poppy planting season
- Use JCMB process to establish comprehensive provincial counternarcotics goals; equip governors to act; ensure GIRoA holds them accountable
- Deemphasize eradication: phase out Poppy Eradication Force, focus on Governor Led Eradication where viable security and agricultural development options exist
- Increase interdiction, build Afghan capacity to investigate and prosecute cases against key narcotics players; use CN-JIATF to develop intel/deconflict operations; develop holistic plan to build CNPA
- Place US counternarcotics efforts under one official with Ambassadorial rank (under COM authority)
- Create incentives for GIRoA to prosecute an agreed short-list of national-level narco-criminals
- Adopt a regional approach working with international community: near-term focus on Pakistan's Balochistan province, Gulf States (cash flows), Central Asia, and Iran
- Improve counternarcotics metrics to emphasize more than cultivation; solicit donor support outside cultivation areas

## ***Agricultural Development: Objectives***

### **Agreed Objectives**

- Increase agricultural productivity, particularly wheat; increase production and marketing of fresh fruit and vegetables, dried fruit and nuts, livestock, and competitive value-added products
- Expand markets (domestic and export)
- Increase incomes: increase liquidity available to agriculture and agribusiness
- Increase off-farm jobs in the agricultural sector for rural people in targeted districts
- Support Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL) objectives under its district approach
- Rehabilitate watersheds (local construction of small-scale irrigation and water storage systems which are resource-conservative)

### **Civ-Mil Guidance**

- Afghan National Development Strategy (Agriculture & Rural Development Sector) and National Agricultural Development Framework

### **Current Activities**

- USAID is working in 30 provinces to accelerate broad-based, sustainable economic development in the poppy growing regions by providing materials, technology, and expertise to produce and market high-value licit crops, including fruits and vegetables (FY 09 budget anticipated to exceed \$400 million)
- Army National Guard Agribusiness Development Teams (ADTs) are deployed to select provinces (6 teams in country, 2 more arriving)
- USDA provides 13 agricultural advisors to the US PRTs and monetized food aid proceeds to MAIL to build its capacity and infrastructure
- USAID and USDA are funding agricultural experts to provide technical assistance to MAIL
- Programs are implemented through partnerships with the MAIL and private sector associations

## ***Agricultural Development: Actions***

### **Questions/Issues Requiring Resolution**

- Human resources: Additional USAID, USDA, ADT and US Army Corps of Engineers technical experts are required
- Financial resources: Fully funded and resourced agricultural re-development program is required (budget requirements FY 2010: USDA \$170 million, USAID \$235 million for agriculture, \$173 million for alternative development in addition to CERP funds)
- Water resources: Small/medium size projects require assessment, survey, and design prior to construction
- Stakeholders: Multinational coordination needed to obtain local support to ensure long-term sustainability
- PRTs: All need to embrace agricultural re-development as a top priority and support it accordingly

### **Recommended Actions and Resources**

- Implement a unified U.S.-Afghan approach to address farmers' needs at the district level (consistent with MAIL)
- Provide financial /logistical support to US PRT experts to maximize district level impact
- Invest labor/capital in infrastructure to facilitate regional agricultural trade corridors
- Invest in human capital
- Use local labor to construct small, community-based irrigation and water storage projects and rehabilitate watersheds
- Invest in fruit and nut tree orchards, wood lots, natural reforestation and vineyard development
- Support processing facilities for cashmere, lamb, wool, and domestic chicken
- Strengthen food security through collaborative agricultural research and extension
- Provide business plan training to agri-businesses and increase access to agricultural credit
- Dedicate a percentage of CERP funds to support agricultural projects and coordinate with civilian agriculture resources

## *Closing Remarks*

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
## **Lessons Learned: The Strategic COIN Command**

**Multi-National Force-Iraq is a strategic-level HQ optimized with an arsenal of COIN tools/subordinate commands:**

- An operational command (MNC-I)
- A command to generate, train, and equip indigenous security forces (MNSTC-I)
- A reconstruction command (Gulf Region Division, Army Corps of Engineers)
- A detention command conducting "COIN inside the wire" and helping with the Iraqi corrections system (TF-134)
- A Force Strategic Engagement Cell (FSEC) to facilitate reconciliation with hostile factions and take them off the battlefield, supported by a Strategic Debriefing Element (SDE) to "map" the enemy
- A robust Pol-MII and Econ staff to reinforce Embassy partners and help execute the Joint Campaign Plan (CJ9)
- An element to fight the war of information (IO Task Force) and an element to "be first with the truth" (Strat Comma/Media Ops Center)
- Fusion cells (Joint MNF-/USEMB elements) for Energy, Medical, and other critical areas
- An intel structure to support all of the above (CIOC, DIA Forward Element, etc.)

**Fully partnered and in coordination with:**

- US Embassy and all its interagency elements
- A counterterrorism command (TF-714)
- An embedded JIATF that includes a threat financing cell
- The United Nations Mission in Iraq (UNAMI)
- An element dedicated to commercial development ("Brinkley Group" – TF Business Stabilization Ops)



**Traditional staff augmented for strategic C2 of a COIN campaign as it evolved in Iraq—Afghanistan HQs will require similar optimization**

