

A002  
PART, B1  
1.4(d)  
T-JS



(b)(6)

10/14/2000 12:19:13 PM

on

To: (b)(6)

CC:

Subject: FW: Final draft of ABC paper (U)

~~CLASSIFICATION: SECRET~~

Jodi/ We have checked CJCS and VCJCS schedule and the ABC lunch is not on the screen for either. With Sec Cohen out and Sec Albright possibly/probably in Egypt with POTUS, I don't see this event taking place on Mon. We need to compare notes 1st thing on Mon. I propose you, me Jennifer and Rick meet on Mon at 0830 so we can give you our TP inputs and strategize how we will put the two papers from ASD Kramer's meeting together. Your place or mine is fine. Just let me know what works. What I received from ASD Kramer and

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appropriate ones to you and Jennifer. I agree with what you have said in the ABC paper attached. I have bounced it off Rick and Paul and will have their inputs early Mon AM (when we meet). Until then, some additional food for thought:

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-A key objective that is not articulated is the need for us to maintain the US/ROK and US/Japan alliances strong throughout the process. We need to remain ready to deter and a large part of that is not getting too far out ahead of the ROKs.

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detail Mon AM. By the way, I talked to Mike Calland late Fri and told him that MG Lay will be TAD next week so I would accompany ASD Kramer to the 1600 meeting with Wendy Sherman.

R. (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From:

(b)(6)

Sent: 13 October 2000 6:26 PM

To:

Cc:

(b)(6)

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A008  
PART, B1,  
1.4(b,c)

## DOD OBJECTIVES FOR US-DPRK ENGAGEMENT

1. ALLIANCE MAINTENANCE. It is critical that as we move forward in improving US-DPRK relations that we continue close and continuous consultations with the ROK and Japan. In particular, the ROK would be extremely sensitive to any US-DPRK discussions on a peace regime. We must ensure that any agreement reached with the DPRK during upcoming visits should not undermine the US ability to sustain a close working alliance with the ROK for the indefinite future.

Goal: Maintain and strengthen US-ROK and US-GOJ alliances, as well as US-ROK-GOJ trilateral coordination.

2. MILITARY CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES. As the diplomatic momentum increases, we cannot lose sight of the importance confidence building measures (CBMs) will play in achieving a lasting peace on the Peninsula. While political, cultural, and economic steps can help reduce tension, to achieve a lasting peace on the peninsula there must be concrete and verifiable progress on CBMs.

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A peace process without commensurate CBMs is meaningless.

Ultimately, we need an agreement that gives us the high assurance that we have in fact established the stability we seek.

Goal: Reduce tension through a concrete and verifiable agreement on confidence building measures and cooperative threat reduction, leading to eventual reduction, relocations, and reorganization along the DMZ of DPRK artillery and forces.

### Objectives of CBMs:

- reduce the threat to Seoul and US forces in Korea
- decrease tensions and increase security along DMZ
- increase strategic warning against a NK attack

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- promote WMD-free peninsula
- Promote transparency that may eventually lead to greater trust among Korean armed forces following N-S reconciliation

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4. PEACE REGIME. The US fully supports the establishment of a peace treaty that replaces the Armistice Agreement. The long-term objective for Korea remains a "peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict with a non-nuclear, democratic, reconciled, and ultimately reunified Peninsula." However, until the two Koreas find a peaceful solution to their differences, USG remains committed to the terms of the Armistice Agreement.



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7. Remains recovery operations.

Goal: Expand cooperation on the accounting of US personnel still unaccounted for from the Korean War.

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~~SECRET~~NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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October 19, 2000 100 OCT 20 AM 8:58


OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

## MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH  
Assistant to the Vice  
President for National  
Security AffairsMR. JOHN PODESTA  
Chief of Staff to the  
PresidentMS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of StateMR. THOMAS H. WOLFE  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence AgencyCOL. MARIA I. CRIBBS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of DefenseCAPT. DOUGLAS F. WHALEN, USN  
Secretary, Joint StaffMR. CHRIS KLEIN  
Staff Assistant to the  
Representative of the U.S.  
to the United NationsSUBJECT: Principals Committee Meeting on the Middle East  
and Korea (S)

Attached are agendas for the Principals Committee meeting on the Middle East and Korea on October 20, 2000 from 2:30-4:00 p.m. in the White House Situation Room. Due to the sensitive nature of the Middle East agenda, it should be passed to principals only.

(S)

  
Robert A. Bradtke  
Executive Secretary

## Attachments

Tab A Middle East Agenda  
Tab B Korea Agenda~~SECRET~~Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke  
Reason: 1.5(d)  
Declassify On: 10/19/10~~SECRET~~

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: October 20, 2000

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 2:30-3:30 p.m. -- Middle East

AGENDA

1. Israeli-Palestinian Implementation of Sharm Agreement
  - Situation Update . . . . . (CIA/State)
  - Next Steps Including Fact Finding Mechanism  
. . . . . (State/NSC)
  - Arab Summit Outlook . . . . . (State)
2. Israel-Syria-Lebanon Tensions
  - Intelligence Update . . . . . (CIA)
  - Diplomatic Update . . . . . (State)
  - Contingency Planning . . . . . (JCS)
  - Next Steps
3. Iraq Update -- Military Activity in Western Iraq
  - Intelligence Update . . . . . (CIA)
  - Diplomatic Update . . . . . (State)
  - Contingency Planning and DC Report (JCS/NSC)
  - Next Steps
4. Regional Security Situation
  - Threat Reports . . . . . (CIA)
  - Security Posture . . . . . (JCS/State)

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Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke

Reason: 1.5(d)

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PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING

DATE: October 20, 2000

LOCATION: Situation Room

TIME: 3:30-4:00 p.m. -- Korea

AGENDA

## 1. Korea

-- SecState Trip . . . . . (State)

-- Next Steps

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Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke

Reason: 1.5(d)

Declassify on: 10/19/10

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INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON 1-00/012574-AP  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY *JMS*  
FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
Prepared by: (b)(6) ISA/AP (b)(6)  
SUBJECT: Principals' Committee Meeting on Korea, October 20, 2000

PURPOSE

(S) A PC on Friday, October 20 will discuss objectives for Secretary Albright's

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BACKGROUND

(S) Secretary Albright will hold meetings in Pyongyang on 23-24 October, then go to Seoul on October 25 to meet with President Kim Dae-Jung and hold a trilateral meeting with ROK Foreign Minister Lee and Japanese Foreign Minister Kono. Mr. Bodner and VADM Doran, Assistant to the CJCS, will accompany SecState.

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(U) Further work is needed to flesh out this phased approach, vet it in detail with the ROK, and integrate it with a sequence of economic, political and social measures. But it represents the kind of approach that could change the actual security situation on the ground, as opposed to merely the atmospherics.

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(U) This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of what took place in Europe. NATO's reorientation from deterring the Soviet threat to projecting stability followed:

(1) two decades in which a series of increasingly significant confidence building measures were adopted (thanks to NATO's refusing to succumb to Moscow's pressure for symbolic measures);

(2) the Soviet missile threat to Europe was essentially eliminated by the 1987 INF Treaty and its strict verification regime;

(3) the Soviet conventional military threat in Central/Eastern Europe dissipated and was withdrawn;

(4) Germany was united within NATO, 21 years after the initial Bonn-East Berlin rapprochement and 13 years after the historic summit between East and West German leaders; and

(5) drastic, verifiable conventional arms reductions were mandated in the CFE Treaty.

(U) On the Korean peninsula, there have been no concrete confidence building measures but there has been a steady increase in the DPRK missile threat; a continued build-up of artillery and MLRS on the DMZ; and significantly increased and impressive training, notwithstanding the DPRK economic decline that undoubtedly is having a negative effect on certain aspects of its military posture.

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(U) The European experience can be a model, but the current Korean situation is analogous to the early 1970s, after Brandt made his strategic opening to Honecker (1969) and before the 1975 Helsinki Final Act's initial confidence building measures – not the early 1990s post-Soviet reorientation of NATO. The lesson is to not succumb to symbolic steps or prematurely reach for total solutions but rather to insist on concrete confidence building measures that lead to meaningful tension and threat reduction measures that lead to a genuine peace based on the absence of a threat. Given the DPRK's economic decline, the timetable can be expected to be much faster than the two decades required in Europe, but a similar patient phased approach could overcome mistrust and enhance security.

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T-JCS

18 Oct 00

Subject: US-ROK Exercises (U)

1. (U) Purpose. To provide rationale for maintaining US-ROK exercises
2. (U) Background. The US and ROK conduct **three annual exercises**:
  - (U) Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL): CFC's large-scale, annual warfighting command post exercise (CPX) designed to exercise ROK-US combined forces government and military forces crisis action measures and procedures for the combined war plans in the defense of the Republic of Korea.
  - (U) Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration: This is a complex, multi-phase exercise annually tailored to train, test and demonstrate US-ROK force projection and deployment capability. It entails a warfighting CPX with a focus on strategic deployment, theater force protection, and a Field Training Exercise (FTX) of selected Flexible Deterrent Options designed to exercise sustainment functions.
  - (U) Foal Eagle: Foal Eagle is primarily a FTX for tactical units and focuses on all joint and combined aspects of CFC's mission: Rear Battle Area Protection, RSOI, Special Operations, and conventional Multi-Service Force-on-Force. Selected CONUS-based units with OPLAN taskings are brought to Korea to participate in this exercise.
3. (U) Key Points. Rationale for maintaining the US-ROK exercise program in at the current:
  - ~~(S)~~ Our exercise program provides the foundation for security on the peninsula and demonstrates the strong US-ROK alliance.

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- ~~(S)~~ All three exercises stress joint and combined interoperability and provide an opportunity to integrate new equipment and doctrine that are essential to maintain readiness.

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- ~~(S)~~ These exercises focus on responding to an external threat to the ROK-- they are defensive in nature.
- ~~(S)~~ The US has already cancelled a large exercise in the mid-90s -- Team Spirit. Whereas, the DPRK has increased its winter and summer Training Cycles over the last decade.
- ~~(S)~~ These exercises have a benefit that extends beyond the peninsula--the overall readiness of our nation's armed forces benefit from participating in these exercises.
- ~~(S)~~ The US is willing to conduct confidence building measures such as an observer exchange program and over-flight observers during exercises to build trust and reinforce the defensive nature of the US-ROK exercises.
- ~~(S)~~ Our strong alliance has been the hallmark of deterrence and forms the backbone on negotiating with the DPRK.
- ~~(S)~~ Bottom Line: US exercise program with the ROK is non-negotiable.

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- Combined US-ROK exercises in Korea are defensive in nature and are not meant to threaten the security of the DPRK.
- Exercises and military training should not be a stumbling block to peace.
- We are willing to conduct confidence building measures such as an observer exchange program during exercises to build trust and reinforce the defensive nature of US-ROK exercises.
- The US will not cancel or scale-back our exercises on the Peninsula.

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NSC

Further, the Director of Central Intelligence, in his August 2000 report to Congress, once again identified North Korea as a "key supplier" of ballistic missile equipment, technologies, and expertise to a number of countries worldwide. The transfer of these sensitive items and assistance to rogue states constitutes a serious threat to U.S. national security and interests.

The President  
October 24, 2000

Not only do these facts suggest that North Korea has not fundamentally changed its behavior, they cast strong doubt on the credibility of Pyongyang's recently-stated opposition to all forms of terrorism, as well as the DPRK's public commitment to support international measures to combat terrorism. Given that the DPRK continues to harbor four Japanese Red Army terrorists accused of hijacking a Japanese airliner in 1970, conducted numerous terrorist activities against South Korea and Japan over the last two decades, and reportedly supplied arms to terrorist groups in the Philippines and Sri Lanka as recently as this summer, we strongly oppose any action you might take to remove or downgrade the DPRK from the terrorism list.

Moreover, we are deeply troubled by the fact that, should North Korea be removed from the terrorism list, a wide variety of sanctions—including prohibitions on the export of U.S. Munitions List items, "dual-use" items, and missile-related goods and technology—would be automatically lifted. It would be extremely irresponsible to lift these specific sanctions on a country hostile to U.S. allies and interests, determined to build weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and identified by the intelligence community as a "key supplier" of WMD technologies and assistance to rogue states.

Finally, we believe that any decision to remove or downgrade North Korea from the U.S. terrorism list must be made in consultation with our allies in the region. It is critical that any action the United States takes with regard to the DPRK neither complicate nor endanger our longstanding relationship with these important countries, or damage America's reputation in the region.

Mr. President, we see no compelling reason why North Korea's status on the U.S. terrorism list should be reconsidered at this time. The DPRK has yet to demonstrate any material change in its policies or actions towards its neighbors, its commitment to international agreements, or its willingness to behave as a responsible player on the world scene. As long as North Korea continues to threaten U.S. allies and our interests in the region, such a move is unwarranted and would be dangerous to U.S. national security. For the reasons listed above, we strongly oppose any action to remove or downgrade North Korea from the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Sincerely,

*Jack Thompson*

*David H. Thompson*

*John C. Lange*

*Robert Lott*

*Mike DeWeine*

*George V. Voinovich*

T. Hutchinson

Richard Shelby

Bob Smith

Susan Collins

Allen Smith

Carrie Mack

Alvin A. Brown

John C. Brown

Jim Bunning

Joe Brown

Jesse Helms

~~CONFIDENTIAL W/ SECRET ATTACHMENT~~  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

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T-NSC

October 26, 2000

## MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEON FUERTH  
Assistant to the Vice  
President for National  
Security Affairs

MR. JOHN PODESTA  
Chief of Staff to the  
President

MS. KRISTIE A. KENNEY  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. THOMAS H. WOLFE  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency


COL. MARIA I. CRIBBS  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

CAPT. (b)(6) USN  
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for PC Meeting on Korea

(S)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the PC meeting on Korea on October 20, 2000. Please pass to principals. (S)

  
Robert A. Bradtke  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A

Summary of Conclusions

CC:  
USDP  
PDUSDP  
ATUSDP

OCT 27 2000

~~CONFIDENTIAL W/ SECRET ATTACHMENT~~  
Classified by: Robert A. Bradtke  
Reason: 1.5 (d)  
Declassify On: 10/24/2010

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A032  
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Koreas-US Military,0301

North Korea denounces U.S.-South Korea joint military exercise

SEOUL, South Korea (AP) North Korea accused the U.S. and South Korean militaries Thursday of hurting thawing relations by holding a joint military exercise.

The two militaries on Wednesday began the 10-day Foal Eagle exercise, the biggest of several joint training maneuvers held annually.

U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had ended a visit to Pyongyang on Wednesday, citing progress in resolving issues such as the North's missile development.

"The maneuvers prove that the U.S. is still pursuing the policy of strength in its strategy towards (North Korea) and that the South Korean authorities are following with increased zeal the U.S. strategy," a spokesman for North Korea's Foreign Ministry said in remarks carried by the official Korean Central News Agency.

"It is as good as spoiling the good atmosphere created in favor of reconciliation and cooperation," said the spokesman, who was not named.

South Korea and the United States have characterized past military exercises as defensive, but North Korea has denounced them as a rehearsal for a northward invasion. About 37,000 U.S. troops are stationed in South Korea.

The Foal Eagle exercise, held since 1961, is to test rear area protection operations and major command, control and communications systems and involves field training for U.S. and South Korean troops, military officials said.

The size of this year's exercise was not announced. In last year's maneuvers, 500,000 South Korean and 30,000 U.S. troops were mobilized for sea, land and air drills.

Similar exercises earlier this year were scaled down amid thawing relations between two Koreas following a historic summit of their leaders in June.

APTV-10-26-00 0941EDT

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## FAX TRANSMITTAL

# of pages 1

To <b>BOLE KESINGER</b>	From <b>LT STEVE CAMBER</b>
Dept./Agency <b>KOREA DESK</b>	# (b)(6)
Fax (b)(6)	Fax #
NSN 7540-01-317-7366	5099-101 GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

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AD-7/  
T-1, T-1.4 (b)(6)

I-00/012574-AP

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
Prepared by: (b)(6), ISA/AP, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Principals' Committee Meeting on Korea, October 20, 2000  
-- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

PURPOSE

(S) A Principals' Committee meeting on Friday, October 20 will discuss the objectives of Secretary Albright's trip to Pyongyang, which includes:

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BACKGROUND

(S) Secretary Albright will depart for Pyongyang on Sunday, October 22, and hold meetings with the DPRK on 23-24 October. She will return through Seoul on October 25 in order to hold a bilateral meeting with President Kim Dae-Jung and a trilateral meeting with ROK Foreign Minister Lee and Japanese Foreign Minister Kono. Jim Bodner and VADM Walt Dorn, Assistant to the CJCS, will accompany Secretary Albright during her trip.

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Part, B1, 1.4(b,c)

I-00/-AP

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
Prepared by: (b)(6) ISA/AP (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Principals' Committee Meeting on Korea, October 20, 2000  
- - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM


PURPOSE

(S) A Principals' Committee meeting on Friday, October 20 will discuss the objectives of Secretary Albright's trip to Pyongyang and to decide the positions the US will take on ...

BACKGROUND

(S) Secretary Albright will depart for Pyongyang on Sunday, October 22, and hold meetings with the DPRK on 23-24 October. She will return through Seoul on October 25 in order to hold a bilateral meeting with President Kim Dae-Jung and a trilateral meeting with ROK Foreign Minister Lee and Japanese Foreign Minister Kono. Jim Bodner and VADM Walt Dorn, Assistant to the CJCS, will accompany Secretary Albright during her trip.


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DISCUSSION

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## Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office

### **Progress in Korea as of October 13, 2000**

#### Background

- 1950 - North Korea Invades South Korea with 130,000 men, initiating the Korean War.
- 1953 - The United States, North Korea, and China sign armistice that ends the war, but fails to bring permanent peace.
- 1951-1955 - American Graves Registration Teams search South Korean Battlefields for remains. North Koreans return several thousand sets of remains in Operation GLORY in 1954; approximately 854 remains were declared unknown.
- 1990-1991 - North Korea unilaterally recovers and turns over 16 sets of remains to Senator Robert Smith and Representative G. V. "Sonny" Montgomery.
- 1992 - 30 sets of remains repatriated through the United Nations Command (UNC).
- 1993 - 162 sets of remains returned following the signing of an UNC-North Korean People's Army (KPA) remains repatriation agreement.
- 1994 - Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) President Kim Il Sung unexpectedly accepts former President Carter's proposal to conduct Joint Recovery Operations (JROs) to search for U.S. remains. Political differences postpone implementation.
- 1996 - US-DPRK talks in New York agree to initiate JROs. First JRO conducted in July results in one set of remains recovered. Second JRO cancelled due to tensions generated by a North Korean submarine infiltration incident.
- 1997 - May US-DPRK talks in New York discuss restarting joint recoveries, initiating archival reviews, and establishing contact with a reported group of American defectors. North Korea agrees to 3 JROs.
- 1997 - December meetings in New York agree on five JROs and one joint archival review for 1998.
- 1998 - Both sides agree in New York to increase the number of JROs (6) and archival reviews (2) for 1999.
- 1999 - In June North Koreans refuse to repatriate four sets of remains from second JRO through Panmunjom. The Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) cancels third, fourth, and fifth JROs. North Koreans agree to talks in New York in October to discuss new repatriation procedures. As a result of those talks, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs led a delegation to Pyongyang on October 25 to repatriate the four sets of remains from the second JRO and to oversee resumption of the final operation of the year as scheduled.
- 1999 - December, both sides meet in Berlin to discuss operations for 2000. KPA explicitly links conduct of future JROs in the DPRK to the USG willingness to provide a large-scale assistance package. DoD rejects such linkage. The talks end without an agreement.
- 2000 - North Koreans return to the negotiating table in Malaysia without preconditions. The two sides agree to 5 JROs for 2000. With four of these JROs completed, 50 sets of remains have been recovered.

## Statistics

- 33,651 Service members killed in action (KIA)
  - 27,709 U.S. Army
  - 4,269 U.S. Marines
  - 1,198 U.S. Air Force
  - 475 U.S. Navy
- 7,140 Service members became prisoners of war
- Over 8,100 remain unaccounted for.
- To date, US Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (USACILHI) has identified only seven of the total 208 remains recovered unilaterally by the North Koreans between 1990 and 1994.
- 92 sets of remains have been recovered during 16 JROs from 1996 to the present. Five have been identified.

## Accounting Efforts on the Korean Peninsula

- There are three main pillars of the Korean War accounting program: live-sighting resolution; archival and oral history research efforts; and remains recovery operations in both the north and south.
- DPMO, with the full support of the intelligence community, aggressively investigates all reports and sightings of alleged American survivors of the Korean War living in North Korea. There have been no credible reports to date other than those that pertain to four known US defectors living in North Korea.
- Archival research and oral history programs are underway in the US, North and South Korea, and in China. These programs are designed to determine the circumstances of loss for missing service men; build our knowledge base on Korean War battle incidents; gain eyewitness accounts of prison camp life and prisoner movements; and gain access to materials and maps germane to POW/missing personnel matters.
- The U.S. pays fair and reasonable expenses associated with the efforts to recover remains, but will not pay ransom for the remains themselves.
- Both sides will meet in December to discuss JROs for 2001.

## Associated Developments with China

- The US continues negotiations aimed at access to archives in the People's Republic of China (PRC). Focus is on working with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to find avenues for engaging the People's Liberation Army (PLA), which controls access to archival materials and witnesses.
- Over the past decade, the USG has presented official requests for information on almost 200 individual Korean War unaccounted for cases. China has yet to respond to any of these.
- DASD Jones and his MFA counterpart, Mr. Chen Mingming, met in January and September of this year. Mr. Chen agreed to work with DPMO to establish an oral history program (OHP) focused on interviews with Chinese Korean War veterans involved in POW camp operations. DASD Jones kicked-off this program during his September visit with the interview of four Korean War POW camp workers. Mr. Chen also agreed to a DPMO request to establish US-PRC academic exchanges focused on the Korean War, and to pursue avenues for open source archival research.
- During July visit to Beijing, SECDEF highlighted importance of increased cooperation on Korean War accounting.

## KOREAN WAR POW/MIA ACCOUNTING EFFORTS

### HISTORY

As of the signing of the 1953 armistice that ended open hostilities on the Korean Peninsula, more than 8,200 American servicemen were missing. Of these, an estimated 6,100 were lost in battles north of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. Between 1954 and 1990, the U.S. was unable to convince the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK/North Korea) to return the remains of American servicemen killed in the conflict. This changed in the early 1990s when the DPRK unilaterally recovered and returned to United States control 208 sets of remains. These remains were repatriated through the United Nations Command (UNC) at Panmunjom. To date, the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI) has identified only 7 of the 208 sets of these remains. Identification has been hampered by the poor recovery techniques used by the DPRK that resulted in commingling of remains and mismatched identification media. From this experience, it was evident that to significantly improve the chances of identifying remains recovered from North Korea, Joint Recovery Operations (JROs) using CILHI's leading edge technical expertise would be required.

In 1994, DPRK President Kim Il Sung accepted former President Carter's proposal to conduct JROs to search for U.S. remains. Talks in New York City between the United States Government (USG) Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) and the Korean People's Army (KPA) in May 1996 resulted in an agreement to begin operations that year. The first JRO took place as scheduled, and the remains of one U.S. Army soldier were recovered and repatriated. Unfortunately, tensions generated by a North Korean submarine infiltration incident resulted in cancellation of the remaining JROs.

The two sides met again in May 1997 to discuss restarting JROs, initiating archival reviews, and establishing contact with a reported group of American defectors (not POWs) that we believe are still in North Korea. As a result of that meeting, the two sides agreed to conduct three JROs in 1997.

In December 1997, DPMO again met with the North Koreans to discuss 1998 operations. The two sides agreed on five JROs and one joint archival review. The first JRO resulted in the recovery of two sets of remains, but the KPA initially refused to repatriate them through the UNC as agreed to at the December 1997 talks. The KPA eventually relented and agreed to honor its commitment for the remaining operations.

During the next meeting in December 1998, DPMO negotiated an agreement to increase the number of JROs in 1999 to six and the number of archival reviews to two. The KPA agreed to conduct repatriations through Panmunjom to the UNC. Six sets of remains were repatriated at the conclusion of the first recovery operation. Four sets of remains were recovered during the second recovery operation, but the KPA refused to repatriate the remains through Panmunjom. As a result, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for POW/Missing Personnel Affairs Robert Jones cancelled the

remaining operations. In early October 1999, the United States attempted to break the stalemate by pursuing direct negotiations on the repatriation issue with the North Korean government. Both sides agreed on a new bilateral repatriation mechanism wherein US military aircraft would airlift remains directly from Pyongyang, as opposed to going through Panmunjom. DASD Jones led a delegation to Pyongyang on October 25 to repatriate the four sets of remains held by the KPA.

Both sides met in Berlin in December 1999 to discuss operations for 2000. At that meeting, the KPA demanded the USG provide a large-scale assistance package as a precondition for the conduct of future JROs. DPMO rejected this demand and the talks ended without an agreement.

### **RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**

In May 2000, the DPRK agreed to return to the negotiating table without preconditions. The two sides met in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in June and reached an agreement to conduct five JROs before the end of the year. The two sides agreed to repatriate remains by U.S. military aircraft from Pyongyang, in accordance with the procedures established at the end of 1999. They also agreed that compensation for these JROs would be in accordance with established formulas for services rendered and to increase the number of U.S. and DPRK personnel participating in the JROs.

Between 1996 and 1999, joint US-DPRK recovery teams recovered 42 sets of remains. Five of these have been identified and returned to families, and several more are near the end of the identification process. In 2000, with four of five JROs completed, 50 sets have been recovered. Identification efforts are ongoing.

### **LIVE AMERICAN POWS**

In addition to conducting JROs, DPMO investigates all reports and sightings of alleged POWs living in North Korea. Since 1994, US interviewers have questioned more than 400 DPRK defectors. Preliminary reports identified 23 individuals who might have some knowledge of live American POWs. Subsequent debriefings revealed, however, that 8 of the 23 did not have the information they originally claimed. The remaining reports seemed to pertain to four known defectors from the 1960s.

### **ARCHIVAL RESEARCH**

Another important area of effort is our archival research, both in the continental U.S. and abroad. DPMO's research and ongoing review of the almost 32,000 pages of documents previously collected from the National Archives and the Eisenhower Library help to develop a more accurate accounting effort. Additionally, DPMO continues to aggressively canvas the former POW community for information. Researchers from both DPMO and CILHI visited North Korea in 1997, 1998, and 1999. They were able to gain access to the North Korean Liberation War Museum and the Great Hall of the People (the North Korean equivalent of the Library of Congress). At the war museum, the KPA

allowed the U.S. teams to completely dismantle displays of captured identification media and photograph and record serial numbers of several pieces of captured equipment.

### **CHINA INITIATIVES**

The USG has also raised this issue with the People's Republic of China (PRC). Because the Chinese role in administered the majority of the Korean War POW camps, they can potentially provide information to aid in the accounting efforts. In January 1999, the Chinese designated a DASD-level counterpart in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Efforts to engage the Chinese were temporarily suspended in the wake of the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the resulting strain in bilateral relations. A DASD Jones visit to Beijing in January of this year got the effort back on track. During the visit, the Chinese agreed to the initiation of an Oral History Program focused on interviews with Chinese veterans of the Korean War. The first four interviews were conducted in September of this year.

### **FAMILY OUTREACH**

DPMO works closely with the military services and the Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory in the conduct of a family outreach program. The program's purpose is to find and restore contact with as many as possible of the more than 8,100 families concerned, secure DNA samples from appropriate family members, and create a DNA reference database. This database will provide samples for comparison that should increase the chances of identifying recovered remains.

### **DISINTERMENT AND IDENTIFICATION**

Last year, CILHI worked with the Veteran's Administration to disinter two remains from the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific (Punchbowl) for the purpose of identification. In May the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy authorized disinterment of unknown remains in any case where there is a high probability of identification when recent advances in forensic techniques are applied.


### **OPERATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

DPMO has a formal agreement with the Republic of Korea Ministry of National Defense covering accountability operations in the South. Though the US Army's thoroughness in recovering remains from 1951 to 1955 minimizes the chances of large-scale recovery operations in the South, the possibility of finding additional burial sites cannot be ruled out. Archival exchanges could also prove useful. To that end, both countries agreed to establish a working group to look for promising sites. The group first met in March 2000. In conjunction with Korean War 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary commemorative activities in Seoul this June, DPMO and ROK MND representatives signed a memorandum of agreement to further enhance cooperation in recovery efforts.





# MAJOR REMAINS CONCENTRATIONS IN NORTH KOREA




## CY 2000 Missions

•Area of Operations:  
Unsan/Kujang  
Counties

•# JROs Planned : 5

•Remains Recovered  
to date : 50

•Current Operation:  
JRO 5 (17 Oct-11  
Nov 2000)



\* Estimated numbers of remains are in parenthesis



Book  
2  
T-DPMO

BIOGRAPHIES ON  
COLONEL GENERAL LI CHON BOK  
AND  
SENIOR COLONEL PAK RIM SU  
ARE PENDING

BOO1f  
R  
T-DPRK

### Proposed Statement by Senior U.S. Representative

- American soldiers made the ultimate sacrifice here, giving their lives in answer to their nation's call.
- More than 30,000 Americans died in combat here
- And another 8,100 are still missing in action from that conflict we call the Korean War.
- Over the past five years, the government and people of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea have joined with the people of America to resolve the fate of these 8,100
- They have joined with U.S. specialists in conducting operations which have located the remains of nearly 100 soldiers from that war.
- They have also assisted us in archival research which may lead to even more answers in the resolution of the fates of these missing soldiers.
- The United States appreciates the support and cooperation by the government and the people of the DPRK.
- Accounting for Americans missing in action is one of the highest priorities of the U.S. government
- This joint work has shown the world that working side-by-side, our specialists – on both sides – can make a positive contribution to the relationship of our two nations.
- Equally important, this work has brought answers to families who have waited for nearly 50 years to learn of the fates of their missing loved ones.
- Progress has been made, but much more work needs to be done, as so many more remain missing in action.
- We are encouraged by the positive language of the joint communiqué which we issued with Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, concluding his visit to the United States on October 12. Vice Marshal Jo agreed to work for rapid progress for the fullest possible accounting of our servicemen.
- Working together, we are confident that much more progress can be made, and we look forward to establishing a schedule soon for next year's joint recovery operations.

## 1. Are we paying the North Koreans for remains?

- It has been the longstanding U.S. government policy that we do not pay for remains
  - It encourages locals to scavenge and excavate crash and gravesites
- (Use only if pressed) From time to time we do hear suggestions that the U.S. government should pay expenses associated with the unilateral turnover of subsequently identified remains. We're examining that suggestion, as well as the implications that ensue.

### Background

- In September 1993, the USG compensated the DPRK \$897,300 for expenses associated with the recovery of 46 remains believed to be those of American war dead...amount was based on expense rates comparable to those used in joint recovery operations in Southeast Asia, as well as Eighth Army (Korea) estimates of collateral damage costs (houses, farm fields, etc.)

We treated the subsequent North Korean claim for compensation for the 162 remains recovered after the initial 46 remains in a similar fashion. The North Koreans originally requested over \$4 million to compensate them for the work of over 100,000 men used to recover those remains. We felt those numbers were extremely inflated. Moreover, analysis of the remains by the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii (CILHI) indicated that not all the remains had been recently recovered. Based on our knowledge of where the remains were recovered, the type of effort necessary to recover them, and the likely laboratory work involved in their identification procedures, a more accurate -- as well as fair and reasonable -- reimbursement was the \$2 million which we offered in Hawaii and was agreed to in New York.

Subsequent compensation has been made in the amount of \$80,000 for work associated with the first joint recovery operation in 1996 based on agreed upon formulas consistent with US recovery missions worldwide. Operations expanded substantially in length and scope in succeeding years so compensation increased accordingly (\$100,000 in 1997 per operation, \$134,000 per operation in 1998 and \$200,000 per operation in 1999, \$400,000 per operation in 2000).

### 1a. What are we paying compensation for in North Korea?

We compensate similarly to our operations in other parts of the world. Services include labor services of about 250 laborers who clear away areas for excavation and assist in the excavation and witness location, an emergency medical evacuation helicopter, if needed, security of the base camp for the entire operation season (about 6 months), fuel for vehicles and heating, incidental destruction of landscape in the conduct of the excavations, and the services of an anthropologist.

**2. Were any American POWs transferred against their will from Korea to the former Soviet Union during the Korean War?**

The American side of the U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs published in 1996 its *Comprehensive Report*. In this document, the Korean War Working Group [KWWG] concluded, "The U.S. side of the Joint Commission on POW/MIA Affairs has collected a significant amount of information that suggests that there is a high probability that during the Korean War American POWs were transferred from Korea to the Soviet Union. While information in support of this assessment that Americans were transferred is incomplete and sometimes ambiguous, it is, nevertheless, highly suggestive. Indeed, when viewed in a broad context, one can see a consistent pattern of events such that there is a high probability that some transfers took place."

The Russian side of the USRJC after seeing the information gathered by the American side stated publicly that "a transfer can not be ruled out."

**2a. Transferred to China?**

Some US service members who crashed or were otherwise captured in China during the Korean War were kept prisoner in China. One aircrew and 4 other aviators were kept after the war and released in 1955. Although there is some circumstantial evidence that other service members were kept after the war, we've been unable to find clear and compelling evidence to support this.

**3. Were there Czechoslovakian hospitals conducting experiments on US POWs during the Korean War, as claimed by a Czech defector?**

The USG has been aware of reports of a Czechoslovakian military hospital's alleged involvement with American Korean War POWs for sometime. Some reports placed the hospital in China during the war, others in North Korea. *This matter was pursued by our JCSD in interviews and archival research.* We have consulted extensively with the Czech Government on this issue, including interviews with some of the staff of the alleged hospital. They admit there was a field hospital, but denied it had any involvement with American, or any other United Nations Command, POWs. Its sole purpose was to treat North Korean and Chinese casualties. To date, we have no evidence supporting the defector's claims, although one US POW claims he was treated by a Czech doctor.

**4. What is the latest information on Punch Bowl disinterments?**

In May 1999 we signed a policy authorizing remains disinterments on condition that current technology would allow for a much greater likelihood of identification for some of those unidentified cases in the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific. In September of last year two unknowns were disinterred for reexamination and DNA testing. Unfortunately possibly because of a powdered bone preservative or due to fluoroscopy (x-ray during the 1950s handling processes), AFDIL was unable to obtain a sequence from these remains using current techniques. We know the DNA is resident in the bones and are now exploring means by which it can be extracted. CILHI is considering exhumation of other sets to examine them for evidence of preservation that would preclude mtDNA sequencing.

**5. Does the Department of Defense believe US POWs are alive in North Korea?**

Although we continue to investigate a limited number of reports alleging American POWs from the Korean War are still being held in North Korea, we have found no evidence substantiating these reports. We do believe that former US servicemen who deserted their units in the 1960s (Jenkins, Abshier, Dresnok, and Parrish) and subsequently defected to North Korea may be the basis of some of these reports. This belief is based on our initial analysis of the North Korean propaganda film, "Nameless Heroes", which we believe features at least some of these defectors, not POWs as alleged in some reports. The USG is also investigating reports of, and seeking contact with, Americans (neither defectors or POWs) who allegedly went to North Korea after the Korean War and are still living there.

**6a. How many reports have there been concerning POWs in North Korea?**

A6a. Over the years since the signing of the armistice in 1953, there have been reports alleging American POWs were held back in North Korea. Compared to the hundreds of similar reports that came out of Southeast Asia, the actual number of Korea-related reports is limited. Up until the 1992, there had been five reports listing 12 sources. The most recent reports are the subject of on-going investigations and remain classified.

As part of the investigation effort, the ROK government was asked if they had any such reporting. The ROKG reviewed records of defector debriefings over the past few years and came up with 4 reports listing 9 new sources and 2 previous reports alleging either POWs or defectors were still living in North Korea. I would like to reiterate that it was the request of the USG that brought these reports out into the open. Of these 11 source reports, most are hearsay. The only direct first-hand reporting corresponds to contact with known defectors, not from the Korean War, but from the 1960s. But because the

US defectors cannot account for all the individuals reported, we investigate all reports. This is consistent with every purported sighting of American servicemen and reflects the priority our Government places on even the remotest chance an American is still alive.

North Korean defectors by CY

1994 - 51

1995 - 41

1996 - 54

1997 - 87

1998 - 69

1999 - 146

2000 - 199 (as of end of September)

Total - 647

The majority of POW/MIA related reporting received from North Korean defector sources pertains to the well-known American post-war defectors who are living in North Korea. The bottom line is that not one intelligence report received from the debriefing of North Korean defectors has provided information that correlates to unaccounted-for American service members from the Korean War.

**6b. A North Korean defector named Oh claims he saw US POWs. What is your reaction?**

The NY Times quotes a report from the Asian Times of an interview with Mr. Oh, Young Nam, a North Korean defector from 1993 who had reported seeing live American Korean War POWs in Pyongyang as late as the early 1990s. Mr. Oh was a former police official who escaped to China and subsequently came to the Republic of Korea in 1995. Much of the information in the article contradicts information previously received in an official debrief of Mr. Oh. It also remains hearsay as to the classification of any individual as an American POW. The USG continues to investigate his reports, but we have yet to find any evidence to substantiate his claims.

**6c. Does the Department of Defense have any information about the lives (occupation, family status, etc.) of the four US defectors to North Korea?**

The Department of Defense has received little information regarding these individuals since their defections, except for propaganda media, which feature them, such as the propaganda pamphlet entitled, "Fortune's Favorites". They have also been referred to in reports by North Korean defectors to South Korea. Based on analysis of these reports, these individuals may be serving as language instructors in a North Korean military language-training center.

**7. What JROs are scheduled for 2000?**

- During our June negotiations in Kuala Lumpur, we convinced the North Koreans to allow a total of 5 JROs for CY2000. Four have been completed with 50 sets of remains recovered (exceeding the 42 total recoveries for 1996-1999). The fifth is underway.



- All JROs are taking place in Unsan and Kujang counties, North Pyongan province
- Each JRO will be manned by 265 KPA personnel and 20 Americans
- U.S. uniformed honor guard will participate in repatriation ceremonies in Pyongyang
- Compensation: total of \$2 million for the 5 JROs...reimburses DPRK for their expenses

#### **8. Are the Chinese cooperating on POW/MIA?**

On WWII and on Vietnam cases they have been very cooperative. We have conducted two WWII air loss recoveries in Tibet and South China since 1994 and numerous on the ground searches for shoot down incidences from SEA. For Korea their files are still classified. Much progress has been made in the last year though. We now have semiannual visits with their designated POW/MIA representative in the MFA. They have agreed to take on specific loss incidences for research and have begun an oral history program in which DPMO researchers interview Chinese volunteers who worked in the Korean War POW camp system. Four interviews were conducted in September. The PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs further informed DPMO last January that academic exchanges could take place later in the year.

#### **8a. How many cases have we sent to the Chinese?**

The USG submitted 7 case inquiries to the Chinese from 1994 to 1996, 44 in 1999, and 2 this year during the DASD's September visit. In July 1994, DPMO submitted two case inquiries based on material discovered in Chinese publications. In April 1995, the Chinese responded to those case inquiries. The response contained limited information regarding the incidents and actions known to have been taken at the time, but no information on which we could follow up. In September 1996, an American businessman returned from China with rubbings of dogtags that he had seen in a Chinese military museum in Dandong. This information generated a follow-up inquiry into one of the initial two cases sent to the Chinese in October 1996, as well as an inquiry on another American pilot whose name was included in the rubbings. In addition to these two inquiries, three inquiries about last-known-alive POWs were submitted. The summer of 1999, immediately preceding the President's trip to China, we contacted the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs one more time, repeating all previous case inquiries and proposing working-level talks to improve Korean War accounting cooperation.

These three cases represent the only individuals so far for whom we have accumulated enough evidence, from the review of POW debriefs, to conclude that the individuals were possibly alive just before the final POW repatriations, and that the Chinese should know what happened to them. As DPMO uncovers more information to substantiate similar conclusions about other individuals, additional case inquiries will be made. In response to submission of general lists of POWs, the Chinese had previously responded that the issue was resolved in conjunction with the signing of the armistice, and that there was no additional information.

In September 1999, the 44 Korean War cases submitted represented aviation, POW, and ground MIA incidences that we believe the Chinese should have some knowledge. As of our last visit in September 2000, the Chinese have no information to report.

In addition to the 44 Korean War cases, we presented a Cold War case on 2 individuals and two Southeast Asia cases involving 3 individuals. They authorized immediate investigation of one of the Vietnam cases resulting in the recovery of remains in South China two weeks after the DASD visit.

## **9. What policies govern declassification of Korean War documents?**

The McCain Bill (as amended to include Korean and Cold War) and EO 12958.

### **McCain Bill:**

The McCain Bill, as revised, directs that a central repository of Cold War and Korean War documents be established in the NARA and that the custodian of that repository is the Archivist of the United States. As holder and custodian, NARA is responsible for declassification of K/CW documents in its possession. Also, as part of NARA's responsibilities, it must control access to and release of documents that contain T-L-C data based on PNOK s' decisions regarding exclusionary provisions. In support of this responsibility, DPMO provides NARA with the PNOK "yes/no" responses.

### **EO 12958:**

This EO was signed by President Clinton and went into effect on 14 October 95.

This EO requires that three declassification programs be implemented.

1. AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION of information 25 years and older (includes the Korean Conflict and a portion of the Cold War) unless an agency takes specific action to extend the duration of classification. This can only be achieved under certain narrowly defined conditions. Material exempted from this 25-year rule is subject to two other declassification programs.
2. SYSTEMATIC REVIEW is a review of information contained in records that have been determined by the Archivist of the United States as having permanent historical value. NARA and individual agencies will conduct review programs focused on records with substantial historical interest.
3. MANDATORY REVIEW is a review for possible declassification upon request by an organization or individual. The office of primary responsibility for the implementation of the automatic declassification program requirements of EO 12958 is the Archivist of the United States. Completion of review and declassification of information 25 years and older is five years after the initiation of EO 12958. Again, the exclusionary provisions of the McCain Bill apply.

Note: An index of classified reports, not the reports themselves) of live Americans in captivity (irrespective of war) not correlated to a specific loss incident is available for examination by family members during file reviews.

**10. Do Korean War accounting efforts have the same priority as accounting efforts for Southeast Asian conflict missing?**

No conflict has a priority over another as far as accounting for missing American service personnel. Generally speaking, agencies responsible for recovering and identifying remains view potential missions in terms of expected success and effective management of resources. Our recovery efforts in Southeast Asia have received much notoriety because they have been ongoing since the end of that conflict, which in turn, was the most widely reported conflict in history. The active effort to search for remains from WWII missing over all the battlefields of that conflict ended after five years of as thorough a search as possible. However, as remains are discovered in remote corners of the world, the US Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii (CILHI) dispatches its experts to investigate and recover remains if possible.

Korea presented the USG with a unique situation. For years, we were denied North Korean cooperation in recovering and returning remains, as well as access to battlefield, POW camp and temporary cemeteries where many of our unaccounted for were lost. Only recently have we made progress in recovering remains and in establishing contacts with the Chinese and former Soviets on what may have happened to many of our missing who were not known to have died. As we have made progress in the Korean War accounting effort, so to has the Department of Defense committed increasing resources to the effort. In May 1996, then Secretary of Defense William Perry signed a DoD Policy Statement establishing Korean War accounting as a Department priority. This reinforced President Clinton's commitment at the dedication of the Korean War Veterans Memorial in 1995 to the fullest possible accounting for our Korean War missing.