



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~SECRET~~  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

(2)



SECDEF HAS SEEN

I-95/20540  
JAN 11 1996

12/22

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS FCSmit 21 DEC 1995  
Prepared by COL (b)(6) ISA/NESA, (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Trip Objectives for Oman, Jordan, and Israel (U)  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

DISCUSSION: (C)

This trip will mark your first visit to Oman and Jordan and your third visit to Israel as Secretary of Defense. Your meetings in Oman will fulfill your March 1995 commitment to visit Oman and reaffirm our continuing commitment to the US-Oman security relationship. Your visit to Jordan will be highly publicized to demonstrate US support for Jordan in the peace process. The visit will be extremely helpful to King Hussein because the Jordanian people have shown signs of impatience with the pace of any "peace dividend." Substantive talks will focus on (b)(1). In Israel, Prime Minister Peres is keen to welcome you following his recent visit. The Israelis are not expecting you to bring any new promises of security assistance; they will want (b)(1) and a discussion on Peres' regional security pact proposal.

Individual scope papers detailing objectives for each country are attached.

Reviewed by DASD NESA

B. O. Riedel 20 DEC 1995

Attachments  
a/s

Classified by DASD NESA, Bruce O. Riedel  
Reason: 1.5 (d)  
Declassify on 20 December 2005

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENTS  
THIS DOCUMENT IS ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

Sec Def Cont Nr.

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(21 DEC 95)

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## OMAN SCOPE PAPER

### OBJECTIVE OF TRIP

~~(S)~~ Your trip to Oman comes on the heels of a number of U.S./Oman visits and conferences last fall: visit of VCJCS, Adm Owens 21 November; visit of the Central Command Air Forces Commander, LTG Jumper, (12 December and 15 October); the U.S. Omani Bilaterals conducted in Washington on 6 October; and the June 1995 ~~(b)(1)~~ in Muscat. Sultan Qaboos will warmly welcome you for your first visit to Oman. Qaboos serves as the Prime Minister and holds the portfolios for Defense, Finance and Foreign Affairs. He has crafted an independent foreign policy and is committed to U.S./Omani military cooperation.

~~(b)(1)~~

~~(C)~~ The meetings will present the key opportunity for you to fulfill your March 1995 commitment to visit Oman and to reaffirm our continuing commitment to the U.S./Oman security relationship and signal the importance we place on Oman's support for our activities in the Gulf.

### KEY EVENTS/DIGNITARIES

~~(C)~~ Your visit will include meetings with the Sultan (Qaboos bin Said Al Said), the Minister of Palace Office Affairs (Ali bin Majid bin Mustahil al Ma'mari), and other key Omani officials. You will arrive at 0130 Saturday at Seeb International Airport, and will proceed directly to Ghurba Guest House to retire for the evening.

~~(C)~~ At 0945 on Saturday morning after a country team meeting, you will proceed to Mu'askar al-Murtafa (MAM) for meetings with defense officials. You will then visit with Gen. Ali bin Majid bin Mustahil al-Ma'Amari at the Ministry of Palace Office Affairs and have lunch. The afternoon will be arranged for an audience with the Sultan, ~~(b)(1)~~

~~(b)(1)~~ Dinner will follow at 1930, after which you will retire to the Guest House. At 0750 Sunday morning you will proceed to Seeb airport for farewells, honors and a 0830 departure to Jordan.

### KEY ISSUES

#### ~~(C)~~ Cooperative Security Relationship

• **Update on Gulf Security** ~~(S)~~ The Sultan will want to hear your review of our GCC security strategy and an overview of the regional CENTCOM "Footprint". Additionally, he would like a synopsis of U.S. policy vis a vis Iraq and Iran, including sanctions maintenance and an update on the D'Amato legislation.

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- **Security Cooperation** ~~(S)~~ Oman remains a staunch and stable American friend in the Middle East,

(b)(1)

- **UNSCOM Support** ~~(S)~~ We understand that Oman has responsibility for delivering to UNSCOM what the GCC will contribute to UNSCOM's future. As host of the GCC summit, Oman has responsibility for organizing the GCC response. The GCC has committed to a three year effort. You should underscore to the Omanis the importance of UNSCOM to the U.S. and

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

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(b)(1)

## SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

(b)(1)

- **Exercises** ~~(S)~~ A key element contributing to our ability to confidently and successfully deter aggression is the robust U.S./Oman exercise schedule. These exercises pay great dividends in response timing and interoperability, and are critical to our ability to "train as we fight".

- **GCC Defense Cooperation and Collective Security** ~~(S)~~

(b)(1)

We encourage Oman to continue to express to its GCC neighbors the key importance of effective military cooperation in times of peace and crisis.

## POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

(b)(1)

Prepared by: Capt. (b)(6) ISA/NESA, (b)(6) 20 December 1995.

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~~SECRET~~

## JORDAN SCOPE PAPER

### OBJECTIVE OF TRIP

(C) This will be your first visit to Amman and it is important for a variety of reasons. Jordan and especially the King will find this an exciting visit. The visit will be highly publicized to visibly demonstrate US support for Jordan and the peace process. The visit will be extremely helpful to King Hussein because the Jordanian people have shown signs of impatience with the pace of any "peace dividend". Though most of the people expected the peace to bring economic returns, the follow-through by the Administration on its commitment to the security of Jordan will elevate the confidence inspired by the successful Middle East Economic Summit Conference concluded in Amman in October.

(b)(1)

### KEY EVENTS/DIGNITARIES

(U) During your visit you can expect to visit the King, PM Bin Shakir and General Hafiz Marei, the Chairman of the Joint Staff of the Jordanian Armed Forces. You will be greeted at your morning arrival by PM Bin Shakir and after a short reception and remarks, you will proceed to meetings with King Hussein followed by larger meetings with the Prime Minister and the JAF Joint Staff. You can expect a joint press conference with the King in the afternoon. The King will host a dinner that evening at which you will make some brief remarks or toast. You will depart Amman to Israel the following morning.

### KEY ISSUES

(b)(1)

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(b)(1)

(U) JMC INVITATION. Finally, you should officially invite the JAF to the JMC April 29-May 1. The JMC was delayed from October due to the Amman Economic Summit.

### SECURITY RELATIONSHIP

Our military relationship with Jordan is very sound based on strong mutual respect. The relationship deteriorated precipitously during the Gulf War, but has regained most of its previous energy as a result of renewed aid and joint activities.

(b)(1)

(b)(1), (b)(3); 50 USC §403(g) Section 6, (b)(3); 50 USC § 3024-(f)

Our willingness to move quickly to support Jordan,

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

heartens Jordan and strengthens our relationship.

### POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

(b)(1)

Prepared by: LTC (b)(6) ISA/NESA, x78088, 20 December 1995

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~~SECRET~~

## ISRAEL SCOPE PAPER

### Objective of Trip

~~(C)~~ This is your third visit to Israel as Secretary of Defense--your first having been 5-6 January of 1994 and your second when you visited briefly for the funeral of Prime Minister Rabin. Prime Minister Peres is keen to welcome you in Israel following his recent visit to Washington on 11-12 December 1995. There are no contentious issues in our security relationship that require immediate fixing, nor are the Israelis expecting you to bring any new promises of security assistance. The main purpose of your stop in Israel will be to brief the Israelis <sup>(b)(1)</sup> and to demonstrate your personal commitment and that of the DoD to Israel's security, especially during this tenuous time following the assassination of former Prime Minister Rabin.

(b)(1)

### Key Events/Dignitaries

~~(C)~~ Your visit will include substantive meetings with Peres and other key Israeli defense establishment officials. Currently, your trip is scheduled to begin with a country team meeting chaired by Ambassador Martin Indyk at the Embassy upon arrival in Israel on 4 January 1996. It is unclear whether Peres will then host you for official meetings in Tel Aviv at the Ministry of Defense (Ha Kiriya) or in the Prime Minister's office in Jerusalem. Following your meetings, a press conference will be held and then Prime Minister Peres most likely will host a working luncheon, time and place yet to be decided. You will depart after lunch on 8 January for CONUS.

~~(C)~~ In addition to Peres, other key Israeli officials that you will most likely meet are Ehud Barak, the new Foreign Minister, Ori Or, the new Deputy Defense Minister, MoD Director General David Ivry, CoS LTG Amnon Lipnik-Shahak, Deputy CoS MG Vilnai, MoD Director of Planning Uzi Dayan, DMI MG Moshe Ya'alon, IAF Commander Herzel Bodinger, INF Commander RADM Ayalon, and MOSSAD Director Shabtai Shavit.

### Key Issues ~~(S)~~

(b)(1)

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(b)(1)



- **Peace Process:** Secretary Christopher was to have provided you a read-out of his visits to Jerusalem and Damascus at lunch on December 20th. Israeli and Syrian negotiators currently are scheduled to meet in Washington on December 27th and again beginning on the January 3rd. Following an assessment of progress made at these two meetings, Secretary Christopher is again scheduled to visit the region the week after your visit. You should be prepared to underscore points made by Christopher on his December visit--if necessary--and to draw Peres and his peace team out on the current state of play during your visit.

- **Regional Security Pact:** The White House wants to keep this process closely tied to the peace process and Secretary Christopher's team. You should be prepared to draw Peres out further on what he envisions for a regional security pact without committing the U.S.

(b)(1)



(b)(1)



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(b)(1), (b)(3)-50  
USC §403(g)  
Section 6 (b)  
(3)-50 USC §  
3024-(i)



~~SECRET~~

(b)(1)

### Security Relationship

(S) The US commitment to Israel's security has been the cornerstone of our policy in the Middle East. Our continuing commitment based on historic and cultural ties, as well as our strong interest in securing a just and comprehensive peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. We also share with Israel concerns related to the security of the Eastern Mediterranean and stability in the Middle East. Successive US administrations have emphasized that Israel's security and legitimacy must not be in doubt if Israel is to feel confident to engage in peace efforts.

(b)(1)

(S) The US military annual assistance program to Israel totals \$1.8B since 1986--the largest such US program anywhere in the world--accounting for over 60 percent of all US FMF grants. We supplement this through a host of extraordinary authorities, such as early disbursement of FMF funds, transfer of excess defense articles under the Southern Region amendment, the drawdown of \$775M of defense items from DoD stocks, War Reserve Stockpiles valued at \$300M, and extensive R&D cooperation programs, such as the ARROW/ACES program. You will want to reassure the Israelis that DoD is committed to continuing the current level of \$1.8B in FMF in FY-97.

### Potential Problems

(b)(1)

Prepared by: (b)(6) ISA/MEA (b)(6) 20 December 1995.

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JCS  
NO 8

(3)

JOE PATT

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE MILITARY ASSISTANT


February 20, 1996

NOTE FOR USD(P)

Please see Secretary Perry's comment, which reads:

"USD(P) should prepare & reply for my signature.

B."



Paul J. Kern  
Major General, US Army

614 34396

SEC DEF CONTR NO. X00381-96

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\*\*\* ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ \*\*\*  
\*\*\*\*\* This Message Has Been Altered \*\*\*\*\*

Page 1 of 8

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RXFEAA/CINCSOUTH NAPLES IT  
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RXFEAA/CINCSOUTH NAPLES IT//PROTOCOL//  
RXFESH/SACEUR SHAPE BE//SIVB//  
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RUFPAFW/CDR 31ST FIGHTER WING AVIANO IT  
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RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC  
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RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//OSD-ES//  
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC  
RUENBUT/HQ JTF PP NAPLES IT//J3//  
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB  
RUEAMDW/NSOCC WASHINGTON DC  
RHDJAAA/89AW ANDREWS AFB MD//CC//  
RHDJAAA/89OG ANDREWS AFB MD//CC//  
RUEANBA/CDR PSU FT BELVOIR VA//CISAP-OP//  
RUWTASA/1ACCS OFFUTT AFB NE//XP//  
RUWTASA/1ACCS OFFUTT AFB NE//DOFS/XP//  
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RUCUSRW/55WG OFFUTT AFB NE//CC/CP//  
RUCUSRW/55OG OFFUTT AFB NE//CC//  
BT

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SR MA TO DEPSECDEF  
has seen

(S)

33350

(12/19)

19 Dec 95

SUBJ: SECDEF TRAVEL TO ITALY, HUNGARY, BOSNIA, UKRAINE, OMAN,  
JORDAN, & ISRAEL, 1-8 JAN 96 (C)

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. THIS CABLE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH  
STATE. SEE PARAS 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, AND 9 FOR ACTION.

2. SUMMARY: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY WILL TRAVEL TO  
ITALY, HUNGARY, BOSNIA, UKRAINE, OMAN, JORDAN, & ISRAEL, 1-8 JAN 96  
TO VISIT US FORCES; FOR TALKS WITH GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS; AND TO  
PARTICIPATE IN CTR ACTIVITIES IN UKRAINE. SECDEF'S TENTATIVE  
SCHEDULE FOLLOWS:

1 JAN: DEPART ANDREWS AFB

2 JAN: ARRIVE AVIANO AB, ITALY; HELICOPTER TO CASERMA EDERLE TO  
VISIT COMBINED AIR OPERATIONS CENTER, RETURN TO AVIANO TO VISIT  
US/ALLIED FORCES; TRANSFER TO MILAIR; VISIT STAGING AREA AT KAPOSVAR,  
HUNGARY; RON BUDAPEST, HUNGARY.

3 JAN: FLY TO SARAJEVO AND TUZLA, BOSNIA, TO VISIT US FORCES AND  
IFOR HEADQUARTERS; RETURN TO BUDAPEST & RON.

4 JAN: TRAVEL TO UKRAINE; TALKS WITH UKRAINIAN OFFICIALS; RON KIEV.

5 JAN: OBSERVE SILO DESTRUCTION AND PARTICIPATE IN HOUSING TURNOVER;  
FLY TO OMAN & RON.

6 JAN: TALKS WITH OMANI OFFICIALS; RON.

7 JAN: TRAVEL TO JORDAN; TALKS WITH JORDANIAN OFFICIALS; RON.

8 JAN: TRAVEL TO ISRAEL; TALKS WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS; RETURN TO  
CONUS.

TRAVEL OF MAIN PARTY WILL BE VIA E-4B AIRCRAFT (747 EQUIVALENT).

THIS CABLE IS FOR ACTION ADDRESSEE PLANNING PURPOSES. SPECIFIC  
ITINERARY AND DETAILED SUPPORT WILL BE FINALIZED BETWEEN SECDEF TRIP  
COORDINATOR AND YOUR POINT OF CONTACT. NSC/PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL OF  
THIS VISIT IS PENDING.

END SUMMARY.

3. COMPOSITION OF SECDEF DELEGATION IS AS FOLLOWS (CHANGES  
POSSIBLE): (NAME, POSITION, PASSPORT NUMBER, DATE OF ISSUE, DATE OF  
BIRTH, PLACE OF BIRTH). TRIP COORDINATOR WILL SUPPLEMENT INCOMPLETE  
INFO BY SEPARATE FAX.

SECDEF AND PERSONAL STAFF (ENTIRE TRIP):

— WILLIAM J. PERRY, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

— PAUL J. KERN, MG, USA, SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE SECDEF.

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

OSD PUBLIC AFFAIRS & TRAVELLING PRESS (ENTIRE TRIP):

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

ARMED FORCES INFORMATION SERVICE.

(b)(6)

AIR FORCE NEWS SERVICE, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

-- CHARLES S. ALDINGER, REUTERS, (b)(6)

-- JOHN ROPER, UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

-- ROBERT W. BURNS, ASSOCIATED PRESS, (b)(6)

-- DAVID A. GOLLUST, VOICE OF AMERICA, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

-- UP TO 5 ADDITIONAL PRESS TBD.

JCS:

-- JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI, GEN, USA, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.

-- UP TO 7 JCS STAFF PERSONNEL TBD.

STATE/NSC:

-- JAMES COLLINS, AMBASSADOR, SPECIAL ADVISOR TO SECSTATE FOR NEW  
INDEPENDENT STATES, (b)(6) (UKRAINE ONLY)

-- ARTHUR H. HUGHES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR  
EASTERN AFFAIRS, (b)(6) (OMAN, JORDAN,  
ISRAEL ONLY)

-- GEORGE KROL, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO AMBASSADOR COLLINS, (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (UKRAINE ONLY)

-- NSC REP, TBD.

-- MARTA ZIELYK, TRANSLATOR, STATE DEPT, (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (UKRAINE ONLY)

-- JOHN CAEMMERER, TRANSLATOR, STATE DEPT, (b)(6)  
(b)(6) (UKRAINE ONLY).

USCENTCOM STAFF (OMAN, JORDAN & ISRAEL ONLY)

-- GENERAL J. H. BINFORD PEAY III, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, CENTRAL  
COMMAND, (b)(6)

-- JOHN M. LUECKE, RADM. USN, DIRECTOR OF PLANNING, CENTCOM,  
(b)(6)

-- EDWARD F. FUGIT, POLITICAL ADVISOR TO CINCCENT, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

USD (POLICY) STAFF:

THOMAS K. LONGSTRETH, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR STRATEGY & REQUIREMENTS, TBD, TBD, (b)(6) (ITALY, HUNGARY,  
BOSNIA ONLY)

(b)(6)

(b)(6) (ITALY, HUNGARY, BOSNIA ONLY)

ASD (ISA) STAFF:

-- BRUCE O. RIEDEL, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS) (NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA), (b)(6)

(b)(6) (OMAN, JORDAN, ISRAEL ONLY)

-- ROBERT T. OSTERHALER, BRIG GEN, USAF, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS) (EUROPEAN &  
NATO POLICY) (b)(6) (ITALY, HUNGARY,  
BOSNIA ONLY)

-- (b)(6)

(ITALY, HUNGARY ONLY)

(b)(6) ASD (ISA) (b)(6)

(b)(6) (OMAN, JORDAN, ISRAEL ONLY)

(b)(6) ASD (ISA) (b)(6)

(OMAN, JORDAN, ISRAEL ONLY)

(b)(6) ASD (ISA) (b)(6)

(DIPL), (b)(6) (OMAN, JORDAN, ISRAEL ONLY)

ASD (ISP) STAFF (UKRAINE ONLY):

-- ASHTON B. CARTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY POLICY) (b)(6)

-- ELIZABETH SHERWOOD, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISP)  
(RUSSIA, UKRAINE, EURASIA), (b)(6)

-- SUSAN J. KOCH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ISP)  
(THREAT REDUCTION POLICY, (b)(6)

-- NICHOLAS KRAWCIW, MG, USA, RET, CONSULTANT TO ASD (ISP), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

ASD (ISP),

(b)(6)

ASD (ISP), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION,

(b)(6)

ATSD (ATOMIC ENERGY) STAFF (UKRAINE ONLY):

(b)(6)

(ATOMIC ENERGY),

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS



ELIMINATION PROGRAMS, (b)(6)  
DEFENSE NUCLEAR AGENCY {UKRAINE ONLY}  
(b)(6) STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS ELIMINATION (b)(6)  
DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY STAFF {OMAN, JORDAN, ISRAEL ONLY}:  
(b)(6)

THE TRIP COORDINATOR WILL INFORM YOU OF ANY CHANGES TO THE SECDEF DELEGATION. PLEASE PROVIDE COUNTRY CLEARANCE FOR ALL U.S. TRAVELERS AS REQUIRED.

4. SECURITY: TWO OSD ADVANCE AGENTS WILL ARRIVE APPROXIMATELY THREE TO FIVE DAYS IN ADVANCE TO COORDINATE AND ASSIST IN ARRANGING SECURITY, TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND ACCOMMODATIONS. APPROXIMATELY THREE TO FIVE ADDITIONAL AGENTS WILL ARRIVE ONE DAY PRIOR TO THE VISIT. SEPARATE MESSAGES FROM CID COMMAND (CIOP-PSA) WILL GIVE ARRIVAL DATES AND OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION FOR ALL AGENTS.

A. STORAGE OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL: (b)(1)  
(b)(1) FOR CLASSIFIED MATERIAL STORAGE AND (b)(1)  
(b)(1) PLEASE PROVIDE CLEAR INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING THE USE OF ANY OTHER (b)(1) FOR PROCESSING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

B. CONTROL OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL: (b)(1)

(b)(1)

THE PROPER STORAGE AND CONTROL OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL.

5. THREE CONTROL ROOMS ARE REQUIRED AT OVERNIGHT LOCATIONS. POC IS REQUESTED TO USE THE LEAST EXPENSIVE COST OPTION FOR THE THREE CONTROL ROOMS, LISTED AS FOLLOWS:

A. SECURITY CONTROL ROOM: THIS ROOM SHOULD BE LOCATED NEAR THE SECDEF SUITE. IT WILL BE MANNED BY AGENTS 24 HOURS A DAY. PLEASE REMOVE THE BED AND PROVIDE A 6-FOOT TABLE. AN INTERNATIONAL DIRECT DIAL (IDD) LINE SHOULD BE INSTALLED IN THIS ROOM. LINE SHOULD BE OPERATIONAL PRIOR TO SECDEF ARRIVAL AND FOR AT LEAST TWO HOURS AFTER DEPARTURE. IDD LINE SHOULD BE INSTALLED AS FOLLOWS:

-- RINGING INSTRUMENT SHOULD TERMINATE IN THE SECURITY CONTROL ROOM, WITH NONRINGING EXTENSION PHONES IN BOTH THE SECDEF'S SUITE AND IN THE SECDEF SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT'S ROOM.

-- IDD LINES NEED TO BE CONNECTED TO ANALOG CIRCUITS TO FACILITATE CONNECTION OF STU-IIIS.

-- IDD CIRCUITS SHOULD NOT TERMINATE OR PASS THROUGH THE HOTEL SWITCHBOARD.

-- INTERCOM CAPABILITY ON IDD INSTRUMENTS IS DESIRED.

B. COMMUNICATIONS CONTROL ROOM. THIS ROOM SHOULD BE LOCATED NEAR THE SECDEF SUITE AND STILL HAVE A WINDOW WHICH OPENS AND FACES SOUTHWEST. SECDEF COMMUNICATORS WILL INSTALL THEIR OWN SECURE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT IN THIS ROOM AND WILL MAN THE ROOM 24 HOURS A DAY. PLEASE REPLACE THE BED WITH A COUCH AND PROVIDE A 6-FOOT TABLE. AN ANALOG IDD LINE CAPABLE OF HAVING A STU-III INSTALLED IS REQUIRED. COMMUNICATIONS POC IS MSGT (b)(6) PENTAGON

(b)(6) (OFFICE) OR (b)(6) (HOME).

C. EMBASSY CONTROL ROOM: REQUIRE 2 IDD LINES, ONE LINE CONNECTED TO A FAX AND ONE LINE FOR ADMINISTRATIVE VOICE/MODEM USE. ONE FAX MACHINE AND ONE COPIER SHOULD BE PROVIDED IN THIS ROOM, WHICH WILL ALSO FUNCTION AS THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONTROL ROOM. IT IS HELPFUL IF



ROOM CAN HAVE A SMALL STOCK OF DRINKS/SNACKS FOR PURCHASE BY DELEGATION. REQUEST MISSION PROVIDE CURRENCY EXCHANGE UPON ARRIVAL AND DEPARTURE; AND ASSIST DELEGATION AS REQUIRED. ROOM SHOULD BE MANNED BY HOST PERSONNEL DURING THE ENTIRE OFFICIAL DAY, NORMALLY 0600-2200.

D. FOUR CELLULAR PHONES WITH INTERNATIONAL DIAL CAPABILITY ARE REQUIRED. THESE PHONES WILL BE CARRIED BY THE SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT, THE ASSISTANT FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS, THE SENIOR COMMUNICATIONS OFFICER, AND TRIP COORDINATOR. THREE ADDITIONAL PHONES WILL BE REQUIRED FOR OSD(PA) IN ISRAEL.

E. REQUEST CONFIRMATION, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, THAT IDD TYPE CIRCUIT CAN BE INSTALLED IN YOUR AREA TO MR. (b)(6)

PH (b)(6) ALSO PROVIDE THE COMMERCIAL TELEPHONE NUMBER FOR THE CELLULAR PHONES (WITH INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW TO DIAL FROM WASHINGTON), HOTEL AND THE IDD CIRCUIT, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, FOR DISSEMINATION TO THE WHITE HOUSE, NMCC, ETC. IF A NUMBER IS NOT AVAILABLE PRIOR TO SECDEF TRIP, IT SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO SECDEF CABLES AS SOON AS IT IS AVAILABLE, PH (b)(6)

F. FOR MOTORCADE PLANNING, REQUEST A VAN MARKED "STAFF VAN 1" BE PLACED DIRECTLY BEHIND THE SECURITY CHASE VEHICLE ON ALL MOVEMENTS FOR THE SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT, THE SECDEF COMMUNICATOR, THE TRIP COORDINATOR, AND THE SECDEF PHOTOGRAPHER.

6. PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE: THE TRAVELING PRESS ARE MEMBERS OF THE SECDEF'S OFFICIAL PARTY AND SHOULD BE EXTENDED DELEGATION COURTESIES. THE PRESS SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN MOTORCADES AND SITE VISITS, AND ATTEND PRESS CONFERENCES, PHOTO OPPORTUNITIES, AND UNCLASSIFIED SPEECHES. THE PRESS WILL PAY FOR THEIR OWN ACCOMMODATIONS AND EXPENSES.

A. FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS TRIP IN WASHINGTON IS PLANNED FOR 21 DEC. TEXT OF THE MEMORANDUM FOR CORRESPONDENTS WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY SEPARATE MESSAGE. QUESTIONS ABOUT THE TRIP BEFORE FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT MAY BE ANSWERED AS FOLLOWS: QUOTE. THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILL BE TRAVELING TO ITALY, HUNGARY, BOSNIA. OMAN, JORDAN, ISRAEL, AND UKRAINE IN JANUARY 1996. A FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT WILL BE MADE AT A LATER DATE. UNQUOTE.

B. THE PA POC IS COL (b)(6)  
SECDEF FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS; PHONE (b)(6)  
{FAX}, (b)(6) {HOME}.

C. PA WILL REQUIRE 24 HOUR ACCESS TO THE FAX AND COPYING MACHINES IN EMBASSY CONTROL ROOM. AFTER THE OFFICIAL DAY, THE KEY TO THIS ROOM MAY BE LEFT WITH AGENTS IN THE SECURITY CONTROL ROOM.

D. EMBASSY SHOULD RECORD AND TRANSCRIBE ANY SECDEF NEWS CONFERENCES, INTERVIEWS, PUBLIC STATEMENTS, OR TRIP-RELATED MEDIA BACKGROUNDEES CONDUCTED BY SECDEF AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION. PASS TO THE PA MILITARY ASSISTANT AS SOON AS AVAILABLE. GOAL IS TO RELEASE TRANSCRIPTS ON SAME DAY AS PUBLIC OR MEDIA ACTIVITY. IF TRANSCRIPTS ARE NOT READY BEFORE DEPARTURE, FAX TO OATSD/PA, (b)(6)

E. REQUEST EMBASSY PROVIDE PUBLIC AFFAIRS MILITARY ASSISTANT NINE COPIES OF AVAILABLE MAJOR ENGLISH-LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS AND USIS WIRELESS FILE, PREFERABLY AT HOTEL PRIOR TO BEGINNING OF SECDEF'S OFFICIAL SCHEDULE EACH DAY.

F. SEND FAX/CABLE TO OATSD/PA OF ANY PA RELATED INFORMATION, INCLUDING REQUESTS FOR SECDEF INTERVIEWS OR OTHER MEDIA REQUESTS, AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. ALSO PROVIDE ANTICIPATED MEDIA QUESTIONS AND

SUGGESTED ANSWERS TO THOSE PERTAINING TO PROJECTED ISSUES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

G. AS THE TRIP UNFOLDS, REQUEST USIS/PA OFFICES COLLECT PRESS CLIPS AND COVERAGE PERTAINING TO THE TRIP AND IMMEDIATELY FORWARD TO SECDEF PARTY OR FAX TO OATSD(PA) AT (b)(6)

H. REQUEST SENIOR PAO MEET THE ASSISTANT TO SECDEF FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS ON ARRIVAL FOR FINAL DISCUSSION OF MEDIA CLIMATE, ISSUES, AND ARRANGEMENTS. REQUEST ANY SUGGESTIONS FOR SECDEF HOST NATION OR LOCAL PRESS ACTIVITIES BE FORWARDED IMMEDIATELY WITH PAO RECOMMENDATION.

I. ASSIST OSD PHOTOGRAPHER IN OBTAINING WIDEST POSSIBLE LATITUDE TO PHOTOGRAPH SECDEF IN MEETINGS, ETC. OSD PHOTOGRAPHER SHOULD FOLLOW SECDEF SCHEDULE, NOT MEDIA ITINERARY.

7. FUND CITATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED BY THE TRIP COORDINATOR VIA FAX UPON RECEIPT OF DETAILED ACTION ADDRESSEE POC COST ESTIMATES. THESE ESTIMATES SHOULD BE DERIVED BY BEARING IN MIND THAT IN NO CASE WILL ACTUAL EXPENDITURES BE PERMITTED TO EXCEED THE AMOUNTS AUTHORIZED. TWO COPIES OF ALL VOUCHERS OR BILLINGS THAT CITE THESE FUNDS MUST BE FORWARDED TO: DIRECTOR, BUDGET AND FINANCE, WASHINGTON HQ SERVICES, ROOM 3B269, THE PENTAGON, WASHINGTON, DC, 20301-1145. REQUEST COST ESTIMATES OF ANTICIPATED EXPENDITURES BE FAXED TO OSD TRIP COORDINATOR NLT 21 DEC, LISTING INDIVIDUAL EXPENDITURES IN THE FOLLOWING THREE CATEGORIES:

A. REPRESENTATION FUNDS: THIS FUND CITE PAYS FOR SECDEF ACCOMMODATIONS, MEALS, AND ROOM RELATED OFFICIAL EXPENSES; AS WELL AS SECDEF-HOSTED SOCIAL EVENTS; CEREMONIAL WREATHS, AND SECDEF GIFTS NOT TO EXCEED \$225 TO ANY ONE PERSON. NOTE: SECDEF PROTOCOL OFFICER OR TRIP COORDINATOR WILL BRING SECDEF GIFTS FOR OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS AND AS MEMENTOS FOR SUPPORT RENDERED. PROVIDE TRIP COORDINATOR INFORMATION ON ANY GIFT EXCHANGES, AND HONORS OR WELCOMING CEREMONIES. ALL OTHER MEMBERS OF THE SECDEF DELEGATION ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN HOTEL-RELATED EXPENSES. SECDEF'S ACCOMMODATIONS SHOULD NOT EXCEED TWICE THE DOUBLE RATE. PLEASE ADVISE TRIP COORDINATOR IF HOST GOVERNMENT DESIRES/INTENDS TO PAY FOR SECDEF ACCOMMODATIONS.

B. TRANSPORTATION. GROUND TRANSPORTATION COSTS DIRECTLY ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE SECDEF VISIT, INCLUDING VEHICLE RENTAL COSTS AND DRIVER OVERTIME.

C. ADMINISTRATION. COSTS FOR OFFICIAL ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT, INCLUDING CONTROL ROOMS, SECDEF MEETING ROOMS, BAGGAGE HANDLING OR PORTER FEES, OFFICE SUPPLIES, FAX AND COPIER MACHINES, AUTHORIZED EMBASSY STAFF OVERTIME, MISCELLANEOUS ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES, TRANSLATOR EXPENSES, COMMUNICATIONS RENTAL OR INSTALLATION, COST OF COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT OR FACILITIES, AND ESTIMATED CHARGES FOR PHONE CALLS/LONG DISTANCE TOLLS.

8. COORDINATE ITINERARY, ACCOMMODATIONS, AND DELEGATION ATTENDANCE AT MEETINGS AND SOCIAL EVENTS WITH SECDEF TRIP COORDINATOR. PROVIDE ACCOMMODATIONS INFORMATION TO INCLUDE PRICE IN DOLLARS, ADDRESS, TELEPHONE/FAX NUMBERS, AND CREDIT CARDS ACCEPTED IN PAYMENT.

9. OSD POC IS THE TRIP COORDINATOR, LTC (b)(6) OSD/ES,  
(b)(6) UNCLAS FAX (b)(6)

DECLAS 15 JAN 96

BT

\*\*\* ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ \*\*\*  
\*\*\*\*\* This Message Has Been Altered \*\*\*\*\*

Page 8 of 8

JOINT STAFF V1

ACTION

(U, 7, 8)

2

INFO SJS-C(1) NMCC:CWO(\*) CMAS(1) J3DSOD(\*)  
J7(\*) QUAL CONTROL(\*) SHAPE LNO(\*) JSAMS(\*)  
CHAIRS(\*) USDP:PS(\*) USDP:EP(\*)  
+NATS PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC  
+J5:MEAF

SECDEF V2

ACTION

(D, 6, 7, 8)

1

INFO SECDEF-C(1) USDP:FILE(\*) USDP:ADMIN(\*)  
DIR:PAE-DAMIS(\*) USDP-CH(\*)

DIA V3

ACTION

(U, 7, 8)

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INFO USDP:DASDEUR(\*) USDP:MEA(\*) USDP:DSAA(\*)  
USDP:EUR POL(\*) USDP:NATOPOL(\*)  
+USCINCCENT INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL  
+USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL//CARA//  
+COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//  
+JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK//CC/DOA//  
+SAFE

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED

3

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5

1996 JAN 23 AM 11:31

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Your Meeting with  
HRH Prince Bandar bin Sultan  
— 18 January 1996 —

**Points to Make:**

- (b)(1)
- 
- 
- Support for reconstitution
- GCC commitment for UNSCOM
- Jordan & Israel visits

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JAN 18 1996

X00172 /96

Sec Def Cont Nr. \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SAUDI ARABIA

17 Jan 96



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~SECRET~~  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400



I-96/26629  
SECDEF HAS SEEN

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
JAN 18 1996

THROUGH: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for International  
Security Affairs *FC Smith* 17 JAN 1996  
Prepared by (b)(6) ISA/NESA (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Meeting with HRH Prince Bandar bin Sultan,  
Ambassador of Saudi Arabia (U)—INFO MEMORANDUM

(U) Prince Bandar returned from the Kingdom last Saturday evening, having stayed in Riyadh a few days beyond your 6-7 January meetings for which he translated. He is coming to the Pentagon directly from the White House where he has a short meeting with the President at 0945.

(b)(1)

(U) Additionally, you should share your overall impressions of your visit to the Kingdom with Prince Bandar, particularly your assessment of the Regent, Crown Prince Abdullah, whom you met for the first time.

*Other points you may wish to raise:*

- (b)(1)
- support for UN/SCOM
- debrief of your stops in Jordan (F-16s) and Israel.

Reviewed by: DASD/NESA

*Bruce O. Riedel* 17 JAN 1996

Classified by: DASD, ISA/NESA, Bruce O. Riedel  
Reason: 1.5(d)  
Declassify on: X6

~~SECRET~~



# ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

50 MAR -4 PM 2:09



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

SECDEF HAS SEEN

I-96/26700

OK/WJP  
MAR 20 1996

⑦

3/5

ISRAEL

## SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: MELBA BOLING, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

THROUGH: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS FC Smith 29 FEB 1996

REQUEST: Prime Minister and Defense Minister Shimon Peres  
meeting and dinner with SecDef on 29 April.

PURPOSE: SecDef will host Prime Minister Peres at the Pentagon for  
full military honors, a plenary meeting, and an evening social event. Peres  
would like to discuss ongoing issues in US-Israeli defense relations and  
strategic cooperation

BACKGROUND: Peres is coming to Washington on a formal State visit.  
He will meet with President Clinton who will also host a formal State  
dinner in his honor. Peres' visit to Washington will be just one month  
before Israeli elections, currently scheduled for 29 May. The PM is  
expected to stay at Blair House, arriving in Washington on Friday, 26 April.  
In addition to official meetings, the PM is scheduled to keynote AIPAC's  
annual meeting on the evening of 28 April.

## PREVIOUS

PARTICIPATION: Secretary Perry last met Prime Minister Peres in  
Jerusalem on 8 January 1996.

DATE AND TIME: Sunday, 28 Apr.  
Monday, 29 April

1100 1030-1050, Arrival Ceremony  
1110 1050-1100, "Four Eyes Meeting"  
1120- 1100-1200, Full Plenary Meeting  
1200 1200-1230, Joint Press Conference Lunch  
1900-2130, Social Event and Dinner  
Signing & Press Conference

29 FEB 1996

1102963 116

2257



LOCATION: River Entrance/SecDef's office/Conference room.

PARTICIPANTS: ISRAEL: PM Shimon Peres; MoD Director General, MG (Ret) David Ivry; Director General of the PM's Office, Zvi Alderoty; AMB Rabinovich; Military Assistant to the PM, MG Danny Yatom; Defense Attaché, MG Yoram Yair; Adviser to the PM and Director of the PM's Office, Mr. Eitan Haber.

US: SecDef; DepSecDef; CJCS; USDP; ASD/ISA;  
PDASD/ISA; DASD NESA; Israel Country Director.

OUTLINE OF

EVENTS: Full military honors ceremony, 10 minute "four eyes" \* meeting in office, 60-minute plenary session in conference room, joint press conference, evening social event and dinner.

REMARKS

REQUIRED: To be provided.

MEDIA

COVERAGE: Joint press conference in the briefing room.

CONTACTS:

ISA/NESA

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

COORDINATION: White House and State concur.

REVIEWED BY DASD NESA

*Ben Zvi Rinkel*

28 FEB 1996

\* one-on-one



MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY PERRY

SUBJECT: Golan Heights

FROM: (b)(6) 1/16/96

SECRET HAS BEEN  
JUL 22 1996

ISRAEL

Here are your last two statements on the Golan Heights. They are very consistent what you have been saying at least since the fall of 1994. I have included some examples.

Gaffney is a trouble-maker who disregards facts that get in the way of his opinions and worst-case projections.

If there is a peace agreement between Israel and Syria and if the parties request U.S. participation in a force to monitor the Golan Heights, it is impossible to imagine that Congress will object, even in the face of Gaffney's anti-administration whining.

16 Jan 96

U 10718 / 96

**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM J. PERRY  
AND PRIME MINISTER SHIMON PERES  
PRESS CONFERENCE  
JERUSALEM, ISRAEL  
8 JANUARY 1996**

**PRIME MINISTER PERES:** I would like to welcome Secretary of Defense William Perry upon his arrival to Jerusalem as a part of the tour in the Middle East. As far as we are concerned, it is a timely and important visit looking, really, how on one hand to move ahead in the direction of peace, and on the other hand, how to guarantee the securities of the parties concerned. And, as far as Israel is concerned, we feel very appreciative by the existing relations between the United States and the State of Israel, generally, and between the Department of Defense of the United States and the Defense Ministry of Israel, in particular.

**SECRETARY PERRY:** Thank you very much. The Prime Minister and I continued the discussions we started in Washington last month. We are friends and partners in peace and we are determined to build on Yitzhak Rabin's legacy of greater security through peace. At our meeting this morning, we discussed our strong and vibrant military ties, including our robust security assistance and a strong, cooperative defense research relationships. I emphasized an unfaltering American commitment to Israel's security. And I pledged to the Prime Minister my personal commitment to maintaining Israel's qualitative military edge. In particular, I told the Prime Minister I recently approved a memorandum of agreement covering the continued joint cooperation of the Arrow missile program over the next five years. This involves the commitment of \$200 million dollars and the sharing of anti-tactical ballistic missile technology. The Arrow advances our shared objectives of preserving Israel's qualitative edge and working together to develop effective ways to counter the threat of ballistic missiles in the Middle East and elsewhere.

A key to Israel's long-term security is continuing progress towards lasting peace in the region. Israel and its neighbors have made giant strides towards this goal over the last three years. Yesterday in Jordan, I discussed this progress with King Hussein. And today, in Israel, I was briefed on the recent talks between Israel and Syria. I am confident that Israel's strong defense posture, which will continue to be supported by the United States, will permit Israel to continue to take the risks of peace required to negotiate a just, comprehensive and lasting peace with all of its neighbors. At our meeting this morning, we agreed to initiate a joint study to determine the best ways of achieving security along with peace. We'll start that study in a matter of a few weeks and it will be one more indication that the United States will continue to stand shoulder to shoulder with Israel in its quest for security and for comprehensive peace. Thank you.

**Q:** Is Israel and the United States planning a military alliance?

**SECRETARY PERRY:** We have not discussed a military alliance. We are looking, instead, at the modalities for combining security and peace. Models for that security and peace model should be focused on confidence building measures. We have very strong security ties with Israel already, and I believe both countries are confident in the ties that exist. What we are looking at ... ways of expanding, in a broader basis, for comprehensive peace throughout the region.

**Q:** Regarding the \$200 million contract to build the Arrow, how is that going to break out? Will it go with U.S. or Israeli defense contractors? And why is the United States supporting a project that has had so many problems?

**SECRETARY PERRY:** The Arrow program..., let me challenge the assumption, first of all. The Arrow program has been a successful technological program with, I would say in general, fewer problems than you expect on a program that involves complex and difficult technology. So, we see the Arrow as a successful program. The overall program that we're looking at over the next five years involves a total commitment of \$500 million, \$300 million from Israel, and \$200 million from the United States. The specific breakout, in terms of contracts and contractors, was not determined at this meeting. That will evolve in the next year or two as the program planning progresses.

**Q:** (translated) The delegation is back from Washington. What did you hear from Syria? Was there any specific breakthrough from Syria? What did the Secretary mean when he mentioned a wider basis for discussions? Did he mean a regional security pact for the area?

**PRIME MINISTER PERES:** (translated) This time, to a major extent, we discussed the other side of the coin, which is the nature of normalization and economic issues and economic relations. We discussed it in much detail. We did not receive answers to our questions. I assume that, during the upcoming visit by the Secretary of State, things will be more clarified. I would not like to utter a definition regarding the nature of the security arrangements needed in the Middle East. We prefer, first of all, to weigh what is the best structure for security arrangements or, as the Secretary of Defense stated, what is the widest possible size of tent in which we can put all forces that are supportive of peace and a comprehensive security in the Middle East.

**Q:** On this trip, in addition to the deal involving F-16s to Jordan, Secretary Perry, as you may know, has been saying that he wants to build up the militaries of some of these smaller Middle East nations. What is your view on that and could you elaborate on the transfer of the F-16s?

**PRIME MINISTER PERES:** We are supporting the United States' position on this buy of F-16s for Jordan, because we feel Jordan today became a real partner for a real peace and security in the Middle East, and we think it's the right way to support a peaceful Jordan. Then, on the other issue, I believe that we are living in a world of enemies and entering a world of dangers. Enemies with a mettle of nationalities, of countries against countries.

Today I think all countries in the Middle East are facing terror, extremism, nonconventional weapons in the hands of irresponsible leaders, and we have to get rid of the coalitions and savageries of yesterday in order to meet the needs and the problems of today.

A wider understanding in the Middle East about the nature of this insecurity, and we don't suggest they impose anything upon anybody, but we would like to have a coalition of goodwill and responsibility to secure the future of all the people in the Middle East. And that we have to study carefully, how to organize it, without annoying anybody, without threatening anybody, without fighting anybody. Our business is not to frighten and not to threaten. Our business is really to provide security and build peace.

Q: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to know if..., you say \$500 million for the Arrow missiles. Will it be completed within the five-year period?

SECRETARY PERRY: The commitment is a five-year commitment, for a total of \$500 million, \$200 million from the United States and \$300 million from Israel. The program will extend beyond the five-year period, but the commitment made by the United States at this stage was for the next five years. This commitment, of course, involves future appropriations and, therefore, it has to be ultimately indorsed by the Congress in the appropriations bills. But this represents the Executive Branch commitment as to how we will put our budget together and how we would request appropriations from the Congress.

Q: Mr. Prime Minister, do you expect that the missile would be completed in five years?

PRIME MINISTER PERES: Hopefully, yes. I think there were some initial successes, as the Secretary has mentioned. And, I mean, if you should find really a way to intercept the dangers of the missiles, and the missiles themselves, this will be a great contribution to the security of all parties in danger.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is the United States prepared to send troops to the Golan Heights in the event of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria?

SECRETARY PERRY: If the peace agreement between Israel and Syria is reached, which we hope and believe will happen, and if that calls for a peace monitoring force in the Golan Heights, and if both Israel and Syria request the U.S. to participate in that, we are prepared to do that.

- END -

THE NEWSHOUR WITH JIM **EHRER** INTERVIEW WITH: DEFENSE SECRETARY WILLIAM  
**PERRY** THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 1996  
LP-11-01 page# 1

dest=ukra,cis,serb,yugo,europe,saudiar,mideast,refugee,oman,nato  
dest+=jordan,italy,israel,hung,france,firear,crime,bosherc,islam,uk  
dest+=arab,amnesty,weektv,weektvpm,sdd,dod,defense  
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THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT.  
.....

ELIZABETH **FARNSWORTH** Secretary **Perry** is back from a week-  
long trip that began at NATO and U.S. bases in Italy and then took  
him to the staging area for U.S. troops in southern Hungary and then  
to Bosnia. From there he went to Ukraine for nuclear disarmament  
talks, and he wrapped up his travels in the Middle East. He went to  
Oman and Saudi Arabia, and then to Jordan and Israel.

Thank you for being with us after such a long trip.

SEC. **PERRY**: Thank you, Elizabeth. It's good to be home.

MS. **FARNSWORTH**: Let's start with Bosnia. There are, as I  
understand it, about 6,600 troops there now. From what you saw, is  
the deployment going as planned?

SEC. **PERRY**: The deployment is going as planned. I came away  
very, very proud of the American troops. In the face of snow and ice  
and mud and floods, they're overcoming those adversities and they're  
meeting their schedules. They are displaying -- as I told them when  
I met with them, not only I was proud of them but they were  
displaying true grit.

"THE NEWSHOUR WITH JIM **LEHRER**" INTERVIEW WITH: DEFENSE SECRETARY WILLIAM  
**PERRY** THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 1996  
LP-11-01 page# 2

MS. **FARNSWORTH**: I want to ask you about some of the things that are happening in Bosnia now. Today, according to news reports,

a two-mile-long stretch of vehicles was passing through across the airport in Sarajevo, and these were Bosnian Serbs who were trying to get some of their, I guess, home furnishings and things out of their homes before their parts of the city passes under -- pass under Bosnian government control. Does this present a real problem for the implementation force? Should they do anything about this?

SEC. **PERRY**: I don't believe so, Elizabeth. That's my answer to both your questions. Our best understanding of what's happening is that there were many Bosnian Serb refugees that were in the Sarajevo area, and those refugees are now leaving and going to Pale and the Pale area. We do not believe that the Bosnian Serbs who live in that area are leaving their homes.

MS. **FARNSWORTH**: So you're not expecting a mass exodus.

SEC. **PERRY**: Well, there are a lot of refugees there. There are thousands of them. So there'll be a large number of refugees leave. We do not expect the local Bosnian Serb residents, though, to be leaving their homes.

MS. **FARNSWORTH**: So they've been reassured enough, you think, that they will stay there, because there have been all these reports that they would torch their homes and it would present such a problem for the NATO forces.

SEC. **PERRY**: Just yesterday, President Izetbegovic announced amnesty for the Bosnian Serb soldiers. I think that will be a very positive step towards reassuring, towards comforting the people who are concerned, which -- there are still problems in the Sarajevo area. We're a long way from having that situation stabilize. But the developments to date, I believe, are not cause for particular concern.

MS. **FARNSWORTH**: Recently, the U.S. had to or was called out of its sector. I know that the U.S. is in one sector, the French are in another sector, the British are in another sector. And U.S. troops were called out to help with some Apache gunships when there was some idea that there was, I guess, a danger at the Sarajevo Airport and some of the advance troops for the president were coming in. Is that likely to happen, that the NATO commander will call on



U.S. troops to help out in Sarajevo sometimes?

SEC. PERRY: Yes. The IFOR -- the name of the NATO forces -- is an integrated force. And the commander, Admiral Smith, who is an American admiral but is commanding that force, has the authority to

THE NEWSHOUR WITH JIM LEHRER INTERVIEW WITH: DEFENSE SECRETARY WILLIAM PERRY THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 1996  
LP-11-01 page# 3

call troops from any one of those regions to assist in any of the other. It's a convenience to organizing and have them located that way, but we're not really organized as different national entities. We're organized as NATO, and we're there as an integrated force.

MS. FARNSWORTH: And finally, on the news reports today about the mine. I guess there's an open-pit mine which apparently has

thousands of bodies that were dumped there, allegedly by the Bosnian Serbs. And a British NATO force is just a mile away but is saying that it's not its job; it's not this group's job to open up the road so that the investigators can get in to look at that mine. What do you think about that?

SEC. PERRY: Two comments to make on that, Elizabeth. The first is that part of the IFOR responsibility is to assure freedom of travel throughout the region. And certainly high priority on that is facilitating the investigation of the war crimes tribunal. So a very positive answer to that question; yes, we do have that responsibility. IFOR does have that responsibility.

Secondly is that we've been in place now for less than three weeks and there's going to be another couple of weeks until we're there in force. And before we are in position to confidently establish freedom of movement throughout the country, we need to have the place enforced. We'll be in that position in about another three weeks.

MORE  
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THE NEWSHOUR WITH JIM LEHRER INTERVIEW WITH: DEFENSE SECRETARY WILLIAM PERRY THURSDAY, JANUARY 11, 1996  
LP-11-02-E page# 1



dest=wheat,usag,weapons,ukra,cis,terr,syria,mideast,start,armscont  
dest+=saudi,ar,russia,ok,nato,kazak,jordan,japan,asia,israel,europe  
dest+=defbud,byel,bosherc,yugo,islam,arab,weektv,weektvp,msd,dod  
dest+=defense  
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MS. **FARNSWORTH**: Okay, moving on to Ukraine, would you describe what you did just south of Kiev, you and the defense minister of Russia and the defense minister of Ukraine?

SEC. **PERRY**: This was, I believe, an historic occasion, having those three defense ministers come together at all -- first time that has ever happened. But what we came together for was to blow up, to destroy a missile silo, an ICBM silo. And all of my adult life, I've been living with a nuclear cloud hanging over my head, threatening the extinction of all mankind.

MS. **FARNSWORTH**: We're the generation that had to go under our desks.

SEC. **PERRY**: Exactly. And now, with the ending of the Cold War, that cloud is drifting away. But there are thousands of weapons still remaining. And we have, as a high priority in the United States, to take actions to get those weapons destroyed as quickly as possible, as efficiently as possible. So we went there for the purpose of -- one aspect of that program was blowing up those silos.

That site, Pervomaysk, just a year ago there were 700 nuclear warheads all aimed at targets in the United States. We're in the process of dismantling that, removing that threat to the United States. By this June, that missile field will have become a wheat field again. That's the process we're going through right now. And to have those three defense ministers come together, to participate in that activity, gave me a real sense of accomplishment, a real sense of pride.

MS. **FARNSWORTH**: And you each had a switch that you threw?

SEC. **PERRY**: We each had a key which was the launch control key for the missile, but the wiring had been changed so that when all three of us turned our keys, it caused the silo to detonate and to blow up.

MS. **FARNSWORTH**: The U.S. has been helping fund the efforts to get rid of these missiles in Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. How's it going elsewhere?

SEC. **PERRY**: This is, by the way, called the comprehensive threat reduction program, for reasons that are obvious, and it's also

known as the Nunn-Lugar program because the program was initiated by Senator Nunn and Senator Lugar. That involves about \$400 million a year out of the defense budget funds, and we're doing that in all four of the countries in the former Soviet Union that have nuclear weapons. And Kazakhstan -- Kazakhstan is already nuclear-free. By this June, we expect Ukraine to be nuclear-free. Ukraine was the

third-largest nuclear power in the world, and they're going to be a non-nuclear nation by this summer. And Belarus is also reducing its weapons. It will be nuclear-free by the end of the year. Russia, in the meantime, is reducing the size of their nuclear forces under START I, as is the United States.

MS. FARNSWORTH: Just before the meetings, the defense minister of Russia, Mr. Grachev, said that if NATO is enlarged to include the ex-Warsaw Pact nations, I think he said Russia might rethink its policy on tactical nuclear arms and its commitment to arms pacts. That's not a direct quote.

SEC. PERRY: Yes.

MS. FARNSWORTH: Did he talk to you about that?

SEC. PERRY: Yes.

MS. FARNSWORTH: Did he say that to you?

SEC. PERRY: I've talked with him many times on this whole question of the expansion of NATO, and I understand that Minister Grachev and most Russians are very much concerned about NATO. NATO to them has been a threat for decades. NATO is a four-letter word in Russia. And therefore, they're very nervous about the prospect of NATO expanding right up to its borders.

I believe, and I've explained to him many times, that as he works more -- as Russia works more closely with NATO -- they're already members of the Partnership for Peace, which is (in?) NATO -- that they will find that NATO does not pose a threat to them, and indeed is there to enhance the security of Europe, which enhances their security, too. The most significant development in that regard is Russia participating in NATO, with NATO in Bosnia. And they're going to see, then, that they and NATO can work together for the benefit of the security of all of Europe. That's going to, I think, ease their concern in time.

MS. FARNSWORTH: Okay, moving on to your visit to Saudi Arabia, this was your first visit, I believe, since the car-bombing last November --

SEC. PERRY: Yes.

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MS. FARNSWORTH: -- that killed five Americans. What did you find there? Do you think that was a sign of rising anti-West sentiment?

SEC. PERRY: No, I don't, Elizabeth. This was one act of terrorism in many, many years in that country. Anywhere our troops are deployed, we have to be concerned with the prospect of terrorism. Even in Oklahoma some of our soldiers were killed by an act of

terrorism. I found generally stability in the country. Nevertheless, we have enough concern about this that we have taken additional security measures to make our troops less vulnerable to that sort of an attack. But I see no reason for singling out Saudi Arabia as a country where our troops might have particular problems. It's a general problem we face, deployments anywhere in the world, and we are taking special measures in Saudi Arabia.

I talked, by the way, with all of our troops that are there and the families. I met with two of the widows of the soldiers who were killed. Our mission there is very important, and we are not going to be pushed out of the country by an act of terrorism.

MS. FARNSWORTH: Jordan and Israel. In Israel at this point, the big question now seems to be, or the big -- Israel is really moving forward on the Syria peace and peace with Syria. And one of the main things they're trying to work out is a way to monitor the Golan Heights. And you said that the United States would help with that. What would U.S. troops do there?

SEC. PERRY: I made a fairly carefully phrased statement of what we would do there. I said, first of all, our willingness to participate there hinges, first of all, on there being a peace agreement which calls for a peacekeeping force in the Golan Heights. And secondly, very importantly, our willingness to do that hinges on both Syria and Israel requesting us. If all of those conditions happen, then we are certainly willing to participate in a peacekeeping operation. It would be a multinational peacekeeping operation. The Japanese have also indicated a willingness to participate in that.

MS. FARNSWORTH: Are you committing the U.S. to something prematurely here, though? There's a lot of opposition to this in Congress, isn't there?

SEC. PERRY: I also told them that any response of the United States, we would have to consult with Congress about. My own belief is that Congress will support a reasonable move, a reasonable deployment of that sort. But it's premature yet because we don't have a peace treaty yet. We don't have a request yet. But given

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that, then we would certainly go to the Congress and consult with them and propose a course of action.

MS. FARNSWORTH: Mmm-hmm. Things have changed so much in the Middle East. The Israelis actually lobbied, as I understand it, for the aid that you promised to Jordan, which is something very new -- military aid, military sales.

SEC. PERRY: When I was in Jordan, I proposed to King Hussein a program which would provide a squadron of F-16s to Jordan, and he was -- and he accepted that proposal. We will be going ahead with that program. I followed that with a visit to Israel. I briefed the

Israelis on this program. And in the press conference I held with Prime Minister Peres, he -- I mentioned nothing about this, but he took the occasion of saying he thought this was a very good move and he and the government of Israel strongly supported this enhancement of Jordan's security. And I think that certainly is an indication of progress in the Middle East.

MS. FARNSWORTH: Well, thank you for being with us, Mr. Secretary.

SEC. PERRY: Thank you, Elizabeth. Nice to talk to you again.

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HOLDS HEARING ON THE BOMBING OF U.S. MILITARY FACILITIES NEAR  
DHAHRAN, SAUDI ARABIA.

July 09, 1996

14

SAUDI ARABIA

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WILLIAM PERRY, U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
GENERAL JOHN SHALIKASHVILI, CHAIRMAN, JOINT  
CHIEFS OF STAFF  
GENERAL J.H. BINFORD PEAY III, COMMANDER-IN-  
CHIEF, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND

[\*]

THURMOND: The committee will come to order. The Committee on Armed Services convenes this morning to conduct a hearing on the circumstances and the consequences of a terrorist bomb attack on the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia on June 25, 1996. The bomb attack results in the deaths of 19 U.S. military servicemen and injuries of approximately 550 others, including 250 Americans. I'd like to express my deepest condolences on behalf of the committee on Armed Services to the families of our servicemen who lost their lives in this terrorist bomb attack, in Saudi Arabia on June 25.

American servicemen and women sacrifice a great deal in volunteering to serve that country, especially when they deploy for extended tours overseas. Members of the committee and the nation are extremely proud of our personnel in uniform. Our sincerest sympathies are extended to the beloved ones of those who sacrificed their lives as well as those injured during the bomb attack. The American people,

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the administration and the Congress are obligated to provide the very best security and support of those in our armed forces who volunteer to stand in harm's way.

We must do all in our power to provide for the continuous readiness and protection of our men and women in uniform as they serve our nation on dangerous missions in an increasingly volatile world. Occurring on the 46th anniversary of the North Korean invasion of South Korea, this most recent terrorist attack on our troops stands as a stark reminder that the United States must maintain a strong military that is prepared to meet and defeat a wide spectrum of threats to our vital and important interests. We must remain vigilant. The purpose of this hearing is for the committee to determine the facts surrounding the bomb attack, including the extent to which it would recognize that U.S. military personnel housed Khobar Towers were vulnerable to a terrorist attack, the degree to which any concerns relating to such an attack were made known to up the chain of command, the measures that were taken to meet the threats and were identified, and why safeguards that might have thwarted such an attack and minimized casualties were not in place.

The committee will review decisions made with respect to these threats and concerns by both U.S. and Saudi authorities. In addition, the committee's interested in the state of security for all the U.S. forces posted in regions where there might be vulnerable to similar attacks. I'd like to add that I have always believed that those issues affecting the security of our nation should be handled here in the Congress in a bipartisan manner.

**THURMOND:** Since I have been chairman of the committee, I have insisted that the committee operate in this way.

I do want to make clear, however, that the protection of our men and women in uniform is a responsibility that rests with the leadership, both civilian and military, from the president down, and must be taken with the utmost seriousness. I intend that this committee will determine if lapses have occurred in carrying out these responsibilities and will recommend strong action where appropriate.

Our witnesses today are Secretary of Defense William Perry, General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General J.H. Binford Peay III, commander-in-chief of the U.S. Central Command whose area of responsibility includes the Middle East.

The committee expects these witnesses to provide information that will assist us in reaching a full understanding of how this tragic event occurred. We must learn what we can from this latest incident and then do what we must to prevent a recurrence. The witnesses are well known to this committee, each having testified before us on numerous occasions, and requires no introduction.

To the witnesses, I want to extend to each of you a welcome on behalf of the committee, and we look forward to your testimony. Because of our limited time and substantial interest in this hearing



by all members of the committee, I request that each of you limit your oral statements to seven minutes or less.

And to members and witnesses, finally, before we begin, I would like to remind the members and the witnesses that immediately after this open hearing the committee will conduct a closed session with the witnesses in Room S-407.

We are very pleased to have you with us. Distinguished senator from Maine, I believe, is in Egypt and could not be here, but he's very interested in this matter and he wanted to express his, have me express his interest to all the committee about this. He's interested over there in the fight against terrorism, peace process, related security, and political and economic issues. Before he left for Cairo, he was briefed on the investigation of the recent bombing in Saudi Arabia and he may submit some questions for the record for today's witnesses.

And Secretary Perry, we'll begin with you.

Oh, excuse me, the ranking member may have a statement to make. Would you care to make a statement?

NUNN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for scheduling the hearing.

NUNN: I realize that our witnesses, Secretary of Defense Perry and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Shalikashvili and Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command General Peay will only be able to provide preliminary information at this point, but it will be helpful to us to have whatever they know at this point.

More complete information will await the outcome of the assessment being performed by retired General Wayne Downing and other investigations being conducted into the bombing incident. But I believe it's very important to begin our oversight effort now to ascertain what happened and what steps should be taken in the future. As you have said, Mr. Chairman, that is most important.

I want to join you, Mr. Chairman, in expressing my deep condolences to the families of the fine Americans who lost their lives and my heartfelt wishes for a speedy and full recovery by those American airmen and the personnel of our allies who were injured. This incident underscores the fact that U.S. servicemen and women are in harm's way every day as they perform their missions at home and abroad.

I want to commend Secretary Perry for appointing retired General Wayne Downing to conduct an assessment of the facts and circumstances surrounding this bombing, the extent to which it was a result of inadequate security infrastructure, policies, or systems, and to recommend measures to minimize casualties and damage from such attacks in the future.



In order to fully understand the circumstances surrounding this tragic incident, we must ascertain the answers to a number of questions, as many as we can this morning, but certainly in the course of this overall investigation, including the following.

What recommendations to improve security came out of the assessments performed after the November 1995 bombing in Saudi Arabia? Which of these were carried out, which were not, and to the extent they were not, why not?

Was an assumption made that militants in Saudi Arabia did not have the ability or expertise to explode a bomb any larger than the 200 pound device used in the November 1995, and if so, why? Where did these assumptions come from? Were they based on intelligence, were they based on analysis, was this simply based on what had happened in the past without regard to any real analytical forecast?

Another question: was human intelligence and other intelligence support on the scene to the commander effective? If not, why not?

Another question: Did Saudi officials turn down a request to extend the perimeter at Khobar Towers facility, and was this decision appealed up to the chain of command? What did Washington officials know about that request and when did they find out about it, and what action was taken?

Did the changes brought about by the 1986 Goldwater-Nickles legislation streamline the chain of command and facilitate the oversight responsibilities of the commander-in-chief central command? That's particularly pertinent given the history of the Lebanon chain of command which was very cumbersome, very difficult, and probably had something to do with the tragedy in Lebanon a few years ago.

Did Saudi officials cooperate fully in the aftermath of the November 1995 bombing, and are they cooperating fully at this time?

NUNN: And finally, have the Gulf States themselves taken sufficient action in the aftermath of the Gulf War to improve their own ability to defend themselves? Should the United States be both the residual back up and also the primary front line support for the defense of the Persian Gulf?

Are we going to play all roles, or should the primary role be played by the Gulf States themselves with us being the back up, which was the assumption that many of us had after the Persian Gulf War. In fact, I think that was our policy, if that was our policy, is that policy still applicable or has it in effect been dropped with us assuming all the roles in the defense of the Persian Gulf?

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to hear from our witnesses this morning. We appreciate Secretary Perry and General Shalikashvili for you being here. And again, I thank you for having this hearing in a timely fashion.

THURMOND: Secretary Perry, you may proceed.

PERRY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The U.S. military is a family. We've just lost 19 members of our family and we feel their loss deeply.

THURMOND: Speak in your loud speaker please, this is a long room and people can't hear you back there.

PERRY: We have just lost 19 members of our family and we feel their loss deeply but we must carry on the mission they were conducting and we must learn from this tragic event and establish measures to provide better protection for our forces. There is no issue that I feel more deeply about, or no task that I work harder at than the safety and welfare of our military personnel. In pursuing that task, I have always had the full support of this committee and I welcome the opportunity to discuss force protection with you today.

In February, 1994 when I came before you for confirmation, I said the secretary of defense has the responsibility to oversee the joint staff and the CINCs in their direction and military operations. If I am confirmed as secretary, I pledge to give first priority to reviewing and assessing war plans and deployment orders. And I pledge to provide the required support to CINCs as they direct our force in the field.

You did confirm me and to the best of my ability I have carried out the promise that I made to you and to the American people. A critically important component in the oversight and military operations is ensuring appropriate force protection. The responsibility for the safety of our military men and women is mine and I expect to be held accountable for carrying out that responsibility. I carry out the responsibility for the safety of our military personnel in four ways.

First of all, by making judgments on whether the missions that we assign our military personnel are worth the risk of casualties.

PERRY: I manifest this responsibility every time I sign a deployment order; secondly, by judging the competence of our senior commanders, especially those who lead our unified commands, the four-star generals and admirals whom I recommend to the president and you confirm for leadership of our deployed forces; thirdly, by making clear policy statements regarding the priority of our missions. In particular, I sign off on each mission statement, which includes the policy on force protection for that mission; and fourth, by visiting our forces in the field to make judgments how our commanders are executing their missions, with special emphasis on force protection.

In my testimony today I will describe in more detail how I carry out these four responsibilities, and specifically, how they apply to protection of our forces in Saudi Arabia. My first responsibility,

then, is to decide whether a proposed mission is worth the risk of American lives.

No responsibility weighs more heavily with me. I have articulated to you on numerous occasions my belief that when our vital national interests are at stake, we must be prepared to use military force, even at the risk of casualties. While such a judgment may be thought of as a risk-benefit analysis, for me it is much more personal.

I make such judgments every week when I sign operational deployment orders. I made such a judgment when I deployed our forces to Bosnia, in the face of forecasts that our forces would be met with fierce armed resistance. I made such a judgment after the bombing of the Saudi National Guard facility in Riyadh when I reconfirmed that the mission our forces carry out in the gulf region is in our vital national interest.

This reconfirmation should come as no surprise to this committee. In every statement I've made on the subject, I have made clear my belief that the security and stability of the gulf region ranks as a vital national interest to the United States. The gulf courses the world's energy storehouse, home to two-thirds of the globe's proven oil reserves.

At the same time, it is a volatile region. It is the reason we fought in Desert Storm and the reason in October of 1944 (sic) when we sent forces to deter Saddam's threatened aggression. Because the gulf region is so important to us and because it is so volatile, we have developed a several-part strategy to preserve the security and stability of the region.

Let me summarize that for you. We maintain a significant military presence in the region, including air power at host national bases and naval power on our ships in the gulf and the Arabian Sea. We maintain prepositioned equipment in the region, a brigade's worth of heavy armor in Kuwait; another brigade's worth of equipment afloat and an additional brigade's worth of equipment going into Qatar.

We maintain lift capability that can get our forces to the gulf quickly if needed, and we maintain access agreements with the countries in the region and we regularly train with them to help build up their own capabilities.

PERRY: The keystone in this strategy is our military presence which serves as the deterrence to rogue nations by reminding that the U.S. will fight to defend our vital interests in the region. If deterrence fails, then our military presence becomes the base on which we quickly build our fighting force, thereby ensuring a rapid military victory with minimum casualties.

For these reasons then, I believe that our military presence in the region is essential to protect our vital national interests and to carry out our strategy. We must not allow ourselves to be driven out

by terrorists. The second way I carry out my responsibility for the safety of our personnel is to make judgments about who is best qualified to lead our military force. The chairman is the key military adviser to me and to the president. I have enormous confidence in General Shalikashvili and this judgment led me to recommend him for reappointment to a second term as chairman.

The commanders in chiefs of the unified commands are the key leaders who direct our troops in combat and in the daily operations that are most likely to lead them in harm's way. I made another judgment about military leadership when I recommended our current commander in chief of the central command, General Binford Peay, for his position. The commander of the 101st Airborne Division in Desert Storm, a veteran of two tours in Vietnam, General Peay probably has more combat command experience than any Army officer currently on active duty.

He is a warfighter, a strategist and a diplomat. Our nation is fortunate to have a military leader of his ability in such a critical position. The third way I carry out my responsibility for the safety of our personnel is by setting clear policy direction. That is the role of civilian leadership. We then rely on the military experts to take the concrete steps to carry out these policies.

One of the missions for all our operations is force protection. Every military plan must make this a priority. It is an inherent part of every operation and a basic responsibility of our commanders, whether for training or operational deployments, commanders issue clear guidance on force protection and specify the applicable rules of engagement for each situation when troops are in any operation involving risk of combat or high threat from terrorism, force protection becomes critical and complex.

Some critics scoff at the stringent rules by which we protect our forces in Bosnia. We have one full company assigned to guard duty for each battalion, convoys of four vehicles minimum, no alcohol consumption while in theater, flak jackets, helmets and weapons when outside secure compounds. I gave the order that I wanted force protection to be a priority.

PERRY: And Major General Nash determined that in his operating environment these would be the rules. I reviewed those rules when I visited him last week and I fully support his decision to maintain such stringent measures.

Our operations in Saudi Arabia take place in a uniquely difficult environment. Our pilots, of course, face daily risks over Iraq and must operate at peak performance. Our personnel using Saudi facilities may not face mines, but they do face a severe threat from terrorism.

Terrorists always strike at the weak link in our chain of defenses. Our goal must be to try to find and strengthen those weak spots first with what I call passive defenses, guards, barriers,

fences. But passive measures are not enough. We must also increase our active defenses by getting better at gathering intelligence so that we can preempt or disrupt terrorists operations before they can come to fruition.

We must also work cooperatively with other governments, in this case the Saudis. After I visited with our troops in Dhahran last week, I flew with General Peay to Jiddah where we met with Minister of Defense Sultan who pledged his full cooperation and determination to find and punish the perpetrators. I then met with King Fahd along with the Crown Prince Abdullah, Minister of Defense Sultan, Minister of Interior Nayif and Foreign Minister Saud.

I would note that we were the first official Americans to meet with the king since his illness last November. I know many of you have read media accounts about the state of the king's health. I can only tell you what I observed. The king was fully in control of the meeting. He met with me late in the evening for more than an hour and then followed that with a meeting with his senior officials for an additional two hours.

In addition to expressing deep sympathy at our loss, he made absolutely clear his determination to bring the perpetrators to justice and he directed that there be full cooperation between the Saudi and U.S. investigators. I then explained to the Saudi leadership our assessment of how serious the threat was and the importance of making significant changes in the security measures for our forces, including the need for re-basing.

The fourth way I carry out my responsibility to the safety of our personnel is by getting out to the field and visiting with troops and commanders. Through this practice, I get the confidence I need to make decisions that put people at risk. I made three trips to Haiti during that operation.

I have visited with our troops in Bosnia four times already, including once during their train up period. I was with them just after they bridged the Sava River and I just returned from a visit with them over the fourth of July. I can report that they understand their mission and that they are accomplishing it brilliantly.

I have made four trips to the gulf region stopping each time in Saudi Arabia to visit with our forces and with the political leaders. My third trip in early January of this year, gave me the opportunity to make a first-hand assessment following the bombing at the Saudi National Guard facility.

PERRY: During that visit, I reemphasized that the first priority must be forced protection, and I reviewed the security enhancements that had been made for our forces in Riyadh. I also reevaluated the mission of our forces in the region -- the risks, the costs and the impact on operational tempo against the goals and benefit. After my visit to the theater that time, I made a follow-up trip to CENTCOM headquarters to review progress on the actions resulting from that

visit.

Last week, I went to Saudi Arabia to see for myself the results of the attack to determine how we should respond to it and to learn firsthand how our people had reacted. I found the troops sobered by the events of the preceding days, but their morale was strong. They clearly understood the importance of their mission and the role they fulfill in this important endeavor.

Even amidst the tragedy, we can take pride in the performance of our military personnel in the critical moments before, during and after the attack. This is a classic case of training paying off. The guards on top of the building spotted the truck, recognized the danger and immediately radioed an alarm. Undoubtedly, some lives were saved by the alertness and quick reactions of the guards.

A patrol and a Humvee responded to the alarm, and a security policeman arrived on the scene in time to warn away four or more joggers. He then went himself to investigate the truck, and only survived the blast because it was deflected into the air by the barrier wall.

Training also paid off in how everyone behaved after the blast. Nineteen airmen, of course, were killed in the blast, but 200 more were injured seriously enough to visit a clinic for treatment. Everyone arrived at the clinic accompanied by a buddy. All the troops have had some basic medical training, and the doctors reported to me that everyone who arrived at the clinic had had some emergency medical buddy care.

So, on this score, I am also satisfied. Our commanders have trained the troops well, and they knew how to react in a crisis.

The mood of our troops was anger and determination -- anger in that they want the perpetrators found and severely punished; determination in that they want to prove that they will not be deflected from their mission. By the time that I arrived four days after the attack, they had already restored the full operating tempo. Operation Southern Watch hardly missed a beat, and the no-fly zone below the 32nd parallel is in full force.

What can we learn from this tragedy? What went right? What went wrong? What should we do differently in the future?

PERRY: I have asked General Wayne Downing to make an independent assessment of the circumstances surrounding the bombing. And I expect to be able to give you a complete answer to these questions when General Dowman's (sic) assessment -- General Downing's assessment is completed next month.

But based on what I've already learned, I can give you a partial answer.

The mission of our forces was clearly understood and recognized



to be of vital importance. The chain of command was clear. There was a clear recognition at all levels of command that we faced a high level of threat from terrorists.

Much had already been done to improve the physical security at Khobar Towers. But the security measures we prescribed after the bombing of the Saudi National Guard facility were focused on a threat less powerful than actually occurred. And our local commanders, for a variety of reasons, had not completed some of the measures that were prescribed and which they agreed needed to be done.

Why did we focus on a threat which proved to be understated?

For the decades of American presence there, it seemed that Saudi Arabia was safe from the terrorist violence occurring in other countries in the Middle East. During the five years since Desert Storm, we have maintained an increased military presence, but the security provisions for the residents and officers of our personnel were roughly comparable to those for the forces based in Germany or Japan, yet we know that the mission we are conducting in Saudi Arabia, so vital to us, is opposed by others.

Certainly it is opposed by Iran and Iraq since our forces in the region deter them from actions they might otherwise take.

And our very presence in Saudi Arabia is opposed by some religious extremists in that country, some of whom are willing to use violent measures to drive us out.

In November of last year, a group of Saudi religious extremists attacked the office of the U.S. program manager for the Saudi National Guard in Riyadh with a car bomb killing five Americans. At that point, we made what we believed to be a prudent judgment that this attack might not be an isolated event, but a new trend and thus assigned a high terrorist threat level to Saudi Arabia.

In response to this judgment, we conducted analyses of the vulnerability of our forces in Saudi Arabia. In particular, the Air Force's Office of Special Investigations conducted a vulnerability analysis of the Khobar Towers that was completed in January of this year.

It was informed by full access to intelligence on the terrorist threat to Saudi Arabia, but the intelligence information, while voluminous and while pointing to a high threat level, was also fragmentary and inconclusive. It did not provide the user with any specific threat but rather laid out a wide variety of threat alternatives.

Consequently our commanders received recommendations to take a variety of actions. Many actions, indeed, were completed prior to the June attack. Some focused on preventing an attack similar to the November bombing. Other actions focused on preventing attacks of a completely different nature and, indeed, may have prevented a

different type of attack from taking place.

My assessment is that our commanders were trying to (AUDIO GAP) a variety of threat alternatives.

PERRY: Consequently, our commanders received recommendations to take a variety of actions. Many actions, indeed, were completed prior to the June attack. Some focused on preventing an attack similar to the November bombing. Other actions focused on preventing attacks of a completely different nature, and indeed, may have prevented a different type of attack from taking place.

My assessment is that our commanders were trying to do right, but given the inconclusive nature of the intelligence, had a difficult task to know specifically what to plan for. And many of the protective measures they took were more appropriate for the size of the bomb used in November. But this attack turned out to be ten times as powerful as the previous attack.

It is evident from what is already known about the attack that the bombers were well organized, had sophisticated training, did extensive practice and had access to military quality explosives and detonating devices. Of course, the investigation is still underway, but it is my working assumption that these bombers had extensive support from an experienced and well financed international terrorists organization.

Therefore, based on that assumption, I believe that it is prudent to conclude that we are now facing a significantly higher and more sophisticated threat than we faced in the bombing of the Saudi National Guard facility in Riyadh.

Why were the recommended security measures not yet completed at the time of the attack? Based on his view of the threat, and the vulnerability analysis done by the Office of Special Investigations, the base commander undertook an extensive set of security measures at Khobar Towers. General Peay will describe those to you in his testimony.

Some of these measures were still in progress, but most of them had been accomplished at the time the attack was made on Khobar Towers. Indeed, the security measures that were already in place undoubtedly saved dozens, if not hundreds of lives. However, it is also undoubtedly true that significantly fewer casualties would have occurred if all of the prescribed security measures had been implemented by the time of the attack.

General Downing's investigation will shed more light on why some of the recommended measures had not yet been completed. But it seems clear, that local commanders would have put a higher priority on...

THURMOND: Mr. Secretary.

PERRY: Yes, sir.

THURMOND: We announced that we would have seven minutes and the full statements would go in the record. Can you finish up pretty quick so the senators have a chance to ask questions?

PERRY: Of course, Mr. Chairman.

What can we do to respond to the threat? General Downing will make a complete assessment and recommendations on this. But even before I receive his assessment, I can tell you that the changes required to deal with this level of threat will be complex, expensive and take many months to implement.

PERRY: It is fundamentally difficult to provide protection against such a threat, particularly in an urban environment, and therefore, I have instructed General Peay to include in his recommendations a plan to move our military forces out of Riyadh and other urban environments where it is difficult to provide adequate physical security.

Let me skip to the end and submit the rest of my talk for the record here, but I want to sum up as follows:

First, the Khobar Towers bombing was a tragedy that revealed vulnerabilities in the force protection measures we had taken.

Second, we can expect further attacks on our facilities in the command. Therefore, we are undertaking a major program to improve our force protection measures throughout the command. This will include plans to rebase our forces that are now located in urban areas.

Third, we must capture and punish the bombers. And, if we identify another nation as the source of the bombing, we should retaliate.

And fourth, we must not let the bombers drive us out of the Gulf region. The mission we are conducting there is vital to the security interest of the United States.

I'd now like to turn the microphone over to General Shalikashvili.

THURMOND: I will repeat again that the full statement of the witnesses -- the entire statement -- will go in the record. And we ask the witnesses to limit their oral statements to seven minutes.

We have a long hearing here and the senators have questions they wish to propound.

General, you may proceed.

SHALIKASHVILI: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee.

Let me begin by once again expressing my sympathies to the families of those who lost their lives in this tragedy that we are here to discuss, and to wish a very speedy recovery to those who were wounded in this incident.

Mr. Chairman, in the past 18 months, the terrorist threat in the Persian Gulf region has gone from a relatively low level to a very high level today. Thus, it is now a much more difficult challenge that we face -- one where we must balance risks to our vital national interests along with the heightened risks to our forces.

But balancing risks is an integral part of my job. As the principal military adviser to the secretary of defense and to the president, I direct strategic planning, monitor contingency operations and assist the president and the secretary in providing strategic direction to our forces.

Out of all of my responsibilities, nothing is more important to me than to properly formulate military missions and shape military forces whenever our men and women have to be asked to go in harm's way; and at the same time, to ensure that we continue to look for better ways to protect our forces in the execution of their many and varied missions here and abroad.

Force protection -- safeguarding the health, safety and physical security of our men and women in uniform and their families -- is a key concern each time I recommend a plan for approval or bring an operational deployment order to the secretary for his signature.

SHALIKASHVILI: That was true when we sent our forces to Haiti and it is, as Secretary Perry already mentioned, why we wear our Kevlar helmets and flak vests in the summer's heat in Bosnia. Details related to force protection from special training to rules of engagement to operating procedures are always a top priority, whether we are conducting a non-combatant evacuation in Liberia, as we just recently did, or operating out of Saudi Arabia to deter Saddam Hussein.

During my trip to the Gulf in late May of this year, I found awareness of the terrorist threat and an appreciation of the importance of force protection to be high throughout the region. Given the expected threat, I found that all of the units that I visited had implemented extensive force protection measures, both in terms of physical protection and in terms of anti-terrorism education and training.

Because actions to deter terrorists must be continuous and must never be satisfied that we have done enough, additional measures were in the works to make security even better. Less than a month before the bombing, I talked at King Abdul Aziz Air Base in Dhahran with some of the very same airmen who lived in Khobar Towers. They were, like all of our young servicemen and women I visited around the world, a most impressive group, with high morale and a sense that what they were doing was important to our nation and very much in the interest

of peace and security.

Indeed, the ones I talked with knew theirs was a vital mission, they knew that the 4404th Composite Wing was there flying daily missions over Iraq to deter Saddam Hussein. And they understood as well that if they were not there that one day we might again have to fight to defend our interests and our regional allies; and most likely do so at great expense to American treasure and American lives.

These members of the 4404th Composite Wing with whom I spoke also understood terrorism and the need for constant vigilance. And I'm certain they knew that the terrorist threat was real. While all of our forces worldwide are sensitive to terrorism, those in Saudi Arabia were especially alert, particularly after the November, 1995 car bombing at the building called OPM/SANG.

This tragic incident was the first such loss of American lives since Desert Storm. Suddenly we faced a different threat in Saudi Arabia and we had to redouble our efforts to increase our defenses. And so, first, as an immediate measure, the secretary directed on 14 November, the day after the OPM/SANG bombing, that all DOD activities at home and abroad review their physical security and anti-terrorism procedures.

SHALIKASHVILI: The purpose of this review was not only to heighten our current security awareness and security posture, but to establish as well a long-term mindset that would help reduce the chances of a terrorist attack against U.S. personnel and facilities in the future.

And while the regional commanders proceeded with their reviews, the secretary and I formed a DOD anti-terrorism task force and, as part of this effort, we dispatched a general officer level team to every overseas unified command to assess security needs and anti-terrorism practices with a special emphasis on high threat areas.

This task force aimed to develop policy recommendations that would strengthen DOD's anti-terrorism efforts.

Last month, the secretary approved the findings of the task force and work has begun on its recommendations.

Additionally, since OPM/SANG falls under the authority of the U.S. ambassador to Saudi Arabia, we participated as well at general officer level in the State Department's Accountability Review Board, whose purpose was to examine the security-related specific aspects of the OPM/SANG bombing and to report its findings and recommendations.

We are continuing to work hand-in-hand with the State Department in implementing recommendations of their report. And of course, today, we are giving General Downing's review of the circumstances surrounding the Khobar Tower bombing every measure of our support.

And it is important to note here that General Peay himself had

asked for this outside review.

But given the ubiquitous and ever-changing nature of terrorism, anti-terrorism must be a continuous process. We can always improve and we will never stop trying.

However, in the future, we must face one hard fact. We will have more terrorist incidents. Terrorism will always seek the weak link and take the most indirect approach to its ends. It will make every effort to strike at the seams, seeking shock effect and publicity of a military utility.

Terrorists will continue to be patient as they are destructive. No one -- not even the Israelis, who have more experience than any other people in dealing with terrorism -- has figured out a way to decisively defeat it in the near term.

Yet in the areas where our interests are great, we must accept that risk while at the same time continuing to work consistently and methodically to reduce the risk to our men and women in uniform.

The Downing assessment is another step in that continuous process. But in the end, we cannot let acts of terrorism deter us from pursuing our vital interests.

That said, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would now to ask General Peay to outline for you his perspective, his command's actions in connection with this tragic event and his efforts to minimize the risks of terrorism to the forces of Central Command.

THURMOND: General Peay.

PEAY: Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by expressing on behalf of all servicemen and women assigned to U.S. central command my deepest condolence to the loved ones of our comrades in arms killed and wounded. While no words can adequately console families during this tragic time, we can take comfort in remembering that these young Americans were struck down while heroically serving our nation.

Accomplishing our missions in the region in general and in Saudi Arabia in particular, means achieving success in a very complex operational environment. The first part involves understanding the Saudi culture and the way of doing business. The second part involves the dynamics of managing operational risk. Our relationship with the Saudis is based on promoting mutual interest. We are not colonizing their country, we do not seek to infringe on their culture, we respect their way of life. But we do not intentionally allow these efforts to endanger our servicemen and women.

Over the last several decades our government has considered Saudi Arabia one of the safest countries in the world. Over 40,000 American civilians live and work in Saudi Arabia this morning. What's more, the U.S. military enjoys a close relationship with Saudi counterparts, that is the envy of nations throughout the world. What may appear as



Saudi indifference or unwillingness to act on an issue is, in fact, a reflection of their different sense of time.

Similarly, what may appear as foot dragging by various levels of government is often a reflection of the compartmentalized nature of Saudi bureaucracy and decision-making. Decisions at all levels of the Saudi government are slow by U.S. standards and are often reached by consensus. In addition, the king's role as custodian of the two holy mosques produces intense Saudi sensitivity to issues involving their sovereignty. Our sensitivity to these dynamics produces a friendship and internal stability supportive of our national interests.

Another aspect of the operational climate that must be understood is the manner in which I as a theater commander and my subordinate commanders manage operational risk. Our relatively small forward presence reflects our recognition that local societies can be easily oversaturated, producing the very instability that we seek to prevent.

The terrorist attack on Khobar Towers reflects the changing nature of the terrorist threat in Saudi Arabia. Though some have attempted to compare this bombing with the suicide attack on the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983, the differences are simply striking. Saudi Arabia is a viable, prosperous, stable country. Prior to the bombing of OPM/SANG last year, there were very few terrorists instances directed against Americans within the kingdom.

It is not in the grips of a civil war. It does not suffer the destruction and chaos associated with a multitude of warring extremist groups.

PEAY: It is not caught in the middle of a conflict between warring nations, such as was Lebanon with respect to Syria and Israel. U.S. forces are not engaged in active combat actions against local military groups, as was the United States in Lebanon where marines were employing small arms, artillery, naval gunfire and air strikes against the Druze and Amal Shi'ite militiamen.

We recognize, however, that Middle Eastern terrorism has evolved over the years. There are several groups operating within our area of responsibility and interest, groups like Hamas, Hizbollah, Al-Jihad; most receiving financing, weapons and sanctuary from countries like Iran and Sudan.

We are seeing a growth in transnational groups comprised of Islamic extremists, many of whom fought in Afghanistan and now drift to other countries with the aim of establishing anti-Western, fundamentalist regimes by destabilizing traditional governments through attacks on the United States and Western targets. Their small cellular structure and tendency to operate independently of state sponsors complicate detection of their activities.

We also are sensitive to the emergence over the last years of anti-Saudi government groups. But the direct relationship of such groups with transnational terrorist cells remains unclear.

Let me suggest these initial thoughts on the terrorist attack on Khobar Towers. First, Central Command and subordinate commands competently fulfilled their intelligence analysis, collection and dissemination responsibilities prior to the Khobar Towers bombing.

CENTCOM, its subordinate commands, and the interagency, conduct thorough intelligence work seven days a week, 24 hours a day. I personally review key intelligence information on all threats to include the terrorist threat every day, seven days a week. The same information is shared with all senior commanders to include those in Saudi Arabia.

Difficulties arise in detecting specific acts of terror before they occur. The terrorist is a criminal. The terrorist is not a soldier. He strikes indiscriminately at the target of his choosing with any means, at any times. All targets are legitimate in his eyes. He seeks to inflict as much damage as possible to horrify and shock the local population and global audience and to embarrass the leaders of a country.

Under the circumstances, there is no way to achieve absolute security for our military people or our civilian citizens living abroad. An initial review of the intelligence relating specifically to Saudi Arabia and Khobar Towers in the months prior to the Khobar Tower bombing reveals an increase in suspected surveillance, but no clear indication of an impending major terrorist attack.

Second, Central Command, its component commands and all the U.S. military organizations in the Kingdom have competently accomplished their missions and command responsibilities prior, and subsequent, to the OPM/SANG and Khobar Towers bombing.

The November 1995 OPM/SANG bombing was a watershed, demarcating a new escalation in the terrorist threat.

PEAY: Soon after the bombing I met with our ambassadors in the region, including those in Egypt, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, and Pakistan to discuss shared secured responsibilities.

Concurrently, I met with all of my senior component commanders and with senior U.S. military leaders in regional countries to review the terrorist threat, the chain of command responsibilities, and legal and military force protection requirements. Subordinate commanders use these meetings to share their concerns on force protection and to brainstorm additional safeguards. In addition, I, I raised the threat from medium to high and directed a theater-wide reassessment of security of our facilities in the region.

Force protection is complicated because each country in the region confronts different types of threats and reflects unique internal political and social conditions. What's more, urbanization, road networks, availability of facilities and time associated with completing all security precautions affects the speed with which we

have completed security upgrades theater wide.

Nevertheless, Central Command and its component commanders initiated a series of security-related inspections throughout the region, a daunting task when you consider that I am responsible for over 50 military facilities, large facilities, and sites for combatants in the region, and between the chiefs of mission and myself, hundreds and hundreds of facilities and housing areas for military noncombatants.

We have completed 50 assessments since January 1996, assessments that have led to further security enhancements. As in the case with any military defense, we are always improving our positions, continually collecting and analyzing intelligence, replacing sand bags, enhancing perimeters, installing improved sensors, early warning devices, employing ground dogs, guard dogs, positioning machine guns and increasing guards and patrols.

Consequently, what we observe at a time of a terrorist attack is a snapshot of a status of a facility at the time of attack. And I think this was somewhat true at Khobar Towers on 25 June, 1996.

Third, Commanders, JTF SWA, Joint Southwest Asia, and 4404th Wing Provisional, responded with appropriate actions commensurate with the existing terrorist threat prior to the bombing. During November 1995 and April 1996, the local military commanders responded to the OPM/SANG bombing by reassessing the security of Khobar Towers. They raised their own local threat conditions as different from my threat condition -- threat warning -- setting into motion more stringent force protection measures, measures designed to contend with various types of terrorist strikes, to include a car bomb.

Enhancements included upgraded fences; adding additional concrete barriers along access roads; establishing a single, well-defended exit and entry point; clearing fields of view along perimeters; denying vehicles access to garages; blocking service roads between buildings; establishing no parking areas near buildings; increasing U.S. patrols and guards; requesting and receiving additional Saudi guards and patrols; inspecting all mails and parcels, deliveries; and augmenting their staffs with physical security agents.

PEAY: A suspicious security-related instance in early spring caused local commanders to enact even more rigorous security measures commencing 1 April 1996. These included adding more concrete barriers along the fence line, boosting stand-off along perimeter fences, increasing Saudi patrols, getting the local police to check license plates numbers of suspicious vehicle, and positioning a manned sand-filled dump truck to block the entrance in an emergency.

To summarize, the local commanders implemented over 130 security improvements at Khobar Towers between November 1995 and June 1996, and I can tell you, in talking with Norm Schwarzkopf several times, the facility today at the time of the bombing was in considerably greater protection than it was throughout the Gulf War.

Fourth and lastly, our servicemen and women at Khobar Towers performed magnificently prior to and subsequent to the terrorist attack.

Prior to the attack, they labored in 115 degree heat to erect protective measures. Guards overcame the drudgery of their duty to maintain vigilance 24 hours a day, and leaders continued to press for additional security measures up until the time of attack.

In the aftermath of the explosion, as the secretary has related, our people performed flawlessly in evacuating our wounded, performing triage and first aid, providing advanced medical care, evacuating buildings. And, as the smoke cleared on the morning of 26 June, our men and women continued their mission. Pilots prepared to launch the air operations over southern Iraq. The Patriot batteries remained steady. And security personnel began to improve their positions.

In conclusion, when I arrived at Khobar Towers several days after the bombing, I was struck by the dedication and the selflessness of our people; their courageous effort to deal with grief at losing friends; their ability to overcome the confusion, to continue their operational missions.

I was impressed with the work done by the commander of the 4404th, Brigadier General Schwalier, for it was this commander who had to deal with the immediate crisis, take care of the wounded and the dead, reorganize his security, coordinate with the Saudis, keep higher headquarters informed, and provide information to the media.

It's easy to forget that his responsibilities extended beyond security at Khobar Towers. While he had a staff and subordinate commanders to assist him, he was nevertheless responsible for air operations in Iraq and in the gulf. He had people living and working

on 11 different sites in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Oman, Qatar and the UAE, and he had been aggressive over the last months in upgrading security in all of these sites.

PEAY: Even with the additional physical security upgrades, we should recognize that we remain vulnerable to terrorist attacks. I don't believe that any amount of money or physical security upgrade alone can stop a determined terrorist. While terrorism has been a threat to our country for many years, it is evolving; and it is growing increasingly more sophisticated.

We must keep in mind it is both a criminal act and a way of war, and our servicemen and women are on the front line of terrorism throughout the gulf. We mourn for fallen comrades. It is the heart-wrenching part of the profession of arms. Some forget that placing our servicemen and women in harm's way around the world involves risk.

And while the American people have every right to demand competence, character and leadership from our military commanders,

they should not expect zero defects. Demanding such a rigid standard produces timid leaders, afraid to make tough decisions in crisis, unwilling to take the risk necessary for success in military operations. And it's this zero-defect mindset that creates conditions that will lead inevitably, in a larger sense, to failure in larger battle and perhaps even higher casualties.

Our nation has vital interests in the Middle East and the Gulf. The recent terrorist attack does not change that reality. We cannot withdraw, for doing so would reward terrorists and endanger our nation. We must remain engaged in the region, take the actions to ensure the safety of our servicemen and women abroad, and focus on accomplishing our mission.

Thank you very much, sir.

THURMOND: Each senator will now have seven minutes to make an opening statement and questions, except Senator Nunn and myself. We've already made an opening statement, so we'll confine ourselves to five minutes each.

Secretary Perry, after the Long Commission investigated the October 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, its report recommended that the secretary of defense direct the development of doctrine planning, organization, full structure, education and training necessary to defend against an encounter to terrorism.

Our losses after this latest attack suggest that the Department of Defense has not implemented this recommendation. Can you explain our security lapse in light of the Long Commission recommendation?

PERRY: Mr. Chairman, I think -- I believe that the Department of Defense does have a very strong emphasis on force protection, including, where appropriate, protection against terrorists. Most recently, in the course of policies and in the course of education, we have just authorized the anti-terrorist program, which General Shalikashvili described to you.

PERRY: He may want to make an additional comment about the implementation of that program, which is quite recent.

SHALIKASHVILI: Mr. Chairman, we do have printed, distributed, taught in schools, practiced on exercises, joint doctrine to deal with anti -- with terrorism. We do, in fact, practice it. As terrorism evolves and becomes more sophisticated and becomes more linked to sophisticated terrorist-sponsored governments, we have to continually improve in our training, in our education, as well as in those protective measures that we have around our facilities.

But I believe that our compliance with the recommendation of the Long Commission on this particular score is quite good.

THURMOND: General Shali, it appears that at the upper levels the Department of Defense and the Joint staff were either unaware or



insufficiently attentive in preparing for this most recent attack, despite numerous internal warnings, indications in similar attacks. What does this tell us about priorities in organization?

SHALIKASHVILI: Mr. Chairman, I believe that, as both Secretary Perry and General Peay have already testified, we did have intelligence that caused us to raise our security level from low, some 18 months ago, to medium, before the OPM/SANG bombing, to high almost immediately after the OPM/SANG bombing.

And we have maintained that high terrorist threat warnings throughout the period to include up to the day of the bombing at Khobar Tower. We have also issued all the, I believe, the requisite instructions to the field to cause a reexamination of our security posture. The results of that reexamination have been described by General Peay.

I tried to touch upon the additional measures that the secretary felt was necessary that we take in order to take a broader, more long-range view on what ought to be done to strengthen our anti-terrorist posture. I think we have done a very exhaustive effort to ensure we understand better what policy changes, what direction, what guidance has to be given to the regional commanders so they can better deal with this heightened terrorist threat -- not just in the Middle East -- but in all the regions where we have our forces stationed.

So, I do not believe that the department from its perspective has either ignored the situation or has somehow been lax in its attention to what needed to be done.

SHALIKASHVILI: Much of the work is done by the regional commanders and it is the department's responsibility to ensure that they are tasked to do that work and then that we stand ready to provide them the resources that they might request of us to get the job done. I believe those things were accomplished, Mr. Chairman.

THURMOND: General Peay, when was the last time, prior to the attack, that you visited the military complex? And what was your assessment, both from personal observation and briefings from subordinates, of the adequacy of the security infrastructure and policies at the complex?

PEAY: Mr. Chairman, I never visited the complex prior to the attack. I visited this particular command, its leadership and its senior leadership a number, number of times over the past 24 months. I had staff that visited that particular facility. I mentioned to you that I have a number of housing facilities. My focus at that time, was on force protection kinds of elements and a series of commander conferences, phone calls with my subordinate commanders and meetings with ambassadors.

I met principally, prior to this time, on the operational level dealing with flights into Iraq, the gulf, working rules of engagement, security, combat CSAR, search and rescue kinds of operations. I had



not physically visited this building or that site prior to the attack.

THURMOND: My time is up.

Senator Nunn.

NUNN: Thank you, Senator Thurmond.

Mr. Secretary, there was the November '95 bombing in Saudi Arabia. After that there was an assessment made. Is that assessment classified and could you furnish that to us?

PERRY: This is the vulnerability assessment of Khobar Towers in particular?

NUNN: Yes.

PERRY: Yes, we had the Office of Special Investigations conduct a vulnerability assessment of Khobar Towers. That was published early this year. It is available, yes. I've already directed that that be made part of the...

NUNN: So, that's not a classified document is it?

PERRY: It is classified, but it can be available...

NUNN: Could you make it available to the committee?

PERRY: It will be available to the committee, yes.

NUNN: Good.

PERRY: I'd be happy to make it available to the committee.

NUNN: General Peay, you mentioned there were a number of housing complexes in your command. I assume also in Saudi Arabia. Do you have any count, do you have any number of how many facilities are in your command that have similar arrangements or are exposed or vulnerable to this kind of attack, in your command?

PEAY: I can try and roll those up to you subjectively, Senator Nunn. I would tell you that in open session here, Khobar Towers was one of our better prepared facilities. We have enormous work to do across the entire region to include, in Saudi Arabia, to upgrade these postures. Many of these facilities go back 40, 50 years.

NUNN: Are you talking about 10, 20, 100, 1,000? Give us some range, some general estimate of how many -- what the scope of this vulnerability is with our military personnel?

PEAY: I would say, in Saudi Arabia -- this is really rough -- maybe ten. But they vary in difference size. Some are high-rise kinds of configurations, others are spread over long distance.

NUNN: What about in your whole command?

PEAY: I would say 50 major facilities that I deal with.

NUNN: General Shali, could you tell us in your, just ballpark figure, how many around the world do we have where we have these kind of vulnerabilities?

SHALIKASHVILI: The threat, of course, varies. But if the threat were the same in other parts, we are talking of hundreds upon hundreds upon hundreds of such facilities.

NUNN: I assume you're talking about upgrading, you're talking about substantial amounts of money, is that right?

PEAY: Sir, I think it would, the upgrades would go to moving away from urbanization areas which would require large monies in relocation or going through what we did 15 years ago as we first came upon this threat on the ambassadorial side of large dollars associated with hardening facilities.

NUNN: What about in Bosnia, General Shalikashvili? That's certainly a high risk area? We had the headlines in the Washington Post yesterday morning about Mujahaddin that are still located there, perhaps in police forces still abusing civilians, according to that report, and so forth. What kind of vulnerability do we have in Bosnia?

SHALIKASHVILI: The situation is very different in Bosnia because the forces we have there for the most part are units that are stationed in concerns that we have constructed that are away from urban areas where we have a pretty extensive perimeter.

And while they are always vulnerable, as we said before, because terrorists find ways to overcome almost any defense, they're vulnerable in a very different sense because they, in most cases, they can't have stand-off distances. In most cases they are, in fact, armed. Their danger runs into when they're on patrols, more than in a -- So, it's a different threat.

But, obviously, whenever you're in an environment, as you are in Bosnia, the last thing you can do is assume that you're not vulnerable to terrorist attacks. You are and they are.

NUNN: General Peay, did the Saudi officials turn down a request to extend the perimeter at Khobar Towers facility? And, if so, was this decision appealed up to your level of the chain of command? And did you pass it on if it got to you?

PEAY: Sir, I don't know the exact answer to that. I think that will be one of the questions that will have to be resolved in the -- under sworn testimony. But I...

NUNN: You would know if it got -- you would know whether it got

to you, wouldn't you?

PEAY: It never came to Central Command and I don't know if it came to the next in immediate command between me and the commander really at the front end of the sphere.

NUNN: It never got to your level?

PEAY: It did not.

NUNN: Did you -- Would then, could it have gotten to General Shalikashvili or Secretary Perry?

PEAY: It would not have if it did not come to me.

NUNN: That would have had to come through you?

PEAY: It would have had to have come through me, and I would like to say that -- that I probably would have -- I know I would have tried to have worked that problem first before I ever raised it to the chairman's or the secretary of defense's level.

NUNN: In other words, if it had come to you, you would have tried to work it directly with your counterparts in Saudi Arabia and defense officials rather than passing it on to the secretary of defense?

PEAY: Certainly initially, and I think in the background of my opening comments of understanding the culture, I think that you very well would have seen me work that for a considerable period of time as we worked with the host government to try to fix that particular challenge.

NUNN: Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. Thank you.

THURMOND: Senator Warner.

WARNER: Thank you. I'm going to pick up on that question by Senator Nunn because it seems to me the responsibility of this committee is to establish accountability. We're not out here to headhunt or anything like that but the buck stops here at this committee because the people of the United States look to the Congress as the ones really ultimately responsible for the welfare of the men and women of the armed forces that take these risks all over the world.

And General Peay, I'm stunned by the answer that it's almost two weeks since this incidence and you still do not know whether or not your subordinates appealed this decision above the, as I understand it, the general officer level in the field.

PEAY: Well, let me tell you what I've gotten telephonically, and I have deliberately tried not to get into that detail while the investigation is on-going by General Downing.

There's lots of...

WARNER: But you knew -- I assumed the president would have been interested in this, and would have called in and asked, well, what -- what happened out there? You knew that we were coming up here with this hearing, so I must say I'm stunned by that.

PEAY: Well, let me -- let me try, Senator Warner, to go further with it.

Certainly in my conversations with subordinate commanders through the chain, in a period of grief and mourning that's still going on today where in the early days, you get conflicting information, I have always found over my 35 years, it's best to be steady and be sure you understand the information that you're hearing.

The information that I have been -- I have been hearing to date, which I don't want to say is final until it's under some sworn testimony or the investigation by General Downing's committee is done, is that on several occasions -- read at least two -- that at the colonel level, the 06 level, there were conversations with Saudi hosts -- government people -- at province state security level in the eastern province region, that those personnel were working through the issue, that a number of other concessions were made -- whether it be an increasing fence levels out with more hardened barriers, cutting vegetation on private land, those kinds of things.

WARNER: General, my time is going to be lost. I talked to General Shalikashvili by telephone three or four days ago, right, General? I asked you this explicit question. You said, I'll get back to you in a few minutes. You then, I think, contacted General Peay. You said, the answer is yet to be developed. And I guess I dropped it at that point on the assumption by the time this hearing came along there could be some evidence shed on that question that I put to you -- one, what was the discussion? Was it appealed up the chain?

WARNER: And two -- were there any corroborative documents like written requests by the on-scene commander to the Saudi government? And you said you'd make that available. I guess it's still not available to this committee. Is that correct?

SHALIKASHVILI: Senator Warner, I -- it is not available to me. The -- I discussed the matter with General Peay after you and I had talked about it. What I had told you was correct. The information had not come to me. The information had not come to General Peay. I am not aware of any written records of that request.

I do have -- I've had reported to me as a result of that inquiry by General Peay just what he told you right now...

WARNER: All right.

SHALIKASHVILI: ... that at the colonel level, there had been

those discussions on at least two occasions.

WARNER: Yesterday I had a talk with the ambassador from Saudi Arabia to the United States, Prince Bandar, and I've recommended to the chairman that he appear before this committee in closed session later today.

THURMOND: Incidentally, I talked to him yesterday, too, and...

WARNER: Yes.

THURMOND: ... and he may be invited to a closed session today.

WARNER: I would urge that, Mr. Chairman.

But statements that he made to me are in direct conflict with some of the evidence before this committee this morning. Now at some point, we've got to resolve that as a committee.

So I'll press on to you, Mr. Secretary.

I was taken by the forthright analysis you put in your statement regarding the intelligence reports. Let me read two of your sentences.

"But the intelligence information, while voluminous and pointing to a high threat level, was also fragmentary and inconclusive."

Further on, you say, "but it seems clear that local commanders would have put a higher priority on timing if they had perceived a threat as sophisticated and as powerful as actually occurred."

Now, that appears to me to indicate you have a judgment that it was an intelligence failure by the U.S. military as well as the Saudi, presumably cooperative, intelligence system.

I think it's important to the American public that people in your position of responsibility from time to time state very clearly -- was there or was there not an intelligence failure in your judgment in this case?

PERRY: I would say not an intelligence failure. We had much intelligence on what was going on relative to the terrorist threat, not only in Saudi Arabia but in the Mid East. It was intelligence of a strategic level, so that we knew we had a high threat level. We called a high threat level based on the intelligence.

That was a very important achievement of intelligence. The intelligence was not useful at a tactical level. It didn't specify the nature of the threat or the timing of the threat.

PERRY: And therefore, it was not what we might call actionable intelligence in terms of doing our planning. And also, the intelligence, I think inevitably in this kind of a problem was

contradictory. And we would -- there is probably not a week go by that General Shali and I don't get intelligence warnings of a specific threat like this and maybe one out of ten of them will turn out to be correct. So, there is a lot of noise in the system.

WARNER: Let me refer you -- I'm sure you've seen this New York Times piece of July 7. It seems to me a very thorough piece on the subject. Now, they -- in this particular sentence, I'll read -- were referring to the failure by the Saudi government to allow our FBI to interview the perpetrators of the Riyadh bombing. But this statement is made: "We are running with a base of knowledge that is virtually zero", said one senior American intelligence official. "We didn't know anything about these people." Now, I think the antecedent is, of course, these four.

So, it seems to me there is a good deal of documentation around here that -- and I believe your statement, indicates that we've got to probe very seriously as to our own decision about the intelligence.

PERRY: I think we need very much more effort on HUMINT and that has to be in cooperation...

WARNER: Well, we've all known that...

PERRY: That has to be in cooperation with the Saudi government.

WARNER: I understand that and that's a subsidiary question, if not a primary one in this entire investigation by the committee. We've got to determine the level of cooperation with the Saudi government.

But Mr. Secretary, in your opening remarks you stated there is no issue that I feel more deeply about, or task that I work harder than the safety and the welfare of our military personnel. Yet, we're learning today of a failure to bring forward up through the chain of command, what now appears to everyone, a very serious break down between the -- the discussions between our military and perhaps the U.S. embassy in Saudi and the Saudi government about the need to improve security.

Did you implement as a part of your concern about overseas security, instructions to your subordinates to bring these questions up to you personally?

PERRY: We always promote exercising the chain of command vigorously in both directions and that certainly includes calling for help when you need help and the judgment call here was whether they thought they needed help. In retrospect, it seems clear they did and it's quite clear that General Peay and General Shali and I would have been prepared to help had we gotten this request.

WARNER: My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

THURMOND: Senator Levin.



LEVIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just so that the record is clear, from what you just said then, Secretary Perry, this request to extend the perimeter never came to you personally?

PERRY: That is correct.

LEVIN: But we have to say, just a tragic reminder here that the number one threat that Americans face here and abroad is terrorism and this is a major change in terms of threats to our security. But it's been clear that this is the major threat ever since the Cold War is over and clearer yet, that the war against terrorists have got to be fought on many fronts.

LEVIN: As has been pointed out this morning, they aim at targets randomly, they do not limit themselves to military targets. This one happened to be, but they aim at civilians just as often as they aim at military or government targets, and we've seen that here in this country with the World Trade Center.

I think your focus, all of your focus is this morning on what you're doing about terrorism and the importance of changing the direction of the expenditure of our resources to fight the war against terrorism instead of some of the older battles that have been fought, and in many cases won, is very important testimony, and I'm very glad to hear it.

I want to also explore this question of the discussions, to the extent that you know them, on site about that perimeter, because I think that obviously is the key question here.

Major General Anderson on a television program said the following, and as I understand, he would be the commander general of Southern Watch, is that correct?

PEAY: That's correct, sir.

LEVIN: And so he would be the commander of general -- is it Schwalier, am I pronouncing his name correctly? And this is what General Anderson said, that at two different times at a working level requests were made of Saudi security personnel to move the particular barrier out farther away, and the response was, no. And then he went on to say, it wasn't a we don't care, therefore no, it was we care, we need to work with you on force protection issues.

Now, have any of you discussed this matter with General Anderson?

PEAY: I have not directly -- well, I'm not sure. I may have over the last two weeks, with the hundreds and hundreds of phone calls that we've had on this issue. Again, I would caution that we not be so sure we're going to get this exactly correct.

I think what we've got here, sir, is at the General Schwalier level I've tried to think through what was going on in his mind at

this time. I think you've got a commander there that has got a lot of installations working for him. He's pursuing a threat. He's conducting air operations into Iraq. He's working bringing the carrier battle group in to integrate the ATON. And he's dealing with local officials.

PEAY: He's got some very qualified people that are working for him, and they are working daily in the province. They are working with the ambassadorial team, the charge, those people to try to "consult" is the word that's used very much in the region, to effect change. I think you had that ongoing at a time that you had a significant change in the threat and the terrorists got into us.

So I don't think it's a case was the fence in too close? I think most people would clearly say yes, it was. I mean, I think it's a common sense reaction that you want to get greater distance from you in terms of protection.

Was that problem being worked very vigorously by young people up and down the chain of command? I think it probably was, in very tough, harsh conditions.

Do you think that that should always result in passing something up the chain of command? I don't know, in the number of things that he's working. And I find it difficult today to try to second-guess a forward-deployed commander, because that's what happens, you know, we could be working the fence, and we'd have had them go through the gate like in Beirut. And I'll tell you, we would have had hundreds and hundreds of casualties.

So I'm a little reluctant to get into a priority of work effort that a youngster that's forward is enduring. Should defense have been further? Yes. Were they working it? I think they probably were. Should they have kicked it upstairs? I don't know. I just don't know.

LEVIN: What is clear is that they did not kick it upstairs. That's what we've heard from each of the three of you this morning. Now, on a previous terrorist attack in Riyadh, we had a request of the Saudis to interrogate the terrorists prior to their execution.

And as I understand it, that request had been denied. Can you tell us about that, as to whether or not that's true? We had -- what is it? -- last November, at the OPM/SANG November of 1995, persons were arrested, they were convicted by whatever process they use in Saudi Arabia, and were executed.

But before the execution, as I read the media here, there was a request for us to discuss this with those terrorists. Can you -- did we make that request? Was it denied by the Saudis? And if so, why was it denied and how far up the chain did that request go to the Saudis?

PEAY: I could ask maybe Secretary Perry...

PERRY: Yes. I'm only a third-hand source of information on that, Senator Levin.

LEVIN: Let me interrupt you, then. Do we have a second or first-hand source of information here?

PEAY: I think, sir, that probably was handled in DCI and FBI chains.

LEVIN: All right.

PEAY: It did not come to the military.

LEVIN: So your information is as good as we're going to have this morning?

PEAY: All right.

LEVIN: Thank you. Secretary Perry?

PERRY: I have discussed -- I've raised this question to Director Freeh. This was not an action that were directly involved in.

PERRY: I was specifically raising it to him relative to my visit over to Saudi Arabia, my plan to meet with the leadership because I wanted to make clear that we require -- we absolutely had to have full cooperation on this investigation.

And so I wanted to get the background on what had happened there so that I could be clear that we did not have that problem this time.

I did meet with King Fahd, as I indicated. He directed, in my presence, he directed the minister of interior to provide full cooperation, to do this as a joint project with the FBI.

Subsequently, Director Freeh has met with the minister of interior in Saudi Arabia and was promised that full cooperation.

We must have full cooperation this time. We cannot accept the problems we had the last time.

Again, I'm not the witness to describe to you how that situation went the last time but I can tell you how important it is that we have full cooperation this time.

LEVIN: My time is up. Thank you.

THURMOND: Senator McCain.

MCCAIN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, we all recognize the deaths of 19 Americans is a tragic example of the risks that are willingly assumed every day by

the men and women in our armed forces, and I believe that all Americans should understand that the U.S. military personnel serving in Saudi Arabia are there to protect our vital national interests.

At the same time, prior to the tragedy of June 25th, measures to protect our forces from terrorist attacks were clearly inadequate and testimony that I've heard so far indicates that.

The president of the United States waged war against terrorism by means of a summit meeting in a resort town in Egypt where there were 240 minutes of opening statements, 40 minutes of discussion, and a photo opportunity.

The summit produced a lot of symbolism but little in the way of concrete recommendations to combat terrorism. Syria, identified by the State Department as one of the world's leading sponsors of terrorism, did not attend the meeting. The aiding and abetting -- the participants couldn't even agree to specifically condemn Iran for aiding and abetting terrorist groups.

The only result of the summit was a lofty joint statement by President Clinton and Egyptian President Mubarak condemning terrorism and promising future cooperation -- future cooperation and consultation on ways to halt these attacks.

I quote from the president's statement, "We must actively counter the terrorists with all the means at our command, combining our efforts tangibly and joining our strength to defeat their evil aims."

Now, little more than three months after the summit in Egypt and after another -- after another couple of international get-togethers to talk tough on terrorism -- 19 more Americans have been killed by a terrorist bomb.

What happened to the goals proclaimed at the Egypt summit?

After the Riyadh bombing in November, it was clear that security at U.S. installations in Saudi Arabia had to be increased. And apparently General Peay did not visit the facilities, did not keep close track of security enhancements, and still doesn't seem to have a good grasp of the situation under his command.

MCCAIN: I would have suggested, General Peay, for example, you call up the general and ask him what he was thinking, rather than coming here and conjecturing as to what his thoughts were. And all due respect, Secretary Perry, you did not answer Senator Levin's question. Were we, or were we not allowed to interrogate those men that were beheaded, those terrorists who were arrested and beheaded in Riyadh? Do you know the answer to that, Secretary Perry?

PERRY: I know that Director Freeh told me we were not.

MCCAIN: We were not. And so, how does that jibe with the cooperation that was pledged at the multi-million dollar cost to the

taxpayer summit in Egypt?

PERRY: Senator McCain, as I testified to Senator Levin, that does not jibe with it and is not acceptable. We must have full cooperation this time.

MCCAIN: Were we, you keep talking about full cooperation, Secretary Perry, were we ever fully informed of the results of the Riyadh investigation, did we press for it? I mean the, obviously, the Saudis interrogated these people. Did we ever press for or receive any information about what information the Saudis received if we were denied access to them?

PERRY: I believe the FBI did press for that, yes.

MCCAIN: But, Mr. Secretary, you're the one that's responsible for the security of these men and women. Wouldn't you want to have that information?

PERRY: I do want it, and I am going to insist on getting it in this investigation.

MCCAIN: Did you ask for it after at the time?

PERRY: I did not ask for it at the time.

MCCAIN: And yet, you stated in your statement here, you said, in November last -- You state that you said at that point we made a prudent judgment that this attack might not be an isolated event, but a new trend in a high terrorist threat level to Saudi Arabia. You made that judgment that it will be a high terrorist threat level to Saudi Arabia and yet you didn't ask for the information that was obtained from the previous terrorists that were arrested, tried and executed?

PERRY: We are asking for it. And as I testified, we expect full cooperation from the Saudis in this investigation.

MCCAIN: But you did not ask for it according to your testimony at the time?

PERRY: That is correct.

MCCAIN: I think that answer speaks for itself. Does it, is it, should it be of interest to the American people that the funding for anti-terrorism according to a Defense Department report, deep cuts in the, I quote, "Deep cuts in the Defense Department's own anti-terrorism funding, an 82 percent drop at the Air Force since 1994 and a 57 percent dip at the Army since 1989."? Is that the way we try to combat terrorism and make a high priority by cutting that much funding for, on our anti-terrorism efforts?

PERRY: No, I think that was a bad cut. I have directed the services to increase the funding in anti-terrorism.

MCCAIN: When did you direct the services to increase the funding, Secretary Perry?

PERRY: Let me, let General Shali describe to you the specific anti-terrorism study we made and that was one of the findings that came out of that study.

SHALIKASHVILI: The anti-terrorism study identified two issues pertaining to funding of anti-terrorism things. One, that the services increased their funding and secondly, that recommendation to secretary of defense that we create a program line under the secretary of defense with which he can fund high priority anti-terrorism programs that need to be funded.

Those recommendations went to him within the last month, month and a half, and he approved it within the last month.

MCCAIN: One of the recommendations was to put Mylar on the windows of the barracks. Reports are that it cost \$4.5 million and that money was not available and so the decision to put Mylar on the windows to prevent glass shattering was put off until October 1. Is that true, General Peay, do you know?

PERRY: I think Mylar was one of a number of initiatives that the commander was working on the ground. He put that in his plan, I guess you would call that for funding. His other monies that -- at other kinds of upgrades.

MCCAIN: So, the answer is that, yes it was delayed until the first of October? Until the...

PERRY: We have already ordered, I think, \$100,000 in the past month. That Mylar will be placed on the windows as the windows are reconstituted and put back in the barracks now over the next several years.

MCCAIN: Over the next several years.

PEAY: Well, we may not be in that facility in the next several years. One of the thoughts here, was to try to get a quick movement out of that facility to another area that's better in terms of defense. So, the young people in the chain were looking at not putting money against that facility if you're going to move.

Like I said, we have place \$100,000 now in the external windows and those are being worked.

MCCAIN: But in the meantime, General, the young people that you referred were not adequately protected. My time is up, Mr. Chairman.

THURMOND: Senator Lieberman.

LIEBERMAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, as I listened



to the testimony here today, it seems to me that in response to the attack in Riyadh last November that a number of steps were taken which were aimed at increasing the level of security. And, in fact, as one of the witnesses testified this morning, those steps undoubtedly had some effect on diminishing the number of casualties from the terrorist attack at Dhahran.

LIEBERMAN: But the obvious fact is that they didn't do enough because 19 Americans are dead. And I think it's in that spirit that we're going forward here with this inquiry.

Sometimes these questions are going to be tough, but we all have an interest, we have a shared interest -- I'm sure the witnesses agree with this -- to make sure that we do everything humanly possible, understanding that hindsight is clearer than foresight; and understanding that terrorists, as has been said, will always search for the vulnerable target and then hit it.

But we can't ever come to another hearing months or years from now and look back and say, we didn't do enough, particularly when we're dealing with a large, but nonetheless, finite number of military installations. It's one thing to say that we can't protect every civilian target of a terrorist, but I think we've got to create a record here where we learn from this tragedy and never face a situation like this.

I might say, parenthetically -- and I appreciate the spirit of the questions here today -- that, in addition to the tragic loss of life, it seems to me that the last thing we want to give the terrorists here is a sense that their act has either dissuaded the United States from its pursuit of the vital national interests we have in the gulf region; that the terrorists' bomb will separate us from our allies in Saudi Arabia, even though we may want to join with them in some mutual self-analysis and self-criticism; or that we become divided in this country one against the other.

But, I must say, some of the things that I've heard today, as much as I know how much of an effort was made after Riyadh to avoid a similar situation, do trouble me. For instance, I don't know how we can say that there was not an intelligence failure here, Mr.

Secretary. General Peay, you used the word that the intelligence forces performed "competently;" perhaps competently, but certainly not adequately, or else this would not have happened.

I want to go to something else; and that is, General Peay, your comment about whether that officer on the ground who had the conversation with his Saudi counterpart about extending the perimeter to the 400 feet should have kicked it upstairs.

It seems to me, and your question, your statement you're not really sure, I think we've got to create a record here that sends an unmistakable message, in spite of all that's going on in a theater like this, that security, force protection is so important that, once we have designated the security level, the threat level as high, that

any question as fundamental as this one of extending the perimeter has to be kicked up almost immediately.

LIEBERMAN: It's as if there was a bomb ticking here. And we could have done something. And we had one bright officer on the ground who understood that we could have done something to limit, perhaps eliminate any casualties here, and it wasn't done. And I want to ask you if you would reconsider that question about whether, in fact -- reconsider your statement about whether, in fact, that officer should have kicked this upstairs, this decision.

PEAY: Sir, that's a great question. You are into the guts of what we call the art of command. I think we have to have latitude in judgment at every level -- platoon leader, company commander, battalion commander -- all the way up the chain of command. I don't think we can necessarily legislate what should be kicked up.

Now, having said that, you have to have an openness and a style of command that does encourage those kinds of things to come up. I think we have that style of command among the subordinate commanders and central command.

And I'd like to point out to the committee the kinds of people that we're talking about here now. The Army component commander, Steve Arnold, who is the G-3 during the Gulf War for our country, basically for General Yeosock and General Schwarzkopf. Also went to Somalia with the 10th Mountain Division; is now back. Lieutenant General John Jumper, just picked to be the deputy chief of staff of operations for the Air Force out of his job as the Air Force component commander. And you certainly understand the importance of that job to the Air Force.

LIEBERMAN: General, if you excuse me, I regret doing this, but I know my time is limited...

PEAY: Well, I guess I'm trying to assert...

LIEBERMAN: ... let me ask you...

PEAY: ... to point out to you that this is a very competent chain of command that encourages openness. I don't think that if I legislated kick-up, an argument at the province level, I think I could come up with another 50. I think we have to teach our youngsters to make those value judgments. And I understand the thrust of your question, but I'm not so sure I'm on your side on this one, sir.

LIEBERMAN: OK. Well, I regret that. And I say, respectfully, I think that's exactly the wrong message to send.

Again, I understand the hindsight is clearer than foresight. But we've got a -- Let me put it to you this way. Secretary Perry, General Shalikashvili, General Peay, you've come before us, and over and over again said to us that you want us to authorize a level of support for our troops that makes sure that, first, we can deter a

conflict, second if we face conflict, that we will not only win it, but we will win it with minimal, hopefully zero, casualties to American forces. And you, Mr. Secretary, have been very insistent on that.

I think part of what we're seeing here -- as you look at it -- is that we've protected ourselves so well, and we've performed so well in battle, that there's a danger here that enemies of ours will strike at our vulnerability.

LIEBERMAN: And one of the vulnerabilities here is to terrorism. And I think now we've got to bring that same heightened, urgent, comprehensive desire to protect our forces not only to the battlefield, but sadly when they're just in installations or in apartments, as they were at Khobar.

And that the message should be that this is such a priority that no colonel on the ground, faced with the slowness of the Saudi response, will just take that. They'll go right to the top and say lives are on the line here. This has the same consequences as if we sent some people into battle without adequate support, without adequate weaponry.

Mr. Secretary, do you want to respond to that?

PERRY: Dealing with terrorism is a difficult and fundamentally different problem than trying to deal with military conflicts and it does challenge the traditional approaches to chains of command. I do believe we still have to use our chains of command to deal with it. And do believe we still have to allow for judgment down the chain of command.

I of course wish that this issue had been brought up to me, and I know what my answer would have been had it been brought up to me. But General Peay's point, I think was quite right. If you set up a system that forces that to be brought up, how many other hundreds or thousands of issues are going to be brought up and how that might clog the chain of command. I think that was the basic point he was making, and I understand that point.

LIEBERMAN: Well, my time is up. Respectfully, I don't understand it, because -- and I understand the difficulty that thousands of items that may be raised, but this as we see here, is life and death.

I don't even want to criticize that particular officer. I'm saying, let's learn from it and create a climate where the next time somebody has so fundamental a security concern that they don't think twice or they don't get an adequate response from the host country, of bringing it right to the top.

My time is up. I thank the Chair.

THURMOND: Senator Smith?

SMITH: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary and General Shali and General Peay, this is -- these kinds of tragedies are always very difficult for all of us and unfortunately even though we do sometimes the best we can, tragedies do occur. It is a risk that all of our military personnel take and one of the airmen who lost his life was Peter Morgera of Stratham, New Hampshire.

SMITH: And I'm trying to be fair about it, and to give the benefit of the doubt, but this is very difficult.

I want to focus back, General Peay, for a moment, on this issue that's been raised several times by other members on the discussions -- you used the term "discussions," quote/unquote -- with an officer regarding the extension of the perimeter.

Was there a formal request originated anywhere to extend the perimeter of that compound?

PEAY: My understanding is, in verbal conversation, that there was not...

SMITH: Verbal conversation -- I'm asking about a -- was there a formal request?

PEAY: There was not a formal request. But I also have heard that there was a memorandum for the record that the officer involved made of that particular request.

But I would again, sir, tell you that these conversations were in a period of grief and mourning. There's a lot of misinformation out there, in my judgment, as I have looked over these last past two weeks. And so I...

SMITH: All right, but...

PEAY: ... caveat it, sir,...

SMITH: I realize you're still in investigation, but let me ask the question again and, if you can, give me a "Yes" or "No" answer. To your knowledge, was there ever a formal request by anybody in the command at any level to extend the perimeter of that fence? To extend the perimeter of that compound?

PEAY: Not to my knowledge.

Not a formal written request? Not to my knowledge.

SMITH: Now, in the discussion that took place with an officer and a Saudi official, do any of the three of you know whether or not there was any representative outside of the military of the U.S. government present at that conversation? Any member of the Defense

Department, State Department? Any non-military official present at that conversation?

PEAY: Sir, I don't know.

SMITH: Do you know, General Shali?

SHALIKASHVILI: I don't know.

SMITH: Mr. Secretary?

PERRY: No.

SMITH: What was the circumstance of that conversation? Where was it?

PEAY: Sir, I don't know. I think the context was that these people were working together over a number of days, maybe even months, on a series of force protection upgrades. This was one of those that were discussed.

It's my feel that a number of these particular areas were agreed to, and they were working through this particular challenge. And again it goes back to my point about defense is never finished.

SMITH: Well...

PEAY: They were working through the problem.

SMITH: Well, the press, if the press reports are accurate, the Saudis -- quote/unquote -- "said 'No' to extension of the perimeter."

Is that correct?

PEAY: Sir, I can't go on the press reports.

SMITH: Well, I'm asking you. Is that correct or not?

PEAY: I don't know.

SMITH: Mr. Secretary, is it correct that the Saudis formally denied the extension of the perimeter?

PERRY: Senator Smith, I'm going to get the answer to that question. The report that I have to this stage, which may turn out to change as we get more formal testimony on it -- but the report that I have to date is that it was requested of some Saudi official, and the answer was not "No," but the answer was, "Not now. Not yet."

PERRY: That was my understanding of how the discussion went.

SMITH: Well, who made the request of the Saudi official?

PERRY: Again, my understanding of it, it was a colonel in O-6,

in the command.

SMITH: On his own, without direction from superiors?

PERRY: Yes.

SMITH: The issue -- following up just briefly on Senator McCain's comment about the 82 percent drop at the Air Force, in this study, regarding anti-terrorism funding. That report also does indicate that a lot of that funding reduction came as a result of the closure of bases, to be fair, not just to cut on active bases.

But it does say that some of the cuts are due to -- it says that the cuts are due to base closings, where security is no longer needed. But the report still argues that future funding levels will be inadequate to cover the security of sensitive areas.

Were any reprogramming requests made of the Congress to reprogram dollars back into the facilities around the world, specifically the Saudi Arabia facilities, or any other facilities in Bosnia or anyplace around the world?

SHALIKASHVILI: I'm not aware of any. Also, we have been under, for quite some time, putting quite a bit of money into security upgrades into our facilities, housing areas and so on.

Much of that work has already been done. And so when we started out with a zero base, there was a need for a different amount, a much larger amount than there is on a day-to-day basis today.

So part of that is because some -- part of the reduction is because some bases have been closed, part of it because some of the -- much of the work has already been done. But there's clearly more work to be done.

And the anti-terrorist task force has found that we had reduced that funding too much, so services have to reprogram more money into it. And we have to create an OSD-controlled fund site for it as well.

SMITH: But the fact is that funding for the security of military installations comes under the operation and maintenance accounts for the most part. And those accounts, since 1993, have been cut.

They've been cut 8.6 percent since 1993. The president's request this year has a seven percent cut in operation and maintenance account.

And we've had testimony -- I believe it was General Krulak who testified that he at times didn't have appropriate materials, tents perhaps, leaky tents in Bosnia, sleeping bags that were inadequate, and so forth, clothing. I mean, these are all falling under this quality-of-life area.

And I think, you know, you cannot come up here and say that you're doing everything possible to ensure adequate security with



those kinds of reductions, unless the O&M accounts are being cut and you're putting money somewhere -- you're taking the cuts elsewhere other than in security.

SMITH: But that's not what this report says.

Let me just ask one more question, perhaps, I guess, Secretary Perry, I'd be you. Why are we continuing to use American pilots to enforce the no-fly zone? Can't the Saudi pilots begin to take up more and more of this?

PERRY: We have American pilots, British pilots and French pilots all involved in the no-fly zone. I believe that we need, for the deterrence of Iraq, I believe we need the presence of U.S. forces in the area and, in particular, the presence of air forces in the area. And the access to the Saudi bases that we have not only provides that no-fly zone, it provides the deterrence and it provides the base on which we would build if we got in a war.

I think it is a very good decision to have American...

SMITH: What percentage of those flights do American pilots fly, do you know?

PERRY: Let me ask General Peay on that.

PEAY: Let me give you an approximate answer. In closed-session I'll give it to you in exact.

But it's not uncommon to put up a 100 flights a day, and night, into Iraq. Sixty-five percent of that, 70 percent of those are combat kinds of flights. The others are support.

SMITH: And what percentage are American pilots, or do you want to do that in executive session?

PEAY: Almost all are American. There are a few, as the Secretary said, British and French.

SMITH: Thank you.

THURMOND: Senator Bryan?

BRYAN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

One of the other security failures that has been alleged -- and this question is to you, General Peay -- is that there are other facilities, in fact, the word was used, "ample facilities" to billet the officers and enlisted personnel who were in the structure that was so badly damaged, and that we all realize, painfully, so vulnerable because of its proximity to the perimeter.

That there were other facilities that could have been used that would have provided a greater measure of protection for those

personnel, and that the military was reluctant to make that relocation because it would be considered disruptive. May I get your comment and response as to the accuracy of the criticism? And if it is accurate, why were not changes made?

PEAY: I have not heard that. I know in the midst of this incident that we did move a number of the outside occupants to other buildings internal. But, I've not heard the criticism that you've mentioned.

BRYAN: Well, aside from the criticism, you have indicated that it was at your request that the threat level was elevated to "high." That was your testimony earlier. It's my understanding it, there is only one level higher than "high," and that's "critical."

BRYAN: So, to put this in some context, from your perspective, you saw this as a very, very dangerous area because of what had occurred in November, and the intelligence data that was coming to you and other commanders.

My question, aside from the criticism, is, if there were other places that these personnel could have been billeted at Khobar on the interior, why wasn't that done?

PEAY: Again, I don't know if there were empty rooms. Certainly, we could have doubled up people internal. That's a commander judgment on the ground.

BRYAN: So, at this point, you're not able to share with the committee as to whether there were other facilities at Khobar where these personnel could have been placed so that they would not have been as close to the perimeter?

PEAY: I don't think there were any housing. Now, could we have put people in dining facilities and other recreational areas that were more internally located? I suspect that could have been an action.

But I think this all goes back to the bigger question of how you looked at the threat. I don't think that the threat was perceived -- even though high, the magnitude of the threat that would cause the destruction that was caused, I don't think was in the mindset of all of us up and down the chain of command.

BRYAN: Well, General, let me just say, in all due respect, I find that somewhat shocking. I don't have the kind of background that you have in security matters. But we have seen all over the world, whether it's the World Trade Center or what occurred in parts of the world that we've seen terrorist activities -- that just seems to me that it's not a greatly sophisticated exercise of judgment that the larger the vehicle, the more of these explosives that can be placed in those vehicles; and that the larger the volume of explosives, the greater damage that can be done.

So, I mean, I must say that it seems to me it's a fairly

elementary thing if you have a sizable vehicle, which is actually what occurred, that, indeed, this particular structure is highly vulnerable. I don't think it's any great surprise to even those of us who are laymen that if you get that kind of explosive combination there, that you can do the kind of damage that we saw, tragically, at Khobar.

Is that something that's new to military commanders? Is that a fair assessment?

PEAY: That's a great question, and I think that is really the issue of what has changed. What has changed to our country, and to all of the countries in the gulf, is that we now have a changed threat. The introduction of large explosives of the kind that you're now talking about, this was something that was not expected by all of the governments in the gulf. This is an introduction of a new threat in the gulf now that we're going to have to look forward to.

BRYAN: Well, I understand that. But I must say that it doesn't seem to me there was a great leap of logic to understand, after the episode in November, where these explosives can be concentrated, that it's not a question of a technology leap or breakthrough.

BRYAN: It's just a question if you can assemble a certain volume of explosives, you can create tremendous damage. But let me pursue another line of questioning.

Mr. Secretary, is it possible to accomplish this mission -- and I'm one who supported Operation Desert Shield, Desert Storm -- believe that decision was correct, believe that we have a vital national security interest in the region. But the question I have is, with all of the risks that we're now painfully aware of, is it possible to accomplish our mission by other than having American military personnel based in Saudi Arabia?

PERRY: I believe we would seriously compromise our mission if we had to remove our physical presence and military presence in Saudi Arabia.

BRYAN: Since the Khobar tragedy, have we made any other requests in the nature of additional security protection to the Saudi government that has been denied?

PERRY: No, we have not, Senator Bryan. And I have put them on notice that we may have very major requests coming up. We have yet to -- I've asked General Peay to recommend to me what would be involved in moving our military forces out of Riyadh.

I believe we can provide much better protection at the Khobar Towers. But Riyadh is an urban environment, and I do not know how we are going to provide protection against bombs this size in Riyadh. And therefore, I think the only solution to that problem is that we have to move out of Riyadh. I have alerted the king, crown prince and minister of defense that such a request may be imminent in a matter of

weeks.

BRYAN: General Peay, if I might ask you, because of the difficulties we've seen in what's reported up through the command structure, are you aware of any security requests that have been made at the O-6 level, lower or higher, to provide additional security protections in which the Saudis have either declined or said look, we're not yet prepared to do that or we've got to give some thought to it?

PEAY: No, sir, I'm not.

BRYAN: With respect to the chain of command, let me be clear on this. The news reports -- and indeed they may not be accurate -- indicate that General Schwalier was aware of these requests that had been made to the Saudi officials to extend the perimeter protection. Is that your understanding, General?

We constantly hear about these O-6s -- and we all understand that those are bird colonels -- but General Schwalier is an O-7 as a brigadier. Did he have first-hand knowledge? Did he make the request? What, if anything, can you tell us about that?

PEAY: I'm rather satisfied that in General Schwalier's news meetings that he would have weekly on force protection within his command, where you have senior people -- they're just not an O-6; these are senior colonels of great responsibility in our Army and Air Force -- I think that those discussions perhaps went on with regularity in the force protection meetings.

PEAY: But I think many things were being done at a time when the threat, when the threat was not quite as clear.

BRYAN: Well, we understand that, but the answer, then, is, to your knowledge then, General Schwalier would have had knowledge of this request?

PEAY: I think he probably would have. Yes, sir.

BRYAN: And I think Senator Levin has told us that, at least, Major General Anderson, who would be the next higher person in the chain of command, did he have knowledge of the request?

PEAY: I don't know. General Anderson has been in the job about five weeks. He's a new commander on the ground, is an outstanding officer. I don't know the specifics of living the year-long or so that the previous commander would have had.

BRYAN: So, I guess the last question I would have, other than the O6 or O6s that may have made the requests to General Schwalier, who you've indicated because of his briefings would probably have been aware, do we know how much further up the chain of command this information namely the request to extend the security perimeter, was made?

PEAY: No, we do not. Again, my judgment is, sir, that it was kept there. I think that he felt, they felt, that they were working through a series of force protection upgrades and that they were working hard at the problem at hand and perhaps did not need higher help at this time in the context of my comments about the Saudi culture.

BRYAN: I think we all recognize that that was a tragic mistake now. My time is up.

THURMOND: Senator Frahm, I want to take this opportunity to welcome you to your first public hearing, I believe, on this committee. You've come to us highly recommended as a very able person and a valuable member of this committee. And we'll now be glad to ask you to propound questions.

FRAHM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I certainly appreciate you calling this hearing to focus on the recent attack against the U.S. military housing complex. This incident has especially importance to me and to the citizens of my state with Senior Airman Jeremy Taylor of Douglas, Kansas, being one of the victims.

Any military operation involves a great deal of risk and danger, certainly. Those who serve in the military know and accept that fact. However, we owe it to the men and women who proudly wear our nation's uniform to make every possible step to ensure the safety of our troops deployed overseas.

A number of questions have been asked, Mr. Chairman, that were of concern to me, certainly about the visit to the base, to the housing unit, the briefings that were received, the information that was ascertained and apparently will be available from the November 13th bombing when five Americans were killed, and extensive questions about the perimeter.

Two additional questions I would like to ask and, Mr. Secretary, is there any evidence of Syrian or other foreign involvement in the most recent bombings?

PERRY: Senator Frahm, the investigation is still on going. I believe they have not reached a conclusion on that yet. It couldn't -- it's possible in the closed hearing to discuss what the evidence one way or the other on that subject is now.

FRAHM: OK. I'll raise it again later. Thank you.

And second, in the big picture for the future, do you anticipate that General Downing's review is going to examine intelligence capacities in assessing threats to our armed forces? Can we expect some review of intelligence gathering and sharing, to be better able to take better action to protect our deployed forces?

PERRY: Part of General Downing's review will be to look at the threat assessment mechanism. That's correct.

FRAHM: And so we could anticipate some...

PERRY: Yes.

FRAHM: ... additional information?

PERRY: We can. We expect to give this committee a full report on all of General Downing's findings.

FRAHM: OK.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THURMOND: Senator Exon?

EXON: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Welcome to you gentlemen, and let me start out by saying that these are very difficult hearings.

And from what I know of this, I simply want to start out by saying I have every confidence in you, Mr. Secretary. I think it's outrageous some of the suggestions that have been made with regard to your position.

General John, I think, as you know, there's been no one connected with the military in whom I have more respect for than yourself.

And General Peay, I know this is a very trying time for you, also.

So this is not an inquisition that we're conducting here. I hope you all know and understand that there are some legitimate questions that we have, not so much finger-pointing but to look to the future to see what we can do to avert this.

It's been said that, you know, it's so obvious that our forces are in harm's way today more from the result of terrorist action than I think they are from potential enemy action. But that's a very, very real threat, and we keep dealing with it over and over and over again. And that is why there are some concerns that we have here. And we have an obligation to try to get to the bottom of it with your help, so please accept the questions that I will ask in that frame of mind.

Let me say that we all have a very heavy heart with what just happened there. It was brought home to me very vividly last Friday when I attended the military funeral of Air Force Staff Sergeant Ronald King, in Omaha, Nebraska. He was the only airman that was involved from our Offutt Base who was killed, and there was a wife and an 11-year-old girl and a nine-year-old son grieving.



And this has not been my first military funeral, nor my last, including many that were of a very hurried nature in the South Pacific in World War II. But these things keep coming back to haunt us.

EXON: I guess that we should recognize and realize that this is a chance to not only remember but salute the men and women of our armed forces who are in harm's way, even though we're not today involved in open hostilities.

I have -- let me make it clear, there have been many statements today with regard to, you know, whose fault this is and what are we going to do about it. There's a lot of second-guessing going on in the United States Senate today.

But I would simply point that the United States Senate had better do some second-guessing on its own. You know, a couple of weeks ago, on the floor of the United States Senate, the majority of the United States senators in what I thought was one of the dumbest votes that I have seen here in 18 years, voted to open up Pennsylvania Avenue. I suspect that that vote would not prevail today. It unfortunately did a couple of weeks ago.

So there are times even us vaunted senators make mistakes. I think that even some of those holding hearings today, chairing hearings today on this, who supported opening up Pennsylvania Avenue would have second thoughts today when they begin to understand the realities of the dangerous situation that we have.

I simply also say, though, you, Mr. Secretary, and others, I think it's well for you to emphasize that we have a mission to carry out there. We certainly do. You said something to the effect that we should not allow ourselves to be driven out by terrorists. I think all of us agree with that, Mr. Secretary.

There have been several statements with regard to your meeting with the king, and he pledges his whole-hearted cooperation. You know, the problem, I suspect, is not basically with regard to what the king wants or what you, as the secretary of defense wants, or what even the president of the United States wants. It's the command up and down the line. What priorities are given. What priorities are set. It's easy to second guess.

But I do want to ask some questions, and I would also say that the statement over and over again that there is no absolute security for our armed forces is a given. And we don't have to say that over and over again.

I want to concentrate, if I might, on some of the reports I have read, and I would like to confirm, if I might, the role that General Schwalier and Colonel Boyle have in this proposition. Is General Schwalier the officer immediately in charge of the command that was affected? And what was the role of Colonel Boyle?

As I understand it, he was an expert supposedly over to advise

the local command as to the realities and dangers of the situation. Do I accurately describe those two gentlemen and their responsibilities?

PERRY: All right. General Schwalier was the Wing Commander. Let me ask General Peay to give a more precise answer.

PEAY: I think the way that you've described it is a good characterization of the two officers, sir.

EXON: Thank you. Now, let's follow up on that just a little bit more.

In the answer to a question by Senator Bryan, General Peay, you indicated that there may have been places that we could have placed our troops that would not have made them as easily killed by moving them into dining facilities. Is it not true that there were lots of barracks rooms that were not nearly as exposed or nearly as dangerous for our airmen that were killed, dismembered and wounded by being at a source that was very easy to get to from the standpoint of planting a vehicle with heavily loaded weapons?

And I know hindsight's already better than foresight. But I have been led to believe -- and correct me if I have been misled -- that there were ample quarters on the inside, or the other side of the road where the troops would have been much safer. And if we were worried about security there, why didn't we move them?

PERRY: I don't know the answer to the availability of lots of rooms. I think we'll have to let the investigation determine that.

Again, I -- respectfully, I admired your words, Senator, that I'm little hesitant today to second-guess the forward commander in terms of the priorities that he was dealing with at that particular time.

EXON: Have you, Mr. Secretary, or have you, General Shalikashvili, or have you, General Peay, had any direct relationships or conversations about any of this with either General Schwalier or Colonel Boyle?

I'm sure you've read reports from them. Have you, Mr. Secretary, had any direct relationship or conversation with either one of these individuals?

PERRY: Senator Exon, four days after the bombing, I went to Dhahran. At that time, I was briefed by General Schwalier, who described to me what had happened, what they'd done to prepare for it, how they had responded to the attack.

So I have discussed with him, subsequent to the bombing, I've discussed with him some of these issues.

EXON: General?

SHALIKASHVILI: I never met General Boyle, to the best of my knowledge.

I did meet with General Schwalier about a month before the incident occurred when I visited Dhahran Air Base. While there, he accompanied me and hosted me.

SHALIKASHVILI: And while we were going from one facility to the other, we did talk about force protection. And in those occasions, he briefed me on what they were doing as far as force protection on the base was concerned, and as far as force protection and the living facilities were concerned.

The issue of moving the fence -- the barrier, or the issue of moving people, never came up. So I did not have a discussion with him about those two things in specific. He just briefed me in general terms what they were doing on force protection.

EXON: General Peay?

PEAY: Sort of the same answer, sir. I've had lots of discussions with he as well as his seniors on force protection. Their head was in the game on force protection. As regards this particular fence issue, that discussion never came up.

EXON: One last question, if you don't mind, Mr. Chairman.

During these conversations with General Schwalier, did you discuss in any detail at with him or his subordinate, Colonel Boyle, the reasons that they did not or were not able to move faster with regard to the concerns that must have been known to them with regard to the potential threat?

PERRY: We discussed that in general. I have to say, though, that at the time I talked with him, Senator Exon, it was just a few days after the bombing. And he was focused mostly then on trying to do the healing necessary in his wing to get the operation back up to full speed again, which he'd just done the day before, and to plan for the moves that he had to make for his forces in the wake of the tragedy.

He did end up moving all of the personnel to less exposed rooms. It was done by doubling and tripling up in rooms, but it was accomplished. And he had also succeeded by then in getting the perimeter of the fence extended.

So he was focused almost entirely, and my discussions with him were focused almost entirely, on where do we go from here?

THURMOND: Senator, your time is up.

SHALIKASHVILI: That subject in that way never came up.

EXON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THURMOND: Senator Hutchison?

HUTCHISON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, join my colleagues who had a constituent that was killed in Saudi Arabia. And I would like to honor Sergeant Millard D. Campbell from Angleton, Texas, who was about seven days from coming home from Saudi Arabia, but did not make it.

I know that it's hard to have Monday morning quarterbacks sitting here and talking to you about failures of judgment or failures in leadership. But I believe the only way we're going to determine what the problems were is to ask the questions and to determine what we can learn from mistakes that might have been made.

HUTCHISON: So I think the questions certainly should be taken in that spirit.

I'd like to ask, in addition to what I think has been covered by others in potential problems that we can learn from, the size of the bomb issue. It has been reported that our intelligence sources said that they did not think that terrorist groups in that part of the world were able to make bombs larger than approximately 200 pounds. Is that correct?

PERRY: That is not correct, Senator Hutchison. I have read that account in the media. It is simply not correct. That was always understood to be one possibility of what could happen. In the various...

HUTCHISON: Secretary Perry, could you just say in your knowledge, then, what was the approximate size of what we thought we were protecting against?

PERRY: Senator Hutchison, they were looking at a whole spectrum of threat possibilities of which not just bombs -- going after our transportation, going after our school buses, going after our work areas as well as our housing areas, going after our water supply, going after food supply. The spectrum of ways a terrorist could attack is very wide indeed.

HUTCHISON: But wouldn't the size of the possibilities determine how far a perimeter should be?

PERRY: I think what may have caused some of the confusion on the size is that in the analysis that had been done they presented a table of the effects of a bomb of 200-pound size. And therefore that probably caused people to focus on the 200-pound bomb.

Nobody believed that only a 200-pound bomb could be used, and everybody understood the possibility that a larger bomb could be used.

HUTCHISON: Do you feel that the intelligence that the armed services had for what was possible was sufficient to see what might

have been forthcoming here -- a 5,000-pound bomb?

PERRY: The intelligence was really all-inclusive. It included all of these possibilities, and it did not direct us or focus us to any one of them.

HUTCHISON: Do you think that our leadership then, if they did have the intelligence about that capability in addition to the other things you mentioned, was pushing hard enough for protections from what we thought the capabilities might have been?

PERRY: I think the protection is the responsibility of the commanders, not of the people who give them the intelligence assessment. And they take that responsibility.

They based their vulnerability assessment, as I said, on a wide variety of threats. But it is also clear that the specific actions they took relative to force protection would have been effective -- much more effective -- much more effective against a 200-pound than a 3,000-pound bomb.

HUTCHISON: Were there any significant pushes in security after the four suspects were executed in May from the November bombing? General Peay?

PEAY: I'm sorry. I didn't understand your question.

HUTCHISON: Were there any significant pushes for security after the May execution of the four suspects from the November bombing?

PEAY: Yes, ma'am. After the OPM/SANG bombing we instituted with vigor a number of force protection kinds of measures, and then in April...

HUTCHISON: I'm talking about the execution in May, not the bombing in November.

PEAY: We had a number going on at that time. I don't think there was one thing directly tied to those executions other than our threat level was "high." But the commanders were undertaking a number of force protection enhancements all through that period.

HUTCHISON: Let me just reiterate a concern that I think Senator Lieberman outlined very well, and that is that we have watched terrorist attacks. We obviously do not have a great deal of experience, but we do have some experience.

And you made the point that you had a chain of command where you put a lot of responsibility in your commanders, the colonel level, down and up. And I'm concerned that as leaders we are not overlapping the policy directions and the policy considerations which you say legislate. I don't call it legislation, I call it policy direction.

From what we have learned from terrorist acts of the past, that

we didn't immediately step in at a higher level and say, we know from November, after the bombing -- and there were steps taken, there were other steps put on the table that were in negotiation.

But I'd like to just ask you if you are rethinking your position about leaving this kind of responsibility at the O-6 level or O-7 without more direction from the top?

PEAY: I don't want to, in any way, leave my comments to indicate that we in Central Command, or that myself personally, is not fully involved in force protection, terrorists kinds of activities with our youngsters up and down the chain of command.

But I would suggest that this is very, very sophisticated with a number of ways to attack -- and we can talk more about that in closed session today. I simply don't believe that we can pick one, two or three things.

I think we have to educate in our school systems. We educate in our chain of command, we grow, we mentor. We do have policies that we put out. But at the end of the day, you've got to let that commander at the final cutting edge of the spear make the right call.

Now, we run open commands. This is not a closed kinds of site. It's a very healthy chain of command, and we do talk.

Let me just take this one fence issue, though. Here's what's in my mind all through this. He's working probably 50 initiatives. He's got this fence that he's working with the government. They've given him certain kinds of things. He's working another one over here, perhaps it's the relocation of his people.

And so, he says, I've got patrols out there. I'm working better with the Saudi officials. I've got observers on top the towers. I can cover that area against what he perceived was about a 200-pound, plus or minus, threat. So, he's working a number of issues and judgments.

It's easy for me. You know, as you go to the site, the first thing you say is, gee, we should have pushed the fence out. I mean, I think that's a common-sense approach. You'd think that.

I'm just suggesting today that we need to give the youngster his chance. He's got a lot of priorities. We should not second-guess him here from Washington today. This is very complex.

Finally ma'am, I think we must be very careful about how we look at the art of command. It's 35 -- in my years -- it's 35 years experience of how to command, up and down the chain. I think I've tried to master that by holding people responsible, by issuing directives. But at various times, I have to give them their head. There's no magic secret here.

Finally, I think terrorism is changing. We may have to -- as you



suggest -- designate a certain thing will be immediately reported up. Maybe it's a vial of anthrax that's thrown over the berm of a perimeter.

I'm not sure where all this is going. It's moving on us. I'm not locked in concrete. If requirements are there that we need to have more exact information, certainly, we'll do that.

I want you to know today though, I'm engaged in force protection. I'm engaged in it. I had my fire base run over as a captain in Vietnam. I understand force protection. I care about youngsters. Please don't let this committee go by today thinking that I'm not an engaged commander. I am engaged.

HUTCHISON: Well, thank you, General Peay. I appreciate your saying that because I think the chain of command argument is theoretical.

HUTCHINSON: But I think we are now getting experience, a very hard one, that we should act on.

And I will just end by saying that I have seen officials from previous administrations who have said that when you go to the highest level with Saudis, that they do accede to our requests. And I would just hope that going to the top and setting a policy is not something that you're not considering after this really bad experience.

Giving young officers their head is an admirable goal, but I think in light of what has happened perhaps there needs to be a reversal of leadership trends as well.

WARNER: General Peay, before I go to the next Senator, if I understood you, you said that the thing that has changed is we now know in the Middle East we can see a bomb of this magnitude.

Is that what you said earlier?

PEAY: I think, historically, now you've got, Senator Warner, a different circumstance. It was plus or minus 200 pounds at OPM/SANG, it's somewhere between 3,000 and 5,000 now.

WARNER: Well, I understand. But let's not forget Beirut, which was 18,000 -- that truck.

PEAY: There's some discussion on the explosive weight -- difference in pounds, versus blast.

WARNER: Thank you. Senator Glenn?

GLENN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think the -- I heard that we were going to have the Saudi Ambassador, Prince Bandar, before the committee, is that correct?

WARNER: My understanding is that the chairman will soon announce

that at the conclusion of the first round by all senators here, we reconvene in S-407, at which time the committee would have an opportunity to hear the testimony of the Ambassador from Saudi Arabia to the United States, Prince Bandar.

GLENN: I talked to him briefly. I know that several members of the committee have already talked to him. I think he has a little that he may be able to shed some light on this questioning of the prisoners, and also the requests for the perimeter moves, is my understanding. So, I'd suggest we do have that.

I'm not sure right after this meeting is the best time to do that, because we have our respective committee or party conferences coming up. But anyway, we might want to consider that at a different time.

Prevention of something like this is dependent on intelligence, to a large extent. That's the best way to prevent it -- to know the problems in advance.

And yet, all this 20/20 hindsight that we're exhibiting here this morning comes from a lot of people in the Congress, here -- and not just here, but not on this committee, but in the Congress and over in the House -- who voted at the same time to cut intelligence funds. I just think that's an interesting observation, going past this.

I don't know, Mr. Secretary, whether you feel we have enough money into intelligence now, or not, and particularly into HUMINT, that you mentioned. That's the most difficult kind to develop. It takes years and years and years. You can't turn it on and turn it off by budgets going up and down. And yet that's what we're dependent on. You can't use overhead photography of satellites to pick out what some of these terrorist groups.

GLENN: So, I'd just ask, do you think we're putting enough into Intel, number one?

PERRY: I think in the area of HUMINT, we should have a greater priority and greater resources. The other areas, I think we are well covered.

GLENN: I agree with that.

General Peay, what are the length of tours of people over there on this assignment?

PEAY: Sir, it varies. As you look back over the past five years, when we were not -- we had units rotating very frequently. We have changed now to where some of the key leadership has a year rotation. The units involved, though, will rotate out sometimes at 45 or 90 days.

GLENN: OK. Well that's -- I was glad to hear you're considering moving out of Riyadh, or at least that may be a request we make one of these days. I don't see any reason at all why we keep people concentrated in an urban area after this.

Now, I know 20/20 hindsight. I don't want to say that the...

PEAY: Sir, we were studying that before this particular bombing.

GLENN: Well, OK. You've sure got lots of land area over there. We've all been there and have seen the place. You've got lots of land area to play around in out there, or to have people based in, whether it's in inflatable structures or tents, or whatever.

And with short tours like this, unaccompanied tours, this is a great training experience for our people over there, out in the desert as well as -- they don't all have to be in air conditioned places in town. We had air conditioned places out in the desert out there for the hottest times with the inflatable structures and all during the Gulf War.

And I would think that something like that where you can even put up sand berms or you have a perimeter that goes out a mile in each direction, if you want to. I would think that's something we'd surely want to consider for the future over there particularly in that area. But without asking for a response on that, I hope you're considering that.

Mr. Secretary, in your statement on page 6 of your written statement, "some focused on preventing an attack similar to the November bombing. Other actions focused on preventing attacks of a completely different nature and may have prevented a different type of attack from taking place.

"My assessment is that our commanders were trying to do right, but given the inconclusive nature of intelligence had a difficult task to know what to plan for."

We could push the perimeter out another 500 yards or half a mile, and you're still going to be subject terrorists attacks. Chemical weapons could be manufactured by any well organized terrorist group. Chemical weapons, as I understand it, are -- we don't have a perfect inventory on those things.

And it seems to me that being out of the urban area, out of the concentrated area, is your best defense against things like chemical attacks, or BW attacks -- you mentioned anthrax a little while ago.

Having the perimeter back another 100 yards or so over there at the Towers, the Khobar Towers, would not have prevented a tragedy from a chemical weapon that was spread up wind on a calm evening, or something like that.

Are you addressing those kinds of attacks in your assessment

also, Mr. Secretary?

And do all our services have instructions to consider their force protection, consider it not just a bomb, that we know can blow up -- we know that from World Trade Center, Oklahoma City and Beirut and Riyadh, or Khobar, yet Riyadh -- but we also have to prepare for a CW, which may be even more easily brought into a compound or someplace than any high-explosive weapon? Would you comment on that and what we're doing in that area?

PERRY: In our consideration of attacks, we're looking at attacks with big bombs, little bombs, attacks on transportation and facilities, attacks on our food supply and water supply.

PERRY: Chemical attacks, mortar attacks -- all of these are ways to which we could be vulnerable.

What we're doing specifically, on nearly all of these, we've actually taken a number of very concrete actions. And that was what led me in my statement that some of the actions we have taken, we have not seen the attack follow, and it could be because the action we took served to make that kind of an attack infeasible.

GLENN: General Peay, would you comment on that?

PEAY: Sir, we're looking at a full range of those things. Again, as you look across the 20 countries and the amount of urbanization, I think what we feel at this time we need to see if we can't get our people into a place where we're just better protected, though, from some form of control or blast. But certainly the magnitude of what you're talking about makes this problem even more difficult.

We're trying to address some priorities, but we're also trying not to turn around here in three or four years and say that, OK, we moved there, but yet, here's a whole different threat that we had to address.

Are there other threats that you're assessing also, in addition to just our people there. For instance, we have a lot of Stinger missiles and things like that, that are unaccounted for.

And the Russian version of that. We've had thousands of those that are unaccounted for. They don't even keep them by serial number like we do. Those are all over the Mideast.

I've been surprised somebody hasn't shot down an airplane over there with Stinger missiles, when a troop transport or something comes in. Is that something we're also looking at?

PEAY: Sir, we're discussing it. I think what you are correctly pointing out is what I have tried to say today that in the Gulf, as

different from the Middle East, there is a changing threat that now our country has got to come to grips with.

GLENN: Well, I'll just say in closing then -- my time is up, I know, or if it isn't, it's almost -- I advocated keeping the same intelligence budget we had before, even increasing it, because I think our intelligence needs increased with the demise of the Soviet Union or the end of the Cold War. I think our needs increased instead of lessened.

And if we ever do go back to war again, I hope it's a general, all-out war. I hope it's with the best intelligence base and the best research base on which to build. Those two things that I think we tend to cut back on in peacetime, that's absolutely wrong, the wrong moves to make.

So, the best way to prevent these things is know about them in advance. And that's the toughest part of this thing. Thank you.

NUNN: Mr. Chairman, could I borrow one minute, just one minute here?

I think it's very important to that this whole matter of force protection be put in perspective.

NUNN: There is no doubt that force protection is an extremely important part of any mission. And there's no doubt that has to be one of the top priorities. And there's no doubt mistakes were made here and inevitably will be made again. Particularly with the threats that Senator Glenn has talked about, with chemical and biological, no perimeter is going to solve that problem.

But it's also important to understand that when we have people all over the world, they are out there protecting our vital national security interests and that force protection, as important as it is, is not the only mission.

And I hope we don't come out of this hearing with the mentality that the only thing that a commander does in the field protecting our national interest is to protect the force. Because if that's the whole mission, then we will have a bunker mentality and we will not be able to protect America's national interest, and the largest superpower in the world will find itself immobilized.

I also hope -- and I think all of the questions have been very appropriate this morning -- but I hope we don't come to a conclusion that zero casualties is possible in the military, or really, for that matter, in any kind of risky endeavor. It's just impossible.

That doesn't mean we don't do everything possible to get better prepared and protect our people as well as they can possibly be

protected, but if we adopt the attitude here in the committee and in the Congress, that our goal realistically is zero casualties in the military, we'd have to stop training.

We have hundreds of casualties -- I don't have the numbers now -- in all of our services in training and preparing for the worst possible contingencies so we lose less lives in the long run. Training accidents are going to happen. Casualties are going to happen in training. And we try to minimize those, but it's in the effort to train that we reduce overall casualties in conflict.

So I hope we don't come or give the impression that we are beginning to move this country towards a zero casualty expectation. That will make it impossible for any military commander to be able to perform their job. So I hope that that message is clear.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THURMOND: Thank you, Senator. Let's see. Senator Kempthorne?

KEMPTHORNE: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And may I say to the three gentlemen that I know that this has to be a difficult hearing for you, because all of us mourn the loss of these Americans. And I appreciate your being here today.

Mr. Secretary, let me reference General Peay's opening comments. He went into some detail about the complex operational environment by which we operate in Saudi Arabia and he stressed that one of the things that we need is to understand the Saudi culture and the way of doing business. The General went on to say that Saudi -- what may appear as Saudi indifference or unwillingness is, in fact, a reflection of their different sense of time. Decisions at all levels of the Saudi government are slow by U.S. standards.

KEMPTHORNE: In the questions that were directed at General Peay as to where the request came to extend the perimeter, General Peay made the point that had it reached him, he would have tried to deal with it at his level for several weeks, perhaps months, acknowledging the culture, I believe, of the Saudis.

So Mr. Secretary, my question to you is this. Is the administration allowing the culture of another country to stand in the way of us protecting our American troops?

PERRY: Senator Kempthorne, any time we are guests in another country, hosted by that country, we have to pay very careful attention to their culture, their laws. But we also have to hold up a concept of force protection, of protection of our forces.

And if those come in conflict, then we have to decide in favor of force protection. That may mean...



KEMPTHORNE: But Mr. Secretary, were we not in conflict?

PERRY: Pardon me?

KEMPTHORNE: Were we not in conflict?

PERRY: We were in conflict in this case, and therefore we have to address the conflict.

The debate in the hearing here is whether we addressed it at the right level. I can assure you, had it been brought up to my level, I would have been prepared to have gone to the highest levels in the Saudi government to deal with this.

KEMPTHORNE: But Mr. Secretary, in light of the fact that we had had a terrorist attack in Riyadh, the fact that we had threats, the fact that we know that there are cultural differences with the Saudi government, in that atmosphere is it appropriate for us to believe that all of this should have simply been handled by the military? Or the fact that this called for diplomacy and others within the administration to clear the way for an atmosphere so that force structure could properly be addressed?

PERRY: Senator Kempthorne, that's, I think, a very astute observation. And it guided my actions when I was in Saudi Arabia shortly after the bombing.

And I focused on two, what I would consider high-level -- I dealt at the highest level of the Saudi government to make two points, which I think determine the extent to which we can operate effectively in the future. One of them is that we had to have full cooperation on the investigation. And the other was that, given the level of the threat we were now dealing with, we had to be prepared to move some of our bases out of the urban area, and that we would require full cooperation with the Saudis on that.

So we're already moving in that direction, these two areas. We have to deal with the highest levels of the Saudi government in order to establish the framework which would allow our lower level commanders to operate and in particular, do the re-basing if it's going to be necessary.

KEMPTHORNE: Mr. Secretary, with all due respect, I believe that we subordinated our culture, which is to protect our troops, to the culture of the host country.

KEMPTHORNE: And I think it cost us.

PERRY: Senator Kempthorne, I can tell you that we never consciously decided to do that. Certainly, I never did. And I do not believe any of our senior commanders ever did either.

KEMPTHORNE: General Shalikashvili, we've discussed at this hearing the fact that there has been a changed threat to our forces, that we now are dealing with terrorists

Does that suggest that we need to re-examine where we base our forces to carry out operations such as they're currently carrying out in Saudi Arabia offshore? Should these planes be aircraft carrier planes as opposed to on the land?

SHALIKASHVILI: I think that in that particular region we maintain, for a considerable period of time each year, aircraft carrier offshore in order to provide us the additional air power. I do not believe that on a day-to-day basis, you would be able to sustain that.

But we certainly need to do the re-basing that Secretary Perry talked about, and there was some thing in discussion before the Khobar bombing. I think we can put ourselves into a much more secure position than our forces are, for instance, in Riyadh. And that, in combination with our retaining a periodic presence offshore with a carrier to provide us that added air power, as we do right now, I think is appropriate.

But I don't believe you can have the flexibility of having the kind of support aircraft and all of that without tying up our aircraft assets and leaving us vulnerable in some other parts of the world.

KEMPTHORNE: All right. Secretary Perry, based on the information that you have to date, do you feel that there may be a connection between the terrorist attack in Riyadh and perhaps the subsequent execution of those terrorists and what took place at Khobar Towers?

PERRY: To get a definitive answer to that question, we're going to have to have the investigation now under way completed. I would be happy in closed session to discuss with you my best judgment.

THURMOND: Mr. Secretary, the people in the back of the room can't hear you. Speak a little louder.

PERRY: I said I would be happy to discuss in closed session my best judgment on that based on the investigation to date. But I can tell you there's not a definitive answer to that question yet.

KEMPTHORNE: And Mr. Secretary, one final question, then.

Do you feel that the administration is fully engaged with the Saudi government so that the requests, such as by the FBI, that they be included in both the investigation and all leads leading to the apprehension of these terrorists will be conducted in a coordinated fashion with the United States?

PERRY: I believe that is the case. I have been assured by the king, and Director Freeh has been assured by the minister of interior, that will be the case. We must insist on that.

KEMPTHORNE: Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

THURMOND: Yes, sir.

Senator Robb?

ROBB: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I must say that I have been frustrated sitting here for three hours listening to the testimony -- not to the testimony that you've given, but to the impression that I'm afraid may be left about where our military is today, where our intelligence community is today. And the implication, at least of failure of either leadership or sound advice, good judgment, whatever the case may be.

I'm quite prepared to ask tough questions, as I have in the past and will continue to do so. And I think it's appropriate to respond to tough questions here today.

I want to join very much in the general comments that were made by Senator Glenn and followed up on by Senator Nunn, in terms of some of the things that we're not talking about today.

I was going to ask some questions about -- nuclear, chemical, biological, Stingers were all on my list in terms of things not to discuss specifically, but in terms of the kinds of risks in unconventional warfare that we're not even talking about and yet still amount to a serious threat if we're talking about terrorists activities.

It seems to me that we ought to acknowledge very openly that we're on the very front edge of a long, steep learning curve with respect to terrorists activities. And I think that you have implicitly and in some cases explicitly suggested that today. But I worry about the second guessing, the money, whatever you want to call it in terms of being able to discern exactly what a specific vulnerability was in a specific situation, and draw broader conclusions about where we are based on that particular matter.

I would urge colleagues who have not already done so, to take advantage of intelligence briefings, to stay for the closed session, and to meet with Prince Bandar. I discussed the matter with him at some length yesterday. Senator Glenn and I met with him again this morning. I think he can provide useful information that addresses several of the questions that have been troubling senators. And if you have not already availed yourself of that, I suggest that you do.

Let me ask a question that has not been formally presented but

seems to me -- let me make a point before I do because, General Peay, I feel very strongly about the point that you made with respect to allowing some latitude of judgment for command.

ROBB: With all due deference to colleagues -- and I'll be a member of one if I have to -- I think that if we take away that latitude we're going to destroy the officer corps, the senior NCOs, and what we expect and indeed, what we in effect hire on people who serve in the military to do.

And if we expect -- and again, I don't mean to in any way diminish the very serious question that was presented -- but if, on a broader sense, if all the tough questions are immediately kicked all the way up the line, we're eating away at almost everything that our force structure -- not only in the military, but throughout the rest of society -- stands for.

And I think it would be a serious mistake, so I would ask you to hold your ground, be ambivalent about whether or not you would do something in this particular case because of the seriousness of the question. But don't suggest that that's standard operating procedure for any question that seems to be a little bit difficult or will begin a cancer.

Let me ask you to comment on the question of tradeoffs, if you will. Not explicitly stated, but implicit is the tradeoff between security risks and quality of life, livability. And in many instances we're talking about whether or not you put people in a buttoned-up atmosphere, whether you put them in flak jackets, whether you put CW gear, whether you put them in gas masks, whether you require them to sit in the cockpits, whether you require them to go through trenches to get back and forth, or whether you assume that there is some level of risk that is necessary and acceptable.

Not just going to the point that Senator Nunn made, in terms of what are we putting people in harm's way in the first place for, but in terms of how we get by the day to day, how likely is it that a threat is more important than the kind of morale problems you'll have if you stick everybody in an un-airconditioned facility when you know there's something else there?

Would you discuss that just a little bit, in terms of the kinds of choices that you're making, so we don't look at this entirely in a black and white situation and suggest that we only for the most secure environment in which our force protection can be administered?

FERRY: Let me comment on that and then maybe General Shali or General Peay would like to add to it. I want to say as strongly as I know how to that this threat of terrorism is very serious. We will face it again. We may face it again soon. We may face it in Saudi Arabia, we may face it in other countries in the Gulf and we should be -- understand that that's what we're up against.

Big bombs are only one aspect of the threat and not necessarily the most difficult aspect. You have the threat of chemical warheads, the threat of Stinger missiles, the threat of mortar attacks. All of these are components of the threat.

Most of the questions today have focused on this one aspect and we have to understand that our problem preparing for this threat is much more complex than that. And I do want to tie on to Senator Nunn's point -- dealing with that while we're trying to carry out a mission, which is why we're over there in the first place.

PERRY: Now, if the mission is important -- and I believe, as I've testified, that it is -- in the face of the kind of threats we're talking about, and understanding we do not want to have our soldiers living in bunkers 24 hours a day, we're going to have to rethink how we do the mission in rather fundamental ways.

It is not just a matter of moving the fence out another few hundred feet. It is not just a matter of putting Mylar in the windows. Those things can be done and should be done short term.

But we have to consider a very significant change in our basing altogether if we're going to stay there and do that mission. That's going to be difficult. It's going to be expensive. It's going to be complex. But I believe that mission is important, and I believe that in order to carry it out we have to make very fundamental changes in basic, not just because of the big bombs, but in particular because of the big bomb threat.

Maybe General Shali or General Peay would want to add to that.

SHALIKASHVILI: The only thing I would add is that it is so correct that we are there, wherever we go, to execute our mission. And so, there's a limit on what we can ask our people to do and they'll still remain 100 percent up to do the mission. Because everything we put on them, or much of what we put on them for force protection detracts from their ability to do their mission, to be sharp, to be ready to go, mentally, physically.

So, we need to balance those things. In a place like Bosnia, we can afford to do certain things and we are required to do certain things. When you have a terrorist threat in the middle of Germany, as we did during Desert Storm, you are limited to what you can do. And when you are in a place like Korea, you again have limitations on what can be done.

I am also mindful that we are asking men and women to be in the armed forces not just for that three weeks or three months that we ask them to deploy to Saudi Arabia. But when you go to Saudi Arabia you find that some of these people are there on a fourth, fifth or sixth time around. And so, for them, this is a way of life.

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And when AWACS crews are not in Saudi Arabia, you will find them in some other place where they have to worry about force protection. So, we need to be mindful of those requirements to balance a quality of life for them and their families, for them to be mentally alert, to do the mission first, and also, of course, to provide the force protection.

I think we have done very well. It has never been 100 percent an all-or-nothing issue. But, I think on balance, when I look at what the armed forces have done for the last, I don't know how many years in that area, by and large, we have done that balancing act very, very well.

And I think that here in Saudi, where we are now facing a much more difficult challenge, we, too, will find the right balance between moving out of urban areas, between making sure that we have people there we need to have there.

SHALIKASHVILI: And that gets at some difficult issues as contractors and others that we need to take a look at. But I believe that we will find the right balance. We have done so in the past, and I think we will do that here.

PEAY: Sir, I agree with all of that. Again I go back to my earlier comments that in addition to what we call combatant troops -- which, frankly, they'll be the easiest ones to secure. We'll be able to move those units out in their totality, and keep them together cohesively. It's all the non-combatants that are there.

Senator Nunn mentioned earlier today about trying to get these countries to start to take on more of their defense. We have 1,500 advisers that are spread out all over Saudi Arabia in various urbanized towns, where they are side-by-side with their Saudi counterparts as we try to improve their performance so that we can wean our way out of all that.

So, I believe in balance as we work through this. I would be unfair as a commander that's interested in, obviously, the readiness of the total force that the Chiefs of our service have to provide.

I've got to tell you, when you start to move organizations, though, it's going to cost money. And that's going to be a consideration as we go down this road.

ROBB: Fortunately, the host nation, in this case, understands the responsibilities of burden sharing. I've already had a discussion on that. So, at least we'll have cooperation, as the secretary has noted.

Mr. Chairman, could I ask one exit question that they can probably answer with a "Yes" or "No" after the three hours?

THURMOND: Go ahead.

ROBB: Gentlemen, is there anything that you have discovered to date that based on the examination of the facts -- not based on the fact that we had the specific terrorist incident that occurred, but based on the general readiness -- that you would clearly have done differently or clearly represents, in your judgment, a failure to take appropriate action, absent the higher indication of this particular threat or any other threat?

In other words, is there anything that you can cite to date that would reflect the kind of error that would be culpable and that we ought to be very much concerned about, putting aside the terrible tragedy that occurred with this particular munition?

PERRY: With all respect, Senator Robb, that question has so much -- is so pretentious that I want to defer my answer to it until I get General Downing's report. He is looking precisely at that question.

In any question that involves culpability, I want it to be very well informed, and very well researched, before I answer it.

ROBB: I think that's a responsible answer. And I won't even ask the other generals to comment on that under the circumstances.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you.

THURMOND: Thank you.

The first round is now over. The committee will now move to Room S-407 for an executive and classified session on this matter. The committee will confer in executive session with the ambassador from Saudi Arabia, and then continue with testimony from Defense officials in classified session.

The FDCH Transcript Report  
July 10, 1996

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December 21, 1995


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MEMORANDUM FOR COL. (b)(6)  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Foreign Travel by Secretary Perry to Italy,  
Hungary, Bosnia, Oman, Jordan, Israel and Ukraine

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
concurs with the travel of Secretary Perry to Italy, Hungary,  
Bosnia, Oman, Jordan, Israel and Ukraine for the period  
December 31, 1995 to January 6, 1996.

  
Andrew D. Sens  
Executive Secretary

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

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15 DEC 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Foreign Travel by DoD Officials

In accordance with established guidelines regarding foreign travel by U.S. officials, the President's approval is requested for a proposed trip by Honorable William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense.

Dr. Perry and party intend to travel from 31 December 1995 to 6 January 1996 to Italy, Hungary, Bosnia, Oman, Jordan, Israel, and Ukraine. The Secretary will visit US forces in Hungary and Bosnia; hold talks with host government officials in Hungary, Oman, Jordan, Israel, and Ukraine; and participate in the destruction of a missile silo and transfer of US-built housing in Ukraine. His proposed itinerary is as follows:

31 December	Depart Andrews AFB.
1 January	Change planes in Italy; visit US forces in Hungary & Bosnia; RON in Italy
2 January	Arrive Oman
3 January	Talks in Oman; arrive Jordan
4 January	Talks in Jordan & Israel
5 January	Arrive Ukraine; talks with government officials
6 January	Observe silo destruction and transfer of US-built housing; return to CONUS

*Robert P. McAleer*  
Robert P. McAleer  
Executive Secretary



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