

~~TOP SECRET//SI~~

Dr. Stephen Cambone's notes
from 9/11

~~22 DOD / DFOISR
TOP SECRET CONTROL
Copy No.
Case No. OLCF-1051
SI No. 11-SI-009
Document No. 1~~

ADOC - East

M.I. - Mount Mid-Town Base

Physical Sec

1023

VTC

Sec Def / Dep Sec Def

ROE - VP from Pres

1025

Another case of form

NSA 717 forward w/ro 1st

(b)(1)

Field Extrem (USG) in Oman

1047

(b)(1)

w/VP?

Rec'd Dep/Com 3

1048

Asst PW to Go Alkaim

Dis/Case: Dep/Com 3

1050

(b)(1)

DPS to call DATT

1053

(b)(1)

~ 1057?

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~~Handle Via COMINT Channels Only~~

6

~~TOP SECRET~~ VFC C

1255

(b)(1)

1.4g




Call To Pass:

10-14

(b)(1)

1.4g



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(2)

1.4g

(b)(1) [Redacted]

1205 DCT Retard Call

UBL Antip From operation
Hunt: "Heard good news"
3rd left left to come?

1.4c

1210- Seek. Option - to VCPG
Link by

1215 FAA team: 50 a/c

1.4g

(b)(1) [Redacted]

1.4g

VPA
(b)(1) 1118

1232 Clarke asks about Springs? ?

1146

GTend Rekeypt - ?

1237 FEMA to Mr. Wrothen

1.4g

(b)(1) [Redacted]

W/H: Ask on 3 A/c - 1151
Said to be inbound

DR to FAA 1153

1.4g

(b)(1) [Redacted]

Adm. Vied @ Dyllen

(b)(1)

[Redacted]

3 A/C accounted for - 1155

1.4g

1237 ~~TOP SECRET~~
1237 Coast Guard

(b)(1)

1.4g

1259 Press Calls -

(b)(1)

1249 Chief Justice

(b)(1)

1.4g

1306: NSC mtg before Powell Rtrns -

(b)(1)

1.4g

1316

1258: FAA Repts. Hijack Search

~~TOP SECRET//SCI~~

1:35 p: Sec Def / VCJCS / 1A80/R

(b)(1)

1.4g

Inherent:
vague - might / not mean something
no good basis for hanging hat

1.4g

1:50

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

2:00: C. Allen called to Sec

(b)(1)

1.4g

2:05 Sec Def to V.D.

(b)(1)

1.4g

(b)(1)

~~TOP SECRET//SCI~~

(5)

2:25-2:35

Sec Del & VC9CS
(b)(1)

15379



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2:40

Review Stokard:

Best info part
judge whether good enough
judge w letter
What St. @ same time -
Not only UBL

Tasks: Jim Haynes to talk w/ PAJ
for additional support w/ U.S. &
connection w/ UBL.

(b)(1)



- Hard to get a good case

- Need to move swiftly -

- Near term target needs -

- so massive - sweep it all up
- thing related & not

need to do so
to get anything
useful

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(6)

~~TOP SECRET~~

2550: Sec 4 w/ DCI
(b)(1), (b)(5)



1.4(d)(g)
FOIA b5

~~TOP SECRET~~

(7)

320 p. w/ Priz

(b)(1)

1.4g

3:30 p. Cuzte

(b)(1), (b)(5)

1.4g

FOIA b5

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(8)

1) CIA - informant
(b)(1), (b)(5)

9-53 EST

1.4(c)(g)
FOIA b5



2) AA 77 - 3 indiv have been followed
since Millennium T. Cole
1. guy is assoc of Cole bomber
2. Entered US in party party
(L2 of 3 pulled aside & interrogated?)

3) No M.O.



(b)(1), (b)(5)

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U.S.


(b)(1), (b)(5)

1.4g
FOIA b5




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(b)(5)



(b)(1)




3:05 pm Lianov

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Sec Def / VC GCS

(b)(1), (b)(5)



1.4g
FOIA b5

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(b)(1),(b)(5)




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Chatter. Condi-est UP
(b)(1),(b)(5)

1.4g
FOIA b5

1.4g
FOIA b5



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(13)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

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(14)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

(b)(1),(b)(5)

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
Pres @ 8:30 pm

NSC 9:00 pm

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(15)

(S)(C)(D)




Fin Ak →
15/15 with by

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(16)

(b)(1)



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~~TOP SECRET//SI~~

4/12

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D650 Staff Mtg

SOP/ISO - (NO)

Strip Asset

Statement for Aldy - DE

Who does what

Brief to Legats

Supplemental

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(18)


8:35a

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Clark:

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(b)(1)



1.4(c)

Q: External Infrastructure

Q: MC links/Person

SH: Agenda:

• Concepts Management

• D: pilot school


• A: 7.0 pilots

• What tools to make use of in training

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(19)

(b)(1),(b)(5)



(b)(5)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

(b)(5)



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(22)

September 17, 2001 10:00 AM



TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Carl Steiner

What do you think about getting Carl Steiner up here and asking him for some unconventional ideas? Goodness knows, he is unconventional.

He is a friend.

Thanks.

(b)(6)

DHR:dh
091701-21

1200~~0~~ / 170ct

TDY

here

classified

Acc: (b)(6)

(b)(6)

*RON
next 10 days "
+ see SD also.*

(b)(6)

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φ (my desk) Sept 11

18 September 2001

3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE

Subject: Deputies' Committee Meeting 18 September 1130-1240

(b)(1)

1. With respect to the security for the meetings, he asked that the information rendered at these meetings be briefed up, not down;
2. Three new compartments have been opened to govern the documentation for the campaign. Hadley did not name the compartments, nor did he tell us what information is in each. He then talked of the role of the Deputies' Committee: to free some of the burden from the Principals.

The daily meeting schedule would begin with the 0930 NSC meeting, usually followed later in the day by a Principals' meeting. The Deputies will meet daily at 1130 SVTC.

Meetings will do three things:

- (a) Review tasking out of the morning NSC meeting and do whatever preparations are needed for the afternoon PC;
- (b) Take individual agency reports with emphasis on three items: (1) additional support that a given agency would need from others; (2) coordination needed on some items; and (3) things that were not being done that should be done;
- (c) Take a read-out of three working groups that have been established. Those three are the: (1) Campaign Coordination Working Group; (2) Protection Coordination Working Group; and the (3) Consequence Management Working Group.

Campaign Coordination Working Group

The Campaign Coordination Working Group will begin meeting today at 1500. It will be led by Frank Miller and Dick Clark. It is to ensure that there is a senior-level integration across all the instruments of state power in the conduct of the campaign against terrorism. What it seeks to do, at a minimum, is to ensure that there is a consolidated set of required

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steps, sequences, coordination, etc., needed by the various agencies for the conduct of this campaign. (Note: Following the meeting, Doug Feith asked Steve Cambone to represent OSD. USDP will adjust representation as subject of meeting and time available requires.)

Protection Coordination Working Group

The Protection Coordination Working Group will be led by the Department of Justice and is concerned with homeland defense issues, particularly protection in the likelihood of response to U.S. actions.

(b)(1)

Consequence Management Working Group

The Consequence Management Working Group is led by FEMA. There also is a fourth working group, Domestic Consequences, for coordination of non-security issues (political).

Items that arose from the NSC meeting that Hadley conveyed:

1. (b)(1)
2. With respect to the notion of interdicting movement of Al Qaeda members from Afghanistan, the definite view is that they be caught and locked up and not allowed to pass into another country;
3. There was some concern about support being generated (b)(1) given his delicate position;
4. The issues of protection of U.S. personnel in (b)(1) was raised again, and it was noted (b)(1) is going to be an issue in warning them. DOD and State are expected to coordinate on this. OMB has suggested that they be part of the process to review the FY 2001 supplemental for relevance of particular items to the campaign on terrorism.

Four items that were not being looked at were:

1. (b)(1) *
2. The prospect that (b)(1) could become militarily and politically unstable to the point that the Taliban or some other organization could take over, confronting us with the prospect of a terrorist organization (b)(1)
3. Strategy for the coalition: State clearly has a lead. It is developing guidelines on who is in and who is not and what are the guidelines for both bringing states in as well as for requesting support and assistance from them. We offered to exchange the DOD paper that has been prepared by J.D. Crouch, and they agreed; (continuation) *

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4. The issue of (b)(1) to support the ruling against Al Qaeda was raised. There was clearly an interest in having a basis in having public and international opinion to support U.S. action. OSD, the Joint Staff, (b)(1) all made the point that we need to be very careful in how we talk about this subject (b)(1) thereby making it more difficult to pursue a broader campaign against terrorism.

Some or all of these subjects will be raised at subsequent Deputies' Committees and working group meetings over time.

Cc: J.D. Crouch
Peter Rodman

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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

CC: USDP

SUBJECT: Intelligence Support

FROM: Steve Cambone PDUSD/P *Sc*

There is a requirement to improve intelligence support to wage a war against terror.

I recommend the following:

1. SECDEF invite to a meeting on Saturday, September 15 the DCI and heads of agencies that would serve as combat support agencies in time of war.

- Purpose of meeting:

[Redacted] (b)(1)

The system in place now is not designed to support your needs.

➤ In the meeting you should provide guidance for support from the IC that will enable you

[Redacted] (b)(1)

➤ It is the occasion to identify [Redacted] (b)(1)

[Redacted] (b)(1) requirements for a long term, sustained campaign

➤ You should identify [Redacted] (b)(6) as liaison to the intelligence community for the [Redacted] (b)(1) intelligence support to both near and long term operations.

2. Role of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Matters

- (b)(6) is an experienced intelligence officer. His strength is synthesizing information and presenting it in understandable briefings. He is also capable of identifying both strengths and weaknesses in an intelligence report or operation.
- As liaison to the IC, working on your behalf, he can sharpen the product you have tasked before it is set in concrete by analysts.
- (b)(6) can also serve as the focus of your effort to keep your OSD staff informed of critical intelligence and lend priority to staff demands for support from the IC. Absent such a function, OSD will saturate and frustrate the IC with its demands.

3. Daily intelligence reporting on the rest of the world should continue through established channels.

4. Intelligence (b)(1) (b)(1) should continue through established channels.

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~~CLOSE HOLD~~

13 September 2001

5

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dr. Stephen A. Cambone, PDUSD(P) *SC*

It is essential that the United States Government regain the initiative in the war.

Actions taken in the next days should meet the following criteria:

1. Establish the capacity and will of the USG to protect the nation, its people and their way of life.

2. (b)(1)
[Redacted]

3. [Redacted]

Toward this end, the DoD should:

1. Create a (b)(1) [Redacted] reporting to the SecDef.

2. (b)(1)
[Redacted]

- Begin formal coordination of planning and force buildup with the (b)(1) [Redacted] (b)(1) [Redacted]

- Initiate consultations with (b)(1) [Redacted] as and when appropriate.

3. Stand up a (b)(1) [Redacted]. The [Redacted] should be chaired by the Deputy (b)(1) Secretary of Defense and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.


- (b)(1) [Redacted]

- Its primary objectives would be:

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
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(b)(1)



4. Initiate nuclear, biological and chemical weapon (NBC) planning for:

(b)(1)




The Department of Defense should request that the President direct (b)(1)

(b)(1)

- The (b)(1) should be led by the USD/P and co-chaired by the Director of the Joint Staff or the Director, J-5.
- Its purpose would be to:

(b)(1)



Acronyms
Dalyo
0925

September 13, 2001 5:30 PM



471.94

TO: Steve Cambone
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld
SUBJECT: Missile

We need a strategic ICBM missile that is conventionally armed, probably more than one. What do we do about it?

DHR:dh
091301-16

13 Sep 01

U13075 /02



Memo

TO: SecDef
DepSecDef
USDP

DATE: September 14, 2001

FROM: Steve Cambone

SUBJECT: Tick List for Camp David Discussion

1. Breadth of Campaign

- broader the definition the easier it to get started with effect
- (b)(1) are worthy targets; they are also the most difficult to reach and to begin and sustain a campaign against at present

2. Character of Operations

(b)(1)

- Other than a demonstration, most likely able to do things that have effect— e.g., upsetting finances—in nearer term that are not so visible
- Can begin to flow forces to (b)(1) as both demonstration and in preparation for operations
- This will be a sophisticated campaign; the first war of the 21st century will not look like any other due to the nature of the enemy and the character of the weapons and forces at our disposal
- (b)(1)

3. Pace

- We can not wait too long to act; public will demand it; administration credibility with US public, international opinion and adversaries on the line

(b)(1)

4. Declaratory Policy

- Needs to address not only goals, but how we will conduct ourselves, anticipated duration, how we will define progress and success, etc.
- President's address at memorial service began to lay the predicates

5. Coalition Building

(b)(1)

- Need to take account of interests of some more than others, e.g.,

(b)(1)

6. Post Mortem

- President should take initiative; appoint group
- Should look forward, not back
- Admit surprise is not surprising
- Objective: how to organize and prepare for the world we now inhabit based on the painful, but not to be ignored lessons, of September 11

7. Organizing the government to prosecute the campaign

- DOD standing up a (b)(1)
- Need to have a government-wide (b)(1) at Principal's level

8. Employing Intelligence and role of the Intelligence Community

- This campaign will blur the lines (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

- Consider President directing that SecDef be given priority

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

9. Role for law enforcement; relationship to intelligence community

- Law distinguishes between criminal acts and national security threats by assigning responsibility for each to different agencies
- Terrorism does not recognize the distinction; we need to adjust to this fact
- Procedures can help, i.e., informal exchanges between FBI and IC; but may need legislation

10. Managing Congress

11. Managing Allies