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OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: September 30, 2001

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: A Marshall Plan for Afghanistan

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Don,

It would enormously strengthen our information operation, both inside Afghanistan and in the rest of the world, if we were to organize now a multibillion dollar Marshall Plan for a post-Taliban Afghanistan.

Announcement of such a plan would reinforce the incentives for people inside Afghanistan to get rid of the Taliban. Moreover, it would help substantially to counter propaganda in the Muslim world that our military actions are aimed against Muslims. Finally, it would counter the argument – which is likely to become more of a problem as the campaign proceeds – that the U.S. created a mess in Afghanistan in the 1980's and is about to do it again.

This would be a good moment to sign up the NATO allies and Japan to long-term financial commitments. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

It will be much easier to announce such a plan than to actually implement it. Afghanistan is not Germany. In Germany, the task was rebuilding an economy, not creating an entirely new one. (b)(1)

(b)(1) However, there is a lot that could be done with just basic food, medicine and education programs, if we don't set the bar too high.

While there are obvious downsides in this proposal, it seems to me that its potential to help us is so enormous that we ought to take it on despite some of the potential difficulties down the road. I would suggest that we get out in front quickly with an effort to organize large-scale financial commitments to post-Taliban reconstruction. The security dimension should be addressed separately, although we may want to start on that in the relatively near future, to take advantage of the current level of support and good will among our Allies.

#### The Security Dimension

The most problematic issue concerns the internal security arrangements in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. This part of the effort would have to be thought through very

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carefully. It would be an obvious mistake (b)(1)  
(b)(1) What might work would be some negotiated modus vivendi among the various Afghan tribes, perhaps through a traditional *shura* – perhaps even using the old king. However, it might also be necessary to have some kind of international peacekeeping force to maintain certain basic conditions of security, e.g., to preserve boundary lines among different Afghan tribes if some could be negotiated.

I don't think one can work up the details of a post-Taliban security structure at this time. However, this would be a time to get some of the countries who are offering to assist us militarily to commit to some significant post-war military presence in Afghanistan. As unattractive as that may sound, it may be necessary and it would be much better to have others doing it than to have it taken to be the U.S. responsibility. It might be appropriate to think about some kind of very large-scale peacekeeping force (b)(1)  
(b)(1)

#### Next Steps

If you agree, I would suggest that you raise the idea in an NSC meeting and see what kind of traction it gets. If the President picks up on it, it is something that really ought to be given to State Department to take the lead on.

Alternatively, if you feel that we should flesh out the details more ourselves, I will work with Doug Feith to see if we could pull together some outside experts to apply their brains to this question.

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