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2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
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2001 SEP 25 11 2: 54

I-01/011414-USDP
September 25, 2001 11:50 A.M.

DepSec Action _____

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) *DJF 9/25/01*

SUBJECT: Key Points from Newt Gingrich at Breakfast with Douglas J. Feith, Peter W. Rodman, and Jack D. Crouch

- A quick, brash military move is politically tempting, but strategically risky.
 - Could have negative secondary effects (e.g. alienating Afghan people)
 - Pin Prick Effect: We Came, We Launched Cruise Missiles, They Laughed.
 - "The slower and easier you enter, the quicker and easier you exit."
- We should quickly declare our implacable goals: destroy terrorist networks, change regimes that Support Terrorism, etc.
 - By declaring our goals, and sticking to them, all of our activities are seen as responsible and understandable action. This takes pressure off the need to execute an ineffective military option.
 - This demands that we stay on message publicly and through our actions:

We confuse Americans, Allies, and our enemies when we speak of Iran joining the coalition against terrorism, or when we pressure Israel to deal with the Palestinian Authority (should the US deal with UBL as we urge Sharon to deal with Arafat).

- Americans understand this as a broad campaign against terrorism. We have their support to conduct this campaign. When we narrow the campaign, we undermine their confidence in our approach.
 - Dangers that State may push to focus just on al-Qaida and not even on changing the regime in Kabul.
 - We should change regimes in Kabul and Baghdad.

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