

18 September, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (POLICY)
(Douglas J. Feith, (b)(6))

SUBJECT: Strategic Planning Guidance for the Joint Staff (U)

"We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them."

President George W. Bush, 11 Sep 01

"President Bush and Secretary Rumsfeld have made it clear that as a country we are entering into a campaign against terrorism that has to be sustained and broad and effective."

Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz, 13 Sep 01

(S) The President clearly intends to root out the terrorist network responsible for the 11 Sep strikes against the United States—wherever it exists. To that end, the United States should begin this campaign in a way that sets a clear course toward the realization of the President's goals. Single pronged attacks against the smallest state sponsor of the terrorist network may not be sufficient to set that course. Such a limited attack may be perceived as a sign of weakness rather than strength. On the other hand, initial attacks against all of the countries in the network may present the problem of strategic overreach. Instead, the United States should seek a middle path—prioritizing its efforts against the states with the closest ties to the suspect group based on the weight of the evidence and isolating the remaining members of the terror network both militarily and politically. A second phase of the operation would, if necessary, compel the remaining states to eliminate their ties to the network.

(S) Below is (1) a list of states that conduct and support terrorism against the U.S. and its interests in priority order and (2) categories of high-value assets and capabilities critical to each regime. Actual target analysis and selection will be conducted by the Joint Staff in concert with OSD.

Afghanistan (U)

(S) The strategic purpose of the campaign in Afghanistan is to alter the behavior of the Taliban regime and defeat al-Qaida. We will compel the Taliban to help destroy al-Qaida or we will inflict severe punishment if the Taliban fail to do so. If the Taliban do not fulfill our demands, the follow-on military objective will be to undermine the regime's ability to defend itself against U.S. and Northern Alliance forces, and to cripple its ability

to govern Afghanistan. The damage must be so severe that it shocks other state sponsors of terrorism, including the possibility that they will abandon preemptively their support for terrorism before the U.S. attacks them.

~~(S)~~ The campaign might begin with a final warning to the Taliban regime, telling them to deliver the remaining elements of al-Qaida to U.S. forces, and to assist U.S. forces to defeat al-Qaida, or we might announce at the start of the campaign that it will continue until they deliver al-Qaida to coalition forces.

~~(S)~~ If the Taliban government does not comply, serious punishment should threaten the regime's existence at the strategic and operational levels. This should include direct attacks against the Taliban strategic leadership; Taliban military leadership and units engaged in the civil war with Northern Alliance resistance forces; and government control over the rest of the country. Broad target categories and priorities could include:

- Taliban air defenses (C2 sites, radar and missile sites, air defense airfields/aircraft)
- Al-Qaida leadership and forces
- Al-Qaida training camps and facilities
- Taliban strategic command/control/communications capabilities
- Taliban intelligence services/secret police/selected prisons
- Taliban operational military leadership and dispositions in the northeast arrayed against the Northern Alliance
- Taliban ground-attack airfields/aircraft/helicopters
- SCUD missile units
- Illegal drug infrastructure

~~(S)~~ A successful campaign would mean the elimination of the al-Qaida network in Afghanistan, and a serious reduction in the Taliban regime's ability to defend itself against the Northern Alliance. Elimination of the al-Qaida network in Afghanistan can be accomplished only if sufficient pain can be inflicted on the Taliban regime. There is some question, however, about whether or not an air campaign by itself can tip the balance in the civil war in favor of the Northern Alliance. There is a view that the commitment of ground forces is necessary to achieve the goal.

Iraq (U)

~~(S)~~ The strategic purpose of the campaign in Iraq is to eliminate a regime that engages in and supports terrorism and otherwise threatens U.S. vital interests. Initially, Saddam's regime should be deprived both of its ability to control Iraq through repression and the

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ability to profit from the illegal sources of income that allow him to finance terror abroad. In conjunction with the campaign, we may want to offer amnesty for defecting Iraqi military units. Broad target categories and priorities could include but are not limited to:

- Integrated air defense system (C2 sites, radar and missile sites, air defense airfields/aircraft)
- Hussein regime leadership to include local police units.
- Iraqi strategic command/control/communications capabilities
- Iraqi intelligence services/secret police/selected prisons
- WMD and missile infrastructure and capabilities
- Military logistics and infrastructure (e.g. Heavy Equipment Transporters)
- Illegal Iraqi oil export infrastructure (e.g. pipeline to Syria)
- Special Republican Guard leadership, forces, and operational military capabilities
- Republican Guard and Regular Army units arrayed against the Kurds in the north and the Shi'a in the south
- Ground-attack airfields/aircraft/helicopters

(S) The list of targets can be expanded considerably if U.S. ground forces are used to seize and control objectives. Most prominent of these objectives are the oil fields in northern and southern Iraq. The southern oil fields produce 60 percent of Iraq's oil and are located within 60 miles from the Kuwait border. Seizing the southern oil fields (instead of destroying them) removes the oil weapon from Saddam's options.

(S) A great deal of damage can be inflicted from the air, but the ultimate successful outcome of this campaign may depend on a willingness to commit ground forces. In any event, this effort will require a more substantial and prolonged campaign than DESERT FOX.

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Classified by: USDP, D.J. Feith
Reasons 1.5 (a, b, c, and d)
Declassify on 14 September 2011

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