TASK FORCE RANGER

OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA

3-4 OCTOBER 1993

UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
and
UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
HISTORY OFFICES
1 JUNE 1994

CLASSIFIED BY USCINCSOC
DECLAS ON OADR

---SECRET-NOFORN---
In late August 1993 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin authorized the deployment of special operations forces to Mogadishu, Somalia, because of increased enemy attacks on United States and United Nations Operations Somalia (UNOSOM) forces and installations. The special operations forces, named Task Force (TF) Ranger, had the mission to capture General Mohammed Farah Aideed and designated others, and to turn over captives to UNOSOM forces. During August and September 1993 TF Ranger conducted six missions into Mogadishu. These six missions were tactical successes, and the cumulative effect of these missions was to impair Aideed's movement and to undermine his authority. On 3 October TF Ranger launched a mission into Aideed's stronghold, seeking to capture two of his key lieutenants. The capture of 24 Aideed supporters was accomplished, but in that process, a TF Ranger MH-60 BLACKHAWK helicopter was shot down by a rocket-propelled grenade. The mission then irrevocably changed from one of capturing Aideed supporters to one of safeguarding and recovering American casualties. When the TF Ranger forces finally returned to its compound the next morning, their casualties totaled 99.

TF Ranger forces acquitted themselves well during their movement to the downed BLACKHAWK. The subsequent actions to defend this position and to retrieve the dead and wounded reflected credit on their training, courage,
initiative, soldier skills, and dedication to one another. What follows is an overview of the 3-4 October Battle of Mogadishu, and then there are vignettes reflecting individuals’ actions during this long and bloody day in Somalia.
UNCLASSIFIED

TABLE OF CONTENTS

An Overview: Task Force Ranger Operations in Somalia 3 - 4 October 1993 ............................................. 1
Vignettes ................................................................................. 13
On 22 August 1993 the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, notified General Joseph P. Hoar, Commander in Chief, United States Central Command (USCINCENT), and General Wayne A. Downing, Commander in Chief, United States Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC) that Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Les Aspin had authorized the mobilization and deployment of forces to support US efforts in Somalia. Increased enemy attacks on US and United Nations Operations Somalia (UNOSOM) installations, heightened tensions, lawlessness, and continued hostile acts by Aideed-led factions had strained UN operations. Accordingly, the SECDEF had agreed to deploy additional special operations forces (SOF). GEN Downing was to provide requested forces, with an advance party departing on 22 August and the main body on 25 August 1993. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) was also to be prepared to provide follow-on forces as required.

At that time, in June, the situation in Somalia was very different from what it was to become in late August. Aideed appeared openly in public and still walked the streets of Mogadishu.
On 22 August MG Waldo D. Freeman, Jr., Deputy Commander in Chief, USCENTCOM, released a message directing the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to deploy forces in two phases. Phase I forces, consisting of advance and command (ADVON) elements, were to deploy on that same day, 22 August. Phase II forces, the main body, was to deploy on 25 August. USCENTCOM directed USSOCOM to provide forces as requested (approximately 400 personnel), to provide follow-on forces and SOF-peculiar logistic support as required, and to respond to possible additional requests for support.

USCINCCENT had operational control of the commander and deploying forces. This operation was named Task Force (TF) Ranger.

Phase I forces deployed on 22 August and arrived in Mogadishu on 23 August at 1017 (local). Shortly thereafter, the TF Ranger commander, MG William Garrison, met with the commander of US Forces Somalia, MG Thomas M. Montgomery. Other ADVON members received detailed briefings from the quick reaction force commander, staff counterparts, and UNOSOM logistics support command. Special operations aviators discussed lessons learned with the 10th Aviation Brigade and rode on visual reconnaissance flights around Mogadishu.
By 28 August, 441 personnel of TF Ranger had arrived in country, were conducting training exercises, and were setting up necessary liaison and communications networks. But that night at 1927, mortar rounds rocked the TF Ranger compound. The attack by Aideed’s followers lasted about 30 minutes, and a total of nine rounds landed at the airport, injuring four TF Ranger personnel. TF Ranger responded by launching an assault at 0309 on 30 August. The assault force cleared the Lig Ligato house and an adjacent building, both of which were on the UNOSOM priority target list. This operation was conducted professionally and on short notice. The assault force detained nine people who turned out to be UN employees. They also took weapons, drugs, communications gear, and other items from the buildings. The UN employees were not supposed to be there.

TF Ranger performed five other missions during the next month. These included the raid on the old Russian compound on 6 September; the Jalilou House/police station raid on 14 September; the raid on Radio Mogadishu on 17 September; the raid on Osman Atto’s garage on 18 September; and the capture of Osman Atto on 21 September. These first six missions were tactical successes. The raid on the police station and subsequent operations were Phase III operations. In each case, the assault and blocking forces landed with no or only minimal opposition, seized their objectives, searched them, detained suspects, and departed the area. Although Aideed had eluded apprehension, his key lieutenants were vulnerable, and the capture of Osman Atto had proven TF Ranger’s capability to strike in the heart of the SNA stronghold.

After the capture of Atto, TF Ranger continued to seek Phase III targets by identifying the location and movement of other key Aideed supporters, including Colonel Abdi Hassan Awale (Qeyidid), the Minister of the Interior, and Omar Salad Elmi, Aideed’s principal political advisor.
During the planning sequences, the joint operations center (JOC) personnel were busy alerting the UNOSOM liaison officer as to the site of the mission in order to confirm that no non-government organizations were located in that area and to deconflict the airspace. MG Garrison informed MG Montgomery of the mission location and targets. The JOC personnel informed other governmental agencies of the pending mission and...
The Red Cross estimated the number of Somali dead as 200 and approximately 700 wounded. Radio Mogadishu reported higher figures—364 killed and 754 wounded. The Task Force Ranger casualties for the operations on 3-4 October were 16 killed and 83 wounded. In addition, a mortar attack on the airfield compound on 6 October killed another soldier and wounded 13 others. The American soldiers killed were:

- CW2 Donavan Briley
- SSG Daniel Busch
- CPL James Cavaco
- SSG William Cleveland
- SGT Thomas Field
- SFC Earl Fillmore
- CW4 Raymond Frank
- MSG Gary Gordon
- SGT James Joyce
- PFC Richard Kowalewski
- MSG Timothy Martin
- SPC Dominick Pilla
- SFC Matthew Rierson
- SGT Lorenzo Ruiz
- SFC Randall Shughart
- SPC James Smith
- CW3 Clifton Wolcott
UNCLASSIFIED

VIGNETTES

Assault Element Leader ........................................... 14

and the Ranger Blocking Force .................................. 17

Ground Reaction Force ............................................ 22

"61 is Down"
The Rangers on the Ground at Crash Site One ............ 25

MH-6 Pilots
Rescue of Crash Victims on 3-4 Oct 93 .................... 33

CSAR (Combat Search and Rescue) and Super 68 ............ 35

Pararescue, 24th STS 3-4 October 1993 ...................... 37

AH-6 Pilot, 3-4 Oct 93 ........................................... 46

A Fire Support Officer's Story .................................. 50

Running the Gauntlet .............................................. 53

Into the Maze ...................................................... 55

Ranger Medics in Somalia ........................................ 57

Holding On .......................................................... 60

The Quick Reaction Force ....................................... 62

It's Going to be a Long Night .................................. 66

UNCLASSIFIED
AND

THE RANGER BLOCKING FORCE

(b)(3): 10 USC §1305(b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3): 10 USC §1305(b)(1), (b)(3)

(b)(1), (b)(3): 19 USC §1305(b)(1), (b)(3)
GROUND REACTION FORCE
SECRET/NOFORM

(b)(1),(b)(3);10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

SECRET/NOFORM

(b)(1),(b)(3);10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

SECRET/NOFORM

(b)(1),(b)(3);10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

SECRET/NOFORM

(b)(1),(b)(3);10 USC §130b,(b)(6)

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM

SECRET/NOFORM
"61 IS DOWN"
THE RANGERS ON THE GROUND AT CRASH SITE ONE

(b)(1),(b)(3): 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1),(b)(6): 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1),(b)(6): 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)

(b)(1),(b)(3): 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)
(b)(1),(b)(3):10 USC §1306(b)(6)
(b)(1), (b)(3): 10 USC §130b (b)(6)
MH-6 PILOTS
RESCUE OF CRASH VICTIMS ON 3 OCT 93
CSAR (COMBAT SEARCH AND RESCUE) AND SUPER 68
SECRET/NOFORN

(b)(1),(b)(3): 10 USC § 130b, (b)(6)

SECRET/NOFORN

(b)(1),(b)(3): 10 USC § 130b, (b)(6)

SECRET/NOFORN

(b)(1),(b)(3): 10 USC § 130b, (b)(6)

SECRET/NOFORN

(b)(1),(b)(3): 10 USC § 130b, (b)(6)

SECRET/NOFORN

(b)(1),(b)(3): 10 USC § 130b, (b)(6)
<p>| | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(b)(1)</td>
<td>(b)(3)</td>
<td>10 USC §130b.(b)(6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)(1)</td>
<td>(b)(3)</td>
<td>10 USC §130b.(b)(6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)(1)</td>
<td>(b)(3)</td>
<td>10 USC §130b.(b)(6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)(1)</td>
<td>(b)(3)</td>
<td>10 USC §130b.(b)(6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)(1)</td>
<td>(b)(3)</td>
<td>10 USC §130b.(b)(6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b)(1)</td>
<td>(b)(3)</td>
<td>10 USC §130b.(b)(6)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

24TH SPECIAL TACTICS SQUADRON

---

SECRET/NOFORN

---

43
A FIRE SUPPORT OFFICER'S STORY

50
RANGER MEDICS IN SOMALIA

(S/NF)
(b)(1), (b)(3); 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)

(S/NF)
(b)(1); 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)

(S/NF)
(b)(1); 10 USC §130b, (b)(6)

(S/NF)
(b)(1), (b)(3); 10 USC §130b, (b)(5)
THE QUICK REACTION FORCE

(b)(1), (b)(3); 10 USC §130b (b)(6)
(b)(1), (b)(3): 10 USC §1306, (b)(6)
"IT'S GOING TO BE A LONG NIGHT"