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FEB 13 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Robert M. Gates

CC: Vice President
Secretary of State

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT: Meeting with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf, 12 February 2007

1. (S) Summary. Secretary of Defense Gates (SecDef) met with Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf in Rawalpindi to urge greater Pakistani efforts against Taliban and Al-Qaeda networks in Pakistan. SecDef made the following points: 1) Musharraf's work to bring together moderate Muslim nations was appreciated by the U.S.; 2) the U.S. is committed to working with Pakistan in the long run; 3) the expected Taliban Spring Offensive requires strong Pakistani action against Taliban safe havens within Pakistan; and 4) we must work more closely together along the border; 5) the U.S. has budgeted significant funds for development of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) initiative and will press allies to do the same; and 6) the U.S. will do what it can to improve the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Musharraf made the following points: (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(1)

End summary.

2. (S) Musharraf's Moderate Muslim Initiative: SecDef opened the meeting by thanking President Musharraf for his efforts to get moderate Muslims to work together more closely. Musharraf stated he had just returned from an overseas trip where he was laying the groundwork for a series of formal meetings. There would be a conference of Muslim foreign ministers in Pakistan, then a summit in Mecca which would issue a declaration. Musharraf added that the countries he was working with (such as Turkey and Malaysia) have a voice, credibility, and acceptability in both the West and in the Islamic world.

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This group could be a force for conciliation and have a positive role in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Lebanon and Iraq. He did not know if the initiative would succeed, but it was better to try than to do nothing.

3. (S) U.S. Long Term Commitment: SecDef drew on his personal experience, stating that he had first come to Pakistan in 1986, when the U.S. and Pakistan were working together to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

4. (S) Taliban Spring Offensive: (b)(1)


(b)(1)

5. (S) US Support for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) Initiative: SecDef said the U.S. would support Musharraf's FATA initiative, and urge others to support it as well. SecDef had urged fellow defense ministers at Seville to contribute development funds to Pakistan for the FATA and elsewhere. The U.S. was committed to finding resources for the Frontier Corps. (b)(1)

(b)(1)


6. Pakistani Action and Afghan Inaction on the Taliban: (b)(1)

(b)(1)




7. Musharraf's View of the Balochi Insurgency: (b)(1)

(b)(1)



8. Pakistan's Three Point Plan to Deal with Taliban/Al-Qaeda - Border Control:

(b)(1)



(b)(1)

9. ~~(S)~~ Pakistan's Three Point Plan to Deal with Taliban/Al-Qaeda – Controlling Refugee Camps: (b)(1)

(b)(1)

10. ~~(S)~~ Pakistan's Three Point Plan to Deal with Taliban/Al-Qaeda – Military Action:

(b)(1)

11. ~~(S)~~ SecDef and Musharraf Private Conversation: SecDef then asked to meet privately with Musharraf. (b)(1)


(b)(1)

12. ~~(S)~~ Musharraf Still Unhappy with Karzai: (b)(1)

(b)(1)

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(b)(1)



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