



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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September 30, 2001; 10:10 AM

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FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
(Peter W. Rodman, (b)(6)) *PRC*

SUBJECT: Access Issues in Support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (U)

• ACCESS PROBLEMS

Uzbekistan: Has agreed to overflights and basing of CSAR and transport aircraft, as well as providing a "cover" for covert operations. But they have not yet acceded to requests to use their country to base SOF ground operations and are seeking US security guarantees.

FEITH
NOTES
Combined Air Operations Center

Saudi Arabia: Rejected our most recent request for deployment of an infantry platoon to secure a PATRIOT site, a TMD planning cell, and a plus-up for the CAOC. They have limited overflight rights to no more than 30% increase of "normal" traffic and continue to insist no combat operations to be conducted from Saudi bases. The arrest on 28 September of a U.S. national attempting to remove records of Saudi helicopter pilots trained in the U.S. from the Ministry of Defense and Aviation has added to their angst.

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Oman: AWACS is allowed in Thumrait but landing and overflight rights are conditional elsewhere with no basing allowed for combat operations and beddown only for CSAR.

• ACTIONS TO DATE

Bilateral access issues have been handled by country teams from the respective embassies and by phone calls between senior U.S. and host nation defense officials. This is a region that addresses the most important bilateral issues by building personal relationships. To date, we have been to the region only once--Egypt, earlier this month.

Rodman and a team from his office

• PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

We believe two fundamental decisions are needed to make progress on the access issue:

(1) Uzbekistan. We have a basic strategic decision to make: do we deal independently with the Central Asian states or do we accede to Russian primacy in the region? Therefore, the manner in which we decide to use either Tajikistan or

~~Classified by DASD William J. Lutz
Reason: 1.5 (A)
Declassify on: September 30, 2011~~

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Uzbekistan in our Afghanistan strategy is pivotal. If we agree to filter our requests for Central Asian cooperation through Moscow, we contribute to the restoration of Russian regional hegemony. Tajikistan is a virtual Russian military protectorate, a politically failed state, with a virulent pro-Iranian radical Islamic insurgency and a corrupt, drug-profiteering leadership. Uzbekistan, although fiercely independent, is seeking security guarantees against a burgeoning Afghan-based Islamic insurgency with ties to Osama bin Ladin. Our interests clearly lie in establishing an independent Uzbekistan. We need to be willing, however, to back up any security guarantees after the war to avoid risking our credibility in the region.

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(2) Gulf states. Personal diplomacy in the form of visits by the Vice President or yourself may be our best next steps. Gen Franks has advocated a trip by senior officials for some time. Many of our senior allied officials know the Vice President from his service during Desert Shield/Storm. In his new capacity as Vice President, he will be able to renew old acquaintances, personalize the Administration's concerns, and deal with host nation access issues. If he cannot travel, your presence on the ground would be helpful. As a senior coalition leader, you would be able to make the access case directly to key decision makers.

• **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

- Choose Uzbekistan (with security guarantees).
- You or the Vice President travel to the Gulf.

COORDINATION: Tab A

Prepared by: (b)(6) COL, USA, (b)(6)

DASD / *[Signature]* 7/30
1300

Tab A: Coordination

Tab B: Partnership for Peace language