


## Information as Advertisement and Advertisement as Information

*China's Global Commercial and Public Affairs Information System*



A research and assessment project in support of the Office of Net Assessment, Department of Defense

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## Executive Summary

*"They cannot represent themselves, they must be represented" (Marx 1852)*

In the 19<sup>th</sup> century, Karl Marx made this observation about French farmers and their inability to assert their class interests within the State. Global information and communication infrastructure that is accessible to the common man today significantly adjusts the conclusion of Marx regarding whether or not the commoner has the means to 'represent themselves' – today they can. This adjustment to a tenet of Marxism set up a debate in China – the fundamental concept of inserting and exchanging thought and opinion in the public domain of information – and challenges the Party to not only to provide for and be a leader in 'messaging' but also to permit and even encourage public discourse. This new 'opening' of China will have an impact both on development of the nation, and on China's engagement with the world. The challenge is how internal information engagement will be managed, and how China will engage in the global *netcitizen* sphere, while attempting to build a positive perception of China and maintain stability. It is the ultimate challenge of perception management.

In 2006, Wu Youfu, Vice President of the Shanghai Public Relations Association and chancellor of Shanghai Foreign Language University suggested that China use the panda rather than the dragon as its national symbol.<sup>1</sup> Across cultures, it was reasoned better to recruit the iconic aid of a benign panda bear than the intimidating stature of a dragon. This symbolic shift sparked both criticism and spirited discussion among Chinese on both the mainland and overseas. At the



center of this debate lies the cultural assumption that Chinese concepts are too specific to be understood correctly by foreigners. However, because 20<sup>th</sup> century discourse of international relations is Westernized, fears are that if the Chinese government expresses itself in the usual international, "panda" language, it will lose its "Chinese-ness" and will be criticized by the Chinese people for being too Westernized.<sup>2</sup> The process continues however. More recently, this shift in branding can be seen in the printing of six million new 10 yuan (U.S. \$1.45) bills. The new currency notes have been released to commemorate the Olympics.<sup>3</sup> In an enormous political shift, Chairman Mao has been replaced by the image of Beijing's Bird's Nest stadium.

<sup>1</sup> <http://book.qq.com/a/20061205/000034.htm> (according to the survey, 90 percent of Chinese people were against giving up the dragon as a Chinese symbol).

<sup>2</sup> Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power, Yiwei Wang, *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 2008

Stability in all PRC sectors is generating confidence, and with that comes the opportunity for outside engagement. An increasingly confident Chinese politic deepens Advertisement as Information – Information as Advertisement outside the government sector, networking the domestic economy with global business. More than a macro-diplomatic tool, advertisement-era semi-privatized messaging also fosters the involvement of the individual (e.g. MySpace, YouTube, blogs, group-texts). The PRC has crossed a new threshold. In today's China, the individual has been empowered with information and the means to engage in "opinion" and message development through self advertising.

The current Chinese leadership appears to have fully embraced the value of public diplomacy and has set its sights on learning how to promote Chinese soft power globally. This paper explores the strategies, systems, and effectiveness of China's ability to communicate – to advertise – its message at home and abroad. Through careful shifts in symbolism and outsider engagement, 21st century China has grown adept at presenting beneficial China information as advertisement<sup>4</sup> and seemingly apolitical advertisement as information—subtle international messaging. China's 30-year transition from dragon to panda is traced in this paper: from the political stratagem of propaganda and overt political messaging to politically benign advertisement.

The use of the term advertisement is purposeful. Analysis of the advertisement industry in China indicates its increasing use in messaging and communication through commercial advertising. Advertising for profit in the PRC didn't exist until after 1979 and it has developed rapidly in recent years. In 2005, commercial advertising was an \$18 billion dollar industry representing 0.78% of China's GDP.<sup>5</sup>

Taking the concept of advertising a step further, and employing the English-language *China Daily* newspaper, foreign-targeted CCTV programs, and internationally heard China Radio International (CRI), China "advertises" itself abroad as an important voice on the world scene, a Chinese alternative to CNN and the BBC (CCTV-9 and CRI). Since the 1990s China's media organs have been functioning much like those in the West—by private entrepreneurial investment and advertisement. When perusing the *China Daily*, ads range from "China Investment Directories" to "Luxury China Hotel Indexes" to advertisements for the *China Daily* or the Olympic games to pleas that readers "Donate Now for Earthquake Relief" (pictured right).

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<sup>3</sup> While meant to be part of China's messaging to the world, this new currency could not distribute fast enough for street entrepreneurs to hawk the demand – asking over RMB300-400 for a new RMB10 bill.

<sup>4</sup> This paper will play with the concept of "advertisement", often highlighting a shift in China away from "propaganda" or "messaging" and towards the capitalistic edge of "advertisement".

The OED defines "advertisement" as:

1. a paid announcement, as of goods for sale, in newspapers or magazines, on radio or television, etc.
2. a public notice, esp. in print.
3. the action of making generally known; a calling to the attention of the public

<sup>5</sup> *Brand New China*

Probably no other single issue provides a more comprehensive illustration of China's expanding communication and information dissemination system than the handling of the upcoming 2008 Beijing Olympics. The Games offer China the opportunity to demonstrate its ability to mobilize resources and attract

investment by showcasing Chinese modernization efforts. The overarching message is that China is not just a rising power but a peaceful and orderly one. The new 10 Yuan note, which features not Mao but the iconic "bird's nest" Olympic stadium, is proof positive of China's determination to enhance its global image.



*The U.S. and other Western countries possess or control almost all the world's media and they mostly show the negative side of China to Western audiences.<sup>6</sup>*

China has long perceived the Western press coverage it receives as often hostile and sometimes deliberately slanderous. China's Foreign Propaganda organizations attempt to counter erroneous statements and protect China's international reputation by using a combination of previously developed and new messaging methods.

As outlined in previous IHSI research (*China's Convergent Communications Network*" & *"China's Information Development, Management, and Dissemination*), the PRC clearly recognizes the importance of information and communication technology (ICT) to network **sustained economic growth and political stability**. In order to remain a financially profitable central player in the borderless realm of *e-commerce* (delete this and a diplomatically viable participant in instantaneous communications exchange), China has vigorously pursued the creation of a seamless ICT network and an efficient physical infrastructure to employ it domestically and abroad. International political relationships, global commerce and the newly empowered individual demand no less. Today the development of a state-of-the-art convergent communications foundation to enable broadcasting, publishing, internet development, telecommunications, and technological advancement incentives are prominently in evidence all over China.

We further assess that China's use of semi-privatized media networks and embrace of 'convergence'<sup>7</sup> technologies (i.e. cutting edge telecom services or web-based broadcasting/publishing) will give the current system of central leadership distinct advantages when delivering influential messaging and 'advertisement' as long as it successfully manages the expectations of individuals now relatively empowered by access to networked communications. PRC senior officials must thread a delicate balance when delivering political messages nationally and internationally. They must successfully employ the converging communications system while at the same time maintaining primary influence over China's information infrastructure. Control over the control over the many layered modal messaging structure – increasingly led by *the people's entrepreneurial periphery* will be challenging. Consequently, it is not only important to have the ICT means to deliver a message, it is critical that the PRC leadership have the dexterity necessary to influence the system and positively communicate a cultural message through the use of information as advertisement, advertisement as information.<sup>8</sup>

### Paper Overview

Formal Abstract: This paper examines China's progress in developing a global commercial and public affairs communication and information system. With the core of the China Radio

<sup>6</sup> Duiwai xuanchuan cankao (Foreign Propaganda Reference) 4 (2004): 12.

<sup>7</sup> '4<sup>th</sup> + ' communication technologies

<sup>8</sup> "China's Convergent Communications Network" & "China's Information Development, Management, and Dissemination", IHS International, 2008.

International (CRI) infrastructure, China is now pushing to advance the quality and scope of its 'content' for information and entertainment to a global public affairs and commercial audience.

Chapter 1 - tracks the evolving strategies of China's foreign messaging from the 1980s, through the Tiananmen demonstrations of 1989, to the present.

Chapter 2 - will consider how China's propaganda in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is not so easily distinguished from marketing. Following a 20 year evolution from overt propaganda to one of public affairs/advertisement, 21<sup>st</sup> century China is fully engaged in the art of *self branding* at home and abroad

Chapter 3 – describes the role that China Radio International plays in message dissemination within China and overseas. With 290 hours of daily programming beamed across the world in 43 languages through some 50 short-wave transmitters in Asia alone, China Radio International (CRI) is a significant component of Beijing's international public diplomacy effort

Chapter 4 – presents the “case study” of China's Olympic marketing. Probably no other single issue provides a more comprehensive illustration of China's determination to project a carefully crafted image of mastery and modernity relative to the upcoming 2008 Beijing Olympics.



**1980s: Foreign Propaganda, Finding Friends**

During the 1980s the Chinese understood "Foreign Propaganda" as essential to reflect a post-Mao, modern China. This marked a dramatic departure from the last ten years of the Mao era during which xenophobia had escalated to the point at which China was almost completely isolated from the world outside. During these years no ordinary Chinese citizen dared to be seen fraternizing with a foreigner for fear of accusations of being a spy.<sup>9</sup> But rather than overthrowing its political system, China of the 1980s was prompted to position itself as economically central to the international market place. While Mao-era propaganda attacked foreign imperialism and *foreign* propaganda, Chinese propaganda officials of the 1980s were actually instructed to "de-emphasize the political content [Marxist/Maoist aspects] of their work and stress that China was a democratic country with a proper legal system."<sup>10</sup> An approachable international image for China was correctly understood as essential to modernization and economic involvement.

Hence, in 1980, the Chinese formed a Foreign Propaganda Group (*duiwai xuanchuan xiaozu*) to specialize in messaging outside of China. In the years following 1980, foreign messaging was no longer concentrated solely in Beijing. Indeed, every province and administrative area in China formed its own foreign propaganda unit. This marked a dramatic change. More than forty government department and semi-private organizations followed suit by establishing their own "official foreign media spokespersons."<sup>11</sup> A national meeting of local propaganda bureaus was held in 1982 and each area in China was instructed to do what they could locally to encourage foreign investment and tourism in their towns or provinces.<sup>12</sup> Also during the early 80s the Foreign Propaganda Group encouraged the increase in foreign propaganda news bureaus, broadcasting, films, television, and publishing (all of which was simultaneously undergoing a major modern revitalization). It was during this period that the Chinese released their first English-language newspaper, *The China Daily*, filled with carefully crafted, China-friendly messaging for non-China audiences.

Beginning in the late 1970s and lasting until the late 1980s, all foreigners were treated as potential friends of China—friends who should be treated as such. Therefore, propaganda released during this time was engineered to appeal to foreign tastes, and overcome suspicions. While the message would carry a Chinese flavor, it would rarely contain a hard-line political message. Unlike the Mao era, both official and non-official propagandists were advised by the CCP via the Foreign Propaganda Group not to use political slogans. If they had to use these

<sup>9</sup> Marketing Dictatorship

<sup>10</sup> "Sifabu Zou Yu fubuzhang tan zhengzhi gongzuode duiwai xuanchuan," *Duiwai baodao cankao* (Foreign Reports Reference) no. 8 (1983): 2-4, "Zhu Muzhi tan duiwai wenhua jiaoliu he xuanchuan gongzuo," *Duiwai baodao cankao* 9 (1983); Zhu Muzhi, "Zai quan guo duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua," November 26, 1986, Zhu Muzhi Discusses Foreign Propaganda, 120.

<sup>11</sup> Marketing Dictatorship

<sup>12</sup> Zhu Muzhi, "Zai quanguo duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua," October 30, 1990, *Zhu Muzhi lun duiwai xuanchuan* (Zhu Muzhi Discusses Foreign Propaganda) (Beijing: Wuzhou chuanbo chubanshe, 1995), 296.

slogans, then they were to adapt them—translate them—to phrasing that foreigners could understand in terms that would not unsettle them.<sup>13</sup>

### **1989: The Pendulum Swings**

The Tiananmen Square Demonstrations, which transpired between April and June of 1989, swung China back to a state of isolationist protectionism. The CCP perceived China as under attack by hostile foreign forces (the most divisive of which was rioting within China itself) seeking to undermine the CCP's hold on China, power, and stability. Marking a dramatic departure from the Foreign Propaganda Group's work to forge ties with foreigners, the protest movement delivered a new framework for thinking about foreigners. The CCP set up a new anti-foreign propaganda effort within China. This propaganda blamed foreign ideology and deceit for the unsettling protests. During the riots senior propagandist and party member Zhu Muzhi issued a report to the Party in which he described the Western press as vilifying the Party's response to the "democratic uprisings" detailed by the foreign media. He explained that China's internationally-released propaganda would have to battle actively for a "just" world opinion of China. Zhu Muzhi explained that propaganda released on the subject of Tiananmen should speak to the fact that the events of April-June of 1989 marked an anti-government rebellion and not a peaceful demonstration. Furthermore, propaganda should attempt to demonstrate why it was necessary to employ military force to re-establish order. All propaganda, according to Zhu Muzhi, should stress that despite the surface unrest, China remained economically and politically stable.

Following the Tiananmen tragedy and the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, China's new leadership became convinced that the Western world did not want China to become strong and was fundamentally opposed to the PRC for ideological reasons. These conclusions became the framework for China's foreign propaganda work in the 1990s and early twenty-first century.

### **1990s: Foreign Propaganda, Protecting China**

The demonstrations of 1989 alongside the collapse of the Soviet Union left China more isolated from the outside world than it had been even under Mao's protective rule in the 1960s. In order to combat the hostile foreign assessments of China, in the 1990s China redoubled its efforts to establish an unmediated voice among the international media. In March of 1990, the CCP revived the Central Committee Foreign Propaganda Group (which had been closed down in 1988). In 1991 the CCP established the Office of Foreign Propaganda/State Council Information Office—making the Office of Foreign Propaganda a separate unit from the Central Propaganda Department.<sup>14</sup> The OFP/SCIO became the public face of China's foreign messaging work. Between 1990 and 1998 Zhu Muzhi was placed in charge. From 1998 until 2005, Zhao Qizheng assumed control of the OFP/SCIO. In late 2005, Cai Wu became the leader of foreign messaging and was given the title "Minister of Information".

As China increased its involvement with the outside world it also increased the volume of foreign propaganda being produced. But as economic efficiency became more and more

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<sup>13</sup> Marketing Dictatorship

<sup>14</sup> 156

central—as State Owned Enterprises began to mount their own advertising campaigns to court private funding and turn a profit—China’s foreign messaging was also semi-privatized. While the philosophical framework contained in China’s overseas messaging was centrally determined, the State was no longer capable of paying for this “news” to find its way to foreign readers. It therefore became important that China produce news—books, articles—that the outside world would care to purchase. Hence, in 1994, the Foreign Language Press underwent a major reform. With the advent of the internet, the CCP also managed to cut costs by posting (not printing) Party lines on the official PRC webpage.

Just as the 1990s increase in foreign messaging required more sustainable economic tactics, it also required a more elaborate organizational structure for the propaganda work itself. The CCP Central Committee Foreign Propaganda Group maintained its role as the policy setter in foreign messaging. The policies were, in turn, implemented at the provincial level by propaganda offices with direct officials in various government departments and work units whose interests touch on foreign propaganda, such as: foreign affairs, foreign trade, tourism, overseas Chinese affairs, radio and television, print media.<sup>15</sup> Also re-invented during the Deng-era, was the term “foreign propaganda”, which was re-titled “public relations/publicity and information.”

### Taiwan, for Example

The changing decades of China’s distinctive foreign propaganda policy can be observed in the PRC’s evolving propaganda directed at Taiwan. During the Mao era propaganda aimed to “divide and demoralize, incite rebellion and get them to come over [to the communist side].”<sup>16</sup> All that changed in the 1980s during which the PRC attempted to build emotional connections, create positive propaganda, and to emphasize unity, friendship, and politeness. One propaganda document dating to that period explains of China’s intended engagement with Taiwan, “we certainly won’t attempt to sow discord, deceive or slander, nor will we ridicule or speak sarcastically.”<sup>17</sup> The document goes on to describe how important it is to avoid ideological questions about Taiwan’s independence, as this fractious issue will only serve to further deteriorate China’s true unity. Indeed, the goal of all of China’s 1980s friendly posturing with Taiwan was unity. Careful “thought work” was performed on Taiwan’s traveling journalists who arrived in China only to be shown the most impressive and China’s friendly of vantages—producing China-friendly perspectives practically regardless of personal biases.

Friendly policy shifted after the summer of 1989. During the 1990s the PRC became concerned that Taiwan was pumping incendiary radio and television programs into the Chinese mainland. Indeed, on June 1990 the PRC claimed to have heard the ROC Information Office (of Taiwan) making a covert decision to export as much Taiwanese culture and intellectual products to China as possible. They were doing this in order to bring about a “qualitative change”—*democracy*—in China. During this period, rather than engage Taiwan in a friendly manner that invited feeling

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<sup>15</sup> Sifabu Zou Yu fubuzhang tan zhengzhi gongzuode duiwai xuanchuan,” *Duiwai baodao cankao* (Foreign Reports Reference) no. 8 (1983): 2-4, “Zhu Muzhi tan duiwai wenhua jiaoliu he xuanchuan gongzuo,” *Duiwai baodao cankao* 9 (1983); Zhu Muzhi, “Zai quan guo duiwai xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua,” November 26, 1986, Zhu Muzhi Discusses Foreign Propaganda, 945.

<sup>16</sup> Brady, Anne-Marie quoting Li Yuanjiang, ed., *Duiwai xuanchuan jichu* (Basic Foreign Propaganda) (Guangzhou: Guangdong renmin chubanshe, 1987), 85.

<sup>17</sup> Brady, Anne-Marie quoting *Duiwai xuanchuan jichu*, 85.

of deep-seated unity, China directly and openly criticized Taiwan's domestic, democratic politics in an attempt to undermine Taiwan's own covert, derisive propaganda program in China.


Today, however, China is once again promoting the message of cultural *unity* in its Taiwan-issued propaganda—though the key term is now “Chineseness”—the Chinese national brand—and the emphasis has ostensibly shifted from politics to commerce. In order to prevent Taiwan's cultural products from flooding the Chinese market, China promotes Chinese culture in its overtly friendly Taiwan engaged propaganda. And the marketing of Chinese culture to Taiwanese and Taiwanese culture to Chinese doesn't stop there. In fact, in the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, when Taiwan began transmitting cable broadcasts within the United States China quickly followed suit so as not to be left behind the battle for the best international image.

### Branding in China in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century

This chapter will consider how China's propaganda in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is not so easily distinguished from marketing. China's foreign messaging looks more and more like state-approved advertising. In 2005, commercial advertising represented an \$18 billion dollar industry—up 12% from the previous year. This means that advertising represents 0.78% of China's GDP.<sup>18</sup> While there were no ad agencies in 1979, by 2005 there were 84,272 and approximately 9,650 advertising media; the total number of personnel employed by ad agencies increased from 700,000 in 2001 to 940,415 in 2005. The newly celebrated "China Brand" blurs the line between messaging and marketing. The geopolitical marketplace transforms politics to profit. Following a 20 year evolution from overt propaganda to one of public affairs/advertisement, 21<sup>st</sup> century China is fully engaged in the art of *self branding*. In this Chapter, Part I introduces the contemporary concept of branding in China utilizing three examples, *Chinese Cola*, *Lenovo*, and *Olympic sponsors*. Part II, identifies the evolving media for foreign (and domestic) messaging/advertising: television, internet broadcasting, print media, and radio.

#### Part I: Brand China

Figure 1. Foreign direct investment in China




Source: Jianguo Liu and Jared Diamond, *China's Environment in a Globalizing World*. Nature 435, 1179-1186 (30 June 2005).

China has taken great strides in recent years to build national unity. By spreading technology—ensuring that everyone, from rural dweller to urbanite, has access to a television, radio,

<sup>18</sup> *Brand New China*

telecommunications technologies, or even a computer—China enables its media organs (like CCTV or CRI) to message to diverse Chinese nationals. These media delivered messages simultaneously activate the Chinese market to “buy” Chinese products and concepts. The PRC has also been effective at communicating with its overseas Diaspora (as Chapter 3 will discuss), while China’s foreign advertising has been effective at encouraging the economic investment by foreign nations and companies. Since China began its concerted effort to engage foreign markets, investors and technologies in 1979, foreign direct investment in China has increased dramatically (as Figure 1 indicates). However, China’s political position internationally is still not central (as Figure 2 suggests below). In order for China to continue its economic climb from workshop of the world to industrialized power—from developing country to international superpower—it will have to resolve the disconnect between its empowered economic position and more isolated international political position. China’s promising 21<sup>st</sup> century strategy, the results of which are still inconclusive, is employing a softer focus public affairs/advertising message not “propaganda”—pandas not dragons—to market a sociopolitical brand China.

**Figure 2. Percentage of populations which favor China politically**



Source: Gallup International Voice of the People 2007 survey

## Localizing: Chinese Cola



In the Western advertising industry the concept of “local” versus “global” once represented a simple binary. While “Coca-Cola” is easily sighted as a *global* enterprise, “Joe’s Cola” might self-promote as a *local’s* brew. However, a closer look at China and the internationalized business community challenge this dualistic thinking. Wahaha, a Chinese company<sup>19</sup>, re-named the product it began marketing (largely in Eurasia) as “Future Cola” to “Chinese Cola” (pictured left). Future Cola’s Chinese Cola marketing: “The Chinese People’s own cola” alongside the slogan “the future will be better” has actually delivered Future Cola a substantial share of the soft drink market—with 70% of Pepsi Cola’s sales and 30% of Coke

sales. Furthermore, they do the PRC a service as they popularize Brand China from the entrepreneurial periphery. In 2001, Wahaha parlayed its China-built base into the American market, where it introduced “China Cola” (pictured right) which it marketed as a health food replete with China-imported herbal infusion with little success. While most modern business falls into the global niche, increasingly the operative word and practice is *localization*. How can a multinational corporation or transnational ad agency appeal to a local market—in China, one that is increasingly nationalistic?



From the U.S. to China, very few “local” brands are true local originals these days, and national ownership says little about how a brand is actually perceived by target consumers. These mixed prototypes push consumers to renegotiate the meaning of localness and localization. For Chinese advertisers and politicians alike *localization* is a push to recast “Made in China” as “Created in China” both to the disparate Chinese citizenry and foreign investors. China uses its messaging system to cultivate a respected *local* image on the *global* scale. But the simple “local” branding of China’s 1.3 billion person contents is no simple task. It involves constructing a national image of unity and marketing that over an elaborate media network to China’s 52 ethnic groups and far slung populace.

## Olympic Sponsors

The International Olympic Committee has 11 TOP (“The Olympic Partner”) sponsors. These are global sponsors who have paid tens of millions of dollars to associate their brand with the Games, and pursue lucrative business opportunities surrounding the prestigious event.<sup>20</sup> As an event that commands the focus of the media and the attention of the entire world, the Olympics are one of the most effective international marketing platforms in the world. The TOP partners for the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games are Coca-Cola, Atos Origin, General Electric, Johnson & Johnson, Kodak, Lenovo, Manulife, McDonald’s, Omega, Panasonic, Samsung, and Visa.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>19</sup> The owner of Wahaha, Zong Qinghou, is the 14<sup>th</sup> richest man in China.

<sup>20</sup> Madden, Normandy, “Sponsoring the Games: Marketing Plans Shaping Up,” [www.plasticsnews.com](http://www.plasticsnews.com) February 14, 2007.

<sup>21</sup> [www.olympic.org](http://www.olympic.org)



Traditional thinking would lead many people to imagine that each TOP company would have one global marketing campaign for the Beijing Olympics. But for these sponsors, the fundamental novelties of the Chinese commercial market, the consideration of the Torch Relay issue, and the continued criticism from groups who want them to use their influence to improve China's human rights record make their role as an "Olympic Partner" a substantial challenge. And yet, the sponsors plan to "stay the course", believing there is more of a financial upside to the relationships they build with Chinese consumers than a political downside globally.<sup>22</sup> China represents enormous growth potential for these companies, whose challenge it is to cement their brand's image with Chinese consumers without letting that process crumble their image with the rest of the world. For the Chinese government, the process becomes a valuable tool for using foreign companies to promote Beijing's agenda on a global stage.

While not a TOP company, Adidas<sup>23</sup> stands apart from the other sponsors by its more obvious promotion of Chinese nationalism. Its Olympics television campaign will air primarily in China, featuring almost exclusively Chinese athletes, and its driving theme will be Chinese pride in hosting and winning the Games. Adidas' risky focus on the home team is evidence of its larger mission: an attempt to overtake rival Nike in its share of the China market. While every brand is taking a calculated risk at the Beijing Games, Adidas faces more of a backlash than other sponsors because of its China-centric message.<sup>24</sup>

McDonald's is using a complex, much subtler approach to Chinese nationalism in their Olympic ad campaign. The most trumpeted element of McDonald's Olympic sponsorship is a reality television program called "McDonald's Champion Kids." Reality shows are extremely popular in China, and this one has aired regularly from October 2007. It brings together more than 200 children from 40 countries to compete in a series of quiz shows and athletic competitions, many of whom will also act as youth correspondents for their hometown media outlets during the Games.<sup>25</sup> Michael Wood, CEO of Leo Burnett ad agency,<sup>26</sup> explains that "nationalism is not a strategy... it is a shared value, which when executed in the right way by the right brand, can create a powerful connection with people." Phyllis Cheung, director of marketing for McDonald's in China, says, "We are an international company, no doubt about that. What we are doing is being locally relevant, rather than getting into the arena of playing up nationalism."<sup>27</sup> By centering the campaign's global message on McDonald's ongoing commitment to children's well-being, the image of gleaming, consummate patriotism portrayed by any bought-and-sold spokesman is replaced with the innocent ambition of a french-fry-eating future Olympian.

Visa is also finding ways to turn our attention toward international goodwill. Their new tagline, "Go World," stresses global harmony over nationalistic competition, and focuses on the achievement of the human spirit as embodied in the athletes. The sepia tones of Visa's visual

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<sup>22</sup> Fowler, Geoffrey A., "Cheers for China – Olympic Marketers Launch Ads Lauding the Home Team; Coke, Pepsi, McDonalds Make Patriotic Appeals," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 18, 2008.

<sup>23</sup> Adidas is officially a Beijing 2008 Partner, one sponsor-level below the TOP Worldwide Olympic Partners.


<sup>24</sup> Kang, Stephanie, "Adidas Ad Campaign Invokes Chinese Nationalism," *Wall Street Journal*, July 3, 2008

<sup>25</sup> McDonald's press release, from [www.chainleader.com](http://www.chainleader.com), June 2, 2008.

<sup>26</sup> Fowler, 2008. Leo Burnett is owned by Publicis Groupe, and works for both McDonald's and Coca-Cola in China.

<sup>27</sup> Fowler, 2008.





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
world's eighth-largest PC maker to the third-largest, after Dell and Hewlett-Packard. The brand Lenovo has chalked out a five-year transition to switch to a Lenovo-only brand, as it only has a five-year use of IBM's internationally known brand, yet Lenovo has moved far more swiftly to remove the IBM name from its brand-building venture than analysts and marketing experts had expected. Since Lenovo took over the IBM personal computer business on May 1, 2005, the company's advertising and marketing efforts have excluded IBM almost entirely. For example, the four television advertisements that Lenovo ran during the Turin Winter Olympics never mentioned IBM at all. In fact, the only connection to the iconic brand is the IBM logo, which still adorns Lenovo's ThinkPad laptops.

Clearly attempting to navigate the international markets successfully, the current headline on Lenovo's "USA" homepage reads, "Lenovo: Freedom to work, to play, to choose" in bold letters before the folds of an American flag. Meanwhile, Lenovo's Canada page entreats viewers to "Celebrate Canada!" by purchasing a laptop today. Lenovo has engineered a similar, yet alternatively edited (language specific) homepages, for sixty-five different countries to which it markets. Each page attempts to appeal to locals' nationalism as a marketing strategy. Still some experts argue that Lenovo has abandoned its internationally appealing "IBM" face too soon to succeed in the international marketplace. David Reibstein, a marketing professor at the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, said, "What Lenovo is trying to do is get itself established with credibility in this market, but it feels like a premature transition. Lenovo may be strong in China, but it is a non-name in the West."



The latest development on Lenovo's marketing front involves making Bangalore, India the global marketing hub from which it will drive all the marketing initiatives of the company. The hub, first established in July 2007 is expected to formulate marketing strategies and create marketing deliverables for print and online. It will also track the effectiveness of the marketing campaigns launched by the company around the world. There are many reasons for the choice of India as a marketing hub for Lenovo's global marketing activities. According to Lenovo, their Indian marketing and creative team is currently its best in the corporation and it has the experience of building brands from scratch. Furthermore, Lenovo has plans to route all their marketing deliverables (including advertisements and brochures) through the hub in order to benefit from the reduced costs of having English printing done in India. By establishing this Indian hub, Lenovo will also be closer to the Western markets which the company considers to be among the most important in future growth plans.

Deepak Advani, Lenovo's chief marketing officer, said the company recognized the value of the IBM brand and intended to keep the IBM name on ThinkPad products for the foreseeable future, even if the advertising did not mention IBM. "While we get established, having the IBM name



on the product gives customers comfort and assurance," Advani said. "But in our industry, there is a tight association between the company and the product, so we have to make sure it is clear that it is really Lenovo selling it to you and not IBM." Advani

acknowledged the challenge of gaining market share in the U.S. market, which is dominated by Dell and Hewlett-Packard. He said Lenovo had "deselected" the consumer market segment in the United States, preferring to concentrate on sales to small and midsized companies, as well as large corporate accounts.

Advani said Lenovo had tracked brand awareness in nine countries and noted that an Intellisearch survey showed that in the past six months the association between ThinkPad and IBM dropped substantially, while the association with Lenovo rose.<sup>33</sup>

## Part II: State-Owned and Semi-Private Media

### Television (CCTV)

Television played an important role in China's foreign propaganda work beginning in the 1990s. Before the 90s, television was seen as a means for the CCP to disseminate news and government decrees, to provide education and to enrich the populations' cultural life. It was employed as a *domestic* tool for implementing PRC propaganda—communicating the benefits of Communism and persuading the diverse Chinese population to support the CCP's policies. The Propaganda Committee of the CCP's Central Committee governed all broadcasting through the Ministry of Radio and Television. Until the late 80s, all funding (and approval) for China's radio and television transmissions came directly from government grants. Therefore, for many years there were no license fees for viewers and listeners, and programming depended on the central governance for both approval and funding. At the end of the 1980s and increasing throughout the 1990s, however, was the use of advertising to supplement a growing number of Chinese television shows and networks.

Throughout the 1990s numerous transnational television providers entered the Asian media marketplace. Hong Kong-based Star TV represented the first broadcaster to target Asia via satellite. Beginning in 1991 with five channels and increasing throughout the 90s, StarTV claimed household penetration across the whole of the Asian continent—increasing in the metrics of millions each year. The politically neutralizing facts of profitability delivered Hutchinson Whampoa's Star TV to the hands of Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation in 1993. Murdoch's purchase catalyzed the market entry of other global challengers and operators like MTV, ESPN, Discovery, TNT and HBO—all introduced to China via satellite.<sup>34</sup> By the end of 1993 up to 70 million Chinese were estimated to watch programs from transnational satellites that include AsiaSat1, Palapa, and Thaicom. Viewing the reception of unapproved satellite broadcasting as a threat to sociopolitical stability, in 1994 the State Council Proclamation No. 129 was signed by the Chinese premier Li Peng. This proclamation banned unlicensed ownership of satellite dishes on the grounds of preserving Chinese culture and socialism. Ironically, while Chinese broadcasters had begun to supplement their budgets by selling ad-space, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) had already begun



<sup>33</sup> "Lenovo makes break with the IBM brand: Chinese firm eases away from big name", *International Herald Tribune*, April 11, 2006.

<sup>34</sup> Thomas, Amos Owen, *Transnational Media and Contoured Markets: Redefining Asian Television and Advertising*, Sage Publications: London, 2004.

to supplement their falling government grants by manufacturing and selling (unlicensed) satellite dishes to Chinese citizenry. Furthermore, Chinese nationals were not only receiving foreign-produced programming via satellite. The many Chinese cable stations (which reproduced exponentially during the 1990s) would illegally relay transnational programming or pirated videos to local neighborhoods. Thus cable television had become a large-scale industry in China, attracting foreign investment (and programming) as well as domestic (including provincial government level) investment.

Aware of this phenomenon, the CCP sought to capitalize on this globalization of media both by turning a profit and making its own voice heard—internationally. In a 1989 meeting, top propagandists identified television as the most important tool to use for foreign messaging in the coming decade. The proliferation of Chinese broadcasting could not be achieved, however, without the financial subsidies derived from advertising. Because *Chinese brand* television was understood as important for both domestic and foreign messaging, the CCP loosened the “apron strings” from the once entirely SARFT-controlled, PRC-financed China broadcasting of the 1980s.

In 1992, the PRC established CCTV-4, a channel that targeted overseas and foreign Chinese viewers (including people in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau). In the mid-1990s CCTV entered into various commercial agreements with Associated Press TV (APTV), US-based Encore Media Corporation and Australia’s Channel Nine for supply and exchange of global news, sports, children’s programs, drama and movie programming. In 2000, CCTV-9 was established as an English-language channel (beginning in 2004—also available in Spanish and French) messaging to foreigners within China as well as English speakers outside of China’s borders. CCTV-9 is the Chinese estimated equivalent of CNN. It provides international news coverage that is Party approved, and China-friendly. Today, CCTV-4 and CCTV-9 can be viewed internationally on Fox and Time Warner networks.

The growth of transnational television was influenced not just by governments and policy makers and regulators but also by the management decisions of media-owners, cable operators, satellite providers, advertising agencies, marketers, software developers and other players, whether proactive or reactive. In 2000, the overall Asian television advertising market was estimated at a worth of US\$36 billion and is expected to more than double to US\$76 billion by 2010.<sup>35</sup>

Beijing wants to develop and wield its international broadcasting power. In recent years, Beijing has made major inroads into the overseas Chinese media market. While Beijing granted AOL Time Warner and China Entertainment Television a license to broadcast the commercial programs of China Central Television (CCTV) in Guangdong Province in 2002, the programs of CCTV-9 (CCTV’s 24/7 English channel) can be broadcast via AOL’s cable network in North America. CCTV-9 also can be watched via Sky Digital in Great Britain. Now, CCTV-9’s

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<sup>35</sup> Thomas, Amos Owen, *Transnational Media and Contoured Markets: Redefining Asian Television and Advertising*, Sage Publications: London, 2004, pp. 121.

broadcasting has more than 700,000 subscribers abroad, and its satellite broadcasting has more than 500,000 subscribers in the United States.<sup>36</sup>

Previous IHSI studies have identified some tactics that characterize Beijing's efforts to influence overseas Chinese media: (1) to directly control newspapers, television stations and radio stations through complete ownership or owning major shares; (2) to use economic ties to influence independent media that have business relations with China; (3) to purchase broadcast time and advertising space from existing independent media; and (4) to deploy its own people to work in independent media, achieving influence from within their ranks.<sup>37</sup>

### **Internet Broadcasting**

Internet-based broadcasting and blogging has created a fundamental culture shift. Through these means Chinese *individuals* are empowered to voice their opinions. Still other Chinese entrepreneurs enable these voices by supporting the online-interfaces by purchasing advertisement space. All this is happening with the awareness and de facto consent of the CCP.

### **Internet We Media**

According to BDA China, a Beijing-based research firm, the number of Internet users in China reached 228.5 million in March 2008, surpassing that of the U.S. for the first time, which was 217.1 million.<sup>38</sup> With the rapid penetration of Internet usage in China, came the development of Internet We Media,<sup>39</sup> an interesting phenomenon in a country known as being traditionally stringent in media and publication censorship. What stance the government has taken toward the We Media and how has it evolved in this short period of development? What role does the We Media play in Chinese domestic messaging and international messaging?

While the Internet emerged as a medium of accessing information in the beginning, one of the less anticipated results of its growth, especially for the Chinese government, is that the sources of information on the Internet could become so diversified as to include audiences themselves. From various forums on Internet portals, to blogs, and to the recently flourishing YouTube comparable sharing-your-own-video websites, the Chinese government at first viewed them with suspicion and then accepted them with caution. Recently, it began to respond to information posted on the We Media platforms in a more positive way and taking advantage of them for government messaging. The very fact that the government is allowing these sites to continue shows a strong shift in censorship, and signals the Party condones their content because its flavor is largely favorable to state interests. Growing nationalism online and the experience of YouTube comparative sites in China provides a strong example.

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<sup>36</sup> Ding, Sheng. "Digital Diaspora and National Image Building" Pacific Affairs. V80, No4, Winter 2007-2008. p642

<sup>37</sup> Duzhe Mei, "How China's government is attempting to control Chinese media in America," *China Brief*, vol. 1, no. 10 (2001), pp. 1-3.

<sup>38</sup> See IHSI report China's Convergent Communications Network, April 2008, page 20.

<sup>39</sup> The We Media refers to the phenomenon that online audience "become an active participant in the creation and dissemination of news and information" with all those "easy-to-use Web publishing tools, always-on connections and increasingly powerful mobile devices." -- See Lasica, J.D. (ed.), *We Media, How Audiences Are Shaping the Future of News and Information*, a thinking paper of the Media Center of the American Press Institute, July 2003, available at [http://www.hypergene.net/wemedia/download/we\\_media.pdf](http://www.hypergene.net/wemedia/download/we_media.pdf).

### *Chinese "YouTubes"*

According to iResearch, a Shanghai-based Internet survey firm, China's Internet video users will increase from 107 million in 2007 to 230 million in 2010. The value of online video market will jump from 900 million Yuan in 2007 to 3.65 billion yuan in 2010. One of the firm's surveys also found that in October 2007, Chinese netizens watched 257.59 million hours of video clips online, up 89% over the same period of 2006.<sup>40</sup>

Many Internet portals in China offer online video services, including existing Web portals and news portals run by traditional media organizations. Such Web portals are not a concern to the government. The emergence of YouTube-like sites, where they allow users to upload video footages to share with other users, was not embraced by the government in the beginning. This was understandable and not unexpected for a government that had been used to rigorous censorship. The content offered by individual users could easily get out of control in the government officials' eyes.

China's "YouTube" sites first appeared when two dominant sites tudou.com and 56.com launched almost at the same time in April 2005. In December 2006, youku.com was established, among numerous other launches that followed the YouTube model. Seeing the dramatic increase of Internet users in China and the huge potential for profits, international venture capitalists flocked to this industrial sector. By July 2008, the largest eight YouTube-like sites attracted close to US\$300 million of venture capital.<sup>41</sup>

However, just like the U.S. YouTube, various content issues also arose with the emergence of its Chinese peers, such as violations related to royalties. In addition to royalties, the Chinese government was also faced with challenges regarding censorship. For a long time, the government watched them with suspicion, but did not do much to curb their growth. During this period, the sites were left in a status of free growth and free competition, and youku.com and tudou.com rose to the top two positions in this sector.

In March 2008, the government tightened regulation of the sites, but the focus was on cracking down on intellectual property violations. Twenty-five of the sites, including tudou.com, were forced to shut down for three days for "publishing content that infringe upon intellectual property rights and royalties." On June 19, 2008, the State Administration of Radio Film and Television issued 247 licenses to entities that provide online video services. Most of the licensees were state-owned media entities, but popular Internet portals like sina.com and netease.com were also included. Surprisingly, the government did not exclude YouTube-like sites, such as ku6.com and 6.cn which were on the list, but the most popular youku.com and tudou.com were missing. As a second set of licenses were issued before the end of June 2008, without tudou.com and youku.com being listed, speculations and rumors became rampant about government policies toward the Chinese "YouTubes", making venture capitalists, advertisers and the businesses all

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<sup>40</sup> Wang Enbin, Paizhao Gaibian Hangye Guize, Shipin Wangzhan Jiang Liangji Fenhua, or Licensing changes industrial regulation, video websites go two extremes, available at [http://news.a.com.cn/Infos/news\\_72387.html](http://news.a.com.cn/Infos/news_72387.html).

<sup>41</sup> Shipin Wangzhan Zaoyu Bing Huo Liang Chong Tian, or Online Video Providers Encounter Two Totally Different Results, available at China Information Industry Network, <http://www.cnii.com.cn>.

very anxious.<sup>42</sup> However, youku.com received its license on July 10, 2008. The website is also reportedly negotiating with CCTV for authorization of broadcasting on-demand videos of the Olympic Games online. It is not the only one making this effort. UUsee.com, one of the earlier licensed websites, has already been authorized to cooperate with CCTV International to do online broadcasting of the Olympic Games.<sup>43</sup>

According to one report<sup>44</sup>, several contributing factors for sites to get a government license are that they have strengthened self-regulation and have avoided being caught by the government. One senior executive of a YouTube-like site believed that the regulator actually knows very well what is taking place on each site, as “this could be proved by the questions they ask when interviewing the sites’ executives for licensing decisions.”<sup>45</sup> One other important factor is that the government has realized the increasing role the YouTube sites, like other We Media format, plays in domestic messaging and international messaging. Following the snow storms in January/February 2008, the recent Tibet riots, and the Sichuan earthquake, the Internet has become an indispensable force in helping the government mobilize people to volunteer, to donate, to proclaim nationalism, and to help bridge the gap between the government and the people. From AntiCNN.com, to the video clip “Tibet Was, Is, and Will Always Be a Part of China” posted on YouTube by a Chinese college student in Canada, and to the My Space account of Wen Jia-bao established by a regular My Space Chinese user, the Internet has helped establish a positive image of the Chinese government. It is also one of the most convenient media forms for people to voice their dissatisfaction toward the government. This is especially true for the We Media, where audiences participate in public or private exchange of information and where they can easily do an online assembly, which can potentially lead to a physical assembly – a format to this day that is still forbidden by the government without approval. The nature of We Media is fundamentally in conflict with the widely known Communist “anti-democracy” ideology, but the Chinese government is accepting it. The reason is simple, the Chinese government is more confident than before. It indicates that the government is willing to take the We Media as a potential platform for people to supervise their governance, and it serves as evidence of their pledge to do a better job.

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<sup>42</sup> See Shipin Wangzhan Na Bu Dao Paizhao Bian Na Bu Dao Guanggao, or For Online Video Providers, No License, No Advertising, available at <http://tech.qq.com/a/20080707/000353.htm>.

<sup>43</sup> See [www.uusee.com](http://www.uusee.com). The authorization was announced on June 23, 2008.

<sup>44</sup> See Shipin Wangzhan Na Bu Dao Paizhao Bian Na Bu Dao Guanggao, or For Online Video Providers, No License, No Advertising, available at <http://tech.qq.com/a/20080707/000353.htm>.

<sup>45</sup> Same as above





A video footage titled "We Care for You (Premier Wen)!" is shown on youku.com. Dozens of footages produced by users eulogizing Premier Wen can be found on youku.com.

### Statistical Overview

1. Last year (2007), about 77% of Chinese netizens, or 160 million people, had the experience of watching online video; China's internet video market is estimated at 1.5 billion RMB yuan (over US 200 million) for the year of 2008;
2. Ad revenue of all websites providing online videos only accounts for 2% of Internet ad revenue in China -- a market with great potentials;
3. The largest eight websites providing videos online had raised US 250 million by May 2008. Investors include Adobe Systems and Softbank China. Youku.com has got US 40 million, Tudou.com, US85 million.
4. According to state law, technically the only companies that are eligible to provide streaming media services online should be state-owned, but exceptions have been made to some private companies that comply with government restrictions on content. The first batch of 247 entities licensed to provide such services were all state-owned, and a majority of them were TV stations and channels, radio stations, newspaper publishers and publishing houses.



5. Some privately run websites have recently been licensed, but they are not as popular as either Tudou.com or Youku.com, which had failed to get the license. The government cited their model - allowing users to upload video clips to share with viewers, or the UTube model - as the reason for not licensing them.
6. Online video viewership: most favorable content is related to movie and TV drama series, about 86.3% of viewers prefers it, next to it is sports, financial news, etc.
7. UUsee.com, one of the licensed websites, has got the right to cooperate with CCTV International to broadcast the Olympic Games online.

### **Print Media (China Daily)**

The Foreign Language Press underwent a structural overhaul during the 1990s. Many new print publications were established for foreign audiences in this decade, as Chinese began to realize that Party-friendly propaganda and profit might go hand-in-hand. Over the course of the 90s, the *China Daily* expanded its foreigner focus by setting up five new English language newspapers each of which targeted a specific market. Surprisingly, not all of these specific targets are, in fact, foreigners. In fact, the *China Daily's* most lucrative English-language subsidiaries (for example, *21<sup>st</sup> Century*) are aimed at Chinese learners of English—eager for practice reading material. The *China Daily's* other most profitable endeavors also involve the tutorial of Chinese nationals in the English language—during the nineties the *China Daily* developed a series of English-language classes, and led language-education trips abroad to English-speaking countries. Adaptive to the changing trends and marketplace, in 1995 the *China Daily* became the first PRC paper to publish an online version of itself—chinadaily.com.cn. Today, while 40% of the *China Daily's* viewership hails from within China, an impressive 60% of these online readers come from outside of China. (See previous two IHS papers (“China’s Convergent Communications Network” & “China’s Information Development, Management, and Dissemination”) for more detailed information on the bureaucratic structure of the *China Daily*)

### **Radio (China Radio International)**

In 1990, the PRC renamed Radio Peking Chinese Radio International, and shifted the target audience to include Chinese and non-Chinese alike. Today CRI broadcasts in 38 languages and 4 Chinese dialects. According to Chinese reports, CRI is one of the 21<sup>st</sup> century’s three most listened to radio stations internationally—in third place after VOA and BBC.

CRI is the only overseas radio broadcaster in the People’s Republic of China. CRI was founded on December 3, 1941 and is owned and operated by the state. CRI is one of the “three central media organizations in China” along with China National Radio (CNR) and China Central Television (CCTV). “English service” is one of CRI’s most important divisions. According to the CRI website, “it is widely acknowledged that the CRI English Service provides the world with one of the most efficient and convenient ways of learning about China. The programs broadcast by the English Service are comprehensive. They focus mainly on news but include a variety of feature programs. The entire staff of the English Service is dedicated to serving our listeners in order to build a bridge for the Chinese people to learn about the world and for the people around the globe to get to know China. Crienlish.com is the official English website of

CRI, providing comprehensive information on both Chinese and international topics. Through our website users can read program transcripts, view illustrations and hear our English radio programs. We are striving to act as a medium to introduce China to the world and provide you with the best service possible.”<sup>46</sup>

Because CRI plays such a central role in China’s foreign and domestic messaging—and because an IHS paper has yet to detail the bureaucracy behind this media—the following chapter will provide a more in-depth introduction to CRI as it plays out foreign and domestic semi-privatized messaging from the CCP.

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<sup>46</sup> [http://english.cri.cn/about\\_us/who-we-are.htm](http://english.cri.cn/about_us/who-we-are.htm)

Brand China is not only filling up Wal-Mart shelves with goods; its also penetrating overseas markets with cultural, economic, and political products launched from increasingly diverse and sophisticated messaging machinery. Chapter Three examines how China is leveraging its arsenal of soft power tools to inform and shape international and domestic public opinion. The following four tools are evaluated: (1) radio media: China Radio International (CRI); (2) cultural diplomacy: Confucius Institutes, China's version of Alliance Française, and the global explosion of Mandarin language study; and (3) the Chinese Diaspora: an enfranchised group that's increasingly connected to and employed by the motherland, particularly through digital media. Each of these tools is made more effective by the addition of new communications technology to CCP message development infrastructure. For example, CRI reaches 700,000 people a day through its 42 multi-lingual websites; overseas and domestic Chinese are bound together both by online video and national pride; commercials from Olympic sponsors, which are very pro-China, travel through satellite feeds before flickering across television sets worldwide. Beijing utilizes each of these tools to advertise brand China, to create a desirable international image of the mainland. This chapter concludes with two points: first, individual elements of Chinese soft power, such as state media organs, are not yet mature enough to rival US counterparts or command global opinion. Second, when these tools are combined, China's soft power is capable of shifting international perceptions of the mainland, particularly in the developing world.

### **Part I: China Radio International**

With 290 hours of daily programming beamed across the world in 43 languages through some 50 short-wave transmitters in Asia alone, China Radio International (CRI) spearheads Beijing's overseas messaging infrastructure. CRI joins China Central Television (CCTV) and China National Radio (CNR) to form the mainland's state-sponsored media triumvirate. While it does have a domestic broadcasting component, and CCTV and CNR do have international channels, CRI, unlike its counterparts, is primarily geared towards sending Party-friendly content abroad. Relatively few Chinese listen to its domestic news service, however, its local music and English-language broadcasts are a hit among young mainlanders. Roughly one million foreigners tune into its programming each day, including sizable African and Southeast Asian audiences.

### **CRI Development, Comparison with VOA and BBC**

Founded in the dusty yellow caves of Shaanxi province at the terminus of the Long March with a transmitter donated by the Soviets, Yan'an New China Radio, the first incarnation of CRI, bubbled to life with its maiden broadcast on December 3, 1941. Japanese announcer Hara Kiyoko rode to this makeshift studio on a donkey and read his script. Like the Voice of America (VOA) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), CRI came of age as a wartime publicity machine. All three opposed the Axis powers. VOA and the BBC cut their teeth countering Nazi propaganda in Latin America and the Middle East respectively. Both set sights on contradicting German broadcasts in North Africa. CRI, meanwhile, busied itself with anti-Japanese programming. With similar charters, the three broadcasters all grew into the voice of their empire:

VOA	<i>The long-range interests of the United States are served by communicating directly with the peoples of the world by radio. To be effective, the Voice of America must win the attention and respect of listeners. These principles will therefore govern Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts:</i> <i>1. VOA will serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA news will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive.</i> <i>2. VOA will represent America, not any single segment of American society, and will therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions.</i> <i>3. VOA will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively, and will also present responsible discussions and opinion on these policies.<sup>47</sup></i>
BBC	<i>The Public Purposes of the BBC are as follows —</i> <i>(a) sustaining citizenship and civil society;</i> <i>(b) promoting education and learning;</i> <i>(c) stimulating creativity and cultural excellence;</i> <i>(d) representing the UK, its nations, regions and communities;</i> <i>(e) bringing the UK to the world and the world to the UK<sup>48</sup></i>
CRI	<i>Introduce China to the world, introduce the world to China, and improve understanding and friendship between the Chinese people and the people outside China.<sup>49</sup></i>

All three sought to tell their story to the world and popularize their nation's viewpoint, but they did so differently. During its first broadcast on February 24, 1942, VOA stated, "daily at this time, we shall speak to you about America and the war. The news may be good or bad. We shall tell you the truth." In 1938, when the BBC Empire Service launched its Arabic language



Original text of the first CRI English Service broadcast

division, director John Reith announced over the crackly airwaves, "we hope with our distinguished friends that these broadcasts will increase and strengthen the understanding and friendship between Arabic speaking countries and Great Britain." The BBC and VOA often spoke of values like 'truth' and 'objectivity' even though they were publicly funded entities, which as the VOA charter put it, would only countenance 'responsible' discussions of national policy. CRI, beginning with its premier broadcast from Shahe village in northern Hebei province on September 11, 1947, was more self-aware of its inherent subjectivity. Presenter Wei Lin flatly told listeners her reports were "designed to inform our English speaking friends on Chinese affairs... in the belief that

such material is not readily available to the English-speaking world. We plan to bring to our radio audience the March of China – one fifth of humanity – over all obstacles towards a new

<sup>47</sup> <http://www.voanews.com/english/about/VOACharter.cfm>

<sup>48</sup> [http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory\\_framework/charter\\_agreement/royalchartersealed\\_sept06.txt](http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/regulatory_framework/charter_agreement/royalchartersealed_sept06.txt)

<sup>49</sup> Whenever official pronouncements mention 'the Chinese people', they really mean the CCP leadership. For example, when President Hu Jintao told France it had 'hurt the feelings of the Chinese people' by disrupting the torch relay in Paris with protests, he meant these events offended senior Party cadres. And when the top is angered, it activates its messaging apparatus to stoke nationalism and harness popular support, such as when CCTV ran a video clip on repeat of pro-Tibetan demonstrators attempting to wrestle the torch out of the hands of handicapped Jin Jing, an Olympic fencer confined to a wheelchair. When a population conditioned by an education system that stresses centuries of humiliation at the hands of foreigners saw these images, they got quite worked up. Boycotting Carrefour resulted.

democratic life, which profoundly affects the future course of world events.”<sup>50</sup> CRI positioned itself as an alternative perspective, not the universal standard. This contrasts with Voice of America’s mission statement: *“To promote and sustain freedom and democracy by broadcasting accurate and objective news and information about the United States and the world to audiences overseas.”*

Over the past sixty years, CRI, VOA, and the BBC matured into multi-media conglomerates that not only create radio content for shortwave, FM, and AM broadcast, but also offer online streaming audio, television programming, and news web sites in dozens of languages. Using the BBC as a comparison metric, CRI has come a long way from its days in the revolutionary caves of Yan’an. It has grown faster than any of its peers; in 2006, CRI pumped out more than 2,030 hours of radio a week, far surpassing VOA (1,370.4) and the BBC World Service (1,258). VOA is the only one of the three that is outlawed from broadcasting domestically.

But quantity doesn’t necessarily translate into reach. The BBC World Service broadcasts 179 hours of programming/day (less than its peers), but connects to 26 million people/day (far more than its peers). Each day 16 million tune into VOA while only 1 million find CRI on the radio dial.<sup>51</sup> Among the top three global state radio networks, the BBC garners the most listeners. CRI attracts the least. The Chinese broadcaster does, however, receive 700,000 hits/day on its website and 2.4 million letters and emails/year. Still, like its other Chinese state-owned media brethren, CRI has yet to capture a significant foreign audience. But CRI is not insignificant, just evolving.

	Employees	Annual Budget	Foreign Bureaus	Languages Broadcast	Daily Content	Global Listeners
<b>CRI</b>	1,830	\$14.6M	32	43*	290 hours	7M/week
<b>VOA</b>	1,173	\$190.4M	>20	45	200+ hours	115M/week
<b>BBC</b>	23,037	£239.5M	60+	33	179 hours	183M/week






Source: Data from annual reports, broadcaster websites. Under BBC, only daily content and listeners are World Service specific.

\* 43 via radio, 48 via webcast

As the table on the next page shows, CRI has been steadily ramping up its broadcast capacity for several decades. This growth has been consistent; after the death of Mao in 1976, China’s international message transitioned from ‘workers of the world unite’ to ‘reform and opening’. Unlike VOA, who saw funding and programming cuts between the end of the Cold War (1989) and the beginning of the war on terror (2001), the BBC and CRI did not need a new enemy to produce a new voice. The table above demonstrates that while CRI listenership and budget are not competitive, it does lead in number of service languages and amount of daily content.

<sup>50</sup> <http://baike.baidu.com/view/34368.htm>; [http://english.cri.cn/about\\_us/memory.htm](http://english.cri.cn/about_us/memory.htm)

<sup>51</sup> CRI does not make its annual budget or listenership figures publicly available. According to internal documents accessed by foreign journalists working there, CRI get approximately RMB 100 million/year from the government and reaches 1 million people with its broadcasts each day.

<b>Weekly Broadcast Output of World's Top Five State Radio Networks (hours)</b>							
<b>Broadcaster</b>	<b>1950</b>	<b>1960</b>	<b>1970</b>	<b>1980</b>	<b>1990</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>2006</b>
 <b>VOA, RFE/RL &amp; Radio Marti</b> <sup>52</sup>	497	1,495	1,907	1,901	2,611	1,821	2,728
 <b>China Radio International</b>	66	687	1,267	1,350	1,515	1,620	2,030
 <b>BBC World Service</b>	643	589	723	719	796	1,036	1,258
 <b>Radio Moscow / Voice of Russia</b>	533	1,015	1,908	2,094	1,876	726	~900
 <b>Deutsche Welle</b>	0	315	779	804	848	655	~600

Source: Voice of America 50<sup>th</sup> Year Anniversary Report (1942-2002); broadcaster websites; <http://www.answers.com/topic/voice-of-america>

<sup>52</sup> Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, which is also known as Radio Liberty, and Radio Marti, which is directed at Cuba, are part of the United States government-sponsored broadcasting apparatus. This infrastructure also includes Radio Farda, Radio Free Asia, Radio Sawa, and the Middle East Television Network. All of these media are run by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (<http://www.bbg.gov/>), headquartered on Independence Ave in Washington DC. The table above references Radio Free Europe and Radio Marti in addition to VOA.



#### Snapshot of CRI Content

"China Drive"

Monday, July 7, 2008

0900 - 1000 EDT

1120AM WUST in Washington DC

*China Drive* is an English-language talk show broadcast during rush hour traffic in Beijing on 91.5 Easy FM. Two thirds of CRI content is done in English. This program is transmitted around the globe through local partners like New World Radio (WUST 1120AM Washington DC), short wave, and live online playback.

Nancy, a Beijinger, and Mark, a Canadian, co-host. But Nancy is really in charge. She is bilingual, sets the tempo, selects topics, and occasionally translates for mainland listeners. Mark provides comic relief. This format is popular among Chinese.

Conversation is light and non-political. On Monday, July 7, Nancy and Mark chatted about styles of reading and favorite books. Listeners interacted with the hosts via text message and email, but not by calling. After a music interlude featuring Sheryl Crow's *The Book*, it was time for the news.

Following the weather, Mark announces the position of the Olympic torch in Lanzhou today, in Hohhot tomorrow. Pandas are next: 61 of the original 65 bears at the Sichuan Breeding Center survived the earthquake, were moved to facilities in other provinces, and, as of yesterday, a mother gave birth to two baby cubs. In related news, a pig stayed alive for 36 days under rubble near the epicenter. Nicknamed "strong and stubborn", the pig subsisted off of rain water and garbage and lost 50kg before being rescued by the PLA.

Next --- research shows that watermelon rind has the same properties as Viagra, says Mark. Then "Chef to Go" appears with cinnamon ice cream and stewed apples for the hosts to sample. After that, sports news: Nadal beat Federer for the Wimbledon men's title. Despite rumors, former Green Bay Packers QB Brett Favre will not come out of retirement.

"Top of the Hour News"

2300 - 2305 GMT+8

CRI Online

Chinese presenter Jack Gar reads the news with a British accent: President Hu Jintao discusses climate change, the world economy, and energy security at G8 meetings in Japan; VP Xi Jinping tours Hong Kong, noting 10 major infrastructure projects that will energize the Mekong Delta Region; Dali Lama representatives successfully conclude talks in Beijing by accepting Chinese demands: don't incite riots, don't disturb the Olympics, oppose splitism; the Bird's Nest Stadium replaces Mao on the 10RMB note; 178cm women's badminton gold medalist hopeful Xie Xingfeng, 27, is profiled along with her boyfriend, Ling Dan, the number one male badminton player in the world. She plays like a man and never rattles; the US dollar has lost 25% of its value during its current six year decline. This encourages foreign tourism in America since products there are dirt cheap; a global economic slump is likely, says a Goldman Sachs vice chairman, due to surging oil and food prices and the credit crunch; the sales of South Korea's top five automakers fell 7% year on year; meanwhile, General Motors' stock hits its lowest point in more than half a century.

"All That Jazz"

2305 - 0000

CRI Online

Plays famous American jazz music. Find a full CRI program listing at:

## CRI in Africa

CRI expansion, in synch with China's diplomatic efforts, focuses on the developing world, particularly Africa and Southeast Asia. This magnifies its impact. On February 27, 2006, CRI launched its first overseas FM radio station (91.9) in Nairobi, Kenya. It broadcasts programming in English, Chinese, and Kiswahili, the main tongue of East Africa. On November 19, 2006, CRI christened another FM station (93.0) in Vientiane, Laos, which transmits in Mandarin, English, and Lao. CCP Chairman Hu Jintao and his counterpart attended the opening ceremony; during the state visit, China announced several foreign aid packages for Laos: a US\$12.7 million economic-technical cooperation project, debt clearance for seven projects worth US\$33 million, and low-interest loans for various joint programs from mainland banks. These efforts enhance Chinese influence in Laos, a country traditionally dominated by neighboring Vietnam. By October 2007, CRI had established 11 all-spectrum FM or AM radio stations, 149 FM/AM cooperative radio stations, and 4 Internet radio stations abroad. Broadcasts at these landing stations top 556 hours each day. The BBC by comparison operates local radio relays or independent stations in more than 150 national capitals.

While CRI cannot yet rival the communications reach of VOA or the BBC, it remains an important component Beijing's soft power projection. Expansion of its service in Africa is quite natural. China is not new to Africa. The Ming Dynasty eunuch mariner Zheng He first sailed to Africa during his fourth voyage (1413-1415). Guiding a fleet of 200-300 ships packed with more than 25,000 people, he arrived in Mogadishu and Melindi during this expedition and brought back giraffes and zebras as presents for Emperor Yong Le, who placed them in the imperial zoo. Later voyages took the Zheng farther down the East African coast; some scholars speculate that he rounded the Cape of Good Hope, citing Venetian monk and cartographer Fra Mauro who saw a 'huge junk' in the Atlantic around 1420.

China returned to Africa in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. After the British Empire outlawed slavery in 1807, England and other European powers used Chinese and Indian labor to work their colonial territories worldwide. Simultaneously, Chinese from Fujian and Guangdong (coastal provinces), began to fan out across the globe. Much of today's Sino-African connection finds its roots in an era of 20<sup>th</sup> century bilateral



engagement. In the 1960s and 1970s, China combated Soviet and American influence on the continent by joining the non-alignment movement.<sup>53</sup> At this time, many African elites were invited to Beijing to study Mandarin and learn from their revolutionary brother. Joaquim Alberto Chissano, former President of Mozambique, is a prime example. He speaks fluent Chinese. This historical foundation gives China's current non-judgmental messaging (economic aid and trade without preaching human rights or good governance) a credible platform from which it can resonate. Effective public relations have aided a surge in Sino-African trade from US\$6.5 billion in 1999 to US\$55.5 billion in 2006. It is expected to exceed US\$100 billion by 2010, according to Premier Wen Jiabao.<sup>54</sup>



CRI has three foreign bureaus in sub-Saharan Africa: Lagos, Nairobi, and Harare. Among its 29 other overseas bureaus (Washington DC, New York, Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, Sydney, Singapore, Bangkok, Macau, Hong Kong, Seoul, Tokyo, Almaty, Islamabad, New Delhi, Tehran, Jerusalem, Cairo, Doha, Ankara, Belgrade, Warsaw, Moscow, Berlin, Geneva, Rome, Paris, London, and Brussels), CRI has chosen some other interesting locations as well, such as Iran and Kazakhstan. This reflects the pragmatism in China's international engagement: they will (and can) go where we do not.

### **CRI Structure and Leadership**

Similar to the BBC and VOA, CRI has a wide portfolio of non-radio media, including an extensive, multi-lingual website, a TV department, a publishing house, and a newspaper. The website, [www.cri.cn](http://www.cri.cn), is the most impressive of these holdings. CRI Online offers news, entertainment, and educational materials on China in 48 different languages. Webcasts and other online broadcasting total 221.5 hours and reach more than 160 countries per day.

<sup>53</sup> "Out of Africa and into China". *The Economist Intelligence Unit*. May 12, 2008.

<sup>54</sup> <http://xyf2.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/workaffair/200711/20071105222466.html>





CRI Farsi



CRI Swahili



CRI Spanish



CRI Urdu

The CRI TV Center was established in August 1999. At present, more than 200 TV stations and 350 TV channels use news footage from CRI TV Center, which is relayed through Asia-Sat II. The Center produces about five hours of international news program each day.

*World News Journal* is a biweekly newspaper published by CRI. The newspaper was launched in the early 1990s. It is the first Chinese newspaper to focus exclusively on international news. *World News Journal* has journalists in over 60 countries and regions. It is printed and issued in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chengdu, Shenyang, Xi'an, Hangzhou, Changchun, and Wuhan.

The CRI Publishing House was established in March 1985. Since then, it has published nearly 4,000 books, and close to 200 audio and video products. Meanwhile, according to CRI website, the Publishing House also has a license to produce TV programs and TV drama series. It now houses an animation production center, a studio, and the equipment necessary for TV production.



**Wang Gengnian** – President, Party Secretary and Chief Editor of CRI. Wang was a journalist of CRI from August 1978 to April 1991. From April 1991 to December 1995, Wang worked for the General Office of CPC Central Committee. From December 1995 to April 2001, Wang was Vice Director-General of SARFT. From May 1997 to April 2001, he headed the Film Script Center of SARFT. In the next

three years, he became Vice President of CCTV, and from June 2001 to March 2005, he was President of China Philharmonic Orchestra. He then studied at CCPS for nearly one year and assumed his current position in December 2004.

## Part II: Confucius Institutes



Confucius Institutes are a public diplomacy tool the central government uses to foster a favorable image of China abroad. Similar to the British Council, Instituto Cervantes, the Goethe Institute, and Alliance Française, they are state-sponsored resource centers set up across the world to promote the study and appreciation of Chinese language and culture. As of July 11, 2008, there were 245 Confucius Institutes spread across 71 countries, including 42 in the

U.S.<sup>55</sup> All have been established within the last four years; applications for 200 more are currently on the drawing board.

Most institutes are based in universities, contain China libraries, and organize frequent panels on contemporary mainland topics. Some lead tours to famous destinations like the Terracotta Warriors, the Great Wall, and the Forbidden City. All are open to the public and offer inexpensive Mandarin Chinese language classes, regular speaking events on China's economic rise, and seminars on everything from tea ceremonies to martial arts. Last September in Smithfield, Rhode Island, Bryant University celebrated the grand opening of its Confucius Institute with a talk on ping pong diplomacy. They invited Zhuang Zedong, a former three time world champion in the sport, to speak about the Sino-American goodwill gaming that lead to President Nixon's historic visit to China in 1972, and eventual détente between the two countries. This May at Texas A&M, hundreds of students attended a vigil hosted by the school's Confucius Institute to mourn victims of the Sichuan earthquake, which killed at least 70,000 people. Every summer, the departments of architecture and urban design at UCLA and Tianjin University conduct study tour exchanges on American and Chinese soil; this May, UCLA's Confucius Institute sponsored the travel of 8 students, who went to Beijing and learned about how the 'Bird's Nest' Olympic stadium was constructed.


This cultural and scholarly activity is a subtle form of publicity – an example of using information as advertisement. Confucius Institutes are designed to impart knowledge about China, knowledge that generates interest, understanding, and even advocacy. Minister of Education Zhou Ji underscored this point at the second Confucius Institute Conference last December in Beijing. "The Confucius Institute has become a window to display Chinese culture to the outside world, and a bridge to strengthen mutual understanding between peoples," he said.<sup>56</sup> The parent website of the institute states a similar goal. "The Chinese government attaches great importance to the promotion of Chinese language throughout the world. In order to enhance the mutual understanding and friendship between the Chinese people and other peoples of the world, promote economic and trade cooperation as well as scientific, technological, and cultural exchanges between them, the China National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign

<sup>55</sup> [http://www.confuciusinstitute.net/confucius\\_institutes](http://www.confuciusinstitute.net/confucius_institutes)

<sup>56</sup> "Foreign School Deans: Confucian Institutes Popular Across World". *Xinhua News Agency*. Dec 11, 2007.

"Chinese Education Minister Vows to Maintain Sound Development of Confucius Institute" *Xinhua News Agency*. Dec 12, 2007.


Language (NOCFL) was established in 1987," which has come to be called the Office of International Language Council or Hanban for short.<sup>57</sup>



Hanban is managed by a leading group of senior members from twelve state ministries and organs.

These include the General Office of the State Council, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Finance, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Culture, the State Administration of Radio Film and Television, the State Press and Publications Administration, the State Council Information Office, and the State Language Committee. This list includes all the government bodies capable of creating and disseminating propaganda. State Councilor Chen Zhili, formerly the Minister of Education from 1998-2003, is the president of this leading group. Xu Lin is the executive director. Hanban has three main responsibilities: (1) design and administer China's TOEFL, the HSK (*Hanyu Shipping Kaoshi* or Standard Test of Mandarin Proficiency); (2) Train

Chinese teachers domestically and internationally; and (3) establish Confucian Institutes. Currently there are roughly 40 million non-Chinese people studying Mandarin worldwide and about 245 Confucius Institutes in operation.<sup>58</sup> By 2010, Hanban seeks to raise these figures to 100 million and 500 respectively. Given its considerable resources - financial, diplomatic, and human in the form of overseas Chinese - coupled with natural factors popularizing the study of Chinese, such as the mainland's ballooning economy and influence, the later goal could be feasible.



#### Hanban Organization Chart

The rapid roll out of Confucius Institutes has paralleled a global surge in Mandarin study. Japan and South Korea, already home to millions of Chinese learners, have made studying the language a national priority; it's now a mandatory part of their primary and secondary school curriculums. In China and Taiwan, the number of legally registered foreign students (a fraction of the total number) has more than tripled in the last decade, passing the 120,000 mark in 2007.<sup>59</sup> In the United States, college students studying Chinese jumped 51% to 51,600 between 2002 and 2006, according to a Modern Language Association survey.<sup>60</sup> This is a significant increase, but pales in comparison to the 800,000 American university students who take Spanish annually. Still, around 500 U.S. high schools, middle schools, and elementary schools now offer Mandarin

<sup>57</sup> <http://english.hanban.edu.cn/>

<sup>58</sup> <http://confucius.tamu.edu/About/WhatIsConIns.html>,

<sup>59</sup> Ko Shu-ling. "International Students at an All Time High" *Taipei Times*. Feb 12, 2008.

<sup>60</sup> Carrie Antlfinger. "Milwaukee Chinese School Part of Growing Nationwide Interest". *Associated Press*. May 12, 2007.

classes, double the number in 2004.<sup>61</sup> Scores of administrators like Dennis Fisher, the superintendent of the 9,500-student Park Hill School District in Kansas City's northern suburbs, have added Chinese to their schools' language offerings. After a recent trip to China, Fisher noted "the Chinese economy is a huge, powerful force. It will be a huge part of our children's future. They need to at least know about that culture."<sup>62</sup> Colorado Spring's Harrison School District superintendent Mike Miles, whose district will begin Mandarin instruction this August, echoes the same sentiment: "China is a growing world power... they are" a "country with great economic influence in the 21<sup>st</sup> century."<sup>63</sup>

More and more U.S. parents share Fisher's and Miles' thinking – and are creating an environment where their young children can be exposed to natively spoken Mandarin so that they can grow up bilingual. Coast to coast, companies are mushrooming to meet this demand. Some facilitate *au pair* – connecting international students, who are willing to do domestic work in exchange for a roof over their head, with host families. According to *the Christian Science Monitor*, *au pair* firms report a boom in requests for Chinese students. Au Pair in America, one such company in Stamford, CT, has received 4,000 requests since 2004 for mainland student nannies and filled several hundred.<sup>64</sup> But like the growth of Mandarin study in the classroom, *au pair* traffic is constrained by a lack of qualified personnel who can get visas.

Hanban and its Confucius Institutes partnered with the College Board to address this need: train good teachers and create testing standards.<sup>65</sup> Since both bodies administer national exams, the match was appropriate. After several years of drafts, the first Advanced Placement (AP) Chinese language and culture test was given in May 2007; 3,261 high school students took it. Earlier, in the fall of 2006, the two launched the Chinese Guest Teacher Program to address the shortage of Mandarin language instructors. In January 2007, the first 35 teachers arrived in the U.S.; in August 2007, 64 more arrived. The group now lectures in 31 states. Hanban pays the teachers' international airfare plus a monthly stipend; the school districts cover all other costs. In addition to teaching Chinese, the instructors tutor would-be Mandarin educators. The Confucius Institutes, who are also charged with training language trainers, pitch in as well. All 42 branches in America run their own teacher education program.

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<sup>61</sup> Tina Tran. "The Future is all about China; Students Soak up Language, Culture, and Tradition" *Associated Press*. March 24, 2008

<sup>62</sup> Kate Beem. "Chinese by Choice: the Growth of Language Classes in Districts Nationwide is Hampered Only by the Challenge of Landing Qualified Teachers of Chinese". *School Administrator*. Feb 1, 2008.

<sup>63</sup> Shari Chaney Griffen. "Study of Chinese is Booming". *The Colorado Springs Gazette*. Apr 29, 2008.

<sup>64</sup> Matthew Russling. "A Leg up on Learning Chinese". *Christian Science Monitor*. May 13, 2008.

<sup>65</sup> The College Board is a non-profit group that administers the SAT and the Advance Placement (AP) exams.



#### Oklahoma Chinese Teacher Training

This annually held training is sponsored by The Office of Chinese Language Council International (Hanban) to meet the increasing demand of people wanting to learn Chinese language overseas, improve the quality of Chinese language teachers around the world, and solve the problem of a shortage of qualified Chinese language teachers. Every attendee will get certificate issued by Hanban. (Hanban has held 2 trainings (2006, 2007) with over 100 business meetings).

1. Introduction: Confucius Hanban
2. Introduction to the Confucius Institute
3. Register online: Learning how

Training 2007 topics include:

History of Confucius Institute  
 Structure & staff of the Confucius Institute  
 The importance of the Confucius Institute

UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII AT MANOA

## CONFUCIUS INSTITUTE

**Chinese Language Teacher Education Program**

To meet the high demand of teaching Chinese language in Hawaii and in the U.S., the Office of Education of the University of Hawaii Learning offers the first Chinese Language Teacher Education program (CELTE). This teacher education program will train the teaching staff of the University of Hawaii and other schools in the state. The program will also provide a pathway for the teaching staff of the University of Hawaii and other schools in the state to become a teacher of Chinese language.

**Program Objectives:**

- 1. To provide a pathway for the teaching staff of the University of Hawaii and other schools in the state to become a teacher of Chinese language.
- 2. To provide a pathway for the teaching staff of the University of Hawaii and other schools in the state to become a teacher of Chinese language.

**Program Structure:**

- 1. Introduction to the Confucius Institute
- 2. Introduction to the Confucius Institute
- 3. Introduction to the Confucius Institute

**Program Contact:**

Dr. [Name]  
 [Address]  
 [Phone]  
 [Email]

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- 1. Introduction to the Confucius Institute
- 2. Introduction to the Confucius Institute
- 3. Introduction to the Confucius Institute

**Program Contact:**

Dr. [Name]  
 [Address]  
 [Phone]  
 [Email]

Worldwide, Hanban has dispatched more than 2,000 volunteer teachers; most have ended up in the U.S. and Thailand.<sup>66</sup> The *Wall Street Journal* calls these cultural ambassadors Mandarin missionaries.

### Confucius Institutes in the United States:

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| 1. University of California, Los Angeles | 22. Confucius Classroom in Denver                     |
| 2. University of Central Arkansas        | 23. Confucius Institute in Atlanta                    |
| 3. University of Hawaii                  | 24. Arizona State University                          |
| 4. University of Iowa                    | 25. Bryant University                                 |
| 5. University of Kansas                  | 26. Chicago Public Schools                            |
| 6. University of Maryland                | 27. China Institute (New York)                        |
| 7. University of Massachusetts Boston    | 28. The Community College of Denver                   |
| 8. University of Memphis                 | 29. Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis |
| 9. University of Minnesota               | 30. Miami University in Ohio                          |
| 10. University of Nebraska-Lincoln       | 31. Michigan State University                         |
| 11. University of Oklahoma               | 32. New Mexico State University                       |
| 12. University of Oregon                 | 33. North Carolina State University                   |
| 13. University of Pittsburgh             | 34. Pace University                                   |
| 14. University of Rhode Island           | 35. Portland State University                         |
| 15. University of South Florida          | 36. Purdue University                                 |
| 16. University of Texas at Dallas        | 37. Rutgers University                                |
| 17. University of Utah                   | 38. San Francisco State University                    |
| 18. University of Wisconsin-Platteville  | 39. Texas A&M University                              |
| 19. Valparaiso University                | 40. Troy University                                   |
| 20. Wayne State University               | 41. University of Akron                               |
| 21. Webster University                   | 42. University of Arizona                             |

America, by comparison, has only five Information Resource Centers (IRC) in China; they are located in Beijing, Shanghai, Shenyang, Chengdu, and Guangzhou. (Note this conclusion is misinterpreted. The fact that the US has only five resource centers reflects a very limited State Department budget not the number of US primary school students studying Chinese.) According to a 2006 U.S. Department of Education report, 200 million mainland primary school children study English (all of them); of the 54 million American elementary and secondary students, only 24,000 study Mandarin. Within the next 10 years, the British Council estimates that 2 billion

<sup>66</sup> Jennifer Chen. "Mandarin Missionaries: Young Chinese Spread their Language --- and Broaden their Horizons" *Asian Wall Street Journal*. Sept 14, 2007.

people will be learning English. These statistics signal a massive disparity: China knows us far better than we know them. Confucius Institutes are an effort to bridge this gap.

Outside of the brick and mortar of the classroom, Hanban has ventured into the digital realm to promote Mandarin – and, indirectly, brand China. The Confucius Institute Online (<http://www.confuciusinstitute.net/>) provides a suite of language learning tools and cultural resources, such as Chinese pod, an award winning collection of lively Mandarin dialogues designed for all skill levels. Also, in December 2007, CRI launched a virtual Confucius Institute on the airwaves and online. Now listeners and CRI website users can access Chinese lessons in 43 languages, both on the radio and on the internet.



### Part III: Digital Diaspora

<b>The Chinese Diaspora</b>	
Total Population: 39,379,784	
<b>Majority populations</b>	
 Singapore	2,684,936
 Christmas Island, Australia	1,045
<b>Minority populations</b>	
 Indonesia	7,566,200
 Thailand	7,153,240
 Malaysia	7,070,500
 United States	3,376,031
 Canada	1,612,173
 Peru	1,300,000
 Vietnam	1,263,570
 Philippines	1,146,250
 Myanmar	1,101,314
 Russia	998,000
 Australia	614,694
 Japan	519,561
 Cambodia	343,855
 United Kingdom	296,623
 France	230,515
 India	189,470
 Laos	185,765
 Cuba	170,000
 Brazil	151,649
 New Zealand	147,570
 Netherlands	144,928
 South Korea	137,790
 Panama	+100,000

Source: Recent census data from relevant countries.

Overseas Chinese play a critical role in shaping the mainland's image abroad.<sup>67</sup> Nearly 40 million Chinese diaspora are spread across the globe's six inhabited continents, a figure that grows by more than 400,000 a year according to the UN. While earlier waves of Chinese emigration in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century were largely poor laborers who built America's transcontinental railroads, mined Peru's guano caves, and worked Indonesia's plantations, today's overseas Chinese are an increasingly educated, entrepreneurial, and nationalistic group. Each year the United States welcomes some 50,000 Chinese graduate students who go on to earn master degrees and PhDs mostly in the hard sciences. In Canada, more than 30% of Chinese diaspora have a college education compared with 18% on the mainland.<sup>68</sup> They are smart. They are everywhere. And due to modern ICT, they are wired – to each other, to their homeland, and to international opinion.

China's digital diaspora are increasingly using their connectivity to broadcast pro-China messaging. Why would overseas Chinese be interested in using the internet and their organizations to express support for their motherland and its policies? They did, after all, choose to leave. There are two reasons; both have to do with rising nationalism.

The first has to do with psychology. Overseas and domestic Chinese are proud of their country's progress. Older generations can remember when China was called the sick man of Asia (*dongya bingfu*): weak, war-torn, and backwards. Now, however, following three decades of successful

<sup>67</sup> There is no consensus on diction used to describe ethnic Chinese living outside greater China (mainland, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan). The older term *huaqiao* refers to Chinese who lived abroad for many years and still retain their citizenship. Overseas Chinese covers nationals who temporarily reside abroad, such as students, professors, or new immigrants. The term Chinese Diaspora captures both newer and older generations of Chinese immigrants, including those who are foreign-born second and third generation Chinese. This section uses all three terms interchangeably and assumes the highest level of inclusiveness: all Chinese abroad, whether PRC citizens or not.

<sup>68</sup> Gordon Pon. "Antiracism in the Cosmopolis: Race, Class, and Gender in the Lives of Elite Chinese Canadian Women". *Social Justice*, vol. 32, no. 4 (2005), pp 161-79.

reform and opening, the mainland is back on its feet. Opportunity, along with Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999, has returned. There is money to be made, and a sense that children will live better lives than their parents. As a result, the Chinese are confident; “the past two decades have witnessed signs of the revival of overseas Chinese nationalism, which has been manifested both in the China front and the international arena. Three key agendas in this revival have been China’s economic prosperity, cultural regeneration, and national reunification. It is widely held by... migrants that they would... benefit greatly from the realization of [state-sponsored] goals.”<sup>69</sup> This sanguine situation resuscitates the traditional idea of the Middle Kingdom: the imperial notion that China lies between heaven and Earth and is, more or less, the center of the universe. “The ubiquitous presence of the Chinese state – its awe-inspiring physical size, its long history, [its past achievements,] and the numerical weight of its population – continues to loom large in the psychocultural constructs of the diaspora Chinese.”<sup>70</sup> Finally, overseas Chinese are drawn to their motherland by the old us vs. them duality that Samuel Huntington highlights in *Clash of the Civilizations*. Like all expatriates in a foreign land, *huaqiao* tend to associate with others like them who speak the same language. They look back to China with a certain nostalgia; “since many Chinese Diaspora possess a sojourner mentality and lack a sense of permanence in their adopted countries, they cherish their connection... with their ethnic motherland.”<sup>71</sup>

The second reason for re-emerging expatriate nationalism has to do with state outreach. Recall that the intersection of old bureaucracy and new technology increased the messaging effectiveness of CRI and the Confucius Institutes. The same is true of the Chinese diaspora. Beijing has a government organ and specific policies in place to encourage ‘brand China’ advertisement among the overseas Chinese.

### The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (OCAO)



OCAO is responsible for liaising with diaspora who reside abroad or have returned to China. Founded in 1949, its predecessor was known as the Committee of Overseas Chinese Affairs (COCA). He Xiangning ran it. She was the wife of CCP financier Liao Zhongkai who lived and studied in San Francisco, Hong Kong, and Tokyo before returning to the mainland and holding senior positions in the KMT-CCP United Front administration. Amidst the ensuing power struggle following Sun Yat-sen’s death, Liao was assassinated in 1925, but his family was still held in esteem for its revolutionary contributions. His wife and two children were accorded elite treatment. At the height of xenophobia during the Cultural Revolution, COCA was disbanded in June 1970 only to be reestablished after the death of Mao and the beginning of reforms in 1978. At that time, OCAO took on its current name and was led by Liao’s son, Liao Chengzhi. In 1984, Liao’s grandson, Liao Hui, took the reins.

<sup>69</sup> Hong Liu. “The New Migrants and the Revival of Overseas Chinese Nationalism”. *Journal of Contemporary China*, vol. 14, no. 43 (2005), pp 291-316.

<sup>70</sup> Wei-ming Tu. “Cultural China: The Periphery as the Center” in *The Living Tree: The Changing Meaning of Beijing Chinese Today*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994, p18.

<sup>71</sup> Sheng Ding. “The Digital Diaspora and National Image Building: A New Perspective on Chinese Diaspora Study in the Age of China’s Rise”. *Pacific Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 4, p638.





Today OCAO is managed by Li Haifeng. Born February 1949, in Leping, Hebei, Madame Li, a graduate of the Central Party School, became the director of OCAO in May 2007. Throughout her career, she served in series of senior Party positions: Secretary of the Daqing Communist Youth League; Standing Committee member of the Daqing Oil Field (China's largest); member National Communist Youth League's Secretariat; Deputy Party Secretary and then Secretary of Shijiazhuang (capital of Hebei province); and Vice Governor of Hebei Province. Madame Li has been a member of the fifth and sixth Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference.

According to its website, OCAO has four functions, including the management of overseas Chinese messaging through their media, their schools, and of course, the diaspora themselves:

- 1) Research and draft the relevant overseas Chinese guidelines, policy, and legislation; supervise and inspect the thorough implementation of this work. Discuss and research the situation of diaspora living at home and abroad; provide the CCP Central Committee and the State Council with information about these activities. Formulate overseas Chinese development and cooperation strategies.
- 2) Provide the Premier with overseas Chinese policy guidance; examine and verify overseas Chinese policy stemming from other government organs, ensuring that it is appropriate. Unify and coordinate diaspora work with other departments and organizations.
- 3) Safeguard the timely rights and benefits of overseas Chinese; promote friendship and unity between the PRC, the diaspora, and their various organizations abroad. Keep in close contact with Mandarin language media and schools in other countries; support their work. Strongly encourage cooperation and exchange between the motherland and overseas Chinese in economic, technological, cultural, and educational areas.
- 4) While guaranteeing legal rights, ensure the diaspora can easily return to the PRC and obtain citizenship. Develop incentives to encourage the return of certain diaspora.

To fulfill its charge, the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office has a vast bureaucracy at its disposal. OCAO has six departments: Policy Research; Cultural and Educational Publicity; Domestic Branches; Foreign Branches; Scientific Economic Development; and the Executive Office. Domestically, outside of headquarters at the State Council, branches are located in thirty provinces and major municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing, Hebei, Shanxi, Liaoning, Jilin, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fujian, Jiangxi, Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangdong, Guangxi, Hainan, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Heilongjiang, and Inner Mongolia). Internationally, there are OCAO bureaus in 134 Chinese embassies throughout Asia, Europe, North America, Latin America, Oceania, and Africa. These resources allow the government and Party to track diaspora activity globally.

Former State Council Information Office head Zhu Muzhi once said that some foreign countries "have prejudices or have wrongly believed rumors; therefore what they think about China is not the true image of China. We will try every means to present a comprehensive and real picture to the outside world so that you can see the true image of China."<sup>72</sup> The diaspora are one of those

<sup>72</sup> Hongying Wang, "National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy". *China: An International Journal*, vol. 1, no. 1 (2003), p1.

means. OCAO is supposed to recruit them advertise a favorable image of Beijing. As pointed earlier, due to rising levels of pride and nationalism, many are all too willing to help.

Another reason the diaspora are keen to promote their motherland, outside of a strong psychological bond, is commercial interest. In late 1990s, former President Jiang Zemin unveiled his 'Go Out' policy, which as explained in previous IHSI research, sought to activate overseas Chinese in order to develop the domestic economy. Diaspora snapped on and quickly became agents of state-owned enterprises. This entrepreneurial periphery quickly learned that sweeter contracts and connections were to be had if a few favorable words were uttered about Beijing here and there. This combination of factors motivated the digital diaspora to produce the examples of pro-China messaging below.



One of the most visible is Wen Jiabao's Facebook profile. With 54,766 supporters, the populist Chinese Premier, affectionately known as Grandpa Wen, is the sixth most popular politician worldwide on America's favorite social networking web site.<sup>73</sup> Presidential hopeful Barak Obama takes first place with over one million supporters; George Bush ranks a distant 17<sup>th</sup> with slightly more than 10,000 supporters behind French President Nicholas Sarkozy. Wen's page features thousands of enthusiastic endorsements: Pangean, who has a

panda avatar, writes "the common people cherish you in their hearts!" in simplified characters. Steven says "China is the strongest country in the world" in English. Helen urges Wen to his health: "take care of yourself or you won't be able to take care of the nation" in traditional characters. Also in traditional characters, Benny pens "China rocks! The people of the dragon will never stumble again!" Mainland Chinese use simplified characters while overseas Chinese tend to use traditional characters (Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and the old diaspora).

YouTube is another hotspot for pro-China internet postings. In one video titled "Global Chinese are Proud of You", diaspora in Germany and the United Kingdom take to the streets to protest the riots in Tibet and to demonstrate their national solidarity. Set to the music of the national anthem, their video features a slideshow of patriotic images: the Chinese flag, Tiananmen Square, and themselves as placard-toting students. One slide exclaims, "Long live the great

<sup>73</sup> Wen had 54,766 supporters as of 630am on Monday, July 14, 2008; Facebook politician rankings can be found at <http://www.facebook.com/pages/?browse&ps=151>.



People's Republic of China." Commentary from a user named leekenwah reads "i luv china / china = gre8est nation on earth / everything u ppl use r made in china, made by us ;) haha." In a similar video called "Brave Chinese Students Shouted Out 'Long Live China!'", mainlanders in Canada hold a flag-waving, slogan-shouting rally outside of a Chinese consulate while a Free Tibet demonstration occurs across the street. Below the video on YouTube, a user named avntz1 says "Tibet is not china / china is not Tibet / Free free Tibet." For this posting, he receives four thumbs down reviews. Chester Doraemon ripostes "Guam is not US / US is not Guam / Free free Guam." He gets three thumbs up reviews for his comment.

Online showdowns between pro-China and pro-Tibet forces have been common over the last four months. The torch relay in Paris sparked an energetic virtual dialogue when a free Tibet protestor attempted to grab the torch from Jin Jing, a wheelchair-bound Paralympics fencer from Anhui province. The protestor was promptly tackled to the ground by French security forces before he got close to the torch. But the incident still resulted in hundreds of video postings and tens of thousands of comments on YouTube alone. Overseas Chinese posted their own nationalistic films in addition to CCTV reels; set to sappy songs about heroism, the short movies lauded Jin Jing's courage, "the Olympic Angel," in resisting the "Gallic barbarians" and in protecting national pride. State publicity organs and public opinion were in lockstep.<sup>74</sup> As baizaidawan, a blogger on YouTube, said, "China's media in the past days is already declaring Total Victory over those anti-Chinese boycotters of the Beijing Olympics. Part of the success is due to the Millions of Chinese Netizens world-wide winning the battle in Cyberspace." Angry Chinese online called for a boycott of the French retailer Carrefour. Within 24 hours, President Sarkozy personally apologized to Jin Jing and the Chinese people.



Another digital diaspora-led messaging effort is the Global Alliance for Preserving the History of WWII in Asia (<http://www.global-alliance.net/mission.html>). This California-based online initiative encourages the Japanese government to accept accountability for its WWII war crimes. Beijing shares the same foreign policy goal and also demands that Tokyo stop denying and

<sup>74</sup> <http://torchrelay.beijing2008.cn/en/journey/paris/news/n214297268.shtml>;  
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I28UcqobzPA>;  
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q10I1yRN9Zg&feature=related>

whitewashing its history.<sup>75</sup> This issue, particularly the Nanjing Massacre, evokes apoplectic rage among all Chinese. The alliance has brought several law suits in Tokyo, including one that seeks apology and compensation for the relatives of Unit 731 victims. Unit 731 was a military research center near Harbin that preformed grotesque experiments on Chinese and allied prisoners in the late 1930s and early 1940s. Japanese officers, for example, would cut off a prisoners arm and see how long it would take them to bleed to death or lock a prisoner in any water tank and record how long it took them to drown. While lawsuits have not met with success in Japanese courts, other efforts have. On June 30, 2005, the Alliance presented a petition with 42 million signatures to Kofi Annan, then UN Secretary General, that opposed the Japanese application for Security Council status. The signatures, all collected digitally, mostly came from Chinese and Koreans. While there were many other factors involved, the Japanese application for P5 status failed.



The final instance of pro-China advertising that this section will evaluate is the Committee of 100. Founded in 1990 by prominent Chinese Americans such as architect IM Pei and musician Yo-Yo Ma, the NGO seeks to bridge Sino-American relations by acting as a cultural ambassador. In 2007, the Committee organized the Washington Initiative. This program brought American Congressional and business leaders together for Beijing-friendly briefings. One in New York was attended by several cabinet level officials

such as Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, private equity mogul and KKR founder Henry Kravis, and Morgan Stanley chairman and CEO John Mack. Another in Beijing honored former vice premier Qian Qichen; vice minister of foreign affairs Zhang Yesui gave the keynote speech. That year C-100 also took influential public opinion makers in the media on a China tour. Columnist David Brooks of the New York Times, NPR senior political analyst Juan Williams, and publisher Charles Cook participated.

<sup>75</sup> This issue is complicated. When it comes to school textbooks, all Asian education systems suffer from amnesia over historical black marks. China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the USA all have this problem.



## Part IV: Summary

What are the implications of a more developed and influential China? Foreign anxiety about this question, Beijing reasons, is counterproductive. China, after all, requires a stable, peaceful, and supportive international environment so it can continue to trade, acquire natural resources, and grow its economy. In order to achieve these critical foreign policy goals, Beijing must convince its neighbors and the larger the global community that its rise is an opportunity not a threat.<sup>76</sup> To allay fears, China is seeking to portray itself as a benign and constructive actor in order to demonstrate that it will evolve into a responsible great power.<sup>77</sup> The challenge will to the central leadership will be how to build and advertise "Brand China" (as explored in the preceding chapter).

<b>Figure 1 – The Soft Power Index</b> <i>Average level of influence on a 0 to 1 scale when soft power questions are combined, followed by rank (see Appendix A for questions included).</i>				
Survey Countries	U.S. soft power	China soft power	Japan soft power	South Korea soft power
United States	—	.47 (3)	.87 (1)	.49 (2)
China	.71 (1)	—	.62 (3)	.65 (2)
Japan	.69 (1)	.51 (3)	—	.56 (2)
South Korea	.72 (1)	.55 (3)	.65 (2)	—
Indonesia	.72 (2)	.70 (3)	.72 (1)	.63 (4)
Vietnam	.76 (2)	.74 (3)	.79 (1)	.73 (4)

### How the Soft Power Index Is Calculated

The questions in this survey were designed to measure Asian attitudes regarding soft power. Various indices were created as summary measures that represent the average rating for each country for different aspects of soft power and provide one basic rating of the overarching concepts. Each index was created by standardizing the scales for several questions on a particular aspect of soft power (i.e., cultural soft power), adding together the scores for those questions, and then averaging to arrive at a combined rating for "cultural soft power." Overall soft power is broken down into five separate indices that each measures a different form of soft power—economic, cultural, human capital, political, and diplomatic. Please refer to Appendix A for a detailed listing of the questions included in each index. The overall Soft Power Index was created by averaging the soft power index scores for each of the five different forms of soft power. Each of the soft power indices was considered equally important and therefore they were weighted equally in the overall score no matter how many questions were included for that particular index.

The previous three sections of this chapter analyze how Beijing uses public diplomacy – China Radio International (media), Confucius Institutes (culture), and overseas Chinese (people) – to market itself, to launch favorable messaging, or to at least combat negative perceptions (i.e. about Tibet).<sup>78</sup> These three levers are part of a larger arsenal of soft power tools.

In 1990, Harvard international relations professor Joseph S. Nye coined the phrase soft power; "soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others... [it] is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideas, and policies."<sup>79</sup> His scholarship immediately attracted the attention of China's senior leadership. Over the last eighteen years, Dr. Nye has regularly met with Beijing's political elite.<sup>80</sup> China's academic and policy-making communities are deeply taken by his theories.<sup>81</sup> In fact, last March, during China's annual session of the National People's Congress (NPC) and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Congress (CPPCC), soft power was not only a major theme of discussions, but also a

<sup>76</sup> Joshua Kurlantzick. *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World*. New Haven, MA: Yale University Press, 2007, p5.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid. p 130.

<sup>78</sup> As discussed in the executive summary, it's no accident that Beijing selected non-threatening, friendly, and cuddly Olympic mascots. This projects a much-needed 'buddy China' image.

<sup>79</sup> Joseph Nye. "Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics". *Public Affairs*. NY, p5, pX.

<sup>80</sup> "Chinese Vice-Premier Meets with U.S. Guest." *Xinhua News Agency*. January 5, 1999. "Chinese Defense Minister Meets with U.S. Guest." *Xinhua News Agency*. May 18, 2000.

<sup>81</sup> "Soft Power, a New Focus at China's Two Parliament Sessions". *Xinhua News Agency*. March 19, 2007.

focus for budgetary allocations. Nye's basic definition of soft power, however, has been expanded to include international trade, overseas investments, foreign aid, diplomatic initiatives, cultural products like movies and movies, education, and tourism: any non-military mechanisms that can be used to affect the behavior of global actors.<sup>82</sup> Joshua Kurlantzick, who just wrote a book on the topic says, "for the Chinese, soft power means anything outside of the military and security realm, including not only popular culture and public diplomacy but also more coercive economic and diplomatic levers like aid and investment and participation in multilateral institutions."<sup>83</sup> This summary will address the question: how successful has Beijing been at deploying its arsenal of soft power tools?

China's track record in deploying its soft power tools is mixed. State media, while growing in content sophistication and technological prowess, do not yet command significant foreign audiences. CRI, CCTV, and China Daily attract, at most, a few million international listeners, viewers, and readers a day; this does not begin to rival the suction power of the BBC and CNN, who draw hundreds of millions each week.

Similarly, while the rapid expansion of Confucius Institutes is impressive, they won't change the global linguistic map anytime soon. Hanban has established 245 centers in four years and has plans to open 265 more by 2010 for a total of 500 institutes. Beijing has, without a doubt, created a massive amount of Mandarin language education infrastructure in a short time. However, it will take more than schools to displace English as the world's dominant language in business, academia, and media. The study of Chinese is skyrocketing globally – perhaps 40 million are learning it, according to the Ministry of Education. But within the next ten years, 2 billion will study English. Currently, 200 million school children pour over English as a mandatory part of their curriculum.

Beijing's diplomatic engagement is, however, quite effective. Five reasons come to mind. First, China approaches its neighbors with humility and asks them for advice. This approach disarms fears of the mainland's size and growing clout. Deng Xiaoping devised this 'learners' strategy' in the 1980s to buy China time for economic development. Foreigners enjoy the deference they are paid. Second, Beijing attaches no strings. When doling out foreign aid, disaster assistance, or infrastructure loans, China does not stipulate good governance or human rights prerequisites. Beijing is also a die-hard supporter of the Westphalia system: national sovereignty should never be impinged upon. This hands-off attitude is very popular in the developing world. It is seen as an efficient and welcome relief from Western demands for transparency and reform. As Abdoulaye Wade, the president of Senegal noted:

I have found that a contract that would take five years to discuss, negotiate, and sign with the World Bank takes three months when we have dealt with the Chinese authorities. I am a firm believer in good governance and the rule of law. But when bureaucracy and senseless red tape impede our ability to act – and when poverty persists while international functionaries drag their feet – African leaders have an obligation to opt for swifter solutions.<sup>84</sup>

<sup>82</sup> "China's Foreign Policy and 'Soft Power' in South America, Asia, and Africa". *Congressional Research Service*, Library of Congress. April 2008.

<sup>83</sup> Kurlantzick. p6.

<sup>84</sup> Senegal President Abdoulaye Wade. "Time for the West to Practice What It Preaches". *Financial Times*. January 24, 2008.

When “surveying the wreckage of 50 years of ideology and fashion-driven development assistance, which mostly failed to produce either sustainable democratic governance or sustainable economic growth in poor countries,” China’s tactics appeal.<sup>85</sup> The third reason is pragmatism. Beijing will go where the West will not. Chinese policy pursues what works while accounting for unique local conditions. This has allowed the mainland to secure political allies and energy resources in Sudan, Venezuela, and Iran. No judgments are made. Business is simply done.

Fourth, Beijing professionally trains its foreign affairs officers. Diplomats are accorded long tours in host countries, which allow them to fully absorb language, culture, and make local contacts. Chinese diplomats are encouraged to seek to understand rather than seeking to be understood. They are asked to engage their communities. Chinese diplomats in Washington DC offer an apt case study. Once withdrawn and conservative, they now attend think tanks lectures, network with journalists, and attend university barbeques. China employs the best lobbying, public relations and law firms to advance its interests: Patton Boggs, Hogan & Hartson, Wexler and Walker, and Hill & Knowlton are examples. Between July 1997 and July 2005, Beijing and Hong Kong spent more than \$19 million on DC lobbyists. This figure does not include outlays to public relations firms.<sup>86</sup> As of January 2007, Ambassador Zhou Wenzhong had personally met two-thirds of America’s congressmen and senators, including ‘dragon slayers’ like West Virginia’s Robert Byrd.<sup>87</sup> This approach of specialization contracts with America’s diplomats, who are quickly rotated from nation to nation.

The fifth and final reason for Beijing’s diplomatic success is effective participation in multilateral institutions. Membership accords status and credibility to the CCP. And since reform and opening began and China reclaimed its UN Security Council seat in 1979, the PRC has joined every major global institution: the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in 1991; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional forum (ARF) in 1994 (the U.S. has drawn criticism because President Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have skipped recent meetings, sending lower level functionaries instead); the World Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11, 2001; the Forum for East Asia and Latin American Cooperation (FOCALAE), of which America is not a member; and the Organization of American States (OAS) as a permanent observer in 2004. Beijing holds leadership positions in many multilateral bodies as well: Justin Lin (Lin Yifu) became the chief economist at the World Bank in February 2008; Margaret Chan, a Hong Konger, rose to become Secretary-General of the World Health Organization on November 2, 2006. Taken as barometer of soft power, this indicates international perceptions and treatment of China are trending upward.

In addition to joining existing regional organizations, Beijing has created a few of its own. The East Asia Summit (EAS) was founded in 2005. Membership includes ASEAN countries, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand, but excludes the United States. Russia is an observer. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) comprises of China, Russia, and most of central Asia; the group has conducted joint-military exercises, trade facilitation projects,

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<sup>85</sup> Arthur Krobel. “Rising China and the Liberal West”. *China Economic Quarterly*. March 2008, p37.

<sup>86</sup> <http://www.publicintegrity.org/news/entry/257/>

<sup>87</sup> Neil King Jr. “Beijing on the Potomac”. *The Washingtonian*. January 1, 2007.

anti-terrorism activity, and infrastructure, including pipeline, development. America is not allowed to participate in SCO. The Forum on Africa-China Cooperation (FOCAC) was established in 2000, and like the two examples above, does not include the USA. FOCAC meets every three years; during its last summit in 2005, China brought 48 of Africa's 53 heads of state to Beijing.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>88</sup> "China's Foreign Policy and 'Soft Power' in South America, Asia, and Africa". *Congressional Research Service*, Library of Congress. April 2008, p8-9.



Probably no other single issue provides a more comprehensive illustration of China's expanding communication and information dissemination system than the handling of the upcoming 2008 Beijing Olympics. China's effort to disseminate its Olympic message is particularly interesting for a number of reasons. These include the interconnection between domestic and international messaging and between China's overall project of public diplomacy and specific media messaging. The Olympics is also an interesting example because it is a complex, contested and highly symbolic phenomenon. Like other massive events, public understanding of it is inherently unstable. Multiple actors seek to influence how the global public interprets the event and these individuals and entities have a variety of techniques at their disposal. Thus China has made a major effort to impose its version of the Olympic message, but this is not an easy task. Moreover, while the overall messaging of the Olympics has been largely consistent across different media platforms and towards different audiences, some minor differences indicate both the complexity of the task and the sophistication of China's efforts.

**The Message**

The basic elements of China's public relations strategy for the Olympics are well known. First, the Olympics celebrate China as a developed and prosperous country. Chinese leaders as senior as Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have identified the policies of economic development as crucial to China's successful bid for the Games. Thus part of the message is an endorsement of the policies pursued by the CCP leadership. Second, the Olympics demonstrate that China is an orderly and stable country. Its strengths include its ability to mobilize huge resources effectively, for example in the construction of the Olympic Village. Third, the Olympics represent China's return to international respectability and normal membership in the global community. This aspect of the message is reinforced by a focus on the 2008 Olympics as a green and high-tech Olympics, demonstrating that China shares the pressing concerns of the global community. As a Beijing Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (BOCOG) spokesman put it: "Winning the host rights means winning the respect, trust, and favor of the international community."

The message of the Games as a celebration of China's return to normal membership in the global community is tied to historical narratives of a Chinese renaissance, a return to power after a century of humiliations. This ties the Olympics to other successes, both actual and potential, such as the return of Hong Kong and the eventual return of Taiwan. It implicitly supports the leadership of the CCP, under whose guidance China has been able to recover its appropriate position in the world. This narrative also serves as a challenge to possible alternative messages: the solidarity and unity of the Chinese people is what is important about the Games, not claims of human rights abuses.

While the Beijing Games are clearly located in a glorious tradition of Olympic Games, they are also a reflection of a certain Chinese distinctiveness, the product of China's unique history and culture. For example, the message runs, unlike previous hosts, Beijing is committed to avoid using the Games as a platform for nationalism (of course, this commitment is open to interpretation). On this key point, the PRC message converges with the basic position of the International Olympic Committee, which consistently opposes the politicization of the Games.

The IOC has since the inception of the modern Games portrayed the Olympics as a form of diplomacy that can promote world peace, and its own messaging relies heavily on appeals to internationalism and fellowship. In practice, this has meant challenging other voices that have sought to use the Games to serve a nationalist public diplomacy agenda (the most famous example being the Berlin Games of 1936, but there are many other examples).

Contrary to much Western media reporting, the main focus of the Olympics message has not been to legitimize continued CCP rule, but rather to legitimize China's place in the modern world. Rather, the issue of CCP legitimacy has remained implicit in the media messaging. The legitimacy of the current regime will no doubt be measured by the success of the Games, but it is the successful handling of the Games itself that will demonstrate competence of the regime, not the successful deployment of overt propaganda testifying to its competence.

### The Media

The entire information arsenal of the CCP is deployed to serve the task of conveying the Olympics message. Olympics news dominates *China Daily*, China Radio International and CCTV's international services. But besides these entities, a number of other players are involved. These include Olympic advertisers, foreign broadcast media, and international public relations and communications firms. Hill & Knowlton, for example, was hired by BOCOG in 2006 to provide "communications outreach to the international media and assistance in communicating Beijing's Olympic vision."<sup>89</sup> Well aware that Chinese media is, at least for the moment, uncompetitive and unable to attract large foreign audiences, the CCP leadership has recognized that it must also rely on foreign media to carry out its international public diplomacy.<sup>90</sup>

This recognition has led to some feedback within the Olympics organization. For example, BOCOG has retained English in its main press conferences. Wang Wei, a former vice deputy mayor of Beijing with a degree from Rutgers and a fluent English speaker, rose to become a highly visible spokesman of the Games, eventually becoming executive vice-president of BOCOG and vice-chairman of the All-China Sports Federation.

The importance attached to the Olympic message has even led the State Council to set aside its own laws. For example, foreign direct investment is currently not permitted in Chinese television. But in fact, a Chinese-foreign joint venture has been approved to provide the international broadcast feed. The IOC set up an in-house broadcaster, Olympics Broadcasting Services, in 2001, to serve as the host broadcaster of all future Olympic Games. When it was realized that it was technically illegal for OBS to provide this role in Beijing, a joint venture was formed between OBS and BOCOG. Although the details of this joint venture are not available, it was almost certainly the result of a compromise between the IOC and BOCOG, requiring State

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<sup>89</sup> "Top Image Promoter Sees Great Opportunities," *People's Daily Online*, [http://english.people.com.cn/200611/24/eng20061124\\_324728.html](http://english.people.com.cn/200611/24/eng20061124_324728.html)

<sup>90</sup> Wang Yiwei, "Public Diplomacy and the Rise of Chinese Soft Power," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (2008). For evidence of this, see also "Service Guide for Foreign Media Coverage of the Beijing Olympic Games and the Preparatory Period" ([http://en.beijing2008.cn/upload/Service-Guide-en/Service\\_Guide\\_en.pdf](http://en.beijing2008.cn/upload/Service-Guide-en/Service_Guide_en.pdf))

Council approval.<sup>91</sup> This approval indicates the high level of importance attached by the PRC leadership to the messaging of the Olympics.

The wide range of actors involved in conveying the PRC's desired messages on the Olympics means that there has inevitably been some fragmentation. A good example is that the Beijing government and BOCOG have on the whole been more accepting of the notion that the Olympics demands greater tolerance for media freedom, relying more heavily on non-state controlled media. Government entities traditionally responsible for regulating the media are less open to this notion. Probably those entities that are most invested in the Olympic are more tolerant of the possibility of problems in messaging as a necessary cost of achieving their goals.<sup>92</sup>

Major Olympic sponsors also play a role in supporting messaging efforts. But they have their own stories to tell. Thus computer manufacturer Lenovo, the largest shareholder of which is the Chinese government, is a worldwide Olympic sponsor, with extraordinary opportunities for publicity during the games. Reportedly, its advertising campaign within China will seek to leverage the company's Chinese heritage, but its global campaign will focus exclusively on the strength of its technology. This is part of its larger project to elevate its brand from a Chinese brand to a global one. But it limits the extent to which it can serve the primary Chinese message.

### **The Target**

The Olympics message is targeted to different audiences, and has had differing levels of success. For example, despite the diversity of views among Overseas Chinese about the future direction of China, it is clear from the torch rallies held around the world that there has been great success in getting Overseas Chinese emotionally engaged with the Beijing Olympics. On the other hand, continued criticism of the Games in the West suggests that not everyone is persuaded. It is not yet evident from the available data whether the messaging has been more successful in some parts of the world than others, for example whether CRI and CCTV broadcasts have played a more effective role in countries with fewer alternatives. Much domestic messaging has been directed at co-opting Beijing residents into the global messaging project, for example by raising standards of behavior so that foreign visitors to the Games will be sufficiently impressed by the high level of development both economic and social in Beijing. On the whole, messaging to domestic audiences has been relatively restrained, perhaps in order to limit popular expectations so that they can be exceeded by the reality.

### **Summary**

The Olympics offers an extraordinary opportunity for China and its government to show off their strengths: the capacity to mobilize resources, attract investment, and shape public behavior. It allows China to showcase the success of its modernization efforts and persuade the world that China is not just a rising power but a peaceful and orderly power. On the other hand, there are many competing voices with their own messages, and the CCP must try to fix the meaning of the Games in response to these voices. It is therefore not surprising that complex, sophisticated and comprehensive efforts are underway to convey the desired message of the Games to different

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<sup>91</sup> Susan Brownell, *Beijing's Games: What the Olympics Means to China* (2007).

<sup>92</sup> Jacques deLisle, " 'One World, Different Dreams': The Contest to Define the Beijing Olympics" in Monroe Price and Daniel Dayan, eds, *Owning the Olympics: Narratives of the New China* (2008).

audiences. These efforts are a testimony to China's recent efforts to construct a global information dissemination system.



While the Western image is marketed with great success in China, China's image, "Brand China," is still an uncertain product in Western markets. China's political position—its diplomatic marketing—is, likewise, as yet only developing on the global scene. Yet the growing strength of China's communications network is generating confidence among the central leadership. China's leaders are eager to show the world their best—most modern yet classically *Chinese*—face. Selecting which face (what image) will best represent China is still a work in progress, but the PRC has already made a determined shift from state-sponsored "propaganda" to privately-funded "advertisement". Indeed, what is already quite sophisticated about China's modern messaging networks is their insight into alternative value scales and cultural categories. The PRC understands that by embracing "advertisement"—and moving away from propaganda, it can both influence the global message exchange and profit from it.

The PRC has employed its semi-privatized communication networks to cultivate a growing sense of national unity among Chinese nationals and the overseas Chinese Diaspora. "Advertisement as information" messaging fosters the involvement of individuals through interfaces such as MySpace, YouTube, blogs, and group-texts. The cultural and de facto political effects of this grass-roots phenomenon and government sanctioned strategy look very much like democracy—one with *Chinese* characters. China's efforts to engage internationally have been rewarded by the central economic position it now enjoys. Investment in China has risen sharply since the Mao era. However, popular outsider-opinion of China has not improved at that same rate. In fact, some scholars argue that China's political position is as isolated as it was in the 1970s. Foreigners miss the subtle (stable) transformation underway in China. Studying the shift from xenophobic "propaganda" of the Mao-era to current "advertisement" issued by China's state-led media reveals the effective *and* semi-privatized voice of CCP messaging. The PRC has crossed a new threshold. In today's China, the individual is empowered with information and the means to engage in opinion sharing and development through self advertising albeit under the watchful regard of government and party institutions.

In order for China to complete its transition from developing to developed world power—in order for it to leave its "workshop of the world" status behind—it is attempting to resolve the disconnect between its political isolation and economic centrality. Globalization and the media revolution have made each state more aware of itself, its image, its reputation, and its attitude—in short, its brand. The tasks for these modern states will include finding a brand niche for their nation, engaging in competitive marketing, assuring customer satisfaction, and most of all, creating brand loyalty. Brand states will compete not only among themselves but also with subbrands such as the EU, CNN, Microsoft, and the Roman Catholic Church. In this crowded arena, the states that lack relevant brand equity will not survive.<sup>93</sup>

<sup>93</sup> Peter van Ham. "The Rise of the Brand State: the Postmodern Politics of Image and Reputation". *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, no. 5 (2001), pp 2-6.

Probably no other single issue provides a more comprehensive illustration of China's expanding communication and information dissemination system than the handling of the upcoming 2008 Beijing Olympics. The Games offer China the opportunity to demonstrate its ability to mobilize resources and attract investment by showcasing Chinese modernization efforts. The overarching message is that China is not just a rising power but a peaceful and orderly one. The new 10 Yuan note, which features not Mao but the iconic "bird's nest" Olympic stadium, is proof positive of China's determination to enhance its global image.



China's 21<sup>st</sup> century strategy is to market Brand China and the image of stability with Chinese characteristics. Over the next four years (up until the 18<sup>th</sup> Congress of the CCP) the current Chinese 'board of directors' will continue their attempt to get this right. **Their confidence, resolve, and established global constituency give this strategic play a better-than-even chance of succeeding.**