

The Future of Europe and Its Muslims: Four Scenarios

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On the basis of extensive interviews in the cities of Rotterdam and Mannheim, key findings are:

The factors impeding the integration of the Muslim populations in these two cities are formidable.

- The Dutch condemnation of murders of a politician and an artist who had offended some Muslims is a reflection of a deeply rooted Dutch commitment to diversity in private practices, but a corresponding demand that groups accept certain broad but definite norms of public conduct. On the Muslim side, all informants regarded the publication of caricatures of Muhammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten as a gratuitous swipe at the Muslim community and one that, again, revealed the real sentiment of a significant portion of the European populace. As a result, the tension between Dutch and Muslim peoples is palpable.
- In Mannheim, the home of the largest Muslim community in Germany, there is just one German-Turkish police translator, despite the fact that the Turkish community is, by and large, not proficient in German.
- German concepts of integration of the Muslim community are unattainable in practice, because the ideal of integration is really an ideal of assimilation, in which German Muslims not only speak German, but embrace German social practices such as drinking beer and eating pork. Currently, a majority of Germans believe that the practice of Islam is incompatible with "modern, Western society." Moreover, all the Muslims we spoke to emphatically opposed assimilation in principle, and historically, Muslim communities throughout the world have proven highly resistant to assimilation and conversion.
- A comparative study of Christian and Muslim immigrants to Germany establishes that the integration of Muslims is substantially harder than the integration of Christians. Although the integration of Spaniards and Yugoslavs in Germany was prolonged and difficult by American standards, it nonetheless took place. Muslims experienced problems forming an ethnic identity in a country where the dominant religion is not Islam. Christian immigrants, by contrast, were able to take advantage of the religious background they share with the vast majority of Germans to integrate.
- German politicians and integration officials readily acknowledge the peculiar difficulty in integrating or assimilating Muslims. In interviews, some told us that the solution to this problem would be to concentrate on women. The notion that women are more receptive to integration is contradicted by research, which suggests that among Muslim immigrants it is precisely the women who constitute the greatest force against integration. There is a growing tendency for Turkish male immigrants to take as their wives women from the villages of their family origins in Turkey.

The emergence of a Europe with a Muslim majority population, a Eurabia, on the other hand, did not seem likely on the basis of our observations, despite severe demographic issues facing the non-Muslim populations of Germany and the Netherlands.

- This scenario assumes that birth rates in the countries of origin of Muslim immigrants to Europe will continue to be so high as to produce a never-diminishing surplus of Muslim job-seekers. However, Turkey, the main country of origin of Muslim immigrants in Germany, is now a classic middle income country—and is well on its way to following the repeatedly observed demographic trend towards lower birth rates, and now has a fertility rate of 2.2. Iran has a birth rate of 2.1. Indeed, Turkish researchers are sounding the alarm about Turkey's graying population. Although populations in the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa are still growing, fertility rates there have begun sharp declines as well.
- Europe's Muslim populations are riven by ethnic, theological and other cleavages. Even mosques are identified first by ethnic affiliation, and then by theological leaning.
- The Eurabia scenario assumes European passivity. There is, however, evidence of a more vigorous European response to the problems presented by the Muslim communities. European security agencies are not ignoring the threat of Muslim radical violence. The Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service, for example, in its Annual Report for 2005, stated that "the terrorist threat again remained the main focus for... the Service."
- Rotterdam has been closed to new refugees for the next five years, and immigrants of all categories will be barred, unless they can demonstrate an income 20 per cent above the minimum wage. Proficiency in the Dutch language will be a requirement for residency. New low-cost housing projects have been suspended. The immigration minister Rita Verdonk, nicknamed "Iron Rita" for her policy inclinations, has imposed onerous requirements on non-Western individuals applying to immigrate to the Netherlands. The requirements include passing interviews and tests over a period of five years and an oath of allegiance to the Dutch State. Applicants must watch a video of topless women and gay men.
- One respondent, an elected official in Rotterdam and representative of a party critical of earlier pro-immigration policies, put it bluntly, when he said, "It would be against law-and-order for people to start going through the streets kicking Muslims around; they should just elect us, and we'll do it for them, legally." Mass deportation or expulsion would clearly be a radical act. But it is not inconceivable and it has already become a part of the public imagination.

The more likely scenario is that the Muslim communities turn into isolated enclaves within a Europe increasingly absorbed by the problems of managing this alien cultural presence in its midst. This outcome can be termed, after the color of Islam, the "Green Ghetto."

- Muslim communities continue as more or less isolated enclaves, located mainly in larger cities. European governments continue to pursue, probably with increasing vigor, programs of integration or assimilation, notwithstanding persisting, and probably mounting, resistance

against such programs by the Muslims whom they target. Muslims neither integrate, nor take over.

- This scenario continues substantial elements of the status quo. However, it must not be confused with a simple freezing of the present-day situation. As analyzed above, integration programs are likely to produce a Muslim backlash against European society. Measures taken by the European host societies against terrorism may intensify the isolation of the Muslim communities. The integration of some Muslim women will intensify the isolation of many men. Some Muslim women who have adopted European ways will seek spouses outside the Muslim community. The resultant depletion of available mates in the Muslim community will intensify a dangerous dynamic. The Green Ghetto will produce an abundant supply of alienated and embittered men, some of whom may be expected to join or form terrorist cells.

INTRODUCTION

One of the challenges that Europe faces is how to deal with the Muslim immigrant populations that have grown to significant proportions within its borders over the last generation. Large-scale Muslim migration to Western Europe began several decades ago. Today, there are over 20 million Muslims in Europe and they make up 5% of the population. Nearly 10% of France is Muslim, and Muslims constitute close to half the population of some major European cities. By 2050, Muslims may easily comprise one fifth of Europe. The subject of relations between Muslim immigrants and their European host populations, however, has only recently begun to attract widespread attention.* There are two distinct but overlapping sets of reasons for why this subject has become topical.

The more obvious is the specter of a civilizational conflict between the so-called West and the Muslim world. The attacks of 9/11 in the United States and several other smaller but bloody acts perpetrated by jihadist groups in Western Europe indicate that a conflict pitting radical Muslims against the United States and Europe is not merely brewing but has already been joined. At a minimum, the presence of unassimilated and resentful Muslim populations within Europe presents a security risk in itself both to the United States and to European states. These populations facilitated the planning and execution of bombings carried out in Europe (London and Madrid) as well as the attacks of 9/11. The most extreme prognosis is that Europe will turn into an extension of the Muslim world. If current problems expand into a more general, civilizational conflict, then the presence of Muslim populations inside Europe grows all the more salient.

The second set of reasons relates to the challenge that Muslim migration poses to Europe's identity and conception of itself. Europe's native population is rapidly graying and beginning to decline in absolute numbers. By contrast, Muslim populations both inside Europe and in the neighboring regions of the Middle East and North Africa have been young and growing. Whereas European societies often seem unsure of themselves, diffident about their culture, and confused as to their proper role in the world, Islamic movements, violent and non-violent alike, have won millions of supporters throughout the world with an assertive and self-confident expression of their political vision and cultural vitality. At the least, the presence within Europe of a significant immigrant Muslim population will pose an array of challenges to European societies and in particular to the project of European unity. The Muslim immigrants hold special relevance to the question of Turkey's accession to the European Union. A major objection to Turkish membership is the fear that it would invite a mass influx of Turks into

* For the sake of simplicity, we will not make distinctions between various ethnic and sectarian groups of immigrants or between the various European states. It should be borne in mind, however, that the Muslim immigrant populations of Europe are quite diverse ethnically and riven by ethnic and other splits. Similarly, despite the formation of the European Union European states and societies still retain important differences in political culture.

Western Europe, and these would add to a population many Europeans believe is already too large and too recalcitrant to manage.

In order to get a better sense of how the challenge of Muslim immigration might affect Europe's future and the national security of the United States, we carried out field research in May 2007, focusing mainly on two cities, Mannheim, Germany, and Rotterdam, the Netherlands. While in Europe, we met with local police, immigration officials, politicians, Muslim community leaders, businessmen, journalists, students, and imams.

Mannheim, with a population of over 300,000, is a mid-size city – after Berlin, Germany's most ethnically diverse. Immigrants make up over 20% of Mannheim's population.

Rotterdam is Europe's busiest port and Holland's second largest city, with a population of nearly 600,000, at least 25% of which is Muslim. Formerly said to have been home to Europe's largest mosque (Mannheim now makes that claim) and likely future host to Europe's first accredited Islamic University, Rotterdam has been the site of acute political tension between Muslim immigrants and the native Dutch.

Rather than presenting a simple trip report about what we saw in these two cities, we identified four scenarios that analysts use, implicitly or explicitly to structure their understanding of the current social dynamics in Europe. Each scenario represents a possible picture of Europe in the near- to medium-term future. We then used these four scenarios as reference points for discussion—and possibly as starting points to form a more detailed prognosis. The scenarios are as follows:

SYNTHESIS: EURO-ISLAM AND A NEW EUROPE

In an extension of the EU project to transcend Europe's internal historical divisions, European societies manage to create a workable new civilization and political culture rooted in cosmopolitan precepts rather than in national or historical legacies. To qualify as a European one need only embrace a new civic creed. The Muslim populations of Europe develop a distinctive variant of their religion, relegating Islam to a personal or private moral code while adopting European languages, modes of dress, career ambitions, lifestyle choices, etc. A core body of secular beliefs and structures comes to characterize the Muslim populations as much as it does pre-existing European populations. This outcome is promoted by inherent tendencies on the part both of migrant and host communities to integrate the Muslim immigrant populations of Europe into the pre-existing social milieu. Designed programs of the State also act to promote integration and assimilation.

EURABIA

With its population aging and declining, Europe has little choice but to permit increased immigration from North Africa, the Middle East, and elsewhere in the Muslim world. Emboldened by their youthfulness, growing numbers, and a vibrant religious-cultural identity, Europe's Muslim immigrants increasingly assert themselves in European politics. The present disparities in birth rate grow even sharper. Exhausted, insecure, disoriented, and intimidated,

European host societies never regain the cohesiveness of identity and purpose to assert themselves against an energetic, rising social order. Ultimately, the Muslim populations of Europe overwhelm the host societies, until Europe becomes a socio-religious extension of the Near East and North Africa, possibly with residual enclaves of the pre-Islamic European population left from place to place. Pressure from within and from without compels the European states to distance themselves from cooperation with the United States, particularly in the Middle East.

FORTRESS EUROPE

Unsettled by its inability to integrate its Muslim populations and impatient with the Muslims' refusal to assimilate, Europe dispenses with its relatively recent experience with liberalism. Global economic downturn and acts of jihadist terror provoke Europeans to embrace a highly xenophobic style of politics. European politics comes to be dominated by anti-Muslim ideologues, who adopt a program of organized hostility to Muslims and to already-established Muslim populations in Europe. The practical manifestations of the new reaction in Europe vary between some combination of isolation and draconian police controls at the least extreme end of a spectrum; to mass expulsion at the most extreme. Factors leading to this outcome include growth in alarm at the socio-economic problems associated with the Muslim populations; a break down of the ideology of multiculturalism and political taboos; and incidents of terrorism as mobilizing shock events.

THE GREEN GHETTO

The present-day (c. 2007) status quo continues—but, through the passage of time, it crystallizes—i.e., becomes more rigid and less likely to undergo transition to other forms. Muslim populations are restricted—at first by choice, later perhaps by formal legal provisions—to more or less clearly defined geographic precincts, chiefly in large European cities. Elites within these populations may achieve a nominal degree of integration, through language acquisition and economic engagement with the host society. The main body of each Muslim population however remains self-contained, and advances little beyond a low-level economic niche. State integration programs stall, achieving, at best, the occasional convert to European social norms—but integration remains an exceptional phenomenon, restricted to individual cases. Globalization in the form of satellite television and air transportation makes it easier for immigrant populations to retain ties to their societies of origin and maintain distinct identities. Meanwhile globalization in the form of increased market competition undermines the European welfare state. Maintaining a homogenous society is no longer easy or even desirable. In essence, European society reverts to a pre-nation-state pattern wherein economic classes are socially distinct and ethnic-cultural groups fill specific economic niches.

I. SYNTHESIS

The first scenario envisions a seamless integration of immigrant Muslim communities into their European host societies. Europeans and Muslims become indistinguishable, as a synthesis takes place between their once-divergent civilizations. This synthesis is accomplished through the mutual efforts of the European host societies acting through state bureaucracies and Muslim immigrant communities actively seeking to better themselves by becoming more integrated in the countries in which they have settled. The Muslim populations develop and embrace a distinctive and moderate variant of their religion that reconciles their beliefs and practices with the norms of contemporary European life. After first mastering the languages of their host societies, Muslims then adopt the same modes of dress, lifestyles, and social habits. Education and employment patterns of Muslims and native Europeans become identical. Inter-marriage becomes widespread. A core body of secular beliefs and structures comes to characterize the Muslim populations as much as it does pre-existing European populations. In short, over time the immigrant Muslim populations become effectively indistinguishable from the native European populations. This process is facilitated by European societies further developing toward their own ideals. European laws and political and cultural norms become ever more strongly rooted in universal and secular principles and outlook. Traditional Christian sources of European values and historical symbols gradually fade from public life. In effect, a new synthesis of cultures transpires and a new civilization is born.

FACTORS SUPPORTING SYNTHESIS

Pushing affairs in this direction are several factors. To start, this scenario is the optimal solution from the standpoint of European political officials, for, if it is achieved, the problem disappears. Achieving synthesis through full integration is the express goal of mainstream European political parties and of integration authorities. The only negative to this scenario from the European perspective is that attaining it will require the state to dedicate substantial resources to facilitate the integration of immigrant Muslim populations.

On the Muslim side there exist several factors militating toward such a scenario. Most obviously, the prospect of integration is attractive economically. Limits on opportunities for education and work are perhaps the greatest source of resentment among Muslim immigrants. In Germany, for example, informants complained about the tendency to put Turkish children at young age on paths to vocational training and not university education. In the Netherlands, the phrase "glass ceiling" was invoked to explain the difficulties Muslim immigrants face in the Dutch workplace. Expanding socio-economic opportunities in their host society is an express goal of many Muslim immigrant organizations.

There also exists among Muslim communities sentiment in support of the creation of a new cultural or civilizational synthesis that would displace or at least dilute traditional sources of

European cultural identity.¹ Past memorialization of historical figures and battles that resulted in victories over Muslims, for example, irritates some immigrants, who interpret such memorials as unwelcoming symbols of arrogance and hostility to Muslims. By replacing the historical conceptions of Europe's nations with a new concept of Europe based on universal principles to which anyone including Muslims can assent regardless of background, this source of friction could be overcome. The EU's currency, which depicts imaginary anodyne bridges and monuments so as to avoid the controversy that would follow were the currency to feature real national artifacts, exemplifies this logic in action. The scenario of seamless synthesis of Muslim and European cultures would thus seem to present a win-win solution for all.

FACTORS AGAINST SYNTHESIS

Yet there exist enough obstacles before the realization of such a scenario that, in our analysis, it is highly improbable, despite the publicly expressed desires of European political leaders and many in the Muslim community. One of the key obstructions lies in very different interpretations of the concept of integration. Our Muslim informants defined integration as having access to the same education and employment opportunities as native Europeans, but rejected assimilation consistently and in strong terms. But when pressed to fill in the details, our informants in the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) ultimately conceded that real integration of the kind they expected was equivalent to assimilation. Mastery of the German language was only the beginning. Linguistic integration was to be followed by dressing and acting in the workplace like a German and even socializing outside the workplace like a German.² A Social Democrat (SPD) representative was less emphatic but acknowledged that a significant degree of acculturation was an intrinsic part of integration. Likewise, integration officials conceded that their work in part consisted of imprinting German cultural norms and overriding non-German ones.

There is reason to question the sincerity and/or depth of European proclamations of support for integrating immigrants. No European country has ever seen itself as a community of immigrants. To the contrary, continental European societies have traditionally valued the creation and maintenance of social cohesion. This in turn requires a willing suppression of difference and a high degree of conformity.

The example of the Netherlands is instructive on this point. The Netherlands, at least prior to the backlash that followed the murders of Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, was heralded as a bastion of laissez faire cultural liberalism. Dutch society, where very different communities and sub-cultures could exist side by side, many thought, provided an atmosphere conducive to

¹ For a nuanced and upbeat survey of Turkish immigrants' attitudes, see Ayhan Kaya, "European Union, Europeanness, and Euro-Turks: Hyphenated and multiple identities," *Eurozine* (4 October 2005). <http://eurozine.com/pdf/2005-10-04-kaya-en.pdf>.

² An independent report on the problems of integration took Germany's political parties, and the CDU in particular, to task for their "unreasonable" demands for naturalization of immigrants. ICG, "Islam and Identity in Germany," ii.

integration and assimilation precisely because it seemed to ask so little of its members. Others, especially American observers, feared that the famed tolerance and openness of the Dutch was a symptom of a more general European loss of conviction and self-confidence, that the ideology of “multi-culturalism” was running amok.³ While there is validity in the thesis that contemporary European societies have been engaged in a confused search for new principles of organization, the fact remains that many traditional assumptions about behavior do remain in place.

The Dutch reputation for tolerance is not a recent phenomenon, but dates back to the 17th century and is the product of the religious fissure between Dutch Catholics and Protestants and of the global presence of Dutch traders. In order to minimize sectarian friction, the Dutch adopted an attitude whereby the public square was shared on the understanding that each community would police itself. This approach was developed at a time when the Netherlands was one of the premier trading powers of the globe. The famous Dutch tolerance cannot be separated from the need to conduct business and host merchants from diverse cultures. A set of social views adopted initially for the commercial advantages they brought were turned by Dutch in more recent times into moral virtue. In short, the Dutch practice of tolerance was not the simple product of a recent infatuation with multi-culturalism. Rather, it fulfilled a pragmatic function within Dutch society and, more importantly, rested on the expectation that society’s members, while free to conduct their private affairs as they wanted, were obliged to adhere to certain broad but definite norms of public conduct. Thus, although the sudden and concrete Dutch reaction to the murders of Fortuyn and Van Gogh surprised those observers who had written off the Dutch as effete multiculturalists, it was in fact a logical outgrowth of Dutch social attitudes, not a deviation from them.

In contrast to the situation in the Netherlands where tension between the native Dutch and Muslim immigrants is palpable, there exists in Germany among both German officials and Muslims a guarded optimism that accommodation is possible. Both sides acknowledge the existence of problems but believe that they can be overcome. The police in Mannheim, for example, have undertaken a campaign to establish contact with local leaders, imams, and other figures in the Muslim communities. Most of the immigrant groups have reciprocated.

Even *Milli Görüş* (National View) has opened up to the police and willingly cooperates. *Milli Görüş* was established in Turkey in 1969 by Necmettin Erbakan for the sake of restoring the Shāria to Turkey. It is perhaps the largest independent Muslim movement in Europe and espouses an activist Islamist politics. It is said to be affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. It has 26,500 dues paying members in Germany, and claims to have 210,000 dues-paying members in Europe as a whole. Many of its members left for Europe where they found greater religious – and political – freedom. The movement has moderated some of its positions in recent years, in part because it recognizes that it has little choice in view of German security concerns and in part because it has lost some of its steam with the decline of Erbakan and his political parties in Turkey. Nonetheless, *Milli Görüş* continues to adhere to an interpretation of Islam that is

³ A cogent but thoughtful presentation of this thesis can be found in Bruce Bawer, *While Europe Slept: How radical Islam is destroying the West from within* (New York: Doubleday, 2006).

uncompromising and militant in spirit, if not in practice. German school-teachers complain that the group brainwashes its members and seeks to construct a parallel society of Muslims.⁴

A smaller Muslim group, the Süleymançılar, concerns the police because it has been less forthcoming.⁵ This is more likely due to the group's structure as a traditional Sufi order than to any deliberate intention to avoid police scrutiny. The Süleymançılar, although quite conservative in their dress and understanding of Islam, are not as politicized as Milli Görüş. They do not maintain ties to political parties. Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan did not aspire to overthrowing or reversing the Kemalist Revolution but instead held the more modest goal of maintaining and transmitting the knowledge of Islam to future generations living under Kemalism. It is said to have up to 100,000 members in 300 local branches.⁶

What is striking about this police initiative to reach out to the Muslim community is not that it is being made, but that it is only being made now. Significant Muslim communities have existed in Germany for over forty years, almost two generations. Similarly, it is only within the last year that the German state has introduced formal programs for the explicit purpose of supporting integration, and the resources it is devoting, so far, are not substantial. For example, in the most crime ridden police precinct of Mannheim, which is also home to the largest concentration of Muslims in that city, there is just one German-Turkish police translator. Yet a consistent complaint of the police personnel on duty was that the immigrant community, including the Turkish and Muslim communities, were by and large not proficient in German. This illustrates that the German state is still just beginning to confront the challenges it faces. As organized integration programs have been operational only a short while, it is too early to gauge how seriously committed European states are to such programs. It is by no means certain that the current commitment to integration in Germany—or other European countries—will be sustained, or, if it is sustained, what amount of state resources will be appropriated for it.

As for attitudes of Muslims, alongside the enthusiasm for “integration” there is significant resistance to the idea of assimilation. Our informants told us explicitly that, whereas they desired integration in terms of equal access to educational and economic opportunity, they emphatically did not desire assimilation. German cultural practices such as consumption of pork and alcohol are, of course forbidden in Islam. The prohibition on the latter is ignored often enough even in predominantly Muslim populations. But it is the extremely rare Muslim who will eat pork. Although dietary choices may appear trivial, they can and do affect human interaction. More fundamentally, Muslim respondents found the patterns of German family life, in particular the high rates of divorce and the decline of marriage, to be highly undesirable.

⁴ “Islamic Identity in Germany,” 11.

⁵ The name of the group is literally “followers of Süleyman.” Their founder, Süleyman Hilmi Tunahan (1888-1959), was a Sufi leader.

⁶ Known under the title “Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren,” the Süleymançılar in Germany have a website at www.vikz.de. A Turkish language website founded by his followers is www.tunahan.org.

While the more rigorous religious beliefs of our informants undoubtedly influenced their attitude, one survey of Turks in Germany found that around half could not imagine ever becoming German.⁷

One might object that part of the explanation for the ambivalent attitude of German Muslims to the question of assimilation is simply reaction against the ambivalence or hostility of native Germans, very much in evidence even in the recent past. A perception that the majority of the native population is indifferent or hostile to the mere presence of Muslims would predictably provoke among Muslims an adverse reaction to the idea of becoming German. Surely this plays a role and were mass German attitudes to flip from negative to positive, over time the numbers of Turks and other Muslims willing to assimilate might increase. But to expect such a sudden and massive switch in German attitudes is not realistic. Currently, a majority of Germans believe that the practice of Islam is incompatible with "modern, Western society."⁸ It is worth noting that Germany (unlike the Netherlands, France, United Kingdom, or Spain) has not yet seen a significant act of Islamic terrorism. Probability, however, suggests that there will be some act of Islamic terror within the next five years. It seems safe to expect that in the wake of such an event the negative opinions of most Germans toward Islam and Muslims will worsen. A vicious cycle of mutual suspicion and recrimination may ensue and would complicate efforts at integration. Likely near-term events can be expected to get in the way of the long-term project of synthesis.

The recent shift from a more forgiving attitude in the Netherlands was deeply disheartening to all of our Muslim respondents, both inside the Netherlands and abroad. While they were aware of the cause of European concerns, several expressed the view that recent acts were merely being used as pretexts for nativist Europeans to express their true feelings about Islam and Muslims. All regarded the publication of caricatures of Muhammad in the Danish newspaper *Jyllands-Posten* as a gratuitous swipe at the Muslim community and one that, again, revealed the real sentiment of a significant portion of the European populace. They saw this and the Dutch reaction as related and similar events.

Underlying the negative attitude of most Germans is a vast socio-cultural gap between them and the immigrant Muslim communities. A fact commonly lamented by representatives of both the German and Turkish communities is that the immigrants who arrived in Germany overwhelmingly came from rural areas of Anatolia. They brought a peasant culture that places little value on education and is ill-suited to success in a post-industrial economy. Although nearly two generations have passed since the first major Turkish immigration to Germany, the social patterns of Turks in Germany in many ways remain those of Turkey several decades ago. In other words, not only have they failed to adapt to German culture but they have not even kept up with changes in their country of origin.

⁷ "Islam and Identity in Germany," 31.

⁸ Christian Bangel, "Integration: Mach Mit!" *Die Zeit* (6 July 2006).

A study prepared for the German police⁹ vividly documents the social gap between Germans, Turks, and other migrants. In comparing the rates of television watching, use of video games, book reading, command of German, etc. the study reveals significant and striking differences between Germans and the Muslim and other immigrants. It makes clear that the gap in educational achievement cannot be explained solely as a function of conscious or unconscious discriminatory policies of German institutions. Instead, the underachievement of Muslims and other immigrants is closely related to behavioral patterns that are not conducive to intellectual achievement. They watch more television, spend more time playing video games etc. The study confirms that the gap in achievement can in part be explained by differences in material conditions. For example, whereas the vast majority of German children have their own bedrooms and thus have a quiet place for study, over 80% of Muslim children share bedrooms and lack a place for completing homework or engaging in reading undisturbed. At the same time, however, more than half of non-German young people have a television in their bedrooms, compared with fewer than a third of their German counter-parts.¹⁰ Differences in material conditions can only explain part of the difference in behavior. More significant are the different patterns of behavior that are cultural inheritances passed down from generation to generation.

These differences might be overcome with the help of state intervention, but intervention demands resources and, more worrisome, is likely to provoke resistance on the part of the targeted community. If nothing else, the attitudes of contempt and condescension that almost necessarily must accompany such policies will rankle some. The fact that there exists at the same time a sharp religious and ethno-cultural divide in addition to the behavioral divide will make the Muslim communities more sensitive to the execution of interventionist policies. Identification checks and police raids at mosques offend most Muslims, who believe that such crude measures are of no use in getting at the real problem.

This is significant because the religious-cultural gap is strongly correlated with an inability to assimilate. A comparative study of Christian and Muslim immigrants to Germany establishes that the integration of Muslims is substantially harder than the integration of Christians. Although the integration of Spaniards and Yugoslavs in Germany was prolonged and difficult by American standards, it nonetheless took place. Muslims experienced problems forming an ethnic identity in a country where the dominant religion is not Islam. Christian immigrants, by contrast, were able to take advantage of the religious background they share with the vast majority of Germans to integrate.¹¹

⁹ Christian Pfeiffer, *Kriminalität unter Jugendlichen mit Migrationshintergrund—Migration und Jugendgewalt* (2006) (copy furnished by Mannheim police, *Revier Innenstadt*).

¹⁰ Pfeiffer, 83.

¹¹ Klaus F. Zimmerman et. al, "Clash of Cultures: Muslims and Christians in the Ethnosizing Process," Institute for the Study of Labor (Bonn: September 2006).

As a religion that grew out of contact and competition with Christianity, Islam possesses a powerful critique of Christianity. Indeed, it could be described as a critique of Christianity in its essence. Over the centuries there has developed a substantial apparatus of apologetics and this has effectively inoculated Muslims against Christianity. Christian missionaries in the Middle East in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were spectacularly unsuccessful in converting Muslims, despite the fact that Western power and culture were at their peaks. However powerful the blandishments and lures of secular European lifestyles may be in practice, there is little reason to expect that in any foreseeable future they will overcome Islam as a source of identity. No matter how anemic their practice of religion may be, the majority of Europeans still identify themselves as Christians. In other words, secularized immigrants of Muslim background will continue to identify as Muslims, i.e, as aliens to the traditional cultures and origins of Europe.

Moreover, a significant number of Muslims claim that their own rediscovery of Islam as an influence upon their daily lives and values has been spurred by what they see as the emptiness and decadence of contemporary European lifestyles. As two scholars of Muslims in Europe put it, "many young Muslims are increasingly alienated by an aggressively secular culture that enforces liberal transgression of moral norms and taboos."¹² Indeed, it is precisely the combination of native indifference to or contempt for Muslims and Muslim distaste for contemporary European lifestyles that many observers and scholars argue has created a generation attracted to radical Islam.¹³

German politicians and integration officials readily acknowledge the peculiar difficulty in integrating or assimilating Muslims. In interviews, some told us that the solution to this problem would be to concentrate on women. Directing integration efforts at women, they believe, offers three advantages. One is that women are more pliable and receptive to integration efforts. Although in Mannheim, for example, Muslim women initially hesitated to enroll in German language courses, once the integration office obliged mothers' schedules and the sensitivities of all women by offering classes in mosques in the evening, enrollment jumped. The experience of attending caused women's enthusiasm and even self-confidence only to grow. Second, targeting women would over time have a greater impact on integration efforts, as women would be more likely to transmit their language skills and attitudes to their children. Third, by empowering women they would undermine the patriarchal norms of Islam and thereby accelerate the breakdown of cultural sources of resistance to integration and assimilation.

Each of these assumptions is problematic, at least in part. The notion that women are more receptive to integration is contradicted by research, which suggests that among Muslim immigrants it is precisely the women who constitute the greatest force against integration.¹⁴

¹² Phillip Blond and Adrian Pabst, "Only traditional Islam can do it," *International Herald Tribune*, (6 July 2007).

¹³ See, for example, Zachary Shore, *Breeding Bin Laden: America, Islam, and the Future of Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), esp. ch. 6 "Clash of the Barbies."

¹⁴ Zimmerman et. al, 8.

Integrated women will speed the integration and assimilation of future generations only if they become mothers to future generations, yet this is not happening. There is a growing tendency for Turkish male immigrants to take as their wives women from the villages of their family origins in Turkey.¹⁵ This in effect knocks integration efforts not forward but back. Finally, although the German officials thought the idea of targeting women to facilitate integration was a novel idea, it has been used before much more systematically and with mixed results. During the 1920s and 1930s the Bolsheviks sought to use the Muslim women of Central Asia as a "surrogate proletariat," as a social class that could be used as a wedge to break apart the culture as a whole and render Central Asian society more vulnerable to social engineering. Even with their monopoly on violence and willingness to use violent coercion on a mass scale if necessary, the Bolsheviks never succeeded in cracking open Central Asian culture as widely and as quickly as they had hoped.¹⁶

While the immigrant communities are much more vulnerable than the Central Asians given their small size and location in the midst of an alien culture, German officials possess nowhere near the resources or determination that the Bolsheviks did. The focus on women may yield increased rates of assimilation, but those increases may well not be decisive. Moreover, the act of concentrating efforts on women equally may spur a backlash as Muslim males seek to protect both communal identity and out of resentment at the greater economic opportunities afforded women. Cultural norms hold that men are responsible for supporting their families. Accelerating the economic advancement of women relative to that of men may well result in stripping young males of their dignity, upset marriage patterns, and disrupt family life

CONCLUSIONS

Although a synthesis of European and immigrant cultures promises the optimal outcome, we are extremely skeptical that it can be realized. It is in its essence a utopian vision. Neither European societies nor Muslim immigrant communities are disposed to cultural compromise. European societies over the preceding centuries have developed fairly rigorous communal norms and have demonstrated a poor ability to accommodate and integrate Muslim immigrants. Muslim immigrants, for their part, have maintained a distinctive identities. Although representatives on both sides speak openly and positively of their desire for integration, the fact is that their definitions of integration are incompatible. Finally, far from facilitating integration, state-led efforts might well provoke resistance. Indeed, an "integration summit" sponsored by the German Prime Minister succeeded in provoking a rift when four major Turkish organizations chose to boycott to protest a recent changes in immigration law that require, among other things, that immigrant spouses possess command of German. Such requirements do not apply to Americans, Canadians, or Japanese. Notably, much of the German press commented acerbically

¹⁵ Christopher Caldwell, "Many German Turks Wedded to Tradition: Foreign marriages exacerbate tensions," *International Herald Tribune* (26-27 May 2007).

¹⁶ Gregory J. Massell, *The Surrogate Proletariat: Moslem women and revolutionary strategies in Soviet Central Asia, 1919-1929* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).

that in boycotting the summit the Turks betrayed both their ignorance of how a democracy works and their true desire not to integrate but to establish a parallel society. In their remarks, these German commentators expressed both their condescension to the Turks and their limited tolerance for immigrants.¹⁷

¹⁷ "Immigration Law Hits Turks Below the Belt," Spiegel Online (12 July 2007), <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,494027,00.html>

II. EURABIA

While integrating the Muslim communities into European society is the official goal of major European governments, the Eurabia scenario has gripped the imagination of much of the media and of a large segment of European (and American) opinion.¹⁸ In the Eurabia scenario, instead of Muslims integrating into Europe, the converse will occur: Europe will be integrated into an expanding Muslim world.

The scenario is roughly as follows. Western Europe is a spent force. It no longer has the inherent social, political, or economic energy to sustain itself. European populations are in decline, due to birthrates below the rate of replacement. The region already hosts a Muslim population of over 20 million. The Muslim population, by and large, is not susceptible to integration on the terms set by the European States. Yet it is a growing population. It grows because it has a high birthrate; and because Muslim immigration continues on a significant scale. Europeans lack the means or the will to respond to the Islamization of their countries. Enfeebled by the ideology of multiculturalism, they are unsure of the merits of their own culture and civilization. Graying and dominated by the elderly, they have little energy to counter the assertiveness of the demographically young and culturally vigorous Muslim populations. In just two or three generations, there will be no Europeans, except, perhaps, in isolated enclaves (one respondent, a city council member in Rotterdam, anticipated that they would be like "amusement parks or Indian reservations"). Muslims will be the demographically and politically dominant group in a Europe that by the year 2060 will be an extension of the Arab Near East and Maghreb.

FACTORS SUPPORTING THE EURABIA SCENARIO

The terms of the scenario themselves suggest the main evidence in its support. The evidence may be categorized, broadly, under two headings: demographics and political will.

Demographics

Europe is in demographic decline, and the decline is rapid. In thirty years, if current birthrates do not increase, most Italians will have neither siblings *nor first cousins*.¹⁹ Declining birthrates

¹⁸ The term "Eurabia" was first popularized by the Egyptian Jewish scholar of non-Muslims under Muslim rule, Bat Ye'Or. In her usage, a conscious political alliance between France and the Arab states is a key component (see Bat Ye'Or, *Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis* (Madison, WI, 2005). Others, notably Bernard Lewis, Niall Ferguson, and *The Economist* have used the term in a sense closer to the one here, i.e. of a transformation of Europe into a cultural and religious extension of the Middle East.

¹⁹ See also for a précis of the birthrate crisis in Italy, Frances D'Emilio, "Italy's Aged Turn to Foreigners for Care," AP Wire, July 7, 2007; and McKinsey Consulting report, "The Coming Demographic: How Aging Populations Will Reduce Global Savings" (January 2005) McKinsey Company, <http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/publications/demographics/>.

are a pan-European phenomenon. By contrast, Muslim populations inside Europe, have a birthrate that is alleged to be three times that of native Europeans.²⁰—The populations of the Middle East and North Africa are young and growing. Some project they will double over the course of the next three decades.²¹ The graying of Europe creates a demand for labor, and the demand must be met by accepting a steady stream of Muslim immigrants from the Maghreb, Turkey, and Arab Near East. Thus a long-term influx of Muslims from outside Europe will further expand the Muslim immigrant communities inside Europe that are already outstripping the native populations in growth. Since 1980, the number of Muslims in France and the Netherlands has more than doubled, while the number in Sweden has increased threefold.²²

Political Will

The polities of Western Europe do not have the political will to react to the Islamization of their countries. The lack of political will owes, in part, to the aging European population: the elderly seek short-term stability in preference to any form of social conflict; managed decline thus is preferred to making a stand. Challenging a radical transformation of European society is further prevented by the prevailing ideology of the post-World War II European States. Western Europe after 1945 consciously rejected the nationalism of the past. In its place, the States of the region—especially through their educational systems—inculcated an ideology of multiculturalism. This is an ideology that rejects any public initiative that smacks of nationalism or parochial European ethnic or religious identity. The phrases “multi-culti left” and “endless feast of understanding” were used derisively by our respondents at a German party political think tank. The concepts behind the phrases are very much alive in European thinking. Not only does the prevailing ideology prevent an official reaction against Islamization, but it also prevents open discussion of the problems presented by the Muslim communities. Stripped even of the ability to discuss the problem, Europeans scarcely can be expected to tackle it with the urgency that the demographic trends require. Finally, the institutionalized regime of human rights in Europe makes it difficult or impossible to respond effectively to a rising non-European social order. In short, radicals use the legal mechanisms of individual rights (Rome Convention, European Court of Human Rights, etc.) to foster their group agendas.

In contrast to an ideology that renders a post-Christian Europe defenseless against radical demographic change, Muslims possess a self-assured worldview, drawing heavily on a compelling and still-vibrant theology. What European government agencies will see as failure to integrate, Muslims will see as resilience against a failing, if still dogmatic, secularism. This equips them to assert themselves, especially as against a Europe adrift.

²⁰ Shore, 103.

²¹ Timothy M. Savage, “Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing,” *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 27 No. 3 (2004), 27.

²² Laquer, 37.

The Eurabia Scenario: An Idea with Considerable Traction

The Eurabia scenario has gained considerable traction on both sides of the Atlantic. Journalists, analysts, and policy-makers have credited the scenario, to such an extent that it must be reckoned influential in its own right. The influence of the Eurabia scenario therefore can be measured apart from the factors on the ground actually militating toward the Islamization of Europe. We will propose at the end of this chapter how the Eurabia scenario may be expected to influence European and American analysis and policy-making. First, the depth and breadth of adherence to the scenario may be set out with several salient examples from the published literature and commentary.

Perhaps the most subtle and best-informed exposition of a crisis in Western Europe is that by Walter Laqueur. An historian of the first rank, Laqueur is not an anti-European, seeking bad news to mesh with *a priori* rejection of European values and doomsaying of the European future.²³ Yet Laqueur concludes now that

...by the turn of the millennium, at the very latest, it should have been clear that Europe was no longer on the road to superpower status, but that it faced an existential crisis—or, perhaps more accurately, a number of major crises, of which the demographic problem was the most severe.²⁴

Laqueur is not the only senior academic taking this or a similar view. Bernard Lewis speaks in more urgent tones, saying that Muslims “seem to be about to take over Europe.”²⁵ Harvard’s Niall Ferguson has echoed Lewis.²⁶ The thesis that Europe is in decline and soon to be overtaken by the Muslim communities it hosts is not without high academic pedigree.

In Germany, Henryk M. Broder published a book in 2006 entitled *Hurra, Wir Kapitulieren* (*Hurray! We’re Capitulating!*). Broder takes aim at European complacency relative to Islamic radicalism and the growing demands of Muslim minorities on the societies that host them. He goes so far as to compare present attitudes to 1930s appeasement. The comparison indeed is the heart of the book:

²³ See 1992 German translation of Laqueur’s *Europe Since Hitler: Europa auf dem Wege zur Weltmacht 1945-1992*.

²⁴ Walter Laqueur, “So Much for the New European Century,” *Chronicle of Higher Education*, May 11, 2007.

²⁵ David Machlis and Tovah Lazaroff, Interview with Bernard Lewis, *Jerusalem Post*, January 29, 2007: <http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1167467834546>

²⁶ Niall Ferguson, “Eurabia?” *Hoover Digest* (No. 3 2004). Originally published in *The New York Times* on 4 April 2004.

As was the case in the 1930s, when Czechoslovakia was sacrificed in the interest of peace under the Munich Agreement – a move that ultimately did nothing to prevent World War II – Europeans today also believe that an adversary, seemingly invincible due to a preference for death over life, can be mollified by good behavior, concessions and submission. All the Europeans can hope to gain in this asymmetric conflict is a temporary reprieve, a honeymoon period that could last 10, 20, or maybe even 50 years. Anyone on death row breathes a sigh of relief when his execution is postponed to some indefinite time in the future.²⁷

The view that Islamization is imminent is well-entrenched in certain segments of opinion. Edward Luttwak says that the AK Party in Turkey not only aims to establish a “Koranic state” in Turkey but to transform Europe into a Muslim continent as well. If necessary, Luttwak says, the AK Party leaders will focus on the Islamization of Europe *before* they tackle the Kemalist establishment at home.²⁸ Jonathan S. Paris considers it possible that “the Islamist tide turns into a global tsunami.”²⁹ Such propositions, at present at any rate, seem overstated, but the fact that commentators are making them is evidence of the spread of the Eurabia scenario.

In June of 2007, Fred C. Ikle, who was Undersecretary of Defense for Policy in the Reagan Administration, said, “Islamization in Europe would be an immense disaster for the Atlantic alliance and NATO.”³⁰ To note such remarks is not to doubt the evaluation that an Islamic Europe would have profound implications for U.S.-European relations. It seems incontestable that it would. The point instead is to note that the proposition that Europe could become Islamized is taken seriously amongst intelligent and experienced policy makers and analysts. It is far from a fringe view.

Not to be discounted are works of fiction, revolving around a hypothetical future Muslim onslaught against Europe.³¹ Such works are not to be taken as building the Eurabia case on the facts. Instead, they are significant for indicating a level of popular awareness of predictions of a Muslim Europe.

²⁷ Henryk M. Broder, “Hurray! We’re Capitulating!” January 25, 2007:

<http://www.Spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,462149,00.html> (condensed version of book in essay form).

²⁸ Edward Luttwak, “Turkey’s leaders plan Muslim Europe,” *The First Post*, 30 April, 2007:

<http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/index.php?storyID=6563&p=2>

²⁹ Jonathan S. Paris, “Europe and its Muslims,” 1 February 2007:

http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&cid=4549&pubType=EurUnion

³⁰ Marisa Morrison, “Talking Turkey,” *National Interest Online*, 19 June 2007.

³¹ See, below, under Part III, Fortress Europe.

FLAWS IN THE EURABIA SCENARIO

On the basis of our discussions with informants in Germany and the Netherlands, and our reading of published material produced on both sides of the Atlantic, it is our view that the Eurabia scenario, as expounded in its extreme form, is extremely unlikely to prove correct. Western Europe, in short, will not become an extension of the Muslim world. A number of factors lead us to this conclusion. We now will set out each in turn.

Demographics: Faulty Assumptions of European Population Collapse

Those adopting the Eurabia scenario start by assuming that current demographic trends will remain unchanged over the course of the next generation or two. History alone suggests that such an assumption of an unchanged trajectory is dubious. Population trends may be considerably “bumpy” and are prone to change. Moreover, evidence suggests that comparatively modest adjustments in State policy—e.g., increasing maternal leave and tax advantages to establishing a family—can change birthrates. One of the main drivers against families having children in Western Europe is the price of real estate. But the proposition that birthrates will remain extremely low inherently leads to the disappearance of this main driver: If populations shrink, the upward pressure on the cost of housing is alleviated, and conditions therefore improve for a recovery of higher birthrates. This leads to a related point.

Demographics: Faulty Assumptions of Population Change in Muslim Countries of Origin

Those advancing the Eurabia scenario do not generally consider in any depth the structure of populations in the Muslim countries in which the Muslim communities of Europe originate. The countries of origin of Muslim immigrants to Europe have had high birth rates typical of underdeveloped and developing countries. The introduction of huge numbers of young people into national labor markets that cannot absorb them has been a main driver behind migration from the Muslim countries of the Mediterranean basin to Western Europe. What is assumed with far too little scrutiny is that birth rates in the countries of origin of Muslim immigrants to Europe will continue to be so high as to produce a never-diminishing surplus of Muslim job-seekers. To be sure, the demographic expansion of such countries is striking, and it produces a starkly visible effect in over-crowded metropolises, seemingly teeming with under-employed individuals, especially young Muslim men. Yet the record of development is one that shows a close correlation between urbanization and wealth creation on the one hand and declining birthrate on the other. This goes beyond mere theory, and is not a matter simply of extrapolating from one case (e.g., South Korea) to others. Turkey, for Germany the main country of origin of Muslim immigrants, under the definition used in development economics is now a classic middle income country—and is well on its way to following the repeatedly observed demographic trend. Indeed, Turkish researchers are sounding the alarm about Turkey’s graying population. The Population Studies Institute at Hacettepe University reported that the percentage of elderly in the population as a whole has gone up from 2 per cent to 6 per cent, and the birth rate, now at 2.2 children, hovers barely above replacement rate. Demographic experts studying Turkey’s

population trend doubt Turks will number more than 100 million.³² Iran has set the world record for the most rapid decline in fertility. Whereas in the early 1980s Iran's fertility rate was 7.0 births per woman, by 2000 the rate was just 2.1, the level required for maintenance. It may fall further.³³ Although populations in the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa are growing, fertility rates there are plummeting as well. An ever-burgeoning population in the countries of origin is a core assumption of the Eurabia scenario, but this assumption must be critically examined, if not rejected outright.

Furthermore, even if European and Muslim birthrates remain constant, it is far from clear that they would lead Muslims to dominate Europe in either the near- or medium-term. The claims by some adherents to the Eurabia scenario that a Muslim-dominated Europe is close at hand are met by calculations by others that current trends, while leading to a doubling of the absolute number of Muslims in the population of Western Europe, would not result in a Muslim population in Western Europe of more than 15 per cent of the total.³⁴ In absolute terms, the estimated Muslim populations of major European countries in 2006 was as follows:

Country	Number of Muslims ³⁵	Total population ³⁶
Germany	3.6 million	82.4 million
Britain	1.6 million	60.7 million
Netherlands	1.0 million	16.5 million
Sweden	0.4 million	9.0 million
Denmark	0.3 million	5.4 million

³² Samed Günek, "Once-Young Population in Turkey Rapidly Turning Grey," *Today's Zaman*, 24 June 2007: <http://www.sundayszaman.com/sunday/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=1319> Respecting the plunge in birthrates in East Asia, see Philip Bowring, "How Asians can have more babies," *International Herald Tribune*, 18 May 2007.

³³ Mohammad Jalal Abbasi-Shavazi and Peter McDonald, "Fertility Decline in the Islamic Republic of Iran: 1972-2000," *Asian Population Studies* Vol. 2 No. 3 (November 2006).

³⁴ Zachary Shore puts the current Muslim population in Europe at 23 million—5 % of the total: Zach Shore, *Breeding Bin Ladens: America, Islam, and the Future of Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006), p. 103. Individual country profiles containing detailed data and background information are available at http://www.euro-islam.info/spip/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=

³⁵ Data from Walter Laqueur, *The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2007) p. 37.

³⁶ Data from *CIA World Factbook*.

Italy	0.9 million	58.1 million
Spain	1.0 million	40.4 million
Greece	0.5 million	10.7 million
Belgium	0.5 million	10.3 million
Austria	0.4 million	8.2 million

Assertions that Muslims, through demographic change, will come to take over Europe in the present century merit skepticism.

Alternative Labor Pools

It also may be faulty to assume that Muslim countries will remain the main labor pools for Western Europe. The region already is taking in large numbers of immigrants from other regions. For example, the predominant immigrant group of recent years in Spain is Hispanic. Immigrants from Latin America now make up close to a third of the European total.³⁷ The half-million Polish immigrants to the United Kingdom suggest that Eastern Europe also may supply the labor needed to keep Western European economies running. There have been indications from the European Commission that, though immigration is necessary to sustain Europe's economy, Muslim countries may not be the best source for immigrants.³⁸ We discuss, below, factors which may lead to a Western European backlash against the Muslim communities. Suffice it here to say that the groundwork is already well-established, for drawing on labor pools from countries other than those of North Africa and the Near East.

Multiple Muslim Communities

A weakness of the Eurabia scenario is its treatment of "Muslims" as a single undifferentiated group and its imputation to them of a shared political program and will. This is very far from reality. Europe's Muslim populations are riven by ethnic, theological and other cleavages. Even mosques are identified first by ethnic affiliation, and then by theological leaning. It is relatively rare that Muslims from different ethnic groups worship together. Our informants, both Muslim

³⁷ Andrew Moravcsik, "The Golden Moment: As the EU celebrates its 50th birthday, critics say it has one foot in the grave. But many countries now look there, not to America, as a model," *Newsweek International*, March 27, 2007: <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17659940/site/newsweek/>

³⁸ EU Commissioner Antonio Vitorino said in 2004 that Muslims tend to isolate themselves and do not integrate easily and, therefore, may not be the best source of labor for the EU: "EU Commissioner Says Europe Needs Immigrants," BBC Monitor, 22 January 2004, quoted by Shore, *Breeding Bin Ladens*, p. 100.

and native European, confirmed that ethnicity was a major source of division in the Muslim communities, pretensions to Islamic unity notwithstanding. Presumably, this will change in future generations as Muslims born inside Europe identify more with each other. There is some evidence that this is beginning to happen, but it is as yet rare.³⁹ Conflicts in the societies of origin further serve to divide Muslims in Europe. Rivalries between Turks and Kurds, and Sunni Turks and Alevi Turks, for example, are as bitter in Europe if not more so. Indeed, according to our police informants in Mannheim, these intra-Muslim conflicts can be a headache for the German authorities.

European Unresponsiveness to the Muslim Question?

A core assumption of the Eurabia scenario is that Western Europeans will not do anything in response to the growing presence of Muslims in their societies. More fully developed, this is the assumption that Western Europeans are at best quiescent about the predicted demographic collapse of their societies in the face of a Muslim wave; at worst so inculcated in an ideology of multiculturalism and cross-societal acceptance that the public space can accommodate nothing other than applause for the impending doom of European civilization. In this view, Europe has not only lost the will to resist, but no longer even has the political vocabulary to start a discussion about the problem. In its extreme form at any rate, this assumption is palpably wrong. The next section sets out evidence of a more vigorous European response to the problems presented by the Muslim communities.

THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE

For the scenario of the Eurabia scenario to come to pass, Europeans and their governments must remain essentially asleep to the threat it describes. Evidence exists, however, that there has been a shift of attitude in Europe, alertness to the threat increasing, as the scope of the problem of a non-integrated and increasingly hostile immigrant polity becomes clear. A European response to the Muslim communities consists of a number of elements, each of which may be instanced briefly.

Integration Programs

Government programs to integrate Muslims into European society are an indicator of the awakening of European concern. We conclude that such programs are unlikely to succeed on their own terms (see above). However, the existence and increasing implementation of such programs has significance independent of their prospects for success. They constitute a response

³⁹ There is one mosque in Rotterdam, the Dar ul-Hijra Mosque, that is known for attracting Dutch Muslims of mixed ethnicity. The imams deliver their sermons in Dutch and see their constituency as Muslims born and raised in the Netherlands. Nasreddine Djebbi, "Dutch, Young Imams Draw Muslims to Rotterdam Mosque," *IslamOnline.net* (17 May 2006). The Islamic University of Rotterdam, which we visited, aims to train Dutch Muslim scholars of Islam regardless of ethnicity. If accredited as expected in the fall of 2007, it will be the first Islamic university in Europe.

to the Muslim situation in Europe and, as such, cast doubt on the proposition that Europeans and their governments are in all respects passive objects in the face of an energetic challenger.

Security Response

European security agencies are not ignoring the threat of Muslim radical violence. The Netherlands General Intelligence and Security Service, for example, in its Annual Report for 2005, stated that “the terrorist threat again remained the main focus for... the Service.”⁴⁰ The Netherlands authorities, moreover, recognize that the threat originates in the Muslim communities in Europe: “The most serious terrorist threat emanates from local autonomous jihadist networks.” Also identified as a problem is the infiltration of Muslim groups in the Netherlands by foreign intelligence services, attempting, for example, “to strengthen loyalty among migrant communities, but also large-scale hacking of computer systems used by government bodies and scientific institutions.”⁴¹ In the United Kingdom, MI5 in November 2006 stated that it had approximately 1,600 suspects comprising 200 terrorist cells under surveillance.⁴²

As a matter of domestic U.S. politics, if a terrorist attack against the U.S. homeland is organized by individuals based in Europe, the European governments will be likely targets of public ire. Pre-emptive action by European governments to curb the terrorist threat on European soil will do little, after an attack, to ameliorate the damage to U.S-European relations. However, European governments ultimately place a high value on their relations with the United States. The costs to Europe of a European-origin terrorist attack on the United States would be enormous. This is a consideration that pushes European governments to implement more vigorous security measures in European territory. Government agencies implementing such measures against radical Islamic groups are likely to be more, not less, mindful of Muslim encroachment on European society. Thus United States security concerns reinforce indigenous European security concerns, and these both militate toward a more active European response to the Muslim communities.

Pulling in the Welcome Mat

Among European countries, the Netherlands long was reputed to have the most welcoming policies toward immigrants. A panoply of social services were available to newcomers with few strings attached, and Dutch society was famously tolerant of non-Europeans. Recent indications however are that the Dutch have pulled in the welcome mat. A number of restrictive measures were implemented after the murders of Fortuyn and Van Gogh. Rotterdam has been closed to

⁴⁰ General Intelligence and Security Service, Annual Report 2005, 14 September 2006: https://www.aivd.nl/actueel-publicaties/aivd-publicaties/annual_report_2005_-

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Jonathan S. Paris, “Europe and its Muslims,” 1 February 2007: http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=4549&pubType=EurUnion

new refugees for the next five years, and immigrants of all categories will be barred, unless they can demonstrate an income 20 per cent above the minimum wage. Proficiency in the Dutch language will be a requirement for residency. New low-cost housing projects have been suspended. The immigration minister Rita Verdonk, nicknamed "Iron Rita" for her policy inclinations, has imposed onerous requirements on non-Western individuals applying to immigrate to the Netherlands. The requirements include passing interviews and tests over a period of five years and an oath of allegiance to the Dutch State. Applicants must watch a video of topless women and gay men. The cost of the process to the applicant is approximately 3000 US dollars, a considerable sum for immigrants from developing countries⁴³

A more restrictive policy on immigration, including more stringent requirements for residency and nationality, goes hand in hand with the security response noted above. As the 2005 Annual Report of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service noted, the political murders of the early 2000s fundamentally changed Dutch attitudes toward the immigrant communities. Across Europe there has been a marked growth in public concern about the problems posed by Europe's Muslim communities and an increased determination on the part of state and government authorities to do something about them.⁴⁴ It would ignore such developments, to say that Europeans are passively awaiting fulfillment of the predictions of the Eurabia scenario.

Media Attention

A further sign of European engagement with the issue is the depth of reporting on Muslim affairs in European media. The examples are numerous. Several may be given for purposes of illustration.

Books like Walter Laqueur's *The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent* (2007) and Henryk M. Broder's *Hurray! We're Capitulating!* (2006) may be seen as full-length alarms of an impending collapse. The Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci's *The Force of Reason* (2004) explicitly raises the specter of Eurabia in a passionate attack on Europe's multiculturalism and relativism that gained widespread attention. News outlets also have published widely on the now-recognized demographic crisis, as well as on the security and social threats posed by hostile Muslim communities. The controversy over the construction of a mosque in Cologne has garnered widespread attention, the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, for example, giving space on its commentary pages to the leader of organized opposition to the mosque, Ralph Giordano.⁴⁵ When a German family court judge delayed a divorce sought by a woman of Moroccan origin on grounds that the husband's Muslim faith gave him a "right to use corporal punishment" to

⁴³ Shore, *Breeding Bin Ladens*, pp. 92-3.

⁴⁴ Charles Bremmer "Stoned to Death... Why Europe is Beginning to Lose Faith in Islam," *The Times* (4 December 2004).

⁴⁵ Ralph Giordano, "Nein und dreimal nein!" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1 June 2007.

discipline his wife, a media uproar ensued. The judge's order was decried for inviting the establishment of sharia law in Germany.⁴⁶

In addition to books and articles sounding an alarm bell over the Muslim communities in Europe, there is a great deal of material in the public domain concerning general issues of Islam. The religion and its political manifestations by no means form a *terra incognita* to informed Europeans. For example, *Der Spiegel*, in its July 3, 2007 edition, published a lengthy article about the Muslim Brotherhood. Spurred by the establishment of Hamas as the effective governing power in Gaza, *Der Spiegel* in the article put out a thorough examination of political Islam. The article covered the origins and social composition of the Brotherhood, its position in the politics of the main Arab countries, the political program of Hamas in Gaza, and the question of whether it is a stepping stone to fundamentalist Islamic rule. Interviews with relevant figures, such as Abu Leila, gave further background.⁴⁷ The July 3 article is not an exceptional example of the media taking up Islam as a theme. News and analysis items on Islam and its various dimensions appear with some frequency. This is supported by the nearly daily inclusion of articles on Islam in German and British newspapers.⁴⁸ Islam is a focus of media attention in Europe. Illustrating a general state of ferment on the issue, this further suggests that Europeans are far from oblivious to Islam's significance for Europe's own future.

Lastly, there are indications in the media from the EU elite that an awareness is dawning that Europe, as presently constituted, is simply too weak a force to remain a major global player. Joschka Fischer, the former foreign minister of Germany, for example, sees the failure to intensify EU political integration as likely to cause "Europe's decline [to] accelerate and trans-Atlantic relations [to] become increasingly turbulent."⁴⁹ Though comments like Fischer's do not necessarily relate directly to the Eurabia scenario, they show that not all decision-makers in European politics are complacent about the risk of European eclipse.

THE IMPACT OF THE EURABIA SCENARIO ON EUROPEAN POLITICS

The facts on the ground—political, social, demographic—do not support the Eurabia scenario. Even the most pessimistic projections for the native European population, paired with the most alarmist projections of Muslim in-flow, population growth, and mobilization, do not add up to the result that the exponents of the Eurabia scenario have been warning is inevitable. Moreover,

⁴⁶ "German Justice Failures: Paving the Way for a Muslim Parallel Society," *Der Spiegel*, 29 March 2007: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,474629,00.html>

⁴⁷ "Dancing with the Devil: Charting the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood," *Der Spiegel*, 3 July 2007: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,491925,00.html>

⁴⁸ See e.g. "Islam unter säkularen Christen," *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 22 June, 2007

⁴⁹ Joschka Fischer, "It's now up to Europe to prove its global relevance," *Daily Star*, 2 June 2007.

evidence shows a heightened European response to the risk of Muslim encroachment on European society. Far from being inevitable, a Europe transformed into an ethno-religious extension of the Muslim Near East is scarcely conceivable.

Yet the Eurabia scenario is expounded, and widely. As we have set out above, there is no shortage of books, articles, and material in the popular media postulating that the Islamization of Europe, if not imminent, will be an accomplished fact within a generation. The chorus of Eurabia alarm gives no sign of quieting. If it may be said with some confidence that Europe is not about to become Muslim, it equally may be said that Eurabia doomsayers are not likely to recant their dire prognostications.

That more than just a fringe of thinkers and commentators have developed, adopted, or promoted the Eurabia scenario is noteworthy. It is at least as noteworthy that there are enough media consumers receptive to the scenario to make a market for the output of the Eurabia school. The possibility is presented that the Eurabia scenario, quite independent of its accuracy as a predication of the European future, reflects something about the attitudes and assumptions of present-day Europeans. What might the resilience of the Eurabia scenario as intellectual-political construct reflect? And what projections might be made on the basis that the attitudes and assumptions supporting it are deeply rooted and likely to be long lasting?

One conclusion that may be drawn from the continued existence of an alarmist strand in public debate over Islam in Europe is that the European public likely will not, at least in the near future, come to feel at ease with the Muslim communities in their midst. This is likely to be sustained both by long-standing elements of European cultural and political identity and by current events. If a meaningful part of the European polity *thinks* and *says* that Eurabia is a real threat, it is necessary to question the assumption that Europeans are entirely passive in the face of the problems presented by the Muslim communities in their midst.

The Eurabia scenario may influence attitudes toward Turkey. If Muslims in Europe are seen as a threat, Europeans may be more hesitant to involve Turkey in the European Union (whether as a full member or as an associate). They also may be wary of Islam in Turkey, especially politicized Islam. The view that the AK Party in Turkey is a threat to freedom there would seem to resonate in an environment where there is a general anxiety over the expansion of Islam. The link between Eurabia and Turkish politics is drawn in stark colors by Edward Luttwak. Luttwak writes that “[AK’s leaders] are clearly willing to defer Turkey’s Islamisation if they can advance Europe’s.”⁵⁰ The proposition that Turkish Muslim politicians have a plan to turn Europe Muslim seems, to say the least, exaggerated. That the proposition would be made, however, illustrates the wider point: Eurabia may exert influence as an intellectual-political construct. One way that it may exert influence is to cause Europeans to look on Turkey, and on Turkey’s Muslim political party, with greater suspicion. This, indeed, is already occurring. Turkish accession to the EU looks much more doubtful now thanks to a range of European objections to Turkish

⁵⁰ Edward Luttwak, “Turkey’s leaders plan Muslim Europe,” *The First Post*, 30 April 2007: <http://www.thefirstpost.co.uk/index.php?storyID=6563&p=2>

policies. Some of these objections seem to stem more from a general unease about what Turkish membership ultimately would mean for Europe than for technical objections related to the established criteria for accession.

The most obvious category of current events that will fuel continued discomfort toward Muslims are terrorist attacks. We will describe in Part IV "The Green Ghetto" forces that we believe, on the evidence, will continue to radicalize Muslims in Europe and thus to fuel the inclination toward terrorism. Terrorism is in Europe for the long-term. The continued threat of terrorism will be drawn to the attention of a wide public by the actual realization of that threat in specific violent acts. Each violent act associated with Muslim extremists will give a general air of credibility to any and all anti-Muslim alarmist voices. Therefore, the Eurabia scenario, even as it seems to fall short when compared against present facts and likely future developments, will continue to find adherents in Europe. It certainly does not strictly follow from the existence of small cells of violent extremists that all of Europe soon is to turn Muslim. In the political marketplace of ideas, however, Muslim-associated violence will be a flood that raises all anti-Muslim boats. Terrorism sustains Eurabia as a fixture of present-day European thinking.

It is not just front-page terrorist acts that will sustain the Eurabia scenario. The notion of an Islamic takeover also is deeply rooted in the European psyche. The dawn of modern European history was a time of conflict between the nascent Muslim religion and Christianity. This started in the seventh century, when the Byzantine Empire was battered by the newly-formed armies of Arabia. The much later arrival of a Turkish Muslim power on Europe's southeastern flank is very much part of the present-day historical consciousness of the Balkans. It cannot be discounted entirely as an element of general cultural awareness in Western Europe. And the history of Turkish-European relations is not the only relevant consideration. The Moorish State in Iberia ended in 1492, but raids by Barbary corsairs generated an insecurity along the Mediterranean shores of Europe that may continue in the undercurrents of collective European identity. It would be absurd to say that present-day European politics is shaped by a conscious fear that Turkish legions will storm Vienna, or that pirates from Algiers will abduct holiday-makers on the beaches of the Côte d'Azur. The point instead is that the Eurabia scenario is not without deep cultural underpinnings, and these contribute to its reception in Europe. It is widely received, in part because it resonates with old, perhaps only vaguely articulated, ideas about the European relation to the Muslim world.

The foregoing is to say that a discussion of the Eurabia scenario would be incomplete, if it did not consider how the thesis is sustained by existing attitudes and concerns in Europe and, in turn, how the Eurabia scenario may help sustain those attitudes and concerns. The discussion also would be incomplete, if it did not consider, at least in passing, the relation of the thesis to American ideas. The Eurabia scenario has not met an enthusiastic reception only in Europe. A meaningful segment of American opinion, too, holds that Europe is a dying continent soon to be overwhelmed by a more energetic Muslim community. Its relation to the facts is no different, as between Europeans stating the thesis and Americans: whoever says that Eurabia is close at hand equally must address the substantial impediments to its realization. It also may be the case with American prognosticators of a future Muslim Europe that the more significant implication of the scenario is what it says about those who espouse it.

The “culture wars” (or whatever other words best describe the differences between liberal and conservative segments of American opinion) are now an established aspect of politics in the United States. A significant number of Americans take the view that religious belief and observance have come to be all but excluded from public life, and to the detriment of the social fabric. The view further includes the proposition that an aggressive secularism has damaged American public institutions, undermined the family, and introduced a host of related ills. Strongly associated with this view is the proposition that Western European society is the well-spring of aggressive secularism – or, at least, that Americans hostile to a conservative political philosophy prefer Western European ways to American ways and find in Western Europe the model that they wished America would emulate. There therefore exists in the American political culture a significant branch of opinion that finds reassurance in evidence that Western Europe is a failure. There well may exist serious European faults (e.g., sluggish growth rates, persistent structural unemployment, seeming incapacity to make a real contribution to global security). At the same time, there may be reasons, embedded in political views existing independently of objective assessments of the actual state of affairs, for Americans to adopt a pessimistic view toward Europe. British conservatives, to an extent, may be characterized in similar terms. Advocates of the Eurabia scenario, though underscoring the need to analyze that scenario on its own terms, also raise the possibility that the reception it is given, rather than reflecting a balanced assessment, reflects the pre-occupations of Americans on the right of the political spectrum.⁵¹

An illustration of the point is a tendency to conflate various features of European society disliked by conservatives when addressing the future of the region. Theodore Dalrymple for example, noting the risk of demographic decline, writes that “[Europeans] seem to care more about the ozone layer and carbon emissions than they do about the continuation of their own societies.”⁵² The point in quoting Dalrymple is not to ask whether Europeans should do more or less about the environment. It is to show that analysis of the demographic question is sometimes mixed with considerations that are, strictly speaking, extraneous to the question. As this example suggests, a

⁵¹ The converse is also the case, with respect to American liberals. Walter Laqueur expresses the situation well:

[Hopes that Muslims would moderate their views] were not exactly strong hopes, and they certainly do not explain the illusions of some foreign observers, particularly Americans, who continued to claim that the 21st century would be Europe’s. They maintained that there had been a revolution in Europe, of which Americans were not even aware. Europe had a vision of justice and harmony very much in contrast to the American dream, which no longer existed... As one observer put it, power politics was a thing of the past; Europe’s main weapons were justice and the law. Coming from Europe, that idea would spread all over the world and become the main instrument in world politics. How to explain the depth of such confusion? It had more to do with the situation in America than with European realities.

Walter Laqueur, “So Much for the New European Century,” *Chronicle of Higher Education*, 11 May 2007.

⁵² Theodore Dalrymple, “How the West Was Lost” (Review of *The Last Days of Europe*), *American Conservative* (18 June 2007).

commentator may connect a prediction of Muslim dominance in Europe to European adherence to policy positions on the environment (or social mores, welfare statism, etc.) The logic in the connection is clear only if it is seen as rhetoric, addressed to an audience holding broadly anti-European suppositions. It may be asked whether a general complex of anti-European sentiments contributes at least in part to the Eurabia scenario's positive reception.

A link between American conservative thought and adherence to the Europa scenario has been observed elsewhere. Johann Hari, a journalist, accompanied American conservatives on an annual cruise organized by the *National Review*. Hari relates the following from dinnertime on the cruise:

The table nods solemnly before marching onward to Topic A: the billion-strong swarm of Muslims who are poised to take over the world. The idea that Europe is being 'taken over' is the unifying theme of this cruise. Some people go on singles' cruises, some on ballroom-dancing cruises. This is the Muslims Are Coming cruise. Everyone thinks it. Everyone *knows* it.⁵³

Hari's purpose is not to address the facts on the ground in Europe. He does not consider the merits (or demerits) of the Eurabia thesis. But nor does objective analysis appear to be his interlocutors' purpose either. The Eurabia thesis finds support elsewhere than objective analysis of the facts. As such, it has a life of its own, which may in turn give it a force in public policy, including European public policy.

In sum, the main significance of the Eurabia thesis well may be that it heightens concern over demographic and other negative trends and thus spurs European States to respond more vigorously to the problems associated with the Muslim communities. Eurabia is very unlikely to be the European future. This is in part because the Eurabia thesis is widely received, and European policy will be shaped in response.

CONCLUSIONS

Analysts who trumpet the successes of the European Union well may over-emphasize the bright spots in a region facing long-term problems. Nevertheless, on the basis of the evidence that we have seen, even Andrew Moravcsik, director of the Princeton University program on the European Union and known EU booster, is broadly right, when he says that the Eurabia thesis "is overblown to the point of unreality."⁵⁴ Even the pessimist Walter Laquer, too, ultimately dismisses the Eurabia thesis. As suggested above, this unreality is a particular trap for those who

⁵³ Johann Hari, "Reshuffling the Deck Chairs on the National Review Cruise," *The New Republic*, (28 June 2007).

⁵⁴ Andrew Moravcsik, "The Golden Moment: As the EU celebrates its 50th birthday, critics say it has one foot in the grave. But many countries now look there, not to America, as a model," *Newsweek International*, March 27, 2007: <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17659940/site/newsweek/>

conflate ambivalence or antagonism toward Europe into doomsday predications about Europe's future.

There also exists a trap for those who exaggerate the successes of post-World War II Europe. Multicultural ideology supposes that any group can be integrated into Western society. This stems from the Hegelian assumption that history is an onward march of progress, with its endpoint in a secularized, pluralistic, rule-of-law-based society. The assumption prevails in many European quarters (and amongst the EU's American admirers, such as Moravcsik). The evidence, however, indicates that integration programs aimed at turning Muslims into Europeans will not work.

The more likely scenario is that the Muslim communities turn into isolated enclaves within a Europe increasingly absorbed by the problems of managing this alien cultural presence in its midst. European management of the Muslim communities can be expected to include two main components: (1) integration and (2) internal security. The governments of Europe are likely to continue, and probably to expand, programs designed to integrate Muslims into European society. Initial resistance against such programs is unlikely to stop the pursuit of integration, yet the continuation and expansion of integration programs is unlikely to meet with success. Backlash by Muslims against European society will probably intensify and spread, as integration programs become more intrusive. Paradoxically, integration of men probably will become even more difficult if integration of women meets with any meaningful level of success. Thus successes of the integration programs measurable by government agencies – e.g, increased female literacy, more police interventions in intra-family violence – actually will worsen the overall situation. This in turn will foster radicalization and violence.

The security component of Europe's response to the Muslim communities is necessary in light of this dynamic. The dynamic that we believe is now in play – failed but persistent integration programs producing disaffection in the Muslim communities – will absorb the energies of the Western European States for a considerable time to come. Indications are already visible that European interior ministries are taking the threat of terrorism arising in the Muslim communities more seriously. While the predicted dynamic in itself may not be enough to take Europe off the stage as an international actor of significance, it will add to the existing internal European forces which have drawn Europe away from affirmative engagement in world affairs.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ This assumes that a long-term crisis involving the Muslim communities has the same or similar effect on Europe's international policy as have had the other structural problems facing Europe over recent decades. Minority problems, however, have not resulted in international retreat in all cases where they have occupied domestic politics. The seismic shift in American domestic policy in race relations from *Brown v. Board of Education* through the 1964 Civil Rights Act and beyond did not bring about a shrinking of America's global commitments.

III. FORTRESS EUROPE

If the "Synthesis" scenario suggests a Europe moving into a brave new future and the "Eurabia" scenario assumes Europe has no future, our third scenario, "Fortress Europe," suggests Europe's future might be one of going back to its past. Whereas the EU project aims to construct a Europe that overcomes its conflict-ridden history through political union and rational deliberation, this remains only an aspiration, not a guarantee. The challenge of dealing with a Muslim population that is chronically resistant, recalcitrant, and violent – and only a fraction of a percent need be violent to implicate the community as a whole – will be difficult and without an obvious solution. Pushed beyond the limits of their much-cultivated tolerance, and in a state of public anxiety prompted by long-term trends and perhaps specific terrorist attacks, Europeans opt for mass expulsion.

The basic idea behind the scenario of Fortress Europe is that Europe decides to deal with its Muslim immigrant question by cutting the Gordian knot and expelling the vast majority of its Muslim immigrants. Along with expulsion, Europe would cut off immigration from Muslim countries and enact stricter control of its borders. Fortress Europe could be realized over a protracted period during which European states gradually set about deporting or otherwise encouraging their Muslim immigrant populations to leave. Or it could erupt quickly, recalling episodes of ethnic cleansing. In that case, it would be more likely to be violent and traumatic.

The idea that European states might engage in the mass expulsion of their Muslim immigrant populations, or otherwise seek radically to reduce the size of the Muslim presence in Europe, rests on two premises. The first is that European societies come to perceive their Muslim populations as long-term net drains on Europe and/or a threat to the future of Europe. The second is that expelling or reducing the Muslim population comes to be seen as the only practical option. The prospect that Europe's Muslim populations will constitute a long-term source of chronic disruption is quite real. As discussed earlier, Europe is not integrating its Muslim populations culturally or socially and most likely will not be able to so in the future. Nor, by and large, are Muslims integrating economically.⁵⁶ In short, there is no reason to expect that more than a small minority of Muslims in most European countries will lift themselves out of the lowest socio-economic category anytime soon. As such, they will remain visible burdens on European welfare systems, while their contribution to the economy will necessarily continue to be undervalued, given that they will be filling the lowest labor niche.

Resentment toward Muslim immigrants borne of economic factors broke the surface during the 1990s. In Denmark, economic stagnation provoked political and social protest against the presence of immigrants, who were seen as benefiting disproportionately from social services. Popular European attitudes, shaped by the history of European identity formation, were already

⁵⁶ Timothy M. Savage, "Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing," *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 27 No. 3 (2004), 30-31. Not much has changed in nearly a generation. Muhammad Anwar, "Employment Patterns of Muslims in Western Europe," *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs* Vol. 5 No. 1 (1984), 120-121.

predisposed against Muslims and thus the brunt of dissatisfaction was directed particularly at Muslims. It is worth noting that the perception of the unjustness of the welfare system also began to erode public faith in the authorities and the state system as a whole.⁵⁷

Resentment against immigrants has played a role elsewhere in Europe. Anti-immigrant sentiment helped catapult the Austrian Freedom Party of Jörg Haider into a coalition government in 2000. In 2002, the perennially marginal candidate Jean Marie Le Pen managed to make it into the second round of the French presidential elections. Anti-immigrant sentiment was one driver behind these political surprises. In recent elections elsewhere in Belgium and Denmark right-wing political parties have had marked success with anti-immigration platforms.⁵⁸ In short, although anti-immigration sentiment is not yet a decisive political force, it already has displayed its ability to mobilize voters and parties, and the issue of immigration has begun to undermine public faith in the effectiveness of existing institutions and leadership. One respondent, an elected official in Rotterdam and representative of a party critical of earlier pro-immigration policies, put it bluntly, when he said, "It would be against law-and-order for people to start going through the streets kicking Muslims around; they should just elect us, and we'll do it for them, legally." Though this might suggest a fine sensibility about the need to act within existing institutions, the wider point is that political formations now exist, that are ready to take advantage of any further shift in public sentiment against the Muslim communities. Moreover the ways in which anti-immigrant politicians exploit such sentiment could well be unconventional.

Whereas the socio-economic position of Muslims will not change much in the medium-term future, what is more likely to change qualitatively in the future is the amount of tension between the two communities. Research by Robert Putnam has confirmed the seemingly self-evident logic that the greater the ethnic diversity in a community, the lower the degree of trust between members.⁵⁹ Other scholars have noted that intercommunal tensions tend to present problems when the minority group breaks the level of ten percent of the general population. At that point, fears among the majority population tend to increase. In the near future, it is highly probable that Europe's native population will continue to shrink while the numbers of its Muslims will continue to grow and will approach the ten percent threshold (according to some statistics they are already above the threshold in France). At the local, as distinct from national, level, Muslims are already well above ten percent. In cities such as Rotterdam, they make up close to fifty percent of the population. Major cities are in themselves large enough to become sites of

⁵⁷ Jan Hjarbo, "Muslims in Denmark," in Gerd Nonneman, Tom Biblock and Bogdan Szajkowski eds, *Muslim Communities in the New Europe* (Berkshire, UK: Garnet Publishing Ltd, 1996), 298-299.

⁵⁸ See Merove Gijssberts, Marcell Lubbers, and Peer Scheepers, "Extreme Right-Wing Voting in Western Europe," *European Journal of Political Research* (2002): 345-378.

⁵⁹ John Lloyd, "Study Paints Bleak Picture of Ethnic Diversity," *Financial Times* (8 October 2006). Putnam says he refuses to publish his research until he can develop an antidote to the problem he identified.

significant tension, as they already have in Birmingham, UK (October 2005) and Paris (November 2005).

Even with sharper restrictions on immigration, the proportions of Muslims to native Europeans will increase in the coming decades. The decline of native European populations all but guarantees that. The sheer numbers of Muslims is not the only cause of European anxiety. There is an important qualitative dimension, namely the popular perception of Muslims as a particularly hostile and aggressive community. Moreover, the fear that Muslims will displace Europeans, even if largely baseless as we believe, will inevitably further sensitize native Europeans to acts of violence by Muslims.

Sheer probability almost dictates that further bombings and other acts of violence perpetrated by Muslims will occur. A number of factors that will increase the likelihood of violence can be identified. One is the imposition of stricter standards for integration and the concomitant expansion of state interference in the daily lives of Muslim immigrants. Already, as noted above, the introduction of more exacting controls on the Muslim populations has generated suspicion and ill-will. If integration programs succeed actually in changing the behavioral patterns of parts of the Muslim communities, such as women, a violent backlash by others in the community (i.e., men) can be expected. Although it is difficult to assign a probability to such an outcome, we do believe that the combination of increased likelihood for an attack with heightened European sensitivity to the possible realization of "Eurabia" could trigger a radical European response that goes beyond measures to slow down or halt Muslim immigration and encompasses the forceful deportation of at least some Muslims.

The Netherlands is instructive as an example of how a European state can alter its policies sharply in a short amount of time. While it is true that there remains a vast difference between markedly reducing and restricting immigration and engaging in active expulsion, it is worth noting that the triggering events were the murders of two individuals, only one of whom was killed by a Muslim. An attack, or especially series of attacks, that claimed many more lives, for example, would likely provoke a much sharper response. There is no guarantee, of course, of a mass effort at expulsion. Great Britain and Spain have suffered substantial bombings and responded incrementally. But the potential exists.

There are two obvious obstacles to a program of mass expulsion. The first is the basic one of actual physical execution. How could European states actually carry out such a program? Suffice it to say, European states have demonstrated an impressive capacity for mobilizing societies for conflict in the past. If anything, contemporary technology would make the tracking and control of large populations still easier. Moreover, expulsion need not be sudden or violent. It could be carried out over an extended period of time and done in a relatively humane way. With determination, the expulsion or deportation of minorities en masse and the erection of a strict border regime could be accomplished.

The bigger obstacle is that such an act would require a truly radical shift in European attitudes. To put it bluntly, such an act would require that the Europeans embrace what would essentially be a racist act, particularly if it applied also to Muslims who hold citizenship (if citizens were excluded, on the other hand, Europeans could assuage their collective conscience by noting that

the relevant distinction is not between European and Muslim immigrants but between European citizens and Muslim immigrants). Europe is still very far away from this stage. But it is again worth stressing that attitudes have already begun to shift in Europe. The case of the Netherlands and new strength that immigration issues gave to right wing parties have been noted. In Germany, the current Interior Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, has begun calling for expanded powers for the police. He faces strong opposition from those who fear that this might lead Germany back to a police state. Schäuble's response, however, is worth noting: if such powers are not granted now, Germany will become a police state when future acts of Islamic terrorism trigger a severe public response.⁶⁰

Mass deportation or expulsion would clearly be a radical act. But it is not inconceivable and it has already become a part of the public imagination.⁶¹ Two novels in French, Jacques Neiryck's *Le Siege de Bruxelles* (Paris, 1996) Clement Weill-Rayna's *Le songe du guerrier* (Paris, 2006) explore scenarios wherein public backlash against Muslim immigrants results in mass expulsions. Both books appear to be selling respectably on Amazon's French site, and *Le Siege de Bruxelles* was reissued in 2005. The point is not that these are harbingers of a future wave of ethnic cleansing – these are novels, not political platforms – but instead to note that such notions have entered the public sphere. When asked if they could imagine a future of expulsion, our Muslim informants in Belgium and the Netherlands replied that they could. Those in Germany found the idea more fantastic but did not regard it as a total impossibility.

If expulsion is a radical but not inconceivable act, what conditions might trigger it? As discussed above, it is safe to assume that future decades will see more, not less, general tension between native Europeans and Muslim immigrants due to demographic trends and the continued economic marginalization of Muslims. These factors are structural and will make themselves felt. By themselves, however, they will not generate tensions sufficient to lead to a mass deportation. We can identify three indeterminate variables. The first would be a sustained economic downturn. This could be expected to have several effects. It would stoke resentment at Muslim immigrants as competitors in the labor market and as beneficiaries of scarce and costly social services, while at the same time undermining trust in existing governments and loyalty to the welfare-state system. By the same token, economic hardship would hit Muslims disproportionately, and in conjunction with growth in anti-Muslim sentiment would alienate Muslims and feed radical movements.

A related variable is that of Saudi funding for fundamentalist groups. Saudi Arabia already subsidizes the export of its Wahhabi interpretation of Islam to Europe and the rest of the world (indeed, the Saudi state's very nature as a religious entity virtually requires that it do so). If, as most industry experts expect, oil prices continue to rise in coming decades, Saudi Arabia will have increased revenue to support Wahhabi groups in Europe. A restless, frustrated, and

⁶⁰ "We Could Be Struck at Anytime," *Der Spiegel* (9 July 2007).

⁶¹ The American newspaper columnist and former US Army Colonel Ralph Peters has predicted precisely such a scenario. Ralph Peters, "The Eurabia Myth," *The New York Post* (26 November 2006).

impoverished Muslim population alienated from both European society and the traditional forms of Islam in their countries of origin will likely prove even more receptive to the message of Wahhabi Islam being delivered by well-funded and confident organizations.⁶² Of course, a severe economic downturn in Europe would quite possibly lead to a temporary decline in oil prices, particularly if it was part of a global downturn. But the potential impact of increased revenue flows to Saudi Arabia should not be ignored when considering the future of Europe's Muslims.

The most important variable that would trigger a European decision to engage in mass expulsions would be violent activity carried out by Muslims (immigrants or otherwise). Needless to say, the more spectacular or damaging the attack(s), the greater the likelihood of a radical European response. As noted above, future acts of Islamic terrorism are all but guaranteed. What is more, the pattern of Islamist violence in Iraq and elsewhere – wherein violence is at times employed gratuitously and with seemingly little concern for calculated strategic advantage – does not suggest that incremental increases in security measures and sanctions or threatened sanctions against Europe's Muslim population will deter major terrorist acts. It cannot be excluded that a radical Islamist group might deliberately provoke a quasi-apocalyptic showdown with Europe, be it for the sake of mobilizing anti-Western sentiment in the Muslim world or out of the belief that God would somehow guarantee Muslim victory in reward for the zeal of the Muslims in carrying out their "jihad" against the infidel Europeans. Terrorist acts also may serve a purpose as a recruitment vehicle, raising the profile and prestige of organizations that carry them out (or convincingly claim that they carried them out). In short, European authorities might feel compelled to conclude that mass deportation or expulsion is the only solution to the security problem posed by their Muslim immigrant populations.

It is a matter of speculation, whether the decision to deport and expel en masse Muslim immigrants would be a pan-European phenomenon or one restricted to separate countries. It may be observed that the latter would be more likely. But such an act taken by any one EU member would necessarily have implications for the EU as a whole. A revamping of immigration policy and border policing would have to accompany any effort at mass expulsion. Given that visa and border control is a policy area with an EU component, coordination with the EU would be necessary. The need to secure EU cooperation would in most cases act as a restraint; i.e. if Denmark were to consider expulsion but believed that the EU would not go along, then it would be much less likely to act so radically on its own. Yet if a major EU member, such as Germany, appeared determined to take such a decision even at the cost of EU consensus, then the other members might feel compelled to go along and adjust their visa and border policies for the sake of maintaining a common approach. On the other hand, a member state willing to take an act so momentous as the expulsion of a significant portion of its population would probably be willing to forfeit its membership in the EU.

⁶² Zachary Shore raises this possibility. Shore, 105.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.

Without knowing the global context of future European events, it is impossible to say with certainty what the implications for the U.S. would be of Europe becoming "Fortress Europe." On the one hand, the mass expulsion of Muslims by European states could put the U.S. in an extraordinarily difficult situation and even precipitate a break-up of the Western alliance. A U.S. government might find it simply impossible before the American people and the rest of the world to justify retaining close relations with a militantly illiberal Europe. On the other hand, if global conditions vis-à-vis Islamic radicalism have deteriorated, Europe falls victim to inarguably vicious attacks, and it conducts its deportations in a relatively humane and lawful manner, it may not present any particular difficulties. It could even bring the U.S. and Europe closer together if by that time the US had experienced more attacks along the lines of 9/11. In most cases it seems safe to assume that the increased European attention to its security and tighter controls on the granting of visas, citizenship, and passports would, on balance, enhance U.S. security.⁶³

⁶³ On the potential danger posed by Islamist terrorists carrying European passports, see Robert Leiken, "Europe's Angry Muslims," *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2005).

IV. THE GREEN GHETTO

On the basis of the considerations set out above, it seems unlikely that European society will absorb the Muslim communities on the terms set by the government integration programs now being implemented in various countries. Nor does it seem likely that European society is approaching its terminal station, inexorable demographics transforming a spent post-Christian civilization into Eurabia. Indications gathered from respondents in Mannheim and Rotterdam instead suggest that Europeans are capable of much more vigorous response than so far has been seen. Signs of such response have been seen already in Rotterdam, where violence by radicals has incited the Dutch public and their elected officials to take a sterner and less permissive approach to the Muslim communities. A question is presented as to how far European response to Muslim violence might go. There remains a deeply entrenched multicultural ideology that resists confrontation. Yet there also remains the historical record of European tribalism. The capacity of Europeans to unify and engage in mass, organized violence has been demonstrated in the recent past – and against targets not necessarily less threatening than Islamic fundamentalists nested within Europe's own cities.

In balance, as set out in the preceding section (Part III: Fortress Europe), we believe it unlikely – but not out of the question – that Europeans could react with extreme measures in the face of some future event or events perpetrated by radicals in the Muslim communities. The degree of the reaction would relate to the degree of violence perpetrated. The likelihood of Muslim-led violence bringing about a radicalization of Europe's own response, of course, will also depend on where the Muslim-led violence takes place. Terrorism against American targets, for example, as demonstrated since 9/11, has less motivating power over Europeans than a 9/11-scale event in a European city might be expected to have.

In the meantime, in our judgment, the most likely scenario is as follows: Muslim communities continue as more or less isolated enclaves, located mainly in larger cities. European governments continue to pursue, probably with increasing vigor, programs of integration or assimilation, notwithstanding persisting, and probably mounting, resistance against such programs by the Muslims whom they target. Muslims neither integrate, nor take over. Their numbers may increase, or decrease, and their degree of isolation will depend on various local and national variables. Broadly, however, the scenario is one of Islamic minorities figuratively, if not literally, walling themselves, and being walled into, a latter-day version of the ethnic minority neighborhoods that were found in most medieval and early modern European cities. A Green Ghetto thus becomes a fixture of 21st century Europe.

This scenario continues substantial elements of the status quo. However, it must not be confused with a simple freezing of the present-day situation. As we will discuss below, there are a number of variables that will be in play, each of which may effect what the Green Ghetto will look like. Also, the continuation of a set of circumstances introduces its own dynamic. A situation which contains a trajectory toward something else is very different from a situation which gives little indication of changing. In other words, a snapshot of the Muslim communities today might, in the Green Ghetto scenario, look very similar to a snapshot ten or twenty years in the future. However, the similarity will be superficial. Isolation accompanied by even cautious optimism

for change differs greatly from an entrenched isolation giving no realistic hope for improvement. It is one thing to be in a bad condition with the hope that things may get better; it is very much worse to be in a bad condition that looks like it will never change. Finally, European bureaucracies will intensify their efforts to integrate the Muslim communities. This will produce a backlash from the Muslim communities, the backlash itself increasing the risk of terrorism.

A number of factors favor the Green Ghetto as the short- to medium-term outcome in Europe. If it indeed is the outcome that prevails in that time frame, then the implications that it carries must be considered, in particular its implications for the national security of the United States.

FACTORS LEADING TO THE GREEN GHETTO

A powerful driver militating toward the scenario we term the Green Ghetto is the default of other options. We do not exclude, under particular future circumstances, a major reversal of the last thirty years of Muslim in-flow. But, in present circumstances, the most likely scenario is for them to stay. If Muslims stay in Europe, but neither become the dominant group nor integrate, then they will remain isolated communities holding a lower socio-economic niche in a society that they little understand and even less identify with. Our judgment that the scenarios described and analyzed in Sections I-III are less likely to come to pass supports the conclusion that something like a continuation of the status quo—albeit with changes that may come if the status quo becomes more deeply entrenched—is likely.

Historical factors also may be adduced, militating toward an on-going process of social isolation of the Muslim communities in Europe. Unlike the United States, European States long have contained tenacious ethno-linguistic minorities, some of substantial size, which, for long periods, remain largely isolated from society around them, as well as more or less fixed in geography. Consider the “Celtic fringe,” consisting of western Ireland, northwestern Scotland, and parts of Wales, Cornwall, and Brittany. Though finally, after World War II, a shrinking fringe, the Celtic minority endured thousands of years, including the several hundred years of European state-building. Small villages of Albanian ethnicity have existed in south central Italy for nearly six hundred years, with little sign of integration into Italian society. German (“Saxon”) minorities in Transylvania never integrated (after the Cold War, they simply left). The long history of European cities containing separate Jewish quarters is further precedent suggesting the plausibility of the Green Ghetto scenario.⁶⁴ It would not be an entirely new phenomenon for Europe to host a long-lasting, unassimilated minority ethno-religious group.

⁶⁴ R. Po-Chia Hsia & Hartmut Lehmann (eds.), *In and Out of the Ghetto: Jewish-Gentile Relations in Late Medieval and Early Modern Germany*, especially chapter 1, Alfred Haverkamp, “The Jewish quarters in German towns during the late Middle Ages” (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

VARIANTS OF THE GREEN GHETTO SCENARIO

Each of the scenarios that we have analyzed so far is a simplified picture, encapsulating a range of possibilities. So too is the Green Ghetto. Multiple variables determine which of the range of possibilities is realized. Some relevant variables may be briefly instanced.

Degree of Legal Entrenchment of Muslim Isolation

The isolation of the Muslim communities may remain a *de facto* situation without being encoded in the legal systems of Europe. It is a presumption of European law that citizenship means equal rights.⁶⁵ Accordingly, special group rights are not the norm. However, the European legal order in particular situations has established special regimes to reflect group rights. The Åland Islands are a main example. The islands, though territory of Finland, are inhabited by ethnic Swedes. The islands have a special regime restricting property rights to Swedes and schooling to the Swedish language. The islanders also enjoy special administrative and legislative privileges. Nordic islands may seem unrelated to urban Muslim ghettos, but the Åland settlement, which has been allowed to continue under special terms in the EU accession arrangements for Finland,⁶⁶ illustrates a wider point. The EU legal order is not incapable of making derogations, in favor of a regime of special group rights.

Hints already exist of an emerging special regime for Muslims. Municipal governments in a number of European cities contain separate councils for Muslims or migrants in general.⁶⁷ The councils may as yet have little or no legislative competence and exist simply for consultative purposes – but they are a step in the direction of formalizing the separateness of the Muslim communities. European law is capable of going much further in that direction. Given that several Muslim communities, such as Millî Görüş, came to Europe in large part to escape intrusive state control, it is safe to assume that some Muslims would be eager to achieve some form of autonomous status that permits them to arrange their internal affairs as they see fit.

Yet it remains unclear how far Europe will go to accommodate special legal regimes for Muslims. A German family court judge caused a scandal by suggesting that the Koran was to be considered as a mitigating circumstance in a case of spousal abuse. Radical clerics in the United Kingdom say that the Muslim community should exist under sharia, independent of national law, but the idea does not appear (yet) to have much support. This suggests that Europeans are not yet ready to accept a special legal regime for Muslims. If they never do, then the Green Ghetto may remain a less deeply-entrenched phenomenon than it would, if it acquired legal imprimatur.

⁶⁵ See Article 14, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“European Convention of Human Rights”), Rome, November 4, 1950, 213 UNTS 221, 232.

⁶⁶ Protocol No. 2 to the Treaty Concerning the Accession of Norway, Austria, Finland and Sweden to the European Union, 94/C241/07, June 24, 1994.

⁶⁷ E.g., Mannheim’s elected *Migrationsbeirat*.

Size of Muslim Communities

If the Muslim communities exceeded a size that could be readily contained, then the dynamic of the Green Ghetto would change. Beyond a certain point, it would no longer be a ghetto. As already stated, it is not in our judgment likely that Europe is soon to be demographically submerged in Islam. However, a wide range of possible demographic futures must be considered. A doubling or tripling of the Muslim population in absolute terms would effectively Islamize a dozen or more major European cities. The ability of a community to exist as a parallel society probably increases as its size and concentration increase. The Green Ghetto is likely to become a more deeply entrenched phenomenon, if its human raw material is abundant.

Size of Non-Muslim Minority In-Flow

Substantial immigration to Europe already is occurring from East Asia and Latin America. Some immigrants from these regions settle in the same, marginal urban areas as Muslim immigrants. The possibility exists that the Muslim minority will become diluted. This is not dilution in the sense of inter-marriage or assimilation, but in the sense of losing numerical dominance in certain urban precincts. The Green Ghetto would be a less pronounced phenomenon in such a situation. Something like this is visible in places like London's Kentish Town, where African, Caribbean and Mediterranean immigrants live in neighborhoods also containing Muslim migrants. By the same token, however, the existence of a non-Muslim labor pool could act to marginalize Muslims even more. If, for example, Latin American immigrants began to best Muslim immigrants in the competition for low-level jobs, then the circumstances of the Muslim immigrants would worsen. Their alienation from Westerners likely would increase, and this would lead ghetto-ization to intensify.

Reactions Against Integration Programs

As analyzed above, integration programs produce a back-lash against European society. The exact extent of the backlash, however, is uncertain and may vary from ethnic group to ethnic group, and also depending on macro-economic conditions.

Terrorism

Measures taken by the European host societies against terrorism may intensify the isolation of the Muslim communities. The Green Ghetto thus creates a feedback loop: the ghetto generates terrorism; terrorism elicits European police and security action; and police and security action drives more Muslims into the ghetto and further ghetto-izes those already there. The extent to which this dynamic arises will be highly specific to individual countries.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE GREEN GHETTO FOR UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY

If the Green Ghetto is the most likely outcome, what implications does it have for the United States?

FURTHER RECESSION OF EUROPE AS A MEANINGFUL PARTNER IN GLOBAL SECURITY

In the rosier predictions for integration, the Muslim communities will soon cease to be a special domestic problem and, as such, will cease to absorb police, social, and other resources. However, if, as it is likely to do, the management of the Muslim communities comes to be a preoccupation of European policy, then yet another internal problem will be added to those often cited as causing Europe to decline as a player in world affairs. Europe, notwithstanding fanfare in the 1990s surrounding an EU defense initiative, has been unable to make significant increases in its armed services appropriations. The burden of an enormous social welfare commitment by the European States, not to mention the costs of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU, leaves little room for budget expansion for defense purposes. Even if fiscal means were available to increase the defense commitment, the European Union has failed to establish the Common Foreign and Security Policy on sufficient footing to pursue a unified defense policy. Several other internal European problems are also frequently identified as decreasing Europe's activity on the stage of world affairs (coping with an aging population; labor shortages; recalcitrant labor unions resistant to free market reforms in corporate management, etc.). A socially disruptive and financially costly campaign to integrate the Muslim communities into European society – a campaign which, owing to its futility, could absorb unlimited expenditures – would add to the internal conditions causing the recession of Europe as a meaningful partner in global security.

IMMOBILIZATION (OR WORSE) OF EUROPE RELATIVE TO THE MIDDLE EAST

A Europe absorbed with managing the Muslim communities in its midst will face constraints in its policy toward the Middle East and Israel. Different European approaches may be envisaged. In the most likely approach, European governments may conclude that a pro-Arab policy should prevail over support for Israel. The theory would be that conciliatory foreign policy toward Muslim Arab States will make it easier to manage relations with European-based Muslim communities. A foreign policy retreat, withdrawing support from Israel, would be the perceived pay-off for internal European social peace.

The entrenchment of the Green Ghetto over the next decade or two would coincide with a generational watershed in European society. The final representatives of the World War II generation will be passing away, at the same time that this other profound social development will be establishing itself. The relevance of one to the other at first may not seem clear. But Europe's policy toward Israel is heavily conditioned by the conviction that amends still must be

made for the Holocaust. This conviction is strongest in Germany, but it also exerts itself in other States, and in Europe as a whole. The existence, for the time being, of a living memory of the war and of organized European anti-Semitism, powerfully supports that strand of European foreign policy that remains supportive of Israel. At the very least, its continued existence holds back European inclinations to oppose Israel. The living memory, however, now is fading. It will have disappeared altogether by the second or third decade of the present century. A coincidence thus is in the making that may have profound implications for Europe's approach to the Middle East and Israel: a greater (perceived) need to placate Europe's Muslim communities will coincide with the disappearance of those Europeans who have recognized that pro-Israel obligations should temper pro-Arabist tendencies. This is a further implication of the Green Ghetto scenario and the European era in which it seems likely to arise.

TERRORIST THREAT

The most immediate implication for United States national security posed by the entrenchment of isolated Muslim communities in Europe is that it will increase the terrorist threat to the American homeland.

In the Green Ghetto scenario, the Muslim communities of Europe exist in hopeless isolation, surrounded by a Western secular society which they despise. Most Muslims in Europe simply will live with the situation, taking advantage of the niche economic position that they occupy while rejecting the European way of life. However, isolation and permanent relegation to low-level jobs contributes to a milieu conducive to radicalization. This is not to say that the poorest Muslims are the most likely to become terrorists. Evidence suggests that they are not. Instead, the more likely recruits to radical action seem to be members of the educated middle class, in particular those in technocratic fields like medicine and engineering. The socio-economic isolation of the Muslim communities nevertheless must be reckoned a significant driver behind radicalization. The sense that they belong to an under-privileged class, rather than personal material want, will make radical Islam attractive even – perhaps especially – to the socio-economic leaders within Muslim communities.

Whatever segment of the Muslim community is most susceptible to the radical appeal, the impact of continued government integration programs is an important component of the Green Ghetto scenario and a powerful contributor to the terrorist threat. The mechanism by which integration programs fuel terrorism needs to be acknowledged; the bureaucracies created to foster integration cannot be expected to acknowledge it. The mechanism can be described as follows: Integration programs, while they will not succeed in transforming the Muslim community as a whole, will have isolated "successes" in the form of transforming individual Muslims. As we note above (Part I, "Synthesis"), some Muslim women have shown a degree of receptiveness to integration initiatives. Though a government bureaucracy will measure this as a success, it will have extremely deleterious effects on the Muslim community as a whole. Muslim men, whatever their socio-economic position, can be expected to reject the integration programs and their results. The integration of women will intensify the isolation of many men. Some Muslim women who have adopted European ways will seek spouses outside the Muslim community. The resultant depletion of available mates in the Muslim community will intensify a dangerous dynamic. The Green Ghetto will produce an abundant supply of alienated and

embittered men, some of whom may be expected to join or form terrorist cells. The recent record of home-grown Islamic terrorism in the United Kingdom indicates the long-term trend.

Islamist terrorists home-grown in Europe should not be expected to restrict their attacks to European soil. The United States remains an obsession for Islamist terrorists, and, if they can obtain access to the United States homeland, they can be expected to seek to carry out attacks there as well. That many Muslims hold European passports increases the risk that they will obtain access to the United States homeland. The Green Ghetto will be a major threat to the national security of the United States.

PROBLEMS IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS

The recession of Europe as a meaningful partner in global security, noted above, has implications for the security of the United States. The implications are perhaps mitigated, by the extent to which the recession already has taken place. In short, Europe's significance to United States security today is far less than it was in the past; a further decline is not a new factor, but, rather, an intensification of an existing factor. Nevertheless, further retreat of Europe from an active security role should be considered a likely by-product of the absorption of Europe in its internal ethno-religious problems.⁶⁸

The problems noted above in Europe's relations to the Middle East and Israel also will effect United States-European relations. It could be that the net result is that the United States is able to pursue its foreign and defense policy in the Near East more easily. The complications of transatlantic coordination may disappear, because there is no longer any reason to seek transatlantic coordination. A Europe that has removed itself from the picture as a foreign and security actor is not a Europe with which the United States needs to consult, much less to coordinate. But a Europe that adopts a policy actively opposed to United States foreign policy and security initiatives in the Near East would complicate, not simplify, transatlantic relations.

⁶⁸ Any prediction that a State project, including defense, will disappear from the European agenda must be accompanied by the caveat that Europe is the birthplace of the modern State, and it continues to be a region of highly energetic (if not always effective) States. Defense is the State project *par excellence*. It engages the full apparatus of the State, and the pursuit of more robust defense creates or strengthens important political constituencies. A Europe faced with greater security concerns (Russia, the Near East, etc.), or faced with a need to find public sector consumers for its manufacturing industries—especially aerospace—well could be seen resorting to a more robust defense policy.