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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

*Handwritten signatures and initials*

23 MAY 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ASD/ISA  
Through: DASD/NESA *24/5*

Subject: Your Meeting with Israeli Military Attache (U) -- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

*(S)* During your meeting with MG Simhony on Thursday, May 24, 1984, the provision of captured weapons for US consumption will no doubt be discussed. You may wish to consider the following points prior to this meeting.

- The chances of the US ever obtaining these weapons is poor if they are not in our possession by July 23, 1984 (date of the upcoming Israeli election). Our contacts in the Israeli MOD (to include both Mr. Arens and Gen Meron) could be gone the following day, and establishing relations with new players could be time consuming.

- During the last three weeks, there has been little visible movement on this project on the part of the GOI. There is no doubt that this slow down is a direct result of the confusion in the GOI over what direction US policy in Central America is heading, and the role that Israel can and should play in relation to the topic.

- If you feel that timing is right you may wish to discuss the issue of payment for these weapons. Because Israeli funds would have to be found to cover specific project related costs (packing, crating, shipping) we should offer to pay these line items. We should not offer to pay anything for the weapons for two reasons: the weapons will be used to further Western interests, and in the grand scheme of US/Israeli relations, a good will gesture on the part of Israel (at a low dollar cost for them) would be most helpful when the GOI is requesting US assistance on major projects such as funding for the new SAAR-5 missile attack boat, the Lavi, the F-4 upgrade, the upgrading of the Mervaka tank, and the usage of FMS funds off-shore, only to mention a few.

- If there appears to be a problem related to this project which could be better addressed by an DoD representative going to Israel, I am ready to leave on short notice.

- Prior to moving any of this equipment, there needs to be a lead time of several weeks, so that our EOD and logistics people can do the planning required to make this operation work. There is no time to spare if we are to complete this effort prior to Israeli elections.

(b)(6)

Israeli Desk Officer  
NESA Region

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: OPERATION "TIPPED KETTLE" ~~(S)~~--INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

~~(S)~~ In late 1982, DCI Casey requested DoD assistance in obtaining infantry weapons from Israel (that had been obtained during the Lebanon War) at little or no cost. Discussions that allowed for this transfer to take place were conducted between ISA and the Israeli Attache in Washington at that time (Major General Meron). The then newly appointed Israeli Minister of Defense, Moshe Arens, made the final decision that these weapons were to be provided on a gratis basis to DoD. This was one of MOD Arens' first actions after becoming MOD and was clearly a signal of his desires to improve US/Israeli relations. As a result, 300 tons of weapons were provided to DoD in May 1983. The operational name for this undertaking is "TIPPED KETTLE." Included in this shipment were 20,000 rifles and sub-machine guns; 1,000 machine guns; 90 recoilless rifles; 110 mortars; 1,000 hand grenades; and a large amount of ammunition. These weapons were moved by the US Navy from Israel to the US and turned over to CIA (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC §403(g) Section 6

~~(S)~~ In February 1984, DoD was again contacted by CIA and asked if there were additional weapons in Israel that might be obtained for their operational use under the same financial terms. ISA contacts with the GOI in March of 1984 revealed that there were additional weapons "for sale" from the remaining stocks of PLO weapons. (The GOI had placed a value of over \$77M on these weapons, while DoD sources estimated the cost of the weapons at around \$35M.) At my guidance, a joint DoD/CIA team, headed by the ISA Israeli Desk Officer, (b)(6), went to Israel in April to view the items available.

~~(S)~~ During a 5 July 1984 meeting that I had with General Meron, who is now the Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, the topic of these weapons was raised. I reaffirmed the DoD position that the US was still highly interested in these weapons and hoped that they could be provided on a grant basis. General Meron replied that the weapons were still available to the US; however, due to the confusion surrounding

the elections in Israel, the issue of providing these items on a grant basis was still undecided. It was suggested that because the only outstanding issue was pricing, a US team be sent to Israel to supervise the packing of the items. General Meron agreed that this action would result in a considerable amount of time savings and concurred in a US team arriving in Israel for this purpose during the week of 16 July 1984.

~~(S)~~ Upon arrival in Israel, the team found that issues of funding and weapons availability were still being hotly debated within the halls of the Israeli Ministry of Defense. The team was allowed to look at the weapons, but were not allowed to undertake any packing operations.

~~(S)~~ In hopes of breaking this impasse, I sent (b)(6) to Israel on 23 July. On the scene, discussions revealed that a power struggle was underway between General Meron of the MOD and General Levy, Chief of Staff of the IDF, over the use of these weapons. General Meron felt that Israel had a real commitment to respond to US requirements whenever possible, while General Levy felt that the need for Israel to provide weapons to pro-Israeli factions in southern Lebanon was the country's top priority. After intense discussions between (b)(6) and General Meron on the advantages of providing these weapons to the US, General Meron received clearance from MOD Arens to provide the weapons to the US on a grant basis, with the US only having to pay packing and shipping costs.

~~(S)~~ Following the Arens decision, which took place on July 30th, packing in Israel immediately started and is continuing as of this date. At the present time, about 100 land/sea containers of material have been packed (included are large amounts of the same types of weapons provided in the first shipment, plus some heavier items such as crew-served AD weapons and rocket artillery). This second shipment will have about three times the weapons involved in the first operation. Packing should be completed by August 10, at which time the weapons and ammo will be moved to an Israeli port for shipment to the US on August 23. The cargo should arrive in (b)(1),(b)(3):50 USC §403(g) on or about 10 September.

~~(S)~~ Operation "TIPPED KETTLE" can be seen as a success on two points: 1) DoD has been able to provide a large number of Soviet/Warsaw Pact-origin weapons for use by CIA at a fraction of their true value; and 2) this action has shown that Israel is willing to work with us to combat pro-Communist forces in other regions of the world that are far removed from Israel's borders.

(U) As a final point, I would like to mention that (b)(6) (b)(6) has been the Project Coordinator since the inception of Operation "TIPPED KETTLE." His work and dedication in a large part contributed to the success of this project.

(U) Attached for your review, are representative photos of "TIPPED KETTLE" acquisitions.

Attachment  
a/s