



REPORT ON THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES FROM UNGOVERNED AREAS 2008

I. Overview

Section 1267 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2008, Public Law 110-181, January 28, 2008, requires the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), to jointly submit a report on threats posed to the United States from ungoverned areas, including threats from terrorist groups and individuals in such areas that direct their activities against the United States.

All ungoverned areas are not safe havens for terrorists. The *Country Reports on Terrorism, 2007* identified 12 safe havens and one potential safe haven (Iraq).¹ Threats from terrorist groups and individuals in ungoverned areas that direct their activities against the United States involve the 11 safe havens: Somalia; Trans-Saharan Africa; Lebanon; Yemen; Afghanistan; Pakistan, specifically the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP); Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral; Southern Philippines; Indonesia; Colombia Border Region (the southern and eastern border with Venezuela, Ecuador, and Brazil); and the Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay). The potential safe haven of Iraq is also an area that threatens the national security interests of the United States.

In ungoverned areas, terrorists exploit for recruitment, operational planning, or physical safe haven conditions such as corruption, poverty, a lack of civic institutions and social services, politically repressive governments, and inadequate or unjust law enforcement and legal systems.

II. Definition of Ungoverned Areas

The Department of Defense (DoD) defines an ungoverned area as: “a place where the state or the central government is unable or unwilling to extend control,

¹ Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, Chapter 5, Terrorist Safe Havens (7120 Report), pages 179-184.

effectively govern, or influence the local population, and where a provincial, local, tribal, or autonomous government does not fully or effectively govern, due to inadequate governance capacity, insufficient political will, gaps in legitimacy, the presence of conflict, or restrictive norms of behavior. “Ungoverned areas” should be assumed to include under-governed, ill-governed, contested, and exploitable areas.”²

The Department of State (DOS) defines a terrorist safe haven as an “ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed area of a country and non-physical areas where terrorists constitute a threat to U.S. national security interests ” and “are able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.”³

III. Statutory Requirement

SEC. 1267. REPORT ON THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES FROM UNGOVERNED AREAS.

(a) **REPORT REQUIRED.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, shall jointly submit to the specified congressional committees a report on the threats posed to the United States from ungoverned areas, including the threats to the United States from terrorist groups and individuals located in such areas who direct their activities against the national security interests of the United States and its allies.

(b) **ELEMENTS.**—The report required under subsection (a) shall include the following:

(1) A description of those areas the United States Government considers ungoverned, including—

(A) a description of the geo-political and cultural influences exerted within such areas and by whom;

(B) a description of the economic conditions and prospects and the major social dynamics of such areas; and

² Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens! Final Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project Prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Robert D. Lamb, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning. January 2008, page 15.

³ Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, Chapter 5, Terrorist Safe Havens (7120 Report), page 179.

(C) a description of the United States Government's relationships with entities located in such areas, including with relevant national or other governments and relevant tribal or other groups.

(2) A description of the capabilities required by the United States Government to support United States policy aimed at managing the threats described in subsection (a), including, specifically, the technical, linguistic, and analytical capabilities required by the Department of Defense and the Department of State.

(3) An assessment of the extent to which the Department of Defense and the Department of State possess the capabilities described in paragraph (2) as well as the necessary resources and organization to support United States policy aimed at managing the threats described in subsection (a).

(4) A description of the extent to which the implementation of Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, entitled "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations," will support United States policy for managing such threats.

(5) A description of the actions, if any, to be taken to improve the capabilities of the Department of Defense and the Department of State described in paragraph (2), and the schedule for implementing any actions so described.

(c) FORM.—The report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, to the maximum extent practicable, but may contain a classified annex, if necessary.

(d) DEFINITION.—In this section, the term "specified congressional committees" means—

(1) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

IV. Descriptions

Safe havens in ungoverned areas used by al-Qa'ida (AQ) and its affiliates, Hizballah, and the Taliban are of particular concern because these terrorist organizations pose the greatest threat to the United States by directing their activities against the national security interests of the United States and its allies.

The following twelve safe havens and the potential safe haven of Iraq described in The Country Reports on Terrorism 2007⁴ pose a threat to the United States and its allies:

1. Somalia;
2. Trans-Saharan Africa;
3. Iraq;
4. Lebanon;
5. Yemen;
6. Afghanistan;
7. Pakistan, specifically the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP);
8. Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral;
9. Southern Philippines;
10. Indonesia;
11. Colombia;
12. Venezuela;
13. Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay).

The geo-political and cultural influences exerted within such areas include: corruption, lack of civic institutions and social services, politically repressive governments, and inadequate or unjust law enforcement and legal systems. The economic conditions and prospects and the major social dynamics of such areas include: poverty and the lack of civic institutions and social services.

AFRICA

Somalia. Somalia remains a concern given the country's long, unguarded coastline, porous borders, continued political instability, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula, all of which provide opportunities for terrorist transit and/or safe haven. A small number of AQ operatives remain in East Africa, particularly Somalia, where they remain likely to make common cause with certain Somali extremists and pose a serious threat to United States and allied interests in the region. Although these elements have been disrupted as a result of Ethiopian and Somali Transitional Federal Government military actions, AQ operatives/affiliates continue to operate in Somalia and elsewhere in East Africa.

The USG has three major priorities in Somalia: encourage inclusive political dialogue between Somalia's Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) and

⁴ Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, Chapter 5, Terrorist Safe Havens (7120 Report), pages 179-184.

other key Somali stakeholders with the goal of resuming the transitional process outlined by the Charter and leading towards national elections in 2009; mobilize international support to help build the governance capacity of the TFIs and provide development and humanitarian assistance for the Somali people; and support the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and a follow-on United Nations peacekeeping operation.⁵

The Trans-Sahara. Remote areas of the Sahel and Maghreb regions in Africa serve as terrorist safe havens because of porous borders and little government control in sparsely populated regions. In 2006, the threat to local, western, and U.S. interests from Islamic extremists increased when the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) merged with AQ to form the AQ in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), based in Algeria. AQIM has used the Sahel to train Islamic militants in small arms, use of explosives, and guerilla tactics for the last several years. Training appears to take place on the move or in makeshift facilities in remote areas outside government control. AQIM taps into already existing smuggling networks in the region to obtain weapons, explosives, and supplies to support its operations.

In contrast, in November 2007, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group's (LIFG) merged with AQ, but has yielded few successful attacks to date, reflecting the depleted capabilities of LIFG within Libya.

ASIA -- THE MIDDLE EAST

Iraq. Iraq is not currently a terrorist safe haven, but terrorists, including Sunni groups like AQ in Iraq (AQI), Ansar al-Islam (AI), and Ansar al-Sunna (AS), as well as Shi'a extremists and other groups, view Iraq as a potential safe haven and are attempting to make it a reality. The Iraqi government, in coordination with the Coalition, made significant progress in combating AQI and affiliated terrorist organizations in 2007. The substantial degradation of AQI stems from a number of factors. The alliance of convenience and mutual exploitation between AQI and many Sunni populations has deteriorated. The Baghdad Security Plan, initiated in February, along with assistance from primarily Sunni tribal and local groups, has succeeded in reducing violence to late 2005 levels, has disrupted and diminished AQI infrastructure, and has driven some surviving AQI fighters from Baghdad and

⁵ Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer, "Exploring A Comprehensive Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Counterterrorism Strategy for Somalia," Hearing Before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 110th Congress, First Session, February 6, 2007, p. 12, and "Evaluating U.S. Policy Objectives and Options on the Horn of Africa," Hearing before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, March 11, 2008, p. 2-4.

Anbar into the northern Iraqi provinces of Ninawa, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. While AQI remained a threat, new initiatives to cooperate with tribal and local leaders in Iraq have led to Sunni tribes' and local citizens' rejection of AQI and its extremist ideology. The continued growth, professionalism, and improved capabilities of the Iraqi forces have increased their effectiveness in rooting out terrorist cells. Iraqis in Baghdad, Anbar and Diyala Provinces, and elsewhere have turned against AQI and were cooperating with the Iraqi government and Coalition Forces to defeat it. The Coalition troop surge and its sustained presence and tactics, and the reduction in violence following the declared ceasefire by Muqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi militia in August 2007, also increased popular support for the actions of Coalition and Iraqi Forces against AQI and other terrorist groups. AQI, although substantially degraded in 2007, retains some infrastructure that allows the group to use these areas for staging operations.

Northern Iraq. The Kongra Gel/Kurdistan Workers' Party (KGK/PKK) maintained an active presence in northern Iraq, using it as a base to coordinate attacks in the predominantly ethnic Kurdish areas of southeastern Turkey as well as other parts of the country. KGK/PKK attacks primarily targeted Turkish security forces, local Turkish officials, and ethnic Kurds who opposed the organization. On October 17, 2007, the Turkish Parliament overwhelmingly passed a motion authorizing cross-border military operations against KGK/PKK encampments in northern Iraq. Turkish forces carried out extensive operations along the Turkey-Iraq border in the latter part of the year. The United States continued to work with Turkey and Iraq to counter the common threat from the KGK/PKK.

Lebanon. Hizballah remains the most prominent and powerful terrorist group in Lebanon, with a strong influence among Lebanon's large Shi'a community, which comprises at least one third of Lebanon's population. The Lebanese government continues to recognize Hizballah, a U.S.-designated Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO), as a legitimate "resistance group" and political party represented by elected deputies in parliament. Hizballah maintained offices in Beirut and training facilities elsewhere in the country, and provides a network of social services to its supporters, primarily in southern Lebanon. Because of Hizballah's military strength and support from the Shi'a community, the central government's control in southern Lebanon has been weak. An increasing number of AQ-influenced Sunni extremists are also operating within the country, often from the Palestinian refugee camps, which remain no-go zones to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). AQ likely views Lebanon as a platform on which to expand its jihad into the Levant, especially after the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hizballah. AQ-

influenced extremists use the Palestinian refugee camps as staging grounds for recruitment, training, planning, and facilitating transit of foreign fighters to and from Iraq. In the summer of 2007, the LAF defeated the militant jihadist group Fatah al-Islam (FAI) in Nahr el-Barid, a Palestinian refugee camp near Tripoli, in Lebanon's north. Though the LAF defeated FAI, the Nahr el-Barid camp was largely destroyed. Local Palestinian groups still retain control of the other eleven refugee camps in the country.⁶

Yemen. Yemen experienced several setbacks to its counterterrorism efforts with the June 22, 2007, announcement that Abu Basir Nasir al-Wahishi was the new head of al-Qa'ida in Yemen (AQY), the July 2 terrorist attack which killed ten people, and the uncertainty of U.S.S. Cole bomber Jamal al-Badawi's continued incarceration. At the end of 2007, the Government of Yemen could not account for seven of the 23 AQ members that escaped from a prison in Sanaa in February 2006. AQY carried out several attacks against tourism targets, most notably the January and July 2007 attacks against foreign visitors to the Queen of Sheba Temple in Ma'rib and the country's oil infrastructure. Yemen continued to increase its maritime security capabilities, but land border security along the extensive frontier with Saudi Arabia remained a problem, despite increased Yemeni-Saudi cooperation on bilateral security issues.

SOUTHWEST ASIA

Afghan-Pakistan Border. Despite the efforts of both Afghan and Pakistani security forces, instability along the Pakistan-Afghanistan frontier appeared to have provided AQ leadership greater mobility and ability to conduct training and operational planning, particularly that targeting Western Europe and the United States. Numerous senior AQ operatives have been captured or killed, but AQ leaders continue to plot attacks and to cultivate stronger operational connections that radiate outward from Pakistan to affiliates throughout the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe.

Afghanistan. The Afghan government, in concert with ISAF/NATO forces and the international community, continued efforts to bring and build security on the Afghan side of the border. The border areas remained contested, however, with

⁶ Country Reports on Terrorism 2007, Chapter 3, State Sponsors of Terrorism, has further information on Iran (pages 168 – 169) and Syria (pages 170 – 171) which provided safe haven to Hizballah and Palestinian terrorist groups, and were used as safe havens by AQ-linked operatives and groups.

ongoing insurgent and terrorist attacks, including AQ activity. Attacks by the Taliban and other insurgent groups and criminal networks, along with those of extremist movements such as Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) and the Haqqani network, continued throughout Afghanistan. Criminal networks and narcotics cultivation remained particularly prevalent in the south and east of the country, constituting a source of funding for the insurgency in Afghanistan. In 2007, AQ expanded its Afghanistan-based leadership cadre and its support to militants inside the country, providing funding, training, and personnel to facilitate terrorist and insurgent operations. Anti-Coalition organizations such as HIG continued to operate in coordination with AQ, Taliban, and other insurgent groups, primarily in the east.

Pakistan. Portions of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) of Pakistan have become a safe haven for AQ terrorists, Afghan insurgents, and other extremists. AQ uses the FATA to launch attacks in Afghanistan, plan operations worldwide, train, recruit, and provide propaganda. Other extremists, including Taliban and Kashmir-focused organizations such as Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin or Hizb-e-Islami Khalis, use the area for safe haven and share short term goals of eliminating Coalition presence in Afghanistan. They exploit the local sympathetic populations to recruit, train, and conduct cross-border raids and bombings in Afghanistan. Islamist Deobandi groups and many local tribesmen in the FATA continue to resist the Government of Pakistan's efforts to improve governance and administrative control at the expense of longstanding local autonomy. Extremists led by Taliban commander Baitullah Mehsud and other AQ-related extremists re-exerted their hold in areas of South Waziristan and captured over 200 government soldiers, who were later released after a local peace deal collapsed. Extremists have also gained footholds in the settled areas bordering the FATA, including Swat, Tank, and Dera Ismail Khan. Pakistani security forces continue to fight militant leader Maulana Fazlullah in Swat, a district in NWFP. As of December, Pakistan's military was conducting increased operations in Swat. The Government of Pakistan maintains approximately 120,000 troops, including Army and Frontier Corps (FC) units, along the Afghanistan border. The United States plans to help modernize and increase the capacity of the FC so they can become a more effective force.

In order to increase the central government's writ in the FATA, the Government of Pakistan is implementing a comprehensive approach with three prongs: political, security, and development. For the political prong, the government seeks to bolster effective governance by empowering local officials. For the security prong, Pakistan's objective is to increase the capacity and efficacy

of local security forces. For the development prong, the Government of Pakistan has designed a comprehensive sustainable development plan for the region. The plan concentrates on four sectors – basic human services, natural resources, communication/ infrastructure, and economic development – and, if fully implemented, would cost \$2 billion. The plan was developed with the extensive grassroots participation of all stakeholders to provide essential economic and livelihood opportunities while upgrading and expanding social services to a population at risk for recruitment by terrorist organizations.

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

The Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral. Southeast Asia includes a safe haven area composed of the Sulawesi Sea and Sulu Archipelago, which sit astride the maritime boundary between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The geography of the thousands of islands in the region made the area difficult for authorities to monitor. Worker migration, tourism, trade, and other non-terrorist activities, both licit and illicit, that occur in this maritime region pose another challenge to identifying and countering the terrorist threat. Although the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have improved their efforts to control their shared maritime boundaries, this expanse remains difficult to control. Surveillance is partial at best, and traditional smuggling and piracy groups provided an effective cover for terrorist activities, such as movement of personnel, equipment, and funds. The Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral represents a primary transit safe haven for the regional terrorists, the Jemaah Islamiya (JI) network and the Philippine Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

The Southern Philippines. Portions of the southern Philippines, specifically the Sulu archipelago and the majority Muslim areas of western portions of the island of Mindanao, serve as terrorist safe havens. The Government of the Philippine's control in this area is weak due to rugged terrain, weak rule of law, poor economic conditions, and local Muslim majority resentment of central governmental policies. In addition to JI and the ASG, the area hosts several terrorist and separatist insurgent groups including the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA). JI and the ASG pose a threat to U.S. interests, including U.S. military forces supporting the Philippine Armed Forces conducting counterinsurgency operations in these areas. JI has a small presence in the southern Philippines where it often colludes with ASG and/or rouge elements of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) or Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), to conduct attack planning, but its capabilities in the region have decreased since 2006. It conducts training in some areas of Mindanao controlled

by some elements of the MILF, though MILF's peace talks with the government have weakened ties (and therefore support capabilities) between the groups.

Indonesia. JI poses the principal terrorist threat to United States and other Western interests in Indonesia. In 2007, the Indonesian government's continuing improvements in counterterrorist capabilities scored several major successes against the group, such as the June arrest of the former acting JI emir Muhammad Naim (aka Zarkasih) and the former JI military commander Abu Dujana, the recent rollup of a JI terrorist cell in Palembang. JI elements operate largely in west and central Java where the group recruits, funds, trains, and plans operations.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Colombia Border Region. The regions adjacent to Colombia's borders with Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Panama, and Brazil include rough terrain and dense forest cover. These conditions, coupled with low population densities and weak government presence, create areas of safe haven for insurgent and terrorist groups, particularly the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, and Panama have often adopted a tacit policy mix of containment and non-confrontation with Colombian narcoterrorist groups, although some confrontations do occur. Much depends on local decisions and cross-border relations. The FARC used areas in neighboring countries near Colombia's border to rest and regroup, procure supplies, and stage and train for terrorist attacks. These areas appeared to be more prevalent in Venezuela and Ecuador, less so in Brazil and Peru. The FARC used areas in neighboring countries near Colombia's border to rest and regroup, procure supplies, transit drugs, evade Colombian security forces, and stage and train for terrorist attacks. In addition, the FARC and another designated terrorist organization, the National Liberation Army (ELN), regard Venezuelan territory near the border as a safe haven and often used the area for cross-border incursions.

The Tri-Border Area (TBA) (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay). Although no corroborated information shows that Hizballah or other Islamic extremist groups used the TBA for military-type training or planning of terrorist operations, the United States remains concerned that criminal elements and Hizballah sympathizers use the TBA as a safe haven to raise funds. Suspected supporters of Islamic terrorist groups, including Hizballah, take advantage of loosely regulated territory and the proximity of Ciudad del Este, Paraguay and Foz do Iguacu, Brazil to participate in a wide range of illicit activities and to solicit donations from within the sizable Muslim communities in the region and elsewhere in Argentina,

Brazil, and Paraguay. The governments of the TBA have long been concerned with arms and drugs smuggling, document fraud, money laundering, and the manufacture and movement of contraband goods through this region. In the early years of this decade, the governments of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay invited the United States to participate in the Three Plus One Group on TBA Security to address these illicit activities.

V.

In January 2006, the President of the United States announced the National Security Language Initiative (NSLI) which is designed to dramatically increase the number of Americans learning critical need foreign languages such as Arabic, Chinese, Russian, Hindi, and Farsi.

Department of State (DOS)

The DOS has technical, linguistic, and analytic capabilities aimed at managing threats posed to the United States from ungoverned areas.

Technical

DOS' technical capabilities reside in a number of its bureaus, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS). The Foreign Service Institute (FSI) provides area studies training covering countries and regions such as Afghanistan, Arabian Peninsula/Gulf, Brazil and Southern Cone, Caucasus, Central Asia, Iraq, Fertile Crescent, Insular Southeast Asia, Mainland Southeast Asia, Northern Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. FSI also provides training that covers international terrorism and reconstruction and stabilization. FSI trains individuals for service as members of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq and Afghanistan to address directly the root causes of destabilization and conflict.

The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), for example, directs U.S. military security assistance programs -- Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) -- to include policy development, budget formulation, and program oversight. PM also administers the non-WMD components of the Non-Proliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) account, and coordinates, for the Department of State on programs authorized by Section 1206 of the NDAA, a DoD authority.

Administered by the PM Bureau

Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides grants to friendly countries for the acquisition of U.S. military equipment, services, and training. This program contributes to regional and global stability, strengthens military support for democratically-elected governments, enables our partners to fight the War on Terror, and serves to contain other transnational threats including trafficking in narcotics, weapons and persons.

FMF enables the United States to foster closer military relationships with other countries and to build stronger multilateral coalitions with key allies and friends by improving their defense capabilities and enhancing interoperability. Since FMF funds the purchases of U.S.-origin military equipment, it also serves to increase demand for U.S. systems thereby lowering costs for DoD acquisitions and securing more jobs for American workers. In FY 2008, \$4.55 billion was appropriated for FMF; the FY 2009 request is for \$4.812 billion.

International Military Education and Training (IMET) provides training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations. This program serves to improve defense capabilities and contributes to the professionalization of foreign militaries. IMET also facilitates the development of important personal relationships that have proven useful in providing U.S. access and influence in a critical sector of society. In FY 2008, \$85.2 million was appropriated for IMET; the FY 2009 request is for \$90.5 million.

Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funding supports peacekeeping activities that are not UN-mandated or UN-funded and provides support to regional peace support operations for which neighboring countries take primary responsibility. PKO funds also support the implementation of peace agreements and enhance the capabilities of other nations to participate in voluntary peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and humanitarian operations. By increasing the capabilities of other countries to undertake these missions, PKO reduces the burden on U.S. military personnel and resources. In FY 2008, \$261 million was appropriated for PKO; the FY 2009 request is for \$247.2 million.

Small Arms/Light Weapons (SA/LW) funding from the DOS' NADR account is used to assist other countries in destroying their excess, loosely secured, or otherwise at-risk Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS), other small arms and light weapons, and related ammunition and explosives, thereby preventing their proliferation to terrorists, insurgents, or other non-state actors

operating in ungoverned spaces. Since the program's inception in FY 2003, the Department of State has enabled the destruction of over 26,000 MANPADS missiles and more than 1 million weapons in dozens of countries, including many of the ungoverned spaces mentioned above. The PM Bureau's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA) works with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to assist governments with improvements to the security and management of the weapons they retain for legitimate defense needs, thus building capacity in partner countries to further reduce threats from ungoverned spaces on their territory. PM/WRA also serves as the home of the MANPADS Interagency Task Force that coordinates broader USG efforts to reduce the threat of MANPADS proliferation to terrorists and other non-state actors. In this capacity, PM/WRA facilitates a wide range of USG activities focused on reducing the MANPADS threat from terrorists and other non-state actors operating in ungoverned spaces.

Section 1206 of the NDAA uses DoD Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds to build capacity for a foreign nation's military forces to conduct counterterror operations or to participate in support or military operations in which U.S. Armed Forces are a participant. Since FY 2006, the State and Defense Departments have been working jointly to implement programs under 1206 authority. In FY 2008, \$300 million was appropriated for use on programs under section 1206 authority in Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Georgia, Indonesia, Kenya, Lebanon, Malaysia, the Philippines, Tunisia and, under the Caribbean Basin Capabilities Enhancements program, the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, and Belize. This authority requires renewal for FY 2009.

NADR Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS)

The Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) coordinates the U.S. interagency-implemented Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) assistance program. EXBS uses NADR funds to help governments establish and strengthen their export control systems and border security capabilities to meet international standards, consistent with their obligations under UN Security Council 1540. Specific areas addressed by EXBS include establishment of strategic trade control laws and regulations, establishment of licensing capabilities, enhanced enforcement capabilities, government-industry outreach, and interagency cooperation. EXBS has also supported efforts to raise regional proliferation awareness on small arms/light weapons and MANPADS in the Middle East. Since the program's inception in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1998, EXBS has funded more than \$366 million worth of

bilateral and regional cooperative efforts, including over 1,300 technical exchanges and workshops, \$208 million worth of inspection and interdiction equipment, and numerous regional conferences and seminars. Since 2002, EXBS has built an increasingly global focus to meet evolving threats and help governments deter and defend against nonproliferation challenges from ungoverned areas. Among the ungoverned areas identified in this report, EXBS has active programs or engagement in Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Argentina. In recent years EXBS has conducted training activities and/or provided equipment to Kenya and Tanzania. EXBS also has recently launched programs in Morocco and Libya, and plans to build on more preliminary engagement efforts in Algeria, Iraq, and Brazil.

NADR/Global Threat Reduction (NADR/GTR)

In addition, the ISN Bureau manages a suite of global security programs under the NADR account to counter WMD proliferation, including WMD terrorism. Specifically, the NADR/GTR Programs aim to prevent terrorists and proliferant states from acquiring WMD and related expertise, materials, technologies and equipment. NADR/GTR programs have engaged scientists in six of the twelve designated "terrorist safe havens" that pose a risk to the U.S. (Trans-Saharan Africa; Yemen; Afghanistan; Pakistan, specifically the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP); the Tri-Border Area through Brazil; and Iraq.) The Iraq Scientist Engagement Program (ISEP) works to engage and redirect former Iraqi WMD and missile experts to sustainable, civilian employment. The Biosecurity Engagement Program (BEP) has engaged scientists in the other five aforementioned safe-havens in order to promote global biological security to raise awareness, protect the dual-use expertise inherent in the biosciences field, and secure dangerous pathogens from illegitimate acquisition. Specifically, BEP has allocated \$8.0 million of its \$26.0 million FY08 NADR/GTR appropriation to biosecurity work in Pakistan, such as scientists training, facility risk assessment, and collaborative project development at the national and institute levels. BEP plans further engagement in Afghanistan and Trans-Sahara Africa in FY 2009. In addition, GTR funds a global Chemical Security Engagement Program (CSP), with initial engagement with Afghan and Pakistani scientists in June 2008.

Linguistic

The DOS, through FSI, provides language training and testing in foreign languages such as Amharic, Arabic, Bengali, Cantonese, Dari, Farsi, Kurdish,

Hindi, Indonesian, Malay, Mandarin, Nepali, Pashto, Sinhali, Swahili, Tagalog, Tamil, Tibetan, Tigrinya, and Urdu.

Analytical

The DOS' analytical capabilities reside in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), the geographic bureaus, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT), and the embassies.

Department of Defense (DoD)

The DoD has technical, linguistic, and analytic capabilities aimed at managing threats posed to the United States from ungoverned areas.

Technical

The DoD's technical capabilities reside in its combatant commands.

Revision
A

Linguistic

The DoD's March 2004 Strategic Planning Guidance for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006-2011 outlines the need for foundational language and culture capabilities in the active and reserve officers, enlisted, and civilian forces. It calls for an ability to surge DoD's language and cultural resources beyond foundational and in-house capabilities. It directs DoD to establish a cadre of language specialists at the professional level in listening, reading, and speaking abilities, and requires processes to track how DoD manages its linguists and Foreign Area Officers (FAOs).

The February 2005 Defense Language Transformation Roadmap has four goals. The Roadmap requires the Joint Staff and Military Departments to ensure regional area content is incorporated into language training, professional military education and development, pre-deployment training, and, in some cases, mid- or intra-deployment training.

The DoD has established quarterly reporting of language and culture requirements, developed the Language Readiness Index, and established the Defense Language Steering Committee to provide senior-level oversight.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) directs the DoD to "... increase investments focused on developing and maintaining appropriate language, cultural skills." It requires DoD to "... dramatically increase the number of

personnel proficient in key languages such as Arabic, Farsi, and Chinese, and make these languages available at all levels of action and decision – from strategic to the tactical.” It emphasizes the need to “. . . foster a level of understanding and cultural intelligence about the Middle East and Asia comparable to that developed about the Soviet Union during the Cold War,” and calls on Military Departments to expand their FAO programs.

The *Guidance for the Development of the Force for Fiscal Years 2010-2015* provides additional guidance directing that DoD components prioritize capabilities that will “improve foreign language dialect skills in order to better understand and engage countries at strategic crossroads.” It further states that: “joint ground forces will have appropriate foreign language and cultural knowledge skills to conduct these missions” and requires that DoD “build foreign language skills, regional and cultural awareness capability and capacity in DoD forces.”

DoD has identified more than 141,000 operational and organizational requirements for language and understanding of foreign cultures for General Purpose Forces as well as Special Forces. The Combatant Commands identified over 60 different language and dialect requirements.

In 2008, the DoD completed the Capabilities-Base Review that examines how it identifies the languages most likely to be needed in the future and how it will manage these requirements as capabilities and not personnel billets. The DoD established the Language Readiness Index (LRI), an application linked to the Defense Readiness Reporting System database that allows comparison of requirements to available on-hand assets. The LRI provides senior level decision-makers within the DoD Agencies, Combatant Commands, and the Services with the information necessary to assess language capability gaps, capabilities, overmatches, and take appropriate action. The LRI will provide the DoD a tool to conduct risk assessments and determine tradeoffs as we have competing needs for people and dollars.

The DoD has several organizations that provide language training, including the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) at the Presidio of Monterey, California; and the Defense Language Institute English Language Center (DLIELC) at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. The DLIFLC provides training in foreign languages while the DLIELC provides training to foreigners in English. The DLIFLC provides training in such languages as Amharic, Arabic (Egyptian, Gulf, Iraqi, Moroccan, Sudanese, Syrian, and Tunisian), Bengali, Cantonese, Cebuano, Dari, Farsi (Iranian-Persian), Hindi, Ilocano, Indonesian,

Javanese, Kashmiri, Kurmanje, Mandarin, Pashto-Afghan, Pashtu-Peshawari, Sindhi, Somali, Sorani, Swahili, Tigrinya, and Urdu.

The Roadmap has led to increased training in strategic languages at the DLIFLC with the number of students enrolled in Arabic, Chinese, and Persian Farsi increasing from 1,144 in 2001 to 2,171 by the end of 2008. The DLIFLC budget also increased from \$77 million in FY 2001 to \$270 million in FY 2008. Also, soldier assigned to the Stryker Brigade Combat Team at Fort Lewis, Washington, study rudimentary Arabic in a 10 month course. Soldiers at Fort Riley, Kansas, learn basic Arabic or Dari -- one of the Afghan languages -- along with the fundamental tenets of Islam and cultural norms of Iraqis and Afghans.

Analytical

The DoD's analytical capabilities reside in its intelligence organizations and is supplemented by contractors.

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VI. Organizational Capabilities and Resource Requirements

Managing the threats posed by individuals and groups in ungoverned areas requires security assistance and foreign assistance so that governments can function more effectively, the rule of law can be established, and economic development programs can succeed.

The FY 2007 Annual Report on Assistance Related to International Terrorism provides information on programs addressing threats posed by individuals and groups in ungoverned areas.

The FY 2009 *Congressional Budget Justification, Foreign Operations* provides information on and budget requests for resources required to address threats posed by individuals and groups in ungoverned areas.

Security and Foreign Assistance programs often address the capabilities of foreign governments to address ungoverned spaces in a bilateral manner. Programs that address these governance gaps in a regional or multilateral context, such as S/CT's RSI program, are underdeveloped and strengthening them is a top priority of the Dept of State.

Engagement programs that build the political will of these states to address the challenges associated with ungoverned areas are also immature and require additional attention and resources. This includes regional workshops, key senior leader visits, programs that sustain connectivity to best practices in governance, and others.

VII. Role of DoD Directive 3000.5 in Managing Threats from Ungoverned Areas

In the short term, DoD stability operations will provide local people with security, restore essential services, and meet humanitarian needs. In the long term, DoD stability operations will help develop indigenous capacity for securing essential services, a viable market economy, rule of law, democratic institution and a robust civil society.⁷

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VIII. Actions to Improve Capabilities

The USG builds partner capacity and encourages countries to cooperate more effectively at the local and regional level in order to deny terrorists safe haven. U.S. Ambassadors, as the President's personal representatives abroad, are in charge of U.S. relations with host nations, with a unique responsibility to bring all elements of national power to bear against the terrorist enemy. They lead interagency country teams that develop strategies to help host nations understand the threat and to strengthen their political will and capacity to counter it.

Defeating the terrorist enemy requires a comprehensive effort executed locally, nationally, regionally, and globally. Working with partner nations, we must eliminate terrorist leadership, but incarcerating or killing terrorists will not achieve an end to terrorism. We must simultaneously eliminate terrorist safe havens, tailoring regional strategies to disaggregate terrorist networks and break terrorist financial, travel, communications, and intelligence links. Finally, and most challenging, we must address the underlying conditions that terrorists exploit at the national and local levels to induce alienated or aggrieved populations to become sympathizers, supporters, and ultimately members of terrorist networks. We can marginalize violent extremists by addressing people's needs and grievances, by giving people a stake in their own political future, and by providing alternatives to what terrorists offer.

⁷ Department of Defense Directive 3000.5, subject: Managing for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations, November 28, 2005.

Economic development offers at-risk populations a better choice. Terrorists exploit despair and hopelessness to win recruits. Systems characterized by an absence of political choice, economic opportunities, and personal freedom can become unwitting incubators of extremism. Economically disadvantaged people are vulnerable to recruitment by extremists and by criminal “quick-fix” livelihoods, such as the poppy production that finances terrorism in Afghanistan.

Combating corruption and fostering good governance in host governments is indispensable to our efforts to strengthen host government law enforcement and oversight of terrorist financing, and the effectiveness of our other training programs, such as those that help border guards interdict dangerous goods and people.

Terrorists exploit weakness, most notably sectarian violence, to create greater instability and to piggyback onto the conflict for propaganda purposes. Fostering reconciliation and strengthening community mechanisms is vital to eliminating terrorism.

This is a long-term challenge. Over time, our global and regional cooperative efforts will reduce terrorists’ capacity to harm us and our partners, while local security and development assistance will build our partners’ capacity. We must continue to enlist the support and cooperation of a growing network of partners. If we are to be successful, we must all work together toward our common goal in a strategic and coordinated manner.

REGIONAL STRATEGIC INITIATIVE

The Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) develops flexible regional networks. The DOS’ Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) is working with ambassadors and interagency representatives in key terrorist theaters of operation to collectively assess the threat, pool resources, and devise collaborative strategies, action plans, and policy recommendations.

The RSI is a key tool in promoting cooperation between our partners in the War on Terror – for example, with Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines as they confront terrorist transit across the Sulawesi Sea; or among Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, Niger, Chad, and Mali, to counter AQIM, as it recruits and hides in the desert that sits astride national borders. Terrorists are highly adaptable; defeating them requires both centralized coordination and field authority. Resources and responses must be applied in a rapid, flexible, and focused manner. The RSI helps achieve this coordinated approach.

RSI strategy groups are in place for South East Asia, Iraq and its neighbors, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Western Mediterranean, East Africa, the Trans-Sahara, South Asia, and Latin America. These groups are chaired by Ambassadors, with interagency representatives participating. RSI programs focus on developing a common understanding of the strategic situation in a region. Using this shared perspective, networked country teams then identify opportunities for collaboration and pool resources not only to eliminate terrorism safe havens, but also to address the conditions that terrorists exploit for recruitment. Terrorists operate without regard to national boundaries. To effectively counter terrorists, we are working to strengthen our regional and transnational partnerships and increasingly operate in a regional context. Denying safe haven plays a major role in undermining terrorists' capacity to operate effectively and forms a key element of U.S. counterterrorism strategy.

Public/Private Partnerships

The DOS is also developing public/private partnerships in order to address economic, educational, and developmental needs in ungoverned areas.

Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS)

The S/CRS works with other parts of the USG and non-governmental organizations on reconstruction and stabilization issues. Section 1210 (formerly Section 1207 in FY 2006-07) of the FY2008 NDAA (PL 110-181) extends DoD's authority to transfer reconstruction and stabilization funds from the DoD to the DOS. Section 1210 provides support for security, reconstruction and/or stabilization. Section 1210 provides that the Secretary of Defense may transfer funds, not to exceed \$100 million, to the Secretary of State for purposes of "reconstruction, security or stabilization assistance to a foreign country." The Secretary of State is to "coordinate with the Secretary of Defense in the formulation and implementation" of any programs funded by this assistance.

S/CRS leads the coordination process by which Section 1210 and Section 1207 programs are formulated and implemented. S/CRS administers Section 1207 programs. In FY 2006, DOS received \$10 million dollars for Lebanon. In FY 2007, DoD transferred \$99.7 million to the DOS and the USAID to fund eight S/CRS-recommended and F-approved programs in Haiti, Somalia, Nepal, Colombia, Trans-Sahara, Yemen, and Tri Border in Southeast Asia. With the authority now renewed for FY2008, S/CRS has recommended \$100 million for programs in the following countries: Colombia, Sri Lanka, the Philippines,

Lebanon, Kenya, Tajikistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Bangladesh, and Afghanistan.

In FY08 Section 1210 authority was \$200 million. The Administration has requested renewal of Section 1210 authority for FY09.

Department of Defense (DoD)

The DoD has and is conducting a number of studies of ungoverned areas as well as held at least one conference.⁸

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IX. Conclusion

Terrorist groups and individuals in ungoverned areas which direct their activities against the national security interests of the United States and its allies pose a threat to the United States and its allies. The USG is working with relevant governments and relevant tribal and other groups to address geo-political and cultural influences, economic conditions and prospects, and major social dynamics in order to manage and minimize these threats.

⁸ Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens! Final Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project Prepared for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. Robert D. Lamb, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning. January 2008, pages 37 - 38.