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INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

**Achieving Unity of Effort:
A Case Study of
US Government Operations in
the Horn of Africa**

(b)(6)



June 2007

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Preface

This paper was prepared under the task order Joint Advanced Warfighting Program (JAWP), subtask Global War on Terrorism – Africa, for the United States Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). It helps address two objectives: (1) identify lessons from interagency efforts in the Horn of Africa; and (2) explore national security challenges and interagency collaboration processes and their results.

* * * * *

JAWP was established at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to serve as a catalyst for stimulating innovation and breakthrough change. It is co-sponsored by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Commander, JFCOM. JAWP includes military personnel on joint assignments from each Service and civilian specialists from IDA. JAWP is located in Alexandria, Virginia, and includes an office in Norfolk, Virginia, to facilitate coordination with JFCOM.

This paper does not necessarily reflect the views of IDA or the sponsors of JAWP. Our intent is to stimulate ideas, discussion, and, ultimately, the discovery and innovation that fuel successful transformation.

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Our thanks to the Cartographic Section of the United Nations and the Central Intelligence Agency for use of their maps. The remaining figures and tables have been created by the IDA study team.

Figures ES-1, 2, and 3: United Nations, Cartographic Section, <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/english/htmain.htm>, accessed 16 March 2007.

Figures 4-10, A-2: *CIA World Factbook*, <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/>, accessed 16 March 2007.

Figure A-1, The Camp Lemonier Expansion, Overhead Photo, US Navy photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Eric A. Clement, <http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/images/Lg/20070123-002.jpg>, accessed 16 March 2007.

Executive Summary

BACKGROUND

In the Horn of Africa, the interests of the United States are threatened by the encroachment of extremist Islam into traditional African culture, the instability of regional governments, and endemic poverty that forces people to become refugees. The diverse array of United States Government (USG) activities in the Horn of Africa provides a laboratory in which to observe operations in the field and glean “lessons learned” for decision-makers to achieve greater orchestration of the instruments of US national power. (Figure ES-1 depicts the Horn of Africa.)

Of particular note, USG and coalition efforts are occurring in a pre-conflict, capacity-building security environment, and not in a post-conflict, reconstruction security environment. The objective is to produce a level of security and stability that denies sanctuary and opportunity to our enemies—and to do so at a lower cost than under post-conflict conditions that could otherwise manifest later. *The organizing principle for USG efforts in Africa would seem to be development oriented, to include encouraging increased capacity within existing societal and governmental institutions.*



The Office of the Secretary of Defense asked the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) to identify lessons from US interagency efforts in the Horn of Africa and visit selected commands and country teams to explore national security challenges and interagency collaboration processes. The Horn was chosen because of its strategic geographic location along traditional trade and smuggling routes on the southwestern flank of US operations in the Middle East. The “lessons learned” can inform USG efforts to improve policymaking and its implementation.

From findings to hypotheses

Based on earlier interviews with senior USG officials on the prosecution of the Global War on Terrorism, members of the IDA study team found several weaknesses in the interagency process. These findings were used as the hypotheses for the case study in this paper, and tested for their applicability in the field. Many of the weaknesses evident at the national level in the interagency process are likewise evident in the field and they are impeding the effective implementation of US policy and programs.

- There is no useful, shared conception of the conflict. The US response to the conflict requires orchestration of all instruments—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—of national power. Competing conceptualizations of the war (regarding the nature of both the threat and the response) have so far prevented effective orchestration. No policy statement exists that assigns roles and missions to the agencies that wield the instruments. USG agency integration and synchronization are inadequate.
- The instruments of national power are not balanced, which results in excessive reliance on the military instrument. There is imbalance within the military instrument as well.
- Barriers to sharing information inhibit coordination not only among USG agencies but also between the United States and its allies, and the United States and host-nations.

Findings and conclusions of the case study

- No settled conception or organizing principles exist.
- Methods for achieving unity of effort are evident in the field but are largely ad hoc.
- USG agencies are not geographically aligned. Within the USG, agencies do not align their geographical subdivisions; neither do they align their organizational boundaries with how the Africans, through an important political entity, the African Union, perceive their subregions.
- The cultural predisposition to resist extremist Islam among the local population in the Horn of Africa is favorable to US foreign policy objectives. (However, in Yemen there is a latent predisposition toward radicalism that makes the Gulf of Aden a critical strategic seam.)
- Distances are long, infrastructure is poor, so location matters. The USG needs to consider carefully where it establishes presence.
- USG agencies vary in their planning processes, and usually plan within agency stovepipes.
- Overseas tour lengths differ with each agency, and are too short in virtually all cases to develop a significant contingent of culturally adroit personnel.

Recommendations

As the USG comes to grips with the multifarious geopolitical environment of the twenty-first century, it is faced with the opportunity of learning how to better “orchestrate” the instruments of national power without losing the unique capabilities of the various departments and agencies. The IDA study team identified and grouped its recommendations in three categories: (1) the planning horizon, (2) presence, and (3) the environment (culture and geography).

- **Planning horizon.** Planning horizons vary by agency according to time, geography, mission, and funding. To gain unity of effort, coordi-

nated planning should occur concurrently across all agencies involved in the region, based on common policy. Coordinated planning could help ease or eliminate some of the natural tension between organizations with differing objectives, authorities, and resources.

- **Presence.** USG personnel with long experience in the region emphasized the need to develop long-term relationships, based on trust. This includes relationships among USG agencies and with coalition partners and the locals. Short tour-lengths hinder effective coordination across USG agencies and with African nations and organizations. Principal staff should be located in the region and given thorough cultural and linguistic training before deploying. Accompanied tours (with families) should be encouraged, depending upon the threat level, of course.
- **Environment. Culture:** Experienced USG personnel contend that sub-Saharan Africans seem culturally predisposed to resist extremist ideology. USG efforts should focus on good governance and humanitarian assistance to strengthen this predisposition. Yemenis appear to have a latent predisposition toward radicalism. USG efforts should stay focused on good governance, particularly within the security forces, and humanitarian assistance to help perpetuate the latency. *Geography:* Align the USG view of African geography with the African view (i.e., through the African Union) and make this consistent across USG agencies.

As stated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review,

[s]olutions developed in the field often have applicability to inter-agency cooperation at the strategic and policy levels. Long experience shows that operators....collaborate closely when faced with challenges in the field.

The study team observed just this sort of developing collaboration in the Horn of Africa.

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I. Introduction

A. Background

The diverse array of United States Government (USG) activities in the Horn of Africa (or simply the Horn) provides a laboratory in which to observe operations in the field and glean “lessons learned” for decision-makers at the strategic and operational levels. The objective is to achieve greater *orchestration* of the instruments of US national power.¹ The geopolitical environment facing the United States now in the Horn of Africa involves the following:

- the presence of al-Qaeda;
- fragile local governments, ungoverned regions, and the failed state of Somalia;
- the active and significant efforts of the Chinese;
- the tension caused by the encroachment of Wahabi Islam into African culture; and
- practically every agency of the USG in some capacity or role.

The lessons learned in this “laboratory” can inform USG efforts to improve policymaking and implementation across the agencies of the USG and those of its partners.

¹ By *orchestration*, we mean many instruments under one director, using the same “score” (policy). Instruments include diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) elements.

The geopolitical environment in the twenty-first century also demands the coordinated application of all the instruments of national power, and not just in the Horn of Africa but in regions across the globe. The level of instability and conflict in these regions varies widely and calls for a flexible, coordinated application of national power by the many agencies of the USG. The power of the United States and the collective capacity of international coalitions are needed to address the security concerns of this century.

Of particular note in the Horn of Africa is that coalition efforts are being expended not in a *post-conflict, reconstruction* security environment but in a *pre-conflict, capacity-building* security environment. The objective is to produce a level of security and stability that denies sanctuary and opportunity to our enemies and at lower cost than under post-conflict conditions that may manifest later.

The organizing principle for USG efforts in Africa would seem to be development oriented, to include encouraging increased capacity within existing societal and governmental institutions.

B. Purpose

In a series of interviews conducted with senior USG officials concerning the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), research staff members from the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) uncovered the weakness of the interagency process in prosecuting GWOT and identified areas where the USG needed greater *unity of effort*. The purpose of the case study described in this paper was to determine to what extent the findings derived from those interviews remain true and applicable to the Horn of Africa. The IDA study team selected the Horn because of its strategic geographic location along traditional trade and smuggling routes on the southwestern flank of US operations in the Middle East, notably in Iraq. This region is host to many USG agencies, among them:

- the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), which is headquartered in Djibouti;

- the country teams at US embassies in Djibouti, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Yemen; and
- other organizations with regional offices such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Walter Reed Army Medical Center HIV/AIDS research facility.

There are also many international efforts in the region, including the United Nations (UN), as well as significant European and Chinese presence.

Selecting the Horn as the venue for a case study, the IDA study team collected data for an analysis of USG interagency operations in the field. The results of the study suggest ways to increase *unity of effort* within the USG. Unity of effort is essential to the USG, which is working to deny sanctuary to those seeking to foment chaos in strategically significant but poorly governed and economically deprived regions across the globe.

C. Scope

The case study focused on the interactions between the departments and agencies of the USG. It is important to remember that these interactions occur in the context of other international efforts not addressed in this paper. The IDA study team assumed that, for the foreseeable future, forces with hostile intent toward the United States will seek sanctuary in countries unwilling or unable to prevent their doing so. The team identified three approaches to the problem of “threats” operating from such sanctuaries:

1. *Regime change* in uncooperative countries through conventional or unconventional warfare, followed by nation-building.
2. *Strikes and raids* against threat elements in their sanctuaries.
3. *Capacity building* in cooperative countries.

This paper focuses on the third approach, treating ongoing activities in the Horn as an example of *capacity building* in cooperative countries. The results of the

case study may prove to be applicable to potential terrorist sanctuaries outside the Horn of Africa. The first and second approaches are outside the scope of this case study. **Note:** Because US resources are constrained, USG efforts should focus on strategically significant regions, to include the geographic, cultural, and political considerations. Resource limitations demand that the orchestrated implementation of USG policies and programs be precise.

D. Approach

Phase I. From 2003 to 2004, IDA research staff conducted unstructured,² non-attributable interviews with senior officials of prominent USG agencies in the Washington, DC, area and around the world.

Phase II. Field research was the principal method used in the second phase. The IDA study team members visited the Horn of Africa on three separate occasions from January through July 2006. Smaller teams have returned periodically since then. Working from a base of operations in Djibouti, they conducted unstructured, non-attributable interviews in offices and headquarters in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Kenya. Team members also visited operations in the field and attended a number of conferences in the region.

Two research questions drove the Horn of Africa case study:

- To what extent do the findings from the Phase I interviews with senior officials remain valid?
- Given the problem of ungoverned areas providing sanctuary to agents hostile to the United States, what would be the appropriate USG response in terms of organization and practice?

² “Unstructured” in that the IDA study team did not submit a list of questions ahead of time to the interviewees.

Two additional research questions arose while the study was in progress:

- Are the effects achieved by CJTF–HOA commensurate with the costs of its operation?
- What are the implications of a unified or subunified command for Africa or sub-Saharan Africa?

E. Organization

Chapter I. Provides the background, purpose, scope, and approach to the national security issue of USG operations in the Horn of Africa.

Chapter II. Discusses the four hypotheses that are derived from findings from the earlier round of interviews. Following this chapter are maps of the region and individual countries.

Chapter III. Contains the additional findings and conclusions of the case study. Because clear policy objectives for the region remain elusive, much of this section remains conditional.

Chapter IV. Reiterates the need for an overarching policy for USG operations in the region, with suggestions on how to develop such a policy from experienced Africa hands and the IDA study team.

Appendix A. Discusses a separate research question that the Office of the Secretary of Defense posed to the IDA study team concerning the costs and benefits of CJTF–HOA operations remaining in Camp Lemonier, Djibouti.

Appendix B. Contains the briefing presented by the task leader of the IDA study team to the sponsor on the results of the visits to the Horn of Africa.

Appendix C. Briefly describes the Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South), Key West, Florida.

Appendix D. Contains a list of the references cited or referred to in the paper.

Appendix E. Contains a list of abbreviations and acronyms.

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II. Case Study Hypotheses

Based on interviews conducted earlier with senior officials from various USG agencies responsible for aspects of the GWOT, the IDA study team took four hypotheses on interagency operations to the field in the Horn of Africa. **Figure 1** below lists the hypotheses, which are discussed in more detail in the following sections.

Hypotheses and Corollaries	
Hypothesis 1	<p><i>There is no useful, shared conception of the conflict.</i></p> <p>Corollaries to Hypothesis 1:</p> <p>1.1 <i>The US response to the conflict requires orchestration of all instruments of national power.</i></p> <p>1.2 <i>Competing conceptualizations of the war (regarding the nature of both the threat and the response) prevent effective orchestration of the instruments of power.</i></p> <p>1.3 <i>There is no policy statement that assigns roles and missions to the agencies that wield the instruments of national power.</i></p> <p>1.4 <i>USG agency integration and synchronization are inadequate.</i></p>
Hypothesis 2	<i>The instruments of national power are not balanced, resulting in excessive reliance on the military instrument.</i>
Hypothesis 3	<i>There is imbalance within the military instrument as well.</i>
Hypothesis 4	<i>Barriers to sharing information inhibit coordination across boundaries with allies, other government agencies, etc.</i>

Figure 1. Hypotheses

The study found that the hypotheses are largely an accurate description of interagency operations in the field. Improvements in the integration and synchronization of some aspects of USG efforts were evident. However, these improve-

ments are ad hoc and personality based, and their utility has yet to be proven outside the Horn of Africa.

A. Hypothesis 1. There is no useful, shared conception of the conflict

The IDA study team uncovered evidence of two prominent and potentially useful conceptions that are not being shared across USG organizations in the Horn of Africa:

- One prominent useful conception is attacking a specific list of individuals intent on employing terrorism against the United States: *a counterterrorist conception.*
- Another prominent useful conception is countering an insurgency: *a counterinsurgency conception.*

The two conceptions could be complementary, with one designated as the *dominant organizing principle* and the other as *supporting*. However, the IDA study team found that these two useful conceptions are *competing* rather than *complementary* in the Horn.

Corollary 1. The US response to the conflict requires orchestration of all instruments of national power.

The need for the skill sets and resources of many USG agencies remains apparent.

- Department of Defense (DOD) policy continues to make many strong references to the traditional list of instruments of power: diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME).
- National strategy documents make frequent references to an expanded and more contemporary list of instruments that comprises military, in-

formational, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic instruments (MIDLIFE).³

Regardless of which list is used, DIME or MIDLIFE, different USG agencies wield the instruments and require *orchestration*. In the Horn of Africa, the need to coordinate efforts across the agencies of the USG is readily apparent. Interviewees consistently referred to the impediments that their parent agencies and USG national policy placed before them as they sought to coordinate efforts with other agencies in the region. These impediments were large enough that some interviewees reported not making any effort to coordinate across the Horn.

Corollary 2. Competing conceptualizations of the war (regarding the nature of both the threat and the response) prevent effective orchestration of the instruments of power.

This condition persists. The original mission of CJTF–HOA was *counter-terrorist*, an offensive manhunt for specific terrorists. The mission evolved into *antiterrorism* (defensive) and moved toward *counterinsurgency*, focusing primarily on *economic development and public diplomacy*. This evolution eventually provided common cause between CJTF–HOA and USAID, but the arrangement is ad hoc and personality dependent and not coordinated across all USG agencies in the region.

Corollary 3. There is no policy statement that assigns roles and missions to the agencies that wield the instruments of national power.

This condition persists. Currently, no national policy statement prescribes or assigns roles and missions to the various agencies. Each agency is finding its

³ See, for example, *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC, 2006), p. 6; *9/11 Five Years Later: Successes and Challenges* (The White House, Washington, DC, 2006), p. 19; and *National Strategy for Combating Terrorism* (The White House, Washington, DC, 2006), p. 1.

own way: at times, agencies are in conflict over ends, ways, and means. Neither is there a policy that compels coordination in the Horn or that assigns responsibility and authority for orchestrating the efforts of co-equal agencies. An agreed-upon *conception of the conflict*, from which flows a single *organizing principle*, is a necessary starting point to coordinate the efforts of USG agencies in the Horn, which includes establishing clear supported and supporting relationships.

Corollary 4. USG agency integration and synchronization are inadequate.

This condition appears to have been ameliorated, at least in the Horn. Cooperation between CJTF-HOA and the US embassies in the region appears to be good and improving. Much of this is driven by personalities and their interactions, specifically between the commander of CJTF-HOA and the US ambassadors in the region. A change of ambassadors in Ethiopia brought a personal willingness to accept greater risk and a positive experience in previous dealings with the military. The ambassador granted CJTF-HOA access to the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, enabling the creation of a security environment amenable to increased USAID operations and contributing to a favorable view of the US among the local nomads.

Increasing the interaction between the military and USAID has the potential to facilitate greater coordination with the efforts of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). NGO participation is essential because of the resources they bring to bear. For example, CJTF-HOA has only two well-digging units while the NGO community has dozens. However, the NGOs found it difficult to operate in the Ogaden because of the lack of security, a problem only partially resolved by the CJTF-HOA presence. NGOs are often wary of any military affiliation but through the good offices of USAID, USG planning can include NGO contributions, particularly when planning humanitarian missions.

B. Hypothesis 2. The instruments of national power are not balanced, resulting in excessive reliance on the military instrument.

This condition persists. The resources that DOD is expending to support the efforts of CJTF–HOA are significant by comparison to other USG agencies. It is due only to the ad-hoc relationships developed between the commander, CJTF–HOA, and the US ambassadors in the region that these resources are being coordinated at all across the “whole of government” US efforts in the region.

C. Hypothesis 3. There is imbalance within the military instrument as well

This condition persists. Such organizations as the “Seabees” (the construction battalions), civil affairs teams, and well-digging units are in high demand but are still too few in number. They remain, for the most part, in the Reserve components but they constitute the main effort in CJTF–HOA.

There is no evidence to suggest that DOD needs to increase its civil affairs and humanitarian assistance capabilities, only that the USG should increase its capability and then orchestrate its efforts across relevant USG departments and agencies involved.

D. Hypothesis 4. Barriers to sharing information inhibit coordination across boundaries with allies and other government agencies

This condition persists. Examples follow.

- The classification SECRET//NOFORN (NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS) remains the default classification of material sent from US Central Command (CENTCOM) to CJTF–HOA. Information thus classified cannot be shared with allies or with host-nation authorities.

- CJTF–HOA’s mission requires cross-boundary coordination with US European Command (EUCOM). (African nations align themselves differently than what the CENTCOM and EUCOM boundaries depict.) Efforts to share information with coalition partners are further complicated by two communications systems competing for Africa:
 - EUCOM product: the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Regional Information Exchange System (ERIES).
 - CENTCOM product: Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS).

Each of these systems requires additional staff work to redact classified documents for promulgation. Because of the staff burden, CENTRIXS is considered largely ineffectual, as the IDA study team observed at CJTF–HOA. The study team did not observe ERIES in operation.

CJTF–HOA accomplishments

During the time in which this study was conducted, CJTF–HOA headquarters staff included a British Army colonel who served as the senior operations officer. A great deal of effort was expended to make as much information available as possible to the Coalition staff, for example:

- the careful culling of message traffic;
- the establishment of CENTRIXS, which requires staff to redact information from other systems; and
- the hosting of several meeting venues at various classification levels.



Figure 2. Africa (Map of the Continent)



Figure 3. Horn of Africa



Figure 4. CJTF-HOA Area of Responsibility: The Horn of Africa and Seychelles




Figure 5. Kenya and Somalia




Figure 6. Eritrea and Ethiopia




Figure 7. Sudan and Yemen



Figure 8. Djibouti

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III. Results of the Case Study

Conclusions and recommendations are usually based in part on the particular national policy objectives being pursued by the USG; however, clear policy objectives for the Horn of Africa remain elusive. *Therefore, much of this section remains conditional.* Nevertheless, the IDA study team established seven major findings from the results of the case study:

- No settled conception or organizing principles exist.
- Distances are long and location matters.
- Methods of achieving unity of effort are available.
- Planning varies by agency.
- USG agencies are not geographically aligned.
- Tour lengths vary by agency.
- Cultural pre-dispositions are positive.

Each finding is presented in more detail in its own section below.

A. No settled conception or organizing principles exist

To achieve unity of effort, there should be a strategy and a plan for implementation for the Horn of Africa. The IDA study team could not find documentation for a “whole of government” US strategy that would compel the coordination of all USG efforts in the region of the Horn. A policy statement is needed that would provide the following:

- A unifying conception of the problem and the response.
- Clear roles and missions for each agency.
- A mechanism or process for adjudicating between USG agencies operating in the region.

There should also be a *common, useful conception of the conflict* from which flows a *dominant organizing principle* that allows for a clear delineation of supported and supporting roles in agency missions. Examples of considerations:

- Is the conflict about killing or capturing specific terrorists in the Horn, with *manhunt* as the organizing principle?
- Is it ultimately about dealing with the root causes of insurgency, with *economic and social development* as the organizing principle?
- Or is it ultimately a *long-term competition* over strategic resources? And if so, what would be the organizing principle for such a competition?

The original focus of the IDA case study was on CJTF–HOA and CENTCOM’s vision for its future as an interagency organization. During the IDA study team’s visit, CJTF–HOA sent the plan for a Combined Joint Interagency Task Force (CJIATF) to CENTCOM headquarters for consideration. It was also at this time that the study team started its analysis of the value of the investment in CJTF–HOA at the request of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy).⁴ As the IDA study team considered the organizing principles evident in the region, at least three constructs emerged for CJTF–HOA:

- **CJTF–HOA as part of CENTCOM.** The value of CJTF–HOA is in being CENTCOM’s left flank, specifically in reference to the war in Iraq.

⁴ The cost and value of CJTF–HOA activities are discussed in more detail in Appendix A.

- **CJTF–HOA as military instrument of USG in the Horn of Africa.** From the perspective of other USG agencies, the value of CJTF–HOA is in its contributions to the USG effort in the Horn, as much as or even more than CENTCOM’s effort in Iraq.
- **CJTF–HOA as military instrument of USG in Africa.** For other interviewees, the value of CJTF–HOA is determined in the context of USG efforts in continental or sub-Saharan Africa.

Each construct is discussed in more detail in the following sections.

Construct 1: CJTF–HOA as part of CENTCOM

CJTF–HOA as CENTCOM’s left flank

If the principal value of CJTF–HOA is as CENTCOM’s left flank, with the mission of assuming US military responsibilities in the Horn to allow CENTCOM to concentrate its attention on Iraq and Afghanistan, then:

- In the study team’s view, CJTF–HOA and Camp Lemonier are effective, properly resourced, and appropriately organized for this purpose, given their current tasking, and both are well positioned to accept follow-on forces should the need arise.

CJTF–HOA relative to Iraq

If the principal value of CJTF–HOA is determined relative to the war in Iraq, and the primary purpose of CJTF–HOA is to interdict or otherwise prevent the flow of humans, weapons, and supplies along the north-south axis leading from Somalia and Sudan across to Yemen and to Iraq, then:

- In the view of the IDA study team, consideration should be given to placing Combined Task Force 50, which is operating under the Naval component of Central Command (NAVCENTCOM) in the Horn of Africa littorals, under the operational control of CJTF–HOA.

Construct 2: CJTF–HOA as military instrument of USG in Horn of Africa

If the principal value of CJTF–HOA is as an integral part of USG efforts in the Horn of Africa, then its purpose is to provide additional regional military capability to US ambassadors and regional US organizations such as USAID as they implement USG policies and programs. Evidence uncovered by the IDA study team revealed a large potential for CJTF–HOA to function well in this capacity. For example, CJTF–HOA uses its resources to bring together all chiefs of mission, deputy chiefs of mission, and African military planners in the region.

- The “regionalizing” effects of CJTF–HOA (e.g., conferences, memoranda of agreements), though not often cited by the command, were frequently hailed by civilian agencies of USG.⁵
- The recognition by USG civilian agencies, operating in the field, of the “regionalizing” effect of CJTF–HOA and their approval of the notion of coordinating efforts across the Horn suggests the need for better orchestration of US efforts across the “whole of the USG” in the region.

Construct 3: CJTF–HOA as military instrument of USG in Africa

During the course of this study, the commander, CJTF–HOA, hosted a “cross-boundary” conference in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to coordinate efforts that cut across the Areas of Responsibility (AORs) of Central, European, and Pacific Commands. The conference was driven largely by the need to coordinate an exercise involving Anglophone⁶ nations in East Africa whose own boundaries cross

⁵ Interviewees from civilian agencies and country team members.

⁶ An English-speaking population, especially in a country where two or more languages are spoken (paraphrased from Merriam-Webster Third International Dictionary, CD-ROM). In this region, these are nations that were either part of the British Empire or in its area of influence.

those of the three US combatant commands. The purpose of the exercise was to train the respective African militaries to respond to a natural disaster. (This is indicative of much of CJTF-HOA's focus.) Based on the study team's observations, the preponderance of CJTF-HOA activity is oriented towards *development, humanitarian assistance, and crisis response*. Also clear is the need to coordinate USG efforts beyond the confines of CJTF-HOA's boundaries to the rest of Africa.

If the USG were to establish a military command with responsibility for the entire continent, a significant counterpart would be the African Union. The African Union is an important political entity in need of greatly increasing its capacity to affect events on the continent. Taking into consideration current and potential future geopolitics, the IDA study team recommends the following:

- The African Union has identified five regions—north, south, east, west, and central. To pursue developmental purposes on the continent, the USG organization should align with the regional composition of the Africa Union.
- Any US regional command would be best situated close enough to the African Union, now headquartered in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, to facilitate daily and personal coordination.
- With the US military headquarters in Addis Ababa, subordinate components or task forces could be situated in the remaining four African Union regions.
- Rather than a CJTF, a unified or subordinate unified combatant command would be a better match for the great expanse of the African continent.
- The military headquarters could be in Stuttgart, Germany, where a large staff and facilities already exist for long, accompanied tours, but at the loss of a critically important presence on the African continent (this according to experienced USG personnel working in the Horn).

To some interviewees, establishing a combatant command in Africa puts too much emphasis on the military arm of US foreign policy, which may not be appropriate on a continent where the focus is more appropriately oriented on development. *In response to this objection, the IDA study team suggests that USAID lead an orchestrated USG effort on the continent of Africa.* Assuming development is the organizing principle, a less-evident military presence could support this larger USG effort. As an example of a civilian agency taking the lead, the United Kingdom has designated its Department for International Development (DFID), the equivalent to USAID, as the lead agency for its diplomatic and military departments in Africa.⁷

B. Methods of achieving unity of effort are available

Two methods are currently in use to achieve USG interagency unity of effort in the Horn of Africa:

- **Country teams.** The dominant, traditional method is bilateral and is represented by the several country teams headed by a chief of mission.
- **Regional military command.** This is a less developed, ad hoc method augmented at some point with liaison officers from USG agencies.

Two other methods were also considered:

- **Interagency task force.** Similar to the second method (regional military command), with representatives from each USG agency who possess decision-making authority.
- **Regional USG headquarters.** With authority over all agencies.

⁷ *The Africa Conflict Prevention Pool: A Joint UK Government Approach to Preventing and Reducing Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Department for International Development, September 2004. Signed by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Secretary of State for International Development, Secretary of State for Defence, and Chief Secretary to the Treasury. The relevant documents are available at www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/acppinfodoc.pdf and www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/global-conflict-prevention-pool.pdf.

We discuss each method in detail in the following sections.

Country teams at US embassies

Short of violating national sovereignty, there is only one way to execute programs in foreign countries: through diplomatic channels based on the bilateral relationship between the USG and the sovereign state in question. The programs carried out by USG agencies are coordinated through the US ambassador and the country team. The country team provides the foundation for the USG response.

Military efforts within each country, including Theater Security Cooperation and Security Assistance, are coordinated through DOD officers assigned to each embassy who report to the chief of mission. Members of the embassy staff usually have a long-term presence in the region, generally two- to three-year tours. As a result, embassy staff members generally possess a stronger understanding of regional culture, languages, and issues than members of DOD, with the exception of Foreign Area Officers.

In general, USG officials operating under this method are focused on the issues of the country where they are currently assigned, and are hard pressed to do any regional coordination.

Regional military command

CJTF-HOA envisions itself making the transition to a CJIATF, a regional military command augmented by liaison officers from other USG agencies. *This approach is already underway.* Liaison officers from non-DoD agencies are assigned to CJTF-HOA to improve interagency coordination. In addition, CJTF-HOA liaison officers have been assigned to embassies in the region.

Benefits

- A CJIATF could effectively coordinate DOD resources with other USG efforts across the Horn of Africa. These efforts would be coordinated regionally and implemented through the country teams.

- A CJIATF would facilitate the personal relationships, concurrent planning, and coordinated resource allocation necessary to orchestrate effectively the implementation of USG policies and programs.

Drawbacks

- A CJIATF is a military command with representatives from other agencies. If these representatives do not have decision-making or resource-commitment authority, then the effects of this model are muted.
- Putting a civilian in charge of the CJIATF will not change the basic shortcoming of this approach.
- Scaling up the CJIATF to a combatant command for continental Africa, augmented by a joint interagency coordinating group (JIACG), would only scale up both the strengths and weaknesses of the CJIATF.

A “true” interagency task force

A method not yet seen in Africa is a true interagency task force along the lines of the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South, located in Key West, Florida, and subordinated to US Southern Command. Like other JIATFs, it has coordinating responsibilities with the following:

- allies, partner nations, and US embassies;
- the Northern, Pacific, and European Commands;
- the Customs and Border Patrol and the US Coast Guard of the Department of Homeland Security; and
- the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Drug Enforcement Administration of the Justice Department.

JIATF South is unique—it has operational capabilities provided by many agencies of government, all of whom have ceded decision-making authority to their own agency personnel stationed in Key West. Appendix C contains a de-

scription of JIATF South, an example of how the USG has implemented the JIATF concept.

Regional USG headquarters

The fourth method, a regional USG headquarters with authority over all other agencies, appears to be completely outside current USG capacity. This method would require national security reform at the highest levels.

C. USG agencies are not geographically aligned

The IDA study team's analysis suggests that taking the first step of just coordinating the implementation of USG policies and programs across the Horn within existing authorities would increase the effectiveness of those efforts.

- One aspect of this coordination might necessitate aligning the geographic perspectives of all USG agencies.
- Additionally, there is a need to *geographically align the USG view of Africa* with the Africans' own view of their continent, i.e., the African Union alignment. This would facilitate greater coordination within a region among USG agencies, between the USG and the Africans, and between the USG and coalition partners who have accepted the African Union alignment.⁸

⁸ As an aside, the country teams operate within a particular country and, for the most part, function already with that perspective. The Nairobi mission (Kenya) is an exception to this. Because of the reduced US diplomatic presence in Sudan and no formal relations with Somalia, the Nairobi mission has Foreign Service officers assigned to "watch" these areas. Additionally, a regionally focused US HIV/AIDS effort is headquartered in Nairobi as the regional USAID office.

D. Cultural pre-dispositions are positive

USG personnel with long experience in the Horn of Africa believe that the vast majority of *sub-Saharan Africans are culturally pre-disposed to resist extremist ideology*. USG efforts focused on development can build on and strengthen this predisposition by

- encouraging increased capacity within existing societal and governmental institutions and
- responding generally with humanitarian assistance as required.

Even given the present situation in Somalia, experienced personnel believe the Somalis are predisposed against militant Islam.



Source: CIA World Factbook, accessed 16 March 2007.

Figure 9. Strategic Seam Along the Gulf of Aden

between the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, beside lines of *cultural predisposition*. CJTF–HOA’s Joint Operating Area (JOA) spans that seam (see **Figure 9**, above).

In contrast, experienced USG personnel in the region believe that *in Yemen there is a latent pre-disposition toward radicalism* in a significant percentage of the population. USG efforts that are focused on good governance and humanitarian assistance would further US interests—but there should be no expectation that the result would be a predisposition to resist radical Islam. These differing predispositions toward radical Islam create a *strategic seam* along the Gulf of Aden,

E. Distances are long and location matters

As previously discussed, Camp Lemonier in Djibouti offers certain advantages owing to geography, but the same geography also imposes costs. One of the most advantageous aspects of Djibouti is its proximity to important sea lines of communication, its location vis-à-vis the Persian Gulf, and Djibouti's deep-water port. The distance required to travel throughout the JOA from Djibouti can be significant, which is particularly important when considering personnel recovery operations.

- Nairobi would better serve as a location for CJTF-HOA staff because of the preeminence of the US embassy in Kenya, the presence of a regional USAID headquarters, and the presence of UN headquarters.
- However, Addis Ababa is a better location for developing relations with African organizations, specifically the African Union.
- Of course, the value of any strategic location depends largely on the overarching strategy it is designed to support—and *that strategy is still unclear*.
- The temporary assignment of military personnel beyond the NSDD-38 agreement in any foreign country is done through the auspices of the chief of mission in that country. In general, the default response from any chief of mission regarding increased military presence is a desire to “keep the footprint small.” The discussion typically centers around NSDD-38⁹ and, while not overtly stated, reflects concerns about chain of authority and resource allocation. Agency principals in Washington decide the specifics of NSDD-38, including agreed-upon resource commitments in the form of people and funds.

⁹ National Security Decision Directive-38, *Staffing at Diplomatic Missions and Their Overseas Constituent Posts*, 2 June 1982, “gives the Chief of Mission (COM) control of the size, composition, and mandate of overseas full-time mission staffing for all U.S. Government agencies.” US Department of State, <http://www.state.gov/m/r/nsdd/>, accessed, 26 April 2007.

- The headquarters of CJTF–HOA and its operational forces need not be collocated. However, Djibouti will likely remain one of the few locations where military forces can be housed in a reasonably secure environment without meaningful political resistance from within the host-nation.

F. Planning varies by agency

One way to facilitate unity of effort is through the planning process. For now, each agency plans separately, plans for different purposes, plans according to different funding authorities, and plans to achieve effects in different time-frames. For example:

- The US State Department develops its Mission Performance Plans annually, country by country, in the embassies. Regional coordination occurs in Washington, DC, at the regional bureau.
- Likewise, USAID formulates its regional strategies in Washington, and USAID personnel who are forward deployed in Africa are there to implement those plans. Different from most other USG agencies, including DOD, USAID has a distant (ten- to fifteen-year) planning horizon.

CJTF–HOA has a continuous planning process with a regional orientation, focused very much on the near term. Planning is done in the field from a regional perspective and then submitted to higher headquarters for coordination. The long-term, development-oriented planning horizon of USAID was initially a source of friction with CJTF–HOA. While wary of short-term views, USAID personnel were able to plan and work alongside their CJTF–HOA counterparts who were better suited for limited and quick reactions to emerging development or humanitarian issues.

Based on its observations, the IDA study team concluded that to achieve a coordinated USG approach, concurrent planning should occur across all the concerned agencies, starting with agency personnel deployed to the field. The

natural tension that exists between organizations with differing objectives and authorities can be eased both in the field and in Washington because of the relationships developed in the course of planning.

G. Tour lengths vary by agency

The importance of personal relationships across USG agencies cannot be overemphasized. The short tour lengths of personnel assigned to CJTF-HOA hamper efforts to coordinate activity in the region. Frequent personnel turnovers impede the development of these relationships, hamstringing efforts to coordinate across USG agencies. Some of the US embassy staff, with decades of regional experience, commented on the deleterious effects that short tour-lengths of CJTF-HOA personnel have had within the USG and on CJTF-HOA relationships with African governments and militaries:

- To be effective until the end of the tour, and to build lasting relationships based on trust, personnel should live in the region for years, not months.
- Some embassy staff members complained of having to “reinvent the wheel” each time turnover occurs at CJTF-HOA. They suggested that staggered, individual rotation of the principal military staff would be strongly preferred to turnover of the entire staff. Currently, the principal positions on the CJTF-HOA staff are turned over *en masse*.
- Personnel with long experience in the region are convinced that the best way to improve performance is for military personnel to spend significant time in the region with their families, as the security situation allows.

If CJTF-HOA were to make the transition to a CJIATF-type organization, then the IDA study team would recommend the following:

- Assign principal staff members to the region for two or three years, accompanied by their families if possible. They should have significant cultural and linguistic training prior to their assignment.

- Locate permanently assigned staff where they could effectively coordinate with other USG agencies and important African organizations. (Nairobi is a suitable site for maintaining coordination within the USG, but it is less suitable for coordination with African organizations because of their locations in Addis Ababa. See **Figure 10** below for examples of the air distances between Djibouti, Addis Ababa, and Kenya.



Source: CIA World Factbook, accessed 16 March 2007.

The sites shown here are only examples of air distances.

From	To	Miles	Kilometers
Djibouti	Addis Ababa	347	558
Djibouti	Nairobi	1002	1613
Addis Ababa	Nairobi	722	1162

Figure 10. Examples of Air Distances Among Coordination Sites

IV. Summary

Ongoing USG operations in the Horn of Africa provide an excellent laboratory to study how the USG is coordinating its efforts in development-oriented operations. The presence of country teams at each US embassy, with their well-established patterns for interagency coordination and operating in parallel with a regional military command, provides a unique opportunity for finding better ways to coordinate the efforts of USG agencies charged with implementing US policies and programs abroad. *This is a unique opportunity for the USG to learn how to better organize itself for the twenty-first century as it learns to counter a growing global insurgency by dynamically applying all instruments of national power across the spectrum of conflict.*

As stated in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review,

“[s]olutions developed in the field often have applicability to inter-agency cooperation at the strategic and policy levels. Long experience shows that operators....collaborate closely when faced with challenges in the field.”

The IDA study team observed just this sort of developing collaboration in the Horn of Africa.

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Appendices

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Appendix A. Cost and Value of Achieving Effects in the Horn of Africa

During the same timeframe as the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) case study of US Government (USG) operations in the Horn of Africa, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy posed a question outside the study's original set of research hypotheses—questions:

*Were the effects of CJTF-HOA operations from Camp Lemonier worth the costs?*¹

The IDA study team approximated the costs (see Section A) and identified and qualitatively described the effects (i.e., benefits and drawbacks) (see Section B). This analysis was performed with the understanding that the *value* of the effects could be determined only by applying the *political judgment* of elected or appointed officials or by comparing the *effects* to *policy objectives* established by the same group. The findings on cost effectiveness are in Section C.

A. The Costs

The costs of CJTF-HOA are difficult to separate from the costs of Camp Lemonier. CJTF-HOA is but one (albeit the largest one) of several tenants at Camp Lemonier. Certainly, the CJTF is responsible for a considerable share of the costs of operating the camp, but were the CJTF removed or relocated, *a substantial portion of the costs associated with Camp Lemonier would continue in order to support the remaining tenants.* The resulting savings would be modest.

¹ CJTF-HOA, Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa.

Camp Lemonier

Components	Cost in Millions (US\$)
KBR ¹ Contract Support	90.0
Land lease	30.0
Other contract support ²	15.8
Food	10.6
Supplies, Materials & Travel	5.4
Total operating costs	151.8

¹ Kellogg, Brown & Root.
² Includes communications support, payroll for Djiboutian employees, airport landing fees, etc.

During the IDA study, the FY06 land lease costs for Camp Lemonier began at \$15 million but increased to \$30 million when a new agreement was signed with the government of Djibouti. Examples of other contract support are \$840,000 for airport-landing fees, \$1.28 million to purchase locally generated electricity, and \$5.8 million (which includes government of Djibouti management overhead costs) to employ 735 locals as base support staff. The total cost of operating Camp Lemonier, including all support to tenants, is approximately \$151.8 million. (See **Table A-1**, above, for a depiction of these numbers.)

Horn of Africa

Support costs associated with the Camp were difficult to isolate but were estimated by prorating Camp costs to CJTF-HOA that were based on the percentage of the population assigned specifically to the CJTF. (See **Table A-2**, right, for a breakout of the numbers.)

Cost Component	Estimated Cost in Millions (US\$)
CJTF-HOA staff (21.6% of Camp population)	29.6
Units OPCON to CJTF-HOA (19% of Camp population)	25.9
Units TACON to CJTF-HOA (15.4% of Camp population)	21.1
CJTF-HOA's share of Camp Lemonier costs (56% of Camp costs)	76.6

OPCON – Operational Control
TACON – Tactical Control

Table A-3. Total Costs of CJTF-HOA (Operations and Support)	
Cost Component	Estimated Cost in Millions (US\$)
CJTF-HOA budget	32.5
Prorated CJTF-HOA Camp costs	76.6
Total CJTF-HOA costs	109.1

Table A-3, left, depicts the total CJTF-HOA costs as the sum of its budget plus its prorated portion of Camp Lemonier costs for FY06. The CJTF-HOA costs do not include the costs of flight hours used in support of the CJTF.

Neither do they include the costs of entitlement pay (e.g., hazardous duty, family separation allowance) for personnel deployed to the area of responsibility of US Central Command (CENTCOM).

Note: In the Horn of Africa during FY06, CJTF-HOA spent \$11.3 million on humanitarian aid and civil affairs efforts. CJTF-HOA’s total budget estimate is \$32.5 million, which includes \$9.4 million in Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid, and \$1.9 million in Humanitarian and Civic Assistance. It does not include the cost of support provided by Camp Lemonier. **Figure A-1**, below, is an overhead photo of containerized living units at the Camp Lemonier expansion site.²



Figure A-1. Camp Lemonier Expansion, Overhead Photo

² US Navy, Camp Lemonier expansion site, photo by Chief Mass Communication Specialist Eric A. Clement, <http://www.hoa.centcom.mil/images/Lg/20070123-002.jpg>, accessed 16 March 2007.

B. The Effects

Djibouti sits astride a strategic sea line of communication and at the “choke point” (*Bab al Mandab*) between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This is a choke point relative not only to the Global War on Terror (GWOT) but to the global economy as well. Djibouti lies along an historic north-south trade route that supports legal and illegal flows of people and goods. According to European and Central Command planners, the coast of Somalia has surpassed the Malaccan Strait as the most dangerous area of the world because of piracy. At this *strategic location*, Djibouti provides a reasonably benign security environment and an important seaport and airport from which to base US military operations.

USG agency personnel interviewed in the Horn of Africa region generally agreed that CJTF-HOA provides additional value to USG operations in the region. The values-added that they cited fall into seven categories:

- CJTF-HOA provides a military forward *presence* in the region for strategic purposes in the execution of the GWOT.
- Its presence provides *visibility*, both for the United States into the region, and for the region’s people into the United States.
- The armed security provided by CJTF-HOA allows *access* to specific areas that would be otherwise inaccessible to other USG agency personnel.
- CJTF-HOA provides a means and venue to *train* US and regional military personnel.
- CJTF-HOA brings additional *resources* to the region.
- As a regionally focused USG entity, CJTF-HOA facilitates dialogue and coordination between individual countries and international agencies to promote *regionalization* of USG action.
- Finally, CJTF-HOA facilitates the institution of *good governance* in the Horn of Africa region.

Each category is discussed in detail in the following sections.

CJTF-HOA provides a military forward **presence** in the region for strategic purposes in the execution of the GWOT


Forward deployed headquarters and forces at Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, provide the United States with presence adjacent to strategic lines of communication. Camp Lemonier provides a forward staging base for ongoing operations in the ungoverned spaces of the region. CJTF-HOA presence at the Camp provides communications for forces operating across the region and a mechanism for local intelligence collection. The command and control capability—command, staff, and equipment—provides an expandable base to accommodate larger-scale operations, if required.

CJTF-HOA presence provides **visibility**, both for the United States into the region, and for the region's people into the United States

An intangible result of physical presence in the Horn of Africa is visibility. If the local populations see Americans in a positive light, and if Americans gain a greater understanding of local populations, the opportunity for thwarting the interests of radicals improves. Many of the people in the region are pastoralist and nomadic. Communication, for the most part, spreads by word of mouth—but it spreads rapidly. *Presence and interaction are essential to that form of communication.*

Humanitarian missions—for example, digging wells and rehabilitating clinics and schools—are visible, well received, and have a positive effect on local opinion. This is particularly true, according to US Agency for International Development (USAID) personnel, in remote regions of Ethiopia with largely Muslim populations of Somali descent. Similar reports come from regions of Yemen. These interactions are invaluable in the long term, yet sometimes they are not possible without the access provided by the security that comes with military presence.

The armed security provided by CJTF-HOA allows **access** to specific areas that would be otherwise inaccessible to other USG agency personnel



Source: CIA World Factbook, Ethiopia

Figure A-2. Yemen and the Ogaden

security. CJTF-HOA enables access for USAID, among other organizations, to areas not otherwise accessible because of security concerns. In Yemen and in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia (see **Figure A-2**, above), US military presence has facilitated access to locales where even military or police forces of the host nation are not welcome.

CJTF-HOA provides a means and venue to **train** US and regional military personnel

CJTF-HOA and Camp Lemonier facilitate training for host-nation counterterrorism and antiterrorism units.³ Through military-to-military contact, relationships develop and the professionalism of host nation forces improves.

³ **Antiterrorism** (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts); **counterterrorism** (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism). Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 12 April 2001 (as amended through 22 March 2007), US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2007.

With sufficient training, host nations can provide security in their own regions, allowing US security forces to move elsewhere. Non-military agencies of the USG and non-government organizations will be able to expand their operating areas and delivery systems.

CJTF-HOA brings additional resources to the region

The payments for land lease, airport landing fees, and electricity supplied to CJTF-HOA all go into the local Djiboutian economy. Camp Lemonier employs several hundred locals. Estimates by the locals interviewed, and confirmed by US officials familiar with the local class structure, are that each Djiboutian employee may support as many as thirty-five family members.

US humanitarian assistance builds local infrastructure directly and indirectly: for example, whenever possible, materials and services are purchased locally for construction projects in the region. One non-governmental organization director who lives and works in Djibouti City noted that home improvement projects were appearing in Djibouti's Balballa district, an impoverished urban area largely under Saudi-funded Wahabi influence. He credited the increased economic activity to employment provided by the US presence at Camp Lemonier.

As a regionally focused USG entity, CJTF-HOA facilitates dialogue and coordination between individual countries as well as international agencies to promote **regionalization** of USG action

Current US State Department structure provides a country-by-country approach. The chief of mission and the country team certainly are aware of the effects of their actions on neighboring countries, but their responsibilities are usually for a single country. The ambassador receives general guidance through the country desk officer at the African Regional Bureau of the US State Department, but the ambassador is the direct representative of the president in the assigned country.

CJTF-HOA has had the effect of “regionalizing” the views of embassy staffs by traveling through the region and by hosting regional meetings. The CJTF commander and staff routinely meet with country team members and other agency staffs to build relationships and coordinate efforts. Embassy staff elements from each country team in the region attend conferences hosted by CJTF-HOA, enabling them to coordinate with their peers from other country teams and with their counterparts on the CJTF-HOA staff. In addition, CJTF-HOA meets with host-nation militaries at planning conferences, and has hosted a conference for the region’s militaries to help facilitate cooperation between the African militaries in the region. The CJTF also facilitated an all-faith meeting of religious leaders, providing a neutral environment for dialogue.

CJTF-HOA facilitates the institution of **good governance** in the Horn of Africa region

Both the *National Security Strategy* and the *National Military Strategy* describe good governance as a critical need and as a method of combating terrorism and extremism.⁴ In the book *East Africa and the Horn*, good governance is described as a civil society based upon five tenets.⁵ “Security” is the tenet that enables the other four:

1. The rule of law
2. Popular political efficacy
3. Economic opportunity
4. Infrastructure

See **Figure A-3** on the next page for a depiction of the five tenets.

⁴ The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, Washington, DC, March 2006, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/>, accessed 10 July 2007. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *The National Military Strategy of the United States of America*, unclassified version, Washington, DC, 2004, p. 5, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf>, accessed 05 July 2007.

⁵ Dorina A. Bekoe, ed., *East Africa and the Horn: Confronting Challenges to Good Governance* (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, CO, 2006).



Figure A-3. Good Governance: The Tenets of Civil Society

Beyond security, CJTF-HOA has the most influence on *economic opportunity* and *infrastructure*. The CJTF-HOA staff has documentation on literally hundreds of civil–military operations that have improved the infrastructure in the region, ranging from water wells to schools and clinics. These projects are conducted in cooperation with the country teams and the host nations. The effect of these projects is both immediate and generational: for example, a new well can provide water for thirty to fifty years.

C. Cost Effectiveness

The question of whether the effects of CJTF-HOA are worth their costs cannot be answered without considering *stated policy objectives*. The IDA study team can approximate the costs and can identify and qualitatively describe the effects. However, the *value* of the effects can be determined only by applying the political judgment of elected and appointed USG officials or by comparing the effects to policy objectives established by the same.

However, one of the results of the IDA study team’s research and field interviews was that three *constructs* (or operational concepts) became apparent through which the value of CJTF-HOA could be calculated:

- **CJTF–HOA as part of CENTCOM.** CJTF–HOA’s value is as CENTCOM’s left flank, specifically determined in reference to the war in Iraq.
- **CJTF–HOA as military instrument of USG in HOA.** From the perspective of other USG agencies, CJTF–HOA’s value is its

contributions to the USG effort in the Horn of Africa as much as or more than CENTCOM's effort in Iraq.

- **CJTF–HOA as military instrument of USG in Africa.** For others interviewed by the study team, the value of CJTF–HOA is determined in the context of USG efforts in continental or sub-Saharan Africa.

(These constructs were previously discussed in Chapter III in the main body of this paper.)

Appendix B. Briefing: Case Study of USG Operations in the Horn of Africa

Slide 1



Institute for Defense Analyses

4850 Mark Center Drive • Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1882

– Orchestrating the Instruments of National Power –



Case Study
of
USG Operations
in the
Horn of Africa

19 January 2007

Institute for Defense Analyses
Joint Advanced Warfighting Program – Analytical Projects Office (JAWP/APO)

Appendix B Slide-1

Slide 2

Introduction**Premise****Effective USG response to National Security issues requires the orchestration of all instruments of national power:**

Current USG operations in the Horn of Africa involve every agency of government to include a significant US military presence in Djibouti with plans to establish Africa Command (AFRICOM). In addition, growing Islamic influence characterized by the encroachment of extremist Islam into traditional African culture, the instability of regional governments and the endemic poverty in the region combine threaten US interests in the region. Of particular note, USG and coalition efforts are occurring in a pre-conflict, capacity-building security situation, not in a post-conflict, reconstruction security situation.

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If the USG (US Government) wants to understand how best to address the threats of the twenty-first century, the Horn of Africa provides an opportunity to learn. In an earlier effort (2003–2004), research staff members from the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) interviewed the principals and deputies of most USG departments and agencies involved in the region, and identified some “lessons learned” based on those interviews.

One clear “lesson learned” from these interviews: There is no real adjudication of agency disputes short of the president of the United States.

Slide 3



Lessons Learned – Interviews with Senior Officials

Hypotheses for HOA Case Study

- No useful shared concept of the national security issue
- Effective response requires orchestration of all instruments of national power
- Competing concepts prevent effective orchestration
- No policy statement assigns clear roles and missions
- USG agency integration and synchronization is inadequate
- Instruments of US national power are not balanced
 - Imbalance within the military instrument
- Barriers to sharing information inhibits coordination

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HOA – Horn of Africa

As the Global War on Terror unfolded, each agency and department brought its capabilities and know-how to the fight. As resources have allowed, they all have adapted to the new national security environment, to include adding capability. By and large, the tools needed to engage in the twenty-first century exist within the USG and certainly within the combined efforts of the USG and allies.

The solution involves organizing the existing capability as much as it does adapting or adding capability.

Slide 4



Common Findings*

- National Security issues are too complex for the current scope of the NSC
- NSC is not optimized to coordinate and implement strategy at the operational (regional/sub-regional) level
- There is widespread belief that there is a need for watershed legislation (e.g., National Security Reform Act of 2008)
- Executive agencies need an increased ability to reallocate resources to address emerging issues
- Need to improve vertical and horizontal integration within and across departments and agencies
- Most agencies lack a detailed planning culture
- "Lead agency" – requires Presidential intervention to resolve differences
- Need greater pre-conflict focus
 - CSIS, *Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Part I*; Donley, "Rethinking the Interagency System"; Mills, "All Elements of National Power"; DSB, "Transition to and from Hostilities"; 9/11 Commission Report; Rast, *Interagency Fratricide*; Naler, "Are We Ready for an Interagency Combatant Command"; Stratman, "Orchestrating Instruments of Power for Nationbuilding."


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Others have come to the same conclusions.

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This model is based on findings of previous studies, including observations of “operator collaboration in the field” in the Horn of Africa. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) calls it the “missing middle”; others call it the “gap” or the “space.”

What we observed is that while more could be done to orchestrate the instruments of US power in Washington, more effective implementation of US programs and policies could occur today if we were to better organize ourselves in the field within a region and its subregions. We observed attempts to do just this in the field in the Horn of Africa.

Slide 6



Observations and Findings

Several themes were apparent:

- **Need an Overarching Policy**
 - Shared understanding of the conflict
 - Clearly assigned roles and missions
 - Mechanism for regional/sub-regional coordination
- **Need a Regional Perspective** to implement policy and allocate resources
- **Need Access** to gain influence, often in unsecured areas
- **Need Presence** to have influence
- **Need Resources** to have influence

Orchestrate regional USG presence to bring to bear all elements of national power

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For example, NSPD-46¹ spells out a process for the formulation of strategic policy in regards to War on Terror and assigns roles in the Washington arena—but provides no mechanism for implementation at the operational level.

¹ National Security Presidential Directive-46, War On Terrorism.

Slide 7



**Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa:
Successful Improvisation?**

Counter-terrorist → Counterinsurgency → Development

Mission: Counter threats to US interests on the Horn

- Find and interdict
- Prevent sanctuary
- Mitigate conditions that destabilize

Implied task: Integrate wider US resources in region

Result: burgeoning regionalization

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By observing the ongoing evolution of CJTF-HOA and its relationship with other USG agencies and international partners in the region, one may find enduring principles that will allow the USG to better orchestrate the instruments of national power.

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Interagency Cooperation: Ad Hoc

- COCOM cross-boundary issues
 - Prevent “falling through the cracks”
- CJTF and USAID
 - Marriage of convenience
- Resource mismatch
 - Evolving mission vs. available resources
 - Medical, veterinarian, civil engineer, Seabee
 - Effort to coordinate resources across HOA
- Regional cooperation
 - Personality dependent
 - Gradual understanding of potential

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COCOM – Combatant Command

Observation: Greater orchestration = greater effect.

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Observations & Findings:
Overarching Policy

- Common assumptions regarding the **nature of the threat**
- Common **organizing principle**
 - Supported/supporting **relationships**
 - Regional **allocation of resources**
- **Authority** to conduct day-to-day operations in the theater

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Nature of the threat

Understand the cultural landscape, social networks, etc.

- AQAM (al-Qaeda and Associated Movements) or underlying conditions?
- Individual leaders of AQAM as the organizing principle?
- “Underlying conditions” as the organizing principle?
 - Most terror in Africa is domestic, supported by a competing state.
 - Help ameliorate underlying conditions, support host-nation in counter-ing domestic terror.
- US interests better secured in the long run?

Observations and Findings: Overarching Policy (Continued)

Organizing principle

The Horn of Africa: left flank in Operation Iraqi Freedom – *or* – regional organizer of USG efforts?

- Supported/supporting relationships: Unclear until organizing principle identified.
- Resources: Difficult to focus limited resources without a consensus on the organizing principle.

Authority

- Who gets to call the shots? Under what authority do they operate?
- JIATF (Joint Interagency Task Force) South history is instructive here.
 - It took 17 years – too long.
 - Authority legislated in 1994.
 - Limited resources effectively applied.
 - Cuts across multiple COCOMs, USG agencies, and international boundaries.
 - Established by the *National Interdiction Command and Control Plan* (1994), which sets forth the following:
 - Presents USG strategy (overarching policy).
 - Assigns specific roles and missions.
 - Identifies specific resources.

Slide 10



Observations and Findings: Regional Perspective

Regional coordination = increased effect (planning and execution)

- Embassy “Country Teams” coordinate USG efforts within the host-nation
 - Nairobi embassy has regional focus on some issues
- CJTF-HOA - “regionalizing” effect
 - Traveling extensively through the region
 - Hosting regional meetings
 - Interaction with host nation militaries
 - Coalition staff

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Threat does not respect borders

- Threat is extremism, disease, instability.

CJTF-HOA almost universally acknowledged for regionalizing effect.

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Observations and Findings: Access

- USAID and other organizations in the region need to operate in the most desperate areas of the region
- CJTF-HOA presence has facilitated USAID access to regions where sometimes the host-nation government is not welcomed within its own borders (Ethiopia and Yemen)
- Strategic geography

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Ogaden and Yemen: CJTF-HOA – the only Americans who could go.

Host-nation credibility (example): Government officials lead dedications of schools and are consulted in planning; the officials publicly thank the United States, which included giving the CJTF commander a goat.

Relationships: Somali nomads are informing Somalis inside Somaliland on CJTF-HOA operations in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Based on that information, the Somaliland government is requesting similar US support. The effect of US efforts is multiplied by the nomadic lifestyle of some Somali tribes in this region.

Strategic seam at the Gulf of Aden:

- Africans seem culturally pre-disposed to resist extremist ideology—must build on that!

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Observations and Findings: Presence

- CJTF-HOA permanent presence in the region is creating a security environment conducive to USAID operations in the Ogaden
- US presence in the region has a positive impact on local opinion of Americans through relationships developed over time
 - Relationships are developed with a disenfranchised population, potentially vulnerable to extremist influence
- Type and amount of USG presence should be tailored based upon the situation of the individual countries
 - US image vs. host-nation credibility

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CJTF-HOA presence: The only Americans who could go to the Ogaden in Somalia.
Local opinions of Americans: Based on USAID personnel interviews of local Muslim Somalis in the Ogaden.

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Conclusions and Recommendations: Planning Horizon

- Planning horizons vary by agency according to time, geography, mission and funding
- To gain unity of effort
 - Coordinated planning should occur across all agencies involved in the region and based on common policy
 - Planning should be performed concurrently, across the region
 - Coordinated planning can eliminate some of the natural tension between organizations with differing objectives, authorities and resources

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It is good to have all the varied agencies with differing perspectives, but they should plan together based on a common policy.

If the “whole” of USG were coordinated, collaborated, and cooperated, it is likely that existing authorities and resources would yield much more effective results.

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Conclusions and Recommendations: Presence (Tour Lengths)

- **USG personnel with long experience in the region emphasized the need to develop long-term relationships based on trust**
 - This includes relationships among USG agencies, with coalition partners, and with locals
- **Short tour lengths impede effective coordination across USG agencies and with the African nations and organizations**
 - Principal staff should be assigned to the region and replaced individually rather than rotating entire headquarters
 - Accompanied by families if security permits
 - Cultural and linguistic training

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Some in the State Department claimed that one year of language and cultural preparation and two- to three-year tours were insufficient!

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Conclusions and Recommendations: Geography

- There appears to be a strategic seam along the Gulf of Aden
 - USG personnel with long experience in the region contend that:
 - Sub-Saharan Africans seem culturally pre-disposed to resist extremist ideology. USG efforts should focus on good governance and humanitarian assistance to strengthen this predisposition
 - Yemenis appear to have a latent pre-disposition toward radicalism. USG efforts should stay focused on good governance, particularly within the security forces, and humanitarian assistance to perpetuate latency
- Align the USG view of African geography with the African view
 - Make this consistent across USG agencies

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However you align the geography, make sure mechanisms are in place to cover the seams.

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Summary

Ongoing efforts in the Horn of Africa provide an excellent **laboratory** in which the USG may gain a better understanding of how to organize itself for the 21st century

This real world "experiment" is ongoing and merits study

"Solutions developed in the field often have applicability to interagency cooperation at the strategic and policy levels. Long experience shows that operators...collaborate closely when faced with challenges in the field"

— 2006 QDR

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QDR - Quadrennial Defense Review

The security environment of the twenty-first century demands a coordinated application of all elements of national power in regions across the globe. The level of instability and conflict varies widely and necessitates a flexible, coordinated implementation of policies and programs across USG agencies.

Many studies have pointed out the difficulty of coordinating across departments and agencies of USG. The wide array of USG activities in the Horn of Africa provides an ongoing laboratory to (1) observe operations in the field and (2) learn lessons for achieving greater orchestration of the instruments of US national power.

The current situation in the Horn of Africa includes the presence of al-Qaeda; fragile local governments; the failed state of Somalia; the active and significant efforts of the Chinese; the tension caused by the encroachment of extremist Islam

Summary (Continued)

into African culture; the United Nations; and, in some capacity, practically every agency of the USG, for example, CJTF-HOA headquartered in Djibouti and organizations with regional offices such as USAID.

As stated in the 2006 QDR,

[s]olutions developed in the field often have applicability to interagency cooperation at the strategic and policy levels. Long experience shows that operators...collaborate closely when faced with challenges in the field.

We have seen this developing collaboration in the Horn of Africa.

Appendix C. JIATF South

In April 1994, the executive branch of the US Government issued the National Interdiction Command and Control Plan to strengthen interagency coordination. The plan called for creating several joint interagency task forces made up of representatives from federal agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD), the US Customs Service, and the US Coast Guard. Within the transit zone, the Department of State manages and coordinates US government efforts while DOD supports US law enforcement agencies by tracking suspected drug-trafficking activities and provides training to host nations. The US Customs Service and the US Coast Guard also provide aircraft and ships to assist in tracking and interdicting drug-trafficking activities.¹ Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South and other JIATFs continue to evolve and provide a useful model of interagency coordination, particularly the coordination of intelligence.² JIATF South is an integral part of the National Drug Control Strategy.³

Mission⁴

Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF) South:

1. Conducts counter-illicit trafficking operations, intelligence fusion, and multisensor correlation to detect, monitor, and hand off suspected illicit trafficking targets.
2. Promotes security cooperation.

¹ US Government Accounting Office, *Drug Control: U.S. Interdiction Efforts in the Caribbean Decline*, GAO/NSIAD-96-119, April 1996, <http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96119.pdf>, accessed 10 July 2007, p. 1.

² A good unclassified description of the intelligence coordination efforts is found in the US Government Accounting Office's *Drug Control: An Overview of U.S. Counterdrug Intelligence Activities*, GAO/NSIAD-98-142, June 1998, <http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98142.pdf>, accessed 10 July 2007.

³ The White House, *National Drug Control Strategy*, February 2007, <http://www.whitehouse-drugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs07/ndcs07.pdf>, accessed 10 July 2007, p. 41.

⁴ Mission statement from JIATF South website, <http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/cg/mission.htm>, accessed 27 June 2007.

3. Coordinates country team and partner nation initiatives in order to defeat the flow of illicit traffic.

Composition

Agencies⁵ with operational personnel embedded in the JIATF South team include:

- Department of Defense (all Services)
- Department of Homeland Security (Coast Guard; Customs and Border Protection)
- Department of Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation)
- National Security Agency
- Defense Intelligence Agency
- Central Intelligence Agency
- National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
- National Reconnaissance Office

International partners include:

- Representatives of the air forces of the following countries: Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.
- Representatives of the navies of the following countries: Colombia, France, El Salvador, Mexico, and United Kingdom.
- A representative from the Brazilian Intelligence Agency.

Extracts below are paraphrased from Richard M. Yateman's "JIATF-South: Blueprint for Success," *Joint Forces Quarterly* Issue 42, 3rd Quarter 2006. Downloaded from www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/4212.pdf.

JIATF-S serves as a model that other interagency organizations can tailor to their specific goals. For example, an interagency effort to track military equipment destined for terrorist organizations could include individuals

⁵ See the list of Services and agencies at the bottom of the JIATF South website, <http://www.jiatfs.southcom.mil/>, accessed 27 June 2007.

from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; Departments of Defense and Homeland Security; and Federal Bureau of Investigation.

For task force participants to feel connected to results, they must be part of the command. Within the JIATF-S organizational structure, representatives from Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice, along with US Intelligence Community liaisons and international partners, work as one team. Interagency personnel are fully integrated within the command structure and serve in key leadership positions. This integration promotes trust and facilitates the sharing of law enforcement investigative information, which is critical for any intelligence-driven organization.

The top command structure demonstrates total integration, with the Director being a Coast Guard rear admiral and the Vice Director coming from Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Integration also exists through the lower levels of the command: both the Directors for Intelligence and Operations are military officers, but their Deputies are from (1) Drug Enforcement Agency and (2) Customs and Border Protection. Intelligence analysts from the Drug Enforcement Agency, Customs and Border Protection, and Federal Bureau of Investigation are located in the Joint Intelligence Operations Center to ensure that law enforcement agencies are involved in daily operations and that information is not stovepiped.

On the operations watch floor, it is not uncommon to see a CBP agent serving as command duty officer, an Air Force captain as the intelligence watch officer, a Coast Guard operations specialist as the intelligence watch assistant, and a Navy lieutenant as the tactical action officer. This diversity of skills boosts the credibility of the organization. For instance, if DEA agents have concerns about sharing sensitive information with allied military partners, they have a certain level of confidence that the DEA Deputy Director for Intelligence will understand those concerns.

JIATF-S incorporates a wide range of governmental and international organizations in addition to those previously mentioned. The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and liaison officers from the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Spain, and a host of Latin American countries all play an important role in intelligence, operations, and planning.

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Appendix E. Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFRICOM	Africa Command
AOR	Area of Responsibility
AQAM	Al-Qaeda and Associated Movements
CBP	Customs and Border Protection
CENTCOM	Central Command
CENTRIXS	Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJIATF	Combined Joint Interagency Task Force
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa
CMO	civil–military operations
COCOM	combatant commander
Col	colonel
COM	Chief of Mission
CSIS	Center for Strategic & International Studies
DC	District of Columbia
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIME	diplomatic, informational, military, economic
DOD	Department of Defense
DOJ	Department of Justice
DSB	Defense Science Board
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ERIES	Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Regional Information Exchange System
EUCOM	European Command

FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FY	fiscal year
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HIV/AIDS	human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immune deficiency syndrome
HOA	Horn of Africa
IDA	Institute for Defense Analyses
JAWP	Joint Advanced Warfighting Program
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command
JIACG	Joint Interagency Coordinating Group
JIATF	Joint Interagency Task Force
JIATF-S	Joint Interagency Task Force South
JOA	Joint Operations Area
KBR	Kellog, Brown & Root
LTC	lieutenant colonel
MIDLIFE	military, informational, diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and economic
MSgt	master sergeant
NAVCENTCOM	Naval component of the United States Central Command
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO	non-governmental organization
NOFORN	Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
OPCON	operational control
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense

QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
TACON	tactical control
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USA	United States Army
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
USMC	United States Marine Corps

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14. ABSTRACT The encroachment of extremist Islam into traditional African culture, the instability of regional governments, and the endemic poverty in the region are threatening the interests of the United States in the Horn of Africa region. OSD asked IDA to identify lessons from US interagency efforts in the Horn and to visit selected US commands and State Department country teams to explore national security challenges and interagency collaboration processes. In earlier interviews with senior US Government officials regarding the Global War on Terrorism, important weaknesses in the interagency process were uncovered. These findings were used as hypotheses for the case study in this paper and tested for their applicability in the field. Many of the weaknesses evident at the national level in the interagency process are likewise evident in the field and they are impeding the effective implementation of US policy and programs.					
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