

TALKING PAPER FOR USE AT THE WASHINGTON SPECIAL ACTIONS GROUP MEETING  
1000 HOURS, 6 MARCH 1973

SUBJECT: Cease-fire Implementation

TAB A - Withdrawal Planning

- US Force withdrawal is again proceeding routinely. Additional airlift has been requested to move the backlog created during the temporary suspension of withdrawals. No problems are anticipated.
  - To date, 12,984 have been withdrawn; 10,532 remain to be withdrawn.
  - By X+45, 17,300 withdrawals are planned.
  - X+46 to X+60, 6,000 withdrawals are planned.
- Republic of Korea forces are also on schedule with 23,750 withdrawn.
  - By X+45, 35,300 will be withdrawn.
  - X+46 to X+60, 100 will be withdrawn.

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TAB B - Cease-fire Violations

- Violations continue to show a downward trend in both number and intensity.
  - Intensity of violations has noticeably declined, particularly in MRs 1 and 4.

TAB C - Post Cease-fire Command Structure in SVN

- DAO/DRSTO has been authorized 1,200 DOD civilians. Currently 1,036 have been permanently assigned or committed by name. (86.3 percent of authorized strength)

TAB D - SEA Command Arrangements

- USSAG/7th AF became operational at Nakhon Phanom, Thailand on 16 February.

TAB E - Mine Countermeasures

- Four MSOs have returned to the Haiphong roadstead and are awaiting orders to resume surface mine clearing.
- Three additional MSOs departed Subic Bay on 4 March and are expected off of Haiphong on 7 March.

6 MAR 73

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BY JS & NSC

DATE 20 JUN 2011

Sec Def Cont Nr. X-

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- Four AMCM units (airborne mine clearance units) are embarked on five ships at the Haiphong roadstead awaiting orders to resume mine clearing operations. Two units will proceed to the Hon Gai and Cam Pha areas when operations are resumed.

- Sweeping operations in the Haiphong area can be completed by approximately X+70 days, subject to weather and operational losses.

TAB F - ICCS

- Contingents strengths are as follows:

	<u>Strength</u>	<u>Shortfall</u>
Canada	277	-13
Hungary	261	-29
Indonesia	290	0
Poland	290	0

- All regional teams and 29 of 38 mandated teams have been deployed.

- Attention has turned from administrative to procedural matters.

- No investigations have been completed. Four major violation investigations are before the ICCS.

TAB G - Four Party Joint Military Commission

- Status of deployments

<u>US</u>	<u>GVN</u>	<u>DRV</u>	<u>PRG</u>
788*	825	784	200

\*Shortfall is in support personnel only - to be transferred as MACV phases out.

- DRV has temporarily withdrawn its personnel from Regions I and II (Hue and DaNang). Personnel returned to Hanoi with minor injuries are being exploited for propaganda against the GVN.

- FPJMC has been tied-up with the delay in US PW releases. Currently commission is tied-up over GVN release of enemy PW which are being slowed down because the GVN believes the PRG is holding back on RVNAF PWs.

-- US authorities in Saigon are taking action at various levels with RVN authorities, so that there is no excuse for delay of Phase III of US PW release.

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TABs H & I - PW/MIA

- Most recent release included:
  - 106 military from DRV on 4 March (plus 2 Thai).
  - 27 military and 3 civilians from PRG on 5 March (plus 4 third country nationals).
- Of total 585 US PWs to be released, 299 have been released. Slightly more than 50%.
- Reasons for delay are not known although the DRV undoubtedly desired to use its leverage for some gain. Analysis at TAB I.

TAB J - US Contingency Options Study

- Study was provided to Dr. Kissinger by Secretary Richardson on 26 Feb 73.
- Item is not supposed to come up for discussion at the WSAG.

TAB K - Laos Agreement

TAB L-P - The Paris Agreement and Its Protocols

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POINT PAPER

SUBJECT: Status of PW Releases/Accounting for Missing

PW RELEASES

- First increment of US PW releases occurred 12 Feb 73.
  - DRV released 116 military
  - PRG released 19 military and 8 civilians
- Second release occurred on 18 Feb 73
  - DRV released 20 military
    - This release was made in connection with visit to Hanoi of Dr. Kissinger
    - DRV indicated release was gesture of good-will
- Most recent release included
  - 106 military from DRV on 4 Mar 73 (plus 2 Thai)
  - 27 military and 3 civilians from PRG on 5 Mar 73 (plus 4 third-country Nationals)
- All returnees included in the recent release are presently undergoing processing at Clark AB
- Of a total of 585 US PW's reported held and to be released 299 have been released
  - Slightly more than 50%
- Release of the recent increment was delayed
  - US expected release by the 30th day following signing of the agreement in Paris
- Agreement requires release at a rate no slower than the rate of withdrawal from SVN of US and allied forces

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- Understanding as conveyed by Dr. Kissinger is that PW's would be released at 15 day increments
  - 1/4 of the men each increment
- In its contacts with US representatives, the DRV delegation attributed delay to the technical matter of availability of liaison flights between Saigon and Hanoi
  - DRV representative declined US representative offer of use of C-130 as interim solution
- In succession of press statements DRV/PRG spokesmen mentioned several issues as reasons for delay
  - Return of civilian detainees
  - Facilities provided for DRV/PRG delegations
  - Safety of DRV/PRG delegations
  - Violations of the cease fire agreement
- It is apparent that DRV/PRG delayed release to apply pressure on US
  - Whether they achieved any of their objectives is not known
- DRV/PRG may well employ same tactic again in the future
  - As we get closer to end of 60 day period, unless we have other leverage, they can be expected to employ same delay tactic with greater effectiveness
    - We will have less to bargain with in terms of stopping withdrawal or minesweeping

#### ACCOUNTING OF MISSING

- Over half of 60 day period has elapsed and as yet we have had

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no reports of progress toward achieving accounting of missing  
- Although one team remains beyond 60 day period for purposes of  
completing accounting requirements, it is essential to  
establish its charter at early date

-- No progress in this regard to date

- Task Force drafted message outlining this problem and providing  
guidance to FPJMC

-- Message being actioned by JCS

CURRENT STATUS OF PROCESSING

- Attached is summary of status of processing as of this morning

Attachment  
as

COLONEL V. A. DIMAURO, U  
PW/MIA Task Force  
5 March 1973

FROM: Task Force Duty Officer  
 TO: Director, OASD(ISA) PW/MIA Task Force

DAILY HOMECOMING SUMMARY  
RETURNEE TABULATION

AS OF 0625 (EST) 5MAR  
 (AMENDED)

	<u>Reported for Release</u>	<u>Returned to US Control</u>		<u>At JHRC</u>	<u>Enroute or at CONUS Hospital</u>	<u>Processi Complete</u>
		<u>NVN</u>	<u>FVN</u>			
<u>MILITARY</u>						
ARMY	<u>76</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>39</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>8</u>
NAVY	<u>136</u>	<u>83</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>11</u>
AIR FORCE	<u>324</u>	<u>155</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>51</u>	<u>36</u>
MARINE CORPS	<u>26</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>
<u>MILITARY TOTAL</u>	<u>562</u>	<u>242</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>133</u>	<u>99</u>	<u>56</u>
CIVILIAN	<u>24</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>5</u>
<u>TOTAL</u>	<u>586</u>	<u>242</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>136</u>	<u>102</u>	<u>61</u>

REMARKS:

The MAC aeromedevac C-141 arrived GIA LAM at 042353 (EST) for pickup of 27 US Military, 3 US Civilians and 4 TCN returnees. Procedures were completed and all had boarded the aircraft by 050152 (EST). The aircraft took off at 050204 (EST), arriving at Clark Air Base at 050450 (EST). Reports received indicated the evolution in Hanoi was completed without complication.

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ISA/VNTF  
1 March 1973

FACT SHEET

SUBJECT: DRV Motives in Holding-up PW Release

Although the delay in prisoner release seems to be cleared up, it is worthwhile to conjecture on the motives of the DRV in challenging the US on such a sensitive issue. Clearly the DRV realizes that the PW issue is the only significant leverage which they have over the US. They also realize that it is a rapidly disappearing asset. They undoubtedly feel strong compulsion to use this leverage while they can.

The DRV/PRG perception of the results of the 27 January Agreement are critical to their need to utilize the leverage provided by the continued holding of US PWs. Although highly conjectural and perhaps somewhat extreme, the following factors must be important to the DRV in deciding to use PW leverage.

- The Agreement itself has some clear disadvantages to the DRV/PRG.
  - Cease-fire leaves NVA/VC in control of relatively unpopulated, unproductive and politically meaningless hinterland.
  - If adhered to literally, prohibitions and restrictions on materiel support and personnel support of NVA/VC do, in fact, portend a "withering on the vine" situation as Kissinger predicted.
  - Political prospects for PRG are no more than vague promises dependent on the Thieu government for their fruition.
- The actual situation which developed in the first 30 days of the cease-fire has eroded the NVA/VC position and reduced the PRG prospects in the south.
  - Last minute attempts to seize territory and population have been defeated at significant cost.
  - The population has failed to return to VC controlled territory or to welcome VC/NVA expansion.
  - Performance of NVA/VC units and the infrastructure has been poor, morale is low, and NVA/VC internecine disputes have been widespread.
  - GVN has reacted strongly and effectively to counter NVA/VC thrusts with no sign of reduced efficiency, morale, or will.
  - The US has abided by the cease-fire but has not controlled Thieu.

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- The ICCS and FPJMC have been ineffective in ratifying NVA/VC holdings or in controlling the GVN.
- The GVN evidently exercises strong control of the population and governmental mechanism as observed first-hand by the DRV/PRG members of the FPJMC.
- The "Popular Front" (PRG/NVA/VC) has found no weak spot to exploit or formula for political advantage.
- Elections, if held in the near term, would overwhelmingly reject the Communists.

With these negative elements in their assessment and cognizant of their perishable leverage over the US, the DRV/PRG have sought, and may again seek, to bring pressure on Thieu through the US. In this instance, the DRV seems to have settled for some formula which includes more specific recognition of the status of the PRG, some assurance of protection for and improved status of the DRV/PRG representatives to the FPJMC, and a reaffirmation of the cease-fire to take the pressure off their forces. However, such peripheral gains do little to rectify the disadvantageous position they find themselves in in South Vietnam. Even if a more effective cease-fire is achieved, even a complete one, and greater freedom of action is afforded DRV/PRG representatives (including access to the press) they have gained little in the political struggle in the South.

The PRG will continue to pressure the DRV, and find some sympathetic support in the DRV Politburo to seek further help from the US in undermining Thieu's position and independent hard-line approach to the situation in the South. The DRV, however, under pressure from its own interests, and from its Allies is probably reluctant to jeopardize the viability of the Agreement or risk renewed US military action. At the same time they must realize that Thieu must be leashed lest the position of the NVA/VC further erode and its political struggle die from lack of access to the South Vietnamese population it must win over.

The frustration of the PRG working on and through the DRV can be expected to cause further difficulties when future prisoner releases are due. Whether these will escalate beyond harassments and threats is not clear. PRG will increasingly wish to use its leverage for significant gain as its perishable asset disappears. The DRV, more cautious, particularly after observing the US reaction to this attempt, may agree to some further delays in future PW releases, but is not likely to hold out for any significant change in the status quo in the face of a strong US reaction.