WORKING PAPER

#161

From: J2 1 of ~~7~~ 8

TO: COMJTF

ComJTF ✓

MG Vaught, DepJTF ____

COVER ____

— Sir, I believe ~~[illegible]~~ we will have to execute in 7-21 days*

— Listed below are a few [SEE PP-8] ideas for your consideration concerning ~~forward~~ HELIO Deployment, Insertion techniques, Spectre/Command + Control Presence and Extraction.

~~(1)~~ — Helio Deployment

— ~~Move~~ Fly Norfolk Helio's in 2's to Dover at dusk, move into Hangar, dissemble, Tranship to [redacted] for assembly and further movement by ship ~~and~~/or ~~[illegible]~~ self contained air.

E

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL CLS DOWNGR TO Secret
REVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources
[redacted]

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Declassified On: OADR

#524
pg. 1000

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2 of 78

CMUS and Support C130 BB

E (C) — Move [Spectre] to Europe [redacted] to support training exercise.

Pacom

E (C) — Move [Spectre] and C130 BB to [redacted] of

A, C, E (S) — Begin irregular flights of [redacted] and [redacted], with occasional] Ron at both Locations.

A (S) — Two/three flights before possible execution selected crew member [of Talon/Spectre fly [redacted]

2

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~WORKING PAPER~~

2 of 7

(S) — Possibly Equip ~~[illegible]~~ Charters
[redacted]

A — Compound [redacted]

(S) — Night Prior to execution
[redacted] with ~~[illegible]~~
A ~~[illegible]~~ [redacted] Lands
~~at Mehrabad for~~ at
Mehrabad and Ron's.

(S) — Next day [redacted]
[redacted] recon the
select evacuation Strip deposit
A, C [redacted] schedules
— That night charter departure
from Mehrabad approx 90 minutes
ahead of Execution
window — delays depart
30-40 minutes checking
NAV. gear - finally departs (3)

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~WORKING PAPER~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

WORKING PAPER

TOP #8

45-30 minutes prior to
Execution window — Departs
— goes outbound — and
30 minutes out in order
from Com JTF ~~[illegible]~~ Groups
Alt- (may declare emergency)
~~Land returns to~~ Flys to
Pickup Landing site —
(~~may~~ re declare emergency
say they are crashing
(~~[illegible]~~ Report wrong location)
Lands at P/U site after
Ground Execution has
started — ~~prep~~ blackout
itself out — prepares to
receive Delta + Hostages —

ALTERNATE
on next Pages

(4)

~~TOP SECRET~~

WORKING PAPER

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WORKING PAPER

5 of 8

A ~~(8)~~ [redacted] Helio Movement into country

~~(1) Establish Charter~~ [redacted] ~~F27/3~~ [redacted] arranged

C (1) Establish [redacted] along Ingress route [redacted] arranged Charter Cargo flights - 3-5 days prior to execution day

~~(2) On day be~~ Night

(2) Night Before execution the Charter flight with spare fuel for Helio - acts as path finder for Helios // Helio Land at selected "Concealment site" (5)

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~WORKING PAPER~~

6 of 7 8

mark landing ~~at~~ strip for Charter // Charter lands unloads fuel ~~etc for~~ and resumes flight.

(3) Helio - + Crews etc go into concealment

A (4) Execution Night Helios initiate [redacted] appropriate time - Charter homes / circles // Helio's lift off and [redacted] which is actually, on this mission, [redacted] ~~w/ LITV~~ acting as [redacted] and airborne [redacted] for ComJTF —

A (5) ~~[illegible]~~ [redacted] Acts as Pathfinder for Helio - ComJTF Directs insertion (8)

of Helio from offset airborne orbit or from ground staging area

(c) If multiple charter flights could be developed/patterned additional a few days before execution additional aircraft eg [redacted] could be brought into the area to [redacted] airlift, or ~~reinforce~~ ground reinforcement.

A,B

(7)

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~WORKING PAPER~~ I-#162

G WORKING PAPER FOR COL [redacted]

INFILTRATION OF ADVANCE PARTY FOR
RICE BOWL

1. PROBLEM (TS): To infiltrate advance parties of various size and composition into Tehran in support of RICE BOWL.

2. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM ~~(TS)~~ ~~(S)~~

a. The major means of legitimate entry into Iran are by commercial air from Europe/Asia; by road from Pakistan Turkey, and Iraq; by rail from Turkey; and by ship from another Persian Gulf port or some more distant location.

b. [redacted] particularly the border areas and unpopulated eastern deserts is possible if thoroughly planned. Means of such entry include

A,C [redacted]; etc.]

c. RICE BOWL has demonstrated a capability to introduce mission personnel into IRAN by both legitimate means [redacted] and through [redacted] insertion.

3. ASSUMPTIONS ~~(TS)~~ ~~(S)~~

A a. That infiltration of advance party personnel to support RICE BOWL could be by either legitimate [redacted] means.

b. That current Iranian entry procedures will remain relatively unchanged during the forseeable future and that commerical airlines will continue to service Tehran and other Iranian airports.

C c. That [redacted] will support RICE BOWL with [redacted] as required.

d. That any decision to infiltrate advance party personnel into Iran would not constitute a firm commitment to launch the actual mission.

A e. That [redacted] will be available [redacted] if required.

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NATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
DESIGNED DOWNGR TO SECRET
BY ON OADR
DATED FROM Multiple Sources

[redacted]

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Declassified ON: OADR

~~TOP~~ [redacted] WORKING PAPER

~~TOP SECRET~~ WORKING

f. That the political climate in Iran, while unstable, will remain such that foreigners can legitimately move about the country.

4. DISCUSSION (TS) (S)

a. The presence of a limited number of RICE BOWL personnel in Tehran prior to the execution of the actual mission would serve to materially enhance the chances of success. These personnel could perform the following types of activity:

1) [redacted]

2) [redacted]

1,B,C

[redacted]

b. Recent experience with both [redacted] and legitimate infiltration techniques has demonstrated that both methods are feasible given proper detailed planning and development. [redacted] entry [redacted] offers the advantage of allowing both personnel and equipment to be introduced at the same time and place. Legitimate entry establishes a bonafide reason for being in Iran and consequently allows a similar means of exfiltration/departure. In either case, all advance party personnel would require [redacted]

A,C

c. The timeframe for insertion of advance parties is [redacted] prior to the actual execution of the Compound assault. Because of the unrest in the Turkish and Iraqi border areas, infiltration by overland means [(truck/train)] would be dangerous and time consuming. The same circumstances apply, although to a lesser degree, in the case of the Iran-Pakistan border. Insertion overland from Iraq is an even less palatable option. Commercial airlines serve Iran from points in both Europe and Asia. US military aircraft have the capability to [redacted]

7,C

[redacted] With proper [redacted] a reasonably intelligent individual or small group can enter Iran without undue difficulty or risk. There are several hotels in Tehran at which foreign travellers comprise the normal clientele. Iranian diplomatic posts are issuing visas for travel to Iran. Arrival and departure formalities are more stringent for Iranians than for foreigners. While individuals can enter and exit Iran relatively freely, the introduction of equipment such as radios could not be accomplished by this means.

5. CONCLUSIONS (TS)

a. Insertion of advance parties could significantly contribute to the success of the RICE BOWL mission.

b. Insertion is feasible by legitimate, [redacted] or a combination of the two means.

c. Support would be required from [redacted]

d. Any infiltration entails risk to both the involved personnel and to operations security for the mission. The size and nature of the advance party would dictate the location means and timing of insertion.

e. The mission of each advance party element would dictate its activities and location once in Iran.

f. A minimum [redacted] would be required to develop [redacted] for personnel being introduced through Tehran International Airport. Advance party members inserted by [redacted] means would have to be prepositioned in the Middle East at least [redacted] prior to infiltration for rest/final briefings.

g. Phasing of the infiltration would allow decision makers to cancel or modify the operation as it proceeds.

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~WORK PAPER~~

6. RECOMMENDATION (TS): That COMJTF explore the idea of an advance party with the CJCS at an appropriate juncture to avoid expenditure of resources and planning time sans raison.

Appendix A: Listing of possible [redacted] and current JTF in-house [redacted] by country/language.

Appendix B: Recapitulation of operational needs which can only be satisfied by in-country advance party personnel. Notional time sequence of infiltration flow for personnel and equipment.

[redacted]

IFGC, USAF
J2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ ~~WORK PAPER~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

i-163

22 April 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CJCS

Subject: RICE BOWL Observer Program, Update #3

This memo provides chronology of [redacted]nsertion program.

[redacted]

FOR
JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA
[redacted]

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REASON FOR Multiple Sources
[redacted]

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~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

18 April 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CJCS

Subject: RICE BOWL Observer Program Update #2

1. The following is update to my memoranda of 12 and 16 April, same subject. This memorandum also requests authority to proceed wit[redacted]

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

OK
DCJ

~~TOP SECRET~~ EYES ONLY

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

16 April 1980

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CJCS

Subject: RICE BOWL Observer Program, Update #1 (TS)

1. (U) The following is an update to my memorandum of 12 April 1980, same subject.

[redacted]

6. (TS) The Army is working to develop several other sources capable of reporting on the situation in Tehran. I view these as longer term propositions which are still tentative in nature. If the present contacts prove to be promising, it will still require [redacted] of processing, training, and evaluation before we could logically expect to employ any of the prospects.

7. (TS) Collectively, the above actions and associated travel expenses are projected to cost [redacted] over the next several months. None of the Service intelligence elements have budgeted funds to cover such an outlay.

8. (S) Request CJCS advise Director, DIA, of the priority attached to the RICE BOWL observer program in order that DIA can initiate those actions required to properly obligate necessary funding.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

(163)

12 April 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR CJCS

Subject: Rice Bowl Observer Program

4/14 DCI - If we can get the info in (a) from [redacted] we should carefully consider ~~what~~ the risks of doing (

1. (~~TS~~ W) IAW your direction action is underway to develop/expand the DoD Rice Bowl on scene observer program.

2. (~~TS~~) As of 12 April 1980 the following actions are underway:

[redacted]

3. (U) Will provide update status on Wednesday 16 April.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
Major General, USA

SECRET

GAGAGAGAGAG

MSG197
281430Z APR 80

FM JTF RC/[redacted] 1503 G
TO SITE ALPHA/[redacted]

[redacted]

SUBJ: STATUS OF [redacted]

REF: YOUR 280630Z APR 80

[redacted] NO STATUS ON REMAINDER. HOWEVER MAY GET MORE WHEN [redacted] ARRIVES.

REVW 28 APR 10

I-180

C

NNNN

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OPERATIONAL CONCEPT

1. Move Vehicles, Equipment and Personnel From [redacted] to Tehran via ROUTE:

A, E

[redacted]

TEHRAN

2. Move Vehicles and Equipment from [redacted] to Tehran, Route as Above, Rendevous with Personnel Between [redacted] Tehran.

A, E

ASSUMPTION

[redacted] Non-Interference

PROBLEM AREAS

1. [redacted]-IRANIAN BORDER

A, E

Access to [redacted] airfield(daylight only/customs)

Access to [redacted]

Laager of vehicles/equipment

Snow Conditions

2. BORDER CROSSING

A, E

Clearance Rqmts

[redacted] Iranian

Standing Time/Snow

[redacted] Rqmt

3. BORDER-KURD CONTROLLED AREA

Snow Conditions

A

[redacted] Rqmt

4. IRAN ARMY CONTROL AREA-TEHRAN

Standing Time

Fuel Locations

Checkpoint Methodology

Urban Transit

(Rendevous Location)

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COMMON PROBLEM AREAS

Control of the Operation by NCA
Flexibility
Political Embarassment Potential
No Ready extraction/Reaction Capability
Significant Unknowns
- Weather
- Maintenance/POL
- Checkpoint Methodology

Four Weather Zones
Stationary Confinement of Personnel en route
Rqmt for Constant Truck Movement
- Sleep
- Exercise

Language
Papers
Actions on Detection/Capture

OPTION ONE

E (C) VEHICLE, EQUIPMENT, PERSONNEL MOVE TOGETHER FROM [redacted]

NOT RECOMMENDED

High Risk of Detection
No Flexibility
Poor Control by NCA
Physical Hardship/Danger for Personnel
High Political Embarassment Potential

OPTION TWO

E (C) VEHICLE, EQUIPMENT, PERSONNEL MOVE TOGETHER FROM [redacted]

NOT RECOMMENDED

A Requires [redacted] Approval
Boor Control by NCA
High Political Embarrasment Potential
Physical Hardship on Personnel
Minimal Flexibility
High Detection Risk in Iran

OPTION THREE

EQUIPMENT TRANSIT BY VEHICLE, PERSONNEL INFILTRATE TO TEHRAN

RECOMMENDED

High Probability of Success
Best Control Option
Most Flexibile
Lowest Embarrassment Potential
Difficulty in Arranging Rendevous
Uncontrollability of Maintenance

MODIFIED OPTIONS

E (S) FOOT CROSSING OF [redacted] IRAN BORDER

Necessitated by high risk checkpoint(if determined)

(S) Requires 5-8 mile cross country move
snow pack most likely
at night
navigation difficulties ([redacted] option)
rendevous problem with [redacted]
detection probability 25%

RENDEVOUS PERSONNEL WITH TRUCK PRIOR TO TEHRAN

Necessitated by distance/risk

Rendevous selection
Below USSR/IRAN radar (if abn option)
outside of urban area or checkpoint visual
identifiable by driver
probable stop point for a [redacted]
concealment for personnel available

REQUIREMENTS

A (S) Immediate [redacted] of route
Access to [redacted] and related commo
Selection of [redacted]
[redacted]
Internal heat, including rear compartment
compartmented/ventilated
Maintenance/POL capability
[redacted] drivers
[redacted]
Cold weather clothing and equipment
Forward positioning of vehicles and equipment

~~SECRET~~

MSG 295
DTG 291[illegible]Z OCT 80
FM: [redacted]02
TO: T SOW
1DIST
[redacted]
DELTA
AWACS

A

2912303 Oct 80

~~SECRET~~

(U) THE FOLLOWING E & E CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS WAS APPROVED IN PRINCIPAL BY COMMANDER JTD. THE ENTIRE CONCEPT IS STILL OPEN FOR SUGGESTIONS, REVISIONS AND EXPANSION AS E & E WORKING GROUP IS DIRECTED BY INDIVIDUAL UNIT COMMANDERS.

1. (U) SITUATION

A. ENEMY (SEE BASIC OPLAN.)

1,B,C B. FRIENDLY. [redacted]

C. (U) ASSUMPTIONS
(1)(U)(~~S~~) THE HOSTAGE RECOVERY OPERATION IS CONDUCTED INDEPENDENT OF OTHER OPTIONS/OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AREA.
(2)(U)(~~S~~) IRANIAN MILITARY FORCES WILL OPPOSE ALL POST-OPERATION EVASION ATTEMPTS.
(3)(U)(~~S~~) THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN WILL ENLIST ALL IRANIANS IN EVADER-LOCATION SEARCHES, COUNTRY-WIDE.
(4)(U)(~~S~~) THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR ZONE SEVERELY RESTRICTS ANY MOVEMENT IN THE WESTERN PORTION OF IRAN.
(5)(U)(~~S~~) DUE TO SEVERE COLD DURING NOV-APR EXFILTRATION BY GROUND MEANS INTO TURKEY WOULD BE EXTREMELY HAZARDOUS.

2. (U) MISSION. MISSION FORCES WILL CONDUCT EVASION AND ESCAPE OPERATIONS, AS REQUIRED, TO ATTAIN REFUGE AND SUBSEQUENT REPATRIATION OF US CONTROL.

3. (U) EXECUTION:
A. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. SEE BASIC OPLAN.
B. (U)(~~S~~) CONCEPT OF E&E OPERATIONS. MISSION SUBORDINATE COMMANDS, ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR EMPLOYMENT OF THE DETAILED PLANS WHICH WILL ENVOLVE FROM THIS CONCEPT. JOINT E&E OPERATIONS WILL NORMALLY BE UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE GROUND FORCES COMMANDER OR AIRCRAFT COMMANDER AS APPROPRIATE. IN CASE OF NO CLEAR COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY, THE INDIVIDUAL MOST KNOWLEDGEABLE/EXPERIENCED IN E&E TACTICS SHOULD ASSUME THE COMMAND.

C. (U)) TASKS OF SUBORDINATE UNITS:
(1) ALL UNITS WILL PLAN FOR AND ACCOMPLISH TRAINING FOR THE CONDUCT OF E & E AS NOTED ABOVE. (CONCEPT OF E & E OPS)

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~~SECRET~~

[illegible]- SYSTEM SAR. THIS SAR WILL COMPRISE THE PRIMARY INITIAL SAR EFFORT DURING THE EXECUTION OF THE MISSION ([illegible] --).

[illegible]. (U) TASKS OF FRIENDLY FORCES:

(1)(U) NAVAL FORCES SUPPORT E&E OPERATIONS OF THIS PLAN AS DIRECTED BY CINCPAC, TO THE LIMIT OF THEIR SAR CAPABILITY, AND TO THE EXTENT THAT THEIR CAP SAR SUPPORT POST- OPERATION E&E.

C

(2) [redacted]

(3)(U) EXTERNAL-BASED SAR EFFORT WILL BE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE MISSION COMMANDER. THIS EXTERNAL SAR EFFORT WILL NOT BE INITIATED PRIOR TO THE COMPLETION OF PLANNED EXFILTRATION PHASE OR CANCELLATION OF THE MISSION OR AS DIRECTED BY THE MISSION COMMANDER.

(4) [redacted]

A,B,C

(5) [redacted]

[illegible]. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

(1) (U) COMMON PROCEDURES:

(A) (U) PRIMARY MEANS OF COMMUNICATIONS WILL BE BY SECURE VOICE RADIO, IF POSSIBLE. BACKUP COMMO WILL BE BY CREW SURVIVAL RADIOS.

(B) (U) HOSTAGES, REGARDLESS OF RANK, WILL NOT ACT WITH COMMAND AUTHORITY, EXCEPT AS DIRECTED BY THE SENIOR RECOVERY FORCE ELEMENT COMMANDER. IN A CONFLICT OF OPINION ON WHERE TO GO, OR HOW TO EVADE BETWEEN DELTA/RANGER [redacted] FORCE PERSONNEL AND OTHER PERSONNEL (AIR CREWS), THE RANKING DELTA/RANGER [redacted] WILL HAVE COMMAND AUTHORITY REGARDLESS OF RELATIVE RANKS.

A

(C)(U) PERSONNEL CONDUCTING E AND E OPERATIONS WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO REMOVE WOUNDED PERSONNEL WITH THEM AS THEY EVADE. NO MISSION PERSONNEL WILL BE LEFT BEHIND UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY TO AVOID TOTAL OPERATION/ELEMENT FAILURE. KIA'S LEFT BEHIND WILL BE CONCEALED AS BEST POSSIBLE; IDENTIFICATION AND COMPROMISING DOCUMENTS REMOVED, [illegible] THE LOCATION MARKED ON A MAP FOR FUTURE PERSONNEL ACCOUNTING/DECEDENT AFFAIRS PURPOSES.

(D)(U) [illegible] PERSONNEL, ONLY, WILL BE BRIEFED ON THE PICKUP POINT, TIME, AND COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO MISSION LAUNCH. OTHER PERSONNEL WILL BE BRIEFED ONLY ON THE E AND E CONCEPT IN BROAD TERMS, AND ONLY PROVIDED WITH INITIAL RALLY POINT/COMMUNICATIONS POINT INFORMATION TO RECEIVE FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. [illegible] APPROPRIATE BY THEIR COMMANDERS.

(U) [illegible] EFFORT IS PRIMARILY BASED ON DIRECTING PERSONNEL [illegible] PRE-PLANNED SAR EFFORT CAN MAKE AN [illegible]. PRIMARY MEANS OF EVACUATING DOWNED PERSONNEL [illegible], BOTH BY BUDDY-SYSTEM SAR DURING THE EXECUTION OF THE MISSION AND BY A PRE-POSITIONED, PRE-PLANNED, POST-MISSION SAR. PROLONGED E AND E WILL BE THE LAST OPTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL, IF ALL OTHER SAR EFFORTS FAIL.

(U) THE E AND E CONCEPT WILL BE BROKEN INTO 5 PHASES: COUNTRY INFILTRATION, ENVIRONS OF TEHRAN PRIOR TO H HOUR, ENVIRONS OF TEHRAN AFTER H-HOUR (PRIOR TO EXFIL "E" HOUR). ENVIRONS OF TEHRAN AFTER H-HOUR (POST-EXFIL "E" HOUR), 72 HOURS AFTER EXFIL, (PROLONGED E AND E).

(1) (U) BUDDY/INFILTRATION PHASE: PRIMARY SAR WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE HELO BUDDY-SYSTEM PLAN. IF THIS CANNOT BE COMPLETED, THE DOWNED PERSONNEL WILL GROUP TOGETHER AND REMAIN IN THE VICINITY OF THE AIRCRAFT. THE DOWNED PERSONNEL MUST BE PREPARED TO CONCEAL THEMSELVES AND THEIR AIRCRAFT FROM ENEMY OBSERVATION FOR UP TO 36 HOURS.

(2) (U) ENVIRONS OF TEHRAN PRIOR TO H-HOUR. ALL DOWNED PERSONNEL WILL BE PICKED UP BY THE BUDDY SYSTEM. IF PICK-UP IS NOT POSSIBLE, AND THE DOWNED PERSONNEL ARE OUTSIDE THE TEHRAN BUILT-UP AREA, MOVEMENT AWAY FROM THE CITY PROPER WILL, DEPENDING ON POSITION WHERE DOWNED, EITHER TOWARD EXFIL POINTS AT PEGGY, PATTY OR OTHER DESIGNATED SITES .

(3) (U) ENVIRONS OF TEHRAN AFTER H-HOUR (PRIOR TO EXFIL "E" HOUR):

(A) FROM EMBASSY:

1. PRIMARY HELO EXTRACTION IS FROM THE EMBASSY. IF EXTRACTION IS NOT POSSIBLE FROM THE EMBASSY GROUNDS, THE FOLLOWING AREAS WILL BE USED (IN ORDER) TO PROVIDE EXFIL POINTS:

(A) STADIUM. IF NO PICK-UP, THEN TO
(B) CONSTRUCTION SITE IN NORTH TEHRAN

2. IF EXTRACTION IS NOT COMPLETED AT THE CONSTRUCTION SITE, [redacted]

A,B,C

(B) FROM DFA:

PRIMARY HELO EXTRACTION IS FROM THE DFA GROUNDS. IF EXTRACTION IS NOT POSSIBLE THEN PERSONNEL WILL MOVE TO THE FOLLOWING POINTS FOR EXTRACTION:

1. PATTY-Shank:
IF EXTRACTION BY HELO IS NOT POSSIBLE, MOVEMENT MUST BE MADE BY VEHICLE TO CONSTRUCTION SITE.

2. CONSTRUCTION SITE IN NORTH TEHRAN:

IF NO EXTRACTION CAN BE MADE AT THE CONSTRUCTION SITE, MOVEMENT TO LZ PATTY MUST BE MADE (SEE PARA 4).

(4) (U) ENVIRONS OF TEHRAN AFTER E-HOUR:

(A) DOWNED PERSONNEL WILL MOVE TOWARD SELECTED PICK-UP SITES. [redacted]

A,B,C

(B) DEPENDING ON POSITION IN THE CITY, PERSONNEL WILL EITHER HIDE AND ATTEMPT TO [redacted] OR MOVE DIRECTLY TO THE LAR VALLEY. WITHIN 48-72 HOURS A SAR WILL BE LAUNCHED (WX PERMITTING) AND PROCEED TO THE LAR VALLEY FOR EXTRACTION OF STRANDED PERSONNEL.

SECRET

IF NO PICK-UP IS MADE BY 72 HOURS AFTER EXFIL, THE INDIVIDUAL MUST PREPARE FOR A PROLONGED E AND E SITUATION.

(C) CORRIDOR DESIGNATION. TWO GENERAL AREAS HAVE BEEN DESIGNATED FOR ESCAPE AND EVASION MOVEMENT, REFERRED TO AS THE EASTERN AREA AND THE WESTERN AREA. THE WESTERN AREA IS A NORTH-SOUTH STRIP RUNNING ALONG A LINE SOUTH FROM TEHRAN TO ISFAHAN TO BAFSANJAN SOUTH TO BANDAR ABBAS. THE EASTERN AREA RUNS FROM SEMNAN SOUTH ALONG THE MAJOR ROAD TO KERMAN THEN S/EAST TO SABZEVARAN, THEN SOUTH TO BANDAR ABBAS.

4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS:

a. (C) LOGISTICS. [redacted] OTHER LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS WILL BE COORDINATED WITH [redacted] SHOULD SERVICE ELEMENTS BE UNABLE TO PROVIDE; I.E., COMPASSES, SIGNAL PANELS, SIGNAL MIRRORS, ETC. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS FOR SURVIVAL BUNDLES TO BE DROPPED TO EVADING ELEMENTS WILL BE CONFIGURED BY [redacted] UPON RECEIPT OF D-DAY/C-DAY AUTHORIZATION FROM JCS. [redacted]

b. (U) ADMINISTRATION. SEE BASIC OPLAN

5. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL:

a. (U) SIGNAL. SEE ANNEX THIS OPLAN, AND TAB THIS APPENDIX FOR COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES.

b. (C) COMMAND. JOINT E AND E OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE SENIOR DELTA/RANGER [redacted] PERSON PRESENT, REGARDLESS OF RELATIVE RANK. UNILATERAL E AND E OPERATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE SENIOR PERSON PRESENT. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL HOSTAGE PERSONNEL BE PLACED IN A COMMAND POSITION OF RESCUE FORCES, REGARDLESS OF HOSTAGE RANK/POSITION.

(U) THE ABOVE CONCEPT WILL BE EXPANDED INTO A FULL ANNEX. [redacted] WILL BE A CONFERENCE HELD AT JTD 5-7 NOV TO COMPLETE THE DETAILS OF THIS ANNEX. PLEASE SEND NAME OF ATTENDEE BY 2 NOV 80.

[redacted] 28 OCT 80
31

SECRET

OPSEC

27/30 NOV

OPSEC PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

184

This document addresses general and specific procedures that must be considered to avoid compromise of the operation and to maintain a high degree of OPSEC. Some of the measures have already been incorporated while others remain unfulfilled.

I. MOVING FORCE TO OVERSEAS STAGING BASE

A. DELTA

1. HUMINT Threat to include inadvertent disclosure by the press, through family and friends.

a. [redacted] Responsibilities

(1) Continue [redacted]

(2) Continue personnel welfare activities such as residence checks, financial support, caring for families, etc.

(3) Monitor [redacted] community (especially [redacted]) for indications through use [redacted], and other sources.

(4) Monitor attachments and civilian hire (cooks, KPs, guards, etc.).

(5) Divert press inquiries to HQDA PAO while otherwise refusing to talk to the media.

b. Delta Main REsponsibilities

(1) Conduct stringent OPSEC briefing to personnel.

(2) Train and live in isolation; restrict contact of personnel with others; [redacted]

(3) Move in isolation - no exposure when possible, [redacted] apply need-to-know principle stringently.

(4) Minimal exposure times on ground.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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12 Aug 92

(5) [redacted]

A,B

(6) [redacted] and transport only essential cargo.

(7) Eliminate access to areas by foreign nationals when possible.

2. PHOTINT/SIGINT Threats

a. Program [redacted] with movement times and [redacted] when applicable.

b. Emplace [redacted]

7,B

c. Use maximum COMSEC procedures to include secure systems, [redacted] etc.

B. USAF

1. Maintain similar measures as Delta.

2. Special attention [redacted] overseas.

A

C. [redacted] RANGERS

1. Maintain similar measures as Delta

2. Move force under [redacted] and have [redacted]

D. POTENTIAL DAMAGE FACTORS IN EVENT OF COMPROMISE

1. Hostages killed.

2. Increased security/vigilance by Iranians.

3. Hostages moved.

4. Combination of above.

(6) II. MC-130 INSERT FROM STAGING BASE TO REFUEL/LAGER SITE

A. DELTA MAIN (HUMINT/PHOTINT/SIGINT THREATS)

1. Secure storage and facilities for personnel and equipment not taken forward.

2. Continue COMSEC procedures with emphasis on [redacted] from staging base.

B. RANGERS - same as for Delta.

C. USAF

1. Same as for Delta.

2. Minimal use [redacted] to avoid [redacted] by USSR, Iranian, and other applicable ground/air stations.

3. [redacted]

4. Route planning [redacted]

5. Establish appropriate OPSEC measures for 1 or more aircraft encountering in-flight emergency.

D. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPROMISE

1. Same as I. D. above.

2. Possible decisive engagement of force by air defense guns/missiles and/or aircraft intercept.

III. RH-53 INSERT TO REFUEL/LAGER SITE

A. Develop plan [redacted] Threat is from [redacted]

B. Develop plan to [redacted] of RH-53s. Threat is same as III. A. with additional [redacted]

C. Route planning to [redacted].

D. Establish appropriate OPSEC measures for 1 or more aircraft having in-flight emergency.

E. Minimal use of [redacted] with COMSEC emphasis.

F. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPROMISE - same as II. D. above.

IV. TAKEOVER AND LAGER AT NA'IN

A. RANGERS (HUMINT/PHOTINT/SIGINT THREATS)

1. Recover/dispose of air items if applicable.

2. Total elimination or capture of guarding force [redacted]

3. [redacted] e.g. food, water, sanitation, trash considerations; [redacted] etc.).

4. Develop plan to give [redacted]

5. Stress COMSEC procedures.

B. USAF

1. Develop landing techniques to avoid ground observation. Attention to light and noise conditions.

2. Ensure minimal ground time for aircraft with appropriate light/noise discipline - will engines be shut down;=what is parking pattern, turn around, and takeoff procedures; what are refueling procedures?

3. Develop OPSEC procedures if 1 or more aircraft is unable to takeoff.

C. RH-53s

1. Same as for USAF.

2. Develop plan to [redacted]

D. DELTA - same as for rangers.

E. CONSEQUENCES OF COMPROMISE - Same as I. D. as well as possible decisive engagement of the force on the ground.

V. MC-130 RETURN FROM NA'IN TO STAGING BASE

Same as I and II above for USAF.

VI. RECRUITMENT/PROCUREMENT OF DRIVERS AND GROUND TRANSPORT (HUMINT THREAT)

A. Standard agent recruitment procedures must be followed but time may not be sufficient to vett personnel and to ascertain full reliability of drivers.

B. Vehicles must be procured, delivered, and stored in such a manner as to avoid suspicion/investigation.

C. Compromise may result in same potential damage as in I. D. above as well as possible intercept and decisive engagement of force.

VII. GROUND TRANSPORT MOVE FROM TEHRAN TO LINK-UP POINT (HUMINT THREAT)

A. Vehicles must be configured for concealment by trusted and reliable personnel to preclude leaks.

B. Cut-outs should be used to assemble and mate drivers to vehicles to avoid compromise.

C. Plan must be developed to prepare vehicles for movement to link-up point to include appropriate cover, documentation, and procedures for drivers. Route planning must occur for passage of check points and routing of vehicles so driver does not necessarily know true destination.

D. Vehicles must be parked near link-up point with an ostensible reason for being there or with concealment to avoid ground/air observation.

E. Consequences of compromise are the same as VI. C. above.

VIII. AIR MOVE FROM NA'IN TO LINK-UP POINT (HUMINT/SIGINT THREATS)

A. RH-53s

1. Establish OPSEC procedures in event 1 or more aircraft cannot take off or have in-flight emergencies.

2. Route planning to [redacted]

3. COMSEC measures.

4. Landing must be in isolated area to avoid ground observation with special attention to noise and light discipline.

B. DELTA/RANGERS

1. Movement plan from aircraft to vehicles without being detected.

2. Last minute concealment check after loading vehicles and prior to move out.

3. Capture or eliminate any personnel observing aircraft.

IX. RH-53 GROUND TIME (HUMINT/SIGINT THREATS)

A. [redacted]

B. Maintain security around aircraft, capture or eliminate ground observers or passers by.

C. Maintain radio silence.

X. GROUND MOVE FROM LINK-UP TO TEHRAN (HUMINT THREAT)

A. Develop plan to bypass checkpoints or to pass through them to include control of drivers.

B. Noise/light discipline in vehicles.

C. Maintain COMSEC measures.

XI. MC/AC-130 MOVE FROM STAGING BASE TO MANZARIYEH

Same considerations as for II above.

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TIME	EVENT/SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
1700L	1 MC-130 with Rangers depart Egypt		
	Successful	None	Go
	Unsuccessful: Launch Rangers in spare A/C within two hours	Delay entire mission by whatever it takes to get airborne	Go, inform RH-53 KC-135s & MC-130
	Unable launch within two hours	No force to secure Main, unable to arrive at hideout before sunrise	Abort, inform other forces Delay 24 hours
1730L	5/MC-130 with fuel (3) and Delta (2) depart [redacted] 10 min separation		
	If spare is available for launch within two hours	Mission will be delayed	Go, inform other forces of delay
	If no spare and a Delta A/C aborts	Lose 1/2 mission force	Abort
	If no spare and a fuel A/C aborts	Fuel for helos degraded	Advise Kitty Hawk to only launch four helos
1815 L	Launch 2/air refuelable tanker (ART):		
	If either gets airborne	Sufficient fuel for Ranger MC-130	Go
	If delayed less than 2 hours	Must orbit of Ranger MC-130	Go, advise other A/C of delay
	If delayed more than 2 hours	Cannot get helos to hideout by first light	Abort, recall MC-130s and helos if launched
1830	6/RH-53 depart Kitty Hawk:		
	$\geq$4 get airborne	Sufficient helos to accomplish the mission plus one spare	Go
	$\leq$3 get airborne	Insufficient helos for mission	Abort, recall MC-130's & KC-135/ARTs

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TIME	EVENT/SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	(U) DECISION/CRIT
1845L	1/KC-135 & 3/ART's launch:		
	≥2 get airborne	Will have to share fuel from more than one tanker for one of the MC-130s	Go, except a for refuelin at least one the MC-130's
	<2 get airborne	Not enough fuel for MC-130s	Abort, advis MC-130s and helos
1845	If a helo goes down while within the range of the SAR helos -- no injuries	Aircrew on the ground in Iran	Go, launch S for pickup
	-- with injuries	Will use one of mission helos to return crew to the carrier	If there are 4 mission he continue - If less th abort, advis KC-135 and M
1920	1/MC-130 air refuels with ARTS:		
	Unsuccessful:	No Ranger force for security at Main	- Try the se tanker, if g go, if no re possible, ab recall helos MC-130s and KC-130.
1950	5/MC-130s air refuel		
2030	with 4/ARTS and 1/KC-135:		
	- All successful	None	Go
	- One of the fuel A/C fails to refuel	Insufficient fuel for 6/RH-53s	- Instruct e in excess of to return to carrier
	- More than one fuel A/C fails to refuel	Insufficient fuel for the mission	Abort, advis MC-130, RH-5 ARTS/KC-135
	- One of the Delta A/C fails to refuel	Insufficient force for the mission	Abort, advis other aircra

TIME	EVENT/SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTI
2215L	RH-53s reach turn around point:		
	4 helos operational	Sufficient helos for operation	Go, from here an abort must worked out of Main
	4 helos operational	Insufficient helos for operation	Abort
2250L	1st MC-130 with Rangers lands at Main to secure the field:	Field will be ready to receive follow-on force	Go
	- Runway blocked	Unable to air land Rangers?	- Jump rangers into target ar to secure the base, clear th runway
	- MC-130 has problem on landing	Runway must be cleared for follow on force	- Off load MC- clear runway, aircraft will destroyed prio to departure, Abort mission
2320 0000L	Follow-on MC-130s land at Main	Delta plus fuel will be ready to receive fuel	Go
	- Field not secure when A/C arrive	Need to complete the security if mission is to go	Land Delta to assist Rangers in completing security. If warning outside Main is suspect abort, refuel helos and send them back to th carrier. Recov rest of force i MC-130s
0000-0030	2/MC-130s that brought in Delta depart	Partially clears Main for arrival of helos	If problem aris later, fuel MC-130s can car Delta and Range out after re-fueling helos

TIME	EVENT/SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPT
0030	6/RH-53 land at Nain Military to refuel	4 RH-53s operational force is adequate for mission	Go
	- RH-53s unable to find Nain Military by 0100, launch MC-130 to provide UHF/ADF homing from 7000.	Helos must arrive at Nain by 0130 or MC-130s will be short of fuel for return	If helos can arrive Nain 0130, missio still Go If helos arr later than 0
	- RH-53s unable to arrive Nain by 0130	MC-130s must depart to reach tanker with sufficient fuel	- Pump fuel one bladder three fuel M (gives one m hour delay). When helos a pump remaini fuel to helo get max numb that can ret to the ship. all helos ba towards carr and set the fuel helos d as necessary, pick up crew and proceed.
0130	The one Ranger and two Delta MC-130 depart for [redacted]	Clears ramp. Delta will go with helos. security force will return on the fuel MC-130.	Go
	Any MC-130 has problem and cannot depart Nain	Mission will be compromised	Abort, retur helos to car take Rangers Delta to [redacted] MC-130s.
0130	6/RH-53s with Delta and the Ranger security depart Nain	All of Delta and 12 Rangers can proceed on the mission.	Go

TIME	EVENT/SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTI
	3 helos get airborne	Spread Delta and Rangers	Go
	3 helos get airborne	Mission badly degraded	Continue in degraded stat or abort
0310	RH/53s arrive at landing zone to drop off Delta	Delta will depart for Tehran in in vehicles	Go
	There are no vehicles at the LZ	Delta unable to move to Tehran	Leave recepti team at LZ. Move helos an rest of force hideout. Del 24 hrs, 48 hr abort
0330	RH-53s depart LZ to hideout. Delta moves to Tehran		

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/CRITERIA
2/0800Z (0300 Est)	Decision to launch MC-130	N/A	N/A
2/1000Z (0500 Est)	Launch MC-130:		
	a. 5/MC-130 Airborne	None	Go
	b. 4/MC-130 "	Reduced fuel for Helo's	Go, will provide t 19 operational bladders to compl mission
	c.<4/MC-130 Airborne	Insufficient fuel for Helo's	No Go/Delay 24 hr
	d.>1:00 delay in T/O	Will not get fuel to helo's in time for them to reach hideout by daylight	No Go/Delay 24 hr
2/1115Z (0615 Est)	KC-135 launch:		
	3 KC-135 Airborne	None	Go
	<3 KC-135 Airborne	Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling	No Go
2/1150Z (0650 Est)	2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch,	None	Go
	<2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch,	Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling	No go
2/1340Z (0840 Est)	MC-130 refueling:		
	5 successful	Sufficient fuel for 6 HELOS	Go
	4 successful	Sufficient fuel for 5 helos, can move camouflage to hideout	Go, Foldup 6th He and leave it + TA
	<4 successful	Insufficient fuel for Helos	No Go
2/1430Z (0930 Est)	Helo launch		
	a. 6/Helo airborne (5 wi Delta/1 Wi extra support equipment, i.e., portable TACAN plus camouflage nets)	Improves Delta's chances of having adequate helo support at the target	Go
	b.≥5/Helo airborne with no more than 1:00 delay	Max delay, AND MINIMUM ESSENTIAL and still be able to reach hide out by daylight with sufficient aircraft	If there is a dela instruct MC-130s t orbit
	c.<5/Helo airborne	Would unacceptably degrade equip and personnel for "Delta"	No/Go, delay 24 hr Inform MC-130's & KC-135's

< = less than
> = greater than
≤ = less than or equal to
≥ = greater than or equal to

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TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
	d.>1:00 delay	Cannot reach hideout by daylight	No Go, delay 24
2/1430Z 1515Z (0830 EST)	Helo goes down over water - Delta Helo down	Force unacceptably degraded	No Go, Recall He advise MC-130s t take 2nd refueli and RTB. Scramb SAR from Carrier advise KC-130s/A
	- Cargo Helo down	TACAN and camouflage nets gone	Option 1 - Delta Helos continue, launch SAR from Carrier Option 2 - Recal Helos advise MC- to refuel and RT launch SAR
2/1640Z (1130 EST)	MC-130 refueling: 5 successful	Sufficient fuel for 6 helos	Go
	4 successful	Sufficient fuel for 5 helos, can move camouflage to hide out	Go, Foldup 6th H and leave it + T
	<4 successful	Insufficient fuel for helos	No Go, recall He
2/1515Z 1810Z (1315 EST)	Helo goes down prior to turn around point: - Delta Helo down	Force unacceptably degraded - may lose TACAN and camouflage nets	Other 5 helos la and spread the l Advise MC-130 to delay by no. minutes required recovery. - If injuries: Option 1: 6th lands, dumps c if necessary, injured and re to carrier. Option 2: Abort recall helos, ad MC-130's RTB, ad KC-135's
	Cargo Helo down	Crew requires recovery	Option 1: Launcl Delta Helos conti

(U) TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPT
			Option 2: La of the other helos and lo crew member camouflage n each. The T should be ab go on one of helos. Advi MC-130's to
	More than one helo goes down	Force unacceptably degraded	Abort, recal advise MC-13 RTB, call fo KC-135 suppo
2/1810Z 1918Z (1310-1416 EST)	6 helos operational for entire route	Arrive at refueling with all Delta and extra equipment	Go
	Delta or cargo helo goes down, no injuries	Part of attack force down, must be recovered	Option 1: La helos and sp load. Conti refuel point Option 2: La helo and p/u plus crew. NOTE: Any o can recover plus the cre cargo helo i 2000 lbs lig
	Delta helo goes down with injuries	Force could be unacceptably degraded	Option 1: A proceed to r point, take fuel, return carrier. Option 2: Pr refuel point helo will re carrier with Remaining 4 on mission. No camouflag can be taken hideout)

(U) TIME	(U) EVENT/ SITUATIONS	(U) CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
2/1948Z (1446 EST)	Airdrop of fuel bladder: - 5 MC-130s make drop - 4 MC-130's make successful drop. Bladders loaded 5/aircraft; one aircraft only has 4.	Enough fuel for all 6 helos if all bladders OK Worst case, if no bladders break, there will be 19 available. Best case, 20 bladders available, can break one.	Go, can proceed number of helos desired Can go with 4 h if we get 19
	<4 MC-130's make successful drop or <19 bladders are usable.	Insufficient fuel for 4 helos to make target	Option 1: Try extract fuel fr extra helos so get 4 operationa Option 2: Spread personnel over 3 helos, strip and return to sh Option 3: Delay hours to get mo fuel the next ni
2/2248Z (1748 EST)	Helos launch from refueling: 6 helos airborne	Will have extra helo support for extraction	Go, use 6th helo carry max fuel
	5 helos airborne	Adequate support for extraction	Go, fold up 6th and leave it. E tract extra fuel operational helo
	4 helos airborne	Marginal support for extraction	Go, spread Delta Helo crews and equipment over operational helo
	3 helos airborne	Minimum helos for extraction	Option 1: Proce mission in degra status Option 2: Sprea personnel over 3 helos, strip dow and return to carrier. Option 3: Delay place 24 hrs. T to fix helos or more fuel, as re

TOP SECRET

(U) TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIC
	2 helos airborne	Inadequate helo support for mission	Option 1: Dela hours, try to helos or get fuel, as requ Option 2: Loac personnel on strip down anc to RV near bea Call for SAR. Option 3: Dela hours, fly per to Manzarieh to meet MC-13(Rangers. Option 4: Delt crews fly to vicinity of Da Takeover airf the next nigh MC-130's land extract.
	1 helo airborne	Same as above	Same as optio above except the one helo Delta from re point to vici of Darband
	Zero helos airborne	Same as above	Walk to Darban call for MC-1(when ready.
2/2248Z+ 1:00 (1748 + 1 Hr. EST)	Helos must be off by 2348Z	After this, cannot reach hideout by daylight	Delay 24 hour
2/2318 (1618 EST)	Helos pass point where they could turn around and return to carrier	Once beyond this point, the force is committed to Manzariyeh for extraction	JTF Commander recall the fo to the carrie contact means
2-3/2248Z 0124Z (1748 - 2024 EST)	Helo goes down between refueling point and Delta's dropoff point:		
	- 6 helos available cargo helo goes	Aircrew on the ground with camouflage nets	2 helos land crew and nets
	- 6 helos available, Delta helo goes	Delta force unacceptable degraded	3 helos land, Delta or crew

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TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISIONS/ACTIONS
			the cargo helo, Delta board each the other two he
	5 helos available, Delta helo goes	Same as above	4 helos land spr load the personn attempt lift off with nets, if un dump nets.
	4 helos available, Delta helo goes down	Same as above	Abort, strip dow spread personnel among 3 helos, proceed to hideo extract on MC-13 the next night.
	3 helos available Delta helo goes down.	Same as above	From here on we find a recovery airfield to secu and call for the MC-130's
3/0124Z (2024 EST)	Any major problem at the dropoff point	Mission could be blown and/or force degraded	Option 1: Abort, move to hideout, meet MC-130s nex night. Option 2: Contin ground commander's decision.
3/2200Z 2210Z (1700-1710 EST)	Helo goes down enroute to hideout	Will affect ability to perform extraction	If 3 or more helc available, contin if <3, inform Delt and abort to Manzariyeh.
3/0124Z 2135Z (2024 - 3/1635)	Delta is discovered enroute while helos are at hideout	With the force split Delta must be able to call the helos to a predetermined RV	Move helos at nig to RV to p/u Delt then to Manzariye for extraction.

(U) TIME	EVENT/ SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIC
3/1500Z (1000 Est)	AC-130 launch		
3/1630Z (1130 Est)	MC-130 Launch		GO
	5 MC-130 OK		
	4 MC-130 OK		
	3 "		
	2 "	Personnel jammed on A/C -	- P/U only hos
	<2 "	Unable to extract all hostages + Delta + Rangers (149 people) A	+ wounded - Direct [redacted] launch and P/U some leftovers
3/1545 (1045 Est)	KC-135 launch for MC-130		
	3 KC-135 OK		
	<3 " OK	Insufficient fuel for 5 MC-130	Refuel at leas MC-130, more i possible.
3/1605 (3/1105 Est)	KC-135 launch for AC-130 MC-130 refuel		
	>2 MC-130 OK		Go
	<2 MC-130 OK	Unable to extract all hostages + Delta and Rangers	Same as above
3/1900 (3/1400Est)	AC-130 Refuel MC-130 refuel	Same as above	Same as above
	>2 MC-130 OK		
	<2 MC-130 OK		
3/2135Z (1635Est)	Helo lift off from hideout		
	>3 RH-53 OK		Use extras (>3) CAS
	<3 RH-53 OK	Unable to lift out all hostages + Delta	- Cycle helos f Manzariyeh to Embassy
3/2230Z (1730Est)	MC-130's arrive at Manzariyeh find R/W blocked	- Unable to land secure airfield	- Paradrop Rang onto airfield - Wait for Delt helos to arri to secure field clear R/W
3/2230Z (1730Est)	Helos land at Embassy		
	5 RH-53 OK	Will have extra helos [redacted]	- Use extra hel [redacted]
	3 RH-53 OK	Min reqd helos for for extraction A	- Land helos si use other 2 for [redacted]
A	<2 RH-53 OK	Not sufficient helos for extraction	- Cycle helos f extraction
3/2230Z 2300Z (1730-1800Est)	[redacted]		

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
322452Z (1745 Est)	Extraction:		
	≥3 Helo's OK	Normal operation	Go
	≥1 Helo OK	Unable to extract all personnel	Cycle Helo's
	Zero Helo's OK	Unable to extract by Helo	Use ground vehicl to drive to Manzariych
3/2300Z (1800 Est)	Helo's arrive at Manzariych ≥3 RH-53 OK	All personnel can be extracted immediately on MC-130	Each MC-130 will leave as soon as loaded
	<3 RH-53 OK	Not all personnel can be recovered in single cycle	- MC-130's depart when loaded - Launch loaded
	<3 RH-53 w/5 MC-130	Helo's will be in cycle made with extra MC-130's on the ground	MC-130 plus 1 or extra MC-130
	Zero helo's OK	MC-130's will have to wait for personnel	- Keep all MC-130 ground till per sonnel arrive - Launch two MC-1 for cover relay or for departur
4/0015 (3/1915 Est)	AC-130 departs area		
4/0045 (3/1945 Est)	AC-130 refuel		
Movement of Delta	Delta is discovered	Mission if blown	- Have Delta set prearranged ral points. If discovered, dis engage, proceed to rally pt. When helo's lif off, direct the to appropriate P/U zone. - Establish Manzariyeh as rally point, He go to Manzariye if no contact with Delta

~~TOP SECRET~~

(#188)

1. Brother - Sister. I am a Moslem like you. I was an engineer in Mecca the home of G then I came to Iran. I was working in Kerman when revolution took place.

BARADAR - KHAHAR - MAN MESLE SHOMA MOSALMAN HASTAM. MAN MOHANDESE KHANEHE KHODA D MACCA BUDAM. BE IRAN AMADAM. DAR KERMAN BUDAM KE ENGHELAB SHOD.

2. A man took money from me to take me out of the country, but he brought me to Tehra He deceived me. Now I am alone without a place and food.

YEK MARD AZ MAN POOL GEREFT KE MARA KHAREJ KONAD VALI OU MARA GOOL ZAD VA BE TEHR AVARD. HALA TANHA VA BE DUNE JA VA GAZA HASTAM.

3. I have a wife, 5 small children, an old mother and father. They are waiting for m You may have children too. You have father and mother and you know how I feel.

MAN ZAN, VA PANJ BACH CHE KUCHAK MADAR VA PEDAR DARAM ANHA MONTAZERE MAN HASTAN SHOMA HAM BACHCHE - MADAR VA PEDAR DAREED VA MIDANEED HALLE MARA.

4. You Iranians and Moslems are famous for hospitality. For the sake of God help m I need your help.

SHOMA IRANIHA VA MOSALMANHA BE MEHMAN NAVAZI MAAROOF HASTEED. BE KHATERE KHODA I MAN KOMAK KONEED. I NEED YOUR HELP.

Classified By: ~~JCS~~ ~~OADR~~
Declassified ON:

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

HELP	KOMAK	کمک
COME HERE	BIYA ENJA	بیا اینجا
DON'T MOVE	TA KAN NA KHOR	تکان نخور
GET DOWN	BE KHAB	بخواب
SIT DOWN	BEN SHEINID	بنشینید
STAND UP	BOLAND SHOW	بلند شو
PUT DOWN	BEGZAR ZAMIN	بگزار زمین
OPEN	BAZ	باز کن
CLOSE	BAS TE	بسته
RIFLE	TOFANG	تفنگ
PISTOL	HAF TEAR	هفت تیر
KNIFE	CHA GHO	چاقو
AMMUNITION	FE SHANG	فشنگ
HAND GRENADE	NARENJAK	نارنجک
MACHINE GUN	MO SAL SAL	مسلسل
WE ARE BROTHERS	MA BARADAR HAS TEAM	ما برادر هستیم
IMAM	EMAM	امام
WHERE AM I	MAN KOJA HAS TAM	من کجا هستم
WHICH WAY IS	RAHE KOJAST	راه کجاست
NORTH	SHOMAL	شمال
SOUTH	JO NOB	جنوب
WEST	GHARB	غرب
EAST	SHARGH	شرق
ROAD	RAH	راه
TRAIN	GHATAR	قطار
BUS	AUTOBOS	اتوبوس
TAXI	TAXI	تاکسی

BICYCLE	DOCHARKHE	دوچرخه
MOTORCYCLE	MOTOR CEAK LET	موتورسیکلت
TRUCK (LORRY)	MACHINE BARY	کامیون
WATER	AB	آب
BREAD	NAN	نان
CLOTHES	LEBAS	لباس
BLANKET	PATO	پتو
SHOES	KAFSH	کفش
SOCKS	JORAB	جوراب
HAT	KOLAH	کلاه
COAT	COAT	کت
PANTS	SHALVAR	شلوار
OVERCOAT	PALTO	پالتو

TOP SECRET

لا اله الا الله محمد رسول الله

۱ - برادر - خواهر عزیز . من مثل شما مسلمان هستم . من در هلند خانه خدا کار میکردم و مهندس ساختمان هلند بودم . با ایران آمدم و در تهران کار میکردم که انقلاب شد .

۲ - هر دری از من پول گرفت که مرا به خارج از کشور ببرد ولی مرا گول زد و به تهران آورد و مرا کان در تهران سرگردان و بدون غذا و جا هستم .

۳ - من زن و پنج بچه کوچک و پدر و مادر پیر دارم که منتظر من هستند . شما هم بچه و لااقل پدر و مادر دارید و حال مرا می فهمید .

۴ - شما ایرانی هار مسلمان به مهمان نوازی و کمک کردن شهرت دارید بخاطر خدا بمن کمک کنید من به کمک شما نیاز دارم .

قربان شما .

TOP SECRET

[redacted]

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA 22030

1-191

REPLY TO ATTN OF INRA

17 MAR 1981

SUBJECT Worldwide Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Contingency Guide for Southwest Asia (IRAN, AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN), USAFINTEL 400-10 Volume I

TO JCS/J-3 SOD
Washington, DC

1. A copy of the SERE Contingency Guide for Southwest Asia with accompanying graphics, is at Attachment 1.

2. This Guide was produced by HQ AFIS/INR, Evasion and Escape/Prisoner of War Directorate of the Air Force Intelligence Service. Assistance in research and analysis is provided by selected members of the Air Force and Navy Intelligence Reserves.

3. Users are reminded that this Guide was primarily intended for use in operational evasion and escape (E&E) planning, E&E intelligence briefings, and various aspects of SERE training. Please refer to the introductory remarks and instructions contained in Section 01 for additional information on this Guide.

4. SERE Guides are furnished to designated Unified, Specified, and Major Commands and other special action agencies/offices noted in distribution list. Request that those distributees arrange for further reproduction and dissemination on a need-to-know basis to subordinate echelons or affiliated commands. Distribution for operational purposes will be determined by the primary distributees. This latter request is predicated on the limited printing and photo reproduction capabilities of the producer and a determination that the primary distributees should control distribution. Computer print tape versions of the Guide are not available.

5. SERE Guides are reviewed for currency as needed. Substantive changes will be forwarded to primary distributees as required.

6. Request that users forward comments, recommendations for improvements, and suggested additions or corrections directly to the producer, at the following address: HQ AFIS/INRA, Fort Belvoir, VA 22060

7. Compendia of plants, animals, diseases, and general survival information has been distributed to elements listed in Attachment 1 of this letter. We will no

[redacted]

[redacted]

Declassified by:
DPD NMCC
12 Aug 92

[redacted]

longer provide details and 35mm slides in each Guide for individual plants, animals or diseases. If detailed information is needed, users should refer to the compendia.

8. Due to an anticipated six to eight weeks delay in photographic reproduction, only the Potential Evasion Locales (PEL) graphic overlays are included with this volume. 35mm slides will be forwarded with Volume II.

9. When Attachment 1 is withdrawn or not attached, this letter becomes "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY".

Frank J Capillupo

FRANK J. CAPILLUPO, Lt Colonel, USAF
Director, Evasion and Escape/Prisoner Of War

1 Atch
SWA SERE Guide, 31 January 1981
[redacted] 1 Cy.

[redacted]

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

7 JANUARY 1981

SUBJ: ESCAPE AND EVASION

1. (U) (TS) The following Escape and Evasion plan is the final product, based on Option 12. This plan should be used in its entirety only if Option 12 is used.

2. (U) (TS) The intent of this plan is to provide an off-the-shelf capability to support Option 12 only. However, this document will hopefully also provide the framework for any other option to be developed.

DAVID G. PREVOST
Maj, USAF

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW OF 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
DECL OR DOWNGRADE TO Secret
REVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources
[redacted]
CONTAINS DERIVATIVELY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION CLASSIFIED BY: JCS-J3
DATE FOR ( ) DECLASSIFICATION OR (X) REVIEW IS: 6 JAN 2001

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ESCAPE AND EVASION

(U) REFERENCES: See basic OPLAN.

1. (U) SITUATION:

a. (U) Enemy. See Annex B, this OPLAN.

b. ~~(S)~~ Friendly. [redacted] However, there are several areas which are designated general Selected Areas For Evasion which should provide water, game, and opportunity to obtain shelter."

A,B,C

c. ~~(S)~~ (U) Assumptions

(1) ~~(S)~~ (U) The hostage recovery operation is conducted independent of other options/operations in the Persian Gulf area.

(2) ~~(S)~~ (U) Iranian military forces will oppose all post-operation evasion attempts.

(3) ~~(S)~~ (U) The Government of Iran will enlist all Iranians in evader location search, country-wide.

(4) The Iran-Iraq war zone limits any movement in the southwestern portion of Iran.

(5) Due to severe cold during Nov-Apr exfiltration by ground means other than vehicles into Turkey would be extremely hazardous.

(6) Although there are networks being used by Iranians opposed to the government to leave Iran covertly into Turkey, no penetration of their structure has yet been made. These networks are dominated by Kurds in the Tabriz and Rezayeh areas.

2. (S) MISSION: JTF forces will conduct evasion and escape operations, as required, to return all U.S. forces to U.S. or friendly country control.

3. (U) Execution:

a. (U) Concept of Operations. See basic OPlan

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REVIEW ON 5 JANUARY 2001

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Tabs -

A. E and E Phases
B. SAR SOP (1-75)
C. Evasion Aids
D. Visual Signals/LZ Markings
E. Communications Procedures

ESCAPE AND EVASION

Country Infil/Exfil

1. Upon boarding any fixed wing aircraft the senior ground commander, or his designated representative, will obtain from the navigator a 1:2,000,000 map with the legs of flight route (for both ingress and egress) depicted, to include approximate flight times for each major leg. (Map will remain with the aircraft). Ground element will then use this chart to flight follow and will be responsible for knowing the approximate position of the aircraft during ingress and egress. For short, rotary-wing legs of flight, the ground forces must flight-follow on their own maps.

2. Actions to be taken on forced/unplanned landing:

a. On decision to execute a forced landing, aircraft navigator will notify ground element commander of aircraft location.

b. Immediately upon stop, all personnel will comply with the directions of aircrew to exit the aircraft.

c. After rallying a safe distance from the aircraft, (500 meters west of the aircraft, if possible) the following actions will be take

(1) Injured/wounded cared for

(2) Establish local security

(3) Destroy classified material

(4) Inventory personal/aircraft survival and evasion aids.

(5) Senior ground element officer/NCO briefs all personnel on the evasion plan, i.e., breakup in groups and evade, stay together, stay with aircraft.

(a) The decision to take one of these options will depend on the security of the downed aircraft position. If the aircraft is not burning and the downed position is reasonably secure/remote, the first option will be to remain together and within 5 km of the aircraft. If possible, movement should be made on a cardinal heading from the aircraft position toward cover. Mark your direction of movement by placing a "T" (stem at least 15 ft in length) with the bottom of the "T" pointing south. This will be an authenticator. Any other direction of the "T" will indicate compromise. Place the "T" near the quarter of the aircraft, indicating your direction of movement.

(b) If the aircraft is burning or the landing is made in a populated or hostile area, a determination must be made whether to break into small groups and evade or to attempt to hide as a large group. In all probability, there would be no external SAR effort launched until the objective has been met and exfil is nearing an end. A 24 to 36 hour maximum prior to launch of a SAR effort is realistic. For the timeframe H+36 hours, all personnel should, if possible, attempt to remain in one group. Initial evasion should be attempted in the direction which will provide the most cover and security for the evaders.

(c) SAR forces should make contact within 36 hours of H-hour. In the time between downing and pick-up, a secure zone should be maintained with a safe access to an adequate helo landing area. For contact/pick-up procedures see SAR ANNEX.

(S)

[redacted]

1,B,C

(S)3. [redacted]

A ~~TAB~~ B SAR PLAN, 101st [redacted]

I. GENERAL:

A. Purpose: The purpose of this SOP is to outline the basic procedures that will be used by the 6 and 12 man SAR teams. This also outlines the basic organization, responsibilities, procedures and special equipment used by this team.

II. TEAM ORGANIZATION:

A 12-Man Team: The SAR Team should work as a 12-man team whenever possible to provide maximum coverage and security on the target. the 12-man SAR Team is broken down into two elements; the Personnel Rescue Element and the Security Element. The 12-man SAR Team breakdown to include primary and alternate duties are:

PERSONNEL RESCUE ELEMENT:

SAR Team Leader: Responsible for SAR Team; directs all actions on the objective; controls and directs all personnel on the ground; controls the use of the SAR aircraft; directs fire control and fire support.

Aid and Litter Team 1; Consists of 2 men; responsible for transporting all personnel from the right side of downed aircraft to appropriate SAR aircraft; responsible for security sweep of right side of aircraft; alternate demo team; alternate equipment destruction team; alternate aircraft entrance team.

Aid and Litter Team 2: Consists of 2 men; responsible for transporting all personnel including navigator from the left side of the downed aircraft to appropriate SAR aircraft; responsible for security sweep of left-side of aircraft; primary aircraft entrance team.

Aid and Litter Team 3: Responsible for acting as guides for all uninjured and slightly injured walking personnel to appropriate SAR aircraft; responsible for engine shut-down and equipment zero; responsible for pilot removal and transportation of injured pilots to appropriate SAR aircraft; primary demolition team/ primary equipment destruction team.

Counter: Responsible for accountability of all personnel being picked up according to each aircraft load. Directs flow of personnel being loaded to insure aircraft are loaded equally if possible.

Security Element: Responsible for security of target area while the Personnel Rescue Element works. If needed the Security Element may be reinforced by the Personnel Rescue Element upon direction of the SAR Team leader.

Assistant SAR Team Leader; Responsible for positioning security forces to secure SAR aircraft and personnel in the target area; keep SAR Team Leader informed on all security matters. Remain updated on all situations in order to assume command of the SAR team if necessary.
Security Personnel: Consists of 2 M-60 gunners and one assistant gunner; responsible for maintaining 100% alertness and observation; informs Security Team Leader of any approaching forces or dangers that may keep the SAR Team from completing its mission safely.

b. 6-Man Team: The capability of the 6-man SAR Team is greatly reduced in comparison to that of the 12-man SAR Team. However, there are situations when the reduced number of personnel would be favorable and still complete the mission. Such situations would include aircraft down due to maintenance where there are no injuries and the area is not populated or built-up. Aircraft down with only the flight crew on board could be handled by the 6-man team. The organization and the duties of the 6-man team follow closely those of the 12-man team:

Team Leader: Responsible for shut-down of engines; zeroing all secure equipment; security sweep of the aircraft; responsible for SAR Team and actions or objective.

Aid and Litter Team 1: Transporting all injured personnel to appropriate SAR aircraft; primary aircraft entrance team.

Aid and Litter Team 2: Guide for all uninjured and slightly injured personnel to appropriate aircraft; primary demo team; primary equipment destruction team.

Security Team: Consists of one M-60; protect the SAR aircraft; keep team leader informed of the security situation.

(C) III. Weapons and Equipment:

a. [redacted]

A, B

b [redacted]

c. [redacted]

d. Special Equipment:
Pry bars: 2
Bolt cutters: 2
POW kits: 8
M5 bags: 2
Airborne litters: 2
120' Rope: 2
Demo kits: 2
Fire Extinguishers: 2

IV. Chalk leads:

SAR Acft 1



SAR Acft 2:



1. Team Leader and Assistant Team Leaders should position themselves on the aircraft so that they are seated to the inside of the formation when flying staggered.
2. Teams should position themnselves together on chalk loading.
3. Key personnel and teams should be positioned where they can be controlled by the Team Leader.
4. Always cross load.

DOWNED AIRCRAFT

V. Landing Configuration:

a.



1. When landing aircraft on the target area SAR aircraft 1 faces the downed aircraft on the right side of the downed aircraft (right side in relation to the direction of flight)
2. SAR aircraft 2 lands to the left of the downed aircraft in relation to the direction of flight, facing the downed aircraft.
3. Spare aircraft should land close by to the downed aircraft maintaining a safety watch on the downed aircraft for any signs of fire.

5. If downed aircraft is in an area where a simultaneous landing by all three SAR aircraft is impossible, SAR aircraft 1 will land first, off-load SAR team and take off. Then SAR aircraft 2 will land to off-load SAR personnel and take off. The spare SAR aircraft will then land for loading of appropriate personnel and then take off. SAR aircraft 2 will land for loading followed by SAR aircraft 1. Landing will always be with the nose of the SAR aircraft pointed toward the target, if possible. Once an aircraft has cleared the PZ, that aircraft should signal clear to the next aircraft to land.

6. Should a SAR team have to off-load and move a considerable distance to secure a target, the drop-off LZ will be the primary PZ. Once a target is secure or located, an alternate PZ may be selected on the target area or enroute. This will be marked by an IR strobe light. If all three aircraft can land the IR strobe light marks aircraft 1's location. IR chemlights will mark the PZ for aircraft 2 and 3. If only one aircraft can land, the landing sequence will be aircraft 3, 2 then 1.

b. General Procedures:

(1) Once the aircraft has landed, all aid and litter teams 1 and 2 move to their respective areas on the downed aircraft and begin to remove personnel and equipment.

(2) Aid and litter team 3 move to the front of the downed aircraft, assemble all injured and mobile personnel, and guide them to the appropriate aircraft.

(3) The counter will count each individual as he loads the aircraft.

(4) A&L 1 and 2 will remove all injured personnel to appropriate aircraft from their location.

(5) A&L 3 will return and extract pilot and co-pilot.

(6) A&L 3 or 1 will then either destroy equipment or aircraft after A&L 3 or 1 zeros the equipment.

(7) Once personnel are removed, wepons and sensitive material will be removed and loaded on A&L team aircraft.

(8) SAR Team Leader will direct and supervise.

VI. Loading of Injured and Uninjured from Downed Aircraft:

a. Loading of uninjured or slightly injured:

(1). Enroute to objective, any uninjured or slightly injured mission ground team members including the pilot of the downed aircraft and who are able to continue the mission, will be loaded on the spare aircraft to continue the mission.

(2) The ground team leader will decide whether a man is able to continue his mission.

(3) The copilot, navigator and crew chief along with all injured personnel unable to continue the mission will be loaded equally on SAR aircraft 1 and 2 in order to receive medical attention.

(4) Injured will be loaded to the front first with their backs against the crucible.
(5) Load priority:
a. Mission able personnel
b. Walking wounded
c. Seriously injured
d. Dead

VII. Priorities of SAR Team At The Objective Area:
a. Security
b. Load uninjured and mission-able injured to continue mission.
c. Load seriously injured
d. Zero equipment and collect sensitive material and weapons.
e. Destruction of equipment and/or aircraft
f. Perform first aid in flight.

VIII. Actions Of Personnel In Downed Aircraft:
a. Shut down engines, fuel system and electrical system.
b. Assemble all injured at the nose of the downed aircraft.
c. Uninjured form local security in front of the aircraft.
d. Remove all weapons and sensitive material and secure.
e. Each individual should retain personal gear.
f. Attempt to zero all secure equipment and leave hood up as signal.to the SAR team that this has been accomplished.
g. Maintain a fire watch to provide warning if the aircraft catches fire.
h. Set up IR strobe to signal SAR aircraft that LZ is clear and secure.
i. Be prepared to assist Aid and Litter Teams.
j. Pilot is in charge of personnel until SAR arrives.

IX. Demolitions:
a. SAR team will be responsible for destruction of aircraft:
(1). No aircraft will be blown enroute to the objective. All secure gear and control panels will be smashed.
(2) Demolitions of aircraft enroute from objective to transload point:
a. Demo will be set on command of the SAR commander.
b. Demo will be set after area is clear just prior to SAR aircraft take off.
c. 5 minute time fuze will be used.
d. Primary demo location will be the left side fuel cap.
e. Alternate demo location will be inside the aircraft, next to the auxiliary fuel tanks.

X. Danger Area Security:

a. Security for 3 SAR aircraft:



Security for 3 SAR aircraft will be formed by placing half moon perimeters on each side. M60 #1 has front security. M60 #2 has rear security.

b. Security for additional aircraft:



For additional aircraft in the Laager area, the additional aircraft must land between SAR aircraft #1 and #2. Half moons will be to the front and rear with flank security provided by the door guns.

XI. Aircraft Accessories needed for SAR:
  a. Head sets for ground commander on each aircraft.
  b. All seats out except Pilot and navigator.

XII. Command and Signal:
  a. Communication:
    (1) Ground to air (SAR Team Leader to flight leader) FM (secure)
    (2) Communications between the 2 SAR elements while in the air will be conducted through the pilots' over-the-flight net.
    (3) SAR element communications while on the ground will be conducted over MX-360.
  b. Signals:
    (1) Downed aircraft signal, clear to land: IR strobe light.
    (2) 100% accountability of SAR team: up and down movement of Illum tape.

ANNEX:
1. Zeroing Secure Equipment
2. Location of Sensitive Material
3. SAR Support Plan from Objective Area

ANNEX 1 ZEROING SECURE EQUIPMENT TO SAR STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES.

A. General: There are a total of five pieces of equipment on a UH-60 to be zeroed to prevent compromising communications security. Four of five pieces of this equipment can be zeroed manually. The manual method will be used by the SAR element.

B. Location of equipment to be zeroed:

(1) The equipment to be zeroed is located in the nose of the aircraft.

(2) The nose hood can be lifted by releasing two latches.

(3) The nose hood may be secured with a lock. It can be easily broken by using a pry bar of axe.

(4) Once the hood is up, three of the items to be zeroed are located under a black cover which is along the back portion of the compartment. This cover can be removed by pulling the cover off. The equipment will be three gray boxes side by side. Each has a sliding type button on the front. To zero, slide each button up.

(5) Item number four is a black box located to the right, in the main compartment. It can be zeroed by pushing a button located on the front of the box.

(6) Item number five is a long gray box located in the center of the compartment. It can only be zeroed from the pilot control panel. Facing the panel, the knob to zero the equipment is to the left of the flight instruments. The knob must be turned all the way to the left to zero it.

(7) Once zeroed, all equipment will be smashed with an axe unless the aircraft is being destroyed. The instrument panel and navigational computer will also be smashed.

ANNEX 2 - LOCATION OF SENSITIVE MATERIAL TO SAR SOP

..A. General: To insure the successful recovery of sensitive papers, codes, and maps, these items should be kept in a single location when not in use. They should be in some type of binder or folder. This container should be located between the copilot's seat and the instrument console.

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ANNEX 3 - SAR SUPPORT PLAN FROM OBJECTIVE AREA TO SAR SOP

SAR Flight #1

-10: PW's

-11: PW's

-12: SAR Element

-Empty Hawk

SAR FLIGHT #2

-#6: PW's

-#7: PW's

-#13: SAR Element

-Empty Hawk

A, B [redacted]

SAR FLIGHT # 3:

-Pavelow or Hawk

-Pavelow or Hawk

-Pavelow or Hawk

-#2 Security Elem.(Black)

-Empty Hawk

-Empty Hawk

SAR FLIGHT # 4:

-Pavelow or Hawk

-Pavelow or Hawk

-Pavelow or Hawk

-#3 Security Elem (Black)

-Empty Hawk

-Empty Hawk

TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET

"BLOOD CHIT"

1. Brother- Sister. I was an engineer in Mecca, the home of God, then I came to Iran. I was in Ahwaz when the Iraqis attacked.

BARADAR - KHAHAR. MAN MOHANDESE KHANEHE KHODA DAR MACCA BODAM. BE IRAN AMADAM. DAR VAKTI KE IRAQIAN TAARUZ KARDAND MAN DAR AHVAZ BODAM.

2. A man took money from me to take me out of the country, but he brought me to Tehran. He deceived me. Now I am alone without a place and food.

YEK MARD AZ MAN POOL GEREFT KE MARA KHAREJ KONAD VALI OU MARA GOOL ZAD VA BE TEHRAN AVORD. HALA TANHA VA BE DONE JA VA GAZA HASTAM.

3. I have a wife, 5 kids, an old mother and father. They are waiting for me. You may have kids, you have father and mother and you know what I feel.

MAN ZAN, PANJ BAHCHE, MADAR VA PEDAR-E-PEER DARAM. ANHA MONTAZERE MAN HASTAND. SHOMA HAM BAHCHE- MADAR VA PEDAR DAREED VA MIDANEED HALLE MARA.

4. You Iranians and Moslems are famous for hospitality. For the sake of God, help me. I need your help.

SHOMA IRANI HA VA MOSALMAN HA BE MEHMAN MAVAZI MAAROOF HASTEED. BE KHATERE KHODA BE MAN KOMAK KONEED. MAN KOMAK MIKHAM.

HELP	KOMAK	کمک
COME HERE	BIYA ENJA	بیا اینجا
DONT MOVE	TA KAN NA KHOR	تکان نخور

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

GET DOWN	BE KHAB	بخواب
SIT DOWN	BENESHEE	بنشین
STAND UP	BOLAND SHOW	بلند شو
PUT DOWN	BEGZAR ZAMIN	بگزار زمین
OPEN	BAZ KON	باز کن
CLOSE	BASTE	بسته
RIFLE	TOFANG	تفنگ
PISTOL	HAFTEAR	هفت تیر
KNIFE	CHAGHO	چاقو
AMMUNITION	FESHANG	فشنگ
HAND GRENADE	NARENJAK	نرنجک
MACHINE GUN	MOSALSAL	مسلسل
WE ARE BROTHERS	MA BARADAR HAS TEAM	ما برادر هستیم
IMAM	EMAM	امام
WHERE AM I	MAN KOJA HASTAM	من کجا هستم؟
WHICH WAY IS	RAHE _____ KOJAST	راه ـــــ کجاست
NORTH	SHOMAL	شمال
SOUTH	JONOB	جنوب
WEST	GHARB	غرب
EAST	SHARGH	شرق
ROAD	RAH	راه
TRAIN	GHATAR	قطر
BUS	AUTOBOS	اتوبوس
TAXI	TAXI	تاکسی
BICYCLE	DOCHARKHE	دوچرخه
MOTORCYCLE	MOTOCEAKLET	موتوسیکلت
TRUCK	KAMYUN	کامیون

TOP SECRET

WATER	AB	آب
BREAD	NAN	نان
CLOTHES	LEBAS	لباس
BLANKET	PATO	پاتو
SHOES	KAFSH	کفش
SOCKS	JORAB	جراب
HAT	KOLAH	کلاه
COAT	COAT	کوت
PANTS	SHALVAR	شلوار
OVERCOAT	PALTO	پالتو

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~~NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY OPERATIONAL GROUP
US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMAND
FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755

1-194

IAGPC-OP

23 May 1980

SUBJECT: FISCAL/Man Hour Expenditures (U)

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ REDUCED TO CONFID
REVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

Special Operations Division
Room 2C840 Pentagon
ATTN: LTC [redacted]
Washington, DC 20310

1. (U) Reference phonecon between LTC [redacted] and LTC [redacted] on 20 May 80, subject: SAB.

2. (~~S/NOFORN~~) Per request, above reference, the following information is provided. Operational expenses were incurred during the perio[redacted] 80.

[redacted]

a. [redacted]

(1) [redacted]	$15,000	
(2) [redacted]	2,825	
(3) [redacted]	1,750	
(4) [redacted]	1,700	
(5) [redacted]	5,990	
(6) [redacted]	2,000	
(7) [redacted]	2,500	
SUB TOTAL		$31,765

b. O&MA

(1) Travel, Lodging Per Diem Expenses (Europe)	$5,000	
(2) CONUS Travel/Per Diem	9,000	
SUB TOTAL		$14,000

c. Total Expenditures $45,765

d. In addition to the above, additional expenditures are required due to the fact that [redacted] are continuing in CONUS. [redacted] is being considered for

CLASSIFIED BY DIAM 58-11, ENCL 3
REVIEW 23 MAY 2000

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IAGPC-OP 23 May 1980

SUBJECT: FISCAL/Man Hour Expenditures (U)

[redacted] Estimated expense for the remainder of [redacted] is [redacted]

3. ~~(S/NOFORN)~~ The following is a breakout of the total manhours committed exclusively for the coordination, control, and tasking of [redacted]

a. HQ INSCOM (ADCSOPS) (Approx. 5 persons)		50
b. HQ [redacted]		
(1) Operations Section - (8 persons)	321	
(2) Collection Requirements Section (3 persons)	191	
SUB TOTAL (11 persons)		512
c. [redacted]		
(1) Command/Operations (2 persons)	376	
(2) Case Officers (4 persons)	1256	
SUB TOTAL (6 persons)		1632
d. Total Manhours (22 persons)		2194

FOR THE COMMANDER:

[redacted]
LTC, MI
Operations Officer

Copy Furnished:
ADCSOPS
[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E-198

1 SOW

TOR 231706Z

~~BKEJKCILHLDPANRQ~~
TLMSG NO: 0123
DTG: 231655Z MAY 80
FM: 1 SOW/A-2
TO: JTF/J-2

~~T O R S E C R E~~ T

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
REFERENCE: YOUR MSG/ DTG 221527Z MAY 80 (SAME SUBJECT)

1. THE BEST ESTIMATE OF INTELLIGENCE MAN HOURS EXPENDED IN SUPPORT OF THE MISSION ARE AS FOLLOWS:
   A. 7 NOV 79 TO DEPLOYMENT DATE: 3,600 MAN HOURS (INCLUDES JTF MISSION INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT AT [redacted]
   B. DEPLOYMENT DATE TO 30 APR 80: 1200 MAN HOURS.

2. ALL FIGURES INCLUDE ESTIMATE OF [redacted] INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL WHO WERE INVOLVED.

RVW 23 MAY 00
BT

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CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
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DISPOSITION FORM

For use of this form, see AR 340-15, the proponent agency is TAGCEN.

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL	SUBJECT
IAFM-OPS-HU-SA	Intelligence Support

i-195

TO Special Operations Div (SOD)
JCS
Pentagon
ATTN: LTC [redacted]

FROM ADCSOPS-HUMINT
USAINSCOM

DATE 22 May 1980 CMT 1
LTC [redacted] glf/7829

G

1. Per your request, the following data pertaining to subject is provided:

a. 129 intelligence reports were prepared and disseminated to your organization during the period 23 Nov 79 to 23 May 80. Approximately 1032 manhours were expended in data acquisition, transcription/assembly, and preliminary analysis of these reports

b. Courier distribution of the finished intelligence reports is estimated at 104 manhours.

c. General intelligence analysis, asaembly of operational data, analyst-analyst meetings, and other operational planning activities are estimated at 160 manhours.

d. Total estimated manhour expenditure by this activity in support of your requir ments is 1296 manhours.

2. Other fiscal expenditures are estimated as follows:

a. 129 cassette tapes = $225.75.

b. Incidental technical equipment = $4.96.

c. Facilities rental = $153.61.

d. Mileage reimbursement for mission essential POV travel = $310.00.

e. Total monetary expenditure is estimated at $694.32.

3. INSCOM Action Officer is LTC [redacted] IAFM-OPS-HU-SA, AVN:923-7829/2769, CIV:(301)677-7829/2769.

G [redacted]

[redacted]

G

G

The three day period of intencive support from 220600 April 80 to 250230 April 80 resulted in a dedication of approximately 236 manhours, of which 160 hrs are already included in para 1d above. Again, I stress that overall figures are on the conservative side.

Regard, [redacted]

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OAD
Declassified by:

DA FORM 1 FEB 62 2496 REPLACES DD FORM 96, WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WORKING PAPER 4

NOV 77 - 30 April 80

	MANHOURS	EXCESS COST
DIA	min 35,000	~~$6,000~~
DMA	(14,094 (?)	#50,000
ARMY (CACW)	2,194	50,000
(WWH)	1,032	,700
USAF (7602)	525	8,000
(OSI)	79	
(Poly)	120	# 128 (1,000)
	~~49,984~~	#165,828

50,000

(S) OPERATIONAL FORCES

- SADD	—	6,132	—
- [redacted]	—		—
- 1/SOW	—	4,800	— 3,000
JTF	—	5,000	— 5,000
		15,932	~~#123,828~~ 126,000

A 17,000

Classified By: ~~JCS~~ DDDNMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: PPO NMCC 12 Aug 92

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ WORKING PAPER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOD SUMMARY SHEET (1-201) Hold

TO:	CLASSIFICATION	SOD CONTROL NUMBER
CJCS	~~TOP SECRET~~	

SUBJECT:	ACTION			
	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
Blivet Drop Concept ~~(TS)~~ (U)			X	

REMARKS

1. ~~(TS)~~ (U) The attached concepts were developed in response to verbal instructions.

2. ~~(TS)~~ (U) Three options are outlined. They are as follows:

- 2 Night Option
- 3 Night Option
- 4 Night Option

Classified By: DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

ACTION OFFICER	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
[redacted] COL, USA SOD, J-3 EXT 55078	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
	J- P						
	EXEC						
	TM CHF						
	VCOPG						
	COPG						
DATE OF PREPARATION							
28 March 80							

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WORKING PAPER
(Destroy when no longer needed)

I. SUBJECT: Blivet Drop Concept.

II. PURPOSE: To address the blivet drop concept.

III. MAJOR POINTS:

A. The helos must be refueled at some point along the ingress route.

B. Blivet drop specifics:

- The blivets are 500 gal collapsable fuel bladders of which approximately 450 gal can be pumped into the helicopters.
- If Delta and attachments were transported aboard helicopters from the carrier to a HLZ, a minimum of six helicopters would be required.
- A minimum of 28 blivets are required to refuel the helos at the selected refuel site.
- Six MC-130s can deliver 30 blivets, 3 M-274 (mules) and associated pumps.

C. Operational Concepts

OPTION 1:

- Delta is prepositioned on the carrier with helicopter crews.
- First night. 6 MC-130s insert 30 blivets and a four man (approx) refuel party by parachute at a remote refuel site. The refuel party will consist of Delta personnel so as not to overload the helos during the flight to Tehran. The refuel party will position the blivets,

check the pumps and camouflage the equipment. If the refuel party reports breakage, the operation will be delayed one night and an additional paradrop conducted the next night to replace the required items.

- Second night. If there are no problems, 6 helos with Delta onboard will fly to the refuel site and conduct refueling operation. The refuel party will depart on the helos with the Delta force.

- Due to the decreasing hours of darkness, the helos will not be able to fly all the way to the original HLZ/hideout. The helos will stop at a new HLZ/hideout located approximately 1-1 1/2 hours from the original HLZ. The helos and Delta will hideout at this location until 1930 hrs. The helos will then fly to the original HLZ arriving at approximately 2100 hours. The Delta force will be met by trucks at this location and proceed immediately into Tehran to conduct the rescue. Extraction will be as originally planned at Manzariyeh.

OPTION 2:

- Delta is prepositioned on carrier.

- MC-130s prepositioned at [redacted]

- 1st Night - 6 MC-130s and C-130 (AWADS) deliver by parachute 35 fuel blivets and a refueling team (4-6 man) into a designated remote LZ along helicopter ingress

route. Team recovers, inspects, positions, and camouflages blivets and equipment. Status report rendered.

- 2nd Night. If required, MC-130s deliver replacement blivets and equipment prior to helicopter arrival. Six helicopters with Delta aboard launch from carrier and proceed to refueling site. Helicopters refuel, recover refueling party and proceed to hide site.

- 3rd Night. Helicopters depart hide site, deliver Delta to drop site and then proceed to a temporary hide site. Delta moves [redacted] to a holding area; conducts reconnaissance. Delta moves into position and assaults compound. Delta extracted from compound and stadium by helicopter and evacuated Manzariyeh air field. Manzariyeh evacuation would be as originally planned.

OPTION 3:

- Prepositioning same as Option 2 above.

- First Night. Same as Option 2 above.

- 2nd Night. Same as Option 2 above.

- 3rd Night. Helicopters depart initial hide site, proceed to Delta drop off point and then enter a new hide site. Delta moves [redacted] to ware house. Conducts coordination with in-country assets and prepares for leaders recon.

- 4th Night. Delta moves from hide site and assaults compound as envisioned in current plan. Compound extraction and Manzariyeh evacuation would also be as originally planned.

SOD SUMMARY SHEET

JCS/J-3	CLASSIFICATION ~~TOP SECRET~~	SOD CONTROL NUMBER 1-203

SUBJECT:

equest for MC-130 Flight Across [redacted]

ACTION			
APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
X	X		

REMARKS

. (TS) The attached message requests RADM Packer to task one EUCOM C-130 to fly a survey route across [redacted] The purpose of the light is to attempt to [redacted] Routing will approximate hat to be flown during the rescue mission.

. (U) (TS) Full requirements for mission to include routing, timing, ltitudes, etc. have been passed telephonically to [redacted] at OTFE.

. (U) Request signature on attached message. SOD will deliver to SSO rivacy Communication Office upon approval.

Point Paper on MC-130 Signature [redacted]

Classified By: ~~J~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

CTION OFFICER	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
[redacted]	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
OD, J-3	J P						55079
XT 55078	EXEC						
	TM CHF						
	VCOPS						
	COPS						
ATE OF PREPARATION							
4 March 80							

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE	DRAFTER OR RELEASER TIME	PRECEDENCE ACT	PRECEDENCE INFO	LMF	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY DATE-TIME	MONTH	YR
01 OF		00			TT			MAR	80

BOOK | MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: JCS

TO: SSO USEUCOM

~~TOPSECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY

PERSONAL FOR RADM PACKER, EUCOM/J3 FROM LTGEN SHUTLER, JCS/J3

SUBJ: CONFIRMATION OF REQUEST FOR ROUTE ACROSS [redacted] (TS)

REF: TELECON BETWEEN RADM PACKER AND LTGEN SHUTLER

1. (TS) REFERENCE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WAS TO ASCERTAIN AVAILABILITY OF MC-130 AIRCRAFT TO FLY A PRESCRIBED ROUTE FROM [redacted] TO [redacted]

2. (TS) REQUEST ONE MC-130 BE TASKED TO FLY FROM [redacted] VIA NORMAL AIRWAYS TO [redacted] PROPOSE THAT, IF POSSIBLE WITHIN NORMAL CLEARANCE PROCEDURES, AUTHORITY BE REQUESTED FOR THE FLIGHT TO DEVIATE FROM STANDARD AIRWAYS TO CONDUCT LOW LEVEL TRAINING DURING THE RETURN FLIGHT. FULL PARTICULARS, OBJECTIVES, ROUTING AND OTHER RELATED INFORMATION HAVE BEEN PASSED TO [redacted] OF SOTFE/J3.

REVW 25 MAR 00

DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS

DISTR:

DRAFTER TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL, PHONE & DATE | SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

RELEASER

TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE

SIGNATURE | SECURITY CLASSIFICATION | DATE TIME GROUP

DD FORM 1 JUL 73 173 (OCR)

S/N [illegible] CONFIDENTIAL

☆U.S.G.P.O. 1979-291-118

JOINT MESSAGEFORM

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE	DRAFTER OR Rreleaser TIME	PRECEDENCE ACT	PRECEDENCE INFO	LMF	CLASS	CIC	FOR MESSAGE CENTER/COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ONLY DATE-TIME	MONTH	YR
01 OF BOOK		00			TT			MAR	80

MESSAGE HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS

FROM: JCS

TO: SSO USEUCOM

~~TOPSECRET~~ NOFORN EYES ONLY

PERSONAL FOR RADM PACKER, EUCOM/J3 FROM LTGEN SHUTLER, JCS/J3

SUBJ: CONFIRMATION OF REQUEST FOR ROUTE ACROSS [redacted] ~~(C) ITSJ~~

REF: TELECON BETWEEN RADM PACKER AND LTGEN SHUTLER

1. ~~(C) ITSJ~~ REFERENCE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WAS TO ASCERTAIN AVAILABILITY OF MC-130 AIRCRAFT TO FLY A PRESCRIBED ROUTE FROM [redacted] TO [redacted]

2. ~~(C) ITSJ~~ REQUEST ONE MC-130 BE TASKED TO FLY FROM [redacted] VIA NORMAL AIRWAYS TO AND FROM [redacted] FULL PARTICULARS, OBJECTIVES, ROUTING AND OTHER RELATED INFORMATION HAVE BEEN PASSED TO [redacted] OF SOTFE/J3.

DELIVER DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS.

DISTR:

[redacted] DATE

J-3, EXT 55078

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

RELEASER

TYPED NAME, TITLE, OFFICE SYMBOL AND PHONE

SIGNATURE

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

DATE TIME GROUP

DD FORM 1 JUL 73 173 (OCR) S/N 0102-LF-001-6000 ☆U.S.G.P.O. 1979-281-118

Alternate Version

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

i-204

(C) FROM SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC

TO AMEMB[redacted]

PERSONAL FOR AMBASSADOR[redacted]

SUBJ: C-130 USE OF [redacted] (U)

1. (S) TO FACILITATE SHIFT FROM [redacted] OF FLEET SUPPORT OPERATIONS, AS AGREED DURING RECENT NEGOTIATIONS ON ACCESS, AND TO CONDUCT TRAINING EXERCISES WITH AND SUPPORT OF TF-70, EMBASSY IS REQUESTED TO FORMALLY APPROACH GOVERNMENT OF [redacted] FOR USE OF [redacted] 18-26 APRIL. THIS ACTIVITY IS OF AN URGENT NATURE AND MUST BE CONDUCTED DURING THE PERIOD SPECIFIED IN ORDER TO MESH WITH TF 70 CHANGEOVER SCHEDULE.

2. (S) SEA SURVEILLANCE TRAINING EXERCISES/SUPPORT MISSIONS WOULD BEGIN ABOUT 18 APRIL. APPROXIMATE SCHEDULE IS FOR ONE MC-130 TO ARRIVE FROM [redacted] ON 18 APRIL, TWO MC-130S FROM [redacted] ON 20 APRIL AND THREE C-130S/ONE MC-130 FROM [redacted] ON 22 APRIL. IN ADDITION, WE WOULD EXPECT TO OPERATE C-130 MISSIONS FROM [redacted] PROVIDING SUPPLY SUPPORT FOR THESE ACTIVITIES ON 18, 22 AND 24 APRIL, AND ONE OR TWO C-141 SUPPORT MISSIONS FROM [redacted] ON 24 APRIL. WE ANTICIPATE NO MORE THAN EIGHT AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND AT ANY ONE TIME. THIS EXERCISE IS PLANNED AT THIS TIME TO LAST ONLY A FEW DAYS. A TOTAL OF APPROXIMATELY 100-125 PERSONNEL WOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE EXERCISE, AND THEY WILL BE PREPARED TO PROVIDE THEIR OWN FOOD AND BILLETING.

3. (S) FUEL REQUIREMENTS (JET A-1) FOR THE AIRCRAFT WILL BE A TOTAL OF 175,000 U.S. GALLONS. COMPENSATION FOR FUEL WILL BE PROVIDED BY AF FORM 15 WHICH CAN BE PROCESSED THROUGH THE DAO.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

25B21

[redacted]

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Declassified ON: OADR

4. (S) FOR PURPOSE OF THIS OPERATION WE DESIRE BLANKET DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE FOR OPERATIONS AT [redacted] 18-26 APRIL WITHOUT DIPLOMATIC NOTES SUBMITTED AS PRESENTLY REQUIRED ON EACH AIRCRAFT IN ADVANCE. HOWEVER, FLIGHT DATA FOR INDIVIDAUL AIRCRAFT OPERATIONS WILL BE PROVIDED BY ICAO FLIGHT PLANS.

5. (S) [redacted], PLUS TWO, WILL BE IN COUNTRY MISSION COORDINATOR. THEY WILL ARRIVE [redacted] ON 15 OR 16 APRIL AND CONTACT EMBASSY PERSONNEL PRIOR TO TRAVEL TO [redacted]

6. (S) REQUEST YOU APPROACH [redacted] GOVERNMENT AT HIGHEST LEVEL AND OBTAIN APPROVAL AS SOON AS PRACTICAL BUT NOT LATER THAN APRIL 16. ABOVE INFORMATION CAN BE RELEASED ON A CLOSE HOLD BASIS AS NECESSARY TO SECURE APPROVAL.

DECL 14 APR 86

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNN

00 2014[illegible] APR 83
FM CO JTF, SITE ALPHA
TO [illegible] JTF, WASH DC

0011

~~SECRET~~

(*) JUST LEARNED FROM LOCAL USAF BASE COMMANDER THAT THE LOCAL [redacted] SECURITY FORCE COMMANDER, A FIRST LIEUTENANT MAY ATTEMPT TO OBSERVE EACH OD OUR ARRIVING AIRCRAFT LOADS WHICH ARE DUE IN TONIGHT. HE TAKES ORDERS ONLY FROM [redacted] HENCE HE CANNOT BE INFLUENCED BY THE LOCAL COMMANDER. WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO LOCATE GEN [redacted] IN [redacted] TO ASK HIS HELP. HAVE LOW CONFIDENCE THAT WE CAN WORK THIS PROBLEM SATISFACTORY FROM HERE. PLEASE ASK HIGHEST LEVELS THERE TO HELP. MEANWHILE WE WILL DO WHAT WE CAN FROM HERE.

E

#263

Classified By: [redacted] DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Apr 83

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GT 03102

JB

DTG 152322Z APR 80
FM: JTF/LTC [redacted]
TO:SITE ALPHA/LT COL [redacted]

[redacted]
PASS TO JOSE MODIC, [redacted]
LT COL [redacted] IS NOW SAC TANKER TASK FORCE COMMANDER. EFFECTIVE
23 APR 80 LT COLL [redacted] ILL BECOME TTFC.
BT

E, G

#i-262

NNNNOT

Classified By: DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0015

TOT | 202035E
VC

DTOD201900Z APR 80
FM : JTF
TO: JCS/ RC
~~[illegible]~~
SUBJ: JTF SITREP NO 1(AS OF 2[illegible]Z)
(C) 1. JTF FORCE ARRIVALS ARE AS FOLLOWS:
A. JTF STAFF AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL (41 TOTAL) ARRIVED [redacted] 200032Z APR
B. HELO FORCES AND CARRIER LIAISON GROUP (63 PERSONNEL) ARRIVED [redacted] 200[illegible] AND NIMITZ 200515Z.
C. TWO MC-130 ARRIVED [redacted] FROM [redacted] 200810Z/[illegible]Z.
D. TWO KC-135 TANKERS ARRIVED [redacted] 201405/1410Z.
(C) 2. JTF FORCES NOW ON STATION:

A. JTF STAFF AT [redacted]

B. THREE MC-130S AT [redacted]
C. EIGHT HELOS AND CROWS ON NIMITZ

D. THREE KC 135 TANKERS AT [redacted]

E. FOUR KC-135 TANKERS AT [redacted].

(U) 3. OPERATION PREPARATIONS PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY.

(C) 4. COMMUNICATIONS:
A. [redacted] SYSTEMS HAVE BEEN EXPERIENCING NOISE BURST DURING PERIODS WHEN INSUFFICIENT POWER IS TRANSMITTED TO THIS LOCATION THESE BURST ARE DISRUPTIVE TO SECURE VOICE AND DATA COMMUNICATIONS. ASSISTANCE HAS BEEN REQUESTED FROM YOUR HQ. B. ALL CIRCUITS UP AT THIS TIME.

XXXXXVOLUTARY CORRECTION: PART 1.PARAGRAPH "B" CHANGE TO READ 63 PERSONNEL IHI 63 PERSONNEL VICE 65 PERSONNEL.
BT

E

E

B

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Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

NNNN

MESSAGE 03 RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT | 202005Z
BDU

0016

[redacted]

258

PRIORITY

FM: JTF NINITE (PITMAN)

E TO: JTF [redacted] VAUGHT)

G JCS (JCS) [redacted]

SUBJ: HELO DET. STATUS (U)

(U) 1. [redacted] TONIGHT'S PERSONAL RECON INDICATES HELO LAUNCH COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AS EARLY AS 1500Z (1900 LCL) BASED ON ACTUAL LEVEL OF DARKNESS. ACTUAL COAST IN WILL OCCUR ABOUT 25 MIN AFTER LAUNCH. THIS WILL PERMIT A SLIGHTLY EARLIER ARRIVAL AT REFUEL POINT.

E, A (U) 2. [redacted] NON-RFI PINS, SERNOS [illegible] AND [illegible] RETURNED TO [redacted] TODAY VIA MAC [illegible]. DOCUMENT INDICATED MARCH AFB AS FINAL DESTINATION.

[redacted]

Classified by: DDO NMCC
Declassify on: OADR

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

FDSCTOUP XFX

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

0825
0 212745Z APR 80
FM SITE ALFA/J2
TO JCS/RC-J2
BT
~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJ: TGT PRIORITIES

TOT / 0905
RC /

(C) 1. COMJTF HAS REQUESTED A J2 RECOMMENDATION ON WHICH OF THE TARGET ALREADY NOMINATED SHOULD BE ATTACKED BY [redacted] PROTECT/ENCHANCE MSN. CHOICES INCLUDE:

A
A. [redacted]
B. [redacted]
C. [redacted]
D. [redacted]
E. [redacted]
F. [redacted]
G. [redacted]

(C) 2. OTHER FACTORS TO CONSIDER: [redacted] IN A PREVIOUS CONVERSATION. AL MAJ [redacted] INDICATED [redacted] ESPECIALLY AT [redacted] WOULD POSE A THREAT TO [redacted] AND OTHER AIRCRAFTWIN THE AREA. USING THEIR OWN ON-BOARD RADAR. HE ALSO INDICATED [redacted]

A,B,C

[redacted] WHAT DO OTHER AGENCIES SAY ABOUT WHERE AGENT A/C ARE KEPT?

A [redacted] MEANING VITAL [redacted] NEED TO BE [redacted] BEFORE [redacted]

(C) 3. WITH SOME OF THE ABOVE IN MIND, [redacted] APPRECIATE AN RC/J2 RECOMMENDATION ON WHICH [redacted] AND IN WHAT ORDER (WITH SPECIAL CONSIDERATION TO FIGHTER THREAT ASSESSMENT AND HOW BEST TO NEUTRALIZE.)

A

BT
#0825

NNNNAAAA

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DCL EO-CONFIRM TO CONFID
REVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources
JS, [redacted]

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT 09557
PA

#247

SSN 0027
O 210935Z APR 80
FM SITE ALFA/J2
TO JCS/RC-J2
BT
~~T O P S E C R E T~~
E ~~(C)~~ SUBJECT: [redacted] REACTION TO US OVERFLIGHTS
DURING EXECUTION PHASE.
~~(C)~~ 1. REQUEST J2 UPDATE ON PROBABLE [redacted]
REACTION IF KC-135'S OR OTHER MSN A/C
ARE DETECTED OVER [redacted] IF
THEY SCRAMBLE FIGHTERS AND IDENTIFY
A/C AS U.S.. WILL THE [redacted]
A. ATTEMPT TO FORCE THE US A/C TO LAND.
B. ESCORT US A/C OUT OF [redacted] AIRSPACE
C. ENGAGE IF US A/C DO NOT COMPLY WITH
E [redacted] INSTRUCTIONS
~~(C)~~ 2. IF [redacted] FIGHTERS CANNOT IDENTIFY OUR
A/C, WILL THEY ENGAGE THEM?
BT
#0027

NNNN
AAK

Classified By: DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*236

DTG 030522

FM JTF 7
TO NIMITZ
[redacted]T
[redacted] HELO LOADS AT DESERT
1. DELTA HAS 87 MEN (LESS DRIVERS AND MONITORS)
270 LBS PER MAN. 87 DELTA PLUS 2
DELTA RTOS ABOARD SHIP, 3 MONITORS, PLUS
2 RED EYE GUNNERS (FOUR WEAPONS), 5
DRIVERS, 7 [redacted] FOR A TOTAL OF
116 PERS. WITH THE NUMBER OF PAX
WEAPONS, AND AMMO DELTA WILL WEIGH 5200
LBS PER HELO (6 HELOS). RECOGNIZE
THAT THIS IS 400 LBS OVER YOUR MAX.
REQUEST THAT YOU REDUCE
TO ONE 50 CAL AND ONE GUNNER.
PUT ALL SECOND 50 CALS AND SECOND GUNNERS
ON SEVENTH RH 53. IF ONLY SIX A/C MAKE REFUEL SITE
THEN SECOND 50 CALS AND GUNNERS PLUS CREW FROM SEVENTH A/C
WILL COME BACK VIA C-130. IF SEVEN
AIRCRAFT DEPART DESERT AND ONE GOES DOWN INROUTE THEN SECOND
50 CALS WILL HAVE TO BE LEFT AT P/U SITE. IF SEVEN AIRCRAFT
MAKE IT TO HIDE OUT THEN SECOND 50 CAL AND GUNNER WILL BE PUT
BACK ON 6 RH-53'S
2. REQUEST THAT YOU PERSONALLY INSPECT ALL HELOS TO ENSURE NO
EXTRA WEIGHT IS TAKEN.
3. DETAILED WT. AND COMPOSITION OF EACH LOAD FOR SIX RH-53'S
WILL BE SENT IN APPROX 8 HOURS.
4. IF EIGHT RH-53 IS OP READY FLY IT, EMPTY LOAD, AS FAR INTO
MISSION AS POSSIBLE. COL KYLE HAS ASSURED ME THAT SUFFICIENT
FUEL IS ON HAND TO FUEL EIGHT HELOS. DETAILS ON REFUEL FOR EIGHT
HELOS WILL BE TRANSMITTED BY SEP MSG. UNDERSTAND PROBABILITY
OF 8 HELOS LAUNCHING IS NOT GOOD BUT TRY YOUR BEST.
5. GEN VAUGHT SENDS
BT

NNNN

DDO NMCC

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Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#235

TOT 219L7Z
RS

SSN 0040
DTG 211500Z APR 80
FM JTF
TO: JCS / RC
~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJECT: JTF SITREP NO 2 (AS OF 211800Z)
1. JTF FORCE ARRIVALS ARE AS FOLLOWS:

J-3
Has Copy

A. THREE EC-130 ARRIVED [redacted] 202020Z, 202030Z, AND 202110Z.

B. TWO MC 130S ARRIVED [redacted] 202100Z AND 210145Z.

C. THREE C-141S W/DELTA FORCES ARRIVED [redacted] 210535Z, 210830Z, AND 211150Z.

D. THREE KC-135S ARRIVED [redacted] 211517Z, 211523Z, AND 211633Z

E

(U) 2. JTF FORCES NOW ON STATION:

A. JTF STAFF AT [redacted]

B. THREE MC-130S AT [redacted]

C. TWO MC-130S AT [redacted] ONE TO MOVE TO [redacted] ON 22 APR.

D. THREE EC-130S AT [redacted] UNTIL 22 APR.

E. EIGHT HELOS AND CREWS ON NIMITZ

F. SIX KC-135S AT [redacted]

G. FOUR KC-135S AT [redacted]

E

(U) 3. COMMUNICATIONS: THE SHF SYSTEM TO FT DETRICK WAS ONLY APPROX 50 PERCENT USABLE DURING THE PAST 24 HOURS. IMMEDIATE IMPROVEMENT IS REQUIRED TO INSURE A POSITIVE COMMAND, CONTROL AND COMMUNICATIONS LINK WITH WASHINGTON.

BT

Classified By: [redacted] DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR

NNNN

Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#232

QSL 2300Z

MSG 345
DTG: 212107Z APR 80
FM: SITE ALPHA/J2
TO: JCS/RC-J2
BT
~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJ: SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY
(U) 1. REF MSG 212010Z APR 80 FM HELO DET. SAB.

2. REQUEST UR VIEWS ON SOVIET VESSELS [redacted]

A. HOW OFTEN HAVE THEY DONE THIS IN THE PAST?

B. HOW LONG AGO WAS THE LAST INCIDENCE?

C. SIGNIFICANCE TO [redacted] PLANNING IF RE-POSITIONING OFFORCES IS TAKING PLACE?

D. ESTIMATED LENGTH OF TIME FOR SUCH AN EXERCISE?

(U) 3. CONCERNING HEADNET RADAR: HOW CLOSE TO THE [redacted] VIP FLIGHT ROUTE MUST THE KRIVAK BE IN-ORDER TO DETECT THE A/C FLYING AT 500' AGL AND BELOW?

(U) 4. PERHAPS WE CAN ADD THIS TO THE "CRY WOLF" LIST.

(U) 5. NO OFFENSE INTENDED ON SATRAN COVERAGE FONECON. JUST ANTICIPATING AS YOU RECOMMENDED.

~~TOP SECRET~~
ET

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGR TO CONF
DECVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources
[redacted] B

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

228

TOT/0713

E KC [redacted] W

RELAY TO NIM

(C) [illegible] 2[illegible] APR [illegible]
FM: SITE ALPHA/J2
TO: NIMITZ/ HFLO DET

E,G [redacted]

BT

C SUBJ: SOVIET NAVAL SURVEILL[illegible]

(U) 1. RPT FM USS NIMITZ [illegible] LAST LOC 21 [illegible]/062 10E
ON COURSE 192 DEG AT [illegible] [redacted]

C, E 2. KRIVAK MOUNTS [illegible] [redacted] AND COULD POSE THREAT
TO [redacted] FLT OPNS.

(U) 3. FURTHER DETAILS [illegible] WILL [illegible] NIMITZ.
ADDITIONAL INFO ON [illegible] [redacted] FORTHCOMING.

G ~~[illegible]~~

BT

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12 Aug 92

MESSAGE 04 RECEIVED.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT 3552

#1-218

M
MSG 067
DTG 221245Z
FM: CDRJTF SITE ALPHA
TO: JTF/RC SOD

~~T O P S E C R E T~~

SUBJECT: SENATIVE LETTERS

(U)1. REFERENCE MY 220915Z APR 93

2. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR [redacted] FOLLOW. WE HAVE JUST LEARNED [redacted] IS TDY EUCOM FOR A SECURITY ASSISTANCE MEETING. ESTIMATED TO RETURN [redacted] LATE FRIDAY OR SATURDAY. E,G

3. COL [redacted] IS SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO [redacted] EVENING OF 23 APR. HE OBVIOUSLY WAS NOT AWARE OF [redacted] SCHEDULE. E,G

4. THIS REQUIRES ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON TWO COUNTS. FIRST, WE SHOULD CONSIDER TASKING [redacted] TO BRIEF A TRUSTED AGENT WHO WOULD BE AT [redacted] MAC CREWS SHOULD HAVE A CONTACT FOR BRIEFINGS AND ASSISTANCE. SECOND CONSIDERATION : IF [redacted] TRAVELS TO [redacted] WE WOULD NOT HAVE SECURE VOICE INTO [redacted] NOR WOULD WE HAVE THE ABILITY TO INFORM [redacted] MILITARY THAT AN EXCERCISE IS ABOUT TO KICK OFF OR UNDERWAY. E,G

5. (U) GAST PROVIDED GEN SHUTLER WITH THOUGHTS ON ADVISING [redacted] YOU MAY WISH TO DRAW ON THEM. E

6. THERE ARE SEVERAL OPTIONS. RECOMMEND THAT [redacted] BRIEF TRUSTED AGENT ENOUGH ON IMPORTANCE OF DELIVERY OF LETTER TO [redacted] ONLY. [redacted] REMAINS AT [redacted] AND [redacted] RETURNS ON 24 APR. I VALUE [redacted] MATURITY BUT WOULD BE COMFORTABLE WITH [redacted] ON SCENE. IF IT IS TOO TOUGH TO GET [redacted] BACK. BURNEY SHOULD BRIEF TRUSTED AGENT AT [redacted] ALL TRUSTED AGENTS SHOULD BE MILITARY. E,G
GAST SENDS

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TO TC | 1404 G

GRH

#217

SSN 0068
O 221330Z APR 80
FM CMDR JTF SITE ALPHA
TO JTF/HC SOD
BT
~~T O P S E C R E T~~
SUBJECT: [redacted] DEFENSE RADARS
1. ON 20 APR 80 COL [redacted] AF SECTION [redacted] APRISED LT COLS [redacted] AND [redacted] OF USAF AIR DEFENSE STUDY FOR [redacted]
2. [redacted] PLANNED TO REVIEW STUDY AND FORWARD RECOMMENDATIONS IF APPROPRIATE. PLEASE ADVISE SOONEST.
BT
#0068

E, G

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E-210

E [redacted]

E [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

[redacted]

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DDO NMCC
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MSG 333
DTG 222250Z APR 80
FM: SITE ALPHA/JEP CDR JTF
TO: NIMITZ
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: COORDINATION DATA (U)
REF: TELECON PITTMAN AND GAST

(U) 1. OVER THE WALL TIME IS PLANNED FOR 2100Z.

2. DELTA PLANS TO CALL AT 2000Z. THIS CALL WILL PROVIDE LATEST ESTIMATE FOR OVER THE WALL TIME. (ASSUMING MISSION IS A GO).

(U) 3. HELOS SHOULD BE IN POSITION FOR PICKUP PLUS 15 MINUTES AFTER ESTIMATED OVER THE WALL TIME.

4. IF HELOS DO NOT HEAR A CALL FROM DELTA, ASSUME RADIO PROBLEMS AND PLANNED OVER THE WALL TIME OF 2100Z. HELOS SHOULD LAUNCH IN SUFFICIENT TIME TO BE IN POSITION FOR FIRST PICKUP AT 2115Z.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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0135

207

SSN 0101
DTG 222355Z APR 80
FM: JTF MAIN: COL [redacted]
G TO: USS NIMITZ/COL [redacted]
~~S E C R E T~~
SUBJ: TACAIR CAP SUPPORT (S)

REF 1 (U) ~~(TS)~~ USS NIMITZ 221425Z APR 80
REF 2 (U) ~~(S)~~ CINCPAC SUBJ TACAIR CAP SUPPROT ~~(S)~~(U)

[redacted]

1. ~~(TS)~~ REF 1 NIGHT ONE REFUELING SUPPORT REQUEST FOR AIR CAP SUPPORT, A KC-135 AIR REFUELABLE TANKER (ART) REFUELED BY TWO (2) KC135A AIRCRAFT CAN PROVIDE A FOUR (4) HOUR LOITER PERIOD OVER 2420N 58E OFFLOADING 82K LBS. REF 2 LIST 1930-2300Z AS THE MOST CRITICAL TIME PERIOD. ANY POSITION NORTH OF THE ARCP NEAR THE END OF THE LOITER PERIOD WOULD REDUCE OFFLOAD/LOITER.
E THIS SUPPORT PLUS PREVIOUS JTF MISSION TASKING UTILIZES ALL TANKER ASSETS AT [redacted] AND DOES NOT ALLOW FOR MECHANICAL FAILURES.
2 (U) ~~(TS)~~ FYI: FOUR KC-135' WILL TRANSIET YOUR AREA ENROUTE TO ARCP AT 2300N 5033E.

FOR C-130 REFUELING SUPPORT. TWO KC-135'S WILL BE ON STATION 2215-2315Z WITH TWO MORE 2315-0020. AIR REFUELING FREQUENCY IS 321.6 SECURE.

3. (U) ~~(TS)~~ NIGHT 2 REF MSG PARA 6 ADDRESSED BY SEPARATE MSG.
BT

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12 Aug 92

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TOT 2305552
BJW

QSL 2305552

#i-205

Copy to J-2

MSG 100
DTG 2305152 APR 80
FM: SITE ALPHA/J2
TO: JCS/J2
BT

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: TEHRAN STREET DEMONSTRATIONS

RPTS HAVE SHOWN CONSIDERABLE TURMOIL SINCE THE WEEKEND ON AND AROUND CAMPUS OF TEHRAN UNIV. PLS PROVIDE UP EST OF EFFECT THESE DEMONSTRATIONS MAY HAVE, IF ANY, ON PLANS TO APPROACH/ASSAULT MEA AND EMBASSY.

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

BT

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGR TO
REVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources
[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

#268

TOR/230138
CS
MCN
101

MSG #72
DTG 222025Z APR 80
FM: JCS/RCS
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2
INFO: SFOD/S2
1 SOW/A2

T O P S E C R E T

SUBJEXT: THREAT REVIEW
SITE ALPHA/J2 PASS TO COMJTF

1. THIS MESSAGE CONTAINS COPY OF MEMO PROVIDED TO CJCS ON 22 APR 80.

2. THE FOLLOWING COMPRISES THE JTF J-2 ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT TO RICE BOWL POSED BY SOVIET, IRANIAN, AND OTHER MIDEAST NATIONS' RECONNAISSANCE AND SURVEILLANCE CAPAPBILITIES. THE ASSESSMENT IS DIVIDED BY COUNTRY AND COLLECTION MEANS.

3. SOVIET CAPABILITIES.
A. PHOTO
1. SATELLITE PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE: [redacted]

2. AIRCRAFT PHOTO/VISUAL RECONNAISSANCE: THE SOVIETS PRESENTLY HAVE FOUR IL-38 MAY RECON AIRCRAFT IN PROXIMITY TO THE RICE BOWL AREA OF OPERATIONS. TWO OF THESE ARE AT ADEN AND TWO ARE AT ASMARA. THE IL-38'S PRIMARY MISSION IS MARITIME SURVEILLANCE AND ASW. [redacted] THE MAY HAS AN OPERATING RADIUS OF 1400 NM.

3. SOVIET COVERAGE OF [redacted] AND THE HELO HIDE SITE WOULD HAVE TO BW PROVIDED BY SATELLITE. COVERAGE OF [redacted] COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY EITHER SATELLITE OF AIRCRAFT. WE PROJECT [redacted] REACTION TIME FOR SUCH COVERAGE IF THE SOVIETS RECEIVE INDICATIONS OF INCREASED

Classified By JCS

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. IRANIAN DETECTION/SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES.

A. IRANIAN PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE: IRAN HAS A LIMITED CAPABILITY TO PHOTOGRAPH OR VISUALLY RECONOITER US NAVAL UNITS OPERATING IN THE PERSIAN GULF OR NORTHERN ARABIAN SEA UTILIZING P-3 AIRCRAFT. ADDITIONALLY, IRANIAN F-4S AND C-130S HAVE SOME VISUAL RECON CAPACITY. WE BELIEVE THAT ANY THREAT TO SECURITY OF RICE BOWL FROM ANY OF THESE PLATFORMS IS NEGLIGIBLE.

B. AURAL DETECTION: WE BELIEVE THAT THE GREATEST DANGER OF DETECTION FOR BOTH THE HELICOPTER AND FIXED-WING ELEMENTS OPERATING IN IRANIAN AIRSPACE ON NIGHT #1 IS POSED BY GENDARMERIE POSTS. THESE POSTS (USUALLY CONSISTING OF 6-10 MEN) ARE SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY ALONG MAJOR LINES OF COMMUNICATION. MISSION PLANNING HAS TAKEN THEIR LOCATIONS INTO ACCOUNT AND FLIGHT ROUTES ARE DESIGNED TO AVOID ALL KNOWN POSTS.

[redacted]

C. VISUAL DETECTION: DESPITE FLIGHT ROUTES WHICH AVOID POPULATED AREAS, THE POSSIBILITY EXISTS THAT AIRCRAFT COULD BE SEEN BY MOTORISTS OR NOMADS. THE LATTER, LACKING COMMUNICATIONS, CAN BE DISCOUNTED AS A WARNING SOURCE. CRITICAL AREAS FOR VISUAL DETECTION ARE THE GULF COASTAL REGION, THE REFUELING SITE, AND THE TRANSFER POINT/HELO HIDE AREA. WE ASSESS THE POSSIBILITY OF DETECTION AT ANY OF THESE LOCATIONS AS LOW-MODERATE. WHETHER A TRUCK DRIVER WOULD BOTHER TO REPORT SIGHTING AIRCRAFT [redacted] TO SOME OFFICIAL ENTITY OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT IS PROBLEMATICAL.

D. SAC PENETRATION ANALYSIS OF SEVERAL GENERIC LOW LEVEL ROUTES INDICATED LOW PROBABILITY OF DETECTION/INTERCEPTION ON ALL THE INBOUND LEGS AND ONLY A SLIGHTY HIGHLY POSSIBLITY OF DETECTION/INTERCEPTION ON THE EGRESS ROUTES. SAC TEAM PREPARED STUDY FOR MC130 AT 500 FEET, AND STATED PROBABILITIES WOULD INCREASE IF C141 OPERATING AT HIGHER ALTITUDES (1,500-2,000 FEET) WAS USED. HOWEVER THE PROBABILITIES WOULD STILL BE ON THE LOW END OF THE SPECTRUM IF ROUTE PLANNING TOOL ADVANTAGE OF AVAILABLE TERRAIN AIR DEFENSE NETWORK WAS NOT ON HIGH/ACTIVE ALERT POSTURE.

4. REVIEW OF INCOUNTRY TACTICAL PHASES IS UNDER PREPARATION WILL FORWARD UPON COMPLETION.

BT

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#286

TOR 22 2130Z
JB / MCN 089

Bootstrap 0015223A

O 222045Z APR 80

FM NIMITZ/PITMAN
TO JTF/VAUGHT

[redacted] SECRET
SUBJ: STATUS (U)
A. NIMITZ/PITMAN 220845Z APR 80
1. PLEASE CORRECT REF A, PARA 3, LINE 7 TO READ - ONLY 200
RDS AMMO VKR GUN WITH ADDITIONAL AMMO IN NUMBER SEVEN AND...
REVW: 21 APR 80
BT

NNNN

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 2325
JB mcng 2

E (C) O 221745Z APR 80
FM [redacted]
TO [redacted]
JTF/ LTG GAST
BT
~~T O P S E C R E T~~
SUBJ: SITREP #6

E,G (C) 1.) [redacted] COMMANDER, [redacted] WILL ARRIVE [redacted] 23 0742Z APR. 80 HE HAS ASKED TO MEET WITH LT/COL. [redacted] AND [redacted] AND WILL PRESUMABLY ASK TO VISIT CAMP SITE AND TOUR AN AIRCRAFT.

i-280

E (C) 2.) WE PLAN TO USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO REQUEST [redacted] SUPPORT FOR DELIVERY OF SENSITIVE LETTER TO U.S. AMBASSADOR IN [redacted] UP COMING MUSLIM WEEKEND, [redacted] WEEKENS STANDDOWN, [redacted] WEEKEND STANDOWN, AND LACK OF SECURE COMM. BETWEEN [redacted] AND [redacted] MAKE IT IMPERATIVE THAT WE USE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO BROACH THE SUBJECT WITH [redacted].

E,G (C) 3.) WE PROPOSE TO INFORM [redacted] THAT [redacted] HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO PROCEED TO [redacted] ON 25 APR. TO PROVIDE U.S. AMBASSADOR WITH A DETAILED INTERIM REPORT ON SEA SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES TO DATE AND THAT [redacted] SUPPORT IS REQUESTED.

(U) 4.) WILL INFORM YOU OF RESULTS OF MEETING WITH BENNETT AS SOON AS COMPLETED.

(U) 5.) REMAINING EC-130 AND MC-130 AIRCRAFT ARRIVED BETWEEN 1145Z AND 1230Z. ALL AIRCRAFT NOW IN PLACE.
BT

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12 Aug 92

DDRFHCFYIHRY
S-

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSC076
DTG: 230015Z APR 8[illegible]

FM: JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: C-130 ACTIVITY TAPES

1. COLONEL [redacted] USAF, WILL DEPART CONUS 23 APRIL FOR ALPHA VIA RAMSTEIN. COLONEL [redacted] HAS IN HIS POSSESSION: MAGNETIC TAPES CONTAINING VOICE, C-130 AIR COMMUNICATIONS; A TAPE RECORDER; AND COMMUNICATIONS CIRCUITS CARDS REQUESTED BY YOUR SITE.

G

Copy to J-2

2. HIS ITINERARY:

ETD DOVER - 230500Z

ETA RAMSTEIN - 231330Z

ETD RAMSTEIN - 240515Z

ETA ALPHA - 241045Z.

#274

3. COLONEL [redacted] IS TOP SECRET SI/TK CLEARED AND HAS EXTENSIVE SIGINT EXPERIENCE.
BT

G

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~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: Q~~ ADR
Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

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~~SECRET~~

FM: JTF/RC
TO: JTF COR/SITE ALPHA

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SENSITIVE LETTERS
REF: YOUR 222345Z APR 80

(U) 1. UNDERSTAND YOUR NEED TO HAVE AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE OF LETTERS ASAP. GEN PUSTAY INFORMED FIRST CHANCE YOU HAVE TO GIVE GEN. [redacted] LETTER IS 230730Z.

(U) 2. AUTHORITY FOR YOU TO RELEASE LETTERS TO DESIGNATED US MILITARY OFFICERS HAS NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN OBTAINED YET.

(U) 3. AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE AND INSTRUCTIONS FOR GEN [redacted] GEN. [redacted] AND COL. [redacted] EXPECTED AT 231600Z AFTER AN SCC MEETING. CURRENT PLAN IS TO SEND THESE INSTRUCTIONS TO YOUR LOCATION AT THE TIME AUTHORITY FOR RELEASE IS APPROVED. AT THAT SAME TIME, [redacted] COMMUNICATIONS SITES WILL RECEIVE INSTRUCTIONS TO FACILITATE NOTIFICATION OF DESIGNATED MILITARY OFFICERS SO THEY CAN ACCOMPLISH FINAL RELEASE OF LETTERS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE AMERICAN AMBASSADORS. WHEN THAT AUTHORITY HAS BEEN OBTAINED.
BT

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~~SECRET~~

[redacted] WILL PROVIDE ADDITIONAL DATA AS AVAILABLE

[redacted]

12. SOVIET PROPAGANDA CLAIMS THAT MOSCOW HAS ALREADY BEGUN EFFORTS TO CIRCUMVENT A POSSIBLE US BLOCKADE OF IRAN. AN ARTICLE IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE "MOSCOW NEWS WEEKLY" SAID CARGO FROM WEST EUROPE IS POURING INTO IRAN, AND THAT TRANSIT OF IRANIAN IMPORTS VIA SOVIET TERRITORY IS OF "VITAL IMPORTANCE TO IRAN BECAUSE OF A THREATENED US ECONOMIC BLOCKADE." [redacted]

A. AREA OF U.S. BATTLE GROUPS AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR AND A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE AO THE USS NIMITZ AND USS CORAL SEA BATTLE GROUPS AND AMPHIBIOUS READINESS GROUP AALPHA

[redacted]

B.

[redacted]

C.

[redacted]

THEIR WHEREABOUTS ARE UNKNOWN.

[redacted]

D.

[redacted]

E.

[redacted]

F.

[redacted]

G.

[redacted]

15. SATELLITE OVERVIEW: AS OF 210002 FRIDAY (16APRIL)

[redacted]

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Declassified ON: OADR

NATION

TOP SECRET [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

~~TOP SECRET~~

G FM NIMITZ/COL[redacted]
TO JTF/J3

~~TOP SECRET~~
REF JTF/J3 201455Z APR 66

SUBJECT - FLEET TACAIR SUPPORT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

1. (U) REF REQUESTED TK-70 KC-135 SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

2. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - DAY 1: WHEN CALLED FOR BY CJTF PICKLORE, TF-70 CAN PROVIDE [illegible] OVER HIGHEST (WORST CASE) ARRIVING AT 1 PLUS 50 FOR 2 PLUS 45 (NEW FLIGHT AT [illegible] 2 ROCKEYE, 2 AIM-9, 1000 RDS [illegible] PER AIRCRAFT) USING ONLY FLEET REFUELING ASSETS AND [illegible] 1 SET OF EXTERNAL TANKS FROM A 5 MIN COCKPIT ALERT [illegible]. SUBSEQUENT COVERAGE MUST BE SUPPORTED BY KC-135'S. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING DISPOSITION OF KC-135'S IF ONLY 5 KC-135 ARTS AVAILABLE:

INSERT WORD "JETTISON/NP"

[redacted] - 2 ARTS, 2 ALFA (STRIP ALERT/ARTS BASKET [illegible] ARTS/3 ALPHA (3/3 ARTS) STRIP ALERT/ARTS BASKET FROM [illegible] MISSION IN DAYLIGHT [illegible] WILL IMMEDIATELY LAUNCH A BASKET [illegible] ARTS AND COMPANION ALPHA TANKER FOR [illegible] TO [illegible] AVAILABLE OFF LOAD TANKER [illegible] [redacted] FOLLOW ON TANKERS WILL LAUNCH AS NEEDED AT APPROPRIATE [illegible]. TF-70 CAN THEN MAINTAIN AIR ASSETS TO COVER EMERGENCY EXFILTRATION AS REQUIRED. TANKERS SHOULD ALSO BE PREPARED FOR POSSIBLE IN-TARGET COUNTRY AROUND [illegible] MOUNTAIN IN [illegible] VICINITY OF [illegible]. TANKER SUPPORT COULD ALSO BE PROVIDED BY NOTIONALLY LAUNCHING KC-135'S FROM [redacted] AT INTERVALS DURING DAYLIGHT [illegible] VERABILITY PERIOD, [illegible] MAINTAINING THE TRAINING SIGNATURE PRESENTLY ESTABLISHED.

E

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - DAY TWO: TF-70 WILL PROVIDE FOUR F-14 AIRCRAFT TO CAP PLANNED EXFILTRATION ROUTE FROM AN AN HOR POINT IN VICINITY OF [illegible]. KC-135 TANKERS WILL LAUNCH NOTIONALLY (INTERVAL [illegible] ARTS/ALPHA MIX) FROM [redacted] TO ARRIVE OVER TF-70 AT PLANNED ASSAULT TIME. IF ARTS AVAILABLE, 3 HOURS INTO MISSION BUDDY REFUELING WILL [illegible] ARTS [illegible] HOURS OF ORBIT PLUS [illegible] OFFLOAD CAPABILITY. (FOUR F-14'S REQUIRE [illegible] LBS FOR 3 HOURS LOITER). [illegible] KC-135(S) ARRIVE VICINITY OF NIMITZ F-14'S WILL LAUNCH, JOIN AND [illegible] THEM TO ABOVE MENTIONED ORBIT POINT. TANKER [illegible] CAPABILITY CAN BE INCREASED BY [redacted] OR [redacted] RECOVERY.

3. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING COMMON REFERENCE POINTS BE USED BY CAP AIRCRAFT/GROUND FORCES TO FACILITATE LINKUP:

E CAP ALFA (REFUEL AREA) [illegible]
E CAP [illegible] (HELO HIDE) [illegible]
E CAP [illegible] (WARDROOM) [illegible]
E CAP DELTA (EMBASSY) [illegible]
E CAP [illegible] (MANZANIYEH) [illegible]
E CAP FOXTROT (KHARIZAK) [illegible]
E CAP [illegible] (KARAJ A/F) [illegible]
E CAP HOTEL (SEMNAN [illegible]) [illegible]

GROUND FORCES/AIR FORCES MUST HAVE [illegible] (PRIMARY) 240.5 MHZ (SECONDARY) [illegible] GROUND FORCES SHOULD HAVE [illegible] SIMILAR MARKING DEVICE. CALL SIGNS WILL BE COORDINATED PRIOR TO MISSION EXECUTION.

4. SUMMARY: IF RADIUS OF ACTION IS SUBSTANTIAL, TF-70 AIR SUPPORT FOR GROUND FORCES IS LIMITED WITHOUT KC-135 AIR REFUELING SUPPORT. MINIMUM FUEL RECOVERIES INTO [redacted] OR [redacted] ENHANCE OFFLOAD POTENTIAL. WE HAVE ESTABLISHED AN AIR REFUEL PRACTICE SIGNATURE WHICH MUST BE CONTINUED (1 MISSION A DAY)

E

AND CAN BE USED AS COVER TO DISCREETLY PREPOSITION TANKERS AT ALTITUDE DURING PERIODS OF VULNERABILITY. NECESSARY MINING MISSION ASSETS (A-6'S, KA50'S) REMAIN DEDICATED THROUGHOUT. ALL TF-70 TACAIR PILOTS ARE NOW QUALIFIED IN KC-135 REFUELING. [illegible]

Planned [illegible] WITHDRAWAL ALTITUDES OF EXTRACTION [illegible] FROM TARGET COUNTRY ON NIGHT TWO. [illegible] BAY ONE IS A CONTINUOUS [illegible], BAY TWO F-14 CAP IS CONSIDERED A PRUDENT ENHANCEMENT FOR MISSION SUCCESS.

G VERY RESPECTFULLY [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

MESSAGE 01 SELECTED.

TOT / 0710Z
KCL

#i-313

SSN 0052
O 220600Z APR 80
FM ALPHA/J2
TO [redacted]
BT
~~T O P S E C R E T~~
SUBJ: SATRAN EXTENSION
FOLL IS ANTICIPATED RECON/SURV COVERAGE
DURING PERIOD 200480/000001 TO 240480/240000
FOR UR LOC:
A. [redacted]

EG

C

[redacted]

BT
#0052

NNNN

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12 AUG 92

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW TO 12356
CONTINUED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
EXT BY OCTOBER TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM multiple sources

~~SECRET~~

FM: JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITH ALPHA/J3
1. SOW/A2
[redacted]/S2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SATRAN EXTENSION

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE/SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD [redacted] TO [redacted]
A. [redacted]

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGR TO Secret
REVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources

P 280[illegible] APR 92
FM WALNUT
TO DUCKHUNTER/MAJ [illegible]
BT
[redacted] T

351

SUBJ: SITREP NUMBER 1
COMMUNICATION CENTER IS OPERATING ON COMMERICAL POWER WITH GENERATORS AS BACK UP.
EQUIPMENT STATUS
2 GENERATOR GREEN
1 GENERATOR AMBER. WE HOPE TO HAVE IT REPAIRED TODAY. TWO OF THEM HAD WATER AND SAND IN FULL LOAD.
1 TT-76 AMBER. KEY BOARD NEEDS REPLACING.
1 USC-129 GREEN
1 WSC-3 GREEN
1 KW-7 GREEN
2 TH-22'S GREEN.
ALL OTHER ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT IN GOOD WORKING ORDER.

EQUIPMENT NEEDED.
1. TT-76 KEYBOARD
1 THREE MAN TENT WITH POLES AND METAL STAKES
C-RATIONS FOR THREE MEN TO LAST AT LEAST 12 DAYS.
MISCELLANIOUS ITEMS NEEDED.
SOFT DRINKS, ICE IF POSSIBLE, COLEMAN STOVE OR HOT PLATEAU
SOME JUNK FOOD.
MORAL IS GOOD THIS FAR. THANKS FOR ANY HELP YOU CAN GIVE US "T"

NNNN

~~Classified By:~~ JCS
~~Declassified On:~~ QADR

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

[redacted]

Col Kyle

TCL-12002

KCC

[illegible] INTEL [illegible] IMMEDIATE MESSAGES

E

2?1010Z APR 80
FM JTF NIMITZ (PITMAN)
TO JTF [redacted] (VAULT)
BT
[redacted] T//COMINT DO NOT PASS ON INTEL BROADCAST
SUBJ: ARRIVAL REPORT ~~(S)~~ (U)

MCN 013

E

1. [redacted] PARTY OF SIXTY THREE ARRIVED [redacted] 2000Z AND NIMITZ [illegible].
2. [redacted] AT [redacted] ONE OF THE DUTY WORKING PARTY PROVIDING SUPPORT DURING C-141 LAYOVER WAS MEMBER OF HM-16 AND RECOGNIZED HM-16 MEMBERS IN OUR PARTY. OSC [redacted] THE HM-16 SAILOR INVOLVED, WAS THEN TAKEN TO NIMITZ WITH THIS PARTY. OSTENSIBLY, HE WAS TO ESCORT SPECIAL [illegible] LIGHT CARGO TO HIS SHIP. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY AWARE THAT SOMETHING WAS HAPPENING BECAUSE HE WORE HIS RING, [redacted] FROM HM-1 [illegible] TELL HIM WHO HE'D SEEN. LT [redacted] HAS BEEN CAUTIONED, AND TOLD THAT [redacted] WOULD BE ESCORTING HIGH PRIORITY CARGO TO THE NIMITZ. NO UNUSUAL REACTION EXPECTED WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR.

E, G

350

(U) 3. ~~(S)~~ REQUEST LATEST DATA ON [illegible] OFF LOAD CAPABILITY USING 6000 GALLON SYSTEM. LAST REPORT INDICATED 500 GALLONS UNUSEABLE.
(U) 4. [redacted] CURRENT HELO STATUS ELEVEN OUT OF EIGHT MISSION CAPABLE (HM-16 REPORT).
(U) 5. [redacted] REQUEST PROVIDE DAILY SURFACE TO 2000 FT WINDS FORECAST FOR TRACK, TEMPERATURE AND DENSITY ALTITUDE PREDICTIONS ON THE SURFACE AT LAND AND TAKE-OFF TIMES FOR SHIP, DESERT TRACK, HIDE AND CITY.
(U) 6. [redacted] REQUEST HELO LOADS BY AIRCRAFT 1 THROUGH 8. NUMBER OF PAX, THEIR WEIGHT (WITH GEAR), CARGO WT AND ITS DESCRIPTION.
(U) 7. CINCPAC LNO HAS DISCUSSIONS WITH TANKER TASK FORCE COMMANDER RE: OPTIONS FOR FIGHTER SUPPORT REFUELING. 20 FLEET AIRCRAFT (F-14, KA-6S) COMPLETED LAST NIGHT, EXPECT AS MANY MORE TONIGHT. ALL TRAINING [illegible] RADIO SILENCE OR SECURE VOICE.
BT

Classified By: ~~[illegible]~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded By
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

#348

[redacted]

TOR 1451 Z
KCL

Relay to [redacted]

1225 E?

[redacted]P 20[redacted]225Z
FM [redacted]
TO JTF
[redacted]
JCS/SOD(LTGEN GAST)
BT
[redacted]
SUBJ[redacted]SITREP #2
1.SECURITY ON AND AROUND THE AIRBASE IS NO PROBLEM,HOWEVER OUR PRESCENCE HAS BECOME COMMON KNOWLEDGE ON THE [redacted]
2.SCULP 52 AND GORE 83 (MC-130'S) ARRIVED ON 20 APRIL AT 0835Z AND 0810Z RESPECTIVELY.GEST 12 GROUND ABORTED ITS MORNING MISSION FOR IGNITION EXCITER AND INS PROBLEMS.EXPECT TO HAVE IT FIXED TODAY.FLEW ONE SEA SURVEILLANCE MISSION TAKEOFF 201200Z APR 80 AND ETR 201500Z APR 80.
3.FUEL COSTS TRANSMITTED IN SITREP #1 SHOULD READ APPROXIMATELY ONE DOLLAR AND FIFTY CENTS PER GALLON.
4.IT HAS BEEN NECESSARY TO ORDER AN ADDITIONAL 80 AIR MATTRESSES SINCE MOST COMING OUT OF PACAF HAD HOLES IN THEM.IN ADDITION, REQUESTS HAVE BEEN PASSED TO EUCOM VIA THE JTF FOR ADDITIONAL STORES: ELECTRICAL CORD,TOILET CHEMICALS,TRASH BAGS,PORTABLE SHOWERS ETC.

MCN 017

TOT 1530Z
RC

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DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

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[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

21
TOT 0529
VC SCS
035

E [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] JTF [redacted]
[redacted]

C-338

E [redacted] ITREP #[redacted]
[redacted] ADVISED THAT [redacted]
[redacted] GROUP WILL BE HEADED BY [redacted]
[redacted] WE ARE ALSO INFORMED THAT [redacted]
[redacted] WILL ACCOMPANY THE GROUP AS WELL AS SEVERAL [redacted] NEWS
[redacted]ORTERS.

E [redacted] WE WERE QUERIED LAST EVENING BY JTF CONCERNING THE SUITABILITY OF
[redacted] AIRFIELD FOR C-141 OPERATIONS. APPARENTLY MAC IS RELUCTANT TO
USE THE FIELD WITHOUT FIRST CONDUCTING AN OFFICIAL MAC SURVEY. SUCH A
SURVEY DOES NOT APPEAR NECESSARY AT THIS TIME NOR WOULD IT BE POLITICALLY
PRUDENT SINCE IT WOULD TEND TO OVERLOAD THE SYSTEM WITH ANOTHER SHORT
NOTICE DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE REQUEST. BASED ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACILITY
AND THE JUDGEMENT OF FORMER C-141 CREWMEMBERS WHO ARE WITH THE MC-130
DETACHMENT. THERE WILL BE NO PROBLEM IN USING THE MAIN RUNWAY FOR TAKEOFF
AND LANDING AND THE HARDPACK DIRTRUNWAY FOR TAXI AND OFFLOAD. THE DIRT
RUNWAY IS COMPOSED OF A TOP LAYER OF TWO INCHES OF COMPACTED SAND AND
GRAVEL OVER A FEDROCK BASE. FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON [redacted] AIRFIELD.
OPERATORS SHOULD REFER TO THE [redacted] TECHNICAL FACILITIES REPORT, FEBRUARY
19[illegible]. REFERENCE IN REPORT TO DIRT RUNWAY BEING C-130 CAPABLE WAS BASED ON
CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS, LANDING AND TAKEOFFS, OF C-130 AIRCRAFT.

C
E

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Declassified ON: OADR

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DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

MESSAGE BE RECEIVED.

BQDALYKSELQXIAIHQBJ[illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] 7:[illegible]/

CONFIDENTIAL

TOR | 0758Z
KCL |

MCN
036

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

#1-337

2758Z DUCK HUNTER DE FOXFIRE

O 2105112 APR 80
FM HELO DET/SZ
TO SITE ALFA/JTF J-2
BT
[redacted] (sic)
SUBJ: PROG REP 01
1. HELO INTEL NODE OPERATIONAL AS OF 20 APR 80. MSN PLANNING PROCEEDING IN DEDICATED SPACES.
2. YOUR AIR SUMMARY IN ABBREVIATED FORMAT IS SAT FOR OUR PURPOSES.
3. WE ARE WAITING FIRST WX. REQ EXPEDITE TRANSMISSION.
4. ANY POSSIBILITY OF GETTING US DMA MFA GRID?
REVW: 21APR80
BT

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 1136Z
RCL

#1-334

MCN
038

MESSAGE 01 RECEIVED.

E [redacted] P 211117Z APR 82
FM [redacted]
TO JCS/SCD (LTG GAST)
BT
[redacted] SECRET
[redacted] SITREP #4
REF SITREP #3 DTG 210550Z APR 82
E 1. REF DISCUSSED 24 APR VIP VISIT TO [redacted] WITH [redacted] OPERATIONS OFFICER HE ASSURED US THAT IT IS [redacted] DESIRE NOT TO ALLOW NEWSMEN TO ACCOMPANY VIPS. EXPECT THE VISIT TO BE ROUTINE AND UNEVENTFUL.

DDO NMCC

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassified ON: OADR

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DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NO EOM.

#332

TOR 1238Z
RC

MCN
Ø41

MESSAGE 03 RECEIVED.

1238Z DUCK HUNTER DE POMPIRE

O 211145Z APR 9[illegible]
FM CTF 70
TO JCS
BT
[redacted]
DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA OPINTEL [illegible]
SUBJ: RH-53D SITREP 211[illegible] APR (U)
1. SEVEN ACFT IN FULL UP STATUS. EIGHTH ACFT UP
FOR POST MAINTENANCE TEST FLIGHT.
~~REVW: 20APR[illegible]~~
BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 04 RECEIVED.

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

MSG #27
DTG 211423Z APR 80
FM: JCS/RC-J-2
TO: SITE ALPHA
SFOD/S2
1-SOW/S2

[redacted]

#328 TOR 1754 C

MCN 046

SUBJ: SATRAN EXTENSION (U)

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 200460/260001 TO 240460/240000 [redacted]

[redacted]

BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGR TO Secret
REVW ON OADR
REVIEW FROM [redacted]

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

~~SECRET~~

NO EOM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSG 034
DTG 212215Z APR 80
G FM: JTF RC/[redacted]
G TO ALPHA/[redacted]

C# 1-325

TOR 212052Z
CT MCN51
copy to
G [redacted]

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

REF: A. YOUR MSG DTG 211836Z AP 80 SUBJ: LOG SUPPORT UPDATE

B. MSG (KYLE) DTG 211635Z AP 80 SUBJ: LOG SUPPORT

C. MSG. THIS HQ DTG 211245Z AP 80 SUBJ: RESUPPLY OF EXERCISE PLAYERS.

1. REF A ESTABLISHED MOVEMENT PRIORITIES FOR REMAINING GEAR IN [redacted] EUCOM ACKNOWLEDGED AND SAID THAT EQUIPMENT SHOULD ARRIVE YOUR LOCATION APPROXIMATELY 221300Z AP. PER PARA 2 YOURS. WE CONSIDER YOUR MA-3 AC RQMT IS FILLED.

2. REF B RQSTD ADDITIONAL PARTS FOR [redacted] RECEIVED REF C AND B AND IS WORKING TO FILL. INDICATIONS ARE THAT PARTS WILL DEPART CONUS [redacted] TOMORROW.

3. RADAR PARTS WILL DEPART [redacted] 220400L AP 80.

4. THIS HQ INFORMED [redacted] THAT ENGINE [redacted] ALONG WITH [redacted] LINES CLOSED [redacted] PLEASE INFORM IF THIS IS NOT SO.

5. MAINTAIN A SENSE OF HUMOR.

BT

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Declassify on: OADR
~~Classified By:~~
~~Declassified On:~~ OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

NNNN

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[redacted]
Q12010Z
FM: HELO DET/S-2()
53 '51/J-2
SUBJ: INTREP 02

~~SECRET~~

C

TOR/2110
JB/MCN

NO TAPE
S-2 has copy

1. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY INDICATIONS OF [redacted] BY ARABIAN SEA PLATFORMS.

KRIVA

I FFG 693 HAS DEPARTED CTF 70 MODLOC. KRIVAK LAST LOCATED VIC 21 50N 062 10E ON COURSE 130 + 10 KTS AT 191900Z. [redacted] AGI 477 REMAINS IN SURVEILLANCE OF AMPHIB READY GROUP. PGF [redacted] IN STRAIT OF [redacted]

2. [redacted] USS BRUMBY NAU RECONNOITERED BY IRANIAN C-130 VIC 25, 1N 057 46E AT 0650Z. [redacted]

3. NIMITZ IS ENDEAVORING TO GET POSITIVE PLOT ON KRIVAK 693. MEANWHILE, [redacted] IS A POSSIBLE THREAT TO FLIGHT OPS VIC AL MASIRAH. IF 693 IS IN THAT AREA.

5. WOULD APPRECIATE WX EARLY AM 22 APR 80.

FATHER BOB

BT

#324

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

~~NINT DSLGXM ANN D NEED ZDK OF YOUR LAST~~ K
[redacted] JSA

2830/76
.11
XHPIMKD
B YRNTHCGUNDPCLL

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 22 Aug 97
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO
☐ DECL CL DOWNGR TO Secret
REVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple
[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

MSGB42
DTG: 220830Z APR 88

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FM: JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

TOP SECRET

TOR 220310
DC 057 V

Copy to J-2 + MAC

SUBJECT: C-141 ACFT FROM [redacted]

REFERENCE: SITE ALPHA/J-2 MSG 202130Z APR 88

1. IN RESPONSE TO YOUR REQUEST IN REFERENCE, WE SUGESST THAT MAC C-141 ACFT FILE [redacted] FLIGHT PLAN FROM [redacted] FOLLOWING TAKE-OFF, ACFT SHOULD ATTAIN NORMINAL ALTITUDE (ABOUT 30000FT) FOLLOWING FLIGHT ROUTE A-1 AND BEGIN [redacted] BEGIN SLOW DESCENT [redacted] AT CAPE CHECK POINT [redacted]. UPON REACHING [redacted] TURN NORTH TO INTERSECT COAST LINE AT CP [redacted]

2. FROM COASTAL CHECK POINT, FLY BY DIRECT ROUTE CLIMBING TO ATTAIN [redacted] TO CHECK POINT AT [redacted] FROM THIS POINT, TURN [redacted] TO INTERSECT NEXT CHECK POINT [redacted] MAINTAIN NORMINAL ALT OF 6000 FT AGL FOR THIS LEG TAKING CARE NOT TO DIRECTLY OVERFLY [redacted] THIS ROUTE SHOULD MINIMIZE CHANCES OF DETECTION BY [redacted]

3. FROM CHECK POINT [redacted], FOLLOW ROUTE SIMILAR TO THAT ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR MC-130 ACFT AT [redacted] AGL ALONG RIDGELINE TO CHECK POINT [redacted] REMAINDER OF C-141 ROUTE IS THE SAME AS MC-130 ROUTE MAINTAINING [redacted] FT AGL ALTITUDE.
BT

DDO NMCC
OADR
#318

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassified On:
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

NNNN

AND MAE THAT IS ALL FOR N

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

APR 92

[redacted]

FM: JTF
TO: SFOR
[redacted]
SITE ALPHA

TOR/1649Z
RC

#361

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SITUATION REPORT IRAN

1. THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED THESE FURTHER SANCTIONS:

--NO FINANCIAL TRANSFERS BY PERSONS SUBJECT TO U.S. JURISDICTION EXCEPT IN NEWS GATHERING OR TO HOSTAGES BY THEIR FAMILIES;

--BAN ON IRANIAN IMPORTS TO THE U.S.;

--NO TRAVEL BY U.S. CITIZENS TO IRAN EXCEPT FOR NEWS GATHERING.

2. IN ADDITION, MILITARY EQUIPMENT IMPOUNDED AFTER PURCHASE BY IRAN IS TO BE USED BY THE U.S. OR SOLD. THE PRESIDENT WILL ASK CONGRESS FOR AUTHORITY TO PAY REPARATIONS OUT OF FROZEN IRANIAN ASSETS; THESE ASSETS WILL ALSO BE AVAILABLE TO PAY AMERICAN CLAIMS.

3. "IF A CONSTRUCTIVE IRANIAN RESPONSE IS NOT FORTHCOMING SOON," FUTURE STEPS WILL INCLUDE BANNING U.S. EXPORTS OF GOOD [illegible] TO IRAN AND CONSULTATION WITH INTELSAT MEMBERS [illegible] IRANIAN USE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES.

4. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS, THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT, IF THESE ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS ARE ACTIONS BY OUR ALLIES IS NOT SUCCESSFUL, "THEN THE ONLY NEXT STEP AVAILABLE THAT I [illegible] COULD BE SOME SORT OF MILITARY ACTION." THE PRESIDENT [illegible] "I CANNOT PRECLUDE" THE OPTION OF INTERRUPTING [illegible] OIL SHIPMENTS.

5. [illegible] - THE FOREIGN MINISTER ADDRESSING THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: "...THE SOLIDARITY THAT UNITES FRANCE TO THE UNITED STATES IN THE CRUEL ORDEAL THAT IT UNDERGOES CANNOT [illegible] FRANCE FROM DECIDING HERSELF, AND AT THE OPPORTUNE MOMENT, THE MEASURES WHICH SHE JUDGES TO BE MOST APPROPRIATE [illegible] EFFICIENT."

6. [illegible] - THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO A PRESS CONFERENCE IN COPENHAGEN: "DESPITE THE FACT THAT WE HAVE NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.A. WE DO NOT APPROVE OF THE (HOSTAGE-TAKING) AS [illegible] INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMATIC CONVENTIONS MUST BE RESPECTED."

7. [illegible] - THE ECONOMIC MINISTER TO THE BUNDESTAG: EVEN IF THE [illegible] NOT TAKE A COMMON STAND, THE MAJORITY OF THE EUROPEAN PARTNERS WILL DECIDE ON BOYCOTT MEASURES. THE PARTNERS MUST PROVE THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH THE U.S. THROUGH "ACTIONS AND DEEDS".

8. TANZANIA/UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY - UNGA PRESIDENT SALIM IN TOKYO: THE HOLDING OF THE HOSTAGES IS "COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE," CONTRARY TO ALL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. "GIVEN THE [illegible] WILL OF ALL CONCERNED IT WOULD NOT BE IMPOSSIBLE TO IMMEDIATELY RELEASE THE HOSTAGES AND ON THE OTHER HAND SATISFY AT LEAST SOME (IRANIAN GRIEVANCES)."

9. [illegible] REPORTS IRANIAN INTERIOR MINISTRY OFFICIALS AS SAYING THAT THE SECOND ROUND OF PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS, SCHEDULED FOR MAY 2, MAY BE DELAYED FOR TWO WEEKS BECAUSE OF HOLIDAYS AND INVESTIGATIONS OF [illegible] IN THE FIRST ROUND.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☐ DERIVED TO
REVIEW BY OADR
[illegible] Multiple Sources

Secret

[redacted]

[illegible]. A PORTUGUESE GOVERNMENT COMMUNIQUE REPORTED BY AFP ANNOUNCES APRIL 17 THAT PORTUGAL HAS DECIDED TO BREAK OFF ITS TRADE RELATIONS WITH IRAN.

[illegible]. SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH CHINA SEA

A. SOVIET INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR AND A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE OF THE USS NIMITZ AND USS CORAL SEA BATTLE GROUPS AND AMPHIBIOUS READINESS GROUP ALPHA. [redacted]

[illegible] FROM PREVIOUS REPORTING WITH INCREASED ANTI-US [illegible] IN SOVIET PRESS AND NEWS COMMENTARIES AS MOSCOW PUBLICLY [illegible] OF POSSIBLE US MILITARY INTERVENTION.

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 16402
RC

A

DTG 1[illegible] APR 92
FM: JTF /J2
TO: [redacted]

T ~~O P S E C R E~~ T

i #363

SUBJ: MFA HOSTAGES

1. ON 16 APRIL 1980 DOS/IWG RECEIVED TELECON FROM LAINGEN, HOWLAND, TOM SETH. THE FOLLOWING IS QUOTE FROM DOS MEMO: THE TRIO HAS BEEN MOVED TO A NEW ROOM WITHIN THE PROTOCOL SUITE OF OFFICES. BRUCE DESCRIBED IT AS THE DINING ROOM. HE SAID THEY ARE NOW ALLOWED ONE HOUR A DAY IN THE OUTSIDE GARDEN UNDER SUPERVISION OF A GUARD. UNQUOTE

2. DURING CONVERSATION LAINGEN GAVE THEIR NEW TELEPHONE NUMBER AS 321-246 REPEAT 321-246.

3. JTF EXPLORING ALL MEANS TO DETERMINE EXTACT LOCATION WITH MFA PLDO.

REVW 1. APR 10

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CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGR TO CONF
REVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM JS

NNNNX

[redacted]

[redacted]

TOR / 1415Z
RC

MESSAGE #1 RECEIVED.

DTG 171430Z APR 80
FROM JTF/J2
TO [redacted]
SPOC/SD
SITE ALPHA [redacted]

#367

SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN ON 17 APRIL 1980

1. YESTERDAY, THE RULING REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL ANNOUNCED IT IS CONSIDERING YET ANOTHER POSTPONEMENT OF THE SECOND ROUND OF THE PARFYTAEQ2K313:5&0.. THE SECOND ROUND, WHICH WAS SCHEDULED FOR 2 MAY, WILL BE POSTPONED FOR AN ADDITIONAL WEEK IF APPROVED BY THE COUNCIL. NO REASON FOR THE DELAY WAS PROVIDED. FOLLOWING THIS ANNOUNCEMENT, AYATOLLAH BEHESHTI, LEADER OF THE MARDLINE FACTION IN THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL, SAID THE FUTURE PARLIAMENT MIGHT NOT DEBATE WHAT TO DO WITH THE HOSTAGES UNTIL JULY. HE SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT THE END OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH IRAN AND THE ECONOMIC SANCTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES WOULD CHANGE THE SITUATION OF THE HOSTAGES. IN FACT HE CLAIMED THAT "THEIR PERSONAL SITUATION WILL BE BETTER DEALING WITH THEM." HE SAID THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR IRAN TO PARDON THE HOSTAGES WITHOUT A TRIAL IF THE "POLITICAL BACKGROUND WAS RESOLVED." HE ADDED THAT THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION MIGHT HELP IN THIS RESPECT.

2. HEALTH OFFICIALS WHO VISITED THE HOSTAGES CONFIRMED IN A PRESS INTERVIEW YESTERDAY THAT SEVEN OR EIGHT HOSTAGES WHO ARE SUSPECTED OF BEING SPIES ARE BEING KEPT IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT.

3. PRESS REPORTS QUOTE ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS AS SAYING THAT PRESIDENT CARTER WILL ANNOUNCE AT A PRESS CONFERENCE TODAY AN EMBARGO ON FOOD SHIPMENTS TO IRAN AND ASK THE UNITED STATES ALLIES TO FOLLOW SUIT. ALTHOUGH SUCH AN EMBARGO WOULD HAVE A SLIGHT EFFECT AS FAR AS AMERICAN SHIPMENTS ARE CONCERNED, THE ADMINISTRATION REPORTEDLY BELIEVES THAT A FOOD EMBARGO BY U.S. ALLIES WOULD BE A SEVERE BLOW TO IRAN. JODY POWELL DENIED THE BOSTON GLOBE'S REPORT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD REACHED A DEFINITION ON A NAVAL BLOCKADE AND HAD COMMUNICATED IT TO OTHER COUNTRIES.

4. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS FROM LONDON, BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO IRAN, SIR JOHN GRAHAM, WAS TO RETURN TO HIS POST THE NIGHT OF APRIL 16. THE EC-9 NATIONS ARE CURRENTLY CONSIDERING A WITHDRAWAL OF THEIR AMBASSADORS FROM TEHRAN.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGR TO
REVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources
[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

6. WHILE THE AMBASSADORS OF COUNTRIES ALLIED WITH THE U.S. ARE RETURNING HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THE HOSTAGE CRISIS, SEVERAL NATIONS ARE SEEKING TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TEHRAN.

[redacted]

7. RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ REMAIN TENSE, BUT THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME EASING IN IRAN'S MILITARY POSTURE.

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

1. (U) THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE/ [illegible] COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD [illegible]

[redacted]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92

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REVW ON OADR

DERIVED FROM DIA

REVW 18 APR 10

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ (#372)

25 JANUARY 1980

From: Maintenance Officer, HELMINERON SIXTEEN
TO: [redacted] USMC

SUBJ: Inventory and custody of special mission items.
ENCL: (1) Serial numbers of items "t." through "x."

1. Inventory of subject items is as follows:

a.	pilot's oxygen masks	8	
b.	sleeping bag straps	44	
c.	ammo pouch (old style)	19	
d.	canteen covers	80	
e.	canteen (plastic)	80	
f.	cartridge belts	40	
g.	first aid packs	41	
h.	belt suspenders	40	
i.	aviation body armor	~~38~~ 27	(3 short; 10 reg; 14 long)
j.	ponchos	40	
k.	poncho liners	~~39~~ 32	
l.	aviation gas masks	65	
m.	watch caps (wool knit)	40	
n.	sleeping bags	~~40~~ 38	
o.	scarf material	1	(bolt of material)
p.	compass (magnetic)	40	
q.	SVRB aviation survival vests	40	
r.	rations, "C" TYPE	119	
s.	water cans (5 gal, plastic)	14	
t.	M16A1 rifles	40	(serial numbers attached)
u.	Caliber .38 pistols	40	(serial numbers attached)
v.	Caliber .50 MG, M2	16	(serial numbers attached)
w.	Pyrotechnic pistol MK8	20	(serial numbers attached)
x.	Night vision goggles	20	(serial numbers attached)
y.	flight jackets, nomex	39	(16 small; 17 med; 6 large)
z.	thermal underwear (bottoms)	41	(21 large; 20 medium)
aa.	thermal underwear (tops)	38	(19 large; 19 medium)
bb.	desert boots	35	(1-7D; 1-7½D; 3-8D; 1-8E; 5-8½D; 3-9D; 7-9½D; 4-10½D; 3-11D; 1-11½D; 3-11½E; 1-12D; 2-12½E)
cc.	canteen cups	40	_____
dd.	duffelbags	40	_____
ee.	camouflage netting	___	_____
ff.	netting support braces	___	_____
gg.	[illegible]	8	[illegible]
hh.	[illegible]	16	[illegible]
ii.	[illegible]	41	[illegible]
jj.	[illegible]	24	[illegible]

KK. mlc Pouches ... 80
LL. mlc magazines ... 240

2. The above items are on board USS NIMITZ (CV-68) and secured in storage area 5-138-2Q. Access to this space is restricted to five officers. The following officer has assumed control and custody by affixing his signature to this memorandum and initialing all changes or additions.

[redacted], Lieutenant Commander, USN, [redacted]

Declassified by: DDO NMCC

~~SECRET~~

Classified By: ~~DJSOA~~
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (1) to basic memorandum on inventory and custody of special mission items dtd 25 JANUARY 1980.

1. Serial numbers of Pyrotechnic Pistols (MK8): (20 count)

E77890; 265923; 282175; 275394; E109697; 268983; 290353; ; 276333; 268503; 276057; E139217; 283007; 268105; E226573; 281709; 265808; 268964; 287906; 268523; 276035

2. Serial numbers of night vision goggles: (20 count)

2015C; 1985C; 1978C; 1979C; 1975C; 1992C; 1972C; 1999C; 2242C; 1974C; 1977C; 1965C; 2264C; 1983C; 2240C; 1981C; 2026C; 1967C; (+ 29 Batteries);2000C; 2257C

3. Serial numbers of M16A1 Rifles: (40 count)

747034; 643585; 638298; 688264; 746488; 643182; 992581; 774466; 580823; 665754 746116; 616322; 685230; 668738; 688329; 1078311; 1625732; 1093105; 1062406; 1793826; 1624267; 1628398; 622392; 740840; 690440; 1659076; 1630348; 769924; 778020; 1629502; 770571; 1898229; 745897; 778236; 689001; 1193976; 675030; 1630554; 857857; 703802.

4. Serial numbers of Caliber .50 MG,M2s: (16 count)

1170273; 1170879; 1164568; 1141547; 1143410; 1169450; 1612714; 1142323; 458473; 1146842; 1143737; 1251051; 1169711; 1142381; 1164578; 2023125.

5. Serial numbers of Caliber .38 pistols: (40 count)

4D13332; 4D17794; 4D17908; 4D17489; 4D17481; 4D12074; 4D13095; 4D13384; 4D13364; 4D13024; 4D17499; 4D13376; 4D17572; 4D17362; 4D13437; 4D13487; 4D13743; 4D13930; 4D17326; 4D13740; 4D11822; 4D13594; 4D13677; 4D13485; 4D17793; 4D13161; 4D13018; 4D16316; 4D13117; 4D17866; 4D16895; 4D13509; 4D13822; 4D17457; 4D17857; 4D13449; 4D12380; 4D13483; D156285; 153-57582.

G [redacted] LCDR,USN

~~SECRET~~

Enclosure (1)

~~SECRET~~

Presidia

INTRODUCTION

E-370

TF - Formed mid-November

- Mil options discussed with you on 8 Dec - ability then too low.

- Since then capability has been strengthened significantly.

(S) INTEL - Much better in all respects. (Big [redacted]

PLANNING - A sound mechanically achievable plan has been devised.

TRAINING - Four full scale rehearsals have been conducted in the US.

(S) EQUIPMENT - Night vision devices, precise navigation aids, air landed rapid refueling system, satellite como, silent, [redacted]

(S) SUPPORT - Eight RH-53's on Nimitz; [redacted]

In sum, the Joint Chiefs agree that we have a sound achievable plan.

Next, I'd like to outline briefly the current situation and then follow with the plan.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGR TO Secret
REVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM Multiple Sources
[redacted]

~~Downgraded to SECRET per authority DDO (NMCC) NADR 11/20/90~~

~~Classified By: TCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

[redacted]

Classified By: DJSOA 18 October 1982
Declassified ON: OADR

(S) CURRENT SITUATION

HOSTAGES

50 at Emb

3 at FM

- Reasonably sure we know where they are.
- Kept by 125-150 persons at least a third armed with rifles and pis
- Embassy is 27 acres - with fence 10 - 12 ft high.

[redacted]

(S) LIKELY REINFORCEMENTS

- [redacted] persons from nearby stations could arrive within 10-15 minutes after the rescue has begun.
- 200 + more in the next 15 minutes.
- Several hundred could be expected within 45 minutes.
- Organized elements of the regular armed forces are not expected during the first hour.
- There is a low probability that the regular armed forces will discover or interfere.

(S) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- The operation would be accomplished during a nine day period (7 days for warning and positioning the force and 2 days for execution and recovery). Heavy helicopters (RH-53s), AC and MC-130 aircraft, KC-135 tankers, C-141 airlifters, and one C-5A will be used. The helicopters will launch from the Nimitz. Other air operations will be from [redacted]

- The operation in Iran takes approximately 38 hours (two nights and one day). It is divided into three phases - Insertion, Hostage Release and Extraction.

- Upon last light of the insertion day, SOFD-Delta (90 Delta personnel plus [redacted] /monitors) and Rangers (46 personnel) will be airlifted by 3 MC-130s from [redacted] to Nain Military Airfield, Iran.

-- The first MC-130, equipped with FLIR, will overfly the airfield and indicate clearance for the Ranger MC-130 to land. Upon landing, the Rangers will secure the field and prepare for reception of the two Delta MC-130s.

-- These 3 A/C will soon be followed by 3 MC-130s w/fuel bladders.

-- In the meantime, 6 RH-53s will have departed the USS Nimitz to marry up with the force at Nain. While at Nain, the helos will refuel from the MC-130 bladder birds and load the Delta personnel. (The refuel and load evolutions should take approximately 40 minutes.)

-- Once refueled and loaded, the helos will fly to a hideout area which is located approximately 100 KM from Tehran.

-- The MC-130s at Nain will return to [redacted] leaving a force of 22 Rangers and two friendly [redacted] to maintain control and insure that the operation is not compromised.

-- Once the helos reach the hideout area, they will be camouflaged and defensive positions set up. This evolution will be completed prior to sunrise.

- The Delta force will [redacted] from the hideout area to a warehouse which is located approximately 15 KM from Tehran [redacted]

-- While at the warehouse, final preparations will be made for the hostage release phase.

- That night, Delta will be moved into Tehran [redacted] enter the compound during the early morning hours.

-- The hostage release can be completed in less than one hour - most will be out in 30 minutes or less.

-- Two AC-130s will fly from [redacted] compound and provide on-call gunfire support if required.

-- In the meantime, 5 MC-130s w/Rangers (75 personnel) will capture Manzariyeh and prepare for arrival of a C-141 [redacted] and the helos from Tehran.

-- A third AC-130 will be available to provide on call gunfire support at Manzariyeh.

-- Once Delta has initiated the hostage release by entering the Embassy compound, the helos will be called in for [redacted] and transportation of the hostages and Delta to Manzariyeh.

-- A separate fully coordinated plan will be used to free Mr. Laingen + 2 from the Foreign Ministry.

-- At Manzariyeh the former hostages will be loaded on the C-141 which is staffed with an emergency medical team. The C-141 will fly to the nearest US military hospital, [redacted] on to Germany.

-- All other personnel will board the MC-130s and depart for [redacted]

-- A sixth MC-130 from [redacted] will extract the Main force once the Manzariyeh extraction has been completed.

-- All AC-130 flights from [redacted] to Iran and return will require air refueling over [redacted]

TO SUM UP -

- The mission can be done.

- It is highly dependent upon surprise.

- The next best time is 27-29 March followed by 3-5 Apr.

- After 5 April, shorter nights drive us to (3-day plan with increased risk).

- Sir, we await your orders.

~~SECRET~~

i-373

~~TOP SECRET~~

WORKING PAPER

A (S) Subject: Concept for use of [redacted] in Hostage Recovery Option

(S) 1. CONCEPT.

- Based on force capability, weather [redacted] and environment, the [redacted] is best munitions to achieve desired results.

1,B [redacted] along the south wall, as required, prior to [redacted] at the [redacted]

- Specific employment techniques and crew training will be accomplished prior to operation.

(S) 2. MUNITION DESCRIPTION. (See attached photo)

- The [redacted] includes a [redacted] and [redacted] each containing [redacted]

- [redacted] permits [redacted] of [redacted] from various [redacted] between [redacted].

1,B - When the [redacted] functions, the [redacted] over the target area.

- After [redacted] Desired [redacted] should [redacted] for approximately [redacted]

(S) 3. AVAILABILITY.

- Army has 1964 at [redacted] Depot.

- Shipping weight is [redacted]

1,B (S) 4. Delta Force will also have [redacted] munitions for use, as required.

(S) 5. No [redacted] should result from use of [redacted] are [redacted] but should pose no greater hazard than [redacted] if employed in buildings or urban areas.

1 Enclosure
A/S

DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

Classified By: OADR
Declassified ON:

Downgraded by: DDO NMCC 12 AUG 92

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~ (E374)

SOD SUMMARY SHEET

TO:	CLASSIFICATION	SOD CONTROL NUMBER
CJCS	~~TOP SECRET~~	

SUBJECT:

Use of [redacted] in Iran Hostage Rescue (TS)

ACTION			
APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
X		X	

REMARKS

1. (TS) The attached memorandum outlines the requirement for and requests approval of discriminate use of [redacted] during the hostage rescue in Iran.

2. (TS) The JTF was previously authorized* to plan for use and train in the use of [redacted]. However, final approval to use [redacted] was deferred.

3. (U) Recommend the attached memorandum be approved and forwarded to the Secretary of defense.

* Summary Sheet/Memo, Subject Use of [redacted] in Iran Hostage Rescue (TS)

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL DOWNGRADE TO Secret
REVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM JS

ACTION OFFICER	INFORMATION/COORDINATION/APPROVAL						
[redacted]	OFFICE	NAME	OFFICE	INFO	COORD	NAME	EXTENSION
SOD, J-3	J-3 P						
EXT 55078	EXEC						
	TNI CHF						
	VCOPS						
	COPS						
DATE OF PREPARATION							
13 April 80							

~~TOP SECRET EYES ONLY~~ ~~SECRET~~

OJCS SUMMARY SHEET

TO:	CLASSIFICATION	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING DIRECTORATE
CJCS	~~TOP SECRET~~	~~SECRET~~
THRU: DJS	EYES ONLY	DJSM NO. / ODJS SUSPENSE DATE / DJSM DATE

SUBJECT:

Use of [redacted]
Tehran Hostage Rescue (TS)

ACTION			
APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	OTHER
X	X		

REMARKS

1. (TS) The attached memorandum outlines the requirement for and requests approval of discriminate use of [redacted] during the hostage rescue in Tehran. Iran

2. (U) Recommend approval and signature on proposed memorandum.

In view of the [redacted] of this final approval to [redacted] it is suggested that the Team be authorized to plan for use and train in the use of the [redacted] requested but the final authority to use during the operation not be issued until the deployment order is approved. Philip D. Shuttler

Return to (See attachment)

CLASSIFIED BY: [illegible]
DATE FOR ( ) DECLASSIFICATION
OR (X) REVIEW
IS: 21 November [illegible]
EXTENDED BY:
REASON:

~~EYES ONLY~~

ACTION OFFICER: [redacted]

COORDINATION/APPROVAL

OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION
J-3	Philip D. Shuttler				

DATE OF PREPARATION

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A

Subject: Use of [redacted] in Tehran Hostage Rescue ~~(TS)~~ ~~(S)~~

1. ~~(S)~~ ~~(TS)~~ The current analysis of the tactical situation associated with the rescue of the hostages from the Embassy has established a requirement for authority to discriminately use [redacted] The intention is to use an [redacted] with [redacted] characteristics and minimum [redacted] at the Embassy Compound to [redacted] predictable enemy reaction.

1,B

2. ~~(S)~~ ~~(TS)~~ The advantages of limiting [redacted] by exercising [redacted] while improving the probability of mission success outweighs the possible [redacted] and [redacted] risk to the hostages and Iranians.

3. ~~(S)~~ ~~(TS)~~ As a point of information, [redacted] have been used [redacted]

1,B

4. ~~(S)~~ ~~(TS)~~ It is recommended that approval be granted to assemble the necessary supplies, conduct training, and prepare to use [redacted] as outlined in paragraph one above.

From CJCS

OK - But not approved now for use. Such approval would be addressed [illegible]

22 Nov 79

CLASSIFIED BY: Chairman, JCS
DATE FOR ( ) DECLASSIFICATION
OR (X) REVIEW
IS: 22 November 2009
EXTENDED BY:
REASON:

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A Subject: Use of [redacted] in Iran Hostage Rescue (~~TS~~) (U)

1. (U) (~~TS~~) Current analysis of the tactical situation associated with the rescue of the hostages from Iran has established a requirement for authority to [redacted] An [redacted] with [redacted] characteristics and [redacted] would be used to [redacted] predictable enemy reaction.

A,B

2. (U) (~~TS~~) The advantages of limiting [redacted] by exercising [redacted] while improving the probability of mission success outweights the possible [redacted] and [redacted] risk to the hostages and Iranians.

A

3. (U) (~~TS~~) As a point of information, [redacted] have been used [redacted]

A

4. (U) (~~TS~~) It is requested that approval be granted to use [redacted] as outlined in paragraph one above.

David C. Jones

4/14
Approved.
Harold Brown

CLASSIFIED BY: Chairman, JCS
DATE FOR ( ) DECLASSIFICATION
OR (X) REVIEW
IS: 12 April 2010
EXTENDED BY:
REASON:

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

DJCS SUMMARY SHEET

#375

TO: DJCS	CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~	FOR USE BY ORIGINATING AGENCY ONLY: DATE
THRU: DJCS	DJSM NO.	DATE RECEIVED BY DJCS
	DJSM DATE	

SUBJECT: Use of [redacted] in Tehran Hostage Rescue (U) (S)

ACTION	APPROVAL	SIGNATURE	INFORMATION	BRIEF
	X	X		

REMARKS

~~(S)~~ (TS) The attached memorandum outlines the requirement for and requests approval of [redacted] during the hostage rescue in Tehran.

2. (U) Recommend approval and signature on proposed memorandum.

CLASSIFIED BY: DDO NMCC
DATE FOR ( ) DECLASSIFICATION OADR
OR ( ) REVIEW
IS: 12 Aug 92
~~EXTENDED BY:~~
~~REASON:~~

ACTION OFFICER: [redacted]
J-3, SOD
EXT 75279

DATE OF PREPARATION

COORDINATION/APPROVAL

OFFICE	NAME	EXTENSION	OFFICE	NAME	EXTEN
JTF	[redacted]	55805			
J-33	[redacted]	71106			
J-31	Has seen				

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

~~EYES ONLY~~

THE JOINT STAFF

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Use of [redacted] in Tehran Hostage Rescue (S) ~~(TS)~~

A, B 1. (S) ~~(TS)~~ The [redacted] by the rescue force is considered a necessity to [redacted] levels. Minimum force is being employed, both inside and outside the Embassy, while maintaining a capability to affect a successful egress from the Embassy [redacted]

A 2. (S) ~~(TS)~~ An evaluation of the folowing [redacted] is being conducted by the rescue force; [redacted] The desire is to employ an [redacted] reasonable period of [redacted]

3. (S) ~~(TS)~~ The members of the rescue force are familiar with both employment of [redacted] conduct of operations while [redacted]

A, B 4. (S) ~~(TS)~~ The primary advantages of limiting the [redacted] by exercising [redacted] while greatly enhancing the probability of mission success, far outweigh the [redacted]

5. (U) Strongly recommend approval and that the attached proposed memorandum be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

JAMES B. VAUGHT
MG USA
CJTF - RICE BOWL

Attachment
a/s

APPROVED _____
DISAPPROVED _____

CLASSIFIED BY: Director, J-3
DATE FOR ( ) DECLASSIFICATION
OR (X) REVIEW
IS: 21 November 2009
EXTENDED BY:
REASON:

Downgraded to Secret
by DDONMCC
12 Aug 2

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP~~ SECRET

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

~~EYES ONLY~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

A Subject: Use of [redacted] in Tehran Hostage Rescue ~~(TS)~~ ~~(S)~~

A ~~1. (S) (TS)~~ The current analysis of the tactical situation associated with the rescue of the hostages from the Embassy has established a requirement for authority to [redacted] The intention is to use [redacted] at the Embassy Compound to [redacted] predictable enemy reaction.

A ~~2. (S) (TS)~~ The advantages of limiting [redacted] by exercising [redacted] while improving the probability of mission success outweighs the possible [redacted]

~~3. (S) (TS)~~ As a point of information, [redacted] have been used [redacted].

A,B ~~4. (S) (TS)~~ It is recommended that approval be granted to assemble the necessary supplies, conduct training, and prepare [redacted] as outlined in paragraph one above.

From CJCS

OK - But not approved now for use. Such approval will be addressed later

22 Nov 79

CLASSIFIED BY: Chairman, JCS
DATE FOR ( ) DECLASSIFICATION
OR (X) REVIEW
IS: 22 November 2009
EXTENDED BY:
REASON:

~~EYES ONLY~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ i #377

TIME CLU IRAN	EVENT/ SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTION
535 2005	1/MC-130 w/ 50 DELTA Dep [redacted] - MC-130 Aborts	Lead DELTA Team late or unavailable	- Abort - Have spare MC ready; transl DELTA continu
555 2025 556 2026	1/MC(50DELTA) & 1/EC(FUEL) T/O from [redacted] - MC-130 ABORT	OK DELTA unavailable	- ABORT advise D-MC-130
	- EC-130 ABORT	- REQUIRE 2/EC-130 AT REFUEL POINT.	- Transload DEL spare - conti - USE 3RD EC-130 AS FA FUEL A/C
	E NOTE: Any delay of these A/C beyond 10 min requires notification to Helos for possible delay		
556 2026	7/Helos dep carrier		
	6 airborne	OK	Continue
	5 airborne	Allows only one spare for entire mission	Depending on execute ... abor
	>5 airborne	Insufficient helos for mission	ABORT
602/3/4	1/MC-130(21/ DELTA) 2/EC-130 (FUEL) T/O from [redacted] - 1/MC-130 Abort	Equip & parts of DELTA unavailable	Transload to spa MC-130, if unavailable .. ABC and recall all forces
	- 1/EC-130 ABORT	Still sufficient fuel at refuel point for helos	Contine
	2/EC-130 ABORT	Insufficient fuel for helos	- If no refuelin available for MC-130 ... ABORT - If refueling available, conti give 5000# from of 3/MC-130s to helos, plan a 5 helo launch ou of refueling

~~TOP SECRET~~

DDO NMCC ~~[illegible]~~ 12 Aug 92 Downgraded

Classified By:
Declassified ON: OADR DDO NMCC

TIME / DELTA PLAN	EVENT/ SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
			- If decision ma to ABORT, give 8 gals to ea of 7 helos, helos ret to carrier, all C-130s return to [redacted]
35	1/MC-130 (DELTA lands at refuel point [redacted]	OK	Continue
		Blind landing	[redacted] gui pilot to landing the road [redacted]
	- A/C damaged or ~~or~~ breaks through crust on landing	A/C will have to be destroyed in place	- ABORT: Land t helos at the ref point, on load f from the MC-130, split the 60 personnel betwee helos and return the carrier
		OR	
		Make damaged A/C [redacted] and burn it [redacted]	Continue
39	Helos pass turn around 5 helos OK	Sufficient force to to support extraction	Continue
	<5 helos OK	Insufficient helos	ABORT
55	2nd/MC-130 lands at refuel point - A/C damaged or breaks through crust	OK	Continue
		Our presence will be discovered the next day	ABORT - Land hel take fuel out of damaged MC-130 f helos, load 60 people on 1st MC return to [redacted] destory MC-130 i place, helos ret to carrier.

1,E

TIME LU IPAN	EVENT/ SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
		If we are allowed to use a security force to prevent word of our presence from getting out fro 24 hours OR Make A/C [redacted] burn it	Continue as plan bring an MC-130 back in the 2nd night to destroy damaged aircraft and remove the security force Continue
958	1st/EC-130 lands - A/C damaged	OK Presence will be discovered	Continue ABORT - If possi take fuel out of EC-130, all forc return to initia departure point
		If we have security force MAKE A/C [redacted] BURN IT	Continue, bring crew out on MC-1 CONTINUE
002	3rd MC-130 lands - A/C damaged	OK Presence will be discovered	Continue ABORT ... all personnel return initial departur point. Destroy A/C in place
		With security force OR Make A/C [redacted], burn it [redacted]	Continue Continue
005	2nd/EC-130 lands - A/C damaged	OK - Same options as above	Continue. Same as above
	- Becasue of damage or malfunction, unable to pass fuel	- LAND 3RD EC-130	CONTINUE
006	3rd EC-130 enters orbit over landing site	Provide terminal guidance for helos	Continue
020	Helos arrive at landing site	OK	Continue
	- If helos are more than min late	Not enough darkness to reach hideout	Helos refuel and move north to desert hide location -- noti reception party OF DELAY

TIME FROM LIFTOFF IRAN	EVENT/ SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
100	Helos depart refuel point with DELTA		
	5 OK	Sufficient helos for operation	Continue
	<5 OK	Insufficient helos for for operation	Good helos retu to carrier, rest of force return [redacted] on C-13
	NOTE: If there is a problem with any A/C departing the refuel point, it will be destoryed in place and [redacted]		
320	Helos arrive at dropoff with DELTA	OK	Continue
	- No reception party	DELTA unable to move to city	- DELTA moves to hideout with hel - DELTA remains dropoff to wait trucks
	- Helo breaks at dropoff	Possibility of discovery	- Leave [redacted] at Helo [redacted]
	- Force discovered at dropoff	- Mission blown	- Load force on and return to desert track - If possible, capture discover keep with helos hideout, release when helos leave continue
350	Helos depart dropoff	OK	Continue
005	Helos arrive hedeout	OK	Continue
	Helos must be in the hideout by 0016Z to arrive in total darkness		

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

TIME DU IRAN	EVENT/ SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISIONS/OPTIONS
07/9	2/MC-130 depart [redacted]	OK	Continue
	-1/MC-130 aborts	Rangers/CCT not available at Manzariyeh	Transload to spare MC-13 continue
	-2/MC-130s abort..Launch spare	Reduced force to secure Manzariyeh	- 24 hour hold - Continue, [redacted]
	- 3/MC-130s abort	No security force	- 24 hour hold - Continue, MC/EC-130s fr [redacted] proceed to Manzariyeh without security, CCT will set lights for C-141's.
	- 1/EC-130 aborts	No extra fuel, reduced b/u extraction capability	
03	3/AC-130 depart [redacted]	OK	- Go
	- 1 Depart	Minimum support	- 24 hour hold, recall force - Continue
	1 Depart	[redacted] support	- 24 hour hold, recall force - Continue, don't tell Charlie
20	1/MC&2/EC-130 Depart [redacted] for Manzariyeh	OK	- Continue
39	1/KC-135 depart [redacted]	OK	- Continue
	- KC-135 aborts, launch spare	OK	- Continue
	- No KC-135	No Refuel	- MC-130s continue, get fuel at Manzariyeh
51	3/KC-135's depart [redacted]	OK	- Continue
	- 1/KC-135 Abort	Insufficient fuel for A/C 130	Launch spare
	NOTE: If this launch requires the use of ~~more than two~~ spares we will affect the return refuelings.		
35	2/MC-130s refuel	OK	- Continue

A, E

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

Tacker outbound

TIME AU IRAN	EVENT/ SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISIONS/OPTIONS
	- 1/MC-130 unable to receive fuel	Reduced security force for Manzariyeh	- Continue The MC-130 that cannot refuel will continue to [redacted]zariyeh to get fuel
	- KC-135 unable to pass fuel or both MC-130s unable to receive	MC-130s will require fuel from EC-130 at Manzariyeh	- Continue rest of missi on schedule, land both MC-130s at Manzariyeh, take fuel from EC-130.
53	[redacted]130's refuel	OK	- Continue
	≥ 1 A/C 130 unable to refuel	Minimum AC-130 available to support DELTA	- Continue
	No AC-130s able to refuel	No gunship support for DELTA	ABORT, recall all forces
			- Continue, have AC-130s land at [redacted], refuel and launch for Tehran.
			- If MC-130s have successfully refueled continue to Manzariyeh & refuel from EC-130
			- Continue, AC-130s retur to [redacted]
11	2/C-141 depart [redacted] for Manzariyeh	Sufficient airlift to carry out 307 personnel	- Continue
	1/C-141 OK	Max load departing Manzariyeh using MC-130 support	- Continue
	[redacted] will not let C-141s launch	Insufficient airlift to extract personnel	- Ulitize alternate rescu party from [redacted] (MC/EC-130)
40	AC-130 arv at Embassy NOTE: AC-130s will have 2+00 station time available.	OK	- Continue NOTE: If EC-130s with fue are at Manzariyeh and the other forces (MC-130s) have sufficient fuel, an AC-130 can land and take on fuel at Manzariyeh to extend station time.
45	2/MC-130s land at Manzariyeh	OK	- Continue
	- Find R/W blocked	Unable to airland	Jump in Rangers to clear runway then land.

E

TIME LU IRAN	EVENT/ SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISIONS/OPTIONS
56	2/C-141 arrive Manzariyeh	OK	- Continue
	- 1st/C-141 crashes on R/W	R/W particully blocked if 2nd C-141 cannot land, insufficent airlift to evacuate all forces.	- Land the 2nd/C-141 and use him to extract hostages, use MC/EC-130s to extract combat force. - Send 2nd/C-141 back, us MC/EC-130s to extract entire force.
		NOTE: C-141s will require at least 5000' to operate at moderate loads.	
Call	Helos start up		
00	DELTA exectute at Embassy (approx time)	OK	- Continue
Call	Helos arrive at Embassy		
	- 5 OK	Sufficient helos for extraction	- Continue
	≤ 4	Will require helos to shuttle to Manzariyeh	- Conside fuel for AC-13(to provide extra static time.
	Zero helos	Unable to extract by helo	Will have to reach Manzariyeh by ground vehicle
10	2/C-141s depart Manzariyeh	OK	- Continue
	- Only 1/C-141 able to depart	Some of force will have to come out on MC/EC-130	Transload force to MC/EC-130 for extraction.
	- Zero C-141s depart Manzariyeh	Entire force must come out on MC/EC-130	Transload force to MC/EC-130s
15	MC/EC-130s depart Manzariyeh	OK	Continue
	≥ 3 MC/EC-130 depart	OK	Continue
< 3 MC/EC-130	depart	Insufficient lift for entire force	Force transition to E&E plan, make pickup at predetermined location ne night.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1-379

G SEE: [redacted] for details o questions on info provi below.

E [redacted] SUPPORT AVAILABLE

E

15 Jan 80:

ITEM	ON-SITE	REQUIREMENT	SHORTFALL	IN-THEATER ?
COTS	200	800	600	Harvest Eagle
MATTRESSES	50(not good)	800	Recommend Sleeping Bags per man	
BILLETS (US assigned)	280	800	600	Requires [redacted] Govt turnover for US use.
LATRINES	19	24	5	Being constructed
SHOWERS	11(HEADS)	19	8	Harvest Eagle
WATER	3 Buffalos 10 Lister Bags	6 Buffalos 20 Lister Bags	3 Buffalos 10 Lister Bags	Harvest Eagle
Water Storage w/demin	4x500gal	8x500gal	4x500gal	Harvest Eagle
A-2 Water Trucks	1	2	1	Not in theater(SA
Water Kits for KC135	0	as req	as req	KC-135 deploy wit them.
MOBILE CLINIC	1	1	0	n/a
INSECT REPELLANT	1 per pers	1 per pers		each pers deploy insect repellant
LAUNDRY	3 washers	6	3	In Theater Quarte
CLASS VI	BEER 330 cases Soda 100 cases	as required " "	get from AAFES, EUR	Yes
RUNWAY LIGHTS	MINIMAL	VACI	VACI	Not in Theater (TA
R-14 Berms	1	2	1-2	[redacted] will con struct with 24 hrs notice.
ELECT POWER	175 KW,380V, 50Cycle (220V) 2x6hr periods	Present + 2x200KW	2x200KW Convertible to 220, 60Cy	[redacted]

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LIGHTING	ALL Shelters and Buildings	Same	Wire/Pigtails	[redacted]
MHE	1 All Terrain Forklift w/ long forks	2 of same	1 All terrain w/long forks	ALCE?
PALLET LOADER	NONE	?	?	ALCE?
POL	240,000gal on base +100,000gal avail w/24hrs notice	?	?	[redacted] need 48 hr notice to assure no shortfall

TIME	SITUATIONS	REQUIRES	DECISION/OPTIONS
2/0800Z (0300 Est)	Decision to launch MC-130	N/A	N/A
2/1000Z (0500 Est)	Launch MC-130:		
	a. 5/MC-130 Airborne	None	Go
	b. 4/MC-130 "	Reduced fuel for Helo's	Go, will provide t 19 operational bladders to compl mission
	c.<4/MC-130 Airborne	Insufficient fuel for Helo's	No Go/Delay 24 hr
	d.>1:00 delay in T/O	Will not get fuel to helo's in time for them to reach hideout by daylight	No Go/Delay 24 hr
2/1115Z (0615 Est)	KC-135 launch:		
	3 KC-135 Airborne	None	Go
	<3 KC-135 Airborne	Unable to accomplish MC-130 refueling	No Go
2/1150Z (0650 Est)	2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch,	None	Go
	<2 ARTS & 1 KC-135 launch,	Unable to accomplish. MC-130 refueling	No go
2/1340Z (0840 Est)	MC-130 refueling:		
	5 successful	Sufficient fuel for [redacted]	Go
	4 successful	Sufficient fuel for 5 helos, can move camou[redacted] to hideout	Go, Foldup 6th He and leave it + TA
	<4 successful	Insufficient fuel for Helos	No Go
2/1430Z (0930 Est)	Helo launch		
	a. 6/Helo airborne (5 wi Delta/1 Wi extra support equipment, i.e., portable TACAN plus camouflage nets)	Improves Delta's chances of having adequate helo support at the target	Go
	b.≥5/Helo airborne with no more than 1:00 delay	Max delay, and still be able to reach hide out by daylight with sufficient aircraft	If there is a del instruct MC-130s orbit
	c.<5/Helo airborne	Would unacceptably degrade equip and personnel for "Delta"	No/Go, delay 24 h Inform MC-130's & KC-135's

< = less than
> = greater than
≤ = less than or equal to
≥ = greater than or equal to

TS

I-378

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TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
	d.>1:00 delay	Cannot reach hideout by daylight	No Go, delay 24 h
2/1430Z 1515Z [illegible]	Helo goes down over water - Delta Helo down	Force unacceptably degraded	No Go, Recall Hel advise MC-130s to take 2nd refuelin and RTB. Scrambl SAR from Carrier, advise KC-130s/AR
	- Cargo Helo down	TACAN and camouflage nets gone	Option 1 - [illegible] Helos continue, launch SAR from Carrier Option 2 - Recall Helo's advise MC-1 to refuel and RTB launch SAR
2/1640Z [illegible]	MC-130 refueling: 5 successful	Sufficient fuel for 6 helo's	Go
	4 successful	Sufficient fuel for 5 helo's, can move camouflage to hide out	Go, Foldup 6th He and leave it + TA
	<4 successful	Insufficient fuel for helo's	No Go, recall Hel
2/1515Z 1810Z [illegible]	Helo goes down prior to turn around point: - Delta Helo down	Force unacceptably degraded - may lose TACAN and camouflage nets	Other 5 helo's lan and spread the lo Advise MC-130 to delay by no. o minutes required recovery. - If injuries: Option 1: 6th l lands, dumps ca if necessary, p injured and ret to carrier. Option 2: Abort, recall helos, adv MC-130's RTB, adv KC-135's
	Cargo Helo down	Crew requires recovery	Option 1: Launch Delta Helos conti

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DATE	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
			Option 2: Land one of the other 5 helos and load 1 crew member and 1 camouflage net on each. The TACAN should be able to go on one of the helos. Advise the MC-130's to delay
	More than one helo goes down	Force unacceptably degraded	Abort, recall helo advise MC-130's to RTB, call for earl KC-135 support
2/1810Z 1918Z (13/C-141E 1ST)	6 helos operational for entire route	Arrive at refueling with all Delta and extra equipment	Go
	Delta or cargo helo goes down, no injuries	Part of attack force down, must be recovered	Option 1: Land all helos and spread load. Continue to refuel point Option 2: Land car helo and p/u De plus crew. NOTE: Any one hel can recover Delta plus the crew. Th cargo helo is 2000 lbs lighter
	Delta helo goes down with injuries	Force could be unacceptably degraded	Option 1: Abort, proceed to refuel point, take max fuel, return to carrier. Option 2: Proceed refuel point, one helo will return t carrier with injur Remaining 4 helos on mission. (NOTE No camouflage net can be taken to hideout)

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
2/1948Z (1448/57)	Airdrop of fuel bladder: - 5 MC-130s make drop - 4 MC-130's make successful drop. Bladders loaded 5/aircraft; one aircraft only has 4.	Enough fuel for all 6 helos if all bladders OK Worst case, if no bladders break, there will be 19 available. Best case, 20 bladders available, can break one.	Go, can proceed wi number of helos desired Can go with 4 helo if we get 19
	<4 MC-130's make successful drop or <19 bladders are usable.	Insufficient fuel for 4 helos to make target	Option 1: Try to extract fuel from extra helos so as get 4 operational Option 2: Spread personnel over 3 helos, strip do and return to shi Option 3: Delay 2 hours to get more fuel the next nig
2/2248Z (1748/57)	Helos launch from refueling: 6 helos airborne	Will have extra helo support for extraction	Go, use 6th helo t carry max fuel
	5 helos airborne	Adequate support for extraction	Go, fold up 6th he and leave it. Ex- tract extra fuel f operational helos
	4 helos airborne	Marginal support for extraction	Go, spread Delta Helo crews and equipment over operational helos.
	3 helos airborne	Minimum helos for extraction	Option 1: Proceed mission in degrade status Option 2: Spread personnel over 3 helos, strip down and return to carrier. Option 3: Delay place 24 hrs. Tr to fix helos or g more fuel, as req

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
	2 helos airborne	Inadequate helo support for mission	Option 1: Delay 2 hours, try to fix helos or get more fuel, as required Option 2: Load al personnel on 2 he strip down and fl to RV near beach. Call for SAR. Option 3: Delay 2 hours, fly person to Manzarieh in t to meet MC-130s a Rangers. Option 4: Delta a crews fly to vicinity of Darba Takeover airfield the next night. MC-130's land and extract.
	1 helo airborne	Same as above	Same as option 4 above except cy the one helo wi Delta from refue point to vicinity of Darband
	Zero helos airborne	Same as above	Walk to Darband, call for MC-130's when ready.
2/2248Z+ 1:00	Helos must be off by 2348Z	After this, cannot reach hideout by daylight	Delay 24 hours
2/2318	Helos pass point where they could turn around and return to carrier	Once beyond this point, the force is committed to Manzariyeh for extraction	JTF Commander ca recall the force to the carrier, contact means Go
2-3/2248Z 0124Z	Helo goes down between refueling point and Delta's dropoff point:		
	- 6 helos available cargo helo goes	Aircrew on the ground with camouflage nets	2 helos land ar crew and nets
	- 6 helos available, Delta helo goes	Delta force unacceptable degraded	3 helos land, 13 Delta or crew bc

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
			The cargo helo, 5 Delta board each o the other two helo
	5 helos available, Delta helo goes	Same as above	4 helos land spre a load the personnel attempt lift off with nets, if unab dump nets.
	4 helos available, Delta helo goes down	Same as above	Abort, strip down, spread personnel among 3 helos, proceed to hideout extract on MC-130' the next night.
	3 helos available Delta helo goes down.	Same as above	From here on we mu find a recovery airfield to secure and call for the MC-130's
3/0124Z (2024 EST)	Any major problem at the dropoff point	Mission could be blown and/or force degraded	Option 1: Abort, move to hideout, meet MC-130s next night. Option 2: Continue ground commander's decision.
3/2200Z 2210Z (1750-1810 EST)	Helo goes down enroute to hideout	Will affect ability to perform extraction	If 3 or more helos available, continu if < 3, inform Delta and abort to Manzariyeh.
3/0124Z 2135Z (2024 - 3/0435)	Delta is discovered enroute while helos are at hideout	With the force split Delta must be able to call the helos to a predetermined RV	Move helos at nigh to RV to p/u Delta then to Manzariyeh for extraction.

TIME	SITUATION	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTION
3/1500Z	AC-130 launch		
3/1630Z	MC-130 Launch		GO
	5 MC-130 OK		
	4 MC-130 OK		
	3 "		
	2 "	Personnel jammed on A/C - Unable to extract all hostages + Delta + Rangers (149 people)	- P/U only hostag + wounded - Direct [redacted] launch and P/U some leftovers
3/1545	KC-135 launch for MC-130		
	3 KC-135 OK		
	<3 " OK	Insufficient fuel for 5 MC-130	Refuel at least 2 MC-130, more if possible.
3/1605	KC-135 launch for AC-130 MC-130 refuel		
	>2 MC-130 OK		Go
	<2 MC-130 OK	Unable to extract all hostages + Delta and Rangers	Same as above
3/1900	AC-130 Refuel MC-130 refuel	Same as above	Same as above
	>2 MC-130 OK		
	<2 MC-130 OK		
3/2135Z	Helo lift off from hideout		
	>3 RH-53 OK		Use extras (>3) f CAS
	<3 RH-53 OK	Unable to lift out all hostages + Delta	- Cycle helos fro Manzariyeh to Embassy
3/2230Z	MC-130's arrive at Manzariyeh find R/W blocked	- Unable to land secure airfield	- Paradrop Ranger onto airfield - Wait for Delta helos to arrive to secure field a clear R/W
3/2230Z	Helos land at Embassy		
	5 RH-53 OK	Will have extra helos	- Use extra helos provide [redacted]
	3 RH-53 OK	Min reqd helos for for extraction	- Land helos sing use other 2 for [redacted] if nee
	<2 RH-53 OK	Not sufficient helos for extraction	- Cycle helos for extraction
3/2230Z 2300Z	[redacted]		

TIME	EVENT/ SITUATIONS	CONSEQUENCES	DECISION/OPTIONS
3/2245Z (3/1715 Est)	Extraction: ≥3 Helo's OK ≥1 Helo OK	Normal operation Unable to extract all personnel	Go Cycle Helo's
	Zero Helo's OK	Unable to extract by Helo	Use [redacted] Manzariych
3/3300Z (3/2115 Est)	Helo's arrive at Manzariych. ≥3 RH-53 OK	All personnel can be extracted immediately on MC-130	Each MC-130 will leave as soon as loaded
	<3 RH-53 OK	Not all personnel can be recovered in single cycle	- MC-130's depart when loaded - Launch loaded
	<3 RH-53 w/5 MC-130	Helo's will be in cycle made with extra MC-130's on the ground	MC-130 plus 1 or 2 extra MC-130
	Zero helo's OK	MC-130's will have to wait for personnel	- Keep all MC-130' ground till personnel arrive - Launch two MC-13 for [redacted] or for departure
4/0015 (3/1915 Est)	AC-130 departs area		
4/0045 (3/2145 Est)	AC-130 refuel		
Movement of Delta	Delta is discovered	Mission if blown	- Have Delta set u prearranged rall points. If discovered, disengage, proceed to rally pt. When helo's lift off, direct them to appropriate P/U zone. - Establish Manzariyeh as rally point, Hel go to Manzariyeh if no contact with Delta

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SR QSC 16072

i #458

SSN 3143
O 231505Z APR 80
FM: SITE ALPHA/JTF
TO: JTF/RC
BT
~~TOP SECRET~~
E SUBJ: [redacted] OVERFLIGHTS
REF: COMJTF MSG 230950Z APR, SAME SUBJECT AS ABOVE.

7 (C) 1. SUBJECT MISSION HAD SOME OMISSIONS PLEASE CHANGE TO READ AS FOLLOWS:
.... [redacted] .....

(C) 2. THE COMMANDER THOUGHT THAT THE SUGGESTED APPROACH COULD BE USED BY
E [redacted] TO [redacted] IF THE FORCE WERE DISCOVERED IN [redacted] AIRSPECE
ENROUTE TO OBJECTIVE AREA.
~~TOP SECRET~~
BT

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#457

[redacted]

[illegible]

1. IN THE [illegible] WILL HAVE AN/PPN-1 [illegible].

2. ONE AN/PPN-1[illegible] WILL BE WITH [illegible] HELOS, [illegible] WITH [illegible] RANGERS AT MANZARIYEH.

3. THE FOLLOWING CODE/CHANNEL WILL BE USED BY THESE ELEMENTS:

ELEMENT	AN/PPN-1[illegible] CODE
HELOS	
DELTA	
RANGERS	

4. FORWARD AIR CONTROL WILL BE ON UNIFORM FREQUENCIES (PRIMARY) IN ACCORDANCE WITH CEOI.

[redacted]

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[redacted]

EG

[redacted]

[illegible] MEHRABAD FLIGHT [illegible]

[illegible] FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT ACTIVITY [illegible] [illegible]/MEHRABAD AVAILABLE AS OF 12[illegible] 33 APRIL

TYPE ACFT	FLT NR.	ORIG	DEST	[illegible]
[illegible]	IR 1703	TEHRAN	FRANKFURT	23[illegible]
YUGOSLAV DC-[illegible]	JP 195[illegible]	TEHRAN	LJUBLJANA	23[illegible]/23[illegible]
SYRIAN [illegible]-210	YKAFC(VIP)	DAMSCUS	TEHRAN	231400/231615

[illegible]7131

[illegible]13/2112
1141236
2123
DT
#013[illegible]

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#455

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[redacted]

[redacted]

142

#454

E,G

[redacted]

SUBJ: DELTA SECURITY FORCE EQUIPMENT

1. CAMOUFLAGE NETS FOR HELOS WILL ARRIVE HOUR LOD VIA C-130 [illegible] APR 80. ADDITIONALLY LOAD WILL CONSIST OF TWO (2) MOTORBYKES ONE (1) 1/4 TON JEEP AND SIX (6) MEMBERS FROM DELTA SECURITY FORCE.

2. REQUEST YOU HAVE [redacted] DISTRIBUTED EQUALLY ON THE THREE EC-130'S TO EXPIDIETE TRANSFER OF DELTA FORCE AT [redacted] ALSO BRIEF EC-130 CREWS TO KICK OUT [redacted] AT REFUEL SITE.

E 3. THE 1/4 TON JEEP AND MOTOR BIKES AND PAX MUST BE MANIFESTED ON THE FIRST MC-130 FLYING TO REFUEL SITE.

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356

[redacted]

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G [redacted]

[illegible]

E,G [redacted]

(U) 1. EXECUTE ABOVE RELEASE AT EARLIST PRACTICABLE TIME.

SSN ~~#0150~~

#447

E,G (U) 2. FINAL RELEASE: COL [redacted] AND LTC [redacted] ARE BEING DIRECTED TO PERSONALLY DELIVER RESPECTIVE LETTERS TO [redacted] AND [redacted] U.S. AMBASSADORS TO [redacted] WILL BE ADVISED OF LETTER CONTENT SUBSEQUENT TO CJCS AUTHORITY FOR FINAL RELEASE.

E,G (U) 3. A COPY OF LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR COL [redacted] IS BEING FORWARD TO YOU. REQUEST COLONEL [redacted] INSTRUCTIONS BE PLACED IN A SEALED ENVELOPE AND BE PROVIDED TO [redacted] FOR DELIVERY TO [redacted] SHOULD BE ADVISED TO DELIVER BOTH THE PRESIDENTIAL LETTER AND THE LETTER OF INSTRUCTIONS TO COLONEL [redacted]

G (U) 4. LTG GAST IS RECEIVING SEPARATE LETTER OF INSTRUCTION FOR COORDINATION WITH LTC [redacted]
ET

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#446

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] JCS/RC

(U) [redacted]

[illegible]ECT: JTF SITREP [illegible] (AS OF 231[illegible])
1. JTF FORCE ARRIVALS AS FOLLOWS:
A. TWO C-141 ARR [redacted] W/RANGERS: 23[illegible] AND 2[illegible]43Z
B. ONE C-141 ARR [redacted] W/[illegible]CAL: 2311[illegible]Z
C. ONE MC-130 ARR [redacted]: [illegible]
D. TWO AC-130 ARR [redacted]: [illegible] AND 2314[illegible]Z
E. FIVE KC-135 ARR [redacted]: [illegible]ZN 221[illegible]Z, 2314[illegible]Z, 231417Z, AND [illegible]1500Z
[illegible]. JTF FORCE NOW ON STATION:
A. [redacted]
(1) JTF STAFF
(2) THREE MC-130. 567 NMC PARTS. 572 NMC #4 PROP VALVE HOUSING CHANGE. ETIC 240400 LOCAL.
(3) FOUR AC-130. 569 NMC MINOR ENG. PROBLEM. 572 NMC INERTIAL NAV. ETIC 240400 LOCAL.
(4) ELEVEN KC-135. ALL FMC
(5) DELTA. MOVES TO [redacted] TOMORROW.
(6) [redacted] MOVES TO [redacted] TOMORROW
(7) [redacted]
B. [redacted]
(1) THREE EC-130. ALL FMC
(2) FOUR MC-130. ALL JMC
C. NIMITZ. EIGHT HELOS AND CREWS. ALL HELOS CAMOFLAGE PAINTED AND FMC.
D. [redacted] FOUR KC-135. ALL FMC.
E. OPERATIONAL REHEARSALS CONDUCTED BY DELTA AND CCTS LAST NIGHT. REHEARSALS AND RANGER TRAINING TO BE CONDUCTED TO NITE.
(U) A. COMMUNICATIONS.
A. AFTER EXTENSIVE SYSTEM RECONFIGURATION AND REALIGNMENT THE JHF SYSTEMS LOOK THE BEST THEY HAVE EVER BEEN.
B. C141 WITH WSC-3 ARRIVED TODAY. IT CHECKED GOOD IN SATCOM MODE WHILE ON THE GROUND THIS LOCATION.
C. AS OF THIS TIME ADEQUATE COMMS ARE AVAILABLE TO SUPPORT MISSION.
BT

A, E

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QSL QLL QSL QSL AT 1[illegible] KKKKK

G [redacted]

[illegible] LIST FIRST TWO HELOS ARRIVING [illegible] REFUEL AND REARM (IF REQUIRED). [illegible] HELO WILL RECEIVE APPROX 552 CALS [illegible] UP MIXED AMMO FOR [illegible]. CREW CHIEFS WILL HAVE TO ASSIST [redacted] IN LOADING [illegible]. FIRST TWO HELOS WILL RETURN TO [illegible] POINT MIDWAY TO TERAN AS BACKUP. REFUEL/REARM POINT WILL BE AT MID POINT [illegible] WAY. REQUIRE THIRD HELO TO REFUEL AND POSITION AT POINT TANGO AND REMAIN ROTORS TRUNING UNTIL ALL BUT LAST C-130 HAS DEPARTED. SHUTDOWN WILL BE ON COMMAND.

G (U) [illegible] C-132'S LOADING SIX SLIVITS. [illegible] [redacted] WILL BE AT FUEL POINT WITH GUNS AND AMMO.

[illegible] [redacted] WILL BE AT DESERT TRACK [illegible] INSTRUCTED TO PUT HIM ON HELO 5 WITH PITMAN.

[illegible]. REGRET LAST MIN CHANGES BUT WANT YOU TO RECEIVE THIS INFO. GEN VAUGHT SENDS.

BT

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TOOTH
TOT 2328

NO EOM.

SSNM136
(C) NY TTTTT
D [illegible]Z
FM JTF ALPHA
TO JCSNIMITZ [redacted]
E,G [redacted] KOLE)
JCS/RC
ET
~~[illegible]~~
SUBJ: CTF 70 CAP SUPPORT
1. CTF 70 WILL SUPPLY CAP SUPPORT TO GROUND/AIR UNITS REQUIRING ASSISTANCE. UNITS MUST HAVE UHF COMM ON 341.4 MHZ (PRI) AND 240.5MHZ (SEC) BEFORE CAP UNITS CAN COMMIT. USE UNIT CALL SIGNS LISTED IN CEOI AND GIVE POSITION USING ECAP POINT CODE WORD. GROUND UNITS USE SMOKE TO ASSIST IF POSSIBLE.

*443

ECAP POINT	DISCRIPTION	COORDINATES
ALPHA	REFUEL AREA	33-0425N/55-52-55E
BRAVO	HELO HIDE-	[redacted]
CHARLIE	WAREHOUSE -	
DELTA	EMBASSY	35-42-40N/51-25-30E
ECHO	MANZARIYCH -	[redacted]
FOXTROT	[redacted]	
GOLF		
HOTEL		
INDIA	ROAD RAILROAD JUNCTION	35-15-00N/52-45-00E

A

2. CAP A/C WILL MONITOR TACAN CHAN 99. GIVE POSIT IN RANGE AND BEARING FROM NEAREST ECAP POINT. IF NOT POSSIBLE PROVID LAT LONG COORDINATES.
3. PASS THIS INFO TO ALL UNITS PRIOR TO START OF MSN.
4. REQUEST CTF 70 PUBLISH CAP CALL SIGN TO ALCON ASAP.
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MESSAGE 06 RECEIVED.

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NO EOM.

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E,G [redacted]

[redacted]

[illegible] WEATHER OBS

[illegible] WEATHER OBS FOR REQUESTED STNS AVKMIL FOR 23/1200Z HOUR.
[illegible] PLACENAME
[illegible] HGT - VIS, WEA - [illegible] DIR/SD (KTS) - SEA LVL PRESS - TEMP

TABRIZ
[illegible] 1000-1500M - [illegible], HAZE - 24[illegible]/1[illegible] - 1006.[illegible]MB - 21 DEG C.

REZA'IYEH
[illegible] 1000-1500M - [illegible]KM, HAZE - 350/10 - 1006.1MB - 20 DEG C.

TEHRAN
[illegible] 1000-1500M - [illegible]KM, [illegible] - 240/26 - 1007.1MB - 26 DEG C.

ESFAHAN/KHATHAMI
[illegible] 1000-1500M - 10KM, NONE - 240/18 - 1006.3MB - 26 DEG C.

BIRJAND
[illegible] 1000-1500M - 10KM, NONE - 220/10 - 1003.6MB - 30 DEG C.

YAZD
[illegible] 1000-1500M - [illegible]KM, DUST - 100/12 - 1006.2MB - 32 DEG C.

ZAHEDAN
CLEAR - 12KM, NONE - 030/10 - 1007.0MB - 32 DEG C.

~~[illegible]~~

ET
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[redacted]

[illegible]

(U) 1. TO [illegible] MISSION PERSONNEL ACCOUNTABILITY, ALL MISSION PERSONNEL [illegible] MANIFESTED AND LOADED AFTER A [illegible] MISSION ROSTERS [illegible] MAC INDIVIDUAL [illegible] NUMBER TO FACILITATE [illegible] DURING [illegible]/DECOVERY [illegible] WILL BE PLACED ON PRELIMINARY REPORT PRELIMINARY, MUSTAGE AND CASUALTY REPORTING. PRILIMINARY [illegible] WILL BE REPORTED ONCE ALL AIRCRAFT HAVE REPORTED. HOWEVER, THIS REPORT SHOULD BE RECEIVED WITH SKETICISM BECAUSE OF THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THEY WILL BE ACQUIRED.

E (C) 2. UPON ARRIVAL AT [redacted] ALL PERSONNEL TO INCLUDE MUSTAGES AND AIRCREWS WILL BE MET [illegible] TEAMS. EACH INDIVIDUAL TO BE CHECKED BY NAME AS THEY DEPLANE. DATA WILL BE COMPILED AT JTF HQ. ONCE COMPILED, A SECOND RELIABLE REPORT WILL BE RENDERED.

E (C) 3. CASUALTY REPORT WILL BE SUBMITTED AFTER SECOND BY NAME [illegible] AT [redacted]. AGREE CASUALTY NOTIFICATION SHOULD BE PERFORMED BY RESPECTIVE SERVICE. POSITIVE ID OF KIA, IF ANY, WILL BE ATTEMPTED.

[illegible] DO NOT BELIEVE IT FEASIBLE TO RETROGRADE THOSE HELO PERSONNEL NOT LAUNCHED ON MISSION THRU [redacted] MISSION CREWS WILL BE RE[illegible] THRU [redacted] PROVIDED CLEAN CLOTHING AND SHIPPED WITH DELTA TO CONUS FOR DEBRIEFING. THOSE REMAINING ABOARD THE NIMITZ WOULD BE TRANSPORTED THRU MAC CHANNELS. THIER ARRIVAL IN CONUS WOULD COINCIDE WITH OR SHORTLY THERE AFTER RELEASE OF MISSION CREWS FROM ISOLATION.

E

(C) 7. [redacted] AND SELECTED STAFF WILL REMAIN BEHIND TO COMPLETE ROLLUP. COMJTF, DECOMJTF TENTATIVELY WILL DEPART WITH DELTA.

[illegible]

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~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

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E, G

[redacted]

(C) [illegible] [redacted]
REFERENCE YOUR MSG 2[illegible] APR [illegible]

E

(C) 1. THERE ARE THREE AIRLIFT SUPPORT MISSIONS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE [redacted] 24 APR 30

(C) 2. THE THREE MISSIONS ARE SCHEDULED AS FOLLOWS:

AIRCRAFT	ETA [redacted]	FUEL [illegible]
C-130	24[illegible] APR	3,[illegible] G
C-141	2410[illegible] APR	20,[illegible] G
C-141	2411[illegible] APR	20,[illegible] G

3. THE C-141S SHOULD ONLY REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY [illegible] GALLONS OF FUEL EACH. HOWEVER, WE ARE REQUESTING THE HIGHER AMOUNT IN ORDER TO REDUCE THE IMPACT ON OUR FUEL SUPPLIES.

BT

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i-#437

DDO NMCC 12 Aug

Classified By:
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded to CONF by DDO, NMCC 12 Aug

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TOT 24 Ø 1452

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

#436

Classified By JCS
Declassified ON OADR

MESSAGE DB RECEIVED.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGR TO Secret
REVIEW BY OADR
DATED FROM [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G [redacted]

[redacted]

SUBJECT: SAR PREPARATIONS

1. ENSURE THAT SAR COMMUNITY TREATS KNOWLEDGE AND ANTICIPATED PREPARATIONS FOR SAR EFFORT IN SENSITIVE COMPARTMENT CHANNELS.

2. PHYSICAL PREPARATIONS ARE NOT REPEAT NOT ALLOWABLE PRIOR TO [illegible] APR [illegible]

[illegible]

#435

Declassified by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[illegible]
[illegible] APR 80
FM: SITE ALPHA/J2
TO: NIMITZ/HELO JET

RETRANS FOR YOUR INFORMATION

MSG124
DTG: 240335Z APR 80

FM: JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHA

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: HOSTAGES LOCATION

1. THIS OFFICE HAS BEEN RECEIVING FRAGMENTARY INORMATION FROM VARIOUS AND SEPARATE SOURCES OF UNKNOWN RELIABILITY THAT [redacted]

2. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT IT BE KEPT IN MIND ALL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THIS POINT WILL BE DATED BY THE TIME OF OPERATION. DUE TO DEMONSTRATIONS EXPECTED ON THE 24TH AND POSSIBLY THE 25TH THERE MAY AGAIN BE A RESHUFFLE/CONSOLIDATION OF THE HOSTAGES AND INCREASE IN MILITANT/REVOLUTIONARY GUARD ALERTNESS ON THURSDAY NIGHT AT LEAST. THIS SITUATION COULD LAST INTO FRIDAY IF DEMONSTATIONS CONTINUE AND COME NEAR THE COMPOUND.

3. FOR MAJ [redacted] PLS PASS BEST WISHES/LUCK TO COL PITTMAN FOR ME, AND TO THE CREWS FM J2. THANX, [redacted]
T O P S E C R E T
BT

G

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 18 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL [illegible] TO [illegible]
REVIEW ON OADR
SENSITIVE DIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#425

[illegible]
[illegible] TTTTT
[illegible]
[illegible] JTF
[illegible] JCS/NC
[redacted]
(c) [illegible] MOVEMENT [illegible]
TWO C-141S [illegible] DEPARTED [redacted]
FOR [redacted] [illegible] AND 24[illegible] APR [illegible]
ETA [redacted] [illegible] AND 241116Z.
[illegible]
#2175

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NNNN

Classified By: ~~JCS~~ DDO, NMCC 12 Aug 92
Declassified ON: OADR

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RGR QSL AT [illegible] INT 3[illegible]Z [illegible] IF U DONT HAVE ANYMORE I HAVE ONE FOR U INT-RGR KKK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SSN 0177

FLASH FLASH FLASH
[illegible]
[illegible]
FM [redacted]
TO [illegible]
JCS/SOD
BT

E,G

E

1.) REQUEST IN [illegible] QUERY OF AMEMB [redacted] TO DETERMINE LOCATION OF [redacted].

2.) LTC COL. [redacted] IS PLANNING TO DELIVER SENSITIVE LETTER TO THE [redacted] IN [redacted] HOWEVER, ON 18 APRIL THE [redacted] AS IN THE [redacted] NEED TO KNOW HIS PRESENT LOCATION.

E,G

3.) REQUIRE ANSWER AT EARLIEST. BECAUSE OF MUSLIM WEEKEND, ADDRESS ALL MESSAGES TO AMEMB [redacted] NIACT IMMEDIATE.

4.) IF [redacted] IS IN [redacted] IT WOULD EXPEDITE MATTERS TO HAVE U.S. AMBASSADOR MEET [redacted] IN [redacted]

(U) 5.) IF LTG GAST IS COMING WITH INFORMATION, DISREGARD THIS REQUEST.

BT
0016

NNNNBZ$50

#423

RELAX

Classified By: DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded by DDO NMCC to 12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FM JTF
TO JTF/RC
[redacted]
SUBJ: LOCATION OF [redacted]
REFERENCE [redacted]
242315Z APR 93
REQUEST YOUR IMMEDIATE ASSISTANCE
IN LOCATING THE [redacted] AND -
IF APPROPRIATE COORDINATE MEETING
BETWEEN [redacted] AND US AMBASSADOR
IN [redacted]
BT
#0179

E,G

422

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Classified By: [redacted] DDO NMcL 12Aug92
Declassified ONI OADR

Downgraded by:
DDO NMcL
12Aug92

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E

DTG 232315Z APR 80
FM DOMJTF
TO DEPCOM JTF, FIXED WING AIR OPS [redacted]/COL KYLE
DEPCOM JTF, HELO OPS, NIMITZ//COL PITTMAN

BT

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~
SUBJ: REPORTS
1. [redacted]S) THE FOLLOWING REQUIRED REPORTS ARE IN ADDITION TO THOSE LISTED IN PARA 64, JTF 79 CEOI(18 APR 1980)

#015

#421

INDIV MAKING REPORT	ACTIVITY REPORTED	CODEWORD	MEANS
COL KYLE(WOODPECKER)	ALL 130 TYPE ACFT DEPARTED DESERT LAND	SWEETROLL	MC 130/WSC3 SECURE
COL PITTMAN(ZEBRA)	RH53'S ARRIVED AT HIDEOUT LOCATION	HONEY DEW	WSC3 SECURE OR PT 25 SECURE OR PSC-1

BT

Classified By: DDO NMC 12 Aug
Declassified ON: OADR

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Downgraded by DDO NMC

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SSN 0164
ZNY TTTTT
DTG 240300Z APR 80
FM COMJTF/VAUGHT
TO CJCS
BT
~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJECT: SENSITIVE LETTER

(S) 1. I HAVE PASSED THE [redacted] LETTER TO [redacted] HE WILL PASS IT TO [redacted] WILL CONVEY IT TO [redacted] WILL STAY IN [redacted] THROUGHOUT THE OPERATION. [redacted] WILL STAY [redacted] TO FACILITATE THE C-141 MISSION AND PROVIDE ASSURANCES AND CLARIFICATION ON ANY ACTIVITY DETECTED BY [redacted]

(S) 2. ALL PARTIES WILL BE TIED IN WITH GEN CAST BY SECURE COMMUNICATION. EACH WILL KNOW WHAT TO DO. THEY WILL BE TRUEFUL OR [redacted] OR SOMEONE TO BRIEF [redacted] ABOUT THE SAME TIME [redacted] IS INFORMED.

(U) 3. ALL ELSE GOES WELL. WEATHER LOOKED GOOD AT 0700Z. WILL MAKE DECISION ABOUT 1300Z..

ET.
#0164

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Classified By: [redacted] DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92
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SC / JSC 07282

#417

SSN 81B7
ZNY TTTTT
DTG 240920Z APR 82
FM ALPHA/J2
TO JCS/RC-J2
BT

SUBJECT: FIGHTER REACTION TIMES

(S)(U) 1. AFTER QUESTIONING MAJ [redacted] HAVE LEARNED THAT ALERT FIGHTERS CAN START ENGINES WHILE STILL IN HANGARETTE.

- HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE AN ALERT F-4 WITH ENGINE RUNNING TO BECOME AIRBORNE ONCE IT EXITS ITS HANGARETTE?

- HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE AN ALERT F-4 THAT IS NOT IN A HANGARETTE TO BECOME AIRBORNE ONCE MAINT/CREW PERSONNEL ARRIVE AT THE A/C AND BEGIN TO PREPARE IT FOR LAUNCH?

2. WHAT IS BEST EST OF FIGHTER ON-STATION TIME AT [redacted] ONCE ACTIVITY AT THAT LOC IS DETECTED?

BT
#0187

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Classified By: JCS DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92
Declassified ON: OADR

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SC / 45C 0930Z

#415

SEN [illegible]
ZNY [redacted]
DTG 24[illegible] APR [illegible]
FM JTF
TO JCS/RC
BT
[redacted]
SUBJ: AIRCRAFT STATUS
1. AIRCRAFT STATUS AS OF 24[illegible] APR [illegible] IS AS FOLLOWS:
A. NIMITZ - EIGHT HELOS ALL FMC
B. [redacted]
(1) THREE MC-130S. ONE NMC DUE TO LACK OF BRAKE PARTS (ETIC PARTS PLUS 4).
(2) FOUR AC-130S. ONE PMC DUE TO AUTOPILOT HOLD INOP/ALR-46 INOP (ETIC PARTS PLUS 2).
(3) ONE C-141 FMC. TWO ENROUTE TO [redacted]
(4) ELEVEN KC-135S. ALL FMC.
C. [redacted]
(1) FOUR MC-130S FMC
(2) THREE MC-130S FMC.
D. [redacted] SEVEN KC-135S ALL FMC.
2. IF PARTS DO NOT ARRIVE FOR NMC MC-130 AND PMC AC-130, CANNIBALIZATION FROM C-130S WILL BE CONSIDERED.
BT
#2168

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Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

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Declassify on: OADR

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SECRET

[redacted]

FOLL RETRANS FOR UK INFO
SUBJECT: SATRAN EXTENSION (U)

THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE/
[illegible]:

SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 230400/120000
TO 270430/240800:

[redacted]

414

REVW 23 APR 80

NNNN

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CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADE TO Secret
REVW ON OAPR
SOURCED FROM JS DIR

SECRET

CSN 0191
ZNY TTTTT
DTG 0 231810Z APR 80
FM HELO DET/NIMITZ/J-2
TO SITE ALFA/J-2
INFO JOC/RC-J2/LENAHAN
BT [redacted]
[redacted]//DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST
SUBJ: INT REP 05
1. SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY HIGHLIGHTED BY [redacted]

2. AGI 472 REMAINS SOLE SOVIET SURVEILLANCE PLATFORM IN OUR IMMEDIATE AREA. AS OF 231700Z SNOOPER WAS LOC VIC 22.2N 62.5E IN TRAIL OF ARG. [redacted] AT 0730Z FRENCH DDG 640 AND FF 725 WERE SIGHTED BY NIMITZ SCOUT A/C VIC 22.1N 63E ON NW COURSE AT 12KTS. SECOND SCOUT LOCATED FRENCH AOR 626 20NM EAST OF AL MASIRAH (VIC 22.2N 059.1E) PROCEEDING 010 AT 12KTS. [redacted] ANTICIPATE THEY WILL BE WELL CLEAR OF OUR AO BY TOMORROW A.M. NO KNOWN SOVIET MERSHIPS IN THE BOX ALTHOUGH AOR LENINA IS UNLOCATED. [redacted] BUT WE ARE STILL CHECKING TODAYS FAC RECCE PHOTOS.
3. IN ADDITION TO IL-39 ACTIVITY REPORTED IN MY INT REP 04, [redacted] BOTH [redacted] REMAINED MINIMUM 250NM FROM NIMITZ AND DISPLAYED NO INTEREST IN CTF 70. IRANIAN AIR RECCE PREVIOUSLY NOTED. NO INDICATION OF CONCERN IN [redacted]
4. AT APPROX 0800Z LTCOL SIEFFERT AND CAPT [redacted] (MSN PRIMARY NAV) FLEW LEADERS AERIAL RECCE OF CIP IN VA-35 A-6E. REVIEW OF FLIR TAPES AND DEBRIEF INDICATE OUR CHARTS OF CIP AREA ARE ACCURATE.
5. NEXT INT REP WILL BE ON THE WAY NLT 240930Z AS PER YOUR REQUEST.
REVW: 23APR80
BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGR TO Secret
REVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

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RGR QSL AT 0555Z IMI QSL AT 0555Z KKKK

SECRET

CSN 11.2
ZNY TTTTT

~~SECRET~~

#409

O 241000Z APR 80
FM HELO DET/NIMITZ/S-2
TO SITE ALPHA/J-2
INFO [redacted]
JCS/RC-J2/LENAHAN
BT
T O P ~~S E C R E T~~ //DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST
SUBJ: INT REP 06
1. ALL SOVIET NAVAL COMBATANTS REMAIN WELL CLEAR OF NIMITZ [redacted] AGI 477 IS LOCATED WESTERN OF ARC ALFA [redacted] CURRENTLY MAINTAINING SURVEILLANCE OF CTF 70 UNITS. AS OF 240830Z 477 WAS 212NM FROM NIMITZ AT APPROX 22.59N 063.19E PROCEEDING CRSE 100, SPEED 10KTS.
2. PRIMARY SOVIET PLATFORM OF CONCERN IS AOR LENINA. LAST POSITIVELY LOCATED [redacted] HOWEVER, CTF 70 UNITS AND A/C MONITORING PERSIAN GULF HAVE NOT SIGHTED LENINA IN TRANSIT [redacted] FLEET SCOUT A/C OPERATING IN THIS AREA HAVE NOT SEEN HER BUT NIMITZ IS SCHED TO FLY ANOTHER MISSION THIS AFTERNOON. [redacted]
3. GIVEN UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING AOR'S LOC BELIEVE IT PRUDENT TO CONCLUDE SHE IS IN MASIRAH AREA AND PLAN ACCORDINGLY. LENINA HAS NO AIR SEARCH RADAR BUT MUST BE CREDITED WITH PASSIVE COLLECTION CAPABILITIES FOR BOTH ELINT AND COMINT. CONSEQUENTLY RECOMMEND THAT MC-130'S USE RADAR ALTIMETER ONLY (VICE TERRAIN MAPPING) IN GULF TRANSIT AND STAY OFF THE AIR AS PLANNED. SIDE LOBE PATTERN OF ALTIMETER AT 500 AGL IS SO SMALL THAT LIKELIHOOD OF DETECTION IS NEAR ZERO. CHANCE OF VISUAL ID IN PROJECTED FLIGHT ROUTE CLEARING DARKNESS IS SAME. SAME LEVELS OF CAUTION ADVISED ON OUTBOUND OVER WATER LEG.
4. NO KNOWN RED FLAG MERSHIPS IN THE BOX BUT COMMERCIAL TRAFFIC REMAINS HEAVY THROUGH STRAITS OF HORMUZ.
[redacted]
5. FURTHER INTREPS WILL BE ON AS REQUIRED BASIS FOCUSING ON LENINA AND AGI. YOUR MSG 082 OF 221830Z REQUESTED "LOCATION AND DTG OF INFO ON SOV AND OTHER SHIPS" IN THE BOX. GIVEN COURSE/SPEED POSSIBILITIES, TO PROVIDE ALL POSSIBLE MERSHIPS IN THE AREA WILL REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY 4 PAGES OF SINGLE SPACE POSITS AND TWO MAN DAYS OF CALCULATION. UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED INTEND TO REPORT RED FLAGS ONLY.
REVW: 24APR80
BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGR TO Secret
REVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM [redacted]

NNNN///

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT/1112
KCL

E,G

[redacted]

~~[illegible]~~

1. UPON ARRIVAL OF [redacted] YOUR LOCATION, IMMEDIATELY OBTAIN KEYLIST [illegible] AT, DAY 24 AND KEY GUN. PROGRAM [illegible] AND COORDINATE WITH [redacted] TO KEY UP ALL KC-135 AIRCRAFT IN TANKER TASK FORCE.

G

2. INSURE THAT KEYING IS DONE AFTER AIRCRAFT IS ON OWN INTERNAL POWER AS KY-28 WILL UNKEY WHEN POWER IS CHANGED FROM POWER CART TO APU.

3. LISTED BELOW IS KEY SETTING FOR DAY 24 TO BE USED SHOULD SALVAN NOT ARRIVE IN TIME. PROCURE KEY GUN FROM LOCAL RESOURCES [redacted]

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
MP	MN	LN	MP	LP	MN	MP	LP	MN	B	D	F	K	E	G
16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26				
H	J	A	J	A	B	C	E	C	H	E				
27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37				
K	MN	MN	LP	MP	LN	MN	LN	MP	LP	MN				
38	39	40	41											
LN	MP	MP	MP											

4. INSURE ALL AIRCRAFT ARE KEYED WITH SAME KEY GUN.

~~TOP SECRET~~

BT

#0132

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#402

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DDO NMC
12 Aug 92

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CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

[redacted]

ZZ 24 [illegible] Z APR [illegible]

#401

FM COMJTF (VAUGHT)

TO DEPCOMJTF [redacted] (LAST)

DEPCOMJTF/FIXED WING AIR OPS/ [redacted] (KYLE)

CDR [redacted] (BECKWITH)

DEPCOM HELO OPS NIMITZ (PITTMAN)

INFO JTF/RC

BT

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: EXECUTE ORDER

EXECUTE MISSION AS BRIEFED

WE ARE READY AND ABLE. GOD SPEED

BT

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TOT 1300

REC [redacted]

E

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SSN 203

ZNY TTTTT

ZZ 24 125 IZ APR 83

FM JTF/[redacted]

E,G TO [redacted]

BT

~~TOPSECRET~~

SUBJ: EXECUTE ORDER

THIS IS EXECUTE ORDER FOR

MISSION. LAUNCH KC-135 AIRCRAFT

FOR PREPLANNED SUPPORT OF CTF 70 AND

MC/EC-130 MISSIONS.

BT

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#400

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DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[illegible] MATE | [illegible] AT 12[illegible] [illegible]

#399 SC/OSC 12428/[illegible]

[illegible]
SSN [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 241240Z APR [illegible]
FM SITE ALPHA
TO JTF/J-3
JTF/RC
INFO JTF [redacted]
BT
[illegible]T
SUBJ: SCHEDULE ADJUSTMENT
1. [redacted] REQUEST YOU MAKE THE FOLLOWING CHANGES TO NIGHT TWO FLOW PLAN:
A. ADJUST AC-130 DEPARTURE TIME FROM [redacted] TO 1420Z (VICE 1503Z)
B. ADJUST AC-130 PRE-ARCT TIME TO 1730Z (VICE 1753-1818Z)
C. ADJUST DC-130 POST-DRCT TIME TO 0120Z (VICE 0134Z)
D. ADJUST AC-130 RECOVERY TIME TO 0450Z (VICE 0459Z)
CHANGES ARE REQUIRED TO ACCOMODATE 15 MINUTE SENSOR ALIGNMENT (OVERHEAD [redacted] AND FINAL FLIGHT PLANNING BA[illegible] ON UPDATED ENROUTE WIND PREDICTION.
2. (U) REVISED TIMES DO NOT AFFECT TIMES AT THE ORBIT POINT OR AVAILABLE TIME ON TARGET.
BT
[illegible]

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File

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~~SECRET~~

#398

SEN [illegible]
ZNY TTTTT
O 241312Z APR 90
FM ALFA/J2
TO JCS/RC-J-2
BT
[redacted]

1. REQUEST ASSESSMENT OF FIGHTER THREAT TO AC-130 GINSHIPS OPERATING OVER [redacted] SPECIFICALLY, INCLUDE ESTIMATES OF TIME REQUIRED FROM [redacted] UNTIL FIGHTERS ARRIVE OVER [redacted] AND EFFECTIVENESS OF FIGHTERS AGAINST [redacted]

2. TO REDUCE/ELIMINATE CHANCES OF [redacted] FIGHTERS FINDING FRIENDLY A/C AT [redacted] WHICH [redacted]

3. SAME QUESTION AS PARA 2 ABOVE FOR [redacted]

BT
#0201

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 1337 A

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i - 395

[illegible]
[illegible] TTTTT
[illegible] 240[illegible]12Z APR [illegible]
FM ALPHA/J2
TO JCS/RC-J2
E,G [redacted]
[illegible] IMITZ/HELO [illegible]
BT
[illegible]
SUBJ: MTF MCD
1. ONCE HELOS/150'S LAUNCH,
[redacted] TO UR LOCS
WOULD NORMALLY FOLLOW.
2. IN ORDER TO AVOID THIS
[redacted] JTF WILL XMIT
A,C [redacted] TFC TO UR LOCS DURING
[illegible]ECUTION PHASE OF OPN. ON WSC-3 UPLINK FREQ 2[illegible] TFC
[illegible]ILL INCLUDE COMPLETELY [redacted]
[redacted] OF TFC
[redacted] XMITTED TO YOU. QSL
[illegible] HIS TRAFFIC BY YOUR STA IS NOT DESIRED.
3. [redacted] TFC WILL BEGIN AND
END [illegible] CODEWORD QUOTE
NOMBAT END QUOTE.
BT
#0168

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Classified By: [redacted] DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92
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RGRGRGRG QSL AT 0320Z IMI QSL 5 0920Z KKKKKK

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#392

TOT/1501Z
RC

CSM 0204
ZNY TTTTT
DTG 0 2414472 APR 80
FM JTF
TO JTF/RC
BT
~~[illegible]~~

SUBJ: C-141 INGRESS/EGRESS ROUTES TO MANZARI [redacted]

E 1. C-141 INGRESS ROUTE FROM [redacted] BASED ON A PLANNED TAKEOFF OF 1811Z. NUMBER TWO AIRCRAFT WILL FOLLOW AT 15 MINUTE INTERVAL.

		ETE	ETA
[redacted]	[redacted]	12	1823
		3	1826
		35	1901
		19	1920
		6.6	1926.6
		4.7	1931.3
		6.1	1937.4
		9.5	1946.9
		3.7	1950.6
		15.0	2005.6
		5.5	2011.1
		6.2	2017.3
		4.6	2021.9
		7.0	2028.9
		12.0	2040.9
		3.9	2044.8
		7.2	2052.0

A

2. C-141 EGRESS ROUTE COORDINATES FOLLOW WITH ETE.

[redacted]	[redacted]	2.0
		8.2
		5.4
		6.8
		7.3
		5.8
		13.8
		3.5
		9.5
		5.7
		4.3
		6.1

3. LAST COORDINATE IS COAST OUT POINT. ROUTE FROM THIS POINT WILL BE A VFR CLIMB TO INTERCEPT NORMAL IFR ROUTES TO CROSS

E [redacted]

#0204

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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GSN 0206
ZNY TTTTT
ZZ 241512Z APR 80
FM JTF SITE ALPHA
TO JCS/RC
BT
[redacted] ~~SECRET~~
SUBJ: ALERT ORDER
REF: A. JCS/RC 241227Z APR 80
1. CINCPAC INST 83711.2C AND
MODIFYING MESSAGES LISTED IN
REF A ARE NOT HELD AT THIS SITE.
2. REQUEST SPELL OUT APPLICABLE ROE
IN EFFECT FOR TAC AIR SUPPORT
BT
#0205

#390

NNNN

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DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

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~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

[illegible]

1 UT 115,27Z

#389

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 24152[illegible] APR [illegible]
[illegible] ALPHA/J2
[illegible]-J2
[illegible]

[illegible] LOCATION REQUEST
[illegible] PROVIDE LOC OF IRAQI
[illegible] IN TEHRAN. CURRENT
[illegible] MAPS AT THIS LOC SHOW
[illegible] DIFFERENT PLACES.
[illegible]
[illegible]207

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

DeClassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

#388

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SOM 12..
ZNY [redacted]
ZE 2418452 APR
FM JTF
TO JCS/RC
T
[redacted]
(C) SUBJECT: AIRCRAFT LAUNCH
1. EIGHT HELOS AIRBORNE 15272.
2. THREE MC130S AND THREE EC-130S
AIRBORNE ON TIME FROM [redacted] LAST
AIRBORNE 15272
BT
#3200

Classified by: DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92
Declassify on: OADR

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

Downgraded by:
NMCC DDO
12 Aug 92

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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E #384

[illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 24-[illegible]Z APR [illegible]
[illegible]
TO JCS/RC
[illegible]
[illegible]
SUBJECT: C-141 EXTRACTION AIRCRAFT STATUS
E (C) [illegible]. TWO C-141 FMC [redacted] ONE C-141 35- SW-#4-, 242110Z APR.
[illegible]. EIGHT NON-PASS [illegible] SPENDING NIGHT ON A/C EQUIPPED WITH
[illegible] POWER.
[illegible]. JOSE RIGGING A/C FOR WHICKEY 3 ANTENNA. WILL ATTEMPT CONTACT
WHEN INSTALLED.
[illegible]. CLEARANCE RECEIVED FOR [redacted] OVERWATER [redacted] EXERCISE.
[illegible] [redacted] ENROUTE [redacted] TO HANDLE ANY [redacted] COVER
PROBLEMS.
[illegible]
[illegible]

1, E, G (C)

DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

Classified By: [redacted]
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by:
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

[illegible]

[illegible]
DTG 242055Z
PARA 1 ETA EXX DHAMARAN

CSL DTG 242055.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

****

SSN 3210
ZNY TTTTT
Z 24192Z APR 80
FM JTF/SZN VAUGHT
TO NIMITZ/[redacted]
BT
[redacted]
SUBJECT: SITUATION REPORTS
1. ADVISE [redacted] ELEMENT AT YOUR LOCATION THAT ALL REPEAT ALL SITUATION REPORTS WILL BE SUBMITTED FROM JTF HQ ONLY. REQUEST [redacted] YR POS DESIST IN REPORTING TO WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY.
BT
#3213

#383

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~~Classified By: DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~
~~Downgraded by: DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGRADE TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

TOR 0215
17162

O
MSG103
DTG: 271330Z APR 80

FM: JCS/RC
TO: ALPHA
DELTA
ISSN
[redacted]

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL 25 DOWNGR TO Secret
REVW ON OADR
REVISED FROM Multiple Sources
[redacted]

i-#467

SUBJ: IRAN SITREP AS OF 0500 27 APRIL 1980

1. IN RESPONSE TO THE ABORTED US RESCUE ATTEMPT ON 24-25 APRIL, [redacted] THE AREA WAS VISITED BY NUMEROUS IRANIAN DIGNITARIES INCLUDING AYATOLLAH KHALKALI AND THE CDR OF IRAN'S ARMY AVIATION. BGEN GHUBADI, IN CHARGE OF THE SEARCH OPERATION, REPORTED THAT 2 HELICOPTERS REMAINED INTACT AND THAT MAPS, WEAPONS, MONEY (1 MILLION RIALS AND $1,000) HAD BEEN FOUND AT THE SIGHT ALONG WITH 3 DAMAGED HELICOPTERS AND 1 DAMAGED C-130. THE BODIES OF 5 US SERVICEMEN WERE RECOVERED AND FORWARDED TO TEHRAN.

2. IRANIAN PRESIDENT BANI-SADR STATED ON THE 20TH THAT THE BODIES OF US SERVICEMEN KILLED IN THE RESCUE ATTEMPT WOULD BE RETURNED TO THE US WITHOUT PRE-CONDITIONS. TO DISCOURAGE ANY FURTHER RESCUE ATTEMPTS, HOWEVER, HE STATED THAT THE HOSTAGES WOULD BE REMOVED FROM THE EMBASSY AND BE DISPERSED AROUND TEHRAN. THE MILITANTS AT THE EMBASSY ANNOUNCED THAT THE HOSTAGES WOULD LATER BE DISPERSED AROUND THE COUNTRY, WITH THE FIRST GROUP BEING DISPATCHED TO THE CITY OF GOM.

3. [redacted] THE IRANIAN AF CDR ADMITTED TO THE PRESS ON 26 APRIL THAT THE IRANIAN AIR FORCE HAD BOMBED AND STRAFED 2 OF THE US HELICOPTERS TO PREVENT THEIR FUTURE USE BY US FORCES. IN THIS OPERATION, THEY HAD INADVERTENTLY KILLED 4 IRANIAN GENDARMES WHO WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY CONDUCTING A GROUND SEARCH OF THE AREA. FURTHER MILITARY RESPONSES TO THE US OPERATION MAY FORTHCOMING AFTER A THOROUGH REVIEW OF THE EQUIPMENT AND DOCUMENTS DISCOVERED AT THE TABAS SITE. [redacted]

4. [redacted] ALTHOUGH PRESIDENT BANI-SADR CALLED FOR A UNILATERAL GOVERNMENT CEASEFIRE IN KURDISTAN ON 26 APRIL, KURDISH SPOKESMEN EXPRESSED THEIR CONTINUED DISTRUST OF THE GOVERNMENT AND DETERMINATION TO CONTINUE THEIR FIGHT FOR SOME FORM OF AUTONOMY.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]IA CONTINUES TO BELIEVE THAT FULL-SCALE HOSTILITIES BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN ARE UNLIKEY ALTHOUGH BORDER INCIDENTS ARE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE. [redacted]

6. IN BAHRAIN GOVERNMENT SECURITY FORCES HAD TO USE TEAR GAS TO DISPERSE DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING THE ALLEGED USE OF BAHRAINI FACILITIES FOR REFUELING US AIRCRAFT IN THE RESCUE ATTEMPT. INTERNATIONALLY, DIPLOMATIC REPONSES WERE MUCH AS COULD BE EXPECTED WITH EGYPT, ISRAEL, AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES EXPRESSING SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING WHILST THE SOVIET UNION, PLO, AND OTHER COUNTRIES CLOSE TO IRAN CONDEMNING THE LASTEST US MOVE.

7. SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH CHINA SEA

A. AREA OF U.S. BATTLE GROUPS: AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR, IN SURVEILLANCE OF THE USS NIMITZ AND USS CORAL SEA BATTLE GROUPS AND AMPHIBIOUS READINESS GROUP ALPHA WAS SIGHTED REPLENISHING FROM AN OILER YESTERDAY. [redacted]

B. SOVIET PRESS: THE SOVIETS ARE STANDING BY THEIR DENOUNCEMENT OF THE ABORTIVE U.S. RESCUE ATTEMPT. NO NEW COMMENTARY HAS APPEARED.

ET

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON
DERIVATIVE CL BY
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGR TO
REVW ON
DERIVED FROM

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR

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SECRET [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

i-#505

Readdressed to JCS RC

FM: JTF/J3
TO: JCS RC

TOR 1604
KCL 0215

MESSAGE [illegible] RECEIVED.

(C) [illegible] 2515[illegible] APR [illegible]
E [redacted]
[illegible]/J3
T
[redacted]
SUBJ: AIRCRAFT REDEPLOYMENT
(C) 1. MC-130 [illegible] TO BE RETURNED TO LAS ONTARIO. THIS AIRCRAFT WAS KEPT OUT OF MAJOR REPAIR TO ACCOMPLISH THIS MISSION. SINCE IT WAS SUBJECT TO HIGH IMPACT LANDING ON NIGHT ONE OPERATION IT IS UNDERGOING INSPECTION AT THIS TIME. PENDING OUTCOME OF THAT INSPECTION RECOMMEND ITS RETURN FLIGHT TO CONUS BE KEPT TO MAXIMUM FUEL WEIGHT OF APPROXIMATELY 40,000. ROUTE OF FLIGHT FROM [redacted]
E [redacted] AND THE CONUS WOULD MINIMIZE STRESS ON AIRCRAFT. [redacted] WOULD REQUIRE APPROXIMATELY [illegible] OUT REMAINING LESS [illegible].
(C) 2. EC-130 [illegible] HAS RAMP THAT WILL NOT HOLD IN LOCKED POSITION UNLESS UNDER HYDRAULIC PRESSURE OR WHEN AIRCRAFT IS PRESSURIZED. REPAIR CAPABILITY DOES NOT EXIST HERE OR [redacted] RECOMMEND THIS
E AIRCRAFT REDEPLOY THROUGH RHEIN-MAIN OR OTHER C-130 MAINT FACILITY FOR REPAIR BEFORE RETURNING CONUS.
BT

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Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NM
12 AUG 9

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 2604 MCN R1

E,G [redacted]

[illegible]/NOFORN/LIMITED
SUB: REQUEST FOR INTEL SPT
1. REQUEST THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION FOR [illegible]
OF [illegible] SEA SURVEILLANCE MISSION.
A. LOCATION AND DIRECTION OF TRAVEL OF
CURRENT SOVIET NAVAL FORCES IN ARABIAN SEA.
B. SECURE/NONSECURE FREQUENCIES AND
CALL SIGNS OF US NAVAL FORCES IN ARABIAN
[illegible]
[illegible] SEPT TIME [illegible]

$500

INSTRUCTED VIA WSC-3
TO READDRESS QUESTIO
TO JTF/EC (J-2)

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Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

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MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR | 064
KCL | #0

E,G

[redacted]

E

[redacted] LANDING APPROVAL FOR [illegible]
AIRCRAFT FLYING IN SUPPORT OF [illegible] 72.
PERTINENT INFORMATION FOLLOWS:
A. AIRCRAFT DATA

SN	CALL SIGN	ETA	ETD
642564	FLOUG 42	270300Z	280700Z
637785	QUEST 14	270030Z	280730Z
621843	NUDE 73	271000Z	280900Z

B. PERSONEL DATA

SN	AIRCRAFT COMDR	TOTAL CREW/PAX
642564	CAPT [redacted]	24
637785	CAPT [redacted]	21
621843	CAP[redacted]	21

G

C. REQUEST ARRIVAL DATA BE PASSED TO LTC [redacted]
ET
2235

i #496

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Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

MESSAGE 03 RECEIVED.

NO EOM.

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CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92
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☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGR TO CONFID
REVIEW ON OADR
SERVED FROM JS

TOR 26 0901
JC 226

DSL [illegible]

RGR DSL AND HERE IS THE NEXT

490

MSG.166
2698207 APR 82
FM: JTF/RC
TO: HELO DET/S-[illegible]

[illegible] LIST
[illegible] APR 82

1. REF [illegible] OF ITEMS DEPARTING NIMITZ ON HIGH ACFT.

2. ARE ITEMS INCLUDED ON THIS LIST WHICH WERE ON ACFT RECOVERING [illegible] TO NIMITZ. IF SO REQUEST DESIGNATION BY QTY AND SERIAL NUMBER OF THOSE [illegible] LOST.

Retransmitted to Nimitz

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~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGR TO CONFID
REVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM JS

HW HOW ON THAT ONE KK

OSL 0802

TOR 260903
VC 0227

MSG 167
260625Z APR 80
FM: JTF/RC
TO: JTF ALPHA
BT

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: EOD
REF: JTF # 260635Z APR 80

1. EOD TASKING PROVIDED EUCOM 260650Z APR 80.

2. REQUEST ADDITIONAL INFO AS FOLLOWS:
   A. APROX QTY AND GENERAL TYPE OF CHARGES.
   B. DISARM AND MOVE, OR DETONATE AT [redacted]
   C. ANY SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS REQUIRED?

BT

E

#489

Acknowledge

~~Classified By~~
~~Declassified On~~

NNNN

AND MATE THAT WAS THE LAST I HAVE ATT INT OSL KKK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

P 242
[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL
FM [redacted]
TO COM JTF// ATTN: [redacted]

[redacted]

SUBJ: RANGER RETURN

A 1. FIRST C-141 RETURNING [redacted] ARRIVED 260630Z. AIRCRAFT #2 WITH REMAINING PAX AND ALL PALLET EQUIPTMENT IS DUE AROUND 260700Z.

2. THE FOLLOWING STEPS HAVE BEEN UNDERTAKEN IMMEDIATELY UPON RETURN:
A. ALL RANGERS ON THE MISSION WERE ISOLATED AND BRIEFED ON THE COMJTF GUIDANCE THAT ALL INQUIRIES ARE MET WITH THE RESPONSE OF "NO COMMENT".
B. NO PHONE CALL HAVE BEEN ALLOWED.
C. THE BATTALION/S2 IS CONDUCTING A DEBRIEFING OF ALL PERSONNEL INDIVIDUALLY FOR THOSE ON NIGHT #1. BY TEAM OF THOSE INVOLVED IN NIGHT #2.
D. ONLY THE BATTALION EXECUTIVE OFFICER AND THOSE DUTY PERSONNEL AT THE AIRFIELD MADE OF THE RANGER RETURN.

3. THE FOLLOWING STEPS ARE PLANNED:
A. COMPLETE EQUIPMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
B. CONDUCT A COMPLETE DEBRIEFING/INSPECTION OF ALL PERSONNEL
C. BEGIN RELEASING RANGERS/A 261730Z UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED.

4. NATURALLY, QUESTIONS EXIST OVER FUTURE PLANS. AND WILL BE ADDRESSED IN A SUBSEQUENT MESSAGE. IMMEDIATE GUIDANCE IS NECESSARY IF CHANGES IN RANGER RESPONSE IS REQUIRED.

5. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP.
LT

TOR 10 JC

488

Answered

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Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

MESSAGE RECEIVED.

[redacted] CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 1321

MSG171
2613162 APR 80

FM JTF/LC
TO ALPHA (PASS TO NIMITZ)
E [redacted]

~~[redacted] S E C R E T~~

SUBJECT: REDEPLOYMENT OF JTF PERSONNEL ABOARD NIMITZ

E 1. REQUEST YOU COD REF 20 PERSONNEL FROM NIMITZ TO [redacted] IN TIME TO REDEPLOY WITH MC OR EC-130 ACFT TO [redacted] ACFT CURRENTLY DUE TO DEPART [redacted] ON 27 APR 80.

E 2. FOR [redacted] PLS ADVISE TO ALL ADDRESSES SCHEDULED DEPARTING TIME OF MC & EC 130'S FOR [redacted]

~~REVW 26 APR 10~~

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12358
CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGR TO CONFID
REVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM

#485

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT | 1254Z - JT
RC | 1255Z - NIM

[redacted]

(U) [illegible] REDEPLOYMENT OF JTF PERSONNEL [illegible] NIMITZ.
[illegible] REQUEST YOU COORDINATE REDEPLOYMENT OF
[illegible] PERSONNEL [illegible] NIMITZ.
[illegible] AND [illegible] DEPLOY FROM [redacted] CHORROW.
[illegible] W/O ARE REPORTEDLY LOADED.
[illegible] PLEASE ADVISE.
[illegible]

E

#484

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ PROL ☒ CONFIDR TO CONFID
REVIEW ON OADR
DECLASSIFIED BY JS

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

TOR/13352
RC

MSG 170
2611152 APR 80
FM: JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHA
INFO: [redacted]

BT

[redacted]

SUBJ: INTELL SUPP: SITUATION IN IRAN AS OF 0530 EST, APR. 25 80

MCN #0231

#483

[redacted]

2. IN RESPONSE TO THE ABORTED US RESCUE ATTEMPT, THE MILITANTS AT THE US EMBASSY ANNOUNCED THAT THEY WOULD KILL THE HOSTAGES IF ANOTHER ATTEMPT IS MADE. HOWEVER, THERE HAS BEEN NO INDICATION YET THAT THE MILITANTS PLAN TO TAKE ANY [illegible] AGAINST THE HOSTAGES AT THIS TIME. ACCORDING TO [illegible] REPORT, THE MILITANTS HAVE CALLED FOR [illegible] BUILD UP THE 24- HOUR PATROLS AROUND THE EMBASSY [illegible] REACTION BY THE MILITANTS COULD BE TO MOVE SOME OF [illegible] HOSTAGES TO ONE OR MORE UNDISCLOSED LOCATIONS. [illegible] AGAINST THIS ACTION. HOWEVER, [illegible] AND COORDINATION PROBLEMS [illegible] SUPPORT PROBLEMS. MEANWHILE, [illegible] LIKELY INCREASE THE READINESS OF [illegible] NEAR TEHRAN AND THE GULF.

3. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI WILL MOST LIKELY USE THE [illegible] TO ONCE MORE DIVERT THE IRANIAN PEOPLE'S ATTENTION [illegible] DOMESTIC PROBLEMS AND TO REVIVE POPULAR FERVOR [illegible] REVOLUTION. HE WILL CITE THE ABORTED RESCUE ATTEMPT [illegible] THAT THE US IS TRYING TO UNDERMINE THE REVOLUTION.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED BY 12 AUG 9
[illegible] DDO NM
[illegible] JADR
[illegible]

[redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ TOR 261715Z

237

(C) 2[illegible] APR [illegible]
[illegible] NIMITZ HELO DET
TO JTF MAIN/COL [redacted]
E,G [redacted] COL RILE OR OING
[redacted]
[illegible] TRANSPORTATION PLANS FOR NIMITZ DET
(U) 1. FOLLOWING IS PROVIDED TO CONFIRM INFO PASSED TO ADDEES
[illegible] BY VOICE.
(C) 2. PRESENT PLAN IS TO MOVE DET FROM NIMITZ TO CORAL SEA
[illegible] HELO 270200Z FOR FURTHER TRANSPORT TO [redacted] BY C-2.
E CORAL SEA REPORTS C-2 NOW IN DOWN STATUS. IF C-2 REMAINS DOWN,
DET WILL REMAIN IN NIMITZ UNTIL 29 APRIL WHEN WE WILL MOVE TO
[redacted] OR MAC CHANNEL LINK UP. C-2 WILL REQUIRE TWO SORTIES TO
MOVE DET FROM CORAL SEA TO [redacted] THREE HRS REQUIRED PER SORTIE
(U) 3. HELO DET CONTAINS 1[illegible] SOULS WITH PERSONAL BAGGAGE. CARGO
IS TWO (2) [illegible] CU FT BOXES OF PERSONAL BAGGAGE REMAINING FROM
HELO CREWS. WT ESTIMATED AT 2200 LBS TOTAL.
ALSO MAJ [redacted] STEEL CLASSIFIED ROLL AWAY CONTAINER
G WILL GO. THIS ESTIMATED AT 30 CU FT AND 200 LBS. TOTAL CARGO IS
[illegible] CU FT AND 2200 LBS.
(U) 4. IF DET FALLS BACK TO MAC CHANNEL TRANSPORTATION, BOTH
CREW BAGGAGE AND [redacted] CONTAINER WILL REMAIN IN NIMITZ.
[illegible]

#477

NOTE
G

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Declassified On: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

[illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[illegible]

AND HEPLEKOSMES ANOYTHER [illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / [illegible]

[illegible]

O 261011Z APR [illegible]
FM HELO [illegible]
TO KEF/RC [illegible]
BT

[redacted]

SUBJ: SERIALIZED ITEMS ISV
A. JTF/RC 260920Z APR [illegible]
1. REF REQUESTS SERIALIZED ITEMS RECOVERED ABOARD NIMITZ AFTER TERMINATION OF OPERATION.
2. ACCORDINGLY, FOLLOWING SERIALIZED ITEMS ARE CURRENTLY IN CUSTODY HM16 ABOARD SHIP:
A. [illegible] RIFLE, M1[illegible]
7
1483
746116
773236
67[illegible]030
[illegible]
1[illegible]220
B. CAL .39 PISTOL
4D 13740
4D 13743

4D 17[illegible]
4D 17491
C. PINS
[illegible]
[illegible]
D. [redacted]
I 18135 [illegible]
14567 16348
15869 [illegible]
EJK MOTOROLA MX350
NONE
F. CAL .53 MG
1159450 1146342K
1169711 1164[illegible]
G. [redacted] (NVG)
1978C [illegible]
[illegible] 3146C
1983[illegible]
1977C
BT

i-476

3/31/92

not [illegible]

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: CADR~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR | 27031
VC | ~~0~~243

i-#472

E [redacted]

[redacted]

[illegible] SENSITIVE LETTER

G [illegible] LTR. COL [redacted] DELIVERED LETTER 26 [illegible] APR [illegible]
[illegible] COMPLIED WITH INSTRUCTION IN REF. MSG.

Classified By: ~~JCS~~ DDO NMCC . NOZED Retransmitt
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC 12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A INFO: SFOD
[redacted] RANGERS
1-SOB

~~TOP SECRET~~

#506

1. AT 0115 EST THE WHITE HOUSE RELEASED THE FOLLOWING ANNOUNCEMENT:

A. THE PRESIDENT HAS ORDERED THE CANCELLATION OF AN OPERATION IN IRAN WHICH WAS UNDERWAY TO PREPARE FOR A RESCUE OF OUR HOSTAGES. THE MISSION WAS TERMINATED BECAUSE OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE. DURING THE SUBSEQUENT WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL THERE WAS A COLLISION BETWEEN OUR AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND AT A REMOTE DESERT LOCATION IN IRAN.

B. THERE WERE NO MILITARY HOSTILITIES, BUT THE PRESIDENT DEEPLY REGRETS THAT EIGHT AMERICAN CREW MEMBERS OF THE TWO AIRCRAFT WERE KILLED AND OTHERS WERE INJURED IN THE ACCIDENT. AMERICANS INVOLVED IN THE OPERATION HAVE NOW BEEN AIRLIFTED FROM IRAN AND THOSE WHO WERE INJURED ARE BEING GIVEN MEDICAL TREATMENT AND ARE EXPECTED TO RECOVER.

C. THIS MISSION WAS NOT MOTIVATED BY HOSTILITY TOWARD IRAN OR THE IRANIAN PEOPLE AND THERE WERE NO IRANIAN CASUALTIES.

D. PREPARATIONS FOR THIS RESCUE MISSION WERE ORDERED FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS, TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THIS COUNTRY, AND TO ALLEVIATE INTERNATIONAL TENSIONS. THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTS FULL RESOPNSIBILITY FOR THE DECISION TO ATTEMPT THE RESCUE.

E. THE NATION IS DEEPLY GRATEFUL TO THE BRAVE MEN WHO WERE PREPARING TO RESCUE THE HOSTAGES.

F. THE UNITED STATES CONTINUES TO HOLD THE GOVERNMENT OF IRAN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES.

G. THE UNITED STATES REMAINS DETERMINED TO OBTAIN THEIR SAFE RELEASE AT THE EARLIESET POSSIBLE DATE.

H. THE PRESIDENT WILL ADDRESS THE NATION THIS MORNING AT 0700EST. FAMILIES OF THE HOSTAGES HAVE BEEN NOTIFIED AND CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS JUSTICE/SSCWERE ALSO BRIEFED. ATHHIS TIME, WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE OF ANY REPRISALS AGAINST THE HOSTAGES.

2. THERE HAS BEEN NO MAJOR REACTION FROM TEHRAN TO THE NEWS OF THE RESCUE OPERATION. AS OF 0400 EST, TEHRAN RADIO HAD NOT YET CARRIED ANY REPORTS IN ITS LOCAL BROADCASTS. ACCORDING TO AFP, IRANIAN LEADERS HAVE ORDERED AN IMMEDIATE INVESTIGATION INTO THE INCIDENT. ARMY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF SHADMEH SAID HE HAS NO INDICATION OF EXACTLY WHERE THE AIRCRAFT COLLIDED. SHADMEH SAID A STATEMENT WOULD BE ISSUED LATER IN THE DAY.

C 3. THE MILITANTS AT THE COMPOUND SAID THEY WOULD RELEASE A COMMUNIQUE IF THE NEWS WERE CONFIRMED. THIS COMMUNIQUE WOULD SPECIFY WHAT ACTION THE MILITANTS WOULD TAKE. A SPOKESMAN INDICATED, AS OF 0430 EST, THE MILITANTS HAD NOT YET MADE ANY STATEMENT. [redacted]

4. THE FIRST BULLETIN FROM TASS CARRIED THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT IN A FACTUAL MANNER WITHOUT COMMENT. SYRIAN STATE RADIO HAS CALLED THE REPORTED ATTEMPT AN " OVERT ACT OF AGGRESSION." ISRAELI RADIO REPORTS THAT THE RESCUE MISSION [redacted] AUNCHED IN EGYPT AND STOPPED [redacted]

5. TEHRAN RADIO AT 0430 EST REPORTS THE ABORTIVE ATTEMPT TO RESCUE THE HOSTAGES AT THE U.S. EMBASSY WITHOUT COMMENT. PARS NEWS AGENCY IS CARRYING AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT THE WRECKAGE OF AN AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN SPOTTED NEAR TABAS IN EASTERN KHORASAN PROVINCE.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 17 AUG 82
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ NEIL ☒ DOWNGR TO Secret
REVW ON OADR
SERVED FROM Multiple Sources

[redacted]

6. THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAD NO IMMEDIATE COMMENT ON THE WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT OF AN ABORTIVE RESCUE ATTEMPT. OTHER THAN TO ORDER AN IMMEDIATE PROBE INTO THE INCIDENT. DIA EXPECTS A HARDENING OF THE MILITANTS POSITION ON THE HOSTAGE ISSUE.

7. THE LATEST PRESS REPORTS INDICATE THAT THE FIGHTING BETWEEN KURDISH GUERRILLAS AND GOVERNMENT FORCES HAD TAKEN ON THE FORM OF A FULL-SCALE WAR. A GROUP IN TEHRAN KNOWN AS THE KURDISH SOCIETY SAID YESTERDAY THAT 50 PEOPLE WERE KILLED AND MORE THAN 200 INJURED ON THE 23RD WHEN THE ARMY FIRED ON THE KURDISTAN PROVINCIAL CAPITAL OF SANANDAJ FROM HELICOPTERS. IN ADDITION, THE GOVERNMENT FORCES REPORTEDLY LAUNCHED A ROCKET ASSAULT FROM PHANTOM JETS IN WHICH PART OF THE CITY'S ONLY HOSPITAL WAS DESTROYED. IN A STATEMENT YESTERDAY THE ARMY ACKNOWLEDGED FOR THE FIRST TIME THAT IT WAS USING HELICOPTER GUNSHIPS IN THE SANANDAJ FIGHTING.

[redacted]

10. ON 21 APRIL THE PAKISTANI PRESS REPORTED THE FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT APPROVED AIRLINE CALLED SHAHEEN AIRLINES. IT WILL RUN PASSENGER SERVICES ON DOMESTIC ROUTES AND CARGO FLIGHTS TO THE PERSIAN GULF.

[redacted]

THE PRESS RELEASE NOTED THAT THE COMPANY WOULD PURCHASE EIGHT BOEING 747 AIRCRAFT, WHICH INDICATES THE IRANIANS MAY USE THEIR AIR FORCE 747'S FOR THIS PURPOSE. [redacted] THE AIRLINES [redacted] IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN [redacted] AIRCRAFT.

[redacted]

FT

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR

SECRET [redacted]

1/15/ MGY JOHN DE TIGER, RA... HERE WITH ... WITH ONE

OBSIDER.

BACKGROUND WILL SHIFT BACK TO OE BOX VOX FOR OSL

Readdressed to JCS/AE MAW

0 2514307 APR 80
FM NIMITZ HELO DET
TO JTF MAIN
BT
~~SECRET~~//DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST
SUBJ: CASUALTY REPORTS
1. MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL REQUIRES A CASUALTY REPORT IN THE FOLLOWING FORMAT WITHIN 48 HRS OF DEATH. THIS UNIT POSSESSES RECORDS OF EMERGENCY DATA ON ALL HELO VICTIMS. THEREFORE MUST INITIATE REPORT. THE FOLLOWING FOUR MESSAGES HAVE BEEN PREPARED FOR RETRANSMISSION TO REQUIRED ADDEES INDICATED AT YOUR DISCRETION. MESSAGE IS CLASSIFIED TOP SECRET FOR OPERATIONAL PURPOSE ONLY. RECOMMEND RELEASING AS UNCLAS, SECURITY PERMITTING, TO FACILITATE CASUALTY PROCEDURES.
2. PROPOSED CASUALTY REPORTS AS FOLLOWS:
   A. SERGEANT JOHN D. HARVEY USMC
      FROM: JCS
      TO: CMC WASHINTON D.C.
      INFO: SECNAV WASHINGTON D.C.
            NAVY BUMED WASHINGTON D.C.
            MCFC KANSAS CITY MO
            CG SECOND MAW
            MAG TWO SIX
            HMH FOUR SIX ONE
            CMC FOR MSPA-1
      SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE
      REF: (A) MCO P3040.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)
      1. IAW REF A FOL INFO RPT.
      A. SERGEANT JOHN DAVIS HARVEY [redacted] 6012/6332 USMC
      B. HMH 461, MAG 26, 2DMAW [redacted] 1461
      C. KIA
      D. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN. DIED WHEN THE RH-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAKING AFTER REFUELING, COLLIDED WITH A HC-130 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.
      E. CRN
      F. 840125
      G. [redacted]
      H. NO
      I. PAY DATA
         (1) 772307
         (2) 1570.80
         (3) NONCREW MEMBER
         (4) NONE
         (5) LAST LES IN SRC FOR MONTH OF MAR 80
      J. SGLI DATA
         (1) [redacted]
         (2) 7[illegible]
      K. BAPTIST SOUTHERN-MO, [illegible] PLAIN
      L. MAJOR LESLIE [illegible] PLTT [redacted] USMC-KIA
         MAJOR JAMES H. SCHAEFER JR [redacted] USMC-KIA
         STAFF SERGEANT DEWEY L. JOHNSON [redacted] USMC-KIA
         CORPORAL GEORGE M. HOLMES [redacted] USMC-KIA
      M. 780424
      N. REASON RPT DELAYED MORE THAN 48 HOURS. (IF NECESSARY)
   B. STAFF SERGEANT DEWEY L. JOHNSON USMC
      FROM: JCS
      TO: CMC WASHINGTON D.C.
      INFO: SECNAV WASHINGTON D.C.

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

MCFC KANSAS CITY MO
CG SECOND MAW
MAG TWO SIX
HMH FOUR SIX ONE
CMC FOR MSPA-1

SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE
REF: (A) MCO P3040.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)
1. IAW REF A FOL INFO RPT:
A. STAFF SERGEANT DERLY LEE JOHNSON [redacted] USMC
B. HMH 461 MAG 26 2DMAW NUC# 01401
C. KIA
D. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN. DIED WHEN THE RH-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXING AFTER REFUELING, COLLIDED WITH A HC-130 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.
E. DNB
F. 800112
G. [redacted]
H. NONE
I. PAY DATA
(1) 060412
(2) 888.30
(3) 05.00 CREW MEMBER
(4) NONE
(5) LAST LES IN SRB FOR PERIOD OF TAD
J. SGLI DATA
(1) $20,000.00
(2) 702903
K. PATIENT-NO ATTENDING CHAPLAIN
L. MAJOR LESLIE A. PLTTY [redacted]
[illegible]
SERGEANT JOHN DAVIS HARVE [redacted] USMC-XXX-XXXX
CORPORAL GEORGE N. HOLMES [redacted] USMC-XXX-XXXX
M. 020424
N. REASON RPT DELAYED MORE THAN 48 HOURS. (IF NECESSARY)
O. CORPORAL GEORGE N. HOLMES JR. USMC
P. JOHN [illegible]
COMCBLANT WASHINGTON D.C.
INFO: SECNAV WASHINGTON D.C.
NAVY BUMED WASHINGTON D.C.
MCFC KANSAS CITY MO
CG SECOND MAW
MAG TWO SIX
HMH FOUR SIX ONE
CMC FOR MSPA-1

SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE
REF: (A) MCO P3040.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)
1. IAW REF A FOL INFO RPT:
A. CORPORAL GEORGE NIEMEYER JONES JR [redacted] USMC
B. HMH 461 MAG 26 2DMAW NUC# 01401
C. KIA
D. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN. DIED WHEN THE RH-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXING AFTER REFUELING, COLLIDED WITH A HC-130 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.
E. DNB
F. 800112
G. [redacted]
H. NONE
I. PAY DATA
(1) 781224
(2) 523.20
(3) 78.00 CREW MEMBER
(4) NONE
(5) LAST LES IN SRB FOR MONTH OF OCT 79
J. SGLI DATA

[illegible] WASHINGTON D.C.
HQFC KANSAS CITY MO
CG SECOND MAW
MAG TWO SIX
HMH FOUR SIX ONE
CMC FOR MSPA-1
SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE
REF: (A) MCO P5040.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)
1. PER REF A FOL INFO RPT:
A. STAFF SERGEANT DEWEY LEE JOHNSON [redacted] USMC
B. HMH 461 MAG 26 2DMAW NUC [illegible]
C. KIA
D. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN. DIED WHEN THE RH-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXING AFTER REFUELING, COLLIDED WITH A RH-130 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.
E. CRN
F. 800112
G. [redacted]
H. NONE
I. PAY DATA
(1) 060412
(2) 688.30
(3) 95.00 CREW MEMBER
(4) NONE
(5) LAST LES IN SRB FOR PERIOD OF [illegible]
J. SGLI DATA
(1) $20,000.00
(2) 760803
K. [illegible]-NO ATTENDING CHAPLAIN
L. MAJOR LESLIE A. PLITT [redacted] USMC-RETIRED
[illegible] CHARLES H. SOLLEDER JR. [redacted] USMC-RETIRED
SERGEANT JOHN DAVIS HARVEY [redacted] USMC-RETIRED
CORPORAL GEORGE N. HOLMES [redacted] USMC-RETIRED
M. 020424
N. REASON RPT DELAYED MORE THAN 48 HOURS. (IF [illegible])
O. CORPORAL GEORGE N. HOLMES JR. USMC
BT
[illegible] WASHINGTON D.C.
INFO: SECNAV WASHINGTON D.C.
NAVY BUMED WASHINGTON D.C.
HQFC KANSAS CITY MO
CG SECOND MAW
MAG TWO SIX
HMH FOUR SIX ONE
CMC FOR MSPA-1
SUBJ: REPORT OF DEATH HOSTILE
REF: (A) MCO P5040.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)
1. PER REF A FOL INFO RPT:
A. CORPORAL GEORGE NIEMEYER JONES JR [redacted] USMC
B. HMH 461 MAG 26 2DMAW NUC [illegible]
C. KIA
D. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN. DIED WHEN THE RH-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXING AFTER REFUELING, COLLIDED WITH A RH-130 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.
E. CRN
F. 800112
G. [redacted]
H. NONE
I. PAY DATA
(1) 730504
(2) 523.00
(3) 75.00 CREW MEMBER
(4) NONE
(5) LAST LES IN SRB FOR MONTH OF OCT 79
J. SGLI DATA

(2) 770815

K. LUTHERAN-NO ATTENDING CHAPLAIN

MAJOR LESLIE B. PETTY [redacted] USMC-KIA

MAJOR JAMES H. SCHAEFER JR [redacted] USMC-KIA

STAFF SERGEANT DEWEY L. JOHNSON [redacted] USMC-KIA

SERGEANT JOHN DAVIS HARVE [redacted] USMC-KIA

M. 800424

N. REASON RPT DELAYED MORE THAN 48 HOURS. (IF NECESSARY)

O. MAJORS LESLIE B. PETTY USMC AND JAMES H. SCHAEFER USMC

FROM: JCS

TO: CMC WASHINGTON D.C.

FOR MSPA-1

SUBJ: HOSTILE CASUALTY

REF: (A) MCO P3040.4A (MARINE CORPS CASUALTY PROCEDURES MANUAL)

(1)A. MAJOR LESLIE B. PETTY [redacted] 7564/9962 USMC

B. HMH 461 MAG 26 2DMAW RUC: 01461

C. 800424

D. IRAN

E. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN. INJURED WHEN THE RH-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXING AFTER REFUELING, COLLIDED WITH A MC-130 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.

F. CONDITION AND PROGNOSIS: SECOND DEGREE BURNS/UNK

G. PRESENT LOCATION: (TO BE INCLUDED)

H. YES

I. [redacted]

(2)A. MAJOR JAMES HENRY SCHAEFER JR [redacted] 7564/7577/2433 USMC

B. MAWTS-1 3DMAW RUC: 01243

C. 800424

D. IRAN

E. 25 APRIL 1980 AT 0200 IN IRAN. INJURED WHEN THE RH-53, WHICH HE WAS A CREW MEMBER, WAS TAXING AFTER REFUELING, COLLIDED WITH A MC-130 ACFT AND WAS ENGULFED IN FLAMES.

F. CONDITION AND PROGNOSIS: SECOND DEGREE BURNS/UNK

G. PRESENT LOCATION: (TO BE INCLUDED)

H. YES

I. [redacted]

REVW: 25APR80

BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

MMH

KK

NO EOM.

[redacted]

DR/2311 4/12
BMD/MCJ
MCN 01211

MSG 084
230900Z APR 80
FM: JCS/RC-J-2
TO: SITE ALPHA
INFO: SFOD
1ST SOW
[redacted] RANGERS

A

C-591

SUBJ: SITUATION REPORT AS OF 0500Z 23 APR 80

1. TEHRAN RADIO REPORTED YESTERDAY THAT CAMPUS UNREST AROUND THE COUNTRY HAD CALMED, AS VARIOUS POLITICAL GROUPS CLOSED THEIR OFFICES. IN TEHRAN, SUPPORTERS OF THE LEFT-WING FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT REPORTEDLY EVACUATED TEHRAN UNIVERSITY AFTER A DAY OF FIERCE CLASHES WITH ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISTS WHICH LEFT THREE DEAD AND AT LEAST 350 WOUNDED.

C

3. IRANIAN FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTEZADEH APPARENTLY STILL HAS PLANS TO VISIT VARIOUS ARAB STATES TO PLEAD HIS CASE FOR ISLAMIC UNITY AGAINST VARIOUS THREATS, INCLUDING THE CAMP DAVID AGREEEMENTS AND IGNORANCE CONCERNING THE GOALS OF HIS COUNTRY'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. ACCORDING TO THE MOST RECENT INFORMATION HE PLANS TO VISIT AT LEAST SYRIA, LEBANON, KUWAIT, BAHRAIN AND THE UAE, PROBABLY DEPARTING SOMETIME THIS WEEK.

4. ACCORDING TO PRESS REPORTS, HEAVY FIGHTING CONTINUED IN SANANDAJ YESTERDAY. KURDISH GUERRILLAS REPORTEDLY BESIEGED THE IRANIAN ARMY OFFICER'S CLUB AND THE LOCAL RADIO AND TELEVISION STATION. THE ARMY SAID KURDISH REBELS SURROUNDED THE OFFICER'S CLUB AND HAD CUT OFF WATER, ELECTRICITY AND TELEPHONE LINKS. NEITHER SIDE GAVE FIGURES FOR YESTERDAY'S CASUALTIES, BUT THE ARMY ADMITTED LOSING 20 DEAD AND 36 WOUNDED ON THE 21ST WHEN KURDISH GUERRILLAS ATTACKED AN ARMY COLUMN SKIRTING SANANDAJ ON ITS WAY NORTH TO RELIEVE GOVERNMENT FORCES IN SAQQEZ. MEANWHILE, KURDISH SOURCES IN SAQQEZ REPORTED YESTERDAY THAT FIERCE FIGHTING WAS STILL RAGING THERE. THEY CLAINED THAT THE ARMY WAS SHELLING HOUSES FROM A HILLTOP GARRISON AND HAD EMPLOYED PHANTOM FIGHTER PLANES SPORADICALLY TO FIRE ROCKETS AT GURRILLA POSTIONS.

[redacted]

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: a

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED BY NSC
12 Aug 92
DOD NMCC
OSD
Mustin to Stowe

[redacted]

G. SATELLITE OVERVIEW: AS OF 2100Z TUESDAY (22 APR) THERE WERE ONE HIGH-RESOLUTION PHOTO SATELLITE, ONE MANNED SPACE STATION WITH A POSSIBLE VISUAL/PHOTO RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY, ONE EORSAT, TWO SECOND-GENRATION ELINT AND SIX THIRD-GENRATION ELINT SATELLITES IN ORBIT.

H. SOVIET PRESS (U): NO CHANGE FROM PREVIOUS REPORTING WITH INCREASED ANTI-US POLEMICS IN THE SOVIET PRESS AND NEW COMMENTARIES AS MOSCOW PUBLICLY WARNS TEHRAN AND THE ARAB WORLD OF POSSIBLE U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION.

BT

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TOT
RC

#509

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[redacted]

SUBJ: DEPLOYMENT
1. BE ADVISED THAT THE FOLLOWING [illegible]
HAVE BEEN INITIATED:

UNIT	[illegible]	AFB	TIME
DELTA	(1) [illegible]	LANGLEY	[illegible]
	(2) [illegible]	LANGLEY	[illegible]
RANGERS	(1) [illegible]	[redacted]	[illegible]
	(2) [illegible]		[illegible]

2. COMUTE DEPARTED THIS LOCATION ON SECOND DELTA A/C.
3. PLEASE NOTIFY XO [redacted] RANGER ARRIVAL TIME.
BT
[illegible]

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: 04DA~~

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW [illegible]
CONDUCTED ON [illegible] 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY [illegible] NMCC
☐ DECL [illegible] CONFID
REVW ON [illegible]
DERIVED FROM [illegible] S

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RGRGRG MATE AND HERE WITH MSG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT/1450Z
RC

#510

CSN 2245
UNI TTTTT
O 281300Z APR 92
FM JTF/J-3
TO JTF/RC
BT
[redacted]
SUBJ: MC/EC/AC-130 REDEPLOYMENT
1. ~~(TS)~~ UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED, PLAN TO REDEPLOY AS FOLLOWS:
A. AC-130 (4) RETURN FROM [redacted] TO [redacted] IN TWO CELLS OF TWO AIRCRAFT EACH (24 HOUR SEPARATION BETWEEN CELLS). WILL BEGIN MOVEMENT 26/0000Z AND CLOSE 26/2330Z. RON 15 HOUR GROUND TIME AT [redacted]
B. PACAF MC-130 (3). RETURN FROM [redacted] IN A SINGLE CELL. WILL BEGIN MOVEMENT 27/0600Z AND CLOSE 28/0200Z. PLAN 15 HOUR GROUND TIME AT [redacted] WILL REQUIRE THAILAND OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE. PLAN TO CONDUCT FINAL OCEAN SURVEILLANCE SORTIE FROM [redacted] 26 APR.
C. CONUS MC-130 (4) ABCCC (2). RETURN FROM [redacted] TO HURLBURT IN THREE CELLS OF TWO AIRCRAFT EACH. WILL BEGIN MOVEMENT 27/0600Z AND CLOSE 28/1940. PLAN 15 HOUR GROUND TIME AT [redacted] ONE MC-130 WILL PROCEED ON TO ONTARIO CA (DEPOT) AND THE ABCCCS TO KEESLER. DEPARTURES MAY HAVE TO SLIP PENDING REPAIR OF AIRCRAFT AT [redacted] AND RETURN TO [redacted]
2. ~~(TS)~~ REQUEST YOU ASSIST IN OBTAINING THAILAND OVERFLIGHT CLEARANCE. DETAILS WILL BE PROVIDED BY JTF [redacted]
3.(TS) FOR [redacted] REQUEST YOU SUBMIT NLT 25 REQUIRED ENTRIES FOR THAT OVERFLIGHT TO JTF/RC. PLAN IS TO DEPART [redacted] 26 APR/1200Z
BT

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12 AUG 92

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 13107
KCL MCN
0209

MSMC020
CO 251135Z APR 5[illegible]
FM [redacted]
TO JTF/J-[illegible]
BT
~~TOP SECRET~~
MISREP NUMBER 5
1. EC-130/02141[illegible]/REPUBLIC 6/241[illegible]/2[illegible]
2A. NTP
2C. GOOD-HAZE LAYER STARTED APPROX 2[illegible] DEGREES [illegible] AND CONTINUED TO LZ
3. LZ 33[illegible]
3A. SCHEDULED 193[illegible]
LANDED 193[illegible]
3B. SUCCESSFUL INFIL X [illegible] LBS [illegible]
3C. N/A
3E. LANDED LAST, TAXIES TO POSITION, RECEIVES
ONE HELO, REPUBLIC 4 HAS 2 HELOS,
MUCH CONCERN IF EXERCISE WAS GOING TO
CONTINUE.
HELO ROTOR BLADE WAS SPINNING
ON FRONT OF FUSELAGE. HELO PILOT JUMPED
OUT OF WINDOW AND WALKED OVER AND STOOD
IN FRONT OF NUMBER 1 PROP. CREW CHIEF FROM ONE
OF THE MARINE HELOS LED PILOT TO THIS ACFT.
SECURED THE AREA PICKED UP ALL POSSIBLE PERSONNEL
WITHIN THE AREA AND TAXIED.
DRAGON 3 TOOK OFF FOLLOWED
BY REPUBLIC 5. REPUBLIC16 FOLLOWED
REPUBLIC 5 FOR
TAKEOFFNND
3F. GOOD/CLEAR BUT ATLOT OF DUST
AND SMOKE VERY 4 MILES
5A. SOME [redacted] INTERFERENCE (1) POSSIBLE [redacted] FROM ANOTHER
ACFT AND (2) SINGLE STRINGS OF SLOTS THAT COULD HAVE BEEN
GROUND RADOR.
5B. FLEW MODIFIED MSA IN AREA OF THREATS
5C. SAME AS INGRESS
5. LZ CONDITION WAS NOT AS BRIEFED
POL PEOPLE COULD NOT SEE HELOS AND VICE VERSA.
BT
DD
(.

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....XLYUQQ

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Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 251115
MCN 0204

MESSAGE 12 RECEIVED.

[redacted]

MISSION NUMBER 24
[illegible]
[illegible] NTA
[illegible] NTA
[illegible] LOW [illegible] MILES
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] NONE OBSERVED
[illegible] ALL AGFT EQUIP WERE POSITIONED PROPERLY
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
DUE TO LENGTH OF TIME [illegible]
[illegible] WERE [illegible]
DEPARTURE DUE TO LOW GAS. WHEN THEY ATTEMPTED
TO MOVE THE CHOPPER [illegible] TAIL
ROTOR STARTED TO [illegible] ALT [illegible]
[illegible] INTO [illegible] AREA.
AFTER [illegible]
PERMISSION TO [illegible]
TAXIED CROSS [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] N/A
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] QUANTITY [illegible] DUE TO [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] POSSIBLE [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] OPERATIONS. [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

i #517

Classified By: ~~JCS~~ DDO NM
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO N
12 AUG

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[illegible]

FM [illegible] JTF
TO [illegible]
[illegible]

[redacted]

(U) 1. [redacted] FOLLOWING PERSONNEL ARE UNACCOUNTED FOR AND PRESUMED TO HAVE PERISHED IN THE [illegible]/HELICOPTER COLLISION:

(A) LE [illegible], HAROLD L. JR. CAPT USAF [illegible]
A [illegible] CREW MEMBER
(B) MCINTOSH, [illegible] CAPT USAF [illegible]
A [illegible] CREW MEMBER
(C) HAYO, JOEL C. TSGT USAF [illegible]
A [illegible] CREW MEMBER
[illegible] HAYES, RICHARD L. [illegible] USAF [illegible]
A [illegible] CREW MEMBER
[illegible] MCMILLAN, CHARLES [illegible] CAPT USAF [illegible]
A [illegible] CREW MEMBER
[illegible] JOHNSON, [illegible] L. [illegible] USMC [illegible]

TOT/1Ø292
RC

i-#520

C74
RH53 CREW MEMBER
(G) HARVEY, JOHN D. [illegible] USMC [illegible]
RH53 CREWMEMBER
(H) [illegible], GEORGE [illegible] JR CPL USMC
[illegible] RH53 CREW MEMBER
(U) 2. [redacted] PERSONNEL INJURED AS A RESULT OF REF COLLISION AND CURRENTLY BEING PLACED ABOARD C- [illegible]
A,G (A) [illegible], LESLIE [illegible] MAJ USMC
[redacted] RH53 CREW MEMBER. STATUS - 22-30 PERCENT SECOND AND THIRD DEGREE BURNS OF EXTREMITIES AND TRUNK AND IS CURRENTLY STABLE
A,G (B) SHAEFFER, JAMES H. MAJ USMC
[redacted] RH53 CREW MEMBER. STATUS - 5 PERCENT SECOND DEGREE BURNS OF FACE AND IS CURRENTLY STABLE.
(C) HARRISON, JEFFREY [illegible] LT, [illegible]
A,G [redacted] EC 130 CREW MEMBER
STATUS - 5 PERCENT SECOND DEGREE BURNS OF FACE AND IS STABLE
(D) BEYERS, JOSEPH J. [illegible] USAF [redacted]
[illegible] CREW MEMBER.
STATUS - [illegible] PERCENT SECOND AND THIRD DEGREE BURNS OF FACE, EXTREMITIES AND TRUNK AND IS STABLE.
(E) [illegible], WILLIAM [illegible] AIRMAN FIRST CLASS, [redacted]
A,G [illegible] SPECIALIST. STATUS [illegible]
[illegible] THREE OTHER PERSONNEL WERE TREATED FOR MINOR BURNS AND ONE TREATED FOR BROKEN FINGER. ALL WERE RELEASED.

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON
DERIVATIVE CL BY
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGR TO
REVW ON
DERIVED FROM

Declassified by:
DDO USMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SC/09108
#0198

MSN 3022
(C) CO 25034Z APR 32
FM [redacted]NES PRINT
E,G TO CRJTF [redacted]
BT
[redacted]
SUBJ: FORCE STATT
(C) 1. GEALIZE THAT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS WILL
GOVERN HOW LONG WE REMAIN AT [redacted]
E OUT FORCE STATUS FOLLOWS
FOR PLANNING.
2. THERE ARE ATOTAL OF 168 PERSONNEL HERE
3. VIRCRAFT STATUS FOR 6 C-130S:
A. THREE IN COMMISSION
B. THREE OUT OF COMMISSION
4. MC-565 HAD 4 AND ONE HALF GS LANDING
AT REFUELING SITE WITH 150,000 POUNDS
ABOARD. THIS IS AIRCRAFT OVERDUE PDM.
WILL PROBABLY REQUIRE INSPECTION TEAM TO
INSPECT WINGS AND MEN AND MATERIALS.
5. EC-130 AND 1857 NEEDS SEAL ASSEMBLY FOR
ACCESSARY HOUSING, WILL FORWARD PARTS
LIST LATER
6. EC-130 NO. 1818. ON TAKE OFF BECAUSE OF HEAVY
LOAD AND RISING TERRIAN PILOT OVEG TORQUED ALL FOUR
ENGINES FOR ONE AND ONE HALF MINUTES.
WE ARE INSPECTING ENGINES. MAY BE ABLE
TO CLEAR FOR ONE TIME FLIGHT. WILL ADVISE.
7. PACAF MC-130S CAN TRANSPORT PERSONNEL AND
EQUIPMENT EASTWARD. 8. CONUS BOUND C-130S REQUIRE SUBSTANTIAL
SUPPORT BECAUSE EC-130S HAVE FUEL BLADDERS
INSIDE WHICH PRECLUDES OTHER LOADS.
ALSO MC-130 565, WHICH WAS
OVER GS SHOULD NOT CARRY LOAD EVEN IF
INSPECTION PERMITS FLIGHT. WE ESTIMATE
TRANSPORTATION REQUIREMENT FOR PALLETS
TO BE 17-19 POSITIONS (INCLUDE ROLLING STOCK).
ALSO HAVE REQUIREMENT TO MOVE
APPROX 90 PEOPLE. ALL OF THIS PARA IS FOR
CONUS.
BT
3022

i #521

J4
MAC

Classified By: DDO NMCC ~~JCS~~
Declassified ON: 6APR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 1110
RCL #0205

G

(U)

#522

NNNN

Declassified by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

ZYU.
FS 18/21713
[illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR | 1035Z
KCL | #0204

NO ECM.

MSN 0025
CO 251000Z APR 80
FM [redacted]
DO SI/J-2
BT
[redacted]
SUBJ: MISREP NUMBER 02
1. MC-130/565/DRAGON-1/241400Z/24[illegible]
2A. EWO NO INDICATIONS
2B.
2C. HAZE VSBY: 3 MILES
3. LZ 0304N05554E
3A. 241[illegible]
3B. SUCCESSFUL INFIL [illegible] PAX
3C. N/A
3D. EWO NONE
3E. TRUCK NOTED ON ROAD HEADING WEST
DURING FLIP PASS. TWO OTHER
VEHICLES NOTED ON ROAD. LARGE EXPLOSION,
FIREBALL NOTED AT 241[illegible] WEST OF LZ, 2-4 MILES.
LANDED NEXT TO A BUL. ORIGINALLY
WERE GOING TO EXFIL 44[illegible] PRISONERS. DID NOT [illegible]
TO LOST PAX WEAPON.
3F. HAZE VSBY: 3 MILES
4A. N/A
5A. POS F-4 WHILE AT 25[illegible]
SITING WAS WEAK AT 3 [illegible]
UNKNOWN. ACFT HEADING 1[illegible], ALT [illegible]
5B.
5C. HAZE VSBY: 3-4 MILES
6. GENERAL REMARKS: [illegible]
HOURS OF BOTH INSPECS AND [illegible]
UPON LANDING.
BT
0025

NNNN

i-#524

Classified By: ~~JCS~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NM[illegible]
12 AUG 9[illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NO COM.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR | 1035Z
RCL | # 0203

E

i-525

(C) MGN 0025
CO 2012257 APR 82
FM [redacted]
TO JTF/J-2
BT
~~[illegible]~~
MISREP NUMBER 023
1. 1XMC-13[illegible]/[illegible]/[illegible]-03/1[illegible]/[illegible]/
A (C) 2A. [redacted] AT [illegible] AND AT
2010[illegible]. ACFT HEADING [illegible] AND 340 RESPECTIVELY
1[illegible] AND 1[illegible]. MULTIPLE [redacted] VIC [illegible]
VOR AT DARLANE MOVED TO AFLD AT [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]. [illegible] FIRST HALF, [illegible] HALF OF INGRESS RTE.
3. LZ 3[illegible]
3A. 1[illegible]-3 MINS LATE
3B. SUCCESSFUL INFIL 32 [illegible] GAL FUEL.
3C. N/A
3D. NONE
3E. SECONDARY EXPLOSION OFF TO LEFT UPON APPROACH
EXPLOSION WERE APPX 1-2 MILES AWAY FM LZ. APPEARED
TO BE POL TRK.
3F. GOOD:SHI BROKEN CLOUDS-3700 SCAT TO
BROKEN-(NO FACTOR)
4. N/A
5.
5A. NONE
5B. PLANNED EGRESS NOT FOLLOWED TO EXPEDITE
DEPT. EXPILZ1 PSNL DUE TO MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES. [illegible] SINGLE SHIP VICE
FORMATION. DICTATED BY [illegible].
IMPROVED FM INGRESS AS [illegible].
6. TF DEGRADED OVER [illegible] DUE TO [illegible].
BT
0025

Classified By: ~~JRS~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NM
12 AUG 92

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT/0910Z
RC

CO
JSN 0230
ZNY ~~XXXXX~~
DTG 250[illegible]Z APR 8[illegible]
FM JTF
TO JCS/RC
BT
[redacted]
SUBJ: POST MISSION DEBRIEF/ISOLATION AREAS
REF: JTF/RC 250[illegible]Z APR 86
B. JTF/U3 250317Z APR 86
1. RANGERS SHOULD REDEPLOY TO [redacted] NO ISOLATION REQUIRED. REFS A AND B REFER.
BT
#0230

A

i-527

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~ File

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 1[illegible]
CONDUCTED ON: 12 AUG 92
DERIVATION REV: DDC NMCC
☐ DECL 12 DOWNGR TO: CONFIDENTIAL
REVW ON: OADR
DERIVED FROM: JCS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

TO 7 | 0932Z
KCL

USNC227
[illegible]
O 2326[illegible]
FM JTF
TO JTF/[illegible]
USSNIMITZ
BT
[redacted]
SUBJ: RETURN OF HELO MISSION MEMBERS
TO CONUS
1. REQUEST THAT ALL HELO MISSION
MEMBERS INCLUDING SUPPORT PERS
BE RETURNED TO CONUS FOR
TRANSFER [redacted] OR DEBRIEF. FOR JTF/RC
REQUEST THAT YOU TASK CINCPAC FOR PRIORITY AIRFLIF.
REQUEST USS NIMITZ ASSIST TO PICKUP POINT.
BT

C

i-529

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 93
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL DES CONTROL TO Secret
REPLY TO OADR
[illegible]

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

File

~~SECRET~~

[illegible]
[illegible]
C 231020Z
FM UTF
TO [illegible]/AC
[redacted]

TOT 23162
VC

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ARE PROVIDED FOR YOUR INFORMATION FROM COMMANDING OFFICER UTF HELO DET [illegible] UTF

Redrafted

SUBJ: STATEMENT OF DEATH FOR
STAFF SERGEANT DEWEY D. JOHNSON [redacted] USMC
SERGEANT JOHN D. HARVEY [redacted] USMC
CORPORAL GEORGE N. HOLMES [redacted] USMC

1. SUBJECT INDIVIDUALS WERE CREW MEMBERS ABOARD [illegible] HELICOPTER WHICH CRASHED EARLY AM 25 APRIL 80 INTO A C-130.
2. I WAS ANY EYE WITNESS TO THE ACCIDENT FROM A DISTANCE OF APPROXIMATELY 100 YARDS. THE H-53 WAS SITTING ADJACENT TO THE C-130 THE CABIN AREA OF THE H-53 BURST INTO FLAMES ON IMPACT AND SUBSEQUENTLY EXPLODED.
3. THE CONFIGURATION OF THE H-53 CABIN, WITH TWO FULL INTERNAL FUEL CELLS (APPROX 550-600 GALS OF JP-4) AND MISCELLANEOUS GEAR WOULD HAVE BEEN TOTALLY PROHIBITIVE FOR REASONABLE EGRESS.
4. SUBJECT MARINES ARE DECLARED DEAD. SIGNED [redacted] USMC

STATEMENT OF DEATH CONCERNING SSGT D. JOHNSON, SGT HARVEY, CPL HOLMES

I WAS SITTING IN MY RH53 ABOUT 100' FROM THE C-130 A/C RH-53 NUMBER 3 WAS THE SECOND PLANE TO MY LEFT. RH53 NUMBER 3 [illegible] (300 GAL) FULL INTERNAL FUEL CELLS, 2 [illegible] GAL) DROP TANKS AND 2 FULL (300 GAL SPONSON TANKS. ABOUT 1000Z RH53 (3) PICKED UP AND FLEW AT AN ESTIMATED ALTITUDE OF ABOUT 25'-50' AGL TOWARD THE LEFT SIDE OF THE C-130 TO OUR FRONT. THE DUST BECAME VERY BAD BUT I COULD STILL MAKE OUT THE C-130 AND RH53-(3) AS THE RH53-(3) WAS OVER THE C-130 THERE WAS THE LOUDEST EXPLOSION I HAVE EVER HEARD ABOUT 30 SEC LATER THE C-130 STARTED EXPLODING. IN MY OPINION NOBODY IN THE BELLY OF THE RH53 COULD HAVE SURVIVED THE BLAST. SIGNED [redacted] USMC

SUPPORTING STATEMENT OF DEATH.
CASE OF: (1) SSGT D. JOHNSON, SGT HARVEY AND CPL HOLMES.

I WAS THE CRASH OF THE H-53 HELO THAT HIT THE C-130 AIRCRAFT. I WAS ABOUT 75 FT. BEHIND THE C-130 WHEN THE ACCIDENT OCCURED. IMMEDIATELY UPON IMPACT BOTH AIRCRAFT BURST INTO FLAMES, THE H-53 CABIN AREA WAS ENGULFED COMPLETELY. IN MY OPINION, IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANYONE TO SURVIVE THAT CRASH IF THEY WERE IN THE CABIN AREA. THERE WERE 2 INTERNAL FUEL CELLS FULL OF FUEL. THE RAMP [illegible] AND THE PERSONNEL DOOR WAS ALSO CLOSED. MOBILITY [illegible] IN THE CABIN AREA WAS RESTRICTED BECAUSE OF THE FUEL TANKS, [illegible] BOWN STRAPS, AND MISCELLANEOUS GEAR. I SAW NO ONE EXIT THE CABIN. SIGNED [redacted]

i-508

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

STATUS:

[redacted]

MSG SEG ORIG

01 02 R
30 SEGMENTS AVAILABLE.

TOR | 0900Z
KCL | 0197

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

E

MSN 0021
OO 250410Z APR 80
FM [redacted]
TO JTF/-2
BT
[redacted] ~~S E C R E T~~
MISREP NUMBEG 01
1. A/C TYPE/TAIL NO./CALL SIGN/TAKE OFF/LANDING
MC-130/564/DRAGON-2/15172/2335Z
2A. EWO NO INDICATIONS
2B. NTR
2C. GOOD
3. LZ 33304N25557E
3A. 191 WITH ONE GO ARU
3B. SUCCESSFUL INFIL X51 PAX
3C. N/A
3D. EWO NO INDICATIONS
3E.
3F. GOOD VIZ APPX 7NM
ALL QUADRANTS
4. N/A
5A. EWO NO INDICATIONS
5B. CREW SAW KC-135 BEACON BUT COULD NOT
ESTABLISH EITHER COMM OR JOIN-UP
5C. GOOD VIZ APPX 7NM ALL QUADRANTS
6A. EEI SIGHTED POSS. POL TGUCK ON FIRE ON HIGHWAY/
330425N0555120E. WITH SECONDARY EXPLOSION.
BT
0021

i #530

Noted

NNNN

MESSAGE 03 RECEIVED.

Classified By: ~~JCS~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

NO EOM.

[redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

TOR 0847
RCL 0196

[illegible] BE BACK SOME TIME TOMORROW AND HERE IT IS

R 250543Z APR 84
FM [illegible] SLT /[illegible]/J-2 AND J-3
TO SITE ALFA J-2

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DO NOT TRANSMIT VIA SPIRITAL BROADCAST
SUBJ: ASSESSMENT OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL COMPROMISE
REF: A/ TELECON OF 250542Z APR 84 SAME SUBJ

(U) 1. [illegible] FOLLOWING IS HARD COPY BACK-UP REQUESTED DURING REF FONECON.
a. EACH A/C UNDR WAS ISSUED BLUE BINDER CONTAINING EMERGENCY LZ'S IN TEHRAN. THIS BOOK IS FAMILIAR TO MAJ. [redacted] BUT I WILL RECAPT CONTENTS --- EACH LZ WITH PHOTO (OVERLAYS/CODEWORDS REMOVED) AND COORDINATES; CITY MAP WITH EACH LZ MARKED; PHOTO STRIP MAPS OF HELO RIDE, TEHRAN EAST APPROACH, TEHRAN-MANTARIYEH, TEHRAN-KARAJ. ALL PHOTO STRIPS WERE MARKED QUOTE SECRET UNQUOTE BUT MOST PILOTS HAD SANITIZED BY CUTTING OFF CLASSIFICATION. BELIEVE SHOULD ASSUME ALL OF THESE BLUE BINDERS ARE COMPROMISED UNTIL THEY ARE RETURNED OR OTHERWISE ACCOUNTED FOR.
b. S-3 PREPARED KNEEBOARD CARDS FOR ALL PILOTS WHICH LISTED EMERGENCY COMBAT AIR PATROL CHECKPOINTS. ONE OF THESE WAS QUOTE [redacted] UNQUOTE WITH GEO REF COORDINATES. WHILE IT IS UNLIKELY THAT [illegible] KNEEBOARD CARDS WERE LOST, PRUDENCE DICTATES CHECK AT [redacted] THERE WERE NO, REPEAT, NO PHOTOS OF [redacted] GIVEN TO [illegible]
c. ALL PILOTS WERE ISSUED PHOTO PRODUCTS QUOTE DESERT TRACK 1 AND DESERT TRACK 2 UNQUOTE. THESE ARE IN SAME CATEGORY AS SUBPARA [illegible] ABOVE.
d. ALL PILOTS RECD CLOT EXTRACT OF TARGETS DETAIL TAILORED TO INDIVIDUAL PILOT NEED. THE CLOT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED COMPROMISED.
e. DELTA MATERIAL ISSUED AND NOT ACCOUNTED FOR AT THIS TIME INCLUDES ONE (1) COPY OF USNAF 6012, ONE (1) COPY OF USNAT 2870 EDITION ALPHA (EFF NO 18 DAY 24 APRIL -- ONLY, ONE (1) KY-65 (PARKHILL) AND ONE (1) KY-[illegible] METER.
REVW:25APR00
ST

#531 JJ JG

NNNN

MESSAGE 04 RECEIVED.

AND BE TIGER RAG [illegible] OSL FM FM M FML
K K K K K

NO COM.

Classified By: ~~JCS~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified On: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP

2504252
0187

MSC 14[illegible]
[illegible]24152 APR [illegible]
FM, JCS/[illegible] (LT[illegible] [redacted]
TO JTF: ([redacted]
BT

G

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

1. AIRCRAFT COVERED IN REFERENCE WERE SCHEDULED TO MOVE FORWARD TO DOVER AFB IN ANTICIPATION OF FUTHER FORWARD DEPLOYMENT.

2. BASED ON INFORMATION THAT ALL PERSONNEL ARE ACCOUNTED FOR, ALL PREPARATIONS FOR SAR PLANNING ARE CANCELLED.
LT

Noted

NNNN

i #532

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

i-539

[illegible]

[redacted]

[illegible] SITUATION REPORT

E [illegible] C-141 LOAD OF [illegible] AND THREE [illegible] ARE AWAITING PICKUP [redacted] ETA THIS STATION IS [illegible].

[illegible] EXCEPTION OF [illegible] AND [illegible] PERSONNEL ALL OF [illegible] SOW HAS [illegible].

E [illegible] ELEMENT AT [redacted] WILL DEPART FOR RAMSTEIN ON MAC CHANN- [illegible] AND CONTINUE TO MAC

[illegible] ELEMENT, [illegible] PERSONNEL AND NINE [illegible] REAR [illegible] DEPARTING THIS [illegible] 2516452 FOR RAM- [illegible] REQUEST TRANS- [illegible] ELEMENT [illegible] BE COORDINATED/PROVIDED. [illegible] AWAITING TRANSPORTATION THIS LOCATION:
[illegible] MAINTENANCE PARTS AND EQUIP [illegible].
[illegible] JOSE (GRALLETS)
[illegible] MAINT EQUIP [illegible].
[illegible] AMMO
[illegible] PERSONNEL AND EQUIP.

(U) [illegible] KC-135S REMAIN. [illegible] ARE SCHEDULED TO DEPART TOMMORROW AND [illegible] ON WEDNESDAY.

E [illegible] AMMO, CS AND PREPARED CHARGES HAVE BEEN TURNED OVER TO [illegible] COMMANDER AND USAFE EOD TEAM. CHARGES WILL BE DESTROYED AT THIS [illegible]. COORDINATED [redacted].

(U) [illegible] MIDMORNING 29 [illegible] THIS [illegible] 29 [illegible] TOMMORROW AFTER- [illegible] ALL REMAINING LOADS WILL BE MARSHALLED PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.

#539

Classified By: ~~JCS~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified By: CADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC 12 AUG 92

[illegible]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT 280636Z
BJW QSL 0637Z

R

RSN 0257
O 280636Z APR 80
FM: SITE ALPHA/JTF
TO: JIF/RC
BT
[redacted]
SUBJ: STATUS OF INJERTED ASSETS
HAVE ASSETS BEEN ABLE TO EXFILTRATE?
BT

¿ #542

Received
Verbal response

NNNN

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT 272372
RC

SSN 3281
O 270T25Z APR 8[illegible]
FM JTF/J3
TO J[illegible]F/RC
BT
[redacted] ~~SECRET~~
SUBJ: AIRCRAFT MOVEMENT
(C) 1. TWO MC-130 AIRCRAFT (762,767) DEPARTED OUR LOCATION 2726[illegible]Z AND 2726[illegible]Z. ET[illegible] (APPROX) 2711[illegible]Z.
(C) 2. TWO AC-130 AIRCRAFT (867,870) DEPARTED OUR LOCATION 2727[illegible]Z AND 2727[illegible]Z. ET[illegible] APPROX) 2723[illegible]Z.
3. REQUEST RELAY POC AT HQ TAC.
BT
#0281

E-547

NNNN

Classified By: DDO NMCC JCS
Declassified On: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC 12 AUG 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

TOT 270619

G Col [redacted] VC

MESSAGE 05 ASSIGNED.

SSSSSN 0276
O 270500Z APR 80
FM JTF REAR SITE ALPHA
TO JCS/RC
SUBJECT: DEBRIEFING STATEMENT
REQUEST YOU SEND FORMATTED
JTF RICEBOWL DEBRIEFING STATEMENT
VIA TTY
BT

i #550

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

NNNN

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

IOT 06282
RC

MESSAGE #1 SELECTED.

SSN #277
O 270615Z APR 80
FM JTF/ALPHA
TO JTF/RC
ET
[redacted]
SUBJ: MSG. DELTA DTG 291230Z AND SUBJ. DELTA STATUS RPT AND MORE.

(U) 1. REF UR MSG NO. 17M DTG 291305Z APR 80 SUBJ SAME AS ABOVE

(U) 2. LTC [redacted] DEP THIS LOCATION ON NAC SAAM NO. 1105/13 ENROUTE TO POPE. ETA ANDREWS 271[illegible]Z APR. POPE UNKNOWN. SUGGEST COORDINATE [redacted] MOVEMENT TO DTG FROM LOCATION.

3. ONLY 5 DELTA SUPPORT PERSONNEL REMAIN AT THIS SITE. INTEND TO REMAIN UNTIL ROLLUP IS COMPLETE. ONE DELTA OPERATOR IS AEGARD NIMITZ AND ONE AT [redacted] ATTEMPTING TO RECOVERY BOTH TO ALPHA TO DAY. ETA CONUS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME.
ET
#0277

#551

NNNN

Classified By: DDO NMCC
Declassified On: OADR

Downgraded by DDO NMCC
12 AUG 91

CONFIDENTIAL

SSN 0356
P 26[illegible]Z APR [illegible]
FM: JTF [redacted]
TO: JTF/RC
SUBJECT: STATUS OF JTF FORCES
BT
[redacted]
SUBJECT: STATUS OF JTF FORCES

1. HAVE RECEIVED UNCONFIRMED INFORMATION THAT VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE JTF HAVE BEEN CHOPPED FOR REDEPLOYMENT I.E. MCS AND AC TO EUCOM.
2. PLEASE ADVISE.
BT

NNNN

TOT 0550
JC

#564

File

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

Declassified by DDO

MESSAGE 21 RECEIVED.

[redacted]

TO 1125 1921Z
CT

A. F

[redacted]

SUBJ: MISSION HELO PERS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FROM USS NIMITZ
1. USS NIMITZ HAS 21 MISSION HELO
PERS AND 2000 LBS CARGO PLUS
PERS LAGGAGE TO RETURN TO CONUS.
THIS WILL TAKE TWO COD FLIGHTS.
2. REQUEST JTF/RC EXPIDED RETURN
FOR PERS.
FOR INFO SUBJ JTF SOD PERSONS
WILL REMAIN IN [redacted] UNTIL
JUN 27 APR.
A. G E 3. PITMAN AND [redacted] ARE
ARRANGING COMMERCIAL TRANS
TO WASHINGTON VIA [redacted] TO
PARTICIPATE IN HELO CREW DEBRIEF
4. FOR USS NIMITZ HELO STATUS
OF HELOS FROM CREW DEBRIEF
FOLLOWS
A. NR1 HELO NO PROBS
B. NR 2: 2 NO STAGE PUMP FAILURE
2 HRS AFTER T/O
C. NR 3 2 NO STAGE HYDRAULIC
FAILURE ENROUTE. CRASHED IN
LS
D. NR 4 NO PROBS
E. NR 6: BAD DIR. LANDED AND
ABANDONED LARGE DESERT DRY
LAKE APROX 1 HR INTO
FLT AFTER CONFIRMING BAD
BLADE. A/C WAS HAVING FUEL
TRANSFER PROBS ALSO
F. NR 7: MINOR AFCS PROBS
ENROUTES. NR 8: BAD AFCS SERVO. INTERMEDIATE
GEAR BOX CHIP LIGHT AT COAST IN
POINT. CONT INSED TO LS.
5. EXPECT HELO CREWS TO DEPART JTF ALPHA
FOR CONUS TOMORROW
BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGR TO CONFID
REVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM JS

i #565

NNNN

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSC181
251520Z APR 8[illegible]

FM JTF-RC
TO JTF

[redacted]

1. DECISION MADE NOT TO SUPPORT JCRX FLINTLOCK 8[illegible] WITH SECOND TAC MC-130 FROM YOUR ASSETS. TAC, AIR STAFF AND USEUCOM CONCUR.

REVW 25; [illegible]

NNNN

TOR/15202
RC/ #0214

i-#567

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT / 1150 Z
KCL

[redacted]

[redacted]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[redacted]

[redacted]

SUBJ: RECOVERY OF EQUIPMENT -
1. DURING EXTRACTION ON NIGHT OF 24 APRIL
A BELTA PERSONNEL LOADED EQUIPMENT
FOUND IN THE FIELD ONTO VARIOUS DEPARTING AIRCRAFT.
IDENTITY OF A/C IS UNKNOWN. PERSONNEL DID
NOT DEPART ON THE SAME AIRCRAFT.
2. SM STATED THAT HE PERSONALLY LOADED
TWO RUCKSACKS, ONE PISTOL BELT W/HANDGUN,
AND OTHER ITEMS ON AN AIRCRAFT.
3. THIS EQUIPMENT MAY NOT HAVE BEEN
TRANSFERRED WITH THE PERSONNEL.
4. REQUEST A THOROUGH SEARCH BE MADE FOR
ANY EXTRA EQUIPMENT WHICH MAY BE ON THE
AIRCRAFT. EXERCISE CARE WHEN HANDLING
RUCKSACKS OR
B/ OTHER ITEMS. THEY MAY CONTAIN DEMOLITIONS,
B/ AMMUNITION AND GRENADES, OR
FRAGILE COMM/NIGHT VISION ITEMS.
5. REPORT ANYTHING FOUND TO STF, J-4 FOR
DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS.
BT
[illegible]

#573

NNNNO

~~Classified By: JES~~
~~Declassified On: OADR~~

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

[redacted]

TOT / 1150Z
KCL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(C) [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
E [redacted]
[redacted]
SUBJ: C-13. SUPPORT
1. PART LISTED PARA 1[illegible] YOUR MESSAGE [illegible] NOT ON HAND THIS STATION. AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO POSSIBLE LENGTHY DELAY IN PART SHIPMENT FROM USAFE, 1 SOW/[illegible] IS PROPOSING ENGINE CHANGE. ENGINE AVAILABLE. ONLY QUESTION IS WHETHER CRANE OR SIMILAR EQUIPMENT TO HOIST PROP/ENGINE IS AVAILABLE YOUR LOCATION. PLEASE ADVISE.
(U) 2. TENTATIVELY PLANNING FOR C-13[illegible] AIRLIFT SORTIE TONIGHT.
BT
#8237

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ GEN. CL. DOWNGR TO CONFID
REVW ON OADR
DESIGN [illegible] JS

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

i #574

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT / 1045Z
KCL

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12358
CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGR TO CONFID
REVW ON OADR
REVIEW FROM JS

(C) SSN 0235
ENY [redacted]
DTG 251035Z APR 80
FM ALPHA/J2
E TO [redacted] COL KYLE
[redacted]
SUBJ: OPSEC VIOLATION
1. [redacted] REPORTS THAT A USAF MAJOR WAS TAKING PHOTOS OF
ACTIVITIES AT DESERT TRACK AND IN [redacted] WITH 35MM CAMERA. HE
E IS MEMBER OF EC- OR MC-130 FLIGHT CREW. ONLY IDENTIFICATION: MAJOR,
LIGHT BROWN HAIR.
(U) 2. PLEASE OBTAIN FILM FM INDIVIDUAL AND FWD IT TO JTF.
BT
#0235

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

#575

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TT 125-250
MC

1-578

BSN 8221
ZNY TTTTT
O 260240Z
FM JTF/VAUCHT
TO JCS
BT
[redacted]

SUBJ: CLASSIFIED MATERIAL COMPROMISE
1. INITIAL DEBRIEFINGS INDICATE THAT SUBSEQUENT TO THE COLLISION AND EXPLOSION OF THE MH-53 AND EC-130 AT DESERT TRACK, HELICOPTER ROUTE MAPS, CEOI'S, KEYLISTS AND OTHER SENSITIVE MATERIAL WERE INADVERTENTLY LEFT ABOARD THE ABANDONED HELICOPTERS. CEOI SINDICATE [redacted]

E (U) [redacted]

(U) 2. WHILE TIS IS A SERIOUS CLASSIFIED MATERIAL COMPROMISE, I RECOMMEND AGAINST A DESTRUCTIVE STRIKE TO DESTROY THIS MATERIAL.

Classified By: ~~JCS~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded by: DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

X 578

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOT 0400Z
PR

i-579

SSN 0222
O DTG 250315Z APR 80
FM: JTF/MOORE
TO: JTF/RC

[redacted] ~~S E C R E T~~
SUBJECT: PROPOSED DRAWDOWN OF JTF KC-135(TS)
E 1. (TS) RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULE FOR REDUCING KC-135 ACTIVITY AT SITE ALPHA AND [redacted]
27 APRIL: 3 KC-135 ARTS REDEPLOY SITE ALPHA TO [redacted]
2 KC-135 ARTS REDEPLOY [redacted] TO GUAM
28 APRIL: 1KC-135 ART AND 2 KC-135A'S REDEPLOY SITE ALPHA TO [redacted]
E 1 KC-135 ART AND 1KC-135A REDEPLOY [redacted] TO GUAM.
ONCE REACHING [redacted] AND GUAM, AIRCRAFT COULD BE INTEGRATED INTO THE EUROPEAN/ PACIFIC TANKER TASK FORCE REDEPLOYMENT SCHEDULE.

E 2. (TS) FOUR AIRCRAFT WOULD REMAIN AT SITE ALPHA AND [redacted] TO CONTINUE KC-135 PRESENCE. IF IT IS DESIRABLE TO RETAIN THESE LEVELS, AIRCRAFT COULD BE REPLACED BY EUROPEAN/ PACIFIC TANKER TASK FORCE ASSETS.

E 3. (TS) [redacted] WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE COULD BE ADJUSTED TO SUPPORT REDEPLOYMENT OF KC-135'S TO [redacted] IF DESIRED.
BT

#579

File

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified By: ~~JCS~~ DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded By: DDO NMCC

~~CONFIDE~~

MAIL COACH

TOT 10600Z

1-581

SSN0226
(C) NY TTTTT
O 250550Z
FM JTF/ALPHA
TO NIMITZ [redacted]
E G [redacted] 6 CYS
[redacted] FOR ALL ELEMENT
INFO JCS/RC
BT
[redacted] ~~S E C R E T~~
SUBJ: JTF 79 CEOI (18 APR 88) (U)
(C) 1. (TS) SUBJ CEOI NO LONGER REQUIRED. REQ ALL ADDEES DEST
REF CEOI AND FWD DEST REPORT DIRECT MAIL TO JCS J3 ATTN SOD.
E [redacted] INSURE ALL CYS RECD AND DIST ARE
ACCOUNTED FOR.
2. (U) REQ ALL ADDEES ACK RECT THIS MSG BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS AVAIL
BT

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#581

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12 AUG 92

File

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~~SECRET~~

Passed 8 Col [redacted]
Section
24/1410Z

REDBARN [redacted]
PASS [redacted] EM[redacted]
G [redacted] STATES NO RPT NO QUESTION PERTAINING TO URSTA
FLASH MSG DTG 241251Z AND NO PROBELMS ON THIS END
ATT. DO URSTA COPY TTY MSG
GGNGTRV117

i #585

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

SSEKK

RED BARN DE EDSEL AND MORGR I WAS JUST ASKED BY LTC [redacted] IHI LTC [redacted]
(NAVY) WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE GENERATORS THAT THEY SEND YOU FROM
[redacted]..........THEY (GERERATORS) WERE SENT OUT WITH [redacted]
ON THE C-130'S...............NEED TO KNOW IF THEY ARRIVED OK AND IF IN
THEY ARE OPERATIONAL AND FIVERS..........KKK//KKN
NNNNJOTJDUKMD
?.872?ZZ): "3ZENLRXOVHYATOIMPYURVNMZF UMMIQ LLTL.

22)

EG

i-#587

Taken care of by ...

Classified By ...
Declassified On ...

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 13097
SC / MCN #0124

MSC 22
DTG 231307Z APR 80

FM: CJC
TO: SITE ALPHA/CDR JTF

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: OPERATION "RICE BOWL/EAGLE CLAW"

REF YOUR 230510Z APR 80
CONCUR WITH YOUR RECOMMENDATION.

~~REVW 23 APR 10~~

i #588

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Declassified by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[illegible] RECEIVED.

[illegible] 0213
[illegible] APR 8[illegible]
[illegible] IN [redacted]
[illegible]
JTF/J[redacted]
BT
[redacted] ~~[illegible]~~
SUBJ: INTEL SUPPORT
1. INFORMATION CONCERNING POSITION DIRECTION
SPEED OF SKR [illegible]/STOROZHEVOJ, KRIVAK 1
LAST NOTED [redacted] AND ACI PELENG
LAST NOTED [redacted] REQUIRED AT THIS
UNIT.
2. ADDITIONALLY REQUEST YOU PROVIDE THIS UNIT WITH
ALL CURRENT NAVAL POSITIONS IN GULF OF OMAN
AND ARABIAN SEA. INFO REQUIRED NO LATER
THAN 241100Z.
REVIEW 23 APR 10
BT
0213

E,G

MCN 0118

C

i #594

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
[illegible] NMCC
[illegible]
[illegible] DAO
[illegible] Multiple Sms
[illegible] A JTS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(U) ISN 0012
O 2309007 APR 80
FM [redacted]
TO JTF/LTG GAST
BT
~~TOP SECRET~~
(U) SUBJ: [redacted] SITREP NUMBER 6
1.) 30 MINUTE C-141 SEPARATION SHOULD POSE NO PROBLEM. WE WILL PART AND OFF LOAD C-141'S ON LOOP TAXIWAY AT NORTH END OF MAIN RUNWAY. AFTER OFF-LOAD, THEY WILL TAXI TO NORTH RAMP NEAR TOWER. C-141 REFUELING WILL TAKE PLACE AFTER C-130 LAUNCH.
(U) 2.) INSURE THAT INBOUND C-130 ON 24 APR ARRIVES NLT 0800Z. REFUELING CAPABILITY INADEQUATE TO REFUEL C-130/C-141'S AND TOP OFF MC/EC-130S AT SAME TIME.
(U) 3.) ATC PROBLEMS AT [redacted] HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. SILENT ARRIVAL AND

PAGE 2 ~~TOP SECRET~~
DEPARTURE ARE NO PROBLEM AS LONG AS WE ARE ADVISED AHEAD OF TIME AND GIVEN ACCURATE ETA'S FOR COORDINATION PURPOSES.
(U) 4.) MET WITH [redacted] INFORMED US THAT [redacted] ONSTRUCTED [redacted] TO STAND BACK AND OFFER SUPPORT ONLY WHEN REQUESTED TO DO SO. HE DID NOT QUESTION THE SEA SURVEILANCE EXPLANATION. SPECIAL AIRLIFT FOR [redacted] TO [redacted] ON 25 APR WILL BE PROVIDED BY [redacted] WILL PLAN TO RETURN TO [redacted] AT 0640Z 26 APR ON A SCHEDULED [redacted] FLIGHT.
BT
0012

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Classified By: DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92
Declassified ON: OADR

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#595

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSC 786
230015Z APR82
FM: CJCS
TO CDR, JTF
BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

E ADMIRAL LONG AND I AGREED THAT PACOM MC-130'S AT [redacted] ARE CHOPPED TO JTF EFFECTIVE 221600Z.
BT

#596

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Declassified ON: OADR

OT

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Declassify on OADR
Downgraded to CAN by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

G

[illegible] [redacted]

[illegible]

[illegible] 2214[illegible] APR [illegible]

~~(C)~~. REF PROVIDED [illegible] DATA AND REQUESTED [redacted]
[illegible] FOR [illegible] ACTIVITIES.

A

~~(C)~~. PRIME CONSIDERATIONS ARE TRADEOFF OF [redacted]

(U) [illegible] NORMAL FLYING PERIODS CAN COVER REQUESTED (4-6 ACFT) WINDOWS.

~~(C)~~. WILL THAT SATISFY [redacted] LEVEL DESIRED OR DO WE NEED LARGER EFFORT, WHICH COULD DEGRADE ALERT STATUS AND SUBSEQUENT CONTINGENCY RESPONSE.

REV: 23APR[illegible]

BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

i-598

Classified by: DDONMC 12 Aug 92

Declassify on OADR

Downgraded by DDONMC 13 Aug 92

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~~SECRET~~ (ADDED)

TAPE FURS.

ZNY TTTTT ZFD
O 232?55Z APR 80
FM HELO DET/NIMITZ/S-2
TO SITE ALFA/J-2
INFO JCS/RC-J2 [redacted] SC/TOT/13208
BT
[redacted] /DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST
REF SITE ALFA MSG 082 DTG 221830Z
SUBJ: HELO DET INTREP 04
1. AS OF 0700Z 23 APR 80 SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY REMAINS ORIENTED WELL TO SE OF NIMITZ TG. [redacted] VIRTUALLY ALL OTHER SOVIET SURFACE COMBATANTS ARE WITHIN 200 NM OF THIS POINT [redacted]
2. AGI 477 IS STILL [redacted]. CTF 70 IS IN PROCESS OF MIVING ARG EASTWARD. THIS WILL UNCOVER AIRSPACE FOR 130 MISSIONS OUT OF [redacted] AGI HAS [redacted] OF TRACKING OUR BIRDS. [redacted]
3. TWO ILGAEI'S FM [redacted] TO SE OF SOCOTRA THIS MORNING. [redacted] ADDITIONALLY, IRANIAN P-3 AND C-130 ARE ACTIVE IN VISUAL RECON OF US NAVAL UNITS IN GULF AND JUST SOUTH OF STRAITS. MORE INFO WILL FOL IN NEXT INTREP. NO AIR ACTIVITY HAS BEEN DIRECTED AT NIMITZ THUS FAR.
4. REF AREA OF INTEREST DESCRIBED IN YR MSG 082, AGI 477 IS ONLY PLATFORM IN OR NEAR BOX AT THIS TIME. ANTICIPATE INTREP 05 WILL BE COMING YOUR WAY APPROX 231800Z. WE HAVE GOOD HANDLE ON SIT AT THIS END AND ARE PROVIDING INTEL SUPPORT TO CAG-8 FOR FIGHTER COVERAGE OF NIGHT NR. 2 EXFIL OPS.
REWW 23 APR 00.
BT

#599

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
REVW ON OADR
REVW BY DIA

~~SECRET~~

MCN 112

[illegible] RECEIVED.

[illegible]
DTG: 2[illegible]145Z APR 80

FM: JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

~~[illegible]~~

SUBJ: SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY

REFERENCE: SITE ALPHA/J2 MSG 221705Z APR 80

BASED ON RESOURCES AVAILABLE TO YOUR SITE, INCLUDING INFORMATION FROM CVN68, WE BELIEVE THAT YOU ARE PROBABLY IN A BETTER POSITION THAN US TO ASSESS THE CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY IN THE ARABIAN SEA AREA. WE STAND READY, HOWEVER, TO PROVIDE ANY BACKUP SUPPORT THAT YOU MAY REQUIRE, ALTHOUGH OUR INFORMATION MAY NOT BE AS COMPLETE OR CURRENT AS YOURS.
BT

i #601

NNNN

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

Classified by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A DUPLICATE

TOR/2305417
BON/MCN 109

MSG 75
DTG: 233035Z APR 80

FM: JCS/RC-J2
TP: SITE ALPHA/J2

~~[illegible]~~

SUBJ: KC-135 DETECTION

1. REF YOUR MSG 221710 APR 80, SA.

2. KC-135 ACFT COULD BE DETECTED AT 25,000 FT [redacted]

3. IF DETECTED [redacted] WOULD PROBABLY QUERY FIRST VIA OPEN ATC COMMO AND [redacted] AND, IF THESE WERE UNSUCCESSFUL, INTERCEPT WITH FIGHTERS FOR VISUAL IDENTIFICATION. THE IDENTITY OF THE ACFT WOULD PROBABLY BE ANNOUNCED IN THE CLEAR TO GROUND CONTROLLERS, BUT IT IS UNLIKEY THAT THEY WOULD ENGAGE. FOLLOWING A SIMILAR IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE, IRAQ WOULD PROBABLY ENGAGE IF THEY PERCEIVED A THREAT FROM THE AIRCRAFT. IRAN WOULD ALSO PROBABLY FOLLOW A SIMILAR IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE. ALTHOUGH IRAN WOULD PROBABLY NOT ENGAGE IF THE ACFT STAYED OUT OF IRANIAN AIR SPACE, THEY WOULD ANNOUNCE THE AIRCRAFT PRESENCE THROUGH THE AIR DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM.

4. REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF DETECTION IS NOT CONSIDERED POSSIBLE
BT

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDONMCC
☐ DECL ☒ DOWNGR TO CONF
REVW ON OADR
DERIVED FROM DIA

i #604

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

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MSN 0011
O 230745Z APR 80
FM [redacted] KYLE
TO JTF/VAUGHT
INFO JTF/BECKWITH [redacted]
BT
SUBJECT: TRANSFER OF DELTA FROM C-141
TO MC-130 AT [redacted]
1. (TS) HAVE OBTAINED TWO TRUCKS
LOCALLY FROM [redacted] THAT ARE
DEDICATED ASSETS FOR OUR EXCLUSIVE
USE 24 APR 80. TWO (2) MAN DELTA
ADVANCED PARTY HAVE INSPECTED
VEHICLES AND HAVE PRACTIZED
DRIVEN SAME. VEHICLES ARE
[redacted] ARMY STYLE AND IN
EXCELLENT CONDITION. ESTIMATE 20-30
PERSONNEL CAN BE MOVED ON EACH SHUUTTLE
FROM OFFLOAD AREA TO MC-130 MARSHALLING
AREA. WE TIMES THE DRIVE
AT THREE MINUTES (3) FROM OFF-LOAD
POINT TO MC-130 AREA FOR
ON LOAD. WILL CONSTRUCT COVER
FOR TRUCK BED (TENT) TO ENSURE
SECURITY OF CARGO/PAX MOVEMENT.
ESTIMATE 100 PERSONNEL CAN BE
TRANSLOADED IN 40 MINUTES (40).
IF 2-C-141'S ARE LOADED TO SPREAD
DELTA EVENLY, CAN PREDICT PAINLESS
AND SECURE OPERATION. IF MOST
OF DELTA ARRIVE ON FIRST C-141, WE
WILL MOVE THEM IN SHORT ORDER.
PATIENCE REQUESTED.
2. (TS) I HAVE CONFIDENT TO THE
RUNWAY WITH DELTA PARTS AND LTCOL
[redacted] TO PACE OFF POSSIBLE
BACKING OF C-130 TO C-141
FOR TRANSLOAD. THIS IS AN
EXTREMELY AWKWARD AND POTENTIALLY
ACCIDENT PRODUCING SITUATION SINCE
WE HAVE NOT PRACTISED SUCH
AN OPERATION.
3. (TS) OF THE TWO(2) ALTERNATIVES,
I STRONGLY RECOMMEND
TRUCKING AS SUREST, SECUREST,
AND MOST EFFICIENT MEANS
TO ACCOMPLIST THE JOB. THE
AREA SELECTED FOR C-141
PARKING IS DEPARTURE END OF
RUNWAY [redacted] (SMALL LOOP AROUND
TAXI WAYS). [redacted] HAS BEEN TO
AREA AND PACED OFF WING
CLEARANCE. C-141'S WILL NEED TO
SHUT DOWN OUT BOARD ENGINES
PRIOR TO LEAVING ACTIVE RUNWAY.
C-141'S WILE REMAIN ON HARD SURFACE
TAXIWAYS AT ALL TIMES. FOLLOW ME
WILL LEAD C-141 TO OFF LOAD POINT
[redacted] WILL PART. C-141'S MAY OR
MAY NOT SHUT DOWN, YOUR CHOICE.
SUBSEQUENT TO OFF-LOAD WILL
REPART C-141'S AT BASE OPS
RAMP FOR REFUEL AND RELAUNCH.
ANTICIPATE FUEL DELAY DUE TO
LIMITED TRUCKS WITH LIMITED
CAPACITY. AFTER ALL MC/EC-130'S
HAVE BEEN TOPPED OFF, GAS
TRUCKS WILL PROCEED TO C-141.
SUPPORT FROM [redacted] TODATE
SUPER. WE ARE WORKING INTO
THEIR WEEKEND SCHEDULE NOW
TO ENSURE NECESSARY SUPPORT
IS AVAILABLE TO OUR OPERATION.
4. (TS) AWAITING YOUR INSTRUCTIONS.
BT
0011

#605

Classified By: DDON MCC 12 Aug 92
Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded to CONF by DDON MCC 12 Aug 92

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CONFIDENTIAL

MCN 102

[illegible]
TO: 2[illegible]1[illegible]Z APR [illegible]

FR: JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

~~[illegible]~~

SUBJ: EMERGENCY LZ'S FOR KC-135'S

RESPONDING TO YOUR REQUEST 222340Z APR 80 SAB, THE FOLLOWING LZ'S MEET THE REQUIREMENT SPECIFIED:

A. SAUDI ARABIA

(1)	AL BATIN	(2754N 04531E)
(2)	AL JORY	(2947N 04006E)
(3)	BISHA	(1959N 04238E)
(4)	DAHRAN INT'L	(2616N 05009E)
(5)	GASSIM	(2618N 04346E)
(6)	GIZAN	(1654N 04235E)
(7)	HAIL	(2727N 04142E)
(8)	JIDDAH INT'L	(2130N 03912E)
(9)	KHAMIS MUSHAIT	(1819N 04229E)
(10)	MEDINA	(2433N 03942E)
(11)	NEJRAN	(1737N 04426E)
(12)	RUJADH INT'L	(2443N 04644E)
(13)	SHARURAH HS	(1725N 04706E)
(14)	SULAYEL	(2028N 04536E)
(15)	TABUK	(2822N 03638E)
(16)	TAIJ	(2129N 04033E)
(17)	WEJH	(2612N 03629E)
(18)	YENBO	(2409N 03807E)

B. KUWAIT

(1)	KUWAIT INT'L	(2914N 04759E)
(2)	KUWAIT MAINBASE	(2856N 04747E)
(3)	KUWAIT WEST	(2921N 04731E)

C. OMAN

(1)	MASIRAH	(2041N 05853E)
(2)	SALALAH	(1702N 05406E)
(3)	SEER INT'L	(2336N 05817E)
(4)	THUMRAIT	(1740N 05401E)

ET

#607

Declassified by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 9[illegible]

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

NNNN

O 22160 Z APR [illegible]
FM: HELO DET/SL
TO: JTF/JI
INFO: JTF/RC
BT
[redacted]
SUBJ: AIRCREW ASSIGNMENT
REF: (A) JTF/JI 22[illegible] APR [illegible]
1. FOLLOWING AIRCREW ASSIGNMENT AS REQ BY REF (A) IS PROVIDED. ACFT BUREAU NUMBER USED INSTEAD OF TAIL NUMBER. NONE OF THE ACFT WILL HAVE TAIL NUMBERS. READ IN FIVE COLUMNS.

ACFT NO	BUREAU NO	NAME	RANK	SER	SSAN
-1	150744	J.R. STIFFERT	LTCOL	USMC	
		[redacted]	CAPT	USMC	
		HE [redacted]	GYSGT	USMC	
			AD3	USN	
		[redacted] SGT	USMC	[redacted]	
			SSGT	USA	
-2	150753	[redacted]	MAJ	USMC	
			CAPT	USMC	
			SSGT	USMC	
			AT2	USN	
			SGT	USMC	
-3	156761	J.H. SCHAEFER	MAJ	USMC	
		U.B. PETTY	MAJ	USMC	
		D.L. JOHNSON	SSGT	USMC	
		J.N. HOLMES JR	CPL	USMC	
		J.D. HARVEY	SGT	USMC	
-4	158693	[redacted]	MAJ	USMC	
			CAPT	USMC	
			SSGT	USMC	
			CPL	USMC	
			GYSGT	USMC	
-5	150754	[redacted]	LCDR	USN	
			CAPT	USMC	
			GYSGT	USMC	
			CPL	USMC	
			SGT	USMC	
			SGT	USA	
		C.H. PITMAN	COL	USMC	
-6	158750	[redacted]	MAJ	USMC	
			LT	USN	
			SSGT	USMC	
			CPL	USMC	
			CPL	USMC	
-7	158688	[redacted]	CAPT	USMC	
			CAPT	USAF	
			GYSGT	USMC	
			AT2	USN	
			GYSGT	USMC	
-8	158758	[redacted]	CAPT	USMC	
			LCDR	USN	
			AMH1	USN	
			SSGT	USMC	
			AE2	USN	

2. ABOVE INFO BASED ON LAUNCH OF 8 ACFT. IF NO. 8 IS NOT A FLYER, CREW COMPOSITION WILL CHANGE. WE WILL KEEP YOU INFORMED.
BT

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

TOR 2223102
LT MCN 91

MSG #71
DTG 2221[illegible] APR [illegible]
FM: 1-30[illegible]
TO: SITE ALPHA

[redacted]

G ATTN: [redacted]
SUBJ: A/C [illegible]

1. AIRCRAFT 690569 MAY HAVE DEPARTED HOME STATION WITH THE FOLLOWING PROBLEM:
NUMBER THREE ENGINE TEMP DATUM SYSTEM INOPERATIVE, FLY IN NULL.

2. PRIOR TO ITS DEPARTURE, THE FOLLOWING MAINTENANCE ACTIONS WERE PERFORMED TO RESOLVE TD PROBLEM.
A. REMOVAL AND REPLACEMENT OF THE RELAY BOX, COORDINATOR, AND TD AMP.
B. TROUBLESHOOT THE LEFT HAND ELECTRICAL HARNESS.
(1) EVERTHINRVLFRGBSA
(2) NINE WIRES WERE FOUND DANGLING IN THE ELECTRICAL HARNESS JUNCTION BOX, WIRES WERE REMOVED. THESE WIRES MAY HAVE CAUSED FAILURE OF THE PREVIOUSLY CHANGED TD SYSTEMS COMPONENTS.

3. THE ABOVE IS PROVIDED TO ASSIST IN FURTHER TROUBLESHOOTING IF PROBLEM STILL EXISTS WITH THE TEMP DATUM SYSTEM.
BT

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~~Classified by~~ ~~JBS~~ ~~CADR~~
~~Declassified by~~

Declassified by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

i #616

O 220350Z APR 80
FM NIMITZ/PITMAN
TO JTF/VAUGHT

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: COORDINATION DATA (U)
A. SECURE PHONECON LTG GAST/COL PITMAN 221730Z APR 80
B. SECURE PHONECON COL PITMAN/COL KYLE 221745Z APR 80
1. AS PER REF, UNDERSTAND PLANNED "OVER THE WALL" TIME IS 2100Z. REQUEST FIRM TIME WHEN HELOS SHOULD GET AIRBORNE IN THE EVENT ALL COMM FAILS; NO RADIO LAUNCH TIME SHOULD PROVIDE FAIL SAFE METHOD OF LAUNCH.
2. REQUEST EXPECTED TIMING BETWEEN MFA AND COMPOUND INFILTRATIONS. I.E. SIMULTANEOUSLY, MFA WHEN FORCE REACHES THE WALL. NJ WHEN OTHER FORCE DISCOVERED. WHAT HAPPENS IN THE EVENT OF LOST COMM BETWEEN GROUND FORCES?
3. WEATHER DATA EXCELLENT DETAIL AND LOOKS GOOD FOR TARGET DATE.
4. HELO STATUS 221900Z SEVEN MISSION CAPABLE. EIGHTH HELO, 736, UL HAS FLOWN BUT IS DOWN EST. UP BY 231000Z. FOUR HELOS HAVE BEEN PAINTED (LOOKS GOOD) AND THE OTHER FOUR ARE PRIMED. EST COMPLETION AT 231400Z.
5. IN DISCUSSING PLANNED TACAIR SUPPORT ANCHORED AT NORTHWESTERN END OF PERSIAN GULF ON NIGHT TWO. THE LIKELIHOOD OF NEEDING FIGHTERS TO PROTECT AIRBORNE WITHDRAWAL WOULD SEEM MORE PREVALENT THAN A REQUIREMENT FOR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT. INDICATIONS IN REF A WERE THAT FIGHTERS WERE TO PROTECT THE TANKER AND ATTACK AIRCRAFT (A-6) WOULD RENDER CLOSE AIR SUPPORT, IF REQUIRED. REQUEST CLARIFICATION OF TACAIR MISSION NIGHT TWO. CTF 70 HAS INDICATED THAT HE COULD PROVIDE 4 F-14'S AND 2 A-6 TRAMS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FIGHTER COVER FOR THE EXTRACTION FORCE AS WELL AS THE TANKER AND NIGHT CLOSE AIR SUPPORT CAPABILITY.
6. REF B CONFIRMED TANKING PLAN FOR DESERT ONE IF EIGHT HELOS ARRIVE. NO. 1 AND 2 ON NORTHERN MOST TANKER, NO. 3, 4 AND 5 ON MIDDGE TANKER (NORTH SIDE) AND 6,7 AND EIGHT ON SOUTHERN TANKER. EST. 1600 GAL REQUIRED BY EACH HELO.
7. STANDING BY FOR PAX/CARGO WT. BREAKDOWN FOR FIRST SIX HELOS.
8. CONCERNING EMBASSY EXTRACTION, STADIUM LZ STILL CONSIDERED PRIMARY AND BEST FOR MISSION DUE TO SPACE AND DEPARTURE AREA WHICH WILL PERMIT HEAVIER LOADS. UNDERSTAND REQUIREMENT MAY COME UP FOR USE OF EMBASSY LZ. THIS WILL BE PASSED TO INBOUND HELOS BY LZ CONTROL. RECOMMEND USE OF PRIMARY ZONE IF POSSIBLE.
REVW: 22 APR 00
BT

DECLASSIFIED
DOD WHS
Public

TSR 2206
JCS
#617

DNP

O 222045Z APR 00

FM NIMITZ/PITMAN
TO JTF/VAUGHT

[redacted] SECRET

SUBJ: STATUS (U)
A. NIMITZ/PITMAN 220845Z APR 00
1. PLEASE CORRECT REF A, PARA 3, LINE 7 TO READ - ONLY 200
RDS AMMO VKR GUN WITH ADDITIONAL AMMO IN NUMBER SEVEN AND...
REVH: 21 APR 00
BT

NNNN

TOP SECRET
JB

[illegible]

[illegible] ON
E U

BERGO

i-#619

O 222040Z APR 80
FM NIMITZ/PITMAN
TO JTF/J-4

~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJ: PREPOSITIONED EQUIPMENT FOR HELO DET
A. NIMITZ/PITMAN 220845Z APR 80
1. PARA 3 AND 4 OF THE REF REFER. REQUEST VERIFY FOLLOWING MISSION
EQJAP IN QUANTITIES/LOCATIONS INDICATED:

ITEM	QTY	LOC
[redacted] NEP /SUPPORT	48	DESERT ONE
SYSTEMS (BACFT)		
CAL .50MG	02	[redacted]
CAL .50 AMMO	1500 RDS	[redacted]
BT		

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: DADR

NNNNJVH

Declassified
DDO NM
12 Aug

~~SECRET~~

OSLI DTG 221710Z AT 2129Z

MSG #65
DTG 221930Z APR [redacted]
FM: JTF/RC
TO: JTF/CDR

[redacted]

SUBJ: SENSITIVE LETTERS

1. [redacted] CHIEF U.S. [redacted] IS DEPARTING EUCOM FOR [redacted] VIA [redacted] DEPARTURE FROM EUCOM 2400HOURS EUCOM TIME TODAY. HE WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO PICK UP A PACKAGE FROM [redacted] FOR DELIVERY TO [redacted] GEN. PUSTAY WILL DISPATCH SEPARATE INSTRUCTIONS TO BOTH GEN. GAST AND [redacted] USMTM [redacted]

2. YOUR [redacted] SUGGESTION BEING IMPLEMENTED HERE. YOU WILL GET A COPY OF [redacted]

BT

NNNN

Classified By JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

[illegible]
[illegible] 221472Z

[illegible]
A [redacted] [illegible]
[illegible]
SITE ALPHA

[illegible]

TCR/2221Z
VC/MCN 083

SUBJ: IRAN SITUATION REPORT AS OF 0500 22 APRIL 1980

#625

1. [redacted]

2. FIGHTING BROKE OUT AGAIN YESTERDAY BETWEEN ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST AND LEFTISTS ON THE TEHRAN UNIVERSITY CAMPUS. THE FUNDAMENTALISTS, NOT ALL OF WHOM APPEAR TO BE STUDENTS, HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN SIMILAR CLASHES THROUGHOUT IRAN OVER THE PAST THREE DAYS AS OF YESTERDAY.

3. PRESIDENT-ELECT BANI-SADR DENOUNCED THE RIGHTWING MUSLIM ATTEMPTS TO TAKE OVER UNIVERSITIES AS BEING "COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY," AND SAID THESE ACTIONS WERE DESIGNED TO UNDERMINE THE POLITICAL BACKING ENJOYED HIS GOVERNMENT AMONG MODERATE, CENTRISTS, AND OTHER GROUPS. HOWEVER, THE ISLAMIC JUNDAMENTALISTS HAVE THE BACKING OF THE QOM THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY (WHICH HAS CLOSE TIES TO KHOMEINI) AS WELL AS SUPPORT FROM THE CLERGY-DOMINATED ISLAMIC REPUBLICAN PARTY. THESE ACTIONS, WHICH ARE PROBABLE DESIGNED TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN THE CLERGY'S HOLD ON THE COUNTRY, APPEAR TO BE YET ANOTHER FACET OF THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE MODERATE SECULARISTS AND THE HARDLINE CLERGY.

4. SHOOTING BETWEEN ARMY TROOPS KURDISH GUERRILLAS ENTERED ITS FOURTH DAY YESTERDAY IN THE KURDISH TOWN OF SAGGEZ.

[redacted]

5. [redacted] THIS IS PROBABLY THE RESULT OF INTENSE EFFORTS BY THE IRANIANS TO IMPROVE AIR DEFENSE READINESS ALONG ITS WESTERN BORDER BECAUSE OF RECENT PROBLEMS WITH IRAQ.

[illegible] JCS
[illegible] DADR

[redacted]

SOVIET PROPAGANDA CLAIMS THAT MOSCOW HAS ALREADY
GUN EFFORTS TO CIRCUMVENT A POSSIBLE US BLOCKADE OF IRAN. AN
IN THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE "MOSCOW NEWS WEEKLY" SAID CARGO
WEST EUROPE "IS POURING INTO IRAN, AND THAT TRANSIT OF IRANIAN
VIA SOVIET TERRITORY IS OF "VITAL IMPORTANCE" TO IRAN
BECAUSE OF A THREATENED US ECONOMIC BLOCKADE. THERE ARE INDICA-
HOWEVER, THAT RAIL TRAFFIC THROUGH JOLFA AND ASTARA IS
SCOW THAT THE FREIGHT TIE-UP COULD LAST FOR MONTHS.

[redacted]

14. SOVIET ACTIVITY IN INDIAN OCEAN AND SOUTH CHINA SEA
A. AREA OF U.S. BATTLE GROUPS: AN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTOR AND A GUIDED MISSILE FRIGATE CONTINUE SURVEILLANCE AO THE USS NIMITZ AND USS CORAL SEA BATTLE GROUPS AND AMPHIBIOUS READINESS GROUP ALPHA./[redacted]

F. INDICATIONS OF TU-95/BEAR D DEPLOYMENTS TO THE INDIAN OCEAN: NO CHANGE, NO ACTIVITY.

G. IL-38/MAY DEPLOYMENTS TO THE INDIAN AND IL-38 RECCE MISSIONS:

[redacted]

TOR/195 c.2
1 C/ MCN 07

i-630

MSG #[illegible]
DTG [illegible]Z APR [illegible]
FM: CJCS
TO: JTF CDR/SITE "[illegible]"

~~[illegible]~~

1. EUCOM HAS VERBALLY CHOPPED THEIR FORCE INVOLVED IN RICE BOWL TO THE JTF EFFECTIVE [illegible]Z TODAY. WAS AGREED TO BY GENERAL ROGERS, CINEUR. HE HAS SO INSTRUCTED GEN. ALLEN, DCINCEUR AT EUCOM. GENERAL HUYSER, CINCMAC, HAS INSTRUCTED HIS PEOPLE TO COMPLY WITH YOUR OPERATIONAL ORDERS ON USE OF C-141 DURING EXECUTION PHASE.

2. WOULD YOU SEE ANY PROBLEM IN OUR CALLING THE EXECUTION PHASE EAGLE CLAW. THIS WOULD DIFFERENTIATE EARLIER PHASES FROM EXECUTION. ALSO EAGLE CLAW WILL CANNOTE A STRONGER IMAGE IN THE AFTERMATH THAN RICE BOWL. IF ANY PROBLEM WITH THIS, WE WILL LEAVE ALONE.
BT

NNNN

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR
Declassified by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

TOP 06463

MCN 107

#631

0644Z DUCK HUNTER DE FOX FIRE

G

O 230645Z APR 80
FM NIMITZ [redacted]
TO CDR JTF
BT
~~T O P S E C R E~~ T//DO NOT RETRANSMIT ON OPINTEL BROADCAST
SUBJECT: COORDINATION DATA
REF: JTF 222350Z APR 80
1. REF REQUESTS CAP DATA
2. FOLLOWING INFO PROVIDED IN RESPONSE PARA 5. REF:
FUEL REQUIRED:
2F-14 PLUS 2A6: 2 HOURS...53,000 LBS; 3 HOURS...73,000 LBS.
4F-14 PLUS 2A6: 2 HOURS...81,000 LBS; 3 HOURS...111,000 LBS.
3. RATIONALE FOR 4 F-14S BASED ON POSSIBLE AIR THREAT FOR WITHDRAWING FORCES.
4. ORDINANCE LOADS: EACH F-14...4SPW, 4SW & GUN; EACH A-6 (TRAM)... 8-APAM (CBU-59).
5. NO, REPEAT NO, OTHER MISSION PRIORITY HAS EVER OR NOW STANDS IN WAY OF YOUR REQUIREMENTS.
VERY RESPECTFULLY
REVW: 23APR00
BT

NNNN

Declassified by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MSG 55
DTG 221445Z, APR 80
FROM JTF RC/MJ-4
TO ALPHA //(COL [redacted]//COL KYLE//LTC [redacted]

G

[redacted]

MCN
Ø73

A 1. ALL ITEMS REQUESTED BY [redacted] MSG DTG 211830Z, LESS THOSE TASKED TO EUCOM TOOK OFF FROM [redacted] 220600 LOCAL APR 80. INCLUDED ARE 45 1ST AID PACKETS FOR [redacted]

2. ITEMS TASKED TO EUCOM ARE:
1942 50 T SWITCH
TUBING
SLEEVES
HYDRO PACKING ITEMS
5985-00-353-8518

A 3. MEDEVAC ACFT THAT DEPARTED POPE 22 APR 80 WILL HAVE 45 AID PACKETS FOR [redacted] THIS WILL FILL THEIR TOTAL RQMT.
BT

i #635

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NNNNT

~~RCRCRC~~ QSL 1543Z
KKKKKKK

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

TOR 15
KCL

2213[illegible]Z APR 80
FM HELO DET/NIMITZ/S-2
TO SITE ALFA/J-2
BT

S E C R E T//DO NOT RETRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCAST
[illegible]: INT REP 03

[redacted]

ACTIVITY IS NOW WELL SE OF NIMITZ. I ESTIMATE FOCUS OF USSR
2. KRIVAK 693 IS STILL UNLOCATED DESPITE AIR RECON [redacted]
NEGATIVE SIGHTINGS VIC MASIRAH IT APPEARS 693 IS [redacted] BASED ON
[redacted] NIMITZ FLAG INTEL IS HOLDING
HER VIC 013N 061E. [illegible] EP-3 FLYING FROM DJIBOUTI SIGHTED ROGOV
GROUP VIC 23 22N 063 27E AT 0145Z.
3. ONLY AGI 477 REMAINS IN CTF 70 SURVEILLANCE ROLE AT PRESENT.
477 IS IN TRAIL OF AMPHIB READY GROUP VIC 22 53N 060 05E. [redacted]
4. SOVIET MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY AERIAL SURVEILLANCE
OF ROGOV BY IL-38 MAYS BASED IN ADEN. MISSION WAS FLOWN
ENTIRELY DURING 21-22 APRIL PERIOD OF DARKNESS. OTHER SOVIET AIR
ACTIVITY OF INTEREST [redacted]
EXCESS OF 300NM. CLOSEST POINT OF APPROACH TO NIMITZ WAS IN
5. AS OF 222000Z APRIL 80, NO INDICATION OF IRANIAN SOVIET OR
OTHER 3RD COUNTRY INCREASED INTEREST IN NIMITZ OR HELO OPS.
6. REF MFA GRIDS. WE REQUIRE 6 COPIES ONLY AT DESERT TRACK.
BT

MCN
070

#638

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
☐ DECL CS CONVERT TO [illegible]
REVW ON OADR
REVIEW [illegible] multiple since [redacted]

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP / 14 / 6 E

MSG F2
DTG 221307Z APR 80 [redacted]
FROM JCS- RC (LTC [redacted]
TO JTF-SITE ALPHA (LTC [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: RECOMMENDED CHANGE TO CEOI.
PARAGRAPH 5. C. (1) REPLACE PERIOD AFTER
[redacted] WITH COMMA.

PARAGRAPH 6. C. DECODE SECTION.
INSERT FOLLOWING CODEWORDS/MEANING
IN EXISTING PARAGRAPH IN ALPHABETICAL
ORDER.

CODEWORD	MEANING
BRONSON	[redacted]
CONCEPT	C-141 BASE
ELECTION	
HERETIC	CORAL SEA
RED BARN	JTF-MAIN [redacted]

PARAGRAPH 7. A. CHANGE FIRST
KY-70 NUMBER TO 75847 RPT 75847.
CHANGE SECOND KY-70 NUMBER (CJCS) TO
75845 RPT 75845.
BT

NNNN

MESSAGE 07 RECEIVED.

MCN
069

1cy TO [redacted]
1cy TO Col [redacted]

#639

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Declassified ON: OADR
Downgraded to Conf by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

BT

[redacted] T//DC [illegible] TRANSMIT OVER OPINTEL BROADCA[illegible]

SUBJ: STATUS (U)

A. JTF 220150Z APR 80

B. SECURE PHONE CON JTF CDR/DEPHELO OPS 220830Z APR 80

1. IN RESPONSE TO REF A, ALL HELOS STRIPPED OF MIN. WT. AND PAINTING HAS COMMENCED. EST. PAINTING COMPLETE 231400Z. ENTIRE SHIP HAS TURNED TO IN SUPPORT OF JTF DET.

2. HELO STATUS AS REPORTED REF B, SEVEN OF EIGHT UP. EIGHTH HELO UP FOR TEST 220530Z. BASED ON REF A AND B GUIDANCE EVERY EFFORT WILL BE MADE TO TAKE EIGHT.

3. IAW REF B, [redacted]S FOR UHF AND FM WILL BE REMOVED. EACH OF FIRST SIX HELOS WILL EXPECT CLOSE TO 5200 LBS OF PAX/CARGO AT DESERT TRACK PLUS SIX SETS OF [redacted] FOR EACH HELO. NUMBER EIGHT HELO WILL REQUIRE SIX ADDITIONAL NETS AND POLES. RECOMMEND BRINGING OLD [redacted] SINCE THERE ARE ONLY 42 SAND COLORED NETS AT YOUR LOCATION. HELO CREW WILL REMAIN FIVE, WITH TWO GUNNERS. ONLY 200 RDS AMMO IN NUMBER SEVEN AND EIGHT HELO AS WELL AS 1500 RDS PLUS TWO .50 CAL GUNS BEING POSITIONED AT CWO [redacted] REFUEL POINT AT [redacted]EM.

4. REQUEST DETAILS OF MC/EC 130 FLT ROUTES INBOUND DAY ONE. HELO DATA BASED ON ESTIMATED WIND IS AS FOLLOWS:

POINT	LAT/LONG	TIME (ZULU
SHIP		1505
COAST-IN	[redacted]	1534
TP 1		1544
TP 2		1616
TP 3		1711
TP 4		1739
DESERT 1		1933
DEPART DESERT 1		2033
TP 5		2039
TP 6		2237
TP 7		2244
DZ		2246
DEPART DZ		2251
HIDE		2306

5. CTF 70 HAS REQUESTED MOVING JTF SPECIAL COMM INTO FLAG BRIDGE AREA. INTEND TO RESPOND THAT COMM WILL REMAIN JTF DISCRETE UNTIL DISCOVERY OR ASSAULT TIME TO PRECLUDE EXPOSING OUR PLAN UNNECESSARILY. HOWEVER, ALL OUR DATA RECEIVED VIA BREVITY CODE OR OTHER MEANS WILL BE PROVIDED DIRECTLY TO CTF 70, SO THAT HE MAY TRACK OUR PROGRESS. ONCE HIS FORCES ARE INVOLVED OR ABOUT TO BE INVOLVED, WE CAN REMOTE DIRECTLY TO HIS STAFF TO PROVIDE NECESSARY COORDINATION AND CONTROL. THIS REMOTING HAS ALREADY BEEN TESTED.

6. LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AGAIN SOON.

REVW: 21APR00

BT

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TOR | 0920
RCL

MCN
066

#642

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Declassify on OADR
Downgraded to CONF by DDO NMCC

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORY CLEAR.

TOR/0509Z
JB/MCN 062

MESSAGE 01 RECEIVED.

(C) SSN 0007
O 220515Z APR 80
FM [redacted] COL [redacted]
TO JCS/SOD/LT GEN GAST
JCS/OPG/COL [redacted] JCS
JTF/LTCOL [redacted]
BT
~~T O P S E C R E T~~
(C) SUBJ: [redacted] SITREP NUMBER 5
1.) HAVE USED 26,000 U.S. GALLONS
JET A-1 FROM 19-21 APRIL. TOTAL
COST IS $37.924 AT $1.46
PER U.S. GALLON.
(C) 2.) MORALE OF TROOPS IS EXCELLENT.
[redacted] PERSONNEL HAVE
COOPERATED FULLY AND CONTINUE
TO BE RESPONSIVE TO OUR NEEDS.
BT

EG

E

E

ZFD 5
JCS

i-646

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Declassified ON: OR

DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

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SECRET

TOR/22-04462
Rbf MICN 060
i #648

NSC047
DTG: 22031EZ APR 80

FM: JCS/RC-J2
TO: SITE ALPHA/J2

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJ: SOVIET NAVAL ACTIVITY

REF: UR 212210Z APR 80, SAB

C [redacted] 1. CHECK WIT[redacted] AND DIA FAILED TO CONFIRM YOUR IMPLICATION THAT [redacted] HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING DATA IS PROVIDED PER YOUR REQUEST:

A. SOVIET SURFACE UNITS OPERATING IN THE ARABIAN SEA [redacted] HAVE NEVER [redacted]

B. THE LAST INCIDENCE NOT APPLICABLE.

C. SIGNIFICANCE TO POTENTIAL FRIENDLY OPERATIONS ARE PROBABLY MINIMUM AS THE BASIC PEACETIME PURPOSE OF [redacted]

D. UNABLE TO PREDICT ESTIMATED LENGHT OF TIME FOR SUCH AN EXERCISE. NOMINALLY SPEAKING WHEN WORKING IN A CONFINED AREA SUCH AS THE NORTHE[redacted] THE PERIOD WOULD BE MEASURED IN HOURS VICE DAYS.

C, E

E. THE KRIVAK UTILIZING ITS HEADNET RADAR WOULD HAVE TO BE WITHIN [redacted] OF THE [redacted] CIP FLIGHT ROUTE TO DETECT A/C FLYING AT 500FT ASL AND BELOW.

BT

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Declassified On: OADR

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CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO
EXT REC CS DOCTRINE TO Secret
OADR
[redacted]

SECRET

[illegible]

FM [illegible]
TO SITE ALPHA [illegible]
[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

i-#649

SUBJECT: TOT PRIORITIES

REF: UR MSG 2107542 APR [illegible]

1. RECOMMENDED TARGET PRIORITIES AND STRIKE TIMES ARE PROVIDED PER YOUR REQUEST

(A) TEHRAN AREA

(1) KARIM KHAN E ZAND POWER SUB-STATION TRANSFORMER YARD. STRIKE [illegible] COINCIDENCE WITH DETECTION OF GROUND ASSAULT

(2) SEPAH SQUARE PIT MICRO WAVE POWER COMPLEX. STRIKE TIME ASAP, AFTER FORCE INITIATES COMPOUND ASSAULT.

(3) MEHRABAD ATC [illegible] ASSOCIATED F4 ALERT AIRCRAFT. STRIKE [illegible] MINUTES AFTER COMPOUND ASSAULT INITIATED.

(4) NATIONAL IRANIAN TV/AM RADIO ANTENNA. STRIKE TIME 10-12 MINUTES AFTER COMPOUND ASSAULT INITIATED

(B) MANZARIYEH AREA

(1) KUSHK-E NOSRAT ATC RADAR SHORTLY BEFORE ARRIVAL OF C141 AND HELICOPTERS.

(2) KUSH [illegible] MICROWAVE RELAY TOWERS SHORTLY BEFORE ATC RADAR.

2. PRINCIPAL AIR THREAT TO EMBASSY WILL COME FROM [redacted] AIR THREAT FROM OUTSIDE TEHRAN AREA WILL COME FROM [redacted]

3. PRINCIPAL AIR THREAT TO [illegible] WILL COME FROM [redacted] AIRCRAFT [redacted] BUT AIRCRAFT REMAIN A THREAT TO [redacted] IF THE LOCATION BECOMES PINPOINTED. BOTH F4 AND F14 CARRY 20MM CANNON. F-4 ALSO CARRIES SIDEWINDER AND SPARROW AAM.

REVW 21 APR 82

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON [illegible]
[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

MSG 046
DTG: 022235Z APR 80

FM: JTF RC/J-3 [redacted]
TO: JTF/J-3

~~TOP SECRET~~

(U) 1. HIGH LEVEL INTEREST HERE IN STATUS OF EC-130 AIRCRAFT (GENERATED BY ENGINE CHANGE) AND STATUS OF EIGHT HELOS ABOARD CV. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE UPDATE BY 22/0400Z IF POSSIBLE.

(U) 2. FROM CHANGE IN TANKER RQMTS FIRST NITE OPS, APPEARS SOME CHANGES IN FLOW/PROFILE HAVE BEEN MADE. REQUEST INFO ON ANY CHANGE, BE RELAYED TO THIS LOCATION TO UPDATE BRIEFING CHARTS.

(U) 3. REQUEST YOU CONFIRM THAT [redacted] HAS BEEN BRIEFED ON OPERATION OF PPN-18 BEACON, METHOD OF EMPLOYMENT, AND RESULTS TO EXPECT I.E. NO COMMO REQUIRED BETWEEN A-6 ACFT AND GROUND UNIT.

(U) 4. REF OUR 211642Z APRIL 80 MSG, SUBJ: DELIVERY OF HIGHLY SENSITIVE LETTERS. [redacted] (USA) WILL COURIER LETTERS VICE AIRCRAFT COMMANDER AS STATED IN REF MSG.
BT

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified On: OADR~~

Declassified by
Donald
12 Aug 92

NNNN

FOR THAT IS ALL

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]
FROM [illegible]
[illegible] ALPHA [illegible]
INFO [illegible]

i-#652

SUBJECT: OVERFLIGHT REACTION
REF: UR SSN [illegible] DTG 21[illegible]
[redacted] REACTION TO [illegible] OVERFLIGHTS.

(S) (1) EXAMINATION OF [illegible] TEAM ANALYSIS OF [redacted] OVER FLIGHT ROUTE INDICATES PROPOSED ROUTE IS BEST FEASIBLE [redacted] RADIO SILENCE IS STILL ESSENTIAL. RECOMMENDED [redacted] EGRESS FOR MC 130 IS ALONG LINE [redacted] THEN TURNING NORTH TO CIP.

C A,E

(C) (2) IF [redacted] WERE TO DETECT KC 135/MC 130 DURING REFUELING THEY WOULD (A) CHALLENGE, SCRAMBLE TO INVESTIGATE, IDENTIFY AND UPON RECOGNITION WOULD VOICE CHALLENGE THEUSAF AIRCRAFT AND DEPENDING THE US EXPLANATION AND DIRECTION FROM THE [redacted] FIGHTER CONTROLLER WOULD DIRECT THE AIRCRAFT TO A [redacted] AIR FIELD OR ESCORT THE AIRCRAFT OUT OF [redacted] AIRSPACE.

C A,E

(C) (3) IF [redacted] SUSPICIONS COULD B[redacted] IT IS AT LEAST POSSIBLE THAT THE [redacted] MAY ALLOW THE ACFT TO PASS.

C A,E

(C) (4) [redacted] ACFT WOULD BE CONSIDERABLY MORE LIKELY TO ATTEMPT A FORCE DOWN OR TO ENGAGE AN ACFT WHICH COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED.

BY

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Declassified ON: OADR

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 220136Z
MAY 055

MSG 241
DTG 212300Z APR 92
FM: JCS-RC
TO: ALPHA (RELAY TO USS NIMITZ)

[redacted]

FOR CDR [redacted]
FM: LTC [redacted]

Relayed Nimitz MSG #049 AT 220202Z

REQUEST FOLLOWING

- UHF FREQUENCY FOR KC-135 TANKERS TO CONTACT USS NIMITZ ON NIGHT 1 AND 2.

- STATUS OF HELO WSC-3 AND FLIGHT TEST.

- HOW DO YOU CALL [redacted] FROM USS NIMITZ.

BT

#653

NNNN

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Declassified On: OADR

Downgraded by JS DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 2340
VC

054 ✓

Relayed us
050
22/03136

MSG036
DTG 212220Z APR 68

FM JTF/RC
TO CDR JTF
SITE ALPHA (RELAY TO [redacted]

~~T O P S E C R E T~~

SUBJECT: UPDATE REPORT

(U) 1. SITE ACTIVATION. CJCS WILL ACCOMPLISH BY PHONCON TO CINOS EITHER LATE 21 APR OUR TIME OR EARLY 22 APR OUR TIME. WILL ADVISE.

(U) 2. CJCS CONCERNED ABOUT YOUR DOWN BLADDER BIRD. PLANNING HERE IN PROGRESS TO GET YOU ANOTHER AIRCRAFT BUT DOUBTFUL. ADVISE US IF YOU THINK YOU CAN GET THREE OPERATIONAL.

(U) 3. SENSITIVE LETTER. WILL CONTACT [redacted] TO HAVE MIN REPORT TO [redacted] 0800Z 23 APR TO PICK UP A LETTER AT YOUR LOCATION.

(U) 4. JTF CMDR NOT AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE ANY SENSITIVE LETTER TO ANY ONE UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY FURTHER COMMUNICATION.

[redacted] TO COORDINATE CONTACT WITH [redacted]

[redacted] SENSITIVE LETTER [redacted] GEN GAST TO DELIVER [redacted] FOR [redacted] OR COL KYLE TO DELI[redacted] BUT NOT PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE [redacted] DELIVERY.

(U) 7. SENSITIVE LETTER (DELIVERY). LETTERS TO BE PLACED IN U.S. MILITARY HANDS FOR DELIVERY TO U.S. AMBASSADORS TWO HOURS PRIOR TO [redacted] WALL TIME. NOTIFICATION OF DELIVERY TO THE RESPECTIVE U.S. AMBASSADORS DONE ONLY ON THE DIRECTION OF CJCS. CJCS WILL AUTHORIZE DELIVERY OF LETTERS AFTER SECURING [redacted] APPROVAL AND KNOWLEDGE THAT WALL HAS BEEN CROSSED.

(U) 8. REPEAT: JTF CMDR NOT AUTHORIZED TO RELEASE ANY SENSITIVE LETTER TO ANY ONE UNTIL AUTHORIZED BY FURTHER COMMUNICATIONS.

(U) 9. FOR GEN GAST: HAVE RECIVED ASSURANCE NAVY AWARE OF [redacted] WITH GROUND FORCE.

~~REVW 21 APR 1[illegible]~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

i-654

SECRET

FM: HELO DET/S-2()
SJ 151/J-2
SUBJ: INTREP 02

[redacted]

KRIVA

I FFG 693 HAS DEPARTED CTF 70 MODLOC. KRIVAK LAST LOCATED VIC 21 50N 062 10E ON COURSE 190 AT 10 KTS AT 1313002. [redacted] AGI 477 REMDINS IN SURVEILLANCE OF AMPHIB READY GROUP [redacted] THIS ACTIVITY MAY BE RELATED TO MOVEMENT OF IVAN ROGOV TASK GROUP. [redacted]

3. NO SOVIET MILITARY AIR ACTIVITY TODAY. USS BRUMBY WAS RECONNOITERED BY IRANIAN C-130 VIC 25. IN 057 46E AT 0650Z. [redacted]

ING 0800 HOURSV

4. NIMITZ IS ENDEAVORING TO GET POSITIVE PLOT MN KRIVAK 693. MEANWHILE, BELIEVE JTF SHOULD BE AWARE THAT HEADNET RADAR [redacted] IS A POSSIBLE THREAT TO FLIGHT OPS VI [redacted] IF 693 IS IN THAT AREA.

5. WOULD APPRECIATE WX EARLY AM 22 APR 80.

FATHER BOB

BT

NINT QSLGMM ANN D NEED ZDK OF YOUR LAST K

BBUDSFJSA

2830/?$

.11

XHPIMKD

B YRNTHCQURDPCLL

Classified By: JES
Declassified ON: OADR

TOR 2110 MCN 50
-5B
NO TAPE

DTG 2120107

#658

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

047

MESSAGE 01 RECEIVED.

JRGHP

NO EOM.

TOR 1805 Nimitz VC

659

~~SECRET~~

FM NIMITZ/COL [redacted]
TO JTF/J3

~~FOR [redacted]~~
REF JTF/J3 201855Z APR 80

SUBJECT - FLEET TACAIR SUPPORT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

(U) 1. ~~(TS)~~ REF REQUESTED TX-70 KC-135 SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

2. ~~(TS)~~ CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - DAY 1: WHEN CALLED FOR BY CJTF RICEBOWL, TF-70 CAN PROVIDE [redacted] (WORST CASE) ARRIVING AT 1 PLUS 50 FOR 2 PLUS 45 (NEW FLIGHT AT :15; 2 ROCKEYE, 2 AIM-9, 1000 RDS 20MM PER AIRCRAFT) USING ONLY FLEET REFUELING ASSETS AND 35589,8,& 1 SET OF EXTERNAL TANKS FROM A 5 MIN COCKPIT ALERT ~~POSTURE~~. SUBSEQUENT COVERAGE MUST BE SUPPORTED BY KC-135'S. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING DISPOSITION OF KC-135'S IF ONLY 5 KC-135 ARTS AVAILABLE:

INSERT WORD "JETTISONING"

[redacted] - 2 ARTS, 2 ALFA (STRIP ALERT/ARTS BASKET

[redacted] - 3 ARTS/6 ALPHA (5/3 ARTS) STRIP ALERT/ARTS BASKET

UPON COMPROMISE OF RICE BOWL MISSION IN DAYLIGHT HOURS, CJTF WILL IMMEDIATELY LAUNCH A BASKET EQUIPPED ARTS, AND COMPANION ALPHA TANKER FOR BUDDY REFUEL, FROM [redacted] DIRECT TO 24-40N, 58-00E. (ETE AT 480KTS - 2.8 HRS) TO MAXIMIZE AVAILABLE OFF LOAD TANKER SHOULD PLAN TO RECOVER WITH MINIMUM FUEL AT [redacted] FOLLOW-ON TANKERS WILL LAUNCH AS NEEDED AT APPROPRIATE INTERVALS. TF-70 CAN THEN MAINTAIN AIR ASSETS TO COVER EMERGENCY [redacted] AS REQUIRED. TANKERS SHOULD ALSO BE PREPARED FOR

VICINITY [redacted]
TANKER SUPPORT COULD BE PROVIDED NOTIONALLY LAUNCHED
ING KC-135'S FROM [redacted] AT INTERVALS DURING DAYLIGHT AVAIL
NERABILITY PERIODS THUS MAINTAINING THE TRAINING SIGNATURE PRESENTLY
ESTABLISHED.
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS - DAY TWO: TF-70 WILL PROVIDE [redacted]
AIRCRAFT TO CAP PLANNED EXFILTRATION ROUTE FROM AN
ANCHOR POINT IN VICINITY OF 29-00N, 50-00E. KC-135 TANKERS WILL
LAUNCH NOTIONALLY (INTERVAL DEPENDS ON ARTS/ALPHA MIX) FROM
[redacted] TO ARRIVE OVER TF-70 AT PLANNED ASSAULT TIME. IF
ARTS AVAILABLE, 3 HOURS INTO MISSION BUDDY REFUELING WILL GIVE EACH
ARTS 3.5 HOURS OF ORBIT PLUS 50,000 LBS AN HR OFFLOAD
CAPABILITY. (FOUR F-14'S REQUIRE 40,000 LBS FOR 3 HOURS LOITER).
AS KC-135(S) ARRIVE VICINITY OF NIMITZ F-14S WILL LAUNCH, JOIN
AND ESCORT THEM TO ABOVE MENTIONED ORBIT POINT. TANKER ON-STATION
CAPABILITY CAN BE INCREASED BY [redacted] OR [redacted] RECOVERY.
3. RECOMMEND FOLLOWING COMMON REFERENCE POINTS BE USED BY
CAP AIRCRAFT/GROUND FORCES TO FACILITATE LINK UP:
E CAP ALFA (REFUEL AREA) [redacted]
E CARUBRAVO (HELO HIDE)
E CAP CHARLIE [redacted]
E CAP DELTA (EMBASSY)
E CAP ECHO [redacted]
E CAP FOXTROT
E CAP GOLF
E CAP HOTEL
GROUND FORCES/AIR FORCES MUST HAVE UHF RADIO CONTACT ON 341.4 MHZ
(PRIMARY) 240.5 MHZ (SECONDARY) BEFORE AIR FORCES CLEAR COMMIT.
GROUND FORCES SHOULD HAVE SMOKE OR SIMILAR MARKING DEVICE.
CALL SIGNS WILL BE COORDINATED PRIOR TO MISSION EXECUTION.
4. SUMMARY: IF RADIUS OF ACTION IS SUBSTANTIAL TF-70 AIR SUPPORT FOR
GROUND FORCES IS LIMITED WITHOUT KC-135 AIR REFUELING SUPPORT.
MINIMUM FUEL RECOVERIES INTO [redacted] ENHANCE O
OFFLOAD POTENTIAL. WE HAVE ESTABLISHED AN AIR REFUEL PRACTICE
SIGNATURE WHICH MUST BE CONTINUED (1 MISSION A DAY)
AND CAN BE USED AS COVER TO DISCREETLY PREPOSITION
ALTITUDE DURING PERIODS OF VULNERABILITY. NECESSARY
ASSETS (A-6'S, KA56'S) REMAIN DEDICATED THROUGHOUT
TF-70 TACAIR PILOTS ARE NOW QUALIFIED IN KC-135 REFUELING NEED
PLANNED
NNED WITHDRAWAL ALTITUDES OF SVTRACTION C-141-S/AC KC-135S FROM
TARGET COUNTRY ON NIGHT TWO. WHILE DAY ONE IS A CONTINGENCY CONCEPT, DAY
TWO F-14 CAP U CONSIDERED A PRUDENT ENHANCEMENT FOR MISSION
SUCCESS.
VERY RESPECTFULLY, [redacted]

Classified By: DDONMCC 12Aug92
Declassified On: OADR

Downgraded to CONF= by DDONMCC 12Aug92

CONFIDENTIAL

i-659

NO FOM

~~SECRET~~

1754

MSG 107
DTG 211[illegible]
FM: JCC/RC-J-2
TO: SITE ALPHA
SFCC/S2
1-SOW/S2

[redacted]

MCN
046

SUBJ: SATRAN EXTENSION (U)

1. (S) THE FOLLOWING IS THE ANTICIPATED RECONNAISSANCE SURVEILLANCE COVERAGE DURING THE PERIOD 2[illegible]/[illegible]01 TO 24[illegible]/24[illegible]: [redacted]

660

C, E

Classified By: OADR
Declassified ON:

NNNN

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW ED 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 9[illegible]
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMCC
[illegible] DOWNGRADED TO Secret
REVIEW ON OADR
DIA

~~SECRET~~

MSG #25
DTG 211245Z APR 80
FM: JTF RC/[redacted]
TO: [redacted]
INFO: ALPHA/[redacted]

[redacted] ~~S E C R E T~~

SUBJ: RESUPPLY OF EXERCISE PLAYERS

1. YOUR ELEMENTS REQUEST THE FOLLOWING ITEMS TO BE FORWARDED BY MOST EXPEDITIOUS MEANS:

A. 1942 50TW SWITCH 2EA
B. ZC 5898 NSN 6145-00-635-1536
COMMO CORD — 500FT ROLL
C. PN U54AU NSN 5935-00-553-9352
CONNECTOR — TEN EACH
D. PN HG 905004
ALTIMETER — ONE EACH
E. PN MS 3106A-145-5P
IP CONNECTORS — TEN EACH
F. PN MS 3057-06
CONNECTOR — TEN EACH
G. 15 FOOT INTERCOM CORD ASSY
FOR INSTR POSITION
H. PN MS 25328-A1
4 PDT RELAY/56-PE — TWO EACH
I. IMS PROGRAMMER (PSP) — ONE EACH
J. POP RIVIT SET — ONE EACH
K. NSN 6665-00-533-7511
INDICATOR — THREE EACH
L. 5965-00-353-8518
HF COUPLER — TWENTY FIVE EACH
M. 5821-00-[illegible]-2[illegible] — ONE EACH
HF RT UNIT
N. METHOL ETHYL KETONE — TWENTY GALLONS
O. 5841-00-007-7046 — ONE EACH
DOPPLER FREQ TRACKER
P. YELLOW BOX ENGINE ANALYZER
Q. TUBING, ASSORTED 3/8 OR 1/8 INCH
R. 8 NUTS AND SLEEVES FOR TUBING
S. HACK SAW FRAME AND BLADES
T. #40 DRILL BITS — TWO EACH
U. TUBE FLARE/CUTTER — ONE EACH
V. HYDRAULIC PACKING
STS PK 300-02 — FIFETEEN EACH
STS PK 300-06 — FIFETEEN EACH
LS4634-8 — FIFETEEN EACH
LS4634-10 — FIFETEEN EACH
LS4634-12 — FIFETEEN EACH
W. SHEET METAL PATCH FLAP
X. ATM SOLENOID
1650-00-723-6722 — ONE EACH
1650-00-7[illegible]-6722 — ONE EACH
Y. C-1[illegible] ENGINE OIL DIP STICK
Z. CABLE 3/32 AND 3/16 10 FOOT CABLE
FITTINGS FOR SWAGE FOR EACH SIZE
AA. RG 58U COAX CABLE ELEC — HUNDRED FOOT
AB. OYLTITE 20R3 (FUEL) — ONE BOX
AC. WIRE TOOTH BRUSHES FOR FUEL — ONE BOX
AD. ACID BRUSHES FOR FUEL — ONE BOX
AE. BRICK BATTERY CHARGER — ONE EACH
AF. BRICK BATTERY — TWO EACH

2. PLEASE ADVISE ON YOUR CAPABILITY TO MEET AND SHIP THIS REQUIREMENT. ITEM H IS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE.
[illegible]

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR
Declassified by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 82

INT RWL PLS [illegible]

MSG[illegible] AND WSL 1715Z

MSG030
DTG 211600Z APR 80

FM: JTF RC//[redacted]
TO: ALPHA//[redacted]

[redacted]

SUBJECT: LOG UPDATE

(U) 1. CRITICAL RADAR PARTS WILL DEPART 1ST SQW LOCATION 221300Z TO ARRIVE 231400Z.

(U) 2. C130 ENGINE REPAIR PARTS & GROUND EQUIPMENT WILL LAND YOUR LOCATION 1800Z TODAY.

(U) 3. FULTON RIG FENDING LINES WILL ARRIVE FROM EUCOM TODAY AT 1800Z.

(U) 4. 1ST SQW TASKED TO PROVIDE ITEMS REQUESTED IN MSG. DTG 211245Z APR 80 SUBJ RESUPPLY OF EXERCISE PLAYERS. PARTS SHOULD DEPART EGLIN NLT 221300Z ARRIVING 231400Z.

(U) 5. REQUEST STATUS OF MA-3 AIR CONDITIONERS.

(U) 6. IF RADAR PARTS ARE FOR FORWARD DEPLOYED ACFT, RECOMMEND YOU CANNABALIZE FROM YOUR LOCATION (COMMENT FROM J-3).

(U) 7. PLEASE FORWARD ANY UNRESOLVED LOG ACTIONS WITH DESIRED PRIORITIES.

~~REVW 21 APR 10~~

Declassified by SDDONMCC 12 Aug 92

#662

#664

[redacted] G

2 cy TO Col
TOK / 1522Z
RC

G TO SMSGT [redacted]
FM MR [redacted]
BT
SECRET

SUBJ: PRE-PRODUCTION PARKHILL FAILURE.

AT 1519Z ON THE 19TH OF APRIL WE HAD A FAILURE OF A PRE-PRODUCTION PARKHILL SERIAL NUMBER 00037. THE SYMPTOMS OF THE PARKHILL FAILURE WERE GOOD PREAMBLE IN THE HANDSET PLAIN TEXT VOICE ON THE AIR AND A GOOD POSTAMBLE IN THE HANDSET. THE PROBLEM WAS NOTICED IMMEDIATLY BECAUSE WE WERE MONITORING THE TRANSMIT FREQUENCY. CONSEQUENTLY THERE WAS NO, REPEAT NO COMPROMISE OF CLASSIFIED INORMATION. THE PARKHILL WAS TURNED OFF AND AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO REKEY THE PARKHILL. THE PARKHILL WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE FILL AND CONSTANTLY ALARMED. IT WILL NOT DUPLICATE THE ORIGINAL SYMPTOMS. THIS MSG IS TRANSMITTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY. IF YOU HAVE ANY SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR COMMENTS PLEASE LET ME KNOW.

THANKS. [redacted]

G THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITTED WITH APPROVAL OF MR [redacted] THIS STATION.

Classified By JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

NNNN P00000000000000000000000000000000

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MCN
Ø38
i #666

MESSAGE Ø1 RECEIVED.

E P 211117Z APR 8Ø
FM [redacted]
TO JCS/SOD (LTG GAST)
BT
~~T O P S E C R E T~~
E SUBJ [redacted] SITREP #4
REF SITREP #3 DTG 210850Z APR 8Ø
1. REF DISCUSSED 24 APR VIP VISIT TO [redacted] WITH [redacted] OPERATIONS OFFICER HE ASSURED US THAT IT IS [redacted] DESIRE NOT TO ALLOW NEWSMEN TO ACCOMPANY VIPS. EXPECT THE VISIT TO BE ROUTINE AND UNEVENTFUL.

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MESSAGE Ø2 RECEIVED.

Classified By: DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR 12 Aug

Downgraded by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMO
TO DIRECTOR

FROM: [illegible]
TO [illegible] ✓

[redacted]

E [redacted] SUBJECT: [illegible] VISIT TO [redacted]

E WE HAVE ARRANGED FOR VISIT TO [illegible] CANCELLED.

~~[illegible]~~

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i #667

Classified by DDO NMC 12 Aug 92
Declassify on: OADR
Downgraded to [illegible] by DDO NMC 12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE 01 RECEIVED.

O 210925Z APR80
FM WALNUT
TO DUCKHUNTER
BT
[redacted] SECRET
SUBJ: AIRCRAFT PARTS REQUIREMENTS.
1. ACFT 62-1843 REQUIRES

A. PUMP ASSY, FUEL P/N 6827283 T.O. 2J-T56-44
FIG. 4 INDEX-1 1 EACH
B. PACKING, PREFORMED P/N M59021-213 T.O. 2J-T56-44
FIG. 4 INDEX-33 4 EACH
C. PACKING, PERFORMED P/N MS 9020-04 T.O. 2J-T56-44
FIG. 4 INDEX-25 2EACH
D. PACKING, PREFORMED P/N MS 9020-10 T.O. 2J-T56-44
FIG. 4 INDEX 29 2 EACH

2. ACFT 63-7785 REQUIRES

A. VALVE, ANTI-ICING P/N 26130010 T.O. 1C-130(H)H-10
FIG. 4-7 INDEX 22 1 EACH
B. GASKET P/N 750244-4 T.O. 1C-130(H)H-10
FIG. 4-7 INDEX 23 2 EACH
BT

NNNN

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: OADR
Declassified by DNMC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 210518Z

#670

P 210850Z APR 80
FM [redacted]
TO JTF [redacted]
JCS/SOD (LTG GAST)
BT
~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJ: [redacted] SITREP #3

1. BE ADVISED THAT [redacted] AIRFIELD WILL BE VISITED BY A PARTY OF [redacted] AND [redacted] DIGNITARIES ON THURSDAT 24 APRIL BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 0800-1000 LOCAL. THE GROUP WILL BE HEADED BY [redacted] FOR [redacted] AND [redacted] AND [redacted]. WE ARE ALSO INFORMED THAT [redacted]. WILL ACCOMPANY THE GROUP AS WELL AS SEVERAL [redacted] NEWS REPORTERS.

2. WE WERE QUUERIED LAST EVENING BY JTF CONCERNING THE SUITABILITY OF [redacted] AIRFIELD FOR C-141 OPERATIONS. APPARENTLY MAC IS RELUCTANT TO USE THE FIELD WITHOUT FIRST CONDUCTING AN OFFICIALMAC SURVEY. SUCH A SURVEY DOES NOT APPEAR NECESSARY AT THIS TIME NOR WOULD IT BE POLITICALLY PRUDENT SINCE IT WOULD TEND TO OVERLOAD THE SYSTEM WITH ANOTHER SHORT NOTICE DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE REQUEST. BASED ON OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACILIY AND THE JUDGEMENT OF FORMER C-141 CREWMEMBERS WHO ARE WITH THE MC-130 DETACHMENT, THERE WILL BE NOPROBLEM IN USING THE MAIN RUNWAY FOR TAKEOFF AND LANDING AND THE [redacted]. FOR FURTHER DETAILS ON [redacted] AIRFIELD, OPERATORS SHOULD REFER TO THE [redacted] TECHNICAL FACILITIES REPORT, FEBRUARY 1980. REFERENCE IN REPORT T[redacted] BEING C-130 CAPABLE WAS BASED ON CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS, LANDING AND TAKEOFFS, OF C-130 AIRCRAFT.

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Classified By: DDO NMCC
Declassified ON: OADR

Downgraded to CONF
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

211535Z APR 92
FM: JTF RESPONSE CELL
TO: JTF CNDR SITE "A" ✓
BT

[redacted] SECRET

E [redacted] LTG GAST ARRIVING BY KC-135, ETA YOUR LOCATION 211535Z. REQUEST YOU CONSIDER HIS PLANNED DEPARTURE FOR [redacted] ON A LATER AIRCRAFT.
BT

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

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MESSAGE 02 RECEIVED.

Classified by DDONMC 12 Aug 92
Downgraded to CONF by DDONMC 12 Aug 92

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MSG 1.
DTG 2[illegible] APR [illegible]
FROM JTF RESPONSE CELL/[redacted]
TO ALPHA//CCL[redacted]

[redacted]

REF: YOUR MSG DTG 2[illegible]Z APR 80 (LTC MICHAELS)

1. SLEEPING EQUIPMENT & CANTEENS WILL ACCOMPANY MC 130 FROM [redacted] THAT DEPART 21[illegible]Z.

2. FENDING LINES ARE NOT AVAILABLE AT [redacted] 1ST SOW INDICATES LINES ACCOMPANIED BASIC RIG. USAFE HAS BEEN TASKED TO PROVIDE TWO SETS FOR CARGO ON MC130 THAT DEPARTS R-M TOMMORROW 0700Z . IS THIS SUFFICIENT?

3. MA-3 AIR CONDITIONERS ARE NOT AT RAMSTEIN. IF AC UNITS ARE NOT YET AT YOUR LOCATION WE WILL GO BACK & TRACE FROM ORIGINAL SOURCE. PLS ADVISE.
BT

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MESSAGE 07 RECEIVED.

+7478

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR
Declassified by DDO NMC 12 Aug 92

#674

202009Z

i-#678

MSG 17
DTG 201935 Z APR 80
FROM JTF RICE BOWL (REAF)/[redacted]
TO ALPHA/[redacted]

[redacted]

REF YOUR MSG 201620Z APR 80

1. REF INDICATED NO MA-3 AIR CONDITIONERS HAVE ARRIVED. [redacted] INDICATED THAT THREE HAVE ARRIVED. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT A TOTAL OF FIVE ARE REQUIRED.

2. PLS INFORM US:
HOW MANY HAVE ARRIVED?
ARE THEY NEW?
HOW MANY MORE DO YOU REQUIRE?

3. BE INFORMED RAMSTIEN HAS 14 PALLETS BACKLOGGED. WE ARE WORKING TO EXPEDITE SHIPMENT.

BT

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MESSAGE 04 RECEIVED.

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified On: OADR~~

Declassified by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR/20[illegible]

#679

RETRANS/202005Z

BDW/JCS

U
CBMBIAMDPEBHDE.FOXFIRE UMCYOU HAV

SAW YURCU43U.2?
NO TXPING 4.
&679-/$

-- WILL SEJATWS
ZFEOCRQN YU ESSAGE S H
CI ROEFIVER;3MHGTEN IS EE
HE VOICE ..

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

PRIORITY

FM: JTF NIMITZ (PITMAN)

TO: JTF [redacted] (VAUGHT)

JCS (SOD) [redacted]

SUBJ: HELO DET. STATUS (TS)

(U) 1. ~~(TS)~~ TONIGHT'S PERSONAL RECON INDICATES HELO LAUNCH COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED AS EARLY AS 1500Z (1900 LCL) BASED ON ACTUAL LEVEL OF DARKNESS. ACTUAL COAST IN WILL OCCUR ABOUT 25 MIN AFTER LAUNCH. THIS WILL PERMIT A SLIGHTLY EARLIER ARRIVAL AT REFUEL POINT.

2. ~~(TS)~~ NON-RFI PINS, SERNOS: 007 AND 011 RETURNED TO [redacted] ODAY VIA MAC C-121. DOCUMENT INDICATED MARCH AFB AS FINAL DESTINATION.

BT

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

Classified by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92
Downgraded to CONF by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MESSAGE 01 SELECTED.

TOR 1616Z
KOL

MCN
024

O 201600Z APR 80
FM WALNUT
G TO DUCKHUNTER [redacted]
BT

[redacted] S
SUBJ: AIRCRAFT PARTS/MISSION STATUS
1. WE REQUIRE THE FOLLOWING PARTS FOR OUR AIRCRAFT.
IGNITION RELAY PN6782647 T/O 2J-T56-44 FIG 5 IND 14

NAVIGATION COMPUTER UNIT P/N 782320-1 T/O 1C-130(Y)-4 2 EA
FIG 50 IND 17

1 CY TO M
VAU

MEMORY MODUCE UNIT P/N 782320-1 T.O. 1C-130(Y)-4 2EA
FIG. 50 IND. 22

1 CY TO C

G →

RT /APN153 DOPPLER RCVR/TYMR 2 EA
F . 50 IND. 9

i - #680

2. FLEW ONE SEA SURVELANCE MISSION
BT

NNNN

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

Declassified by
DDO NMCC
12 Aug 79

CONFIDENTIAL

MESSAGE IS RECEIVED.

MSC 14
DTG 2[illegible]Z APR [illegible]
FROM DEPCOM JTF WASH [illegible]
TO COMJTF, [redacted]

[redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted] COMPROMISE

HAVE JUST TALKED TO CGN [redacted] HE WILL DO WHAT HE CAN. ACTION WILL BE TAKEN MON MORNING, YOUR TIME.
BT

MCN
~~023~~

#681

~~Classified By:~~ JCS
~~Declassified ON:~~ OADR

NNNN

Classified by: [illegible] NMCC 12 Aug 92
Declassify on OADR
Amended to conf by DDON MCC 12 Aug 92

CONFIDENTIAL

MSC 1[illegible]
DTG 2[illegible]Z APR [illegible]
FROM JCS/RC-J2
TO SITE ALPHA/J2

[redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted] REQUEST

(1) WILL HAVE SAC PENETRATION ANALYSIS TEAM IN BLDG TOMORROW (21 APRIL [illegible])

(2) REQUEST YOU PROVIDE SPECIFIC MAC QUESTIONS VIA MESSAGE TO REDUCE CHANCE OF MISINTERPRETATION.

(3) WILL PROVIDE RESULTS AS OBTAINED.
BT

NNNN

15482

MCN 022

#682

Classified By: JCS
Declassified On: ADR
Declassified by DDO NMCC 12 Aug

~~SECRET~~

TOR/1510Z
RC/20
#684

MSG 11
DTG 201445Z APR 80
FROM JCS/RC-J2
TO SITE ALPHA/J2

~~TOP SECRET~~
SUBJECT: QUERY RESPONSE
REF: (A) UR DTG 201445Z APR 80
SUBJ: HOSTAGE UPDATE

(B) JCS/RC-J2/DTG 201330Z APR 80
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR INFO

(1) [redacted]

(2) REF B CAUTIONS AGAINST ASSUMING ALL HOSTAGES ARE BEING HELD IN CHANCERY.
BT

NNNN

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 Aug 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMC
Secret

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

DUCKHUNTER DE FOXFIRE 02 TWO IMMEDIATE MESSAGES

TCR 1200Z
KCL 12

VV
O 221015Z APR 80
FM JTF NIMITZ (PITMAN)
TO JTF [redacted] VAUGHT)
BT
[redacted] S E C R E T//COMINT NO NOT PASS BY INTEL BROADCAST
SUBJ: ARRIVAL REPORT (TS)
1. (TS) PARTY OF SIXTY THREE ARRIVED [redacted] 220600Z AND NIMITZ 2039152.
2. (TS) AT [redacted] ONE OF THE DUTY WORKING PARTY PROVIDING SUPPORT DURING C-141 LAYOVER WAS MEMBER OF HM-16 AND RECOGNIZED HM-16 MEMBERS IN OUR PARTY. [redacted]. THE HM-16 SAILOR INVOLVED, WAS THEN TAKEN TO NIMITZ WITH THIS PARTY. OSTENSIBLY, HE WAS TO ESCORT SPECIAL EVENING FLIGHT CARGO TO HIS SHIP. HE WAS OBVIOUSLY AWARE THAT SOMETHING WAS HAPPENING BECAUSE HE WOKE HIS OINC, [redacted] FROM HM-16 TO TELL HIM WHO HE'D SEEN. LT [redacted] HAS BEEN CAUTIONED, AND TOLD THAT [redacted] WOULD BE ESCORTING HIGH PRIORITY CARGO TO THE NIMITZ. NO UNUSUAL REACTION EXPECTED WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR.
(U) 3. (TS) REQUEST LATEST DATA ON EC-130 FUEL OFF LOAD CAPABILITY USING 6000 GALLON SYSTEM. LAST REPORT INDICATED 900 GALLONS UNUSEABLE.
(U) 4. (TS) CURRENT HELO STATUS SEVEN OUT OF EIGHT MISSION CAPABLE (HM-16 REPORT).
(U) 5. (TS) REQUEST PROVIDE DAILY SURFACE TO 2000 FT WINDS FORECAST FOR TRACK, TEMPERATURE AND DENSITY ALTITUDE PREDICTIONS ON THE SURFACE AT LAND AND TAKE-OFF TIMES FOR SHIP, DESERT TRACK, HIDE AND CITY.
(U) 6. (TS) REQUEST HELO LOADS BY AIRCRAFT 1 THROUGH 6. NUMBER OF PAX, THEIR WEIGHT (WITH GEAR), CARGO WT AND ITS DESCRIPTION.
(U) 7. CINCPAC LNO HAD DISCUSSIONS WITH TANKER TASK FORCE COMMANDER RE: OPTIONS FOR FIGHTER SUPPORT REFUELING. 20 FLEET AIRCRAFT (F-14, RA-6S) COMPLETED LAST NIGHT. EXPECT AS MANY MORE TONIGHT. ALL TRAINING DONE RADIO SILENCE ON SECURE VOICE.
BT

Classified by: [redacted]
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted]

TOR
VC

P 200300Z APR 90
FM WALNUT
TO DUCKHUNTER/MAJ G
BT
[redacted] ~~SECRET~~
SUBJ: SITREP NUMBER 1
COMMUNICATION CENTER IS OPERATING ON COMMERICAL POWER WITH GENERATORS AS BACK UP.
EQUIPMENT STATUS
2 GENERATOR GREEN
1 GENERATOR AMBER. WE HOPE TO HAVE IT REPAIRED TODAY. TWO OF THEM HAD WATER AND SAND IN FUEL BOWL.
1 TT-76 AMBER. KEY BOARD NEEDS REPLACING.
1 UGC-129 GREEN
1 WSC-3 GREEN
1 KW-7 GREEN
2 TH-22'S GREEN
ALL OTHER ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT IN GOOD WORKING ORDER.

EQUIPMENT NEEDED.
1. TT-76 KEYBOARD
1 THREE MAN TENT WITH POLES AND METAL STAKES
C-RATIONS FOR THREE MEN TO LAST AT LEAST 12 DAYS.
MISCELLANIOUS ITEMS NEEDED.
SOFT DRINKS, ICE IF POSSIBLE, COLEMAN STOVE OR HOT PLATEAND
SOME JUNK FOOD.
MORAL IS GOOD THIS FAR. THANKS FOR ANY HELP YOU CAN GIVE US "T"

NNNN

i-#692

Classified By JCS
Declassified On QADR
Declassified by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 16402

i #696

DTG 1[illegible] APR 82
FM: JTF /J2
TO: [redacted]

A3

~~[illegible]~~

SUBJ: MFA HOSTAGES

1. ON 16 APRIL 1980 DOS/IWG RECEIVED TELECON FROM LAINGEN, HOWLAND, TOM SETH. THE FOLLOWING IS QUOTE FROM DOS MEMO: THE TRIO HAS BEEN MOVED TO A NEW ROOM WITHIN THE PROTOCOL SUITE OF OFFICES. BRUCE DESCRIBED IT AS THE DINING ROOM. HE SAID THEY ARE NOW ALLOWED ONE HOUR A DAY IN THE OUTSIDE GARDEN UNDER SUPERVISION OF A GUARD. UNQUOTE

2. DURING CONVERSATION LAINGEN GAVE THEIR NEW TELEPHONE NUMBER AS 321-246 REPEAT 321-246.

3. JTF EXPLORING ALL MEANS TO DETERMINE EXTACT LOCATION WITH MFA FLDG.

REVW 15 APR 10

Classified by: DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92
Declassify on: OADR

NNNNX

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

V

AND MATE I QSL AT 1632 1632

GOIO AHEAD WITH UR TRAFFIC KKKKK

TOR / 1635
32

DTG 190001Z APR 80

FM JTF
TO USS NIMITZ

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: INOPERATIVE PINS

1. [redacted] REQUEST INOPERATIVE PINS SERNOS 011 AND 007 BE BROUGHT TO [redacted] COD/VOD FLT FOR RETROGRADE VIA A/C BRINGING COL PITMAN AND PAX ON 20 APR.

2. [redacted] REQUEST THAT NON OPERATIONAL PINS BE ADDRESSED:

TO: MARCH AFB, CALIF.
MARKED [redacted], BRAVO, TWO
ATTN [redacted] 15TH AF/DOTO.
TEL [redacted]

~~REVW 19 APR 10~~

#697

Classified by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92
Declassify on Downgraded to by DDO NMCC 12 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

I-698
"2"

[illegible] U.S. [illegible] FOR [illegible] AGAINST IRAN. SOME OFFICIALS, HOWEVER, HAVE EXPRESSED DISPLEASURE THAT THE U.S. HAS PRESENTED THEM A FAIT ACCOMPLI WITHOUT REGARD TO ITS ALLIES NATIONAL INTERESTS NOR PRIOR CONSULTATION. [redacted]

8. WHILE THE AMBASSADORS OF COUNTRIES ALLIED WITH THE U.S. ARE RETURNING HOME FOR CONSULTATIONS ON THE HOSTAGE CRISIS, SEVERAL NATIONS ARE SEEKING TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH TEHRAN. [redacted]

7. RELATIONS BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ REMAIN TENSE. [redacted]

10. WEATHER ANALYSIS FOR MIDDLE EAST - 17 APRIL 1980

[redacted]

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 1002
KCL

MEMORY CLEAR.

i — # 701 [redacted]

MESSAGE 01 RECEIVED.

P 200905Z APR 80
FM WALNUT
TO DUCKHUNTER
INFO EUCOM
BT
[redacted] ~~S E C R E T~~
SUBJ: DREAM LIST
1. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS WOULD BE DESIRABLE AT THIS LOCATION TO IMPROVE MORALE.
2. STERNO FUEL 200 CANS
STERNO STOVES 100 EA
200' EXTENSION CORDS W/LIGHTS 12 EA
COLEMAN LANTERNS W/FUEL 12 EA/
COLEMAN STOVES W/FUEL 6 EA.
Q-TIPS
BASEBALL CAPS (VARIOUS SIZES FROM 7 TO 7 5/8)
AIR MATTRESSES 80 EA
MIRRORS 3 EA
DISHPANS 9 EA
LARGE POT 3 EA
BAR-B-QUE GRILL 3 EA & CINDER BLOCKS 12 EA
ICE MAKER
PLASTIC TRASH BAGS
SMALL COOKING POTS
GEOGRAPHIC COORDINATES FOR BOTH ENDS ACTIVE RUNWAY AND [redacted]
WHOISKEY (MEDICINAL) DRINKING
PILLOWS 70 EA
NAILS (ASSORTED) 10 LBS
KOOL AID
ALUMINUM FOIL
BREAD
FIELD REFRIGERATOR 3 EA
TOILET CHEMICALS
COFFEE 30 LBS
SUGAR 18 LBS
DRY CREAMER 5 LBS
CANNED HAM
PORTABLE SHOWERS

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

Classified by DDO nmdc
Declassify on: OADR
Upgraded to DDO nmdc by

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR | 1220
KCL

G

[illegible]
FROM: [illegible] [redacted]
TO: USS NIMITZ
[illegible] [redacted]

JTF DEPLOYMENT [illegible] (14 APR [illegible])

TOT | 1407
KCL
TO DMTZ

1. (U) TEX I INDEX

	ITEM NO
INDEX	1
CALL SIGNS	2
RADIO NETS, FREQUENCIES AND KEYLIST	3
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ONE COPY TAK
BY TSgT [redacted]

~~(C)~~ ~~(TS)~~ CALL SIGNS

A(S)
A,E

JCS (SOD)	TOOTHPICK
JTF MAIN [redacted]	DUCKHUNTER
JTF ALTERNATE [redacted]	SKYDIVER
[redacted] (FT BRAGG)	TRANSFER
[redacted]	WALNUT
C-141 [redacted]	MOON GLOW
MC-130 [redacted]	TIDE RIP
[redacted]	BROADWAY
MC-130 [redacted]	STARLIGHT
NIMITZ	FOXFIRE
HELO (ON BOARD NIMITZ)	BLACKBEARD
[redacted]	CROWS NEST

MCN 0008

E-707

(U)
~~(TS)~~ RADIO NETS, FREQUENCIES AND KEYLIST

(C)
~~(TS)~~ ATLANTIC OCEAN WSC-3 UHF TACSAT NET SECURE VOICE OR TTY. JCS IS NCS

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: JCS JTF MAIN, JTF ALTERNATE
(2) SATELITE CHANNEL: ATLANTIC OCEAN AFSAT 23 DEG [illegible]
(3) FREQUENCY: UPLINK XMIT 295.075 MHZ, DOWNLINK REC 261.475 MHZ (OFFSET 33.6 MHZ)
(4) KEYLIST: PARKHILL: USKA[redacted] ORESTES: USKA[redacted]
(5) THIS NET MAY ONLY BE USED IN SECURE MODE. EVEN INITIAL CONTACT WILL BE MADE IN SECURE MODE. PLAIN TRANSMISSIONS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED.

A

~~(C)~~ INDIAN OCEAN WSC-3 TACSAT NET, SECURE VOICE AND [illegible] JTF MAIN IS NCS

(1) OPERATING STATIONS: JTF MAIN, JTF ALTERNATE [illegible] NIMITZ.
(2) SATELLITE CHANNEL: INDIAN OCEAN AFSAT 75 DEG [illegible]
(3) FREQUENCIES: UPLINK XMIT 295.675, DOWNLINK [illegible] 262.075 MHZ (OFFSET 33.6 MHZ)
(4) KEYLIST: PARKHILL: USKAT[redacted] ORESTES: USKA[redacted]
(5) THIS NET MAY ONLY BE USED IN SECURE MODE. EVEN INITIAL CONTACT WILL BE MADE IN SECURE MODE. PLAIN TRANSMISSIONS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED.

A

12 aug

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

[illegible]

(U) [illegible]

PARKHILL	[illegible]
TTY	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]
[illegible]	[illegible]

~~(C)~~ E JTF MAIN [redacted]
AUTOSEVOCOM NEST
PARKHILL
TTY
KY-7

[redacted]

~~(C)~~ JTF ALTERNATE [redacted]
PARKHILL TTY

[redacted]

~~(C)~~ A, E [redacted]
AUTOSEVOCOM NEST
PARKHILL

[redacted]

~~(C)~~ S [redacted]
PARKHILL
TTY

[redacted]

~~(C)~~ A S [redacted]
PARKHILL
TTY

[redacted]

(U) G. YUMA (HELOS)

PARKHILL	899-2120
TTY	899-2130

NOTE: WHEN CALLING JTF MAIN AND ALTERNATE SAY ONLY "GO GREEN" WHEN PARTY ANSWERS AND IMMEDIATELY GO PARKHILL SECURE. JTF MAIN AND ALTERNATE WILL IDENTIFY THEMSELVES ONLY BY TELEPHONE NUMBER, NOT NAMES OR LOCATION. PLAIN CONVERSATIONS EVEN OF UNCLASSIFIED MATTERS WITH THESE TWO LOCATIONS ARE NOT AUTHORIZED. THESE RESTRICTIONS ALSO APPLY TO CALLS ORIGINATING AT JTF MAIN AND ALTERNATE.

BT

NNNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR / 1600
UC

TOT / 1654
RC

MESSAGE 01 SELECTED.

DTG 0315

DTG 031515 APR 80
FM JTF/CS
TO: USS NIMITZ/[redacted]
[redacted]
SUBJ: FORCE DEPLOY MENT RECALL
1. ~~(U)~~ REFERENCE: MSG 021500Z SUBJ: ARRIVAL ARRAGEMENT.

2. ~~(TS)~~ (U) THE ANNOUNCED DEPLOYMENT OF THE MARINE ELEMENT TO THE NIMITZ HAS BEEN DEFERRED INDEFINETLY.

3. ~~(TS)~~ (U) YOUR ADVANCE ELEMENT WAS DIRECTED BY A SEPERATE MESSAGE TO RETURN TO CONUS.
4. (U) REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.
BT
NNNN

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

717

Declassified by
DO NMCC
2 Aug 92

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOP SECRET [redacted]

DTG 311550Z MAR 80
FM: JTF /J-2/
TO: [redacted]
STATION ALPHA [redacted]

TOP SECRET

SUBJ: SITUATION IN IRAN AS OF 0530 EST, MARCH 31 1980

1. WHITE HOUSE PRESS SPOKESMAN JODY POWELL DENIED AGAIN LAST NIGHT THAT THE ADMINISTRATION HAS SENT A LETTER TO IRAN SUCH AS THE ONE ALLEGEDLY RECEIVED BY AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI FROM PRESIDENT CARTER. AT THE SAME TIME, POWELL SAID HE WOULD "NOT DISPUTE" A SWISS FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT THAT SWITZERLAND'S CHARGE IN TEHRAN PASSED A MESSAGE TO KHOMEINI AND PRESIDENT BANI-SADR FROM PRESIDENT CARTER EARLIER THIS WEEK.

2. TEHRAN RADIO'S DOMESTIC SERVICE THIS MORNING REPORTS, ACCORDING TO FBIS, THAT "JODY POWELL HAS CONFIRMED THAT CARTER SENT A MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT OF IRAN". THE BROADCAST SAID THE MESSAGE, RECEIVED LAST WEEK, WAS MEANT "TO RESOLVE THE CRISIS BETWEEN AMERICA AND IRAN AND EXPEDITE THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES." POWELL IS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT REVEALING THE DETAILS OF THE MESSAGE "MIGHT ENDANGER FINDING A SOLUTION" TO THE CRISIS.

3. THE WASHINGTON POST TODAY WRITES THAT FOREIGN MINISTER GHOTBZADEH BELIEVES, THANKS TO "PRESIDENT CARTER'S NOW ADMITTING MISTAKES IN PREVIOUS U.S. POLICY," THAT HE HAS SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL TO APPROVE THE TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES TO IRANIAN GOVERNMENT CONTROL. HOWEVER, A NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE THIS MORNING CLAIMS IRANIAN OFFICIALS SEE THE U.S. MESSAGE AS THREATENING."

4. KHOMEINI IS NOW REPORTED BY AP AS SAYING HE WILL ALLOW A VATICAN REPRESENTATIVE TO VISIT THE FIFTY HOSTAGES. IT IS NOT CLEAR, HOWEVER, WHETHER THE FILM CLIP ON WHICH THE REPORT IS BASED IS RECENT AND REPRESENTS A NEW DEVELOPMENT OR NOT. "IF THE POPL WANTS TO BE REASSURED ABOUT THE CONDITION OF THE HOSTAGES, HE MAY SEND AN ENVOY TO COME AND SEE," KHOMEINI IS SHOWN TELLING THE PAPAL NUNCIO IN TEHRAN.

[redacted] DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW-EO 12356
[redacted] 12 Aug 93
[redacted] DOD/OSD
[redacted] DAOR
[redacted] Mulcahy Smith
[redacted]

5. THE NINE COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES SENT LETTERS OVER THE WEEKEND TO IRANIAN AUTHORITIES URGING THE RELEASE OF THE HOSTAGES, ACCORDING TO AP. BRITISH AND WEST GERMAN OFFICIALS HAVE CONFIRMED THAT PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AND CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAVE WRITTEN TO BANI-SADR, BUT THE DETAILS OF THEIR MESSAGES WERE NOT DISCLOSED.

6. FORMER IRISH FOREIGN MINISTER SEAN MCBRIDE TOLD REUTER TODAY THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS APPROVED A MCBRIDE PLAN FOR A NUREMBURG-STYLE INTERNATIONAL TRIAL OF THE DEPOSED SHAH. THE TRIBUNAL WOULD BE CREATED UNDER U.N. SPONSORSHIP, ACCORDING TO MCBRIDE. THE U.N. WOULD ALSO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING THE VERDICT WAS CARRIED OUT. WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION FROM IRANIAN SOURCES THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL HAS ENDORSED MCBRIDE'S PROPOSAL.

7. THE DOS MANAGED TO CONTACT BRUCE LAINGEN YESTERDAY. HE AND POLITICAL OFFICER TOMSETH INDICATED THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE PRESS PLOY IN TEHRAN OVER THE PURPORTED CARTER-KHOMEINI MESSAGE. TOMSETH FEELS THAT THE IRANIANS MIGHT BE TRYING TO PREPARE PUBLIC OPINION FOR POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE HOSTAGE CRISIS. THE CONVERSATION WAS TERMINATED AFTER ABOUT SEVEN OR EIGHT MINUTES.

8. A REPORT BY CBS CORRESPONDENT TO FENTON IN TEHRAN HAS THE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL VOTING TO APPROVE THE TRANSFER OF THE HOSTAGES TO GOVERNMENT CONTROL. ACCORDING TO THE CBS NEWS DESK, FENTON CLAIMS AYATOLLAH MAHDAVI KANI PROVIDED A CRUCIAL SWING VOTE. REPORTEDLY, OPPONENTS OF THE TRANSFER WILL TRY TO ORGANIZE DEMONSTRATIONS TO BLOCK THE MOVE. MAHDAVI KANI HAS ISSUED A PUBLIC STATEMENT REMINDING ALL CONCERNED THAT DEMONSTRATIONS WITHOUT THE PERMISSION OF THE AUTHORITIES ARE NOT PERMITTED, EXCEPT FOR THE STATEMENT ABOUT DEMONSTRATIONS WITHOUT PERMIT. WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF THIS.

[redacted] DEMONSTRATIONS WITHOUT A PERMIT. WE HAVE NO CONFIRMATION OF THE [redacted] REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL'S DECISION.]

[redacted]

TOP SECRET [redacted]

[redacted]

11. IRAN'S RELATIONS WITH IRAQ REMAIN COOL WITH BOTH NATIONS CONTINUING TO ACCUSE THE OTHER OF HINDERING DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY. IRAN ALSO REMAINS WARY OF IRAQI MILITARY INTENTIONS

[redacted]

PRESS, HOWEVER, CITED THAT THE FIGHTING IN WEST AZERBAIJAN PROVINCE HAS BEEN FAR MORE EXTENSIVE WITH SEVERAL LOCATIONS TO THE SOUTH OF RUMIYEH INVOLVED (UNCLASSIFIED)

[redacted]

FT

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

[redacted] SECRET [redacted]

I-725



[redacted] IRANIAN P-3 ORION CONDUCTED AN AERIAL SURVEILLANCE MISSION IN THE STRAITS OF HORMUZ ON 27 MARCH [redacted]

THE P-3 CIRCLED AT LEAST TWO OF THE SHIPS AT AN ALTITUDE OF [redacted] FEET, PASSING WITHIN 1,000 YARDS OF THE VESSELS.

BT

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR

MESSAGE 01 RECEIVED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

E (C) [illegible] APR 60
FM [redacted]
TO/TF [redacted]
JOB/LTS [illegible]/WASH DC
BT
~~T O P S E C R E T~~
SUBJ: DEPLOYMENT REPORT [redacted] NUMBER 1
E (C) 1.) [redacted] AND [redacted] COOPERATION AND SUPPORT HAS BEEN EXCELLENT SO FAR.
E (C) 2.) HOWEVER, AS SIZE OF FORCE GROWS, [redacted] OFFICES ARE BECOMING INCREASINGLY APPREHENSIVE. THIS MAY BE DUE TO ABSENCE OF [redacted] WHO HAS BEEN OUT OF COUNTRY SINCE BEFORE WE ARRIVED AND HAS NOT BEEN IN ON THE PLANNING AND DECISION-MAKING NORMALLY. [redacted] INVOLVES HIMSELF IN EVEN THE ROUTINE [redacted] DECISIONS AND THIS OPERATION IS OF GREATER MAGNITUDE THAN THAT TO WHICH [redacted] IS ACCUSTOMED.
E, G
(C) 3.) JET A-1 STORES AT [redacted] TOTAL

PAGE 2 ~~T O P S E C R E T~~
OVER 1 MILLION [redacted] GALLONS. VERSUS EARLIER ESTIMATE OF 2.4 MILLION. HOWEVER, [redacted] INDICATES THIS IS NO PROBLEM. REFUELING OPERATIONS ON 19 APR TOTALLED 12,000 [redacted] GALLONS. PROCEDURE OF TRUCKING FUEL FROM TANK FARM BY THE THREE AVAILABLE REFUELERS HAS WORKED SATISFACTORILY. CONTRACTOR WILL PROVIDE AFTER-HOUR SERVICE IF NECESSARY. ANTICIPATE NO DIFFICULTIES WITH REFUELING.
E
(C) 4.) REPLENISHMENT OF [redacted] FUEL STORES SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY 10 MAY, PRIOR TO MONSOON SEASON. JET A-1 PRICE IS APPROXIMATELY 50 CENTS PER GALLON.
(C) 5.) [redacted] C-130 AND [redacted] MC-130 ARRIVED WITH MOST REQUIRED EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES. WE DO NOT HAVE LATRINE CHENICAL, GARBAGE BAGS, AND LIGHTS FOR

PAGE 3 ~~T O P S E C R E T~~
CAMP. REQUIRE C-RATIONS FOR 3 COMM PERSONNEL WHO ARRIVED WITHOUT. CHARCOAL WOULD BE A HELPFUL QUID TO GIVE TO THE [redacted] SINCE THERE IS NO FIRE WOOD ON THE [redacted]
E
(U) 6.) AIRCRAFT AND CAMP ARE CO-LOCATED AT EAST END OF DIRT RUNWAY, A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE FROM BASE PROPER.
(C) 7.) WE ARE USING BASE ELECTRICAL POWER TO OPERATE W-3 SYSTEMS. [redacted] HAS SET UP TELEPHONE LAND LINE FROM CAMP TO TOWER AND SQUADRON OPERATIONS.
E
(U) 8.) TEMPERATURE TODAY WAS 103 DEGREES. PEOPLE ARE TAKING PRECAUTIONS. WOODEN TENT PEGS WON'T PENETRATE GROUND. WE PRECURED METAL STAKES IN LOCAL VILLAGE.
(C) 9.) ADVISE MAC THAT [redacted] HAS NO CAPABILITY FOR TRANSMITTING FLIGHT PLANS OR PROVIDING ENROUTE WEATHER.
E
BT

Classified By: DDD NM 12
Declassified ON: OADR

~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

i-735

THE JOINT STAFF

12 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAROLD L. MILLER, LEGAL ADVISOR AND LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT TO THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Helicopter Maintenance Records

1. Maintenance records for the eight US Navy RH-53D aircraft used on the attempted hostage rescue in Iran are available for review as requested by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Please contact me, RADM Tom Cassidy (ext 52749), or LTC Stephen D. Olynyk (ext 74546) when arrangements have been made for the review.

2. Attached is a summary prepared on the basis of a careful review of both the helicopter maintenance records and the performance of the eight RH-53Ds on the rescue effort. It is intended that a copy be provided SASC personnel when they review the records.

3. This has been a major area of interest and we stand ready to assist with records review or answer questions as appropriate.

4. Note that the attached report is SECRET.

CHARLES W. DYKE
Major General, USA

Attachment
a/s

Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

WITHOUT ATTACHMENT
THIS MEMORANDUM IS
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

8 May 1980

OPERATION EVENING LIGHT

POST MISSION SUMMARY

RH-53D HELICOPTER

MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CONDITION

~~NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS PRIVILEGED INFORMATION AND IS NOT FOR GENERAL DISTRIBUTION~~

~~SECRET~~

~~Classified By: JCS~~
~~Declassified ON: OADR~~

30A02

COPY 6 OF 10

POST MISSION SUMMARY
RH-53D MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL CONDITION

1. (U) PURPOSE. To determine the adequacy of maintenance performed on HM-16 RH-53D aircraft used on the rescue mission, to evaluate maintenance/ supply support procedures used to prepare the aircraft for the mission, and to assess the failures that occurred to helicopters in the mission.

2. (U) SCOPE. Effort expended and sources of information utilized were as follows:

a. Review of CTF-70/NIMITZ message traffic

b. Review of OPG point papers

c. Review of mission aircraft logs and maintenance records.

d. Personal interviews with:

(1) Mission flight crews

(2) Mission aircraft maintenance officer

(3) Selected passengers in mission aircraft

(4) Shipboard squadron aircraft maintenance officer

(5) Shipboard squadron aircraft maintenance control officer

(6) Shipboard squadron aircraft maintenance control chief.

3. (U) AIRCRAFT DESCRIPTION

a. The single main rotor RH-53D helicopter is designed for both land and ship based operation. The helicopter was manufactured by Sikorsky Aircraft. It is powered by two General Electric T64-GE-415 turboshaft engines. The Automatic Flight Control System gives the helicopter an all weather capability. An auxiliary power plant (APP) gives the helicopter a self-starting capability. The helicopter has a fuel jettisoning system, rescue hoist, and seats for 37 passengers or 24 litters. It also has a rear ramp loading system and cargo tiedown facilities. There are provisions for external auxiliary fuel tanks, internal range extension tanks, air-to-air, and helicopter in flight refueling (HIFR) capabilities. It also has an external cargo hook and provisions for door guns. See TAB A for an aircraft illustration.

b. The primary mission of the RH-53D is airborne mine counter-measures (AMCM), which includes mine sweeping and ancillary tasks. The helicopter's secondary utility mission involves the movement of cargo and equipment and the transportation of passengers. The helicopter may be used for the rescue of personnel and the transportation of external cargo or inoperable aircraft.

c. The aircraft utilized for EVENING LIGHT were modified with commercial Omega navigation systems and provisions for the palletized inertial navigation system (PINS). Two internal fuel tanks and door mounted .50 caliber guns were also installed. Flight crewmembers were equipped with night vision goggles and aircraft landing lights were modified with infrared filters. Various items considered non-essential for this mission were removed for weight reduction. Items removed/added are contained in TAB B. Normal allowable gross weight for the RH-53D is 42,000 pounds. The Naval Air Systems Command provided a waiver to operate to 47,500 pounds for this mission.

4. (C) SUMMARY OF EVENTS

a. Pre-Mission Phase

(1) On 21 November 1979, six (6) RH-53D helicopters from HM-16 were air lifted from Norfolk to [redacted] by C-5, reassembled, and flown aboard KITTY HAWK on 28 November 1979.

(2) On 29 December 1979, two (2) additional RH-53Ds were transported by C-5 from Norfolk to [redacted] The helos were reassembled and flown aboard NIMITZ at [redacted] on 2 January 1980.

(3) On 23 January, the six (6) RH-53Ds, HM-16 personnel, and equipment were cross-decked from KITTY HAWK to NIMITZ making a total of eight (8) helicopters aboard NIMITZ. It was the determination of mission planners, based on past operational history, that eight RH-53D aircraft would support a launch of seven

(4) During the period the RH-53Ds were deployed aboard KITTY HAWK and NIMITZ, they were flown at such a rate and in such a manner as to maintain maximum readiness and OPSEC. See TAB C for pre-mission flight-time and TAB D for pre-mission availability.

(5) The mission aircraft maintenance officer had visited the ship approximately three weeks prior to mission execution to review maintenance records and personally inspect the aircraft. He had provided specific and detailed guidance to HM-16 squadron maintenance supervisors regarding items to be inspected, additional maintenance actions desired, and other pre-mission preparations to be accomplished. He also screened all related records and log books and did not note any components that exceeded allowable removal times. Based upon his guidance, the HM-16 squadron aircraft maintenance officer developed a pre-mission checklist and procedures for its completion (See TAB E). Completion of these actions was verified by the mission aircraft maintenance officer upon his return to NIMITZ on 20 April.

(6) On 20 April, eight mission aircrews and supporting personnel arrived aboard NIMITZ. The total team consisted of 50 personnel. During the period 20-24 April, mission crews participated in familiarization flights, maintenance check flights, deck turn-ups and mission preparation activities. All eight aircraft were given a full functional check flight during this period and the engines were adjusted to provide maximum allowable power. At least one pilot in each assigned mission flight crew was a qualified functional check pilot. Maintenance records were reviewed by the mission aircraft maintenance officer for appropriate maintenance action, and crewmembers made repeated inspections of their assigned aircraft.

(7) The loading of mission equipment commenced early evening of 23 April immediately upon completion of painting. All eight aircraft were turned up and those discrepancies noted were corrected (TAB F). Except for assistance specifically requested by mission maintenance crews, HM-16 personnel were restricted by HM-16 CO's direction from aircraft access. Without exception, all mission equipment was loaded exclusively by mission crews.

(8) The engine air particle separators (EAPS), one for each engine, were designed to remove sand, dust, and other foreign particles entrained in the engine inlet air. The foreign particles are scavenged and exhausted overboard allowing clean air to enter the

engine. The aircraft mission commander directed the removal of EAPS. There is no prohibition from removing the EAPS from the RH-53D. EAPS removal increases power available from each engine by 2% and reduces weight of each aircraft by approximately 200 lbs. A decrease in overall engine life was not a factor for the relatively short total time of this mission. Although sand and dust were anticipated, engine damage from FOD was not a consideration because of the conditions at the planned landing sites. Aircraft weight and power available from the engines were critical factors in mission planning.

(9) All eight RH-53D aircraft were full mission capable to perform the rescue mission at the time of execution. Aircrews were familiar and comfortable with their assigned aircraft. Mission pilots reported the material condition of their aircraft was excellent. All agreed that mission aircraft were in better material condition than either the CH-53s or the RH-53s in which they trained in CONUS.

(10) HM-16 troubleshooting teams were assigned to each aircraft for the mission launch with spare parts immediately available and were standing by on deck to provide assistance for the launch. Assistance requested was of a minor nature and was not related to navigational equipment.

b. Mission Execution Phase

(1) On 24 April, eight fully mission capable aircraft launched on the mission. Shortly after take off, aircraft #8 experienced an intermediate gearbox chip warning light. Since this gearbox had been recently replaced, this discrepancy was not considered aborting. Such occurrences are common during break-in of a new gearbox. The mission was continued uneventfully.

(2) Approximately two hours into the flight aircraft #6 experienced an in-cockpit redundant BIM (Blade Inspection Method) indication of impending main rotor blade failure and made an emergency landing in the desert. After rotor shutdown, the crewchief confirmed visually by checking the indicator on the blade that one main rotor blade had lost pressure, indicating a possible cracked spar. This was an aborting discrepancy since it cannot be determined

in the field if a crack has developed in the blade or if the indicator is faulty. Average flight time on all blades on this aircraft was 956 hours and the high time blade was 1546 hours. Main rotor blade established replacement life is 3000 hours. It is not known which blade failed. Aircraft #6 had experienced a second stage hydraulic system low pressure indication a short time earlier; however, hydraulic quantity was normal. This situation is not uncommon and could have been an indicator problem. The crew was in the process of changing the indicator in flight when the blade emergency occurred. Further, the crew suspected fuel was not transferring from one of the two internal range extension tanks. Manual transfer would have been possible. Neither the hydraulic pressure indication nor the perceived electric fuel transfer problem were causes for aborting the mission.

(3) Aircraft #8 landed and recovered the crew and classified material from aircraft #6. At this point seven RH-53Ds were proceeding with the mission.

(4) Shortly after departure from the NIMITZ, #5 experienced loss of the TACAN (ARN-52) and loss of yaw stabilization associated with the AFCS. The copilot, who was in control of the aircraft, was required to continuously make heading corrections with the rudder pedals. Since the copilot was wearing night vision goggles, the pilot was required to monitor the needle ball and continually advise the copilot of required rudder inputs. Once in the sand/dust storm, the situation became very vertigo-inducing. Because of the reduced visibility and an abrupt maneuver by the aircraft flying lead, flight integrity was lost. At this point the co-pilot notified the pilot that he had vertigo. The pilot took control of the aircraft, leveled the wings, and noticed that the RMI was frozen and there was a 15 degree bank error in his vertical gyro indicator. This was verified by checking the needle ball. By actuating the vertical gyro transfer switch, the pilot switched to the copilot's gyro. At this point the cockpit conditions were extremely difficult. The wet compass was required for heading information and navigation was limited to the PINS System, which the pilot reported had an approximate 5 NM error. With an inaccurate navigation system, lack of precise heading instrumentation, aircraft

stabilization problems, and no TACAN, the pilot considered mission continuation in instrument meteorological conditions at low level through the mountains which lay ahead to be impossible. Based on these factors, the decision was made to abort the mission and return to NIMITZ. Upon returning to NIMITZ, inspection revealed failure of the ASN-50 power supply by overheating due to failure of the power supply cooler blower. The ASN-50 powers the AHRS and AFCS. The TACAN blower motor, which is located in the nose electronics compartment, was also found inoperative. Although these failures caused an abort under the unexpected IMC flight conditions experienced, #5 could have continued the mission if forecast visual meteorological conditions had existed. On #5's recovery on NIMITZ, HM-16 maintenance personnel found one mission duffle bag wedged between a rib next to the left gunner station and the ASN-50 cooling intake. Overlapping the top of the air duct and the duffle bag were two mission flak jackets. The items were heavy enough and wedged in place securely enough to avoid movement under normal aircraft maneuvering. The positioning of these items severly restricted the airflow. A quantification of this restriction is not possible, however, it is the opinion of squadron maintenance personnel that the airflow intake was essentially secured by the mission equipment. Loading of mission equipment commenced on 23 April immediately afer completion of painting. Except for assistance specifically requested by mission crews, HM-16 personnel were restricted from aircraft access and Marine guards were posted. Without exception, all mission equipment was loaded by mission crews. It cannot be determined when the items were placed against the intake. The aircraft commander supervised placement of mission gear on 23 April 80 and stated that gear was not placed in the area of the ASN-50 intake. The aircraft commander further stated that in his personal estimation and direct observation that gear stored directly in front of the master internal fuel cell was moved by maintenance personnel to the vicinity of station 222 port side to gain access to the ASN-50 compartment (after landing). It is not possible to arrive at any firm conclusion regarding the possible obstruction of the cooling air intake.

(5) Six aircraft eventually landed at the refueling site. Arrivals were approximately 45 minutes to 1 hour and 25 minutes later than the planned estimated time of arrival. The delays were caused by weather and visibility problems experienced enroute that

AIRCRAFT LOGS AND RECORDS

The aircraft Logs and Records (OPNAV 4790/19), Weight and Balance Data (NAVAIR 01-1B-40), and Aircraft Inventory Record (DD Form 780) were reviewed. The aircraft was received from Sikorsky Aircraft by HM-12 on 1 Nov 73 and was transferred to HM-14 on 12 May 78. On 28 Dec 79 aircraft was disassembled for C-5A airlift to [redacted] and reassembled. It was flown aboard NIMITZ on 2 Jan 80. Aircraft was transferred to HM-16 on 23 Jan 80.

The last major rework was completed at NARF North Island on 15 Dec 76. On 1 Feb 80, the aircraft commenced a 3 month extension of its service period. A one hundred hour Phase D scheduled airframe inspection was completed on 1 Apr 80. No significant discrepancies were noted during this review. The time remaining on the aircraft until the next scheduled airframe inspection was 78.5 hours.

All maintenance records indicate the aircraft was full mission capable at launch time.

AIRCRAFT SUMMARY

MISSION #4 BUNO: 158693 MODEX: 631
MISSION STATUS: Full mission capable
HOURS FLOWN: 19-23 Apr: 8.8
Total Apr: 9.1
Total Dec 79 - Apr 80: 83.1

MISSION EQUIPMENT/SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS

Aircraft was left at Desert One upon mission abort. No abort discrepancies existed at Desert One.

PRE-MISSION MAINTENANCE SUMMARY (19-24 Apr)

No significant maintenance discrepancies existed prior to the mission (TABS F and I).

AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE SUMMARY (Dec 79-Apr 80)

A review of all reported maintenance discrepancies and corrective actions revealed no outstanding, or significant discrepancies that would affect/degrade mission performance.

(C) AIRCRAFT LOGS AND RECORDS

The aircraft Log and Records (OPNAV 4790/19), Weight and Balance Data (NAVAIR 01-1B-40), and Aircraft Inventory Record (DD Form 780) were reviewed.

The aircraft was received in the Navy by HM-12 on 6 Feb 74. The aircraft was transferred to HM-16 on 27 Oct 78. On 21 Nov 79, the aircraft was disassembled for airshipment via C-5A, and was reassembled at [redacted] on 25 Nov.

The last major rework was completed by NARF Pensacola on 25 Oct 77. On 1 Mar 80 this aircraft commenced a 3 month extension of its service period. A 100-hour Phase "C" scheduled airframe inspection was completed on 18 Mar 80. No significant discrepancies were noted. The time remaining on the aircraft until the next scheduled airframe inspection was 85.3 hours.

All maintenance records indicate aircraft was full mission capable at launch time.

AIRCRAFT LOGS AND RECORDS

The aircraft Logs and Records (OPNAV 4790/19), Weight and Balance Data (NAVAIR 01-1B-40), and Aircraft Inventory Record (DD Form 780) were reviewed.

The aircraft was received in the Navy by HM-12 on 20 Jul 73. Aircraft was subsequently transferred to HM-16 on 27 Oct 78. The aircraft completed scheduled depot level maintenance by NARF Pensacola on 14 December 1979. The aircraft was disassembled on 28 Dec 79 for transport aboard a C-5A and was received aboard NIMITZ 2 Jan 80. The time remaining on the aircraft until the next scheduled airframe inspection was 42.3 hours.

All records indicate this aircraft was full mission capable at launch time.

7. (U) (S) SUPPLY SUPPORT PROCEDURES

a. Normal Support. When deployed, RH-53Ds are supported by a 90 day pack-up kit for support of 8 aircraft. The kit consists of 1289 line items including dynamic components. Historically, these pack-up kits have deployed with 85% range and depth. Follow-on support during deployment is as follows:

(1) Common items are obtained from nearest Naval Air Station.

(2) All requirements that cannot be satisfied at the operating site are passed to supply officer NSA, Norfolk via phone or message. He coordinates supply action with other supply activities and the inventory control point.

(3) Material is transported via Air Parcel Post, QUICK TRANS and MAC as appropriate.

b. EVENING LIGHT. The following actions constituted special, high priority treatment of support for the RH-53D mission:

(1) A 90 day pack-up of 1289 line items was deployed with 99.2% range and 98.8% depth.

(2) An additional pack-up of 169 line items augmented the normal 90 day pack-up. This additional pack-up increased the depth of some dynamic components by over 100%.

A, B

(3) Special logistics procedures to provide follow-on support were established on 27 Dec 1979. A special project code 807 was established for EVENING LIGHT. All support activities were directed to expedite all requirements identified to that project code. No reference was made as to what project EVENING LIGHT entailed.

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(4) Points of contact were established at NAS Cubi Point, COMNAVAIRLANT, and COMNAVAIRPAC.

(5) All requisitioning and expedite action was accomplished by phone or priority message. No reference to aircraft type was made in telephonic exchanges.

(6) All requisitions for RH-53D aircraft on KITTY HAWK/NIMITZ were processed through NAS Cubi Point. Cubi conducted an in-theater screen for assets. If not available in-theater, requirements were passed to NAS Norfolk. All actions were coordinated with points of contact established at various support activities.

(7) On 5 March 1980, NAVSUP initiated action to establish contact points at various transportation activities such as NAVMTO Norfolk, NATCO Travis AFB, and NATCO Clark AFB to coordinate the expeditious movement of material for EVENING LIGHT.

(8) In early March OP-51D was designated as OPNAV contact point to monitor movement of material. Daily phone contact with COMNAVAIRPAC provided a constant monitoring of material flow. Additional action was directed whenever material movement appeared stalled. This involved duplicate shipment of material in several instances.

(9) A daily SITSUM was provided both to OP-05 and the OPG in JCS.

c. Supply Support Summary. During the entire support phase of the RH-53D mission, supply support was considered excellent. The daily monitoring by OP-51D which began in March indicated that for the most part 7 aircraft had no unresolved material requirements and were reported in an up status.

8. (U) (S) CONCLUSIONS

a. Maintenance performed on the eight mission RH-53Ds was adequate in all respects. Special maintenance procedures in the form of additional check lists, which included extensive inspection procedures, were accomplished to the satisfaction of the mission maintenance officer. Mission pilots felt the aircraft were in excellent material condition. The aircraft had been flown as necessary to exercise the dynamic components and to verify/evaluate maintenance actions. Special supply support was also provided. Eight mission ready RH-53Ds launched from NIMITZ on time for the rescue mission.

b. Transition from maintenance by HM-16 squadron personnel to mission preparation by mission flight crews was accomplished smoothly and professionally. Independent

TAB B

SPECIAL PROCEDURES ACCOMPLISHED SPECIFIC TO MISSION PREPARATION ONBOARD NIMITZ

ITEMS REMOVED FOR WEIGHT CONSIDERATION (WEIGHT INDICATED IN LBS)

Crew Chief Seat (11)
KB-18 (3)
MCM Mirrors (94)
Cargo Winches (94)
Cargo Pendants (3)
Cargo Straps (85)
Smoke Flares (25)
Stowage Container (21)
Tow Lines (5)
Equipment Container Bags (8)
Heater Ducting (10)
Windshield Anti-Ice Control (2)
EAPS and Control Panel (201)
#7 Tail Rotor Drive Shaft Cowl (10)
Emergency Exit Lights (3)
Static Discharge/Excitor Box (56)
Cargo Hooks (42)
MCM Cutter Supports (7)
IFR Probes (242)
Heaters (86)
Rescue Hoists (Except for 2 ACFT)(
Exposure Suit Blowers/Hoses (30)
Upper Personnel Doors (15)
Passenger Seats/Fittings (121)
Tie Down Fittings (6)
IFF and Control Box (21)
Ky-28 (20)
Ky-28 Control Panel (2)
Drip Pans (10)
ICS Overhead Reels (11)
External ICS Phone (2)
Tow Winch Guillotine Tester (14)

ITEMS ADDED FOR MISSION

PINS (101)
OMEGA (61)
Range Extension Tanks (Int) (700)
Crew Night Vision Goggles (40)
50 Cal Mounts (86)
50 Cal Weapons (164)
Armor Plating (Engine) (200)
IR Filters on Landing Lights (0)

ITEMS RECEIVING SPECIAL INSPECTION/ADJUSTMENT

Engine topping increased
Hydraulic lines/fittings checked for leakage
Fuel lines checked for leakage
Clocks synchronized (GMT)
Dampeners checked for wear/limits
Sleeve and spindles checked
All rotor blades inspected
Hydraulic pumps inspected for leakage
Primary servos/AFCS servos
Flight controls/linkages
Hydraulic compartment control rods
Rotor head control rods
Tail rotor control rods
Tail rotor control cables
Thomas couplings
APP drive shaft/couplings
MGB oil cooler
MGB oil cooler drive shaft/couplings
MGB high speed drive shaft/couplings
All lights
Windscreens
HF radios
FM radios
Rescue hoist (2 ACFT)
Cockpit instruments
Armor plating (Engine)

TOTAL REMOVED -1308
TOTAL ADDED -1352

TAB C

AIRCRAFT PRE-MISSION FLIGHT HOURS (While Embarked)

158744/632 (#1)	
DEC 79	4.8
JAN 80	42.7
FEB 80	29.2
MAR 80	52.9
APR 80	32.7
TOTAL	162.3

158753/634 (#2)	
JAN 80	12.2
FEB 80	13.9
MAR 80	48.7
APR 80	17.1
TOTAL	91.9

158761/637 (#3)	
DEC 79	3.1
JAN 80	21.5
FEB 80	9.3
MAR 80	20.7
APR 80	24.0
TOTAL	78.6

158693/631 (#4)	
DEC 79	10.7
JAN 80	29.2
FEB 80	17.9
MAR 80	16.2
APR	9.1
TOTAL	83.1

158754/635 (#5)	
DEC 79	5.7
JAN 80	24.6
FEB 80	56.0
MAR 80	25.7
APR 80	19.6
TOTAL	131.6

158750/633 (#6)	
JAN 80	6.0
FEB 80	0.0
MAR 80	8.6
APR 80	22.1
TOTAL	36.7

158686/630 (#7)	
DEC 79	6.8
JAN 80	19.6
FEB 80	54.0
MAR 80	27.2
APR 80	15.1
TOTAL	122.7

158758/636 (#8)	
DEC 79	2.4
JAN 80	4.8
FEB 80	36.1
MAR 80	0.0
APR 80	1.2
TOTAL	44.5

TOTAL FOR DET	
DEC 79	33.5
JAN 80	160.6
FEB 80	216.4
MAR 80	200.0
APR 80	140.9
TOTAL	751.4

TAB D

PRE-MISSION AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY

0800-0800 DAY	UP/ASSIGNED STATUS	SORTIES	HOURS FLOWN
25 MAR 80	6/8	0	0.0
26 MAR 80	6/8	4	13.6
27 MAR 80	7/8	0	0.0
28 MAR 80	7/8	0	0.0
29 MAR 80	7/8	1	3.7
30 MAR 80	7/8	2	6.1
31 MAR 80	6/8	4	15.7
1 APR 80	6/8	2	7.0
2 APR 80	6/8	5	14.2
3 APR 80	7/8	0	0.0
4 APR 80	7/8	0	0.0
5 APR 80	7/8	1	3.5
6 APR 80	7/8	2	10.0
7 APR 80	7/8	1	0.1
8 APR 80	7/8	2	2.1
9 APR 80	6/8	2	3.6
10 APR 80	6/8	3	6.1
11 APR 80	6/8	2	6.2
12 APR 80	7/8	0	0.0
13 APR 80	7/8	0	0.0
14 APR 80	7/8	4	10.2
15 APR 80	7/8	1	1.5
16 APR 80	7/8	4	10.1
17 APR 80	7/8	2	7.5
18 APR 80	7/8	2	7.2
19 APR 80	7/8	3	5.6
20 APR 80	7/8	7	7.1
21 APR 80	7/8	6	13.2
22 APR 80	7/8	2	4.0
23 APR 80	8/8	0	0.0

TAB F

MAINTENACE TURN-UP/DRESS REHEARSAL ON THE NIGHT OF 23 APRIL 80

The below listed discrepancies were noted by mission crews and squadron personnel during a maintenance turn-up/dress rehearsal on the night of 23 April:

MISSION #1

1. Upper rotating beacon needs more I/R paper.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: This discrepancy was repaired by the mission crew.

2. Install spot light panel and check operation.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Installed spot light panel and functionally operated system.

3. Install rescue hoist and panel.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Installed hoist and control panel, operationally checked good.

MISSION #2

1. TACAN inoperative.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Operationally checked, TACAN worked as it should. The ships TACAN was not transmitting during this turn-up evolution.

MISSION #3

1. HF&FM inoperative.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced both receivers and transmitter.

2. Gunner's ICS inoperative.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Repaired cannon plug and operationally checked system, it worked as it should.

3. Master caution light illuminated periodically during engine turn.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced master caution panel and checked same.

4. Tail rotor anti-collision light needs more paper.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Mission crew repaired this light.

MISSION #4

1. Lower anti-collision lite inoperative.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced lower anti-collision light.

MISSION #5 CONTINUED

1. Pilot's 8 day clock in operative.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced clock.

2. Pilot's spot light rotates side to side but will not sweep fore and aft.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Due to absence of spare spot lights and with direction from mission #5 crew, swapped the pilot and copilot light.

MISSION #6

1. No UHF side tone.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced UHF radio.

2. 8 day clock inoperative.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced 8 day clock.

MISSION #7

1. Pilot's spot rotates side to side but will not sweep fore and aft.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Due to the absence of spare spot lights and with direction from Mission #7 crew, swapped the pilot and copilot light.

MISSION #8

1. UHF radio inoperative.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced UHF radio.

2. Pilot's spot light rotates side to side but will not sweep fore and aft.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Due to absence of spare spot lights and with direction from mission # 8 crew, swapped the pilot and copilot light.

3. #2 internal fuel tank will not transfer.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: Replaced tank and pressure refueled aircraft in order to check for leakage.

MISSION AIRCRAFT #1

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

DATE	SYSTEM	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
4 Dec	Rotor	#1 blade dampener bearing high limit	Removed and replaced
17 Dec	Fuselage	Pilot's windshield needs replacement	Removed and replaced
21 Dec	Airframe	Massive oil leak #2 nose gear box	Reseated "O" ring in filter
24 Dec	Flight Control	Lateral cyclic stick drive, both directions	remove and replace roll trim sensor
31 Dec	Airframe	Pilot's emergency exit window latch broken	Repaired latch
1 Jan	Rotor	Steady #2 BIM caution light	Found and repaired bad electrical connection
4 Jan	Rotary Wing	#1 high speed shaft Thomas coupling out of limits	Removed and replaced shaft/couplings
9 Jan	Electrical	#2 nose gear box pressure switch sticks	Removed and replaced
18 Jan	Rotary Wing Drive	Accessory gear box chip light	Cleaned and replaced chip plug, cleaned filter and did 30 min. penalty run
21 Jan	Rotor System	Tail rotor blade damaged during move	Removed and replaced
30 Jan	Landing Gear	Port main mount tire bald	Replaced tire
3 Feb	Rotor System	Tail rotor blade damaged	Removed and replaced
4 Feb	Radar Nav	Radar altimeter failed	Removed and replaced
12 Feb	Rotor System	#3 Main rotor blade Pocket #18 bent down	Removed and replaced blade

MISSION AIRCRAFT #1 (continued)

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

DATE	SYSTEM	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
14 Feb	Rotor System	Tail rotor blade damaged	Removed and replaced
15 Feb	Transmission	Intermediate gear box leaks	Removed and replaced
17 Feb	Transmission	Accessory gear box chip light	Replaced APP clutch
19 Feb	Flight	1st stage hydraulic filter button	Found bad pump; removed and replaced same
24 Feb	Flight Reference	Pilot's turn-rate needle inop	Replaced Pilot's turn rate gyro
1 Mar	Electrical	Cyclic trim inop	Found broken wire to roll servo, repaired same
3 Mar	Radio Nav	TACAN inop. No DME Azimuth good	Removed and replaced
10 Mar	Radio Nav	TACAN inop. No DME	Replaced TACAN. Checks O.K.
10 Mar	Flight Control	Pilots beeper trim intermittent	Replaced bad switch
11 Mar	Flight Control	Beeper trim still inop.	Replaced pilot's cyclic stick
15 Mar	Rotor	Solid #1 cockpit BIM	Found and repaired two broken wires
24 Mar	Engine	When motoring #1 engine, #2 engine would motor also	Replaced dual start valve
1 Apr	Electrical	#2 generator quit	Replaced #2 generator
2 Apr	Flight Ref	Pilot's turn rate gyro has full deflection	Replaced bad gyro
6 Apr	Radio Nav	TACAN breaks lock-on	Removed and replaced

MISSION AIRCRAFT #1 (continued)

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

DATE	SYSTEM	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
6 Apr	Radio Nav	Omega dropped off line five minutes	Replaced control box
11 Apr	Rotor	#4 Blade BIM check out of limits	Replaced main rotor blade
14 Apr	Radio Nav	Erratic TACAN Azimuth/ DME	Replaced TACAN
17 Apr	Radar Nav	Radar altimeter inop.	Replaced bad alt
20 Apr	Radio Nav	TACAN stopped after one hour	Replaced TACAN
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

MISSION AIRCRAFT #2

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

DATE	SYSTEM	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
24 Jan	A/C	HM-16 Acceptance Inspection	Complied with acceptance inspection
3 Feb	Rotor Sys	A/C has medium freq in all flight regimes	Inspected all main rotor components. Found 3 bad dampners; removed and replaced. A/C checks good.
19 Feb	Flt Controls	2nd stage hyd sys overserviced	Deserviced
21 Feb	Radio Nav	DME portion of TACAN inoperative	Removed and Replaced TACAN
21 Feb	Instruments	Flickering BIM	Could not duplicate discrepanc 2 adel clamps replaced, cleane all cannon plugs.
21 Feb	Navigation	Litton Omega Nav wanders 150 miles west SW during flt	System checked good on ground power
28 Feb	Navigation	TACAN bearing inop DME good	Removed and replaced TACAN
1 Mar	Navigation	Litton Omega Nav inop all modes	Tech Rep check system - Checks good on ground power.
1 Mar	Navigation	TACAN inop both DME and Azimuth	Found suppression pulse cables crossed. Corrected cables. System checks good on ground power.
1 Mar	Navigation	BIM #2 flickers constantly in flight	Troubleshot system. Found bad #1 harness; removed and replaced same.
6 Mar	Navigation	TACAN - No DME or Azimuth any channel	Removed and replaced. Checked bad on ground power, no DME.
6 Mar	Navigation	Litton Omega outputs unreliable	Removed and replaced Omega

MISSION AIRCRAFT #2 (continued)

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

DATE	SYSTEM	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
9 Mar	Navigation	TACAN - No DME Azimuth O.K.	Removed and replaced TACAN. Checks good on channel
15 Mar	Flt Control	2d stage hyd system between Yellow & Green on deck. Drops 1/4" into Yellow inflight. Suspect air in system.	Serviced 2d stage to proper level cockpit qty level chec good. Found no air in syste
21 Mar	Airframe	Inspect all rigid & flex hyd lines in cabin ovhd for chafing, proper routing and replacement if needed.	Complied with same.
24 Mar	Navigation	Omega nav showed 75 mile error from known position.	Omega check good on next flight.
24 Mar	Airframe	2d stage hyd qty sys has mod leak. Dropped from full to top of yellow in 2.5 hrs. Suspect air.	Bled reservoir and serviced to proper level. No evidence of leakage.
24 Mar	Rotor	#2 blade BIM block cracked all the way through.	Potted crack in #2 BIM block.
26 Mar	Airframe	2nd stage hyd press filter button found popped on pre-flt insp.	Replaced 2nd stage pressure filter element.
9 Apr	Transmission	#1 NGB chip lite, 10 mins after T/O. Recycled ckt bkr...Lite stayed on.	Pulled chip detectors and oil filters, found no chips. Flushed NGB twice and reserviced. Checked good after 30 min penalty run.
11 Apr	Main Rotor Blade	#5 blade heavily scratched (to metal) 3rd pocket from inboard side.	Blended, cleaned and preserved.

MISSION AIRCRAFT #2 (continued)

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

DATE	SYSTEM	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
11 Apr	Main Rotor	#4 blade pocket dented, 2d pocket from tip	Inspected pocket, O.K.
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

MISSION AIRCRAFT #3

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

DATE	SYSTEM	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
3 Jan	Airframe	Both wind screens scratched	Replaced same
5 Jan	Engine	#2 engine would not start	Replaced ignitor plugs
7 Jan	Ground Accident	Tail rotor gearbox Tail rotor hub assy Tail rotor pitch beam assy Tail rotor pitch link assy Tail rotor blades (3) Main rotor head Swashplate Main rotor blades (4) Pitch rod assy	Removed and replaced damaged components
20 Jan	Fuselage	Winch-engine start pump case cracked	Replaced pump
22 Jan	Electrical	#2 steady BIM light	Replaced electrical harness
29 Jan	Rotor	#1 and #6 main rotor blades damaged	Replaced blade
14 Feb	Rotor	Tail rotor blade cracked	Replaced blade
28 Feb	Instruments	1st stage hydraulic quantity low light pressure & quantity O.K.	Replaced caution panel
22 Mar	Radio Nav	Omega display frozen	Repaired by FSR
8 Apr	Electrical	#2 generator failed in flight	Replaced supervisory panel
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

MISSION AIRCRAFT #4

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

DATE	SYSTEM	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
79			
07 Dec	Main Rotor Blade	Bad BIM indication on #3 blade. Shows partly black	Removed and replaced #3 main rotor blade
23 Dec	Navigation	TACAN #2 needle would not search	Removed and replaced TACAN
80			
16 Jan	Flight Reference	Pilot's gyro has intermittent "OFF" flag	Troubleshooting pilots gyro using ASN-50 test set found power supply to be bad. Removed and replaced power supply.
16 Jan	Navigation	TACAN has no DME	Removed and replaced TACAN
18 Jan	Hydraulic	1st Stage manifold filter popped	Checked manifold for metal particles and replaced filte:
26 Jan	BIM	Flickering #2 BIM in flt.	Cleaned #6 BIM block and harness. Checked Good.
11 Mar	T/Rotor Blade	T/R blade has 4 dents on leading edge	Removed and replaced T/R Blade.
20 Mar	Hydraulic	2nd stage hyd qty indicator fluctuates from center green to 1/8 inch from bottom of yellow in 3.1 hr Flt.	Serviced reservoir system checks good.
21 Mar	Hydraulic	Inspect all rigid and flex hyd lines in cabin ovhd area for chaffing proper routing, and replacement if needed.	Complied with same.
29 Mar	BIM Sys	#1 MRB has 2 cracks in BIM block	Repaired BIM block

MISSION AIRCRAFT #4

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

DATE 80	SYSTEM	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
08 Apr	Engine	#1 Engine experienced 3 loud pops, followed by another pop and torque decreased from 80% to 30%. Incident occurred after maint hover, when A/C transitioned to fwd flt.	Removed and replaced #1 eng
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

MISSION AIRCRAFT #5

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

DATE	SYSTEM	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
17 Dec	Flight Reference	ASN-50 Power Supply missing from Acft	Installed ASN-50 Pwr supply
17 Dec	Airframe	Pilot's windshield hazy	Replaced windshield
27 Dec	Integrated Guidance	Roll trim inop all AFCS channels	Found disconnected cannon plug. Reconnected same.
01 Jan	Flight Reference	Compass card on BDHI frozen	Replaced ASN-50 Gyro
05 Jan	Fuel	Internal range extension tank control box inop	Removed, repaired and replaced
09 Jan	HF Comm	HF Radio inop	Replaced HF Radio
02 Feb	Radio Navigation	TACAN inop in Azimuth/DME	Removed and Replaced
06 Feb	Electrical	Lost #2 Generator	Replaced #2 Generator
08 Feb	Radio NAV	TACAN 40° lock-off	Replaced TACAN
11 Feb	UHF Comm	UHF failed after take-off	Removed and replaced UHF
15 Feb	Rotor	Tail rotor blade bent	Replaced T/R blade
16 Feb	Rotor	#4 Main rotor blade has bad pocket	Replaced #4 MRB
16 Feb	Power Plant	Auxiliary power plant shaft sheared	Removed and replaced APP support/shaft
23 Feb	Integrated Guidance	AFCS YAW problems above 150' and 60 Kts	Replaced AFCS AMP and blown Fuse
27 Feb	Integrated Guidance	AFCS YAW hardover #2 AFCS	Repaired broken wire
28 Feb	Integrated Guidance	Stiff right pedal with #1 AFCS servo on	Replaced bad #2 dual input servo valve

MISSION AIRCRAFT #5 (continued)

DATE	SYSTEM	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
07 Mar	Integrated Guidance	AFCS and CoPilot Gyro problem in roll	1080Y Gyro found bad, replaced same.
12 Mar	HF Comm	HF Radio inop	Replaced HF Radio
01 Apr	Rotor	Tail rotor blade has FOD damage	Replaced T/R blade
14 Apr	Integrated Guidance	With AFCS AMPS off got sharp yaw kick when switching servo from #1 to #2	Adjusted #2 Moog valve check good
14 Apr	Radio NAV	TACAN inop all channels Azimuth/DME	Removed and replaced TACAN
19 Apr	Rotor	Remove and Replace tail rotor blade due to bad balance	Completed same.
19 Apr	Radio NAV	#2 needle on TACAN will not rotate	Removed and replaced blower motor and TACAN
24 Apr	Aircraft	None, noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

MISSION AIRCRAFT #6

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

DATE	SYSTEM	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
24 Jan	A/C	A/C acceptance inspection	Performed acceptance inspection
25 Jan	Main rotor blade	Removed #3 MRB for installation on A/C #3	Replaced on 28 Feb 80
28 Jan	Hydraulics	Removed 1ST stage hydraulic pump for A/C #8	Replaced on 31 Jan 80
28 Jan	Hydraulics	Removed winch engine start pump for A/C #8	Replaced on 25 Feb 80
15 Feb	Main rotor blade	Removed #1 MRB for A/C #4	Replaced blade 28 Feb 80
15 Feb	Main rotor blade	Removed #6 MRB for A/C #7	Replaced on 26 Feb 80
16 Feb	Main rotor blade	Removed #5 MRB for A/C #5	Replaced on 26 Feb 80
18 Feb	Intermed. gearbox	Removed IGB for A/C #1	Replaced on 19 Feb 80
20 Feb	Main rotor blade	Removed #4 MRB for #5	Replaced on 26 Feb 80
28 Feb	A/C	Ground incident involving T/R blade striking overhead	Replaced all dynamic components aft of main gear box during period from 28 Feb to 19 Mar 80
13 Mar	Hydraulics	Removed 1ST stage hydraulic pump for A/C #1	Replaced 18 Mar 80
16 Mar	Full system	Check all internal tanks	Complied with same

MISSION AIRCRAFT #6

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (JAN 80 - APR 80)

DATE	SYSTEM	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
21 Mar	Hydraulics	Insp all rigid and flex. hyd. lines in cabin ovhd. for chafing, proper routing and replacement, if needed	Complied with same
24 Apr	Aircraft	None noted	None, aircraft full mission capable

MISSION AIRCRAFT #7

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

DATE	SYSTEM	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
06 Dec	Instruments	Pilots AFCS indicator erratic regardless of AFCS status	Removed and replaced
18 Dec	Integrated Guidance	Hardover to right in yaw with both feet off pedals	Repaired bad AFCS control panel
30 Jan	Integrated Guidance	AFCS has right hardover	Indicator out of adjustment. Repaired same.
12 Feb	Flight Control	Cyclic hunts and drives any configuration	Replaced bad roll sensor
13 Feb	HF Comm	Unable to transmit or receive on HF	Removed and replaced
14 Feb	Rotor	#6 Main rotor blade has cracked 3rd pocket	Replaced main rotor blade
16 Feb	Flight Controls	Cyclic hunts in roll	Replaced bad AFCS roll sensor
20 Feb	Integrated Guidance	#1 AFCS Amp on with #2 Amp off result in full right YAW	Replaced Lateral accelerometer
21 Feb	Flight Reference	Copilot turn Rate Gyro inop in norm position	Replaced Turn Rate Gyro
21 Feb	Navigator	OMEGA INOP	Replaced OMEGA Control Box
28 Feb	Flight Control	Excessive Force Required to move cyclic with Trim off	Replaced Roll Trim Valve
7 Mar	Navigation	OMEGA quit half way through flight	Replaced Power Supply
16 Mar	Integrated Guidance	Acft yaws right any AFCS Configuration	Adjusted Lateral accelerometer

MISSION AIRCRAFT #7 (Continued)

DATE	SYSTEM	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
16 Mar	Flight Reference	Pilot's Gyro Precesses in flight	Replaced ASN 50 Gyro
29 Mar	Engine	Unable to start Aux Power Plant	Replaced ignitor Plugs
29 Mar	Engine	Aux Power Plant pump cavitated	Replaced pump
30 Mar	Integrated Guidance	With AFCS 1 or AFCS 2 Servo on and AFCS #1 amp off, have outer loop drive	Replaced bad AFCS Roll Sensor
11 Apr	Flight Refererence	Pilot's Gyro shows extreme nose down	Replaced ASN 50 Gyro
11 Apr	Integrated Guidance	AFCS has roll oscillations	Replaced bad AFCS Amp
11 Apr	Rotor	Tail rotor blade cracked	Replaced blade
19 Apr	Instruments	1st stage hydraulic pressure fluctuations	Replaced bad indicator
19 Apr	Integrated Guidance	#2 YAW indicator stays 1 mark to right of neutral	Replaced bad AFCS Amp
22 Apr	Nav	OMEGA Alert Lite intermittent	Replaced by FSR
23 Apr	Rotor	Tail Rotor Blade Abrasive Strip coming off	Replaced T/R Blade
24 Apr	Aircraft	None, noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

MISSION AIRCRAFT #8

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

DATE	SYSTEM	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
10 Dec 79	Transmissions	#1 nose gear box chip-lite, recycled chip detector CKT-BKR lite went out.	Removed and cleaned chip-detector, No evidence of fuzz.
30 Dec 79	Transmission	#1 nose gear box chip lite.	Removed and cleaned chip detector, no evidence of fuzz. Penalty run conducted, system checks good.
8 Jan 80	Flight Reference	Pilot's attitude gyro warning flag stays on-Transfers to Co-pilot when VGI transfer switch activated.	ASN-50 power supply system bad. Removed and replaced.
8 Jan 80	Transmissions	#1 nose gear box chip lite illuminated stays on when CKT-BKR is reset.	Removed all chip detectors, no evidence of metalic chips. Electrical continuity checks performed. 30 Min penalt run. No lite.
28 Jan 80	Hydraulics	1st stage hyd system pressure did not come online.	Removed and replaced 1st stage hyd. Pump reservice Checks good.
5 Feb 80	AFCS	Heading hold hunts with feet off pedals.	Replaced yaw sensor.
11 Feb 80	AFCS	#2 amplifier has no dampening in roll mode. @ 140kts A/C has porpoise in pitch.	Removed and replaced roll-rate and pitch-rate gyros.
21 Feb 80	Hydraulics	Cannibalization of 1st stage hyd pump.	Replaced pump on 29 Feb 80
4 Mar 80	Intermed GB	Removed IGB for A/C #6	Replaced on 22 Mar 80

MISSION AIRCRAFT #8

SIGNIFICANT MAINTENANCE ACTIONS (DEC 79 - APR 80)

DATE	SYSTEM	DISCREPANCY	CORRECTIVE ACTION
21 Apr 80	Aircraft	Functional check flight flown with following discrepancies: - Dampners require servicing. - FM squelch does not work. TACAN no lock-on.	All discrepancies repaired prior to mission launch
24 Apr 80	Aircraft	None noted	None; aircraft full mission capable

SEC NOFORN ~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted] 759

OpOrd

[redacted]

JTD Exercise

STORM CLOUD

CLASSIFICATION REVIEW EO 12356
CONDUCTED ON 12 AUG 92
DERIVATIVE CL BY DDO NMSC
☐ DECL ☐ DOWNGRADE TO
REVIEW ON OADR
SOURCES USED Multiple Sources
[redacted]



CLASSIFIED BY ~~JCS~~ J-3, JTD
REVIEW ON ~~15 NOVEMBER~~ 2000
EXTENDED BY ~~JCS, J-3,~~
REASON ~~5200.1R, PAR 2-301c(5~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ [redacted]

OPORD STORM CLOUD (U)

1. (U) Situation

2. (U) Mission

3. (U) Execution

4. (U) Support

5. (U) Command Control, Communications

ANNEXES:

A. (U) Task Organization

B. (U) Intelligence

Appendix 1 (U) Weather

C. (U) Operations

Appendix 1 (C) Delta
Appendix 2 (C) Rangers
Appendix 3 (U) Helo Ops
Appendix 4 (C) [redacted]
Appendix 5 (U) MC/EC-130
Appendix 6 (U) [redacted]
Appendix 7 (U) Air Defense
Appendix 8 (U) C-5/C-141B
Appendix 9 (U) KC-135
Appendix 10 (U) [redacted]
Appendix 11 (U) Airfield Plans, Clamity Jane procedures

D. (U) Logistics

Appendix 1 (U) Medical

J. (U) Command Relationships

Appendix 1 (U) Command Structure Chart

K. (U) Communications

L. (U) Operations Security

X. (U) Flight routes, Flow Chart

1. (U) Situation:

a. (U) General: A wealthy, radical "third world" nation, Calivada, is in the final stages of becoming a nuclear power. Peaceful nuclear facilities purchased from European nations have helped this process. Recently this nation has decided to speed the process by kidnapping three US nuclear physicists and stealing components and plans for nuclear weapons. The self proclaimed President-for-Life of Calivada has clearly stated that he will attempt to use his future nuclear capability to coerce the US on a number of regional issues. The US has confirmed that Calivada was responsible for the kidnapping and theft. An exhaustive search has located the US physicists and the plans/components (hereafter collectively referred to as "critical cargo") in a large city within the country.

(U) The physicists are being held in a government research office, BACON, while the plans and components are being kept at a nearby reseach facility, LIMESTONE.

(U) The objective of JTD Exercise STORM CLOUD is to recover the critical cargo intact and the physicists alive and well.

b. (U) Enemy: The country of Calivada is extremely hostile to the US. The neighboring countries of Arizona and New Mexico, while hostile to both the US and Calivada, would nonetheless probably warn Calivada of any US attempt to recover the critical material. Although Calivada's armed forces are relatively inefficient, there are adequate military resources available to present a hostile environment to any US recovery attempt.

c. (U) Friendly: The countries east of the Mississippi are sympathetic to the US and have granted the US overflight rights and a few staging facilities. These facilities are in sufficiently remote areas to allow short-term use without drawing undue attention.

2. (U) Mission: JTD STORM CLOUD forces covertly penetrate the hostile territory of Calivada and conduct simultaneous air assault operations to recover the US assets being illegally held at locations LIMESTONE and BACON.

3. (U) Execution:

a. (U) Concept of Operation

(1) (S) Phase I. Pre-Deployment. At D-1, [redacted] and DELTA move to an isolated area of Ft Bragg to conduct day and night rehearsals. [redacted] conducts rehearsals at a site to be determined.

b. (U) Coordinating Instructions:

(1) (U) Annex A - Task Organization

(2) (U) Annex C - Operations

(3) (U) Annex X - Execution Time Chart

(4) (U) Location Designators:

CAMELOT (Edwards AFB)
RIVERSIDE (Desert Rock)
EVERGLADE (Indian Springs)
BACON (Jackass Flats)
LIMESTONE (MX Site)
BROOMCORN (Campbell)
CANVASBACK (Hurlburt)
HORSESHOE (Bragg)
REMINGTON (Hunter)
GARRISON (Pahute Mesa)

(5) (U) CPX to be conducted 19 Nov. Message to follow.

(6) (U) Alternate evacuation sites are RIVERSIDE and CAMELOT in order.

(7) (U) Tasking:

(U) JTD:

(a) (U) Provide OPSEC/cover story.

(b) (U) Staff weather services.

(c) (U) Provide overall guidance/command.

A (U) [redacted] (RGR) [redacted] Inf.

(a) (U) Provide required forces for LIMESTONE, RIVERSIDE and EVERGLADE.

(b) (U) Provide OPFOR at exercise area. OPFOR to deploy to GARRISON 20 Nov.

(c) (U) Assist at CAMELOT as required.

(C) DELTA

(a) (U) Provide required forces for LIMESTONE.

(b) (U) Provide control of UH-60 assets during assault phase.

A (c) (C) Provide guidance/control of [redacted] assets chopped to use in assault phase.

(C) [redacted]

(a) (U) Provide required forces for BACON.

(b) Provide control of OPCON [redacted] assets during assault phase.

(c) (U) Verify headcount to DELTA at EVERGLADE.

A

(C) [redacted]

(a) (U) Construct BACON/LIMESTONE objectives.

(b) Provide control of their [redacted] during attack phase.

(c) (U) Provide OPSEC evaluation of exercise area at conclusion of trainex.

(d) (U) Provide focal point for coordination with DOE.

(U) 101st

(a) (U) Provide required helo force.

(b) (U) Provide admin recovery capability for downed helos.

(c) (U) Coordinate administrative backhaul from Edwards AFB.

(d) (U) Schedule assault force arrival at BROOMCORN to preclude standing time.

A

(e) Interface with [redacted]

(C) 1st SOW

(a) (U) Provide required fixed wing support.

(b) (U) Provide CCT support as required.

(c) (U) Insure CCT conducts liaison with CAMELOT and EVERGLADE prior to 21 Nov 80.

(d) (U) Coordinate emergency abort plan and Calamity Jane procedures with ground commanders.

(e) (U) Develop helo ground refuel plan and provide OPCON of 101 Pathfinders for refuel operations at EVERGLADE.

[redacted] AWACW

(a) (U) Provide AWAC support as required.

(b) (U) Develop, coordinate and control under separate Frag Order: F-14 Cap, F-4 Aggressor package and associated tanker support.

(C) USA QM Unit

(a) (U) Support as required.

(b) (U) Establish FAR system at EVERGLADE and RIVERSIDE.

(8) (U) Debrief will be conducted at 1300 on 25 November 1980. Commanders and unit representatives should report to the Pentagon, Room 2C840.

4. (U) Support.
Annex D - Logistics

5. (U) Command, Control, Communications

a. (U) Communications:

(1) (U) There will be three JTD Command Nets; SATCOM, ALPHA, SATCOM BRAVO, and HF CHARLIE. All will operate in the secure voice mode.

(2) (U) The mission element nets will operate in the categories of inter-air, air-ground, ground, and fire support. HF VHF-FM, VHF-AM, and UHF, both secure and non-secure, will be the modes of operation.

(3) (U) See C-E Annex K and the CEOI, published separately, for additional information.

b. (U) Command and Control:

(1) JTD command communications will operate from eight locations; the JTD base (photography), two JTD relays (POCKETBOOK and RYE GRASS), the JTD forward command posts (CAMELOT and EVERGLADE), a JTD response cell (BRASS RING), the JTD airborne command posts (E-3A and AC-130), and the JTD Main (HAMMER).

(2) (U) All primary element commanders will report directly to the CDR, JTD.

(3) (U) The Main JTD command post will be located with the CDR, JTD at all times.

(4) (U) See Annex J for additional information.

ROBERT A. TURNER
Colonel, USA
Joint Test Director

OFFICIAL:

ROBERT C. DUTTON
Colonel, USAF
J-3

ANNEXES:
A. Task Organization
B. Intelligence
C. Operations
D. Logistics
J. Command Relationships
K. Communications-Electronics
L. OPSEC
X. Time Chart

DISTRIBUTION

Unit	Cys
[redacted]	2
1 SOW	4
[redacted]	2
101st	4
DELTA	2
[redacted]	1
[redacted] AWACS	2
C-141/C-5	5
KC-135	2
JTD	6
[redacted]	6
USA Qm Unit	1
CCT (Charleston)	1

ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) TO OPORD STORM CLOUD (U)

(U) Task Organization

1. (S) Unit:

JTD HQ

[redacted]
TF 79.1 (DELTA)
[redacted]
101st AVN GP (-)
1st SOW (+)
AIR CAP (F-T4)
AWACS
QM Det
Ele JCSE
Ele ADA

2. (C) (S) Mission Area:

LIMESTONE	BACON	RIVERSIDE
TF 79.1 [redacted]	[redacted]	CO, [redacted] Ele, 1st SOW

EVERGLADE	OTHER	FIRE SUPPORT
[redacted] 1st SOW (-) Ele ADA QM DET	JTD HQ AWACS [redacted]	AC-130 AIR CAP AH-1G

ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) (U)

a. (U) (S) Strategic Setting: Joint Training Exercise STORM CLOUD will be held utilizing the following: Hurlburt Field, FL; Ft. Bragg, NC; Ft. Campbell, KY; Edwards AFB, CA; Indian Springs Aux, NV; Desert Rock Aux, NV; and Nevada Test Site. This is a JCS coordinated, JTD sponsored exercise. The setting is a representation of world-wide capabilities in a hostile environment.

b. (U) (C) Setting Countries: In the exercise strategic setting, country Calivada is surrounded by countries inimical to its own as well as to US interests. In the region there are friendly countries which will allow US forces use of their territories as landing/staging sites, as long as the influx of forces are kept as inconspicious as possible.

c. (U) (C) Political Situations: Country Calivada has long been suspicious of US and European motives in the region. Despite Calivada's continuing attempts to rid the region of US and European influence, it has continued to do business and purchase arms from both. Calivada is also regarded by its neighbors as being a threat to the stability of the area. Its neighbors suspect Calivada of planning to develop a nuclear capability that will allow it not only to influence US actions, but to intimidate its neighbors as well. There is ample reason for this suspicion, as Calivada has had historical territorial designs on its neighbors as well as a history of irrational actions. Calivada's armed forces, while inefficient by Western standards, is one of the largest and best equipped in the area. Calivada has shown itself to be extremely security conscious and has attempted to arm itself with the best and latest military equipment.

APPENDIX 1 (WEATHER) TO ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE) (U)

Situation Climatic Brief
CAMELOT

November

1. General. Site E is generally clear to partly cloudy in November with chilly nights and mild days. Skies are clear 42-68% of the time. Maximum cloudiness occurs between 0900 and 1700 local time. Mean cloudiness is 17-23% at night and 28-34% during the day. Morning minimum temperatures average 36F increasing to 66F during the afternoon. Precipitation occurs on about three days per month. Thunderstorms are very rare. The prevailing surface wind direction at night is southwest to west (11-17% of the time) at mean speeds of 3-10 knots. Calm winds occur 19-29% of the time. Daytime wind directions are variable, but show a slight tendency to be north-easterly. Speeds are 3-16 knots, and calms occur 19-34% of the time.

2. Flying Weather. Good to excellent. Cloudy and rainy conditions are infrequent. Ceilings less than 5000 feet and/or visibilities less than 5 miles occur 3-6% of the time; less than 1500/31% of the time or less. Conditions less than 55/1 are rare. Icing and turbulence are usually not a problem.

3. Exposure Weather. Generally pleasant. Nighttime temperatures are chilly, but reach the mid 60's during the afternoon. Sunshine is abundant and rain is rare. Relative humidity varies from an early morning high of 60-65% to an afternoon low of 35-40%.

ABSOLUTE MAXIMUM (F)	85
MEAN MAXIMUM	66
MEAN MINIMUM	36
ABSOLUTE MINIMUM	16
NUMBER OF DAYS WITH PRECIPITATION	3
SNOW	*
FOG	1
95% WORST DA	4800 Ft
95% WORD PA	2400 Ft

* = Less than 0.5 day

e. (U) Coordinating Instructions:

(1) (U) Actions at downed aircraft: TAB C (Downed Aircraft)

(2) (U) Aircraft load plans: TAB D (Load Plans)

4. (U) Service Support: SOP

5. (U) Command and Signal:

a. (U) Signal: TAB E (SIGNAL)

b. (U) Command: The TF 79.1 Commander is in UH-60 #4 during the assault flight, in the vicinity of point GRANGE during the assault, in the vicinity of the SW corner of EZ WHISKEY after the evacuation to objective GOLD, and is UH-60 #6 during the exfil.

DELTA: SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

EVENT		XMIT TO	BREVITY
1.	ASSAULT FORCE ON GND, ASSAULT IN PROGRESS.	[redacted] RGR BN CDR TO DELTA CDR, DELTA CDR TO CDR, [redacted]	ACCLAIM
2.	# PERSONNEL ENROUTE TO EXFIL AIRFIELD.	DELTA CDR TO CDR [redacted]	ANTELOPE
3.	FORCES DEPART OBJ, RGR BN CDR ASSUMES FSC.	DELTA CDR TO [redacted] RGR BN CDR,	BASKETBALL
4.	FORCES CLOSED INTO FIELD.	DELTA CDR TO CDR [redacted]	CITADEL
5.	TM DELTA (-) ENROUTE TO EXFIL AFLD VIA HELO.	[redacted] RGR BN CDR TO CDR [redacted]	DENTIST
6.	TM RANGER ENROUTE TO EXFIL AFLD VIA HELO.	UH-60 FLIGHT LDR TO CDR JTF.	FOOTNOTE

PHASE I

CAMELOT

(U) 1. OFF LOADING/BUILD UP

(U) 2. ASSEMBLY AREA

~~(C)~~ 3. T/O TIME

A. 4 UH-60	0310Z
B. 8 AH-1S	0320Z
C. [redacted]	0321Z
D. 20 UH-60	0515Z

(U) 4. ENROUTE MAP

~~(C)~~ 5. ARRIVAL AT RIVERSIDE

A. 4 UH-60	0428Z
B. 8 AH-1S	0438Z
C. [redacted]	0508Z
D. 20 UH-60	0633Z

~~(C)~~ 6. REFUELING TIME

A. AH-1S	0508Z
B. [redacted]	0633Z (21)
	0648Z (24)

PHASE II

RIVERSIDE TO BACON & LIMESTONE

(C) 1. T/O TIME (RIVERSIDE)

A. 16, [redacted]1, AH-1S	0824Z
B. 24, UH-60/2, AH-1S	0825Z
C. 8, [redacted]	0826Z
D. 3, AH-1S	0829Z
E. 1, AH-1S	0832Z
F. 1, AH-1S	0838Z

(U) 2. ENROUTE MAP

(U) 3. AH-1S TARGET MAP

(C) 4. EGRESS TIME

A. 16, [redacted]	0900Z
B. 8, [redacted]	0902Z
C. 8, UH-60	0915Z
D. 16, UH-60	0945Z
E. 8, AH-1S	0945Z

PHASE III

EVERGLADE:

(U) 1. ARRIVAL AT EVERGLADE

A. 16, [redacted]		0932Z
B. 8, UH-60		0939Z
C. 16, UH-60		1009Z
D. 8, AH-1S		1005Z

(U) 2. REFUEL/DEPARTURE

A. 8, UH-60		1004Z
B. 16, UH-60	(8)	1034Z
	(8)	1039Z
C. 8, AH-1S		1139Z

RIVERSIDE:

1. 5, [redacted] ARRIVE		0923Z
2. 5, [redacted] DEPART		1003Z

APPENDIX 5 (MC/EC-130) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

1. (U) (C) Seven (7) Aircraft (5-MC's/2-EC's)

2. (U) (S) Takeoff CANVASBACK - 0100Z to 0130Z (as required)

3. (U) (C) Refueling Times: 0300Z - 3 aircraft
(at the ARIP) 0310Z - 2 aircraft
0320Z - 2 aircraft

4. (U) (S) Low level entry times: 0430Z till 0455Z

Low level entry point: N35-07 W99-50

5. (U) (S) TOT's:

a. EVERGLADE - 0845/46/47/48/55Z

b. RIVERSIDE - 0855Z/0905Z

6. (U) (C) Takeoff times: (Approx 2 hrs on ground)

1045Z till 1115Z

7. (U) (S) Low level exit time: 1500Z till 1520Z (N35-07 W99-50)

8. (U) (S) Refueling times: 1540/1550/1600Z

9. (U) (S) Land times CANVASBACK: 1820/1830/1840Z

APPENDIX 8 (C-5, C-141B OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

1. (U) TASKS:

(a) (U) Provide 8 C-5 and 3 C-141B aircraft to airlift JTD STORM CLOUD forces/equipment to required destinations.

(b) (U) Provide Combat Control Team as required to:

(1) (U) Exercise positive control of all fixed wing and rotary wing takeoffs and landings except for initial blacked out MC-130 landings at EVERGLADE and RIVERSIDE and initial helicopter landings at RIVERSIDE.

(2) (U) Assist and plan with [redacted] for the safe transloading of passengers from helicopters to fixed wing assets.

A

(3) (U) Coordinate emergency abort plan with the on-scene ground commander.

(4) (U) Develop helicopter ground refueling flow plan.

2. (U) COMMAND AND SIGNAL: COMJTF exercises command and control of MAC forces through the COMALF.

3. (U) EXECUTION:

a. (U) C-5: 8 C-5 aircraft will airlift helicopters and forces from BROOMCORN to CAMELOT.

#1	T/O BROOMCORN	212030
#2	"	212040
#3	"	212050
#4	"	212100
#5	"	212110
#6	"	212120
#7	"	212130
#8	"	212140
#1	ARV.CAMELOT	220130
#2	"	220140
#3	"	220150
#4	"	220200
#5	"	220210
#6	"	220220
#7	"	220230
#8	"	220240
#1-8	ON-LOAD CAMELOT	221800

b. (U) Depart times and arrival times at BROOMCORN to be determined.

c. (U) (S) C-141B EVERGLADE 3 C-141B aircraft will airlift fuel blivets.

#1	T/O HORSESHOE	220333
#2	"	220335
#3	"	220337
#1	ARCP	220500
#2	"	220500
#3	"	220500
#1	ARV. EVERGLADE	220908
#2	"	220913
#3	"	220918
#1	T/O EVERGLADE	221000
#2	"	221020
#1	ARCP	221330
#3	"	221350
#1	SVN/POB	221530
#3	"	221550

d. (U) (S) #2 C-141B will remain at EVERGLADE to admin airlift bivits and load personnel to HORSESHOE. T/O time to be determined.

e. (U) LOAD/BACKHAUL PLAN:

See Charts

APPENDIX 9 (KC-135 OPERATIONS) TO ANNEX C (OPERATIONS)

1. (U) (S) Concept of Operations: SAC will provide inbound and outbound refueling support for AC/MC/EC-130 and C-141B aircraft, as well as refueling for E-3A/F-14 fighter cap package. The 1SOW will coordinate special tracks for low altitude refueling. For high altitude operations, fighter cap package will use A/R 3E, while C-141Bs will use AR 112 W/E. All refueling operations will be conducted using only minimum essential communications.

a. (U) (S) E-3A/Fighter Support: A tanker task force at March AFB will support F-14 refuelings with drogue-equipped KC-135s. Specific mission details will be contained in E-3A air-to-air annex for STORM CLOUD.

b. (U) (S) C-141B Support: Altus AFB KC-135s will support both inbound and outbound refuelings in A/R 112, using point parallel procedures. The inbound ARCT will be a firm preplanned time; outbound ARCT will be adjusted based on the receiver's launch time. Tankers will be prepared to hold, awaiting C-141 late outbound arrival.

TANKER CALL SIGN	RECEIVER CALL SIGN	A/R TRACK	RATIO TNKR/RCVR	ARCT	ALTITUDE	OFFLOA
THEM 51	TBD	112W	1:3	220500Z	270	15m ea
THEM 52	TBD	112E	1:1	221330Z	270	25m
THEM 53	TBD	112E	1:1	221350Z	270	25m

c. (U) Communications/Rendezvous Plan is as published in FLIP.

d. (U) (S) AC/MC/EC-130 Support: A tanker task force at Grissom AFB will support all 1SOW refuelings, using overhead comm-out rendezvous for inbound refueling; modified point parallel for outbound A/R. Inbound ARCT (time at the RZ point) will be preplanned; outbound ARCTs will be adjusted based on receiver launch time. The 1SOW will coordinate the special low altitude refueling tracks to be used for this exercise.

(1) (U) (S) Planned A/R tracks:

TRACK	RZ POINT	ARCP	EAR
A	TXK 316/33	ADM 087/85	ADM 067/20
B	ADM 306/33	ADM 067/20	TXK 316/33
C	(Between Abilene, TX and Roswell, NM)		
D	(Between Prescott VORTAC and St Johns VORTAC)		

Final determination of AR Tracks will depend upon 1SOW requirements and FAA constraints.

(2) ~~(S)~~ (U) MC/EC-130 Support:

TANKER CALL SIGN	RECEIVER CALL SIGN	A/R TRACK	ARCT(Z)	ALT	RECVR ON-LOAD	A/A TACAN	KC-13 BEACO
BAR 11/12	TBD (3)	A	220300Z	11,000	25m	31/94	1-1-
BAR 13	TBD (2)	A	220310Z	11,000	25m	32/95	2-1-
BAR 14	TBD (2)	A	220320Z	11,000	25m	33/96	2-1-
A/R FREQ	P.366.3	/BU	391.8				
BAR 15/16	TBD (3)	B	221540Z	11,000	25m	31/94	1-1-
BAR 17	TBD (2)	B	221550Z	11,000	25m	32/95	2-1-
BAR 18	TBD (2)	B	221600Z	11,000	25m	33/96	2-1-
A/R FREQ:	P.366.3/B.U. 391.8						

A

(3) ~~(S)~~ (U) [redacted] Support:

TANKER CALL SIGN	RECEIVER CALL SIGN	A/R TRACK	ARCT(Z)	ALT	RECVR ON-LOAD	A/A TACAN	KC-13 BEACO
BAR 21/22	TBD (2)	C	220455Z	10,000	32m	30/93	2-1-
BAR 25/26	TBD (2)	D	221140Z	11,000	38m	30/93	2-1-
A/R FREQ:	P.361.7/B.U. 350.7						

APPENDIX 10 (Det A Operations) TO ANNEX C (Operations)

1. (S) Mission: [redacted] conducts [redacted] assault of BACON at 220745Z Nov 80 to recover US assets.

2. (S) Execution:

a. (U) Concept of Operations: The operation will be conducted in three phases.

(1) (C) Phase I: Unit will be moved from CANVASBACK to BROOMCORN on 21 Nov in time to outload on C-5s.

(2) (S) Phase II: Unit will conduct [redacted] assault of BACON to recover assets.

(3) (S) Phase III: Unit will exfiltrate [redacted] to EVERGLADE where they will transload to C-141 aircraft for return to CANVASBACK.

Everglade:

C-130 OFF-LOADING POSITIONS

MC-130 #1 LANDS AT H HOUR
MC-130 #2 LANDS AT H+1MIN
MC-130 #3 LANDS AT H+2
MC-130 #4 LANDS AT H+3
EC-130 #5 LANDS AT H+10



Everglade

C - 141B GROUND MARSHALLING PLAN



Everglade

SECRET

PARKING PLAN:



SECRET

Everglade

REFUEL / DEPARTURE OPERATIONS:



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OPERATIONS: CLAMITY JANE PROCEDURES

CALAMITY JANE Procedures - ELEVATE. The "CALAMITY JANE" procedure is devised in the interest of safety and to insure orderly aircraft spacing in the event that any go around is required.

Format: "(Aircraft Flight) This is (Command Agency), ELEVATE XX at YY; acknowledge." Where (Aircraft Flight) is the string of aircraft to which the procedure applies, and (Command Agency) is the agency commanding the procedure.

XX is the number of minutes each aircraft will delay.
YY is the time in minutes at which the procedure will be initiated.

Procedure: If necessary to implement a "CALAMITY JANE" procedure, the ELEVATE call will be given early enough to allow each aircraft to receive and acknowledge the call prior to YY. After acknowledgement, all aircraft will fly their assigned route to the location corresponding to time YY. At YY, all aircraft will initiate a 180 degree standard rate turn to the right. Even suffixed aircraft will initiate a climb to base altitude plus 500 feet. Aircraft will fly a single holding pattern so as to arrive back at YY location at time YY plus XX. Even suffixed aircraft will descend to base altitude when reestablished on course.

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ANNEX D (LOGISTICS)

LOGISTICS (U)

1. (U) Concept. Initial logistics provisioning will be through normal Service channels to the extent possible. Equipment maintenance is a responsibility of the providing Service/ command. Minimum resupply is planned. Emergency requirements which cannot be satisfied in objective areas will be forwarded to JTD J-4.

a. (U) Supply:

(1) Class I. Operational rations will be used throughout. Each command is responsible to deploy into area with sufficient rations for consumption until return to home station.

(2) (U) Class III:

(a) (S) 101st will operate FARRP (2 points) at RIVERSIDE. POL, Blivit and pumps will be provided from JTD assets at Ft Bragg. 101st will coordinate pickup of material.

(b) (S) QM detachment will operate refuel point (8 points) at EVERGLADE.

(c) (S) Refuel of AH-1G [redacted] by UH-60 refuelers will be conducted by 101st at RIVERSIDE.

A

(d) (S) [redacted] will be refueled administratively at EVERGLADE after ENDEX either by QM detachment or base tanker truck in order of priority.

(e) (U) No other refueling except for air refueling of aircraft is planned.

(3) (U) Class V:

(a) (U) All deploy with sufficient Class V for conduct of operation.

(b) [redacted] Only resupply is at FARRP at RIVERSIDE for AH-15 [redacted] Requirements to be determined by 101st. (Simulate carrying Class V into RIVERSIDE.)

A

(4) (U) Other Classes of Supply: No other resupply is scheduled.

b. (U) Medical. Tab 1.

c. (U) Transportation. Deployments/redeployments will be coordinated between HQ JTD and MAC. Requirements for additional transportation will be forwarded to JTD-J4.

APPENDIX 1 (MEDICAL) TO ANNEX D (LOGISTICS)

MEDICAL SUPPORT

1. (U) Unit level medical support utilizing organic medical assets will be the responsibility of the organization commander.

2. (U) Medical support beyond the capability of unit level medical personnel will be planned, coordinated, and controlled by the designated JTD Surgeon.

3. (U) JTD level medical support for Exercise STORM CLOUD is as follows:

a. (U) (S) CAMELOT Forces: Aboard C-5A #6, two Delta Med personnel and two medical chests. (101 Flight Surgeon to accompany UH-60 flight at the discretion of Helicopter Air Mission Commander.)

b. (U) (S) EVERGLADE Forces: (MC-130) Two Delta Med personnel and two medical chests aboard aircraft #5.

c. (U) (S) EVERGLADE Forces: (C-141) Two Delta Med personnel and two medical chests aboard C-141 # 1.

d. (U) RIVERSIDE Forces: Medical support to be provided by 1st SOW flight surgeon personnel.

4. (U) (C) Evacuation procedures in the event of actual evacuation requirements during staging activities (Campbell, Pope, Hurlburt) casualties should be evacuated to local base medical facility. Evacuation of personnel involved in operations in-and-around Edwards AFB should be directed to USAF Medical Clinic, Edwards - Main. Evacuation of personnel involved in operations in-and-around DOE, Indian Springs, and Desert Rock should be directed to Nellis AFB Hospital. Air crews should be briefed on potential evacuation requests and routes.

5. (U) In the event of actual emergencies--evacuation procedures will be handled in accordance with normal SAR.

ANNEX J (COMMAND AND CONTROL) TO OPORD STORM CLOUD (U)

1. (S) JTD Succession of Command:

	Individual	Call Sign	Location
a.	HAMMER	LANCER	JTD MAIN
b.	STONE	ARCHER	[redacted]
c.	SNUFFY	CYCLONE	SCORPION (AWACS)
d.	BG SCHOLTES	OUTLAW	EVERGLADE
e.	Col TURNER	COMANCHE	PHOTOGRAPH

2. (U) Command Relationships (See attached diagram Appendix 1):

a. (U) JTD CDR - Is in full, overall command of all forces, during all phases of the exercise. (See paragraph 1 above for Command Succession). All of the following commanders report directly to the JTD commander when appropriate and required. (See paragraph 3 for Command Concept).

b. [redacted] JTD Deputy Commander - Located [redacted]

(1) [redacted] Manages and directs [redacted] AH-1S assets in providing supporting fires in response to assault commander within pre-established priorities.

(2) (U) Manages and directs SAR assets and efforts.

(3) [redacted] Controls [redacted] assets upon their completion of initial objectives.

c. (C) Air Support Commander - Located AWACS.

(1) (U) Manages and directs the employment of E-3A and F-14 assets in provision of CAP.

(2) (U) Manages the employment of all KC-135 assets.

(3) (U) Provides track information and firing recommendations on low altitude targets to the ADA controllers at designated ground sites.

(4) (U) Manages the employment of all KC-135 assets.

d. (U) Air Mission Commanders (CAMELOT, EVERGLADE, RIVERSIDE):

(1) (U) Command all fixed wing assets designated to support their respective objectives.

(2) (U) Each is Dominant Authority while airborne on his in-bound and out-bound routes.

(3) (U) Responsive to Ground Commander while landed.

A (4) (U) [redacted] assets chop to JTD Deputy Commander during on station time.

e. (U) Ground Commanders (CAMELOT, EVERGLADE, RIVERSIDE).

A (1) (U) Command all security ([redacted] Rangers) forces, CCT personnel, and support elements at their respective locations.

(2) (U) Security forces include, under the subordinate command of the on-site Ranger Commander, the ALO, Fire Support Coordinator, and ADA elements.

(3) (U) Support elements include Medics and a substantial DACO effort at EVERGLADE, and a FARRP at RIVERSIDE.

(4) (U) Is the Dominant Authority at their location while forces are on the ground.

f. (U) LIMESTONE Assault Commander.

A (1) (C) Commands LIMESTONE assault forces (Delta, [redacted]

(2) (U) Commands LIMESTONE UH-60 assets from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

(3) (U) Dominant Authority from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

A (4) (C) Determines time of final assault (H-Hour) within guidance provided by JTD Commander, and coordinates launches of BACON assault forces/helicopter assets, [redacted] helicopter assets, and attack helicopter assets at appropriate times.

g. (U) BACON Assault Commander.

(1) (U) Commands BACON assault forces (Detachment A).

A (2) (S) Commands BACON [redacted] from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

(3) (U) Dominant Authority (along with LIMESTONE Assault Commander who has priority) from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

h. (U) [redacted] Commander.

(1) (C) Commands [redacted]

(2) (C) Commands designated [redacted] assets from RIVERSIDE launch until EVERGLADE landing.

(3) (U) Upon completion of initial assigned mission chops to JTD Deputy Commander for employment in SAR and/or combat forces role.

i. (U) Helicopter Mission Commander.

(1) (U) Becomes the Ground Commander at CAMELOT on landing at that location.

(2) (C) Commands all helicopter assets from CAMELOT take-off until RIVERSIDE landing. The Deputy Helicopter Mission Commander in the flight of four UH-60 refueling helicopters will in fact, for the HMC, command all [redacted] AW-15 assets from CAMELOT take-off to RIVERSIDE landing. DHMC during this period will report directly to JTD if required.

(3) (U) Chops all assets to appropriate mission commanders at RIVERSIDE.

(4) (U) (C) Commands all UH-60 and AH-1S forces upon exfiltration take-off from EVERGLADE.

3. (U) JTD Command Concept:

a. (U) The Commander, JTD, is in full overall command of all forces, during all phases of each JTD operation. All subordinate commanders will function in an Imperative Activity/Dominant Authority Mode.

b. (U) Imperative Activity is defined as the portion of the operation which, at a given point in time, is critical to successful mission completion.

c. (U) The term Dominant Authority denotes the commander responsible, at that time, for execution of the Imperative Activity.

d. (U) The Dominant Authority concept implies temporary OPCON of one or more lateral elements; not a formal transfer of command. For example, during an airfield seizure phase, the Ground Forces Commander (GFC) has the

Imperative Activity and, for that period, is the Dominant Authority. The Air Mission Commander (AMC) who had just landed, would remain in the JTD command net, but would be prepared to execute, on order of the GFC (under the monitoring of the Commander, JTD), various tasks necessary to successfully complete the seizure phase of the operation.

e. (U) At certain times during an operation, there may be more than one Dominant Authority. An example might be the Air Support Commander defending against an air attack over the target area at the same time the ground assault phase was in progress. In these instances the general situation and the nature of events will dictate which commanders respond to the requirements of the others. Priorities will be monitored and adjusted, and positive command guidance will be provided when required, by the Commander, JTD.

JTD COMMAND STRUCTURE

EXERCISE STORM CLOUD



——————— FIRE SUPPORT REQUESTS
..... PROGRESS/STATUS REPORTS

ANNEX K (COMMUNICATIONS) TO OPORD STORM CLOUD (U)

1. (U) Communication Doctrine.

a. (U) (S) Radio listening silence is required for OPSEC reasons in certain situations prior to H-Hour.

(1) (U) (S) When Direction Finding (DF) or local monitoring of aircraft station transmissions would reveal movement towards or within a hostile country.

(2) (U) (S) When DF or local monitoring of ground station transmissions at in-country staging/refueling sites would reveal the in-country presence and possibly the exact location of such sites.

b. ~~(U)~~ Once the actual assault has begun there are few security limitations. [redacted] should probably remain secure (on FM or UHF), but most other transmissions can be made in the clear, and as often as necessary.

2. (U) Procedures for EXERCISE STORM CLOUD.

a. (U) (S) General: Except for JTD Base and relay stations operating in the Broadcast Mode;

(1) (U) (S) Radio listening silence to maximum degree practical.

(2) (U) (S) Minimum transmissions are at other times.

b. (U) Procedures by phase.

(1) (U) (S) Pre-deployment. For one week prior, establish patterns of base stations/relay stations broadcasting messages on secure SATCOM and secure HF. Each message acknowledged by at least one other base or relay station and broadcast back. Stations include unit admin stations at home bases, and JTD deployed base/relay stations.

(2) (U) Deployment. Same as pre-deployment.

(3) (U) (S) Insertion (includes all inbound fixed-wing flights, landing at Camelot, assembly, flights to Riverside, and staging at Riverside).

(a) (U) (S) Nominal radio listening silence by all aircraft and ground stations on all frequencies.

(b) (U) (S) Base stations periodically broadcast information messages on secure SATCOM and secure HF. Acknowledged (and repeated) only by other base or relay stations. These transmissions include weather updates, time checks, and aircraft progress reports (as observed by the AWACS).

(c) (U) (S) Transmissions by aircraft/ground stations only when absolutely required to report difficulties. Use the ZEBRA channels in the clear, with the ZEBRA number code. The in-the-clear, numeric transmissions reduce the total time on the air, eliminate the give-away sounds of the PARKHILL, and eliminate the use of English spoken code words. The base stations will then initiate detailed questions, comments, and instructions, fully secured on the broadcast channels, with answers, if required, using in-the-clear numbers on the ZEBRA channels.

(d) (U) (C) In cases of extreme difficulty approval may be given to use secure UHF between aircraft, if the situation permits.

(4) (U) Assault.

(a) (U) (S) Enroute is the same as the Insertion Phase until H-Hour, or until operation is detected, whichever comes first.

(b) [redacted] (S) During assault [redacted] should use secure FM and/or UHF. All other transmissions in extraction zone areas secure or in the clear if needed to facilitate operations. During this period, all the out-of-CALIVADA transmissions will use two-way secure SATCOM and HF radio (single channel), on the SATCOM ALPHA or BRAVO net as appopriate.

A

(5) (U) (C) Extraction (includes flights to Riverside, transloading, and outbound flights).

(a) (U) (C) Same as Assault through outbound flight Riverside.

(b) (U) (C) Absolutely minimum transmissions on outbound flights.

4. (U) For all other communications information, see CEOI.

ANNEX L TO OPLAN STORM CLOUD (U) OPERATIONS SECURITY (U)

References:

a. (U) JCS Pub 18, "Doctrine for Operations Security."

b. (U) DODR 5200.1R

1. (U) GENERAL: This annex provides guidance for the secure planning and conduct of exercise STORM CLOUD (U).

2. (U) RESPONSIBILITY FOR OPSEC: All participants in this exercise share responsibility for OPSEC. In order to efficiently manage this responsibility OPSEC points of contact (POC) will be appointed by each participating unit and cognizant higher headquarters. These POC's will work directly with JTD security to coordinate all security matters. JTD security will provide a specific hostile all source intelligence collection report at D-3., Updates will be provided as required.

3. (U) OPSEC THREAT: Because the STORM CLOUD exercise areas are normally associated with high priority science and technology, a potential OPSEC threat exists at both home bases and in the exercise areas.

a. (S) SIGINT - A variety of hostile spaceborne, seaborne, and land based stations pose a threat to this exercise. Among these will be: Soviet and Cuban land based HF DF stations; diplomatic missions in Washington, San Francisco, and Mexico [redacted] In addition, periodic overflights by Communist Bloc airlines pose a threat.

b. (S) The WSC-3/Parkhill communications signature which is identifiable with the JTD may be subject to hostile traffic analysis techniques. Pre and post exercise management of traffic levels will partially counter this threat. Specific guidance on desired traffic levels wil be provided in separate message. Another partial counter to this traffic analysis threat will be the use of Parkhill secure phones. Outside of maintaining minimum acceptable traffic levels on the WSC-3, an effort should be made to use the PARKHILL secured phone lines for necessary coordination. The possibility of detecting phone conversations is less than radio-satellite communications.

c. (U) HUMINT. This threat is posed by both both overt and covert means. Among these are hostile diplomatic travel, merchant seamen transiting the CONUS, students and cultural/ scientific exchange personnel. The best counter to this

threat is good continuing unit OPSEC training and clear guidance concerning current activity. Specifically, unit personnel should, to the degree possible, act in a business as normal manner. While there is no desire to publically announce the exercise, it is recognized all necessary preparations cannot remain hidden. Therefore, unit personnel should understand that the unit will/did participate in a TRAINEX is unclassified.

d. (U) (S) Open sources. Media stories currently present an extremely great threat to STORM CLOUD security. The unusually large deployment/redeployment activity at Campbell may provoke media inquiries. The on-going exercise BRIGHT STAR, increases this possibility. Noise or accidents during the exercise may also result in media inquiries. The primary means of defusing this threat will be timely responses to inquiries. This will require a combination of contingency press releases and rapid cross tell between units and JTD HQ in the event of inquires. FAA flight plans and communications frequency coordination are also potential open source threats. To the extent possible, frequency coordination will be done via secure means. While hostile intelligence will be able to note fixed wing flight plans to the Edwards and Nellis AFB areas, rotary wing aircraft operating between these points will attempt to file flight plans for general radi of action vice specific routes.

e. (U) (S) PHOTINT: Soviet photo satellites may pose a threat to the deployment/redeployments and to the construction of exercise facilities. JTD security will provide satellite warnings and to the extent possible, daylight exercise related activities will be adjusted. Separate JTD message will provide further details on this threat.

4. (U) EXECUTION:

a. (U) JTD will provide:

(1) Satellite warnings for home bases and all exercise locations beginning on D-3 with updates as appropriate.

(2) AGI, merchant ship, Communist Bloc airline warnings beginning on D-3 with updates as appropriate.

(3) Notices of pertinent Soviet Bloc attache travel will be provided when available.

(4) Liaison with OSD, JCS, and service public affairs officers as required.

(5) Numbered, accountable copies of this OPORD.

b. (U) All units will:

(1) (U) Make the maximum use of secure vice non-secure comms.

(2) (U) Immediately report to JTD HQ any incidents which have a potential security impact. Aircraft accidents or personnel injuries are prime examples.

(3) (U) Provide daily (NLT 2400 local) feedback on security situation. Reports should begin on D-3 and extend through D+3. Security situations requiring assistance/ coordination with JTD should be reported ASAP.

(4) (U) Politely refer all media/public inquiries to public affairs channels and immediately alert JTD security. Inform the person who makes the inquiry that it is the function of the public affairs to provide the information they seek.

(5) (U) Instruct all personnel, that in the event of an accident/incident they should provide as necessary; name, rank, unit, and if necessary, admit to participating in a joint training exercise. Provocative actions or words (classified, sensitive, etc) should be avoided. Additional inquiries should be directed to public affairs.

(6) (U) Appoint a POC to liaison with INSCOM team performing counter-intelligence assessment. Note, INSCOM team will not be cleared for JTD information. Neither confirm or deny INSCOM findings; however, use their information to take corrective action. If necessary INSCOM reps can be asked for clarification of their findings or OPSEC recommendations.

(7) (U) Transmit INSCOM reports to JTD HQ in a timely fashion.

(8) (U) At the conclusion of the exercise each unit may retain one copy of OPORD STORM CLOUD. All other copies of the OPORD are to be collected and returned to JTD HQ.

(9) (U) Beginning on D-8, all units will insure that at least a minimum level of activity is established on the WSC-3. Details on this will be provided in separate message.

(10) (U) The use of Edwards AFB will be treated as CONFIDENTIAL information until arrival at Edwards AFB. As an exception to this pre-exercise coordination with MAC concerning airfields usage at Fort Campbell and Edwards will be For Official Use Only. To the extent possible this coordination information should be limited to as few personnel as required. After arrival of the main body of exercise forces at Edwards, the Edwards AFB location will no longer be treated as CONFIDENTIAL. All other locations will, however, be classified as CONFIDENTIAL prior to, during and after the exercise.

(11) (U) All unit personnel will be briefed that the fact that the unit participated in a TRAINEX is unclassified. Unit personnel should also be briefed to refer to all requests for specifics of the TRAINEX to their unit commander.

c. (U) Unit hosting exercise debrief:

(1) (U) Insure that normal security proceedures contained in DODR 5200.1R and service supplements are followed. Among these are:

(a) (U) Insure that adequate space is available for conducting TOP SECRET debriefings.

(b) (U) Insure that access to debriefing is controlled.

(c) (U) Double check the conference area at conclusion of the debrief.

(2) (U) 101st will:

(a) (U) To the extent possible, avoid overflight of inhabited areas between exercise points.

(b) (U) Act as primary security POC for Edwards AFB.

(c) (U) Perform a double check to insure that no classified information is left at Edwards AFB.

(d) (U) Coordinate directly with Delta and JTD HQ to insure that the cross load at Campbell is conducted in a low key, non-provocative manner.

(3) (U) Rangers will:

(a) (U) Act as primary security POC for Indian Springs.

(b) (U) Perform a double check to insure that no classified information is left at Indian Springs.

(4) [redacted]

(a) (U) Act as primary security POC for Desert Rock and exercise locations within the Department of Energy (DOE) area.

(b) (U) Perform a sweep to insure that no classified information is left in above mentioned area.

(5) (U) 1SOW will:

(a) (U) To the extent possible, avoid low altitude flights of inhabited sections of the exercise area.

APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEX L TO EXERCISE STORM CLOUD OPLAN ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF FRIENDLY INFORMATION

Subject Requiring Protection	Plan Phase	Prep Phase	Exec Phase	Post Phase
Participation of DELTA, [redacted]	X	X	X	X
Identities of Personnel attached to DELTA, [redacted]	X	X	X	X
Use of Edwards AFB range	X	X		
Use of NTS areas	X	X	X	X
Lessons learned	N/A	N/A	N/A	X
Identification of specialized equipment not normally a part of a units TA	X	X	X	X



EX X TO OPLAN STORM CLOUD (U)



ANNEX X TO OPLAN STORM CLOUD (U)
ROUTE CHART

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

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ANNEX X TO OPLAN STORM CLOUD (U)
FLOW CHART

[redacted]

I-760

OPERATION POTENT CHARGE

(U) Purpose -

1. Train to deployability readiness a SNOWBIRD mission-capable force consisting of [illegible] UH-60's, 5 HH/CH-53C's, 5 CH-47C's (HICAP), 10 UH-60A's (HFCA+).

2. Train a cadre of mission - ready crews for the purpose of conducting SNOWBIRD - oriented individual and unit training.

3. Articulate doctrine and procedures for the conduct of joint helicopter special operations missions, and document for the future.

(U) Concept -

1. 1 Aug 80 - Establish Joint Aviation Plans and Operations Directorate directly subordinate to CJTF.

2. 6 to 8 Aug 80 - Conduct Joint Helicopter Operations Doctrine and Procedures Conference, sponsored by JTF. Attendees from HQ, JTF; HQ, 101 [illegible]; HQ, 1st Special [illegible] Wing; US Army Aviation Center; and Marine Aviation Weapons and Tactics Squadron One. Determine, in conference, using HONEY BADGER evaluations as a basis, doctrine and procedures for conduct of future helicopter special missions. Document procedures.

3. 18 to 31 Aug 80 - Conduct operational training of a mission package to refine and test doctrine and procedures. Conduct a mission-oriented exercise over realistic distances, in a type mission environment. Evaluate special mission package potential to successfully conclude a SNOWBIRD mission.

(U) Assets -

10 - UH60 HICAP
5 - CH47 HICAP
5 - HH53H
5 HH/CH53C/D

Select crew:
- 8 UH60, Army
- 4 CH47, Army
- 4 HH53H, Air Force
- 4 HH/CH53, Air Force/USMC

Classified By: JCS
Declassified ON: OADR
Declassified by:
DDO NMCC
12 AUG 92

(U)

) Doctrinal/Procedural Subject Areas -

1. Briefings:

   a. Briefing format/guide
   b. Pre-mission [illegible]
   c. Map/chart/flight [illegible]
   d. Formation briefs
   e. Emergency procedures briefs
   f. Cell standardization
   g. Tactical situation briefs
   h. Mission note cards

2. Mission, profile, [illegible] phase -

   a. Ground abort procedures
   b. Communications plan
   c. Spare aircraft procedures
   d. Departure join-up
   e. Enroute link-up
   f. Lost lead link-up
   g. Formation visual signals

      (1) lead change
      (2) frequency change
      (3) position change
      (4) emergency
      (5) break

   h. NVG navigation check points - route selection
   i. Lost comm
   j. Lost visual contact - signals and procedures
   k. Evasive maneuver battle drill
   l. Wing man abort
   m. Downed crew recovery
   n. Re-link procedures, enroute, holding area, LZ/PZ.
   o. IP procedures
   p. Holding area procedures
   q. Hides
   r. AR procedures

      (1) timing
      (2) missed AR
      (3) cell procedures
      (4) lighting

3. Mission profile, terminal phase

   a. Aircraft spotting in LZ/PZ/holding area
   b. ROE/LZ status/threat/security
   c. Rejoin by aircraft left in holding area
   d. RRP closeout procedures - signals and counts

e. PZ closeout procedures - signals and counts
f. Authentication procedures
g. Evasive maneuver, re-link
h. Pax onload/offload procedures

   (1) count
   (2) control
   (3) conform

i. Lost lead
j. LZ lost comm

   (1) visual signals
   (2) withhold

k. Rescue and recovery response procedures
l. Signals - compromise/pickup/proceed
m. Holding area communications -

   (1) call forward plan
   (2) re-link plan
   (3) withhold plan
   (4) NLT times

n. Passenger instructions
o. Transload area procedures

   (1) pax instructions
   (2) pax marking
   (3) pax accounting
   (4) ingress/egress
   (5) lighting
   (6) communications plan
   (7) lost comm plan - signals
   (8) control points/holding areas

p. RRP/LZ/PZ timing/traffic/holding
q. RRP/LZ/PZ HA procedures
r. Go around procedures
s. CCT/Pathfinder coordination

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5 August 1980

JTD PROCEDURAL CONFERENCE
EXERCISE POTENT CHARGE - PHASE I

Following is a list of participants in POTENT CHARGE Joint Doctrine Conference:

NAME/RANK	CLEARANCE (S)	ORGANIZATION	SSN
COLONEL [redacted]	TS	USAAVNC	[redacted]
MAJOR [redacted]	TS	DA,ODCSOPS (JCS)	[redacted]
MAJOR [redacted]	TS	USAAVNC	[redacted]
CAPTAIN [redacted]	TS	USAAVNC	[redacted]
CWO-3 [redacted]	S	USAAVNS	[redacted]
MAJOR [redacted]	TS	101 AVN GP	[redacted]
CWO-3 [redacted]	S	D/158 AVN BN	[redacted]
CWO-3 [redacted]	S	C/158 AVN BN	[redacted]
CAPTAIN [redacted]	S	C/158 AVN BN	[redacted]
CWO-4 [redacted]	S	A/159 AVN BN	[redacted]
MAJOR [redacted]	TS	1st SOW	[redacted]
MAJOR [redacted]	TS	AF/RDQL	[redacted]
CAPTAIN [redacted]	S	1st SOW	[redacted]
CAPTAIN [redacted]	TS	1st SOW	
MAJOR [redacted]	TS	437 MAW/CCT	
MAJOR [redacted]	TS	MAWTS-1 Yuma AZ	[redacted]
MAJOR [redacted]	TS	HMX-1 Quantico	[redacted]
MAJOR [redacted]	TS	6510th Test Wg (JCS)	[redacted]

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EXPENDABLES

QUANTITY	ITEM	PROVIDED BY	
250	40MM [redacted]	Anniston	
400	[redacted]	Anniston	
300	Ammo Pouches	Anniston	
660	7.62MM Tracer Ctg.	Anniston	
48	White SMoke Grenade	Navy	
400	Concussion Grenades	Navy	
100	Practice Concussion Grenades	Navy	D
272	Rocket Incendiary 66MM 4rd Clip	Anniston (48 Bragg)	Del
936	40MM CTG HEDP for M79	Anniston	[redacted]
40	All weather goggles	Bragg	Delta
100	Ear Protectors	DSC Richmond	Delta
100	Navy Watch Caps	Navy Exchange (paid)	Delta
272	Navy Watch Caps	DLA	Delta/[redacted]
100	Navy Watch Sweaters	Navy Exchange (paid)	Delta
60	Navy Watch Sweaters	DLA	Delta/H
150 (1)	Mountain Sleeping w/covers	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
150	Air Mattresses	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
10 (1)	5 gal water cans	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
100	Panel Markers SRU-22/P	DPSC	Delta
5130	"C" Ration Meals	Bragg	Delta

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EXPENDABLES

QUANTITY	ITEM	PROVIDED BY	PROVIDED TO
250	40MM [redacted]	Anniston	Delta
400	[redacted]	Anniston	Delta
300	Ammo Pouches	Anniston	Delta
660	7.62MM Tracer Ctg.	Anniston	Delta
48	White SMoke Grenade	Navy	Delta
400	Concussion Grenades	Navy	Delta
100	Practice Concussion Grenades	Navy	Delta
272	Rocket Incendiary 66MM 4rd Clip	Anniston (48 Bragg)	Delta
936	40MM CTG HEDP for M79	Anniston	[redacted]
40	All weather goggles	Bragg	Delta
100	Ear Protectors	DSC Richmond	Delta
100	Navy Watch Caps	Navy Exchange (paid)	Delta
272	Navy Watch Caps	DLA	Delta/[redacted]
100	Navy Watch Sweaters	Navy Exchange (paid)	Delta
60	Navy Watch Sweaters	DLA	Delta/H
150 (1)	Mountain Sleeping w/covers	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
150	Air Mattresses	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
10 (1)	5 gal water cans	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta/Helo
100	Panel Markers SRU-22/P	DPSC	Delta
5130	"C" Ration Meals	Bragg	Delta

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QUANTITY	ITEM	PROVIDED BY	PROVIDED TO
*	M16 Repair Parts	Belvoir/Bragg	Delta
48	Batteries for goggles	Sacramento	Delta
4 (1)	Immersion heaters & cans	XVIII ABN Corps	JTF
89	Distress Markers	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta
8	A2 Marking Lights	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta
*	Various gear to rig loads for airdrop	XVIII ABN Corps	JTF
60 (1)	Parachutes [redacted]	82nd	JTF
*	Railroad ties [redacted]		JTF
*	Demolitions	Navy	JTF
204	Shoulder Patches (American Flag)	Local Procurekent	Delta [redacted]
995	Ctg, Barrier Penetrating Model SGA-300	Local Procurement	Delta
400	Baseball grenades	Local Procurement	Delta
200 lbs	C-3 [redacted]		Delta
5	BAT Drones for Redeye Tng	Red River AD	Delta
54	[redacted]	Letterkenny AD	Helo/1st SOW
6 Boxes	Grenade Hand Smoke	Sierra AD	Helo
12	IR Filters	Anniston AD	[redacted]
60 sets	Air Force Fatigues (JTF)	JTF/Delta	DLA

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QUANTITY	ITEM	PROVIDED BY	PROVIDED TO
60 sets	Air Force Flight Suits (JTF)	DLA	JTF/Delta
12 sets	Air Force Fatigues	DLA	[redacted]
50	Parkaliners and sweat pants	DLA	JTF
100 pr	Boot Socks	DLA	JTF
6 pr	Combat Boots [redacted]	DLA	[redacted]

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NONEXPENDABLES

QUANTITY	ITEM	PROVIDED BY	PROVIDED
8	TRK, M274A4 (mule)	XVIII ABN Corps	JTF
6	TRK, M151A2 1/4T	"	[redacted]
66	Parachute T-10	"	JTF/Delta
29	" G-12D	"	JTF
69	" G-11A	"	JTF
4	Mount Pedestal	"	[redacted]
90	Drum Fuel Collection	"	JTF
42	LSS	"	JTF
36	LSS Support	"	JTF
2	Pump 100 GPM	"	Helo
2	Nozzle	"	Helo
43	Parachute Ext 15'	"	JTF
32	" Pilot 68"	"	JTF
20	Container A22	"	JTF
8	Dirt Bikes	Intelligence Materiel Support Office (IMDSO)	[redacted]
120	Protective Masks	IMDSO	Delta
35	Kevlar Vests	Natick Labs	Helo
12	Riot Guns	IMDSO	Delta
41	Evasion & Escape Kits	Langley	Delta
20	M16A1 Rifles	Anniston AD	Delta
8	Inerital Nav Sys	SOFD-D	CV
6	Walkie Talkies	SFOD-D	Helo
8	Fares W/8-100GPM Pumps	2/Bragg & 6/Campbell	JTF

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QUANTITY	ITEM (S)	PROVIDED BY	(S) PROVIDED TO
1	350 GPM	Ft Campbell	JTF
7	AN/PAQ4 IR Aiming Light	Night Vision Labs	Delta
9	T-MEG Beacons	Hurlburt	Delta [redacted]
1	Small Arms Repair Kit	XVIII ABN Corps	Delta
72 (40)	AN/PVS-5A Night Vision Goggles	Sacramento AD	Delta [redacted] 1 SOW/MAC
4	PSC-1	Ft Monmount	Delta
75	Promethium Night Sight (M16)	IMDSO	Delta
5	3000 Gal bladders & 10 pumps for airborne refueling system	MacDill (Harvest Eagle)	1st SOW
2	R-144 Refuel system (100,000 Gal)	EUCOM	[redacted]
10	[redacted]		[redacted]
6	Omega Navigation Systems	CINCLANT	Helo
	Commo Equipment	JCSE	
9	PRC 90 Radios	Eglin AFB	[redacted]
10	Search light set, infra-red AN/VSS-3A	Tobbyhanna AD	helo/1st SOW
2	R-9 Tankers	EUCOM	[redacted]
2	Coleman Tugs	EUCOM	[redacted]
1	Demineralization Trucks	EUCOM (SAC)	[redacted]

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QUANTITY	ITEM	PROVIDED BY	PROVIDED TO
2	100 GPM Filter Separators	Ft Stewart	1st SOW
2	350 GPM Filter Separators	Ft Stewart	1st SOW
8	Fuel Filter Separators	Tooele AD	1st SOW
144	Fuel Filters	Tooele AD	1st SOW
18	Shoulder Holsters	Red River AD	[redacted]
50	45 Cal SMG AMMO pouches	DLA	[redacted]
10	[redacted]	JFK Center	[redacted]
40	[redacted]	JFK Center	[redacted]
10	[redacted]	JFK Center	[redacted]
70	[redacted]agazines	JFK Center	[redacted]
10	[redacted]	[redacted] Rangers	[redacted]
3	Daytime Filters for PVS-5's	Ft Rucker	1st SOW
10	Motorola PT-25-A Radios	CERCOM	Delta
24	MX360 Motorola Radios plus components	Local Procurement	[redacted]

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I 763

ARMY AIR SUPPORT FOR JTF

Aircraft used were U-21/C-12

ONLOAD	DESTINATION	CARGO
APG, MD	Langley	Protective Mas
Simmons AF	Langley	AMMO
Anniston	Langley	AMMO
Davidson	Pat Henry Airport	Pax
Davidson	Ft Stewart	FTX Plan
Elizabeth City	Cherry Point	Pax
Davidson	Pope	Pax
Elizabeth City	Pope	Pax
Pope	Elizabeth City	Pax
Davidson (NOTE)	Pope	Pax
Pope	Davidson	Pax

NOTE: Numerous trips between JTF HQ and POPE have been conducted to include return flights.

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I-164

MAC MISSIONS FOR JTF

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MSN	A/C	ONLOAD	DESTINATION	CARGO
2101-01	C-5	Norfolk	[redacted]	Helo's & Pax
2101-02	C-5	Norfolk		Crane & Pax
2101-03	C-5	Norfolk		Helo & Pax
2101-04	C-5	Norfolk		Helo & Pax
2101-05	C-141	Norfolk		Helo Spt Equi
2101-06	C-141	Norfolk		Helo Spt Equi
2101-07	C-141	Norfolk		Helo Spt Equi
2101-08	C-141	Cherry Point		Fuel Tanks
2101-09	C-141	Cherry Point		Wpn, Ammo & P
1092-01	C-130	Maxwell/Pope	Langley	Ammo, vehicle bladders
1092-02	C-130	Hanscon	Cherry Point	Protective ve
1092-03	C-130	Pope/Andrews/Maxwell	[redacted]	Jeeps, Bikes, explosives
1092-04	C-130	Langley	N/A	Air Drop
1092-05	C-130	Bergstom	Langley	Radios
1092-06	C-130	Maxwell	[redacted]	[redacted]
1092-07	C-130	Virginia	Langley	Helo Pilots
1092-08	C-141	Langley	Laguna	Helo Pilots
1092-09	C-141	McDill	Laguna	JCSE
1092-10	C-130	Virginia	Langley	Delta & Equip
1092-11	C-141	Langley	Laguna	Delta & Equip

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MSN	A/C	ONLOAD (6)	DESTINATION	CARGO (5)
1092-12	C-141	Langley	Laguna	[redacted] & Equi
1092-13	C-141	[redacted]/Pope A	Yuma	Equip & Pax
1092-14	C-141	Pope	Davis Monthan	Fuel Blivets
1092-15	Cancelled			
1092-16	C-141	Pope/Andrews	Yuma/Monthan	Fuel Blivets Commo
1092-17	C-141	Yuma	Langley	[redacted]elta
1092-18	C-141	Yuma	Langley	[redacted]lta
1092-19	C-130	Langley	Farm	Delta (shutt
1092-20	C-141	Monthan	Pope	Fuel Blivets
1092-21	C-141	Yuma	Pope	Cargo & Pax
1092-22	C-130	Maxwell	Langley	Wpns
1092-23	C-130	Farm	Langley/Phillips	Delta & Palle
1092-24	C-141	Langley	Laguna	Pax
1092-25	C-141	Pope	Norton	Fuel Blivets
1092-26	C-130	Maxwell	Langley	Ammo
1092-27	C-130	Farm	Pope	Delta & Equip
1092-28	C-141	Laguna	Pope/Charleston	Pax & Equip
1092-29	C-141	Yuma	Cherry Pt/Norfolk	Pax & Equip
1092-30	C-130	Yuma	Tampa	Trucks, Pax
1092-31	C-130	Yuma	Tampa	Trucks, Pax
1092-32	Cancelled			
1092-33	C-130	Travis	McDill	Trucks & Pax
1092-34	C-130	Norton	Pope	Blivets, Pax

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MSN	A/C	ONLOAD	Destination	CARGO
1092-35	C-130	Norton	Pope	Blivets, Pax
1093-01	C-141	Norfolk	Yuma	Pax
1093-02	C-130	Pope	Yuma	Pax, Nets
1093-03	C-130	Yuma/RR	Pope	Nets, Bats
1093-04	C-130	Pope	Eglin	Jeep
1093-05	C-130	Pope/Warminister	Yuma	Qrt, Searchl
1093-06	C-141	Hurlburt	Yuma	[redacted]
1093-07	C-130	McChord	Yuma	Wpns
1093-08	C-130	Yuma	[redacted]	Pax & Wpns
1093-09	C-130	Andrews/HAAF	Nellis	Model, Pax,
1093-10	C-141	[redacted]	Hurlburt	[redacted] Equip
1093-11	C-141	[redacted]	Hurlburt	[redacted] Equip
1142-01	C-141	Hurlburt	[redacted]	[redacted] Equip
1142-02	C-141	Hurlburt	[redacted]	[redacted] EQuip
1142-03	C-141	Nellis	[redacted]	[redacted] Truck
1142-04	C-141	Yuma	Cherry Pt, Norfolk Andrews/McDill	Helo Pax, JCS

II In addition to above flights, fourteen T-39/T-43 flights provided to JTF for passengers and intelligence material movements.

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