



POLICY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

MAY 5 1994

I-94/16544

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, NATIONAL
SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Rwanda: Jamming Civilian Radio Broadcasts (U)

Sandy,
(C) I understand that during their luncheon yesterday Tony Lake raised with Dr. Perry the possibility of jamming Rwandan radio broadcasts. We have looked at options to stop the broadcasts within the Pentagon, discussed them interagency and concluded jamming is an ineffective and expensive mechanism that will not accomplish the objective the NSC Advisor seeks.

(C) International legal conventions complicate airborne or ground based jamming and the mountainous terrain reduces the effectiveness of either option. Commando Solo, an Air National Guard asset, is the only suitable DOD jamming platform. It costs approximately \$8500 per flight hour and requires a semi-secure area of operations due to its vulnerability and limited self-protection.

(C) I believe it would be wiser to use air to assist in Rwanda in the relief effort, particularly in neighboring countries, like Tanzania. This weekend we will be assisting with air lifts to Tanzania for the UNHCR (blankets and plastic sheeting) and an American NGO, AmeriCares (medical supplies). In addition, we are developing several additional options for providing excess DoD non-lethal supplies such as food and medical supplies to refugees. Furthermore, we are considering funding commercially contract relief flights into Kigali in support of the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and other relief groups.

Frank
Frank G. Wisner

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF
MEAD/OSD

27 MAR 1995 95-F-0177
DATE CASE #

CLASSIFIED BY: DIR, Africa Region
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

A-1



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

9 June 1994

POLICY

I-94/36222

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: ACTING UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

SUBJECT: Senator Kennedy Letter on Jamming of Rwandan Radio
Broadcasts (U)

(U) Purpose: To respond to the Secretary's request for information about the use of DoD assets to jam Rwandan radio stations.

(C) Summary: On 1 June, Senator Kennedy wrote the Secretary to ask that DoD, in concert with UN allies, jam Rwandan radio broadcasts which are inciting violence. While DoD does have assets which could jam the station (with limited effectiveness), their use would be expensive and legally contentious.

(C) Discussion: One of the media used by Hutu extremists to encourage the slaughter of Tutsis in Rwanda has been local radio. In late April, DoD was asked to investigate possibilities for jamming these transmissions. Frank Wisner responded to Tony Lake's request on 5 May (TAB A).

(C) There is no effective means of jamming the radio station from a ground station outside of Rwanda. With this in mind, the only suitable jamming platform is Commando Solo, an Air National Guard asset (TAB B). It costs approximately \$8,500 per hour and requires a semi-secure area of operations due to its vulnerability and limited self-protection. To be fully effective, the Rwandan transmissions would need to be jammed 24-hours a day until the massacres ended -- a very expensive, dangerous and open-ended prospect.

(C) If conducted unilaterally, jamming has been determined by State and DoD lawyers to be troublesome legally because it violates international transmissions agreements. If done through UN auspices, this action would probably require a Chapter VII mandate, which is not the case currently. Whether conducted unilaterally or through the UN, the executing agency's neutrality would be called into question.

EXCISED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 5USC552

(b) (1) 95-F-0177

CLASSIFIED BY: DIRECTOR AFRICA REGION
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
COMMANDO SOLO

(S) COMMANDO SOLO (formerly VOLANT SOLO) is an EC-130 platform used by DoD for broadcasting; jamming is an available capability, but only as a secondary role. [

] COMPASS CALL is another airborne platform, and is the primary EW asset, []

(S) COMMANDO SOLO operates only in a secure environment. The Rwandan military is known to have SA-7s which makes the airborne option over Rwanda hazardous. The country's mountainous terrain makes cross-border jamming difficult. Also, [] while broadcasts have occurred on multiple frequencies. From initial estimates, COMMANDO SOLO's effectiveness in Rwanda would be approximately 50%.

(U) Sample broadcast period of 12 hours for two weeks requires two platforms, four crews, and two tanker aircraft. A very rough order of magnitude for a COMMANDO SOLO deployment without factoring in deployment of tankers and support/maintenance lift is \$8500 per flight hour.

(U) International telecommunications agreements may be violated if COMMANDO SOLO is used unilaterally.

(U) The tasking chain of command for this platform is EUCOM CINC, JS, SOCOM, Air Staff, National Guard Bureau, State of Pennsylvania, and COMMANDO SOLO unit.


(U) The ALCE for COMMANDO SOLO would probably be significant. For example, the ALCE to conduct the C-141 airlift into Mwanza, Tanzania alone was three (3) C-141 airloads of equipment.

CC: SO/LIC

PK/PE

J5

ISA



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
AFRICA REGION

Date: 9 June 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR Walt Slocombe

SUBJECT: Response to SecDef's Question Re: Jamming of
Rwandan Radio Transmissions

The attached memo for your signature responds to SecDef's questions about jamming Rwandan radio stations as a result of a letter from Senator Kennedy (attached). He wants a response by 1200 today.

As you are aware, we've already gone through this before. We have attached our previous response to the NSC at Tab A. FYI, even State lawyers said this was a non-starter, back in early May.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "V. Kern".

VINCENT D. KERN
Director

A-3

20 Jul

~~SECRET~~

Countering Extremist Hutu Radio Broadcasts

Extremist Hutu radio broadcasts have contributed to the current Hutu exodus from Rwanda. Reports suggest the broadcasts are emanating from inside the French secure zone; the French deny this and say they have traced the source to Zaire. They have reportedly sent personnel to "neutralize" the station, and informal reports suggest they are planning on jamming the broadcasts. In the event the station remains on the air, several options exist to minimize its impact.

- Ground based tactical jammers could be employed by U.S. military personnel to ensure that the broadcasts could not be heard in or around the refugee camps; EH-60 rotary wing aircraft could be employed to extend the area of jamming for limited periods of time.
- Fixed wing EC-130 COMPASS CALL aircraft could DF the broadcasts and provide broader area jamming coverage, but at much greater expense. Like the EH-60s, they would not be able to provide 24 hour jamming; their time on station would be dependent upon the proximity of airfields from which they could operate and most of the airfields in the immediate area of the refugee camps are already saturated with humanitarian assistance flights. Also, COMPASS CALL does not have HF jamming capability below 20 MHz, and therefore might not be effective against the Hutu station, depending on the frequency being used for broadcast.
- Another airborne system, COMMANDO SOLO, could be employed to both jam and broadcast persuasive messages. Although COMMANDO SOLO does not have the frequency restrictions of COMPASS CALL, the same operating restrictions would apply. Two of the four operational COMMANDO SOLO aircraft plus a support package are currently forward deployed to Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico, conducting broadcast operations into Haiti.
- Perhaps the best option would be to use a psychological operations radio transmitter based near the refugee camps and tuned to the same frequency as the Hutu station. The PSYOP broadcasts would overpower the Hutu transmissions in the vicinity of the camps and at the same time provide a means of communicating with the refugees. In areas further removed from the PSYOP transmitter the signal would still interfere with the Hutu radio transmissions, thus degrading their effectiveness.

DECLASSIFIED BY AUTHORITY OF
ME A / OSD

27 MAR 1990	95-F-0177
DATE	CASE #

~~SECRET~~

A-4

From collierj Mon Aug 8 11:57:05 1994
Date: Mon, 8 Aug 94 11:55:35 -0400
From: Col James Collier <Col.James.Collier@misn_pol.solic.osd.mil>
To: taylorwb, robertj
Subject: Rwanda
Cc: andersjs, williamc, mitche, meyerj, collierj
Content-Length: 1825
X-Lines: 10

FYI, some facts and my thoughts on where we seem to be heading in Rwanda. Recognize that H&RA serves as the SO/LIC lead, but since there are significant PSYOP considerations we have attempted to stay abreast of developments.

- Message from JTF Cdr came out over the weekend confirming that he wants little (if any) SOF, including PSYOP, to be deployed. I'm told he is looking to minimize the US military footprint. Will look for copy of message.
- Seems to be several radio systems springing up--RPF station(s) in Kigali, Reporters Without Borders supporting UNHCR. In the paper we prepared last week for DepSecDef we suggested that we can provide assistance to the UN (UNAMIR, UNHCR) in developing and coordinating the informational effort.
- Extremist Hutu broadcasting seems to have been reenergized. Some reports indicate that their broadcasts continue to fuel Hutu refugee fears of retribution if they return to homeland. Latest innovation is increasingly hostile, anti-US messages.
- US has had great difficulty determining policy on encouraging return of refugees. It quickly becomes a question of to what extent the US will then be committed to ensuring the security of returning refugees. Even though the President, SecDef, and other key officials have stated that the return/repatriation of refugees is critical to mid-term resolution of the problem, we have been unwilling to adopt that position as official policy.
- I'm of the opinion that our eventual strategy will be to:
 - Limit our unilateral effort to just "stopping the dying."
 - As quickly as possible, help (or perhaps lead) to get UNAMIR in control and capable of assuming full responsibility. That could include repatriation as well as humanitarian relief.
 - Reduce US role, particularly military, as soon as possible.

COL Collier

H-C

~~SECRET~~

RWANDA RADIO IWG AUG 18 1994

I. WHAT IS USG POLICY REGARDING RETURN OF REFUGEES TO RWANDA ?

- USCINCEUR initially requested authority to employ PSYOP to persuade the refugees to return home, JTF Commander subsequently put deployment of PSYOP assets on hold, on the grounds that they were not required
- The Rwandan government has stated they would welcome the return of refugees, this message has been clouded, however, by their stated intention to hold war crimes trials for those responsible for the massacre of some 500,000 Tutsis during the civil war
- On 2 August, UNHCR promulgated policy supporting the voluntary return of refugees to Rwanda, this position has now softened somewhat as a result of persistent anecdotal reports of returning Hutu refugees being killed by Tutsis

RECOMMENDATION: [REDACTED]

II WHAT CAN/SHOULD BE DONE TO ENHANCE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT RADIO BROADCAST CAPABILITY?

- SecDef offered to provide Rwandan government "technical assistance" to improve their radio broadcast capability (in the context of facilitating Rwandan government efforts to persuade refugees to return)
- On August 4, USIA assessed the existing broadcast facilities in the region (to include NGO/PVO stations) as adequate to disseminate information to refugees in their present locations

RECOMMENDATION: USG should move quickly to do a technical assessment of the Rwandan government radio broadcast capability to determine what equipment enhancements are needed, [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

A-7

~~SECRET~~

III WHAT CAN/SHOULD BE DONE TO COUNTER THE INFLAMMATORY BROADCASTS OF EXTREMIST HUTU RADIO STATIONS?

- Reports of extremist Hutu radio broadcasts exhorting refugees not to return to Rwanda for fear of Tutsi retribution continue, broadcasts are variously reported to be emanating from southwest Rwanda, Zaire and/or Burundi, and to be on FM and/or short wave. Some reports indicate the transmitters may be mobile.
- We do not currently possess the solid intelligence needed to develop options for countering the broadcasts, i.e. jamming, physical destruction, counter propaganda, etc.

RECOMMENDATION: DoD task the intelligence community to undertake all appropriate measures to provide definitive information on the location of and broadcast frequencies used by the extremist Hutu radio transmitters, and to provide that information to the Joint Staff so they can develop a list of options for countering the broadcasts.

Prepared by Mr. Chuck Williamson, OASD(SO/LIC)SS, x55693

~~SECRET~~

Date: August 24, 1994

FAX COVER SHEET
AMERICAN EMBASSY/KIGALI
TEL: 873-150-7503/4

TO: AF/C - Kevin Aiston

FAX: (202) 647 - 1726

FROM: Embassy/Kigali - Joyce Leader

FAX: Embassy - 873-150-7504; DART - 873-151-2310

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES:

SUBJECT: Radio Rwanda Transmission

MESSAGE:

Attached is a report of our military's efforts to facilitate restoration of nationwide broadcasts over Radio Rwanda. It identifies 1,000 ltrs of fuel per day as the inhibiting factor to start-up. It recommends that the fuel be provided by Deutsche Welle or the Rwandan government with local purchase.

The Embassy and DART recommend:

-- the U.S. should consider funding the fuel needed to ensure prompt start-up and continued broadcast of Radio Rwanda for a limited period of time, say 45 days. The next few weeks, which coincide with harvest and planting seasons, will be a critical decision-making period for refugees and displaced persons inclined to return home. We estimate the total cost at USD 45,000 (1,000 ltrs x USD 1.00/ltr x 45 days = USD 45,000).

B-21

Note for Rwanda Task Force

From: Kern, Vince
Date: Mon, Aug 29, 1994 10:39
Subject: FW: TASKERS FROM POLICY UPDATE
To: Hicks, Kathleen; Rwanda Task Force
Cc: McConnell, Bear

Let's still shoot to get all three in the AHG book.

From: Shaffer, Joe on Mon, Aug 29, 1994 10:33 AM
Subject: FW: TASKERS FROM POLICY UPDATE
To: McConnell, Bear; Rwanda Group

FYI

From: MA, S&R on Mon, Aug 29, 1994 9:59 AM
Subject: TASKERS FROM POLICY UPDATE
To: AFR/Dir
Cc: Gendron, Gerard; Shaffer, Joe

VINCE, JUST WANT TO CONFIRM THREE TASKERS OUT OF THIS MORNING'S POLICY STAFF MEETING: OPTIONS TO RESPOND TO POTENTIAL GENOCIDE IN BURUNDI (DUE COB 8/30), OPTIONS FOR SECURITY IN REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE (DUE COB 8/30), ISSUES OF PIRATE AND HELPFUL RADIOS IN RWANDA (DUE COB TODAY). THANKS, CHARLIE M. X77728.

From connolly@sg2e258i.asd_pol.solic.osd.mil Mon Aug 29 14:14:28 1994
Date: Mon, 29 Aug 94 14:19:26 -0400
From: Timothy Connolly <Timothy.Connolly@asd_pol.solic.osd.mil>
To: williamc@sg2e258i.asd_pol.solic.osd.mil
Subject: Radio IPR
Cc: rowede@sg2e258i.asd_pol.solic.osd.mil
Content-Length: 817
X-Lines: 17

Ted Warner (as acting USDP) has asked for a short/short paper on the current state of p
re: radios.

Please work one up. Should cover what we know about:

- efforts to find extremist station.
- policy implications re: taking it off the air, to include the likely need to have USG
ax on the ground somewhere where they are not currently on the ground.
- Request from UN to provide UNIMIR w/ broadcast capability, as independent from Radio
gali. They want equipment from USG, and have asked for P&A by COB today. Policy questi
s to cover include whether it would be turnkey, or simply equipment w/ no pax package.
- Anything else that bears on the subject.
- No suspens was given, but let's shoot for COB tomorrow. Let me know if this is undoa
le...

Thanks -- See you at 1600 tele-wacking.

TGC

A-9

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

POINT PAPER

082994

SUBJECT: U.S. Role in Suppressing or Promoting Radio Broadcasts in and around Rwanda

DISCUSSION: Broadcasts by extremist Hutu radio stations were influential in causing the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Hutus to Zaire, and there continue to be sporadic reports of hate messages being broadcast these stations to Hutu refugees.

- Radio Kigali/Radio Rwanda (now operated by the new RPF government) has broadcast appeals for the refugees to return home, but these broadcasts have been largely ineffective for a variety of reasons, both technical and in terms of program content
- In the context of facilitating Rwandan government efforts to persuade the refugees to return, SecDef offered "technical assistance" to improve Radio Kigali/Radio Rwanda broadcast capability. Since the time of that offer, a number of instances have occurred that have raised questions as to the government of Rwanda's ability and/or intent to provide for the security of returning Hutu refugees
- PVO/NGO sponsored radio stations have begun operating in the vicinity of major refugee camps to provide basic information and instructions to the refugee population, UNHCR is using these stations to communicate with the refugees
- At the request of the NSC, DoD formed an Interagency Working Group (IWG) chaired by the PDASD(SO/LIC) to address Rwanda radio broadcast issues

CURRENT STATUS: In order to provide the basis for a policy decision on the appropriate U.S. role in either suppressing extremist Hutu radio broadcasts, promoting Rwandan government broadcasting and/or supporting UNHCR/UNAMIR broadcast requirements, the working group engaged in several tasks

- USIA dispatched a Voice of America broadcast engineer to Kigali to do a technical assessment of existing Radio Kigali/Radio Rwanda broadcast capabilities and to provide recommendations as to how those capabilities could be enhanced, should the U.S. choose to do so. This assessment is expected to be available later this week
- The Joint Staff was to determine what (if any) capabilities existed in third country militaries to either jam extremist Hutu radio broadcasts or enhance existing broadcast capabilities in the region. To date, none have been identified

- [DIA tasked 

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

2-10

- [DIA also provided an] assessment of the efficacy of eliminating the Hutu hate broadcasts and replacing them with broadcasts providing accurate information on the present conditions in Rwanda as a means of getting the refugees to return to Rwanda [They concluded that while these actions would be helpful, the primary reason the Hutu refugees remain in Zaire lies in the transplanted village political and social and social structure that exists in the refugee camps and the control of that structure exercised by the ex-FAR and militia. In DIA's view, eliminating this source of former government control will be critical in achieving the UN's goal of peaceful refugee repatriation]
- OASD(SO/LIC) provided a paper on the capabilities of psychological operations military information support teams (MIST) to assist the Rwandan government or the UN in developing an information campaign to help persuade the refugees to return should such assistance be deemed appropriate
- The next meeting of the IWG is scheduled for tomorrow at 1530, at which time the above issues will be addressed along with a request received from the UN late on 26 August for radio broadcast equipment for UNAMIR

Prepared by Mr Chuck Williamson, OASD(SO/LIC)SS, x55693

Approved by Director, Special Support

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
(SPECIAL OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT)

DATE 31 AUG 94

MEMO FOR PDASD(SO/LIC)

SIR Per our telecon last PM--

-Spoke with Dianne Halberson, DSAA person tasked to provide P&A data on UNAMIR radio request. She was unable to get through to UN yesterday to determine if request was specific or if they would take other kinds of radio equipment. Her view was, based on her experience, that if they just wanted help they would not have provided the specific equipment list LtCol Gordon Kennedy, JCS J-4, is on 0900 shuttle to UN today and will attempt to clarify the requirement Bottom line remains the same we do not have any appropriate equipment available to provide to UNAMIR to meet their request

- Re jamming, atchd is spec sheet on equipment that was leased by MI guys at Ft Gordon Believe this will meet the requirement

- Next under is USIA memo on joint international broadcasting Note that the proposal would require establishing a local transmitting facility--probably a non-starter for lots of reasons, including the fact that they're thinking AM when it seems that FM is preferred (see below)

- Also atchd is preliminary tech evaluation of Radio Kigali by Gaines Johnson, VOA broadcast engineer. Report raises about as many questions as it answers, but per Amb Moose issue may be OBE in any case.

[redacted] did not attend yesterday's IWG because they had no word back from the team I've jerked their chain & they will get back to me with status prior to 1100 teleconference

VR,

Chuck Williamson

~~SECRET~~

A-11

25-

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

POINT PAPER

SUBJECT: U S Role in Suppressing or Promoting Radio Broadcasts in and around Rwanda

DISCUSSION: Broadcasts by extremist Hutu radio stations were influential in causing the massacre of Tutsis during the civil war and the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Hutus to Zaire. We continue to receive sporadic reports of hate messages being broadcast by these stations to Hutu refugees in camps across the Rwandan border.

- Radio Kigali/Radio Rwanda (now operated by the new RPF government) has broadcast appeals for the Hutu refugees to return home, but these broadcasts have been largely ineffective for a variety of reasons: technical, program content, and the influence of former Hutu officials and the ex-FAR in the refugee camps.
- At the request of the NSC, DoD formed an Interagency Working Group (IWG) chaired by the PDASD(SO/LIC) to address Rwanda radio broadcast issues.

CURRENT STATUS: In order to provide the basis for a policy decision on the appropriate U S role in either suppressing extremist Hutu radio broadcasts, promoting Rwandan government broadcasting and/or supporting UNHCR/UNAMIR broadcast requirements, the working group engaged in several tasks:

- USIA dispatched a Voice of America broadcast engineer to Kigali to do a technical assessment of existing Radio Kigali/Radio Rwanda broadcast capabilities and to provide recommendations as to how those capabilities could be enhanced, should the U S choose to do so. The initial assessment has been received and at the Ad Hoc Group meeting on 29 August, it was agreed that the U S had provided sufficient assistance to Radio Kigali/Radio Rwanda.

- DIA tasked 

Once the technical parameters of the extremist Hutu broadcasts are confirmed we will be in a position to determine required jamming capabilities. The Ad Hoc Group agreed that the U S would not engage in jamming, but would be prepared to provide technical data and a source of commercially available jammers to the UN should they wish to undertake the mission.

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

- On 26 August, USUN received a request from the UN for assistance in "leasing a mobile radio station" for Rwanda on an "extremely urgent basis " The request stated a requirement for five 2KW FM transmitters, a broadcast studio, a program distribution system and other miscellaneous supplies
- Further discussions on 31 August among USUN Amb Inderfurth, UN Asst SYG Rizza, UK Amb Hannay and UN DPKO representative Beissel clarified the request
 - A recent UN DPKO mission to Rwanda returned with the recommendation that UNAMIR establish an independent broadcast capability in order to maintain a perception of neutrality
 - The UK is making a voluntary contribution of \$250K earmarked for a radio station, The UN confirmed that money is not the issue, but rather that the UN had no broadcast engineers to set up and run a station, and that procurement would take 4-6 months What the UN wants is for U S and UK to provide the equipment and expertise through donation, lease or purchase through an LOA
 - The preferred UN option is that the U S provide all studio production equipment and 26 broadcast engineers while the UK provides the transmitters, backup option is the same except the U S also provides a base transmitter on a reimbursable basis
- USUN requested a meeting at the UN on 2 September where DoD and USIA/VOA representatives with radio expertise could provide a coordinated position on what the USG could offer That meeting has been rescheduled for 7 September
- DoD PSYOP forces are fully committed supporting Radio Democracy and Haitian/Cuban migrant camps, they have neither the studio equipment nor technical personnel available to meet the UN request AFRTS has indicated they have some excess studio production equipment that could be provided to the UN, VOA may also have equipment that could be used and may be able to offer suggestions to the UN as to a source of non-U S technical personnel Per agreement of the Ad Hoc Group, U S personnel should not be deployed to Rwanda to support broadcast operations
- These and other related support issues will be resolved at a PDASD(SO/LIC) chaired IWG on 6 September to prepare for the meeting with the UN on 7 September

Prepared by Mr Chuck Williamson OASD(SO/LIC)SS. x55693

Approved by Director, Special Support

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

WAR 2 Sep

Rwanda Radio Broadcasting

PDASD(SO/LIC) chaired Interagency Working Group continued to address three primary issues support to Radio Kigali/Radio Rwanda, jamming extremist Hutu radio stations, and radio broadcasting support for UNAMIR. The VOA broadcast engineer tasked to visit Radio Kigali/Radio Rwanda has provided a preliminary assessment and is en route back to CONUS. The Ad Hoc Group has determined that further assistance to Radio Kigali/Radio Rwanda is not required. In response to a DIA tasking, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The Ad Hoc Group agreed that the U S should not jam the broadcasts but could offer the technical data and a commercial source for jammers to the UN in the event they wished to undertake the mission. On 26 August USUN received a request for radio broadcasting support for UNAMIR. Subsequent discussions revealed that the UK could provide the requested FM transmitters and what the UN wanted from the U S was studio equipment and 26 broadcast engineers. Per the Ad Hoc Group, the U S will not deploy personnel to Rwanda to support broadcast operations. However, some equipment may be available from AFRTS and VOA. An IWG meeting on this requirement is scheduled for 6 September prior to a 7 September meeting with the UN.

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

A-18
A-18

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

Re: Sep.

BACKGROUND PAPER

SUBJECT: Rwanda Radio Update

ISSUE: The U S role in promoting or suppressing radio broadcasts in and around Rwanda

DISCUSSION: Promoting radio broadcasts

- The UN requested assistance in establishing a radio broadcast capability for UNAMIR. It was agreed that the U K would provide radio transmitters and that the U S would provide studio production equipment to meet the UNAMIR requirement
- On September 15, 1994, OSD hosted meeting between USIA/Voice of America and UN personnel to discuss technical requirements for the studio production capability requested by the UN as the U S contribution to establishing Radio UNAMIR
- It was determined that an available VOA mobile radio production van will satisfy the UN requirement. It was agreed that the van would be provided to the UN on a reimbursable basis. Department of State is working with the UN to determine the modality of the transfer of equipment. It is expected that the transfer will occur within the next two to three weeks, to match up with the availability of the radio transmitters being provided by the UK

Suppressing radio broadcasts:

- The USG will not deploy U S personnel to jam extremist Hutu radio stations reported to be broadcasting hate messages to Hutu refugee camps
- [REDACTED]
- There are commercially available man-portable jammers that could be given to UNAMIR or other governments in the area. However, according to the contractor, lead time to acquire the jammers is nine to twelve months. UNAMIR does not wish to conduct jamming operations on grounds of needing to maintain neutrality to enhance credibility of messages they will broadcast on Radio UNAMIR
- [REDACTED]
- Based on availability, jamming does not appear to be an option in the near term even if UNAMIR or other area governments were willing to undertake the task

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

A-13

29 Sep

BACKGROUND PAPER

SUBJECT: Radio Broadcast Support to UNAMIR

ISSUE: What can the U.S. do to support a UN request for a radio broadcast capability for UNAMIR?

DISCUSSION: The UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) dispatched a mission to Rwanda during the period 17-23 August 1994 to assess the requirement for radio broadcasting to support UNAMIR operations. The mission recommended that, in order to maintain its neutrality, UNAMIR immediately establish its own radio broadcast capability independent of other radio stations broadcasting in the area.

- On 31 August Ambassador Inderfurth met with Assistant Secretary Riza and UK Ambassador Hannay to discuss the Mission's report. All agreed that a radio broadcast capability was needed; however, although UN funds were available to address the requirement, the UN could not rapidly procure the needed equipment. Both Ambassador Inderfurth and Ambassador Hannay offered to determine what assistance their respective governments could provide.
- On 7 September, representatives of DoD and USIA/Voice of America met with representatives of UN DPKO in New York to discuss specifics of the UN requirement. At this meeting it was determined that the UK would provide the necessary radio transmitters and that needed U.S. support would be limited to a mobile audio production facility, which would be provided on a reimbursable basis. Subsequent to the meeting it was determined that all existing DoD mobile audio production equipment was fully committed and thus unavailable to meet the UN requirement. However, USIA/VOA did have an audio production van that could be provided to the UN if it met their technical specifications.
- On 15 September, DoD hosted meeting between USIA/Voice of America and UN personnel in Washington to discuss technical requirements for the studio production capability requested by the UN. It was determined that the available USIA/Voice of America mobile radio production van would satisfy the UN requirement. It was agreed that the van would be provided to the UN on a reimbursable basis.
- DOD and USIA are working with the UN to determine the modality of the transfer of equipment. Voice of America has scheduled four days training starting on 11 October for the UN technicians who will operate the van. It is expected that the transfer will occur within the next two to three weeks, to match up with the availability of the radio transmitters being provided by the UK.

Prepared by: Mr. Chuck Williamson, OASD(SO/LIC)SS, x55693

Approved by: Mr. James Q. Roberts, Director, Special Support

A-14

~~SECRET~~



SPECIAL OPERATIONS/
LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D C 20301-2500

In Reply Refer To:
I-94/23958


03 October 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

(S)

(S) The United Nations has requested the USG make available to it the capability to jam extremist radio broadcasts in the Rwanda area of operations

(U) Please respond by 11 October The point of contact for this action is Mr Charles Williamson, x3-2897


Timothy G. Connolly
Principal Deputy

Classified by: PD ASD(SO/LIC)
Declass: OADR

~~SECRET~~

2-15

7017

Rwanda Radio Status for WAR

~~(SNT)~~ Based on continued reporting of extremist Hutu propaganda broadcasts targeting Rwandan refugee camps, the UN has requested the USG make available to it the capability to jam such broadcasts

[REDACTED] On October 3,

PDASD(SO/LIC) tasked the Joint Staff to

[REDACTED] to support a policy decision on the UN request

(U) Actions to meet the UN request for a transportable radio production capability continue. The Voice of America (VOA) has agreed to provide their Voyager audio production van to the UN, the UN has agreed to reimburse the USG for the cost of the van. ASD(SO/LIC) will act as the facilitator for both the equipment transfer and the procurement of a replacement van for VOA. On October 5, a meeting was held at VOA to engage DoD OGC and VOA Legal Counsel in the transfer and replacement process. It was agreed that the VOA van would be provided to the UN not later than the end of November to match delivery of radio transmitters being provided by the UK, that VOA would provide training for UN technicians prior to transfer of the van to the UN, and that the cost of the training, cost of VOA design work related to the van, and actual procurement costs for the van would be captured and provided to the UN for reimbursement.

H-16



~~SECRET~~

THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

JS

Reply ZIP Code
20318-0300

DJSM-1071-94
14 October 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SPECIAL
OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT)

Subject. PACJAM Communication Jammer (U)

1. (S) As requested, * the following information on the PACJAM
communication jammer is provided

2. (S)

[REDACTED]

3. (S) The impact of

[REDACTED]

Walter Kross

WALTER KROSS
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director, Joint Staff

Reference.

* OASD memorandum, 3 October 1994, no subject

Classified by Director J-3
Declassify on OADR

~~SECRET~~

104/37333
B

POSITION PAPER

SUBJECT: "Hate Radio" Broadcasts Targetting Rwandan Refugees (U)

ISSUE: (SNF) The appropriate U S role in suppressing extremist propaganda broadcasts in and around Rwanda

DISCUSSION: (SNF) Extremist radio broadcasts continue to hamper the efforts of the UN, the new Rwandan government, and the governments of adjacent countries to promote internal stability and a return of Rwandan refugees to their homeland. The NSC has tasked DoD to examine the problem and determine what can and should be done to address it, given that the USG will not deploy U S personnel to jam the broadcasts. In this context, several factors must be considered

- **Availability of Jammers.** There is a commercially available, man-portable jamming system (PACJAM) that could be employed in the vicinity of the camps to selectively jam the extremist broadcasts so they could not be heard by the refugees

[REDACTED] The vendor, AEL Defense Corp, requires 6-9 months to build new systems, however, they do have a demonstration model and an additional prototype system available that they would be willing to sell, if pressed. Cost would be approximately \$100K per unit

- **Employment of Jammers.** UNAMIR could jam the broadcasts if provided with the equipment. There is, however, opposition within UN DPKO to jamming on the grounds that this would be perceived as taking sides (the extremist broadcasts are Hutu in origin). The U S has not received a formal request from the UN for assistance in jamming the broadcasts. The governments of Rwanda, Burundi or Zaire could also jam the broadcasts if given the jamming systems. The PACJAM systems were designed as "throw away" units, so technology transfer is not an issue. What IS an issue is that the PACJAM systems could also be used by these governments to selectively jam other transmissions, including broadcasts by UNAMIR. A decision to provide electronic warfare equipment, even low-tech systems such as PACJAM, to these or any other governments in the region would have major policy ramifications which should be considered at least at the ad hoc group (AHG) level

CONCLUSION: (~~SNF~~) Ambassador Inderfurth, USUN, will raise the issue of UN jamming at the interagency working group meeting with UN DPKO later this week. If the UN decides that a jamming capability is needed to support this or other peacekeeping operations, we recommend providing the necessary information to the UN so they can deal directly with the vendor to acquire one or more PACJAM units.

Prepared by Chuck Williamson, OASD(SO/LIC)SS, x55693

Approved by James Q Roberts, Director, Special Support