MV National Pride has engine problems
- Rendezvous with similar-size ship 25 nm N of Guam app. 1030Z
- Destination still unknown
- Probable Iranian aboard
• "National Pride" hijacked before the attack
• "Friends" may refer to North Koreans
• Activity consistent with KN naval SOF operations
EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE -- ELIGIBLE RECEIVER 97
NORTH KOREA/IRAN EMERGING TIES

 COMMENT:
• Circumstantial evidence of North Korean/Iranian cooperation
• State support likely but no direct evidence
• Iran/North Korea appear responsible for ongoing terrorist campaign despite only minor previous links
  – Vahid and Asadi presence on Philippine ship points to Iranian involvement
- Food problems continue
- US DOE officials working at Yongbyon
  - No unusual developments reported
- No additional evidence of internal upheaval
• North Korea capable of attacking with limited preparations

• Major detectable preparations -- none reported
  - Removal of mines/clearing DMZ
  - Lateral comms between corps
  - Activation of Supreme Command
  - Activity across DMZ
  - Increased tactical recce
IRANIAN MOTIVES TO WORK WITH KN

- Carrot and stick tactics to lift US sanctions
- Reduce US influence in Persian Gulf

Kim Chong-il

Supreme Leader Khamenei
25 active of 150 indicators of IW attack

- PSY OPS 5 of 19
- DESTRUCTION 4 of 14
- INTEL OPS 3 of 26
- COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK 10 of 50
- EW 1 of 12
- MISC ACTS 2 of 5

No indicators active for:
- Deception; defensive IO
• 10 of 50 active-computer network attack attempts to:
  - Remotely access protected systems
  - Implant malicious software to destroy data and deny service
  - Penetrate/attack of US systems
  - Virus incident reports
  - Report of attack on networks originating from US government domains
  - Access/possession of passwords to US networks
  - Searching for/downloading of intrusion software/techniques
  - Denial of service attacks on networks
  - Theft of computer/systems
  - DISA COMSPOT's (communications incidents, actions, etc.)
• KN/Iran probably cooperating
• Significant danger of simultaneous large scale IO/IW attack
  – Events have been cumulative, increasingly more violent and potentially more dangerous
  – Moved from civil to military targets
  – Spread from CONUS to PACOM
• IW assailants increasingly sophisticated
  – IW attacks have probed to find weaknesses in US systems
  – IW probes have practiced/rehearsed access
• Capable of large-scale civil and military disruptions
  – Also capable of more destructive attacks on selective targets