



(U) Drone Strikes: CIVCAS Considerations

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(U) Drone Strikes: CIVCAS Considerations

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(U) Over the past decade, in addition to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Government (USG) has conducted operations outside of declared theaters of armed conflict (ODTAC) to counter threats to the United States. These operations have often used Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS, commonly called “drones”) to conduct strikes on designated targets. The USG has described its use of drone strikes in Pakistan and elsewhere as “exceptionally surgical” with minimal civilian casualties.¹ These strikes appear to have been effective in killing senior leaders of enemy networks that threaten the US.² At the same time, some have voiced concerns about the possible negative second-order effects of these strikes. For example, members of Parliament in the United Kingdom (UK) recently wrote a letter to the editor of a national newspaper expressing concern that such strikes increase radicalization of the local population, lead to many unaccounted-for civilian casualties, and undermine the sovereignty of Pakistan.³

(U) While these ODTAC operations can differ significantly from those in declared theaters of armed conflict in approaches and forces used, there are some elements that are similar. One such element is the issue of civilian casualties (CIVCAS). In Afghanistan and elsewhere over the past decade, US-caused CIVCAS curtailed the United States’ freedom of action and undermined its objectives, especially when these casualties were not addressed through effective consequence management. While the author does not have operational data for ODTAC operations, this paper combines insights and lessons based on analysis of operations in Afghanistan with news reports and public statements of USG officials to test assumptions made by USG policy makers concerning collateral damage during ODTAC operations. Specifically, this paper discusses three issues:

- Two types of CIVCAS and implications for avoidance and consequence management;
- The nature of CIVCAS from airstrikes, including the relative likelihood and magnitude of CIVCAS from manned and unmanned “drone” platforms; and
- Effective consequence management when CIVCAS occur, including making accurate estimates of CIVCAS when they occur.

¹ (U) For example, “It’s this surgical precision—the ability, with laser-like focus, to eliminate the cancerous tumor called an al-Qa’ida terrorist while limiting damage to the tissue around it—that makes [drones] so essential.” John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, 30 April 2012; similarly, “[drone strikes are] exceptionally precise, exceptionally surgical, and exceptionally targeted.” Jay Carney, Presidential spokesman, 31 January 2012.

² (U) For example, airstrikes have been reported to have killed the number two leader of Al-Qaeda, Abu Yahya al-Libi, as well as several consecutive leaders of the militant group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.

³ (U) Letter to the Editor, *UK Times*, 27 July 2012.

(U) This paper does not assert that drone attacks should be stopped because of CIVCAS concerns. An important lesson from Afghanistan is that it can be possible to deal with CIVCAS—both reducing CIVCAS and mitigating their impact when they occur—without sacrificing the mission. In fact, in 2010, through a recalibrated approach, the US special operations campaign in Afghanistan successfully reduced CIVCAS while also improving mission effectiveness: a win-win situation.⁴ To this end, this paper points to ways that the USG can maintain effectiveness in ODTAC operations while dealing more successfully with CIVCAS and thus avoid strategic setbacks experienced in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

(U) Two Types of CIVCAS

(U) This report makes multiple references to civilians, such as in the term “CIVCAS.” For the purpose of this paper, civilians are “those persons who are not combatants (members of military/paramilitary forces) or members of organized armed groups of a party of a conflict.”⁵ The term CIVCAS refers to the death or injury of a civilian as a result of actions of a combatant entity: the US, a Coalition partner, host-nation security forces, or insurgents/terrorists. The nature of the enemy in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and other locations can create challenges in obtaining positive identification (PID) of enemy combatants and discriminating between the population and the enemy. These challenges result from their noncompliance with the laws of war: including the irregular nature of combatants, with a lack of uniforms and standard equipment limiting the utility of a visual signature for positive identification within an armed culture, and enemy practices of co-locating with the local population and using noncombatants as human shields. When visual identification is not a sufficient means for PID in itself, the basis for PID tends to come from two sources: intelligence and observation of hostile intent or a hostile act.

(U) Analysis of civilian casualties in Afghanistan identified two primary types of CIVCAS overall:

- **Collateral effects:** civilians killed or wounded by the effects of an engagement of enemy forces;
- **Misidentification:** where targeted entities were believed to be enemy at the time of the engagement, but the entities were found later to be civilian.

~~(S//REL)~~ In the first case, the US positively identified enemy forces and engaged them, with collateral effects of the engagement also causing CIVCAS. Examples of this kind of CIVCAS would be a 500lb bomb impacting a vehicle with the targeted individual, but the vehicle also contains civilians or shrapnel impacts a person walking alongside of the road during the engagement. This collateral damage may have been anticipated and accounted for in the engagement approval process, or it may have been unplanned; for example, local nationals travelling at night contrary to the expected pattern of life. This type of CIVCAS tends to be relatively more straightforward

⁴ (U) “Joint Civilian Casualty Study,” Joint Center for Operational Analysis (JCOA) 2010.

⁵ (U) *Afghanistan Annual Report 2011: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), February 2012. The UNAMA definition also includes the restriction that civilians not be part of “levee en masse,” a term from the Third Geneva Convention, but this restriction applies only to non-occupied territories, so it is not applicable to current operations in Afghanistan.

to confirm after the fact (b)(1)

(b)(1)

~~(S//REL)~~ In the second case, the US engaged what were believed to be enemy forces based on available intelligence, or perceived hostile intent or hostile act, and then the targeted individual(s) were later found to be civilians. In many cases, this occurred because the perceived hostile intent or hostile act turned out to be a misunderstanding of the situation. This type of CIVCAS tends to be more difficult to determine, and engagements with a lack of a ground battle damage assessment (BDA) often do not detect this type of CIVCAS. Instead, CIVCAS is generally discovered after the fact by third parties, often reported through the host nation or the press, complicating consequence management and leading to magnified negative second-order effects.

(U) There has been much attention on the process of generating accurate collateral damage estimates for the strike approval process to pursue the goal of reducing CIVCAS during operations. The fact that there are two pathways to CIVCAS—misidentification as well as collateral effects—suggests that additional steps are also important in order to minimize CIVCAS and manage negative second-order effects when they occur. For example, steps that can validate hostile intent or hostile act can be valuable in avoiding misidentifications. In addition, more accurate BDA is often needed to identify when CIVCAS occurs due to misidentification. This can be difficult to determine when there are no supporting forces on the ground. One possibility is for the USG to try and address this question using available information from the host nation and/or trusted third parties. In the case of continued ambiguity, this determination is specified by another tenet of international humanitarian law: that “in case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be considered to be a civilian.”⁶

(U) Nature of CIVCAS from Airstrikes: Insights from Afghanistan

(U) Operations in Afghanistan can shed light on the nature of CIVCAS from airstrikes, because Afghanistan effectively serves as a testing ground: operations in Afghanistan include a large number of airstrikes, and the many ground forces in Afghanistan allow for an improved determination of ground truth of the effects of airstrikes compared to assessments from air platforms. Therefore, the magnitude and frequency of negative second-order effects of airstrikes can be well characterized over a large data set. This allows some assumptions concerning airstrikes in other areas of operations to be tested. For example, it is commonly assumed that unmanned (here called “drone” platforms to match USG statements) airstrikes are the most surgical option available and are the best approach for avoiding CIVCAS when striking targets. This section will test that assumption.

(U) There are several aspects of airstrikes that are relevant to CIVCAS. One consideration is collateral damage estimation.⁷ In this part of the targeting process, the effects of weapons

⁶ (U) Protocol 1, Additional to the Geneva Conventions, 1977, Part IV: Civilian Protection, Article 50.

⁷ (U) See, for example, CJCSI 3160.01, “No-strike and the Collateral Damage Estimation Methodology,” 13 February 2009.

employment are considered in light of possible casualties to noncombatants and damage to civilian structures. This affects a number of factors concerning an airstrike, such as the type and number of ordnance used, the pattern of life surrounding the target, and specific weaponing considerations such as the direction of aircraft approach and tailored weapon fusing. In discussions of potential collateral damage, drone platforms have been touted by the USG as a surgical option for maintaining effectiveness against threats while keeping collateral damage to an absolute minimum.

~~(S//REL)~~ Data from Afghanistan can be used to explore the relative likelihood of CIVCAS from engagements by manned and unmanned platforms: both the relative frequency of CIVCAS during engagements and the average numbers of civilians killed and wounded in a CIVCAS incident.

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




Table 1. (U) CIVCAS rates per engagement for manned and unmanned platforms in Afghanistan⁸

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


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~~(S//REL)~~ As shown in Table 2,

(b)(1)



(b)(1) The table also includes the numbers of civilians killed (as compared to CIVCAS which includes civilians killed or wounded) and the rates of

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


Table 2. (U) CIVCAS and CIVCAS per incident for manned and drone platforms in Afghanistan

⁸ (U) "CIVCAS Update Study" for COMISAF, JCOA, January 2012.

⁹ (U) Ibid. Time period was August 2010 to June 2011.

civilians killed per incident; (b)(1)

(b)(1)

~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(U) The data in Table 2 examines drone strikes in declared combat operations (specifically Afghanistan) where the strikes are controlled and conducted by military forces. It is important to note that drones being used in other areas of the world can be controlled by other government agencies—which could lead to differences in the characteristics of strikes in ODTAC operations due to factors such as different training standards for drone operators and different rules of engagement (ROE).

(U) Factors that contribute to CIVCAS during drone strikes

(U) In recent efforts to reduce CIVCAS in Afghanistan, it was helpful to not only capture CIVCAS frequencies, but also identify key causal factors of CIVCAS when it occurs, both to help predict high-risk areas of CIVCAS and to help mitigate those risks.

~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)

(b)(1)

¹⁰ (U) "CIVCAS Update Study" for COMISAF, JCOA, January 2012.

~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)
(b)(1)

- (b)(1)
- *Ground forces positively identified two individuals on a motorcycle as enemy.* (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) *During the second engagement, an Afghan farmer walked into the engagement area and was severely wounded by the blast.*

~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)
(b)(1)

- *Partnered International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) ground forces conducting a reconnaissance patrol requested airborne reconnaissance* (b)(1)
(b)(1) *to determine if there was enemy activity ahead of their patrol. (b)(1) identified several individuals digging along a path next to a stone wall, and described their activity as "nonagricultural digging." The unit had encountered improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in the area previously, so the description was used as the basis for PID of the individuals as hostile.* (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) *The platoon then moved to the location and they identified four civilians dead and three wounded, one of which later died of their wounds.*
- (b)(1) *monitored three vehicles moving in the general area of a Special Operations Forces (SOF) team after their insertion into a remote area in Uruzgan province.* (b)(1)
(b)(1) *described the vehicles with characteristics that suggested they were an enemy quick reaction force, and disregarded several indicators that could have pointed to the civilian nature of the vehicles, such as the movement of the vehicles away from the area, the absence of any indications of hostile intent, and the presence of children*

in the vehicles. Based on the positive ID based (b)(1)
(b)(1) engaged the vehicles resulting in 16 civilians killed
and 12 wounded.

~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)
(b)(1)

- During an operation targeting a high value individual (HVI), (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) The casualties were believed to be enemy until
the BBC reported on the incident a few days later showing the individuals to be civilians
travelling to a wedding party. An estimated 37 civilians were killed.
- In the earlier-mentioned incident in Uruzgan province, (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1)
- During a HVI operation, (b)(1)
(b)(1)
(b)(1) Instead, they had engaged the wrong
individuals, killing two civilians.

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(b)(1) Examples include:

- *Ground forces received small-arms fire and rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fire from several buildings in a compound. (b)(1) observed the compound and saw two men exit one building and enter another carrying small arms and RPGs. The platform then observed them leave that building and move to a third. With (b)(1) not seeing any signs of civilian activity in the area, ground forces assumed there were no civilians in the compound and (b)(1) Four civilians were killed and three were wounded.*
- *(b)(1) monitored a vehicle with a high value individual. (b)(1) two individuals were visible in the vehicle. After engaging the vehicle, imagery showed three civilian casualties, including women and a child, in addition to the targeted individual.*
- *(b)(1) observed six individuals conducting suspicious digging on and around a road. After observing a number of factors over three hours of observation—time of night (after midnight), absence of lights, individuals providing security, and lack of coordination with Afghan National Police (ANP)—(b)(1) engaged the individuals as IED emplacements. Ground forces discovered three civilian casualties with no evidence of IED materials at the site.*

~~(S//REL)~~ While it is not a reasonable goal to reduce CIVCAS to zero, the above factors represent areas where CIVCAS (b)(1) in Afghanistan operations could be reduced through additional attention. Dedicated analysis of ODTAC operations would show whether attention to the above factors would help to reduce CIVCAS during those operations;

it is also likely that such analysis could identify additional areas where focus could be beneficial. Addressing these areas would be expected to both reduce CIVCAS while maintaining mission effectiveness, and avoid the curtailing of freedom of action by avoiding negative second-order effects.

(U) It is important to note that the rates of CIVCAS per incident for Afghanistan discussed above may represent a best-case scenario since they reflect significant efforts in




Figure 1. (U) Average number of civilian casualties per air-to-ground incident over time

Afghanistan to reduce CIVCAS. Over time, these efforts—including the development of new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) as well as the issuance of multiple directives and guidance for the use of force—contributed to a major reduction in air-to-ground CIVCAS per incident, as shown in Figure 1 on the previous page.¹¹ This figure shows that CIVCAS can be reduced significantly with effort and focus; it also indicates that CIVCAS levels could be considerably higher than that shown in the section above in operations where CIVCAS reduction does not receive similar attention.

(U) CIVCAS Consequence Management

(U) Lessons from CIVCAS Consequence Management in Afghanistan

(U) Between 2005 and 2008, the US caused an increasing number of CIVCAS in Afghanistan, but did not regularly admit to them nor effectively adjust to reduce them. Complaints made by President Karzai and the international community (e.g., the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan [UNAMA]) appeared to go unaddressed. Finally, the issue became “toxic” and the issue of CIVCAS became of such a magnitude that it undermined the overall ISAF strategy in Afghanistan, restricting ISAF and US freedom of action.¹²

(U) It is not a realistic goal to reduce CIVCAS to zero in operations; their occurrence will be a reality in operations. A key element of preventing the issue of CIVCAS from becoming toxic is effective consequence management. To be effective, consequence management relies on accurate and rapid battle-damage assessments for determining the presence and extent of CIVCAS, as well as for combatting false allegations. Some of the most harmful incidents in Afghanistan occurred when Coalition forces either denied that CIVCAS occurred or significantly underestimated their numbers; when independent reporting revealed evidence of additional casualties, the credibility of the US was undermined. This negative impact from proactive and accurate reporting of civilian casualties has been seen in other theaters as well: during Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR, US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) credibility was undermined by coalition press reports indicating no “confirmed” CIVCAS in Libya, which was later contested by independent assessments indicating that CIVCAS did indeed occur. In addition, not having accurate information also left US and its allies unable to counter false allegations of civilian casualties.

(U) In contrast, both leaders and tactical forces in Afghanistan gradually learned the importance of responding properly to civilian harm. The essential elements of this response included effective and rapid communications of the truth, expressing regret for civilian harm, and making amends for that harm, in recognition that conflict can create a significant toll on civilians both emotionally and financially.¹³ Best practices for consequence management in Afghanistan minimized negative

¹¹ (U) “CIVCAS Update Study” for COMISAF, JCOA, January 2012.

¹² (U) General Petraeus, USA, Commander, US Central Command, JCOA interview, 11 December 2009.

¹³ (U) Sharing the facts concerning incidents, particularly in the face of allegations, included sharing photos from ground BDA and having full motion video from air platforms declassified in an expedited timeframe.

second-order effects of civilian harm, and in some cases even improved relationships with the local population by showing concern about their welfare.

~~(S//REL)~~ Effective consequence management was illustrated in an incident in Laghman Province in Afghanistan on 16 September 2012, where (b)(1) positively identified armed military-aged males as a threat and multiple aircraft engaged those individuals eight times over a 90-minute time period. The next morning, Afghan government officials claimed that dozens of women had been harmed in US airstrikes, and an ISAF investigation confirmed that 8 women were killed and about 21 injured as a result of being misidentified as enemy. Rapid action by the battlespace owner and ISAF HQ (including a message of personal condolence to the families, a joint US-Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) shura, and solatia payments when appropriate) mitigated the impact and avoided potential negative consequences from this incident compared to past high-profile CIVCAS incidents.¹⁴

(U) Consequence Management in ODTAC Operations

(U) According to USG public statements, the US is currently conducting drone strikes in multiple locations throughout the US Central and Africa Commands' area of operations. CIVCAS, as a result of those strikes, have gained attention over time. US officials estimate that CIVCAS from these airstrikes have been exceedingly low, but, similar to Afghanistan, their estimates do not necessarily agree with those in the press, made by third-party organizations, and—importantly—by the local population.

(U) For example, the US has repeatedly stressed how covert drone strikes in Pakistan caused very few civilian deaths.¹⁵ But this position runs counter to a number of independent investigations regarding these strikes. For instance, below are three examples of drone strikes in Pakistan where third parties claimed CIVCAS occurred during a time-frame where the US stated that it had not found credible evidence of collateral deaths.¹⁶

- **(U) March 11, 2011:** *During a strike on a vehicle, a follow-on strike was reported to have killed rescuers that had moved to the scene after the first airstrike. Several reports stated there were civilian casualties ranging from two to five individuals.*
- **(U) March 17, 2011:** *During a strike of a suspected militant compound, Pakistani authorities and news reports stated that the gathering was a jirga (a tribal assembly of elders) to settle a mining dispute at a nearby chromite mine. Reported civilian casualties varied from thirteen to forty-four. The government of Pakistan provided compensation to the families of thirty-nine individuals killed during the strike.*

¹⁴ (U) Joint Incident Assessment Team (JIAT) Assessment of Alleged CIVCAS Event, Alingar District, Laghman Province on 16 September 2012.

¹⁵ (U) "CIA is Disputed on Civilian Toll in Drone Strikes," *New York Times*, 11 August 2011, accessed 25 June 2012 at <http://nytimes.com/2011/08/12/world/asia/12drones.html>.

¹⁶ (U) Examples are taken from a longer list of examples contained in a draft version of Columbia Law School's report on drone attacks, forwarded by the author in June 2012.

- **(U) May 6, 2011:** *During a strike on a vehicle, collateral damage occurred at a nearby religious school (possibly a militant compound) and a restaurant. Multiple organizations reported that six civilians were killed during the strike.*

(U) This is not to say that these independent investigations are always correct in their assessments of civilian deaths. Similar incidents in Afghanistan have shown that initial US estimates can tend to be too low and independent claims can tend to be too high, with the ground truth often found somewhere between the two positions. These experiences in Afghanistan have shown the potential value of working with other organizations that investigate civilian harm during combat operations. Operation UNIFIED PROTECTOR also illustrates how it can be difficult for the US to conduct accurate assessments of civilian harm without ground forces; while assessments can be conducted by air, such assessments often miss the presence of CIVCAS.¹⁷

(U) While some consequence management approaches used in Afghanistan may not translate directly into operations where the US does not want to officially acknowledge its actions, the use of proxies or leveraging relationships with cooperative host-nation governments could provide additional options for consequence management during these operations. For example, seeking a partnership with host-nation security forces or trusted independent organizations could help to improve the accuracy of assessments of the numbers of CIVCAS. Surrogate organizations could also be used to provide compensation payments when appropriate, since the US has historically found that there are strategic advantages in mitigating harm when it is a consequence of its actions.¹⁸ Compensation provided to individuals after instances of civilian harm signals to the host-nation government that the US is concerned about the local population, reinforcing the perception of host-nation sovereignty by showing that the US does not act with impunity. Compensation can also enhance stability and reduce radicalization; for example, in World War II, the US military found that providing compensation for civilian harm “had a pronounced stabilizing effect” that more than justified the modest expenses of the program.¹⁹

¹⁷ (U) CIVCAS Update Study Executive Summary, JCOA, January 2012.

¹⁸ (U) For example, during World War I, General Pershing, the commander of American Expeditionary Force Europe, requested that the War Department develop a system where the military could pay claims to compensate the French population for US-caused harm. Failure to respond to these incidents, he said, “injures our reputation” among the population. “Joint Civilian Casualty Study,” 2010.

¹⁹ (U) “Joint Civilian Casualty Study,” 2010.

(U) Conclusions

~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)

(b)(1)

Tailored training that addresses these causal factors could aid in reducing CIVCAS in engagements involving drones. While processes and operating forces in Afghanistan can differ from those in ODTAC operations, the factors above suggest that a dedicated look at CIVCAS in ODTAC operations would be worthwhile.

(U) US forces in Afghanistan were also challenged with inaccurate assessments of civilian harm and ineffective consequence management; these challenges both tarnished the US' reputation and contributed to limitations in freedom of action. Open-source reporting is suggestive that USG efforts in ODTAC operations share these challenges. While consequence management approaches used in Afghanistan may not translate directly into covert actions where the US does not want to officially acknowledge its actions, the use of proxies or leveraging relationships with cooperative host-nation governments could provide options during these operations. Conducting more comprehensive assessments of civilian harm during airstrikes in ODTAC operations, followed by effective consequence management efforts, should help to protect the reputation of the US, combat false allegations, and mitigate negative second-order effects that can undermine US campaign objectives and freedom of action.

(U) Recommendations

(U) **Include specific causal factors for CIVCAS in training:** Drones feature several factors that can increase the risk of CIVCAS. Personnel potentially involved in joint fires that could include drone aircraft as an engaging or ISR platform should be trained in these factors and how they can be mitigated, to help reduce CIVCAS while maintaining mission effectiveness. Such training should include drone crews and PED personnel.

(U) **Leverage CIVCAS consequence management lessons from Afghanistan:** CIVCAS in Afghanistan limited USG freedom of action and necessitated an evolving approach to maintain effectiveness, including effective consequence management. Best practices and lessons from Afghanistan regarding CIVCAS consequence management can also apply to other USG efforts, including operations outside of ODTAC. Deliberate efforts to improve CIVCAS consequence management during these operations should aid in reducing CIVCAS and avoiding negative second-order effects, such as the curtailing of freedom of action.

(U) **Conduct a review of CIVCAS levels in ODTAC operations:** Airstrikes in support of ODTAC operations appear to have some common elements with operations in Afghanistan. This is likely

to include several factors that increase the risk of CIVCAS. ODTAC operations should be analyzed to identify current CIVCAS issues and point to additional areas where focus could help to reduce CIVCAS while maintaining mission effectiveness. This would benefit those operations by avoiding negative second-order effects, which can curtail freedom of action and undermine US objectives.

(U) Review the process for classifying casualties as enemy combatants versus CIVCAS in ODTAC operations: While the US has stressed how covert drone strikes in Pakistan caused very few civilian deaths, this appears to contradict a number of independent investigations regarding these strikes. Review of the US process for classifying CIVCAS in ODTAC operations should aid in reconciling these disparate reports. In addition, this process could likely benefit from best practices and lessons for CIVCAS classification processes from Afghanistan.

(U) Where appropriate, apply Afghanistan CIVCAS reduction best practices to ODTAC campaigns: ISAF and US forces in Afghanistan have made significant progress in reducing CIVCAS while maintaining mission effectiveness. A number of these best practices and lessons could be applied to the conduct of ODTAC campaigns. These best practices and lessons should be shared with USG elements conducting ODTAC campaigns, including both leaders and elements responsible for executing operations.

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(U) Appendix A: Abbreviations

ANP	Afghan National Police
BDA	Battle Damage Assessment
C2	Command and Control
CIVCAS	Civilian Casualties
CONUS	Continental US
(b)(1)	(b)(1)
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HVI	High Value Individual
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
(b)(1)	(b)(1)
(b)(1)	(b)(1)
JTAC	Joint Tactical Air Controller
MAM	Military-Aged Male
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ODTAC	Outside Declared Theaters of Conflict
(b)(1)	(b)(1)
PID	Positive Identification
ROE	Rules of Engagement
RPG	Rocket Propelled Grenade
(b)(1)	(b)(1)
SPINS	Special Instructions
TIC	Troops in Contact
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
UAS	Unmanned Aerial Systems
UK	United Kingdom
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
USG	United States Government