

# JOINT STAFF ACTION PROCESSING FORM

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

ACTION NUMBER 05-03885

TO CJCS

THRU DJS

Approved & Secured with Approval [Signature]

ORIG SUSPENSE 18 Jul 05

**SUBJECT /O/** Review of QFRs, IFRs, and Transcripts for 23 June 2005 Hearing Before the Senate Armed Service Committee, Subj: US Military Strategy & Operations in Iraq, Witnesses: Gen Myers, CJCS, Gen Abizaid, Gen Casey

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

1. Purpose. To approve of the transcript and questions for the record (QFRs)<sup>1</sup> from the CJCS testimony before the SASC held on 23 June.

2. Discussion

a. The SASC submitted the transcript and QFRs following CJCS testimony. The following is a breakdown of the answers provided by the Joint Staff:

- (1) J-1: QFRs 4, 5
- (2) J-3: QFR 12
- (3) J-5: QFR 6
- (4) NG/RM: QFR 11

b. LA has coordinated the transcript and answers through LC, PA, SA, and (b)(6)

**WORK:**<sup>2</sup> The CJCS asked a question about the statement on page 87, the statement is correct as written. The word "insurgency" is the act of something. The word "is" is the verb for the "condition." Gen Myers also wanted to correct for the record page 114 line 11.

3. Recommendation. CJCS approve the transcript and answers to the QFRs at TAB.

**CJCS Decision:**

Approve

Disapprove

See Me

**COORDINATION**

NAME	AGENCY	DATE	NAME	AGENCY	DATE
<del>XXXX</del>	VDJS				
(b)(6)	OCJCS/LA	21 Jul	(b)(6)	J-2	15 Jul
	OCJCS/SA	22 Jul	MG Peterson	VDJ-3	28 Jul
	OCJCS/PA	25 Jul	(b)(6)	J-4	15 Jul
	OCJCS/LC	22 Jul	RADM Sullivan	DJ-5	15 Jul
	OCJCS	25 Jul	(b)(6)	J-6	13 Jul
BG Dyches	NG/RM	12 Jul		J-7	12 Jul
(b)(6)	VDJ-1	12 Jul		J-8	12 Jul

AO/J/DIV/EXT

(b)(6)

Date Prepared: 2 Aug 05

CLASSIFICATION

UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION/DECLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS

**UNCLASSIFIED**

**ENDNOTES**

---

<sup>1</sup> 05-03885

<sup>2</sup> Return Pkg.pdf

**UNCLASSIFIED**

SJS 05-03885

6 July 2005

DISTRIBUTION OCJCS/LC,  
OCJCS/LA, J-1, J-2, J-3,  
J-4, J-5, J-6, J-7, J-8,  
ACJCS/NG-RM

SECRETARY, JOINT STAFF DIRECTIVE

on

/O/ REVIEW OF QFRS, IFRS, AND TRANSCRIPTS FROM 23 JUNE 2005  
HEARING BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, SUBJ: US  
MILITARY STRATEGY & OPERATIONS IN IRAQ, WITNESS: GEN MYERS,  
CJCS, GEN ABIZAID, GEN CASEY

1. The attached is referred to LA for CJCS APPROVAL in collaboration/coordination with the CJCS Communications Director, CJCS Special Assistant, OCJCS/LC, ACJCS/NG-RM, and all-J-Directorates. IAW VDJS guidance, directorate coordination must be J-Vice Director level or higher for QFRs/IFRs prepared by the Joint Staff.
2. Templates to be used for preparation of QFRs/IFRs are available in WORD JS FORM under DOCUMENTS.
3. The suspense for this action is 15 July 2005, unless an extension is coordinated with the Secretary, Joint Staff.

Joint Secretariat



# CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY REVIEW

Hearing Date: 23 JUNE 2005

Committee: SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Subject: US MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

Witness: GEN RICHARD MYERS, CJCS; GEN JOHN ABIZAID, USCENTCOM; GEN GEORGE CASEY, MNF-IRAQ  
OCJCS/LA ACTION OFFICER

(b)(6)

## For Review By:

Joint Staff <u>X</u>	CENTCOM _____	SOCOM _____	OTHER _____
Joint Staff Editors _____	EUCOM _____	STRATCOM _____	_____
CJCS _____	PACOM _____	TRANSCOM _____	_____
VCJCS _____	SOUTHCOM _____	USFK/CFC/UNC _____	_____
JFCOM _____	NORTHCOM _____	_____	_____

X Please review the witness \_\_\_\_\_ statements X transcripts \_\_\_\_\_ QFRs \_\_\_\_\_ IFRs for security, accuracy of data and correct policy. Make proposed changes directly on your copy and provide name, office and phone of person making change. Indicate if change is suggested or mandatory. Be sure to attach a justification to support all mandatory changes.

X Please edit transcript in accordance with the instructions outlined on the reverse of this form.

X Prepare answers only for the following inserts for the record (IFRs). Provide an original and one (1) copy of each (IFR). [Bracket] all classified info on the copy only. (Use attached committee specific example for instruction and format).  
Page/Line number(s):  
PAGE 87, LINE 15

X Prepare responses to the attached list of questions for the record 5 QFRs. Provide an original and one (1) copy of each QFR. [Bracket] all classified info on the copy only. (Use attached committee specific example for instruction and format).

X Other Instructions: PLEASE SEARCH FOR ALL INSERTS FOR THE RECORD

QFRS - #4, 5, 6, 11, 12

THE GO/FO WILL REVIEW & APPROVE ALL SUBMISSION PREPARED BY THEIR  
DIRECTORATE

X **NOTE FOR JS ONLY:** PLEASE RETURN THE COMPLETED PAPER COPY PACKAGE TO SJS NO LATER THAN 1500 ON THE SUSPENSE DATE. SJS WILL FORWARD TO DJS FOR FINAL JOINT STAFF APPROVAL.

**NOTE FOR COMMANDS ONLY:** TESTIMONY PACKAGES WILL NOT BE ACCEPTED BY OCJCS/LA UNLESS WITNESS APPROVAL DOCUMENTATION IS ATTACHED.

(b)(6)

Routing  
Date:

5 JULY 2005

Suspense:

18 JULY 2005



Senate Armed Services Committee

Questions for the Record

Hearing on 06/23/05, #05-64

To receive testimony on U.S. military strategy and operations in Iraq.

Witnesses: Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, General Richard Myers, General John Abizaid, and General George Casey

Senator Jim Inhofe

Improvised Explosive Devices

1. General Abizaid and General Casey, in the last 2 days, there has been a great deal of media coverage with regard to improvised explosive devices (IEDs). It is apparent from our casualties that the biggest danger our military faces in Iraq is a result of IEDs. Coalition forces, Iraqi security forces, and Iraqi civilians face these same threats. General Joseph Votel, the Director of the IED Defeat Task Force, is quoted in Defense News as stating that IED incidents – the discovery or detonation of a bomb – have surged in recent months and are currently running at about 30 per day. I realize and applaud all the fine work that is being done by this Task Force in a very time critical environment to diminish any further escalation of these devices. Like you and my colleagues and all Americans, I remain concerned about what more we can do to keep the insurgency from continuing to make and adapt these devices to combat whatever offensive or defensive measures we put in place.

I know there was a counter-IED seminar at Fort Irwin last week, which was also attended by some of our coalition partners. Without getting into any classified areas, what assurances can you offer that there continue to be initiatives in the pipeline to defeat the insurgency's successful use of IEDs, especially the recent elevated use of vehicle-borne IEDs, and what can Congress do to better protect our troops on the ground?

A. General Abizaid?

JCS

B. General Casey?

JCS

2. General Abizaid and General Casey, it is my understanding that to track and capture the makers of these IEDs, human intelligence (HUMINT) plays an especially critical role. Are there any blockers to continuing to build our HUMINT capability as rapidly as we need to and what are we doing to overcome any such blockers?

A. General Abizaid?

JCS

B. General Casey?

JCS



3. General Abizaid and General Casey, I believe we all agree that the success of a new Iraq depends on Iraq being able to secure itself. We are making great progress in this area. I have seen positive changes in my two visits to Iraq this year. What I'd like to know is, with the increasing casualties amongst Iraqi security forces and civilians, are you seeing the Iraqi populace and the new Iraqi Government providing critical information or taking definitive actions to "help us, help them" be a free people and defeat this insurgency by pinpointing where the insurgent is hiding, and where the IEDs are being manufactured?

A. General Abizaid? JCS  
 B. General Casey? JCS

Troop Levels and End Strength

4. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, General Abizaid, and General Casey, recently, many of my colleagues in Congress have been pressing the Department of Defense (DOD) and the administration to reduce the number of troops in Iraq. Right now we have about 135,000 U.S. troops on the ground in Iraq. They have a mission, a critical mission: to defeat the insurgency, train the Iraqi security forces to protect themselves, and enable a free Iraq. I believe and support strongly that we base any withdrawal timeline on the mission, and only on the mission. There has been significant progress in Iraq. I have seen it. We expect continued progress with the Iraqis scheduled to hold their first election under their new constitution at the end of this year which the current Iraqi Government is working toward.

Along with our Active-Duty Forces, we have relied heavily on our Reserve and National Guard, all of which who have done an exemplary job. However with recruiting and retention challenges, I am concerned if we are maintaining adequate end strength in our military forces to meet the rotational needs of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) mission. Gentlemen, is this a concern you share?

A. Secretary Rumsfeld?  
 B. General Myers? JCS  
 C. General Abizaid? JCS J1  
 D. General Casey? JCS J3  
 J8

5. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, General Abizaid, and General Casey, what do you see on the horizon with regard to the negative recruiting trend, particularly in the Army and Marine Corps, and what plans are there to address this concern?

A. Secretary Rumsfeld?  
 B. General Myers? JCS  
 C. General Abizaid? JCS J1



D. General Casey?

JCS

Prisoners at Guantanamo Bay

6. Secretary Rumsfeld, General Myers, General Abizaid, and General Casey, a lot of controversy has surrounded the prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay lately. Inflammatory statements have been made and inflammatory articles have been written. Many claim that we should charge these prisoners or just let them go. This is of course the same group of people who believed we should treat terrorism as a crime and not as a war. This is the same group of people who watched as Osama bin Laden and his thugs attacked American interests repeatedly and simply sent the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to investigate and try to bring these people to justice, after the fact.

In a Washington Post article dated October 22, 2004, John Mintz wrote: "At least 10 detainees released from the Guantanamo Bay prison after U.S. officials concluded they posed little threat have been recaptured or killed fighting U.S. or coalition forces in Pakistan and Afghanistan ... One of the recaptured prisoners is still at large after taking leadership of a militant faction in Pakistan and aligning himself with al Qaeda ... In telephone calls to Pakistani reporters, he has bragged that he tricked his U.S. interrogators into believing he was someone else." The reporter further reported about one former detainee named Mehsud: "Mehsud said he spent 2 years at Guantanamo Bay after being captured in 2002 in Afghanistan fighting alongside the Taliban. At the time he was carrying a false Afghan identity card, and while in custody he maintained the fiction that he was an innocent Afghan tribesman, he said, U.S. officials never realized he was a Pakistani with deep ties to militants in both countries ..."

Last week, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales said, "There are 12 people that we have released that we know have come back and fought against America because they have been recaptured or killed on the battlefield ..."

I would like to hear your view of this debate. Should these men be charged or released? Do you believe they would return to theatre to cause you additional trouble?

- A. Secretary Rumsfeld?  
B. General Myers?  
C. General Abizaid?  
D. General Casey?

JCS  
JCS  
JCS

J5

Media Coverage

7. General Abizaid and General Casey, during my last two trips to Iraq I met many soldiers and marines who believed the media coverage was unbalanced. They told me the successes achieved by our forces seemed to not be news worthy, and the media at every



opportunity touted the insurgents' successes. With the exception of the coverage of the election in January, I must agree. What is your perception of the media coverage? How does that affect your mission?

- A. General Abizaid? JCS
- B. General Casey? JCS

8. General Abizaid and General Casey, what can we do to get a more balanced story?

- A. General Abizaid? JCS
- B. General Casey? JCS

#### Democracy in the Arab World

9. General Abizaid, in a recent article you stated: "Politics will assure the defeat of the insurgency, provided the politics are open, transparent and legitimate. And it is clear we are moving in that direction." It seems to me that this same strategy is starting to work in Lebanon, Libya, Afghanistan, and maybe someday in Egypt and Saudi Arabia to name just a few countries in the region. What do you see as the major obstacle to achieving an open, transparent, legitimate political environment in Iraq and what is your assessment of the changes we see taking place in the region? Are they sustainable? JCS
10. General Abizaid, in the same article you stated: "The Afghans and Iraqis on this trip kept saying to me over and over again, 'Are you going to stick with us?' ... And I kept telling them over and over again, 'Yes we will.' I ask the American people not to make a liar of me." What will happen in the region if we don't stick with them? JCS



Senator Susan Collins

National Guard and Reserve Deployments

11. General Myers, you and I have talked many times about the strain that we are placing on our National Guard and Reserve. I am concerned that the situation is getting worse, not better, and that we are asking too much of the Guard in particular, through multiple, repeated and lengthy deployments.

NG/KM  
J3

I would like to share an example with you. A constituent of mine is a helicopter mechanic and an Army National Guard staff sergeant. Her name is Jessica Wing. Staff Sergeant Wing left Bangor, Maine, last Friday morning for what will be her fourth deployment overseas in 10 years. She has had four deployments in 10 years – to Haiti, to Bosnia twice, and soon she'll be in either Iraq or Kuwait.

I understand that the DOD's policy mandates that Guard and Reserve members must not be deployed for more than 24 cumulative months unless they volunteer, but the key here is the word "cumulative." I also know there's the one-in-five rule stipulating that only one 24-month cumulative deployment can take place within the 5-year period. But, even if the deployments aren't for 24 months, it still imposes a tremendous hardship for a Guard member to be deployed overseas four times in 10 years.

I would like to know what specifically is being done to alleviate the repeated deployments of those like this staff sergeant who have specialty skills in areas that have unusually high demand? In her case, she's a helicopter mechanic, and I can see why there is a high demand for helicopter mechanics. From my personal conversations with Guard and Reserve members of Maine, we are already seeing the impact on recruitment, and I think we are going to start seeing it on retention as well. JCS

**Senator John Thune**

Operational Tempo

12. General Myers, can you describe the impact and strain of the repeated rotational deployments of ground units and air squadrons to Iraq - some are beginning their third tour - has had on yearly training cycles, readiness ratings and maintenance cycles - and, of course on the home-base infrastructures that support these units? JCS

J3  
J4



**Senator Daniel Akaka**

**Force Protection**

13. Secretary Rumsfeld, recently General Conway, Director of Operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters that insurgents are developing a shaped explosive charge "sufficient to penetrate certain levels of armor." Could you tell us what steps you are taking to improve the armor on High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs), Bradleys, and Strykers to compensate for this new explosive?

**U.S. Strategy in Iraq**

14. Secretary Rumsfeld, recently we have witnessed little reduction in the number of insurgent attacks, little increase in the ability of the Iraqi Armed Forces and police to protect their own countrymen, and have seen a drop in support by Americans of the ongoing conflict in Iraq. My question to you is what efforts, if any, are being undertaken by the Department to adjust the U.S. military strategy in order to make progress in these areas before there is any further erosion in the support of the global war on terrorism (GWOT)?
15. Secretary Rumsfeld, the preferred targets of the insurgents continue to be the Iraqi police and security forces. In the past you have testified that while there is no exit strategy for the United States, we are committed to ensuring that the Iraqis can provide security for their citizens and their elected government. In the past, you have provided testimony to this committee that included the number of Iraqi security forces that have volunteered, the number that have been trained, and lines of Iraqis waiting in line to volunteer, thus increasing the size of the Iraqi security forces. What impact do these insurgent attacks have on the U.S. strategy of remaining in Iraq until the Iraqi security forces are capable of maintaining order in that country?

**Iraqi Security Forces**

16. General Abizaid and General Casey, the preferred targets of the insurgents continue to be the Iraqi police and security forces. In the past this committee has received testimony that while there is no exit strategy for the United States, we are committed to ensuring that the Iraqis can provide security for their citizens and their elected government. Previous testimony to this committee has included numbers of Iraqi security forces that have volunteered, numbers that have been trained, and have shown lines of Iraqis waiting in line to volunteer, thus increasing the size of the Iraqi security forces.

My question for each of you is with the increase in insurgent attacks against the Iraqi forces, are you seeing a reduction in the number of volunteers similar to the reduction the U.S. is seeing in its recruitment numbers? **JCS**

A. General Abizaid?

JCS

B. General Casey?

JCS

17. General Abizaid and General Casey, news reports indicate that in some cities it is the political parties that control security through their militias, not the Iraqi police forces or Iraqi security forces, especially in the South. Reports, for example, indicate that in the southern city of Basra the local mullahs have to give individual approval to police officer recruitment. These militias may become even more important as the Iraqis take over more political control. Are you concerned about this and what should we do about it?

A. General Abizaid?

JCS

B. General Casey?

JCS



20f5

Stenographic Transcript  
Before the

05-64

COMMITTEE ON  
ARMED SERVICES

HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON  
U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

Printer's Copy


Thursday, June 23, 2005

Washington, D.C.

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY  
1111 14TH STREET, N.W.  
SUITE 400  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20005-5650  
(202) 289-2260

To be edited and returned  
to the U.S. Senate Armed  
Services Committee by:

08/01/05



**\*AMENDED NOTICE\***

**UNITED STATES SENATE**  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

*Sir/Madam:*

*There will be a meeting of the Committee on*

**ARMED SERVICES**

Room SR-325, The Caucus Room  
Russell Senate Office Building

Thursday, June 23, 2005 - 9:30 a.m.

**OPEN**

To receive testimony on U.S. military strategy and operations in Iraq.

**Witnesses:**

Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense

General Richard B. Myers, USAF  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

General John P. Abizaid, USA\*  
Commander  
United States Central Command

General George W. Casey, USA\*  
Commanding General  
Multi-National Force - Iraq



## 1 HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON

## 2 U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY AND OPERATIONS IN IRAQ

3  
4 Thursday, June 23, 2005

5 U.S. Senate

6 Committee on Armed Services

7 Washington, D.C.

8  
9 The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:37 a.m. in  
10 Room SR-325, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. John Warner,  
11 chairman, presiding.12 Committee Members Present: Senators Warner [chairman],  
13 McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Collins, Ensign, Talent, Chambliss,  
14 Graham, Dole, Cornyn, Thune, Levin, Kennedy, Byrd, Lieberman,  
15 Reed, Akaka, Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, and Clinton.  
1617 Committee Staff Members Present: Judith A. Ansley, Staff  
18 Director; and Leah C. Brewer, Nominations and Hearings Clerk.19 Majority Staff Members Present: Charles W. Alsup,  
20 Professional Staff Member; Regina A. Dubey, Professional Staff  
21 Member, Ambrose R. Hock, Professional Staff Member; Sandra E.  
22 Luff, Professional Staff Member; Thomas L. MacKenzie,  
23 Professional Staff Member; Elaine A. McCusker, Professional Staff  
24 Member; David M. Morriss, Counsel; Stanley R. O'Connor, Jr.,  
25 Professional Staff Member; Lynn F. Rusten,

1 Professional Staff Member; Joseph T. Sixeas, Professional Staff  
2 Member; Robert M. Soofer, Professional Staff Member; and Scott  
3 W. Stucky, General Counsel.

4 Minority Staff Members Present: Richard D. DeBobes,  
5 Democratic Staff Director; Daniel J. Cox, Jr., Professional  
6 Staff Member; Evelyn N. Farkas, Professional Staff Member;  
7 Richard W. Fieldhouse, Professional Staff Member; Bridget W.  
8 Higgins, Research Assistant; Gerald J. Leeling, Minority  
9 Counsel; Peter K. Levine, Minority Counsel; and William G.P.  
10 Monahan, Minority Counsel.

11 Staff Assistants Present: Alison E. Brill, Nicholas W.  
12 West, and Pendred K. Wilson.

13 Committee Members' Assistants Present: Cord Sterling,  
14 Assistant to Senator Warner; John A. Bonsell, Assistant to  
15 Senator Inhofe; Chris Arnold, Assistant to Senator Roberts; Arch  
16 Galloway II, Assistant to Senator Sessions; Mackenzie M. Eaglen,  
17 Assistant to Senator Collins; D'Arcy Grisier, Assistant to  
18 Senator Ensign; Lindsey R. Neas, Assistant to Senator Talent;  
19 Clyde A. Taylor IV, Assistant to Senator Chambliss; Meredith  
20 Moseley, Assistant to Senator Graham; Bob Taylor, Assistant to  
21 Senator Thune; David S. Lyles, Assistant to Senator Levin;  
22 Sharon L. Waxman, Assistant to Senator Kennedy; Mieke Y. Eoyang,  
23 Assistant to Senator Kennedy; Jarret A. Wright, Assistant to  
24 Senator Kennedy; Christina Evans, Assistant to Senator Byrd;  
25 Barry Gene (B.G.) Wright, Assistant to Senator Byrd; Erik Raven,



1 Assistant to Senator Byrd; Frederick M. Downey, Assisant to  
2 Senator Lieberman; Elizabeth King, Assistant to Senator Reed;  
3 Davelyn Noelani Kalipi, Assistant to Senator Akaka; Richard  
4 Kessler, Assistant to Senator Akaka; William K. Sutey, Assistant  
5 to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, Assistant to Senator Ben  
6 Nelson; Todd Rosenblum, Assistant to Senator Bayh; and Andrew  
7 Shapiro, Assistant to Senator Clinton.

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1                   OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, U.S. SENATOR  
2       FROM VIRGINIA

3           Chairman Warner: The committee meets this morning to  
4       receive testimony on U.S. military strategy and operations in  
5       Iraq and Afghanistan. I welcome our distinguished panel of  
6       military witnesses: General Richard Myers, Chairman of the  
7       Joint Chiefs of Staff; General John Abizaid, Commander of U.S.  
8       Central Command; and General George Casey, Commander of the  
9       Multinational Forces-Iraq.

10          I particularly want to thank Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld  
11       for his total cooperation in working with the leadership of this  
12       committee to arrange this very important hearing. When I first  
13       discussed the need for this full complement of military and  
14       civilian witnesses, the Secretary's reply was: "Name the day."  
15       Today is the day. Thank you.

16          I want to thank each of our witnesses and their countless  
17       men and women in uniform and the civilians that they lead, for  
18       their service and their tireless efforts to protect our Nation  
19       and our allies from the ever-present terrorist threat,  
20       particularly those serving in Iraq and Afghanistan, to secure  
21       the peace and self-determination for the Iraqi and Afghan  
22       people, and to bring hope to these troubled regions.

23          Speaking recently to those who have lost their family  
24       members, President Bush, who has shown a steady and unflinching  
25       resolve, has asked us to remember the following, and I quote



1 him: "One, we are not going to leave them, not going to allow  
2 their mission to go in vain; and two, we will complete the  
3 mission and the world will be better off for it." End quote. I  
4 agree with that assessment.

5 Likewise, we are never unmindful of the loss of life and  
6 limb and the sacrifices of the Iraqi and Afghan people. They  
7 are more and more each day assuming greater responsibility to  
8 secure and lead their respective nations.

9 On January 30th this year, the Iraqi people took a bold,  
10 courageous step, in defiance of the threats from insurgents, to  
11 rescue their country from decades of tyranny and to move in a  
12 sequence of steps to form a democracy of their own choosing.  
13 These historic elections in Iraq gave the world hope that an  
14 important milestone had been reached in the combined efforts of  
15 the international community to bring peace and security to the  
16 Iraqi people.

17 These initial hopes have been tempered somewhat by the  
18 reality of the political and ethnic challenges that have delayed  
19 the establishment of the Iraqi transitional government. The  
20 process over the coming months by which the Iraqis adopt a  
21 constitution and form a permanent government is the key to  
22 success. With the support of the coalition governments, the  
23 Iraqi government must not allow any extensions or delays in  
24 providing for a constitution, elections, and the formation of a  
25 permanent government. Only strong political leadership will

1 provide a free Iraq.

2 All governments must work as partners, must stay the  
3 course, strengthen their resolve, in order to achieve the common  
4 goal. All must be truthful and realistic with their people  
5 about the difficulties that lie ahead. Political courage must  
6 be as steadfast as the military courage.

7 As we look back over the history of the men and women of  
8 the armed forces of the United States in preserving our freedom,  
9 never have the challenges and responsibilities been greater than  
10 those that rest upon today's shoulders of the generation of  
11 military leaders. Terrorism knows no boundaries. Terrorists  
12 follow no international rules. They have no respect for life,  
13 limb, or anyone in their path of destruction. Terrorism of the  
14 magnitude the world is confronting today has no precedent in  
15 history. They are today's enemy.

16 I ask our witnesses to give us their candid assessment of  
17 the situation and the strategy for the way ahead. The American  
18 people must clearly understand what is at stake and why their  
19 mission in Iraq contributes to the United States' security, the  
20 security of the region, and to a great extent the security of  
21 the world. It is vital that our witnesses candidly give us  
22 their assessment of the commitment of the Iraqi people, the  
23 Iraqi security forces, and their willingness to increase their  
24 level of responsibility to defeat terrorism and build a peaceful  
25 nation.



1           No matter what level of troops, both coalition and Iraqi,  
2   no matter what level of weaponry they employ, we will not win  
3   this battle against insurgents unless every Iraqi citizen joins  
4   in supporting the efforts to ferret out and rid their nation of  
5   the insurgency.

6           Our great Nation has an enormous capacity for sacrifice  
7   and hardship when we understand the cause is just and that  
8   success is critical to the security of our Nation. Americans  
9   can and will accept difficult challenges and continue to support  
10   a call for service and sacrifice from our Nation's leaders.  
11   Many of us lived through such calls during World War II. This  
12   global war on terrorism today is no less vital to America's  
13   future.

14           Senator Levin.

15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

1 STATEMENT OF HON. CARL LEVIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM  
2 MICHIGAN

3 Senator Levin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 First let me join you in welcoming our witnesses this  
5 morning, thanking them for their presence. I join with you, Mr.  
6 Chairman, in expressing the gratitude of the committee to our  
7 troops for their courage, their professionalism, their  
8 sacrifice. Every American is in their debt.

9 Our men and women in uniform are serving with great honor.  
10 They deserve an objective assessment of the situation in Iraq.  
11 They deserve a clear layout of the next steps there. They are  
12 not getting either from the administration. Instead, they get a  
13 repetitious bugle that sounds: Things are going well, things  
14 are going well, stay the course, stay the course.

15 The Vice President said on Memorial Day that the  
16 insurgency is in its, quote, "last throes." But the fact is  
17 that the insurgency has not weakened. On Tuesday, Lieutenant  
18 General John Vines, Commander of the Multinational Corps in  
19 Iraq, acknowledged the following: "We do not see the insurgency  
20 contracting or expanding right now."

21 Indeed, growing numbers of fanatic jihadist suicide  
22 bombers are coming to Iraq with the intent of killing our troops  
23 and destroying the prospects for an Iraqi nation. Brigadier  
24 General Don Alston, the chief U.S. military spokesman in Iraq,  
25 said a few weeks ago, quote: This insurgency is not going to be



1 settled through military options or military operations. It is  
2 going to be settled in the political process."

3 The administration has said that Shia and Kurdish militias  
4 operating independently are not acceptable and that only a  
5 national army is. But the ground truth is that militias are  
6 becoming more entrenched and relied upon to maintain order. The  
7 Iraqi president and prime minister in effect acknowledged this  
8 recently by praising the militias publicly.

9 Since March of 2003, more than 1700 American lives have  
10 been lost in Operation Iraqi Freedom, almost 13,000 Americans  
11 have been wounded, and untold numbers of Iraqis have met the  
12 same fate. The cost to the American people in dollars is \$230  
13 billion and rising. Staying the course is not only  
14 hollow-sounding rhetoric, it is an unacceptable policy. We need  
15 to change the current dynamic in Iraq. The status quo is  
16 neither static nor acceptable.

17 Some have proposed setting a fixed date for departure. I  
18 believe that policy would be counterproductive. It would give  
19 an incentive to insurgents and jihadists to simply outlast us  
20 and would also increase the chances of civil war on our  
21 departure. At the other extreme, the Secretary of State  
22 recently said that we would stay in Iraq, quote, "as long as  
23 needed." That is also the wrong signal, an open-ended  
24 commitment to the Iraqis that we will be there even if they fail  
25 to agree on a constitution. That lessens the chances that the

1     Iraqis will make the political compromises necessary to defeat  
2     the jihadists and the insurgency and become a nation.  
3     Suggesting to the Iraqis that we are willing to remain without  
4     limit is not only unacceptable to the American people, it is  
5     also placing great stress on our armed forces and reducing  
6     military recruitment. Indeed, it is jeopardizing our volunteer  
7     army.

8             In looking for ways to change the current dynamic, two  
9     points are clear. First, only a political settlement will end  
10    the insurgency. The insurgency cannot be defeated by military  
11    means. Our troops and a gradually improving Iraqi force will  
12    help facilitate a settlement, but they will not on their own  
13    produce one. As General Casey said recently, the political  
14    process will be the decisive element.

15            Second, none of the Iraqi communities want us to leave  
16    precipitously or to leave without a political settlement in  
17    hand. Sunni Arabs gradually are becoming aware that the  
18    departure of U.S. troops would leave them vulnerable militarily  
19    because of the growing strength of the Shia in and out of the  
20    army. I believe Sunni Arab leaders recognize that our presence  
21    provides them some protection, not so much against the  
22    insurgents, but rather against the Shia prevailing if civil war  
23    broke out. Sunni leadership, which used to call for our  
24    immediate departure, no longer does so.

25            As for the Shia, their principal leader, Grand Ayatollah



1     Sistani, has consistently supported our continued presence.  
2     Peaceful majority rule favors the Shias since they are in the  
3     majority, while civil war may or may not have the same result.  
4     The Shia also want settlement with the Sunnis as the only way  
5     the country can unite against the foreign jihadists, who aim  
6     their terror mainly at the Shia. The Kurds also favor our  
7     continued presence.

8             If those two points are correct -- there is no military  
9     solution without a political one and none of the ethnic groups  
10    in Iraq want an immediate U.S. withdrawal -- there is one clear  
11    message that we can and should send to the Iraqis: You need to  
12    reach a political settlement on the timetable to which you have  
13    agreed.

14            Secretary Rumsfeld said earlier this week that the  
15    political process in Iraq, quote, "has to move forward on  
16    schedule." I agree. The Secretary said in addition, quote:  
17    "The more the Iraqis delay, the greater the damage, and my view  
18    is that it must go forward on schedule and that is the  
19    President's view." I agree.

20            But following through on that message, our following  
21    through on that message, is essential. The Iraqis have approved  
22    a timetable for adopting a constitution: August 15th, with the  
23    possibility of one and only one 6-month extension. The United  
24    States needs to tell the Iraqis and the world that if that  
25    deadline is not met we will review our position with all options

1 open, including but not limited to setting a timetable for  
2 withdrawal.

3 The successful drafting of a constitution surely does  
4 involve some different issues, such as the role of Islam, the  
5 degree of autonomy for the Kurdish areas, and the protection of  
6 minority rights. We need to put some pressure on the Iraqis to  
7 deal with these issues in a satisfactory and timely manner.  
8 Failure to adopt a constitution as scheduled would represent a  
9 lack of will to create a country and would instead reflect a  
10 continued willingness to rely on U.S. troops to carry a burden  
11 that Iraqis must carry.

12 The possibility of our withdrawal would also lead to  
13 increased pressure on the Sunni Arabs from Iraq's Sunni  
14 neighbors. Those neighbors do not want U.S. forces to leave  
15 without a political settlement, given their fear of the prospect  
16 of civil war and instability. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria  
17 are all Sunni Arab states. Instability in Iraq would threaten  
18 their own stability because they perceive it as possibly leading  
19 to the growth of Iranian power and Shia influence closer to home  
20 and to greater Kurdish pressure to separate from the rest of  
21 Iraq, with accompanying pressure from Kurdish populations in  
22 Syria and Turkey to join them.

23 Just the possibility that U.S. forces would leave Iraq  
24 before a political settlement would motivate Jordan, Saudi  
25 Arabia, and Syria to pressure their Sunni Arab brethren in Iraq



1 to reach a political settlement.

2 The most important action that we could take to change the  
3 current dynamic in Iraq would be for the President to inform the  
4 Iraqi that unless their own timetable for adopting a  
5 constitution is followed that we will need to rethink our  
6 presence there with all options open. We must demonstrate to  
7 the Iraqis that our willingness to bear the burden of providing  
8 security has limits. We have opened the door for the Iraqis at  
9 great cost, but only they can walk through it. We cannot hold  
10 that door open indefinitely.

11 Only a constitutional agreement, a political settlement,  
12 can change the status quo and end the insurgency in Iraq. The  
13 possibility of our leaving unless such a settlement is reached  
14 can help bring about that agreement.

15 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

16 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Senator.

17 Secretary Rumsfeld. If I could make an administrative  
18 note, there will be a cloture vote at 10:00 o'clock this  
19 morning. We will recess the hearing at 10:15 and promptly  
20 resume upon the completion of that vote. If in the course of  
21 the questioning period, if any of our witnesses feel that their  
22 answers to be full and complete would require a closed session,  
23 we are prepared to recess at the conclusion of this open session  
24 and hold a brief closed session such that we can receive that  
25 testimony. Thank you.

1 Mr. Secretary.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25



1 STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, U.S. SECRETARY  
2 OF DEFENSE

3 ACCOMPANIED BY:

4 GENERAL RICHARD B. MYERS, U.S. AIR FORCE, CHAIRMAN,  
5 JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF;

6 GENERAL JOHN P. ABIZAID, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDER,  
7 UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND; AND

8 GENERAL GEORGE W. CASEY, U.S. ARMY, COMMANDING  
9 GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE - IRAQ

10 Secretary Rumsfeld: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of  
11 the committee.

12 Let me begin by saying that the general officers that you  
13 introduced sitting next to me, General Myers and General Abizaid  
14 and General Casey, are doing an outstanding job for our country.

15 The American people and our Nation are truly fortunate to have  
16 men of this professionalism and skill and talent and dedication  
17 and courage.

18 One year after World War II ended, a leading news magazine  
19 published an article about post-war reconstruction efforts in  
20 Germany. It was entitled "Americans Are Losing the Victory in  
21 Europe." The author disparagingly wrote: "Never has American  
22 prestige in Europe been lower. People never tire of telling you  
23 of the ignorance and rowdiness of the American troops and of  
24 America's misunderstanding of European conditions."

25 The year was 1946. But consider how different 1946 looks

1 to us today. In retrospect, it was not a time to despair, but a  
2 time to build, and that is what that generation did.

3 It has now been one year since the turnover of sovereignty  
4 to the liberated Iraqi people and, just as Europe was a central  
5 battlefield, ideological and military, in the war against  
6 communist aggression, so too the Middle East and Central Asia  
7 are centers of gravity in today's struggle against violent  
8 extremism.

9 I know the American people still have the same  
10 determination and resolve. They know today, as then, that  
11 struggles are not won on defense; they are won on offense.  
12 Violent extremists have made clear their intentions. It is to  
13 kill as many westerners and moderate Muslims as possible. They  
14 have access to money, to weapons, and they are sending even more  
15 dangerous -- seeking even more dangerous weapons. They are  
16 surveying and targeting landmarks in our country and other  
17 civilized countries.

18 Terrorists have to be stopped and the world must find ways  
19 to encourage would-be recruits to choose a better path. Our  
20 Nation's actions to liberate Afghanistan and Iraq have  
21 eliminated two state sponsors of terrorism, most certainly  
22 contributed to Libya's decision to open its nuclear weapons  
23 programs to international inspection and to renounce terrorism,  
24 encouraged democratic movements in regions that have long been  
25 breeding grounds for violent anti-western extremism.



1           It is not surprising that there are questions about the  
2 situation in Iraq today. That has always been the case in a  
3 time of war. Today the questions I hear are something like  
4 this: Is the effort underway worth the cost and the sacrifice?  
5 How are the coalition and the new Iraqi government really doing?  
6 When will Iraqi security forces be able to assume full  
7 responsibility for securing their country? And what happens  
8 next, and should Congress set a timetable for withdrawal of U.S.  
9 troops?

10           It is important to note what success will mean.  
11 Specifically, a free, democratic, peaceful Iraq will not provide  
12 aid to violent extremists, will not plot the assassination of  
13 American presidents, will not invade or fire missiles at its  
14 neighbors, and it will not use chemical weapons on its neighbors  
15 or its own people, as Iraq had done in the past.

16           Let there be no doubt, if the coalition were to leave  
17 before the Iraqi security forces are able to assume  
18 responsibility, we would one day again have to confront another  
19 Iraqi regime, perhaps even more dangerous than the last, in a  
20 region plunged into darkness rather than liberated and free.

21           Americans ask, how are we doing in Iraq? The President's  
22 strategy is clear. It is to empower a democratically elected  
23 Iraqi government to aggressively go after the insurgents and  
24 terrorists, and that is exactly what their forces are doing,  
25 with some success, to pursue an inclusive constitutional

1 political process, to improve public services with the help of  
2 the international community and the quality of life for the  
3 Iraqi people, and to enable Iraqi security forces to take charge  
4 of their own country.

5 Each of these strategies depends on the others. Success  
6 will not be easy and it will require patience and progress on  
7 each of those three fronts. But consider what has been  
8 accomplished in 12 months -- not 12 years, but 12 months --  
9 since sovereignty was passed on the 28th of June. More than  
10 eight million people defied terrorist threats and voted in the  
11 January election. Duly elected Iraqi leaders with input from  
12 the Sunni minority are now drafting a constitution, to be voted  
13 on by the Iraqi people by October 15th.

14 Under their new constitution, a permanent government will  
15 then be elected on December 15th, 2005. And I agree completely  
16 with Senator Levin that it is critically important that that  
17 timetable not be changed.

18 Iraqis are building an economy and it is growing. The  
19 insurgency remains dangerous, particularly in several parts of  
20 Iraq. But terrorists no longer can take advantage of  
21 sanctuaries like Fallujah and coalition and Iraqi forces are  
22 capturing or killing hundreds of violent extremists on a weekly  
23 basis and confiscating literally mountains of weapons.

24 The general officers here today are leading the troops  
25 that are contributing to these accomplishments. They are



1 prepared to provide a detailed report on the progress of Iraqi  
2 security forces. The number of U.S. troops in Iraq has moved  
3 from a high during the Iraqi election period of about 160,000 to  
4 less than 140,000 currently. But their priorities have also  
5 shifted, from conducting security operations essentially to a  
6 heavier focus on training, equipping, and assisting the Iraqi  
7 security forces.

8 In the past, as we all know, the performance of the Iraqi  
9 security forces has been criticized as being mixed. Fair  
10 enough, but consider that 2 years ago few Iraqi security forces  
11 had the critical equipment, such as radios, vehicles, body  
12 armor. Today the vast majority of Iraqi security forces do have  
13 the appropriate equipment. The Iraqis had inexperienced  
14 military chain of command and weak ministries of defense and  
15 interior. Today both are improving, but they have a way to go.

16 They had weak unit cohesion and insufficient midlevel  
17 leadership. Today the leaders at all levels are stepping  
18 forward. A year ago, six Iraq army battalions were in training.  
19 Today dozens of trained battalions are capable of conducting  
20 anti-insurgent operations, albeit with coalition support.  
21 Sections of the country are relatively peaceful and essentially  
22 under control of Iraqi security forces at the present time.

23 Finally, the question is asked, when can the coalition  
24 leave and should Congress establish a deadline to withdraw?  
25 Some in Congress have suggested that deadlines be set. That

1 would be a mistake, as Senator Levin has said. It would throw a  
2 lifeline to terrorists, who in recent months have suffered  
3 significant losses and casualties, been denied havens, and  
4 suffered weakened popular support.

5 Timing in war is never predictable. There are no  
6 guarantees, and any who say that we have lost this war or that  
7 we are losing this war are wrong. We are not. Coalition  
8 military personnel are in Iraq at the request of the Iraqi  
9 government. They are under the UN Security Council Resolution  
10 1546. The objectives of the overwhelming majority of the Iraqis  
11 and the coalition are the same and that is a peaceful and  
12 prosperous Iraq with a representative government. Even today,  
13 that is a radical notion in that part of the world, and the fact  
14 is that a new approach is going to result in confusion,  
15 resistance, and difficulties, as we have seen, we understand  
16 that.

17 Iraq was a violent place before its liberation and there  
18 will undoubtedly be some violence in Iraq after the coalition  
19 forces depart. But success in this effort cannot be defined by  
20 domestic tranquility. Rather, success will be when there is a  
21 free Iraq where Iraqis are the guarantor of their own security,  
22 with minimal coalition involvement, and that will be an historic  
23 accomplishment.

24 The timing must be condition-based. It will depend on the  
25 extent to which the various ethnic factions reconcile -- and

1 they are now doing that -- the level of support from the  
2 international community, and with the successful meeting  
3 recently in Brussels this week international support is growing.

4 The UN and NATO, for example, are increasing their commitments.

5 And the timing will depend on Iraq's neighbors as well,  
6 whose behavior continues to be unhelpful. Insurgents continue  
7 to come into Iraq from Syria and Iran. Nations that serve as  
8 conduits for mass murderers are not friends of the Iraqi people,  
9 they are not friends of the United States, and they are  
10 certainly not friends of the civilized world.

11 One final point. Someone recently asked me about the  
12 differences between my current tenure as Secretary of Defense  
13 and my previous service some 30 years ago. One thing that has  
14 remained the same is the tendency in some quarters to blame  
15 America for the world's troubles. Well, I am not one who wakes  
16 up every morning seeking ways to suggest that America is what is  
17 wrong with the world. The people who are going on television  
18 chopping off people's heads and using disabled children as  
19 suicide bombers, they are what is wrong with the world. The  
20 violent extremists that killed 3,000 innocent men, women and  
21 children on September 11th, they are what is wrong with the  
22 world.

23 In every war there are individuals who commit wrongdoing  
24 and there are setbacks and there are hardships. Recently the  
25 noted historian and author David McCullough recalled the year



1 1776 as the most important year in the most important conflict  
2 in our history. He said: "If it had been covered by the media  
3 and the country had seen how horrible conditions were and what a  
4 very serious soup we were in, I think that would have been it."

5 And in 1864 many, including President Lincoln himself,  
6 believed that he would lose the upcoming election, due in part  
7 to the slew of criticism he was receiving for his prosecution of  
8 the Civil War. Speaking to an Ohio regiment, President Lincoln  
9 said, and I quote: "I wish it might be more generally and  
10 universally understood what the country is now engaged in.  
11 There may be mistakes made some time and things may be done  
12 wrong, while the officers of the government do all they can to  
13 prevent mistakes. But I beg of you as citizens of this great  
14 Republic not to let your minds be carried off from the great  
15 work we have before us." Unquote. That was good advice.

16 Today's servicemen and women, like the generations before  
17 them, are performing noble work. Though some pundits and  
18 observers and nonparticipants have criticized the American  
19 military with inaccurate comparisons and purple rhetoric, those  
20 of us who work with the men and women in the U.S. armed forces  
21 know otherwise. Our fellow citizens in uniform serve with great  
22 compassion, with professionalism, amid danger and provocation,  
23 and we should not allow the actions of a few to distract from  
24 the mission we face or from the necessity to succeed.

25 To all U.S. military personnel and their families, who

1 sacrifice while guardsmen and reservists are deployed in battle,  
2 I offer my fullest appreciation. One day, all those who have  
3 made sacrifices on behalf of this cause and the American people  
4 who support their important work will find a place of honor in  
5 our country's history and they will have won the appreciation  
6 and respect that they have richly earned, and I include the  
7 three general officers here today.

8 Thank you.

9 [The prepared statement of Secretary Rumsfeld follows:]

10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

1 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I might add  
2 that when a group of us had a chance to be with the President  
3 the other day, he likewise indicated the extraordinary trust and  
4 confidence he has in the military officers appearing before us  
5 today in this hearing and others throughout the world. We are  
6 fortunate to have them in the service of our country.

7 General Myers.

8 General Myers: Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator Levin  
9 and members of the committee. Thank you for your continuing  
10 support of our men and women in uniform and for this opportunity  
11 to discuss our progress and challenges in Iraq.

12 In the year since the transfer of sovereignty in Iraq, we  
13 have watched the Iraqi government and Iraqi security forces make  
14 steady progress in providing for their own security. Of course,  
15 many, many challenges still remain. We see that every day as  
16 violent extremists murder innocent men, women, and children and  
17 sabotage the efforts of the Iraqi people and the coalition. But  
18 that is only part of the story. Every day as well, the new  
19 Iraqi government, with the help of the coalition, takes  
20 significant positive steps down the road to freedom and to  
21 security.

22 We are on the right course and we must stay that course.  
23 Under General Abizaid's and General Casey's leadership, we have  
24 the right strategy for helping build a new and secure Iraq, at  
25 peace with its neighbors, with a representative government that



1 respects human rights and maintains the rule of law.

2 The stakes in Iraq are enormous. Iraq is not just a  
3 battle in the struggle against violent extremism and Al Qaeda.  
4 It is currently the central battle. The enemy is counting on  
5 our resolve to weaken. I can assure you, however, that our men  
6 and women in uniform are firm in their resolve.

7 We are grateful for the support of the American people and  
8 that support absolutely must continue until the job is done.  
9 While we are all eager to see our troops come home, leaving  
10 before the task is complete would be catastrophic, not only for  
11 Iraq but also for the overall struggle against violent extremism  
12 and for our national security.

13 Our troops understand exactly what is at stake in Iraq and  
14 they know that they are making a huge and important difference.  
15 One Army captain from Pennsylvania, currently on his second  
16 deployment to Iraq, wrote him in an email, quote: "When I am  
17 really tired, I occasionally think that I am giving a little  
18 more than my share. But then I think back to World War II and  
19 Korea, when soldiers deployed oftentimes not knowing when they  
20 were coming home. That gets me back in the correct frame of  
21 mind." Unquote.

22 I am very proud of all our servicemen and women, as I know  
23 you all are, proud of their tremendous determination, their  
24 courage, the compassion that they show every day under very  
25 challenging conditions.

1           You know, shortly we are going to celebrate the Fourth of  
2   July, the day that our Nation's first leaders told the world  
3   what we stand for as Americans. As we approach the Fourth, we  
4   are also reminded that building a free and open society is a  
5   very difficult task and it takes a long time. But it is a most  
6   noble task. I think we are all grateful for our freedoms, we  
7   are grateful for those that have fought for those freedoms in  
8   the past and those that today are fighting to defend those  
9   freedoms as well.

10           We thank you for your support and we look forward to your  
11   questions.

12           Chairman Warner: Thank you.

13           At this time the committee will stand in recess until the  
14   completion of the vote.

15           [Recess from 10:10 a.m. to 10:31 a.m.]

16           Chairman Warner: General Myers, I believe you had  
17   completed your statement. General Myers, you had completed your  
18   statement?

19           General Myers: Yes, sir.

20           Chairman Warner: We will now hear from General Abizaid.

21           General Abizaid: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin,  
22   and members of the committee. I thank all of you for the  
23   opportunity to join you today.

24           I just returned from the region and spent some time in  
25   Iraq, Afghanistan, and Djibouti. Our troops and their

1 commanders remain confident, competent, and courageous. We  
2 honor their dedication and sacrifice.

3 Discussions with Afghan and Iraqi security force leaders  
4 and visits to their units in the field showed growing  
5 confidence, increased capability, and increasingly better  
6 organized chains of command. As you know, the keystone to our  
7 theater strategy is to build effective local forces and, while  
8 they have made much progress, they are not yet ready to stand  
9 and operate alone.

10 I know we are here today to talk primarily about Iraq, but  
11 we must not lose sight of the broader struggle under way. The  
12 same enemy that brought us 9-11 fights us in Afghanistan and  
13 Iraq. They challenge our partners in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.  
14 They attack friends in Turkey, Spain, and Morocco. They  
15 organize to develop or acquire weapons of mass destruction and  
16 connect their hateful ideology and recruitment through the tools  
17 of the connected world.

18 While we do not exclusively fight Al Qaeda and their  
19 associated movements in our region, they represent the main  
20 enemy to peace and stability. Their vision of the future is  
21 best seen in the example of the Taliban's rule in Afghanistan:  
22 no music, sequestered women, executions in soccer stadiums, and  
23 destruction of treasured art. Like the ideologies of fascists  
24 and communists before them, Al Qaeda seeks to be the vanguard of  
25 the extremist movement and the oppressor of free-thinking



1 people.

2 Our campaign since 9-11 has put them on the defensive.  
3 The enemy is under pressure, but still dangerous, still seeking  
4 to hit us again at home. I share the view of many of our troops  
5 in the field that fighting this enemy abroad makes it more  
6 difficult for them to strike us at home. We can decisively  
7 weaken the ideological extremists led by bin Laden, Zawahiri,  
8 and Zarqawi by stabilizing Iraq, stabilizing Afghanistan, and  
9 actively helping regional nations help themselves against this  
10 threat.

11 The great sense of confidence I gain from U.S., Iraq, and  
12 Afghan troops in the field stands in often stark contrast to  
13 those who see no obvious progress on the battlefield. I can  
14 understand the confusion. This is no longer a war of mass fires  
15 and easily traced maneuver, but rather a war of subtle  
16 intelligence action, position, precise strikes, and the  
17 painstaking work of institution-building.

18 The enemy does not seek to defeat us militarily, but to  
19 wait us out, to sap our confidence, and to break our will. We  
20 must not let their success about grabbing headlines confuse us  
21 about our ability to help the people of the region build better  
22 futures. Militarily, our forces are strong. They provide the  
23 shield behind which legitimate institutions form. They gain  
24 time for the political process in Iraq and Afghanistan to  
25 mature. Elsewhere in the region, their presence and assistance

1 help shape capabilities that allow our friends in the region to  
2 resist extremism.

3 For those of us who have spent many months in the field,  
4 we see good progress in both Iraq and Afghanistan. We sense  
5 good progress against the extremism that once seemed so  
6 pervasive in the region. But we are realistic and we know that  
7 great change is almost always accompanied by violence.

8 It is not our intention today to paint a rosy  
9 picture of tasks easily accomplished. We have sacrificed much  
10 and there is much more work ahead. Progress in  
11 counterinsurgency and counterterrorist work is not easily  
12 recognized. Setbacks, casualties, and difficult problems  
13 undoubtedly remain ahead, but with your support and the support  
14 of the American people success is undoubtedly ahead as well.

15 We will need patience and strength to achieve success.  
16 Our men and women in uniform have both.

17 Thank you.

18 Chairman Warner: Thank you very much, General.

19 General Casey.

20 General Casey: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all  
21 of the committee for their continued support. As we approach  
22 the 1-year anniversary of sovereignty in Iraq, I continue to be  
23 inspired by the demonstrated courage, conviction, tenacity, and  
24 commitment of the Iraqi people as they march toward democracy.  
25 After more than 3 decades of living under a brutal dictator, the

1     Iraqis have embraced the ideals of self-governance and tolerance  
2     and are fighting and dying to build a better future for all  
3     Iraqis. Such commitment deserves our admiration and continued  
4     support.

5             In the past year the Iraqis, supported by the coalition,  
6     have established an interim government, neutralized the Shia  
7     insurgency, eliminated terrorist and insurgent safe havens  
8     across Iraq, mobilized their security forces to confront the  
9     insurgency, increased the pace of economic development, seated a  
10    democratically elected transitional national assembly, and  
11    peacefully passed control from the interim government to the  
12    transitional government. And the new government, after a  
13    transitional period, has formed and aggressively continued the  
14    campaign against the terrorists and insurgents while building  
15    inclusive political, governmental, and constitutional processes.

16            The Iraqi people are serious about their future and they  
17    are serious about building a government that respects the human  
18    rights of all Iraqis and they are serious about defeating the  
19    terrorists and the insurgents that are doing the utmost to deny  
20    them their dreams.

21            I sense that many view the daily snapshots of violence in  
22    Iraq in isolation and conclude that our efforts in Iraq are not  
23    progressing. That is what the terrorists and the insurgents  
24    would like you to believe. Quite the contrary, the Iraqi people  
25    make progress every day. They are fighting for their future



1     against the remnants of the regime that tyrannized them for over  
2     3 decades and they are fighting for their future against the  
3     extremists with the same goals as those who attacked the United  
4     States on September 11th.

5             Now, you hear a lot about what the insurgents do, so I  
6     thought it might be useful to consider what the insurgents and  
7     the terrorists have not done over the past year. First of all,  
8     they have lost their safe haven in Fallujah and they have not  
9     been able to reconstitute it.

10            Secondly, they have not been able to expand their support  
11    base across Iraq, nor have they attracted a broad following,  
12    largely because they have no positive vision for Iraq's future  
13    to offer. Even by our most pessimistic estimates on the size of  
14    the insurgency, we believe the insurgency constitutes less than  
15    one-tenth of one percent of the Iraqi population. And as I have  
16    said several times, this is a localized insurgency and in 14 of  
17    the 18 provinces they still average less than three incidents of  
18    violence per day.

19            The insurgents also have not prevented the growth of the  
20    Iraqi security forces, even with almost daily attacks. Iraqi  
21    security forces, after struggling last spring and fall, drew  
22    great confidence from their decisive role in protecting the 30  
23    January elections. These Iraqi security forces, that now number  
24    around 170,000, have been further enabled by a more proactive  
25    partnership with coalition forces that, while only a few months

1 old, has enabled the Iraqis to begin moving toward assuming the  
2 lead for their counterinsurgency effort.

3 The insurgents have also not sparked sectarian violence,  
4 although they work hard at it every day, but they cannot do this  
5 because the Iraqi commitment to something better is so strong.

6 Lastly and perhaps most importantly, the insurgents have  
7 not stopped political and economic development in Iraq. The  
8 well-known 30 January elections where 8.5 million Iraqis defied  
9 intimidation and terror to take a stake in their future, the  
10 formation of the first democratically elected government in  
11 decades, and the beginnings of the development of an Iraq  
12 constitution all indicate that the momentum is in favor of  
13 democracy and not terror.

14 What perhaps is less well known is the progress in the  
15 economic sector, progress that only begins to meet Iraq's needs,  
16 but progress nonetheless. In the last year, through the hard  
17 work of Iraqis, the U.S. embassy, and coalition forces, we have  
18 started over 2500 of the 3100 reconstruction projects funded by  
19 our government and we have completed over 1300 of those. Even  
20 more heartening is the private construction of homes and  
21 businesses that we witness on a daily basis and attribute to  
22 Iraq's growing economy and public confidence. Iraq slowly gets  
23 better every day.

24 Unfortunately, the tough part about counterinsurgencies is  
25 that the insurgents do not have to win; they just have to not



1     lose. This, as General Abizaid said, is a battle of wills and  
2     the terrorists and insurgents are challenging ours. They will  
3     continue to contest the Iraqi political, economic, and social  
4     advances by attacking the innocent men, women, and children,  
5     symbols of the government, and coalition forces. But they will  
6     not succeed.

7             The stark reality is that insurgencies have not done well  
8     against democratically elected governments, particularly  
9     insurgencies that offer no positive vision. Recent polls  
10    confirm that Iraqis are: one, confident in their government and  
11    in their security forces; they are optimistic about their  
12    future; and they intend to vote in large numbers in both the  
13    upcoming constitutional referendum and the democratic elections.

14    The Iraqi people are committed to something better than the  
15    tyranny that they have known for the past 3 decades and are  
16    fighting every day for the dream of a better future.

17             The last year was one of progress and firsts for Iraq, but  
18    one also impacted by terror and violence. Yet the Iraqi people  
19    persevered to their greatest accomplishment in decades, the  
20    January elections. 6 months before the constitutional  
21    elections, I will tell you, Mr. Chairman, that we are well  
22    positioned for another Iraqi success. To be sure, there are  
23    long-term development challenges and much to be done. And to be  
24    sure, Iraq's steady progress will be contested. But this  
25    insurgency and these terrorists will ultimately be defeated as



1     Iraqis elect a government based on an Iraqi constitution that  
2     respects the human rights of all Iraqis, as they build Iraqi  
3     security forces that can maintain domestic order and deny Iraq  
4     as a safe haven for terror, and as they continue economic  
5     development programs that help Iraq recover from decades of  
6     neglect.

7             The Iraqi people will continue to be enabled in their  
8     journey by the determined efforts of the coalition and our  
9     embassy personnel that have done so much and that have given so  
10    much over the past 2 years.

11            We are humbled by the sacrifices that they and their  
12    families have made and we continue to be humbled by their  
13    commitment and their resolve. I could not be prouder of the  
14    magnificent men and women of our armed forces.

15            In closing, Mr. Chairman, I can tell you that we make  
16    progress in Iraq every day. But it is hard work and it is a  
17    challenging environment. That said, after a year on the ground  
18    I can tell you that I am more convinced than ever that this  
19    mission is both realistic and achievable. It will require  
20    patience and will, but both the region and our country will be  
21    better when Iraq succeeds.

22            Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

23            Chairman Warner: Thank you very much.

24            We have had I think very good opening statements from our  
25    distinguished panel and we will now proceed to a 6-minute round

1 of questions.

2 Mr. Secretary, I would like to reread a brief part of my  
3 opening statement and a brief part of Senator Levin's opening  
4 statement. I said the following: "The process over the coming  
5 months by which the Iraqis adopt a constitution and form a  
6 government is key to the success. With the support of the  
7 coalition governments, the Iraqi government must not allow any  
8 extensions or delays in providing for a constitution, elections,  
9 and the formation of a permanent government. Only strong  
10 political leadership will provide a free Iraq."

11 Senator Levin said the following. It seems to me you have  
12 taken it a step further than I have: "The United States needs  
13 to tell the Iraqis and the world that if the deadline is not met  
14 we will review" -- that is with regard to this formation of  
15 government -- "we will review our position with all options  
16 open, including but not limited to setting a timetable for  
17 withdrawal."

18 In your opening statement you said you agree with Senator  
19 Levin and I would like to have your further amplification with,  
20 I presume, the statement "we will review our position" --  
21 certainly we would." "All options are open." That seems to me  
22 reasonable. "But not limited to setting a timetable for  
23 withdrawal."

24 My point is that I see no alternative whatsoever for the  
25 coalition of governments, and most particularly ours, from

1 allowing Iraq to not succeed in the formation of its government.

2 I am just wondering, if they are not able to make this  
3 timetable as laid down for the constitution, the elections, and  
4 the formation of the permanent government, what are our  
5 reasonable options? Because we have no alternative but to see  
6 that that government does succeed at some point in time.

7 Otherwise it will be a signal to the worldwide terrorism that  
8 they stayed the course and indeed thwarted the efforts of the  
9 coalition forces to achieve the goals of some form of new  
10 government in Iraq.

11 Secretary Rumsfeld: Mr. Chairman, there is no question,  
12 as each one of us have said this morning, but that there must be  
13 progress on the political side, there must be progress on the  
14 economic side, and there must be progress on the security side,  
15 and they are all linked. To the extent there were, for whatever  
16 reason, a delay in moving forward with drafting a constitution  
17 or a referendum on the constitution or holding the elections, it  
18 would retard the entire process. And during this process  
19 coalition people are being killed, Iraqis are being killed, and  
20 it would be an enormous disservice in my view to delay the  
21 constitution or the elections under the new constitution.

22 That is what I said I agreed with. It is not for me to  
23 tell the Iraqi government what the President might do with  
24 respect to reviewing our situation or anything like that. I  
25 might make recommendations to the President, but it is for him



1 to make those decisions, not me.

2 But there are a number of things the Iraqi people must do.

3 A number of countries, 32 countries, have sent their finest  
4 young people over there and liberated that country. They now  
5 have an opportunity to grab a hold of that country and take all  
6 the wealth they have in water and intelligence and education and  
7 oil and turn it into a model for the Middle East. It is their  
8 task to do that. They are going to be ultimately the ones who  
9 will win this insurgency.

10 The Iraqi people have to have confidence that they have a  
11 voice in it, all the Iraqi people. But they have to fight  
12 corruption. They are going to have to move forward on the  
13 political side. They are going to have to provide information  
14 to the Iraqi security forces so they know where the terrorists  
15 are hiding and the extremists are so that they can capture or  
16 kill them. They are going to have to take responsibility for  
17 all the Iraqi detainees and build prison facilities and  
18 establish a criminal justice system to see that people are dealt  
19 with in a proper manner.

20 They have got a lot of things they have to do. But one of  
21 the first and foremost clearly is to see that they move forward  
22 on the political side and that the Iraqi people feel they have a  
23 stake in the future of that country.

24 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

25 General Abizaid, you have had a very long and

1 distinguished career in our military and much of that career of  
2 service has been in this region of the world. Your  
3 understanding of the people and the culture and their  
4 capabilities and the history -- there is a lot to be said that  
5 we should have examined with greater care the history of this  
6 culture as we proceeded with this military mission.

7 What are your assessments as to the ability of the Iraqi  
8 people to succeed in the goals outlined very clearly by  
9 Secretary Rumsfeld just now and in other testimony?

10 General Abizaid: Mr. Chairman, I think both General Casey  
11 and I would tell you that we spend a lot of time working very  
12 closely with Iraqis on the political side and on the military  
13 side, and we have known Iraqis that have been killed by the  
14 terrorists, that have succumbed to the insurgents. And it is  
15 interesting how many times when one of them is killed another  
16 one will stand up and take their place.

17 The desire to be free, the desire to develop a society  
18 within their own cultural norms, that allows them freedom and  
19 opportunity for a better future for their families, is not only  
20 an Iraqi desire; I think it is a desire of most human beings  
21 everywhere on this planet. That the United States armed forces  
22 helps to give them that is absolutely one of the most important  
23 things I think we have ever been engaged in.

24 We often do talk past one another culturally. We do have  
25 barriers of understanding that get in the way of efficient

1 business sometimes. But as we go down this road, both in  
2 Afghanistan and Iraq and in other places in the region, the  
3 cultural gap is closing, and it needs to close faster. There is  
4 nothing about Islam that says Iraq cannot move in the direction  
5 it is moving. There is nothing about the Arab culture that says  
6 that people cannot participate in their future in a free and  
7 participatory manner.

8 The opportunity for a new beginning is clearly there. I  
9 believe that people throughout the region, not only in Iraq but  
10 elsewhere, in Lebanon, in Syria, in Saudi Arabia -- you name the  
11 country in the Middle East, but they are all looking for the  
12 opportunities for reform and a better future and for  
13 accountability from their governments, and I think that is  
14 possible.

15 Chairman Warner: Let me ask a second part of this  
16 question. Should there be a delay in adopting the constitution  
17 or the invoking of the 6-month extension and a perception that  
18 this new permanent government, the formation is being delayed,  
19 for whatever reason, what is likely to be the reaction of the  
20 insurgents and others who want to stop this process in Iraq?

21 Will they redouble their efforts? Will there likely be  
22 more participants from other nations that are flowing into Iraq  
23 daily? What would be the consequences from a military  
24 standpoint should that eventuality become a reality?

25 General Abizaïd: My view is that if there is a delay it



1 gives the insurgents the opportunity to get better organized, it  
2 increases the number of deaths and the tempo of action. It  
3 would be a bad thing, but not fatal.

4 Chairman Warner: Thank you.

5 General Casey, the committee received an extensive  
6 briefing --

7 General Casey: I am sorry, sir. Before you go, could I  
8 just add something on your question about the abilities of the  
9 Iraqis to succeed in accomplishing their goals? And I alluded  
10 to it in my testimony, but we should not underestimate the  
11 impact of having lived under the regime of Saddam Hussein.

12 Senator Byrd: I cannot hear him, Mr. Chairman. Would he  
13 speak louder or into the mike?

14 Chairman Warner: Yes, thank you, Senator Byrd.

15 The mikes in this room are very directional.

16 General Casey: Okay.

17 Senator Sessions: Do you have it on?

18 General Casey: I do. This time I do, Senator.

19 Chairman Warner: And bring it up very close, if you  
20 would, just a few inches.

21 General Casey: How is that?

22 Chairman Warner: Thank you.

23 General Casey: As I was saying, Senator -- and I alluded  
24 to it in my opening statement -- we should not underestimate the  
25 impact of having lived under the tyranny of Saddam Hussein for 3

1 decades. We should not underestimate the impact that that has  
2 had on the psyche of the Iraqi people and the desire for  
3 something better.

4 They are very, very resilient. Again, as I said in my  
5 opening statement, they want something better.

6 Chairman Warner: They manifested that in the election  
7 period.

8 General, in terms of the IED's and other weapons that are  
9 being directed at the coalition forces, and indeed these  
10 insidious type of weapons are taking a very high toll of life  
11 and limb, our committee received I think an excellent briefing  
12 from those in the Department yesterday who have the  
13 responsibility of developing the technology and getting it into  
14 the field to counteract this problem.

15 But there is a certain realism here that our technology  
16 has been I think reasonably successful in overcoming the  
17 complicated electronics and the variety of electronics being  
18 employed in these IED's. But now the insurgents seem to be  
19 departing from burying them and putting them in static positions  
20 and going more to the mobile platform, namely stealing a car and  
21 then utilizing that car and the armaments in it to bring about  
22 death and destruction.

23 Much of the technology that we put into effect does not  
24 have the same level of deterrence in overcoming those systems  
25 once you go into that mobile platform. How are we going to

1 address this situation?

2 General Casey: Senator, just two points I would make  
3 here. First of all, I thank the committee up front for their  
4 great support. I think you might be interested to know that as  
5 a result of the additional protective gear and vehicles that  
6 have been sent over there, what we have seen over the last  
7 several months is that our return to duty rate, someone who is  
8 wounded but not seriously enough to be evacuated from the  
9 theater, has gone up by over 10 percent. So now over 70 percent  
10 of our young men and women who are wounded are only wounded  
11 slightly. So that is a huge step forward.

12 On the car bomb, the shift to car bomb, I think it is not  
13 so much a shift as an increase in the use of car bombs to create  
14 terror. I think it is interesting that, while the overall  
15 numbers of attacks have gone down, the casualties of those  
16 attacks have gone way up because they are driving car bombs into  
17 crowds of civilians for the sole purpose of terror.

18 Now, how do you deal with that? This is part of the  
19 nature of the war that we are in and really any war. Action,  
20 reaction, counteraction. Our commanders on the ground are  
21 continuously adapting and adjusting, not only to what the enemy  
22 does, but also to try to out-think the enemy and get ahead of  
23 him.

24 So as we work against the car bombs, while the  
25 technological solutions will not -- are not a silver bullet, as



1     you suggested, the adaptation of a more holistic strategy: one,  
2     to conduct operations along the borders to disrupt the flow of  
3     the suicide bombers and foreign fighters that drive those  
4     suicide cars, suicide car bombs; two, to attack the facilitators  
5     that take those car bombers, match them up with the car; three,  
6     to attack the car bomb makers and the cells that make those.

7             We have been attacking each of those three areas here  
8     across Iraq over the past 6 weeks to 2 months. So we are  
9     adopting a holistic approach to this.

10            But I will tell you, Senator, it is very, very hard, if  
11     not impossible, to defend against someone who is willing to kill  
12     themselves to accomplish their objective.

13            Chairman Warner: The suicide participant, I agree.

14            Senator Levin.

15            Senator Levin: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

16            General Abizaid, can you give us your assessment of the  
17     strength of the insurgency? Is it less strong, more strong,  
18     about the same strength as it was 6 months ago?

19            General Abizaid: Senator, I would say --

20            Senator Levin: Can you put the mike right in front of  
21     you.

22            General Abizaid: In terms of comparison from 6 months  
23     ago, in terms of foreign fighters, I believe there are more  
24     foreign fighters coming into Iraq than there were 6 months ago.  
25     In terms of the overall strength of the insurgents, I would say

1 it is about the same as it was.

2 Senator Levin: So you would not agree with the statement  
3 that it is in its last throes?

4 General Abizaid: I do not know that I would make any  
5 comment about that, other than to say there is a lot of work to  
6 be done against the insurgency.

7 Senator Levin: Well, the Vice President has said it is in  
8 its last throes. That is the statement of the Vice President.  
9 It does not sound to me from your testimony or any other  
10 testimony here this morning that it is in its last throes.

11 General Abizaid: I am sure you will forgive me from  
12 criticizing the Vice President.

13 Senator Levin: I just want an honest assessment from you  
14 as to whether you agree with a particular statement of his. It  
15 is not personal. I just want to know whether you agree with  
16 that assessment. It is not a personal attack on him, any more  
17 than if he says that something is a fact and you disagree with  
18 it. We would expect you to say you would disagree with it.

19 General Abizaid: I gave you my opinion of where we are.

20 Senator Levin: General Casey, you have said that the  
21 political process will be the decisive element. Can you expand  
22 on that?

23 General Casey: I can, Senator. As we look at how to  
24 fight this war, we are fighting a counterinsurgency. If you  
25 look back historically at how insurgencies have been defeated,

1 they have been defeated when the insurgents saw their options as  
2 better protected in the political process and their prospects  
3 for economic advancement to be better protected by the political  
4 process than fighting for them. That is the essential element  
5 here.

6 So the timetable that has been established for the  
7 political process is a great forcing function to keep this  
8 moving. As was discussed earlier, I also support the notion  
9 that any extension of the constitutional process would not be a  
10 good thing.

11 Senator Levin: Beyond their own timetable?

12 General Casey: Right.

13 Senator Levin: Pardon? Is that right, beyond their own  
14 timetable?

15 General Casey: I am not sure what you mean by "beyond  
16 their own" --

17 Senator Levin: They have a timetable of August 15th for a  
18 constitution and then they have allowed themselves under their  
19 own law one 6-month extension. That is it.

20 General Casey: Right, and what I am saying is I do not  
21 even believe that they ought to have the 6-month extension.

22 Senator Levin: I agree with that fully. But if they do  
23 not meet their own timetable, what you are saying is it could  
24 have severe negative consequences on our troops and on the  
25 outcome?



1           General Casey: It certainly has the potential for that,  
2   Senator.

3           Senator Levin: Well, I agree with that.

4           Given that position -- and I think everybody wants them to  
5   meet that timetable. The President has flat-out said that they  
6   should meet the timetable. Our Secretary of Defense has said  
7   again this morning how important it is, how essential it is that  
8   they meet their timetable, and again earlier this week said that  
9   it is absolutely important that they meet their timetable. It  
10   seems to me that it is important that the administration say  
11   publicly that there will be consequences or might be  
12   consequences in terms of our policies and actions if they do not  
13   meet that timetable.

14          I very much welcome the statements here this morning as to  
15   how essential it is that they meet it. But unless we do more  
16   than just say the words that it is important or essential or  
17   critical, unless we also give a message that we are going to  
18   have to review our situation if they do not meet their own  
19   timetable, it seems to me those words become hollow.

20          The Secretary of Defense - excuse me. The Secretary of  
21   State made a statement, which is that we are going to keep our  
22   forces there as long as they are needed. That has the opposite  
23   effect of telling them that if they do not meet their timetable  
24   for a political agreement which is essential to ending the  
25   insurgency according to all your testimony, if they do not meet

1 their own timetable that we are going to need to assess our  
2 situation. We are not going to decide in advance we are setting  
3 a deadline. We are not going to say what the consequences are  
4 going to be, but we are going to look at all options, including  
5 the possibility of setting a timetable.

6 That it seems to me is a critically important thing for  
7 the administration to do, and what troubles me is that the only  
8 public statement that really we have had on that so far that I  
9 think is relevant is the opposite, which is the Secretary of  
10 State saying we will be there as long as we are needed. That is  
11 open-ended. If they do not agree to a constitution, if they do  
12 not agree to a political settlement, we are going to be needed  
13 for a much longer time than if they do.

14 So I would hope, Secretary Rumsfeld, that you would take  
15 back at least this suggestion to the administration, to the  
16 President, even though you do not want to tell us or do not know  
17 perhaps what your own advice would be on this key issue as to  
18 what public statement should be made if they do not keep their  
19 own timetable. I would hope that you would take back the  
20 suggestion that, in order for those important words that they  
21 must keep it have some kind of oomph behind it, some kind of  
22 impact, that there has got to be a suggestion which is explicit:  
23 Folks, political settlement is essential to ending the  
24 insurgency. Our experts all here say that. A political  
25 settlement requires a constitution, and if you do not meet the

1 deadline for settling your political differences and adopting a  
2 constitution, then we are in a deeper soup than we are in now  
3 relative to the insurgency. That is the testimony here this  
4 morning.

5 So I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that you would pass along  
6 this suggestion, that there be an explicit statement to the  
7 Iraqis that not only do we expect them to meet, to keep their  
8 timetable for adopting a constitution, but that if they do not  
9 that we would have to assess our position, not prejudging what  
10 we would do, but looking at all options, including but not  
11 limited to setting a timetable for withdrawal. Are you willing  
12 to at least consider that and take that suggestion back?

13 Secretary Rumsfeld: I will be happy to take that back,  
14 and I do know what I think. And I would like to clarify one  
15 thing. You seem to include in their timetable the possibility  
16 of a 6-month delay. I want it very clear that I do not favor a  
17 6-month delay even though that may be permitted under the  
18 transitional administrative law.

19 Senator Levin: Well, good for you. I hope that the words  
20 then are followed by actions as to what will be the effect if  
21 they extend it. That is fine with me.

22 Secretary Rumsfeld: Fair enough.

23 Let me make one other comment, Senator Levin. You raised  
24 the question of the Vice President's remarks about the "last  
25 throes." You yourself and I both have emphasized the importance



1 of progress on the political side. The enemy knows that as  
2 well, and they know that if a democracy is established with a  
3 permanent government under a constitution in Iraq that they have  
4 lost a great deal. I do not doubt for a minute but that they  
5 will respond to that challenge and recognize how important it is  
6 for them not to lose and in these final months between now and  
7 that constitution-drafting and the election they may very well  
8 be in their last throes by their own view because they recognize  
9 how important it will be if they lose and in fact if a democracy  
10 is established.

11 So I think those words, while I would not use and I did  
12 not use them, I think it is understandable that we should expect  
13 that kind of response from the enemy.

14 Chairman Warner: Senator McCain.  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

1 STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN MCCAIN, U.S. SENATOR FROM  
2 ARIZONA

3 Senator McCain: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 I want to thank the witnesses. General Casey and General  
5 Abizaid, thank you for your outstanding leadership to the men  
6 and women who are serving. Also, my appreciation to others,  
7 like General Petraeus and others who are doing such an  
8 outstanding job.

9 I share your view that there are some signs of progress  
10 that should be encouraging to us and I share your view that we  
11 have to stay the course and the worst thing we could do would be  
12 to set a time or date of withdrawal of U.S. troops until the  
13 Iraqi military is able to take over those responsibilities of  
14 ensuring the security and safety of the Iraqi people as they  
15 transition to democracy.

16 I also must tell you I am very worried. My concerns range  
17 from overstressing our guard and reservists, some of whom are  
18 going back to Iraq for the second and third time. I am worried  
19 about our recruiting shortfalls and I am not satisfied yet with  
20 the plans that you may have to address that issue.

21 General Casey, I may have gotten the wrong briefing  
22 yesterday, but I understand the attacks are up and casualties  
23 are up, not down, over a year ago. Go ahead, please.

24 General Casey: I was specifically speaking about attacks  
25 against civilians.

1 Senator McCain: I see, thank you.

2 General Casey: I am sorry. And just to be clear, attacks  
3 now currently as compared to a year ago are actually about the  
4 same. If they are up it is only slightly, it is not  
5 significant.

6 Senator McCain: Thank you. But the fact that it is not  
7 significantly down is not encouraging to me.

8 General Casey: As it should not be.

9 Senator McCain: Could I -- General Casey, could we talk a  
10 little bit about the training of the Iraqi military. We went  
11 back and forth, perhaps for too long, in this committee about  
12 how many were trained and equipped, and then I think all of us  
13 agreed and I think that we now grade by units rather than  
14 individuals. What percentage of the Iraqi units would you judge  
15 now are combat-ready?

16 General Casey: Senator, let me -- and I am using the same  
17 kind of criteria we use for the United States Army.

18 Senator McCain: Go ahead.

19 General Casey: Let me give you some generalities here.  
20 First of all, let me tell you what we have done over the past  
21 months. We have developed a readiness assessment very similar  
22 to our own readiness assessment process. We have established  
23 four readiness categories. I think General Petraeus may have  
24 talked to you about that. It is a classified assessment, just  
25 like our own is a classified assessment.



1           We categorize the units by those who are ready for  
2     independent counterinsurgency operations -- that is a very high  
3     standard and we do not expect many of those to make that gate  
4     for some time.

5           The second category is those that are capable of  
6     counterinsurgency operations with enabling support from us, with  
7     our transition teams and with intelligence and medevac, those  
8     kind of supports from us. That number is increasing daily and  
9     we will get a good number of units there over probably before  
10    the end of this year.

11          The third category are those that are good enough to  
12    operate with us but not operate by themselves even with our  
13    help. Then the last category are those that are forming and are  
14    not ready at all.

15          Senator McCain: I understand.

16          General Casey: So that is how we lay that out.

17          Senator McCain: Well, I think we need to know that  
18    information, General Casey. I do not know why it is classified.  
19    We need to know how things are progressing in Iraq. That is  
20    the key element to success in Iraq.

21          Maybe, Mr. Chairman, we can somehow elicit that. We seem  
22    to have great difficulty, including redacting of information in  
23    the Boeing thing, including failure to get other information  
24    that I find very frustrating.

25          General Casey, I do not think it is an illegitimate nor

1     should it be a classified answer, what percentage of those  
2     170,000 are combat-ready.

3             General Casey: Okay, and I am not --

4             Chairman Warner: We can proceed to a closed hearing  
5     following --

6             Senator McCain: Well, then we will proceed to a closed  
7     hearing. I think the American people need to know, Mr.  
8     Chairman. They are the ones who are paying for this conflict.  
9     But I will drop the question for now.

10            General Abizaid, obviously one of the major, one of the  
11     major problems that we have is this new influx of foreigners  
12     into Iraq across Syrian borders; is that not correct?

13            General Abizaid: That is correct, Senator McCain.

14            Senator McCain: And a larger and larger percentage of  
15     these suicide bombers come from Saudi Arabia, Jordan, other  
16     countries, is that not correct?

17            General Abizaid: That is correct. We have also seen a  
18     influx of suicide bombers from North Africa, specifically  
19     Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco.

20            Senator McCain: And Syria is facilitating this passage  
21     through money, training, and other, and equipment and other  
22     means; is that correct?

23            General Abizaid: I think I would put it somewhat  
24     differently. I would say that there is a clear node inside  
25     Syria which facilitates it. Whether or not the Syrian

1 government is facilitating it or ignoring it is probably a  
2 debatable question. But the key node is Damascus in Syria.

3 Senator McCain: It is a growing problem?

4 General Abizaid: It is.

5 Senator McCain: If Syria does not enforce its borders,  
6 should we reach a point where we may not want to respect those  
7 borders?

8 General Abizaid: I think that question is best put to the  
9 policymakers. But I would tell you, I would tell you --

10 Senator McCain: I think it is probably a tough question  
11 for you.

12 General Abizaid: -- that the Syrians have not done  
13 enough.

14 Senator McCain: Thank you.

15 General Abizaid, my other comment is that I believe that  
16 too often we are seeing that we are going into the same places  
17 we have been in before, and that means that we are not staying  
18 and clearing as opposed to coming in and striking and leaving.  
19 I hope that we can -- maybe it is the training of the Iraqi  
20 military that would help us, because clearly we do not have  
21 enough troops to do all that. Maybe it is the training of the  
22 Iraqi troops that would do that.

23 But do you see any improvement in that scenario? For  
24 example, I hear in Fallujah now we are having firefights again  
25 after one of the toughest battles in really American military



1 history, much less in the Iraqi war. So I would be interested  
2 in your comments about that.

3 General Casey: If I could, Senator. It is probably more  
4 appropriate for me to take that question than it is for General  
5 Abizaid.

6 Senator McCain: Go ahead, General.

7 General Casey: As I mentioned, we are fighting a thinking  
8 enemy here. This conflict ebbs and flows; action, reaction,  
9 counteraction. We are constantly moving forces around, trying  
10 to take advantage of vulnerabilities that we see in him, and  
11 sometimes we move forces to react.

12 These Marine operations that we have just seen out west  
13 are intelligence-based operations designed to disrupt the flow  
14 of foreign fighters through the Euphrates River valley into  
15 Baghdad. The operations that we are doing up north, in the  
16 northwest, with our Third Armored Cavalry Regiment and the Third  
17 Iraqi Army Division, the same thing: going out after  
18 intelligence and then conducting operations based on that  
19 intelligence.

20 Your notion that after these operations are conducted  
21 putting in Iraqi security forces to sustain the success is  
22 exactly the notion, exactly the right notion, and it is exactly  
23 the notion that we are following. As they continue to develop,  
24 you are going to see more and more of Iraqis taking charge of  
25 areas and coalition forces stepping back. But your notion is

1 exactly right.

2 Senator McCain: Thank you. Again, I want to thank you  
3 for your leadership. You give us confidence, you give us hope.  
4 I can only speak for myself, but I know I speak for many of my  
5 colleagues. This is a conflict we have to win and we cannot  
6 afford to lose. We are appreciative that we have the quality of  
7 leadership that we have there today.

8 Thank you.

9 General Myers: Can I follow onto just a couple of  
10 questions?

11 Chairman Warner: General Myers.

12 General Myers: Senator McCain, the one on Syria. My  
13 worry is not just the border, it is the ease with which foreign  
14 fighters transit through Syria and somehow are facilitated as  
15 well, not just getting past the borders but what might happen in  
16 terms of identification they acquire somewhere along the way.  
17 Whether or not the Syrian government is involved in that is  
18 pretty murky. But it is clear that foreign fighters are going  
19 --

20 Senator McCain: At least they must be acquiescing, would  
21 you think?

22 General Myers: You would think so. I mean, it is a  
23 pretty well controlled, tightly controlled country, so you have  
24 to assume that they have some knowledge of what is going on in  
25 their capitals and in their land. I think that is inexcusable.

1 It disrupts stability in Iraq and it contributes, of course, to  
2 killing of the coalition men and women. So it is unacceptable  
3 behavior and it is happening. So I would enlarge that a little  
4 bit.

5 The other question, you mentioned the health of the  
6 reserve component, and I share your concerns. I think we have  
7 worked all our forces very hard. That is one of the things that  
8 we have to be very aware of. I do not know of reservists that  
9 have gone back for a second or a third time unless they have  
10 done it voluntarily. Now, in the Air Force they will have done  
11 that, but I do not know of other reservists, unless it is  
12 voluntary, that have gone more than once.

13 We track that. If we could track it by name we would. We  
14 do not have the data to do that, but we track it by individuals,  
15 basically, in units is how we do it.

16 But I do share the concern about the health of the force,  
17 certainly.

18 Senator McCain: Thank you very much.

19 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

20 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Senator McCain.

21 Senator Kennedy.

22

23

24

25



1                   STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD M. KENNEDY, U.S. SENATOR  
2           FROM MASSACHUSETTS

3           Senator Kennedy: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And  
4           I want to thank General Casey and General Myers, General  
5           Abizaid, and Secretary Rumsfeld for their service to their  
6           country.

7           During the course of their presentations we hear the words  
8           "dedication," the "commitment," "sacrifice," and "courage" of  
9           our armed forces, and that is something that all of us admire,  
10          respect, and commend for those men and women in the regular  
11          forces, the reserve, and the guard. Quite frankly, it puts an  
12          additional burden, I think, on all of us to make sure that we  
13          are going to get it right over in Iraq, because the kinds of  
14          sacrifice that all of you have talked about about American  
15          servicemen and women and in terms of the Iraqis as well mean  
16          that we have a real responsibility to get it correct.

17          That comes to the policymakers and moves out of those that  
18          are out there going on patrols every day and every night and  
19          doing the job that they feel is important and is important in  
20          terms of the United States. So it is the policy. It is the  
21          policymakers.

22          Which brings me, Mr. Secretary, to you. Secretary  
23          Rumsfeld, as you know, we are in serious trouble in Iraq and  
24          this war has been consistently and grossly mismanaged. We are  
25          now in a seemingly intractable quagmire. Our troops are dying

1 and there really is no end in sight.

2 The American people I believe deserve leadership worthy of  
3 the sacrifices that are fighting forces have made and they  
4 deserve the real facts. And I regret to say that I do not  
5 believe that you have provided either.

6 You were wrong in September 2002 when you told the House  
7 Armed Services Committee that, knowing what we know about Iraq's  
8 history, no conclusion is possible except that they have and are  
9 escalating their WWD programs. And you were wrong when you told  
10 this committee that no terrorist state poses a greater, more  
11 immediate threat to the security of our people than the regime  
12 of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

13 When General Shinseki estimated that we would need several  
14 hundred thousand soldiers, you scoffed and said the idea that it  
15 would take several hundred thousand U.S. forces is far from the  
16 mark.

17 And when the massive looting occurred after Baghdad fell  
18 because we did not have enough troops for security, you  
19 callously said: Stuff happens.

20 You wrongly insisted after Saddam fell that there was no  
21 guerrilla war, even though our soldiers continued to be killed.  
22 In June 2003 you said: "The reason I do not use the phrase  
23 'guerrilla war' is because there is not one."

24 You wrongly called the insurgents "dead-enders," but they  
25 are killing Americans, almost three a day, and Iraqis with

1    alarming frequency and intensity.

2           You wrongly sent our service members into battle without  
3    the proper armor. When asked by a soldier about inadequate  
4    equipment, you said: "You go to war with the army you have.  
5    They are not the army you might want or wish to have at a later  
6    time."

7           You exaggerated our success in training capable Iraqi  
8    security forces. In February 2004 you told this committee: "We  
9    have accelerated the training of Iraqi security forces, now more  
10   than 200,000." That is in February of this year. In fact, we  
11   had far fewer actually able or capable of fighting then and far  
12   fewer that are capable even now.

13          So you basically have mismanaged the war and created an  
14   impossible situation for military recruiters and put our forces  
15   and our national security in danger. Our troops deserve better,  
16   Mr. Secretary, and I think the American people deserve better.  
17   They deserve competency and they deserve the facts.

18          In baseball it is three strikes, you are out. What is it  
19   for the Secretary of Defense?

20          Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, that is quite a statement.  
21   First let me say that there is not a person at this table who  
22   agrees with you that we are in a quagmire and that there is no  
23   end in sight. The presentations today have been very clear,  
24   they have been very forthright.

25          The suggestion by you that people may, or others, are



1 painting a rosy picture is false. There as been balance in my  
2 remarks. It is always possible for you to select out a word or  
3 two and cite it and suggest that that was the thrust of it, but  
4 the fact is from the beginning of this we have recognized that  
5 this is a tough business, it is difficult, that it is dangerous,  
6 and that it is not predictable.

7 Third, the issue of a guerrilla war. I mean, my goodness,  
8 I do not think it is a guerrilla war. You may think so. I do  
9 not know if anyone at this table thinks so. It is an  
10 insurgency. It is a semantic issue, but listing that as some  
11 sort of crime or wrongdoing or misleading it seems to me is a  
12 world class stretch.

13 I did call them "dead-enders." I do not know what else  
14 you would call a suicide bomber. What is a person who straps a  
15 vest on themselves, walks into a dining hall, kills themselves  
16 and kills innocent Iraqi people or innocent coalition soldiers?  
17 It seems to me that that is a perfectly appropriate comment.

18 With respect to the Iraqi security forces, there has been  
19 a great deal of misinformation that has been thrown around in  
20 this country. You know and we have told this committee on  
21 repeated occasions that in the early periods they included the  
22 site protection people, so the numbers were higher by some  
23 80,000. We said that. It is in the material that is presented  
24 to your committee every week or 2. There is an asterisk in  
25 there, a footnote; it says it. We have repeated it, and to then

1 pull that number out and say it is less today it seems to me is  
2 misleading.

3 I will say that the idea that what is happening over there  
4 is a quagmire is so fundamentally inconsistent with the facts.  
5 The reality is that they are making political progress without  
6 question. Reality is that the American forces that are training  
7 and equipping and mentoring the Iraqi security forces are doing  
8 a darn good job, and the number has been going up steadily and  
9 consistently, and I would be happy to have General Abizaid or  
10 General Casey mention the effective work they are doing.

11 To denigrate them and to suggest that they are not capable  
12 -- to be sure, they are not like the U.S. forces. They are  
13 never going to be like U.S. forces. There is not an army or a  
14 navy or an air force on the face of the Earth that is comparable  
15 to the United States military. But that does not mean that they  
16 are not capable of doing that which needs to be done.

17 To talk about the total number of 168,500 and suggest that  
18 because they all cannot be deployed across the country at any  
19 given moment, with their own lift and their own intelligence and  
20 their own combat support, it seems to me misunderstands the  
21 situation. As you know, in the material we give you a large  
22 number of them are police. They are not supposed to deploy  
23 anywhere. Policemen in Washington, D.C., do not get in  
24 airplanes and fly to California.

25 These people are trained to be border guards. They do not

1     deploy. They do not need to deploy. They go out to the border  
2     and they guard the border. They are policemen; they go to the  
3     city and they do their police work. There is a full range of  
4     security forces. Site protection people, they go out to an oil  
5     well and they sit there and guard the oil well.

6             There are a limited number of military people and special  
7     police battalions that have the responsibility of  
8     counterinsurgency and they do an increasingly good job.

9             So I think I must say that I think that the comments you  
10    made are certainly yours to make and I do not agree with them.

11            Senator Kennedy: Well, my time is just expired. But Mr.  
12    Secretary, I am talking about the misjudgments and the mistakes  
13    that were made, the series which I have mentioned, the disarming  
14    of the Iraqi army. Those were judgments that were made and  
15    there have been a series of gross errors and mistakes. Those  
16    are on your watch. Those are on your watch.

17            Isn't it time for you to resign?

18            Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator, I have offered my  
19    resignation to the President twice and he has decided that he  
20    would prefer that he not accept it, and that is his call.

21            Senator Kennedy: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

22            General Casey: Excuse me, Mr. Chairman. But as the  
23    commander in Iraq, I would like to put myself on the record,  
24    Senator Kennedy, as saying that I also agree with the Secretary  
25    that to represent the situation in Iraq as a quagmire is a



1 misrepresentation of the facts. I thought I was fairly clear in  
2 what I laid out in my testimony about what is going on in Iraq,  
3 but you have an insurgency with no vision, no base, limited  
4 popular support, an elected government, committed Iraqis to the  
5 democratic process, and you have Iraqi security forces that are  
6 fighting and dying for their country every day. Senator, that  
7 is not a quagmire.

8 Senator Kennedy: And Mr. Chairman, I put in the record  
9 the interview of General Vines, who says the situation is  
10 absolutely static in Iraq today. That is on the 21st June. I  
11 will put his in the record as well. Thank you.

12 [The information referred to follows:]

13 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

1 Chairman Warner: This is an important issue. Are there  
2 any other members of the panel that wish to address that  
3 question?

4 General Myers: I will just identify myself -- it is  
5 clearly not a quagmire. It never has been. The term has been  
6 used loosely and it is not accurate in my estimation. I  
7 identify myself with General Casey's comments and my earlier --

8 Chairman Warner: General Abizaid?

9 General Abizaid: I guess the only thing I have to say is  
10 I have been fighting this next to the Secretary for a long time  
11 and there is no doubt that I certainly have made my mistakes,  
12 but when it comes to toughness and stick-to-it-iveness and  
13 fighting the enemy the way they need to be fought, I am standing  
14 by the Secretary.

15 Chairman Warner: Now, Senator Inhofe.  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

1 STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM  
2 OKLAHOMA

3 Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 I think we all know that the cut-and-run caucus is always  
5 alive and well. It does not matter what war it is, what  
6 conflict it is, and it certainly is today.

7 In the opening statement you made, General Myers, you said  
8 that for us to leave prior to the time that our mission is  
9 complete, it would be catastrophic. I agree with that, but I  
10 want to make sure that the other three get on the record as to  
11 agreeing with that statement. General Casey, General Abizaid?

12 General Casey: I am certainly in agreement.

13 General Abizaid: I agree with General Casey, sir.

14 Senator Inhofe: Good.

15 A year ago the American people would not have known what  
16 we were talking about if we mentioned an "IED." They do today.  
17 We had a hearing, as the chairman said, yesterday or the day  
18 before on this and at Fort Irwin last week there was an IED  
19 seminar. You have briefly addressed this, but I would like to  
20 get on the record any progress that is being made, anything  
21 specific to the IED and what it is looking like in the future,  
22 if you could comment, any of you who want to, to elaborate any  
23 more than you already have.

24 General Casey: Other than the session, Senator, that you  
25 have already alluded to, where the Army continues to focus their



1 efforts technologically to give us the tools that we need to  
2 defeat these IEDs, that process is continuous and it is ongoing.

3 I will tell you that I have asked several times. What we  
4 really need is a way to set off a blasting cap from a distance.  
5 All of these improvised explosive devices and car bombs are all  
6 triggered by a blasting cap and if you can set that off -- if  
7 you think about it, have you ever been by a construction site  
8 where you see the sign that says: "Turn off your two-way  
9 radios; blasting caps in use." My sense has always been if you  
10 can do it with a radio, why can you not do it?

11 Senator Inhofe: General Casey, some of us have been  
12 exposed to some new technologies out there that are working on  
13 that right now, and hopefully there will be technological help  
14 in the field for you on that.

15 Any comment, General Abizaid?

16 General Abizaid: Senator, it is very clear that, in  
17 today's connected world, that the insurgents are sharing lessons  
18 learned. They do it on the Internet. They do it in a lot of  
19 different ways. We see their technologies moving from the  
20 battlefield in Iraq to the battlefield in Afghanistan and no  
21 doubt we will see that elsewhere.

22 This is, like George said, General Casey said, it is  
23 action, reaction, counteraction. We have got to tighten our  
24 tactics, techniques, and procedures as much as we can. But I am  
25 convinced, like General Casey is, that there are technologies

1 out there that could be more useful and we have just got to work  
2 real hard to find them.

3 Senator Inhofe: Thank you. We will try to help in that  
4 regard.

5 It has appeared to me that most people who are critical of  
6 what is going on over there are the ones who do not go over and  
7 see for themselves. Unfortunately, if you rely on the media as  
8 to your information as to the progress of the conflict over  
9 there, then you are in really bad shape. This has bothered me a  
10 lot. I think most of the members of this committee have been  
11 there. I have been there quite a few times, twice in the last 3  
12 months.

13 You go over, like in the Sunni Triangle, and experience  
14 over there with General Madhi, who used to -- all of you know  
15 him. He used to be the brigade commander for Saddam Hussein in  
16 Fallujah. He hated Americans. And he has been training,  
17 embedded training with our marines. He looked at us and said  
18 that when the marines had to rotate and go out they actually  
19 cried. Here is a general that just hated Americans under Saddam  
20 Hussein and he has actually renamed his Iraqi security forces  
21 the "Fallujah Marines."

22 At the same time we were there, at Tikrit they had the  
23 blow-up of the training area. 10 were killed, 30 were severely  
24 wounded. General Myers mentioned, or one of you did, the fact  
25 that they are giving members of their family to replace those

1 who are -- and that has happened. All 40 families that were  
2 involved replaced the person that was either killed or injured  
3 with their own people.

4 As you go across the Sunni Triangle, where they are  
5 supposed to hate us the most -- in a helicopter maybe 100 feet  
6 off the ground is the safest way to do it -- and you see our  
7 troops throwing candy and cookies that came from the people back  
8 home, and the little kids in the villages waving American flags  
9 and waving at us. That is not the picture you get in the media.

10 I would only ask you this question. That was about a  
11 month ago. Do you see any deterioration in that support that we  
12 are getting from those people out in the villages as a result of  
13 some of the increase in attacks or of the negative media that we  
14 have?

15 General Casey: Senator, we do not. And as I mentioned,  
16 the insurgents and the terrorists have a fairly narrow base that  
17 they operate from, and the people in the villages that you  
18 mentioned are the same people who want a better future for their  
19 family and they want to be part of the political process.

20 If I could just give you an indicator, recent polling  
21 across Iraq. Better than 80 percent of the population says that  
22 they want to vote, they are going to vote in the referendum and  
23 they are going to vote in the election based on that  
24 constitution. So they want to be part of this process.

25 Senator Inhofe: Thank you.



1           General Myers: In fact, Senator, let us put up the chart,  
2           "Confidence in the National Government."

3           [Chart.]

4           General Myers: It is a different slant on it, but recent  
5           polling data. And this is the confidence that the Iraqi people  
6           have in their government. It starts back in December of '04 and  
7           it goes through May of this year. I know some of it is hard to  
8           read, but you can see the increase in the green and the  
9           percentage of people that have now more and more confidence as  
10          time goes on. The big surge after the elections, and that surge  
11          has continued, I think, which just adds to, adds to what General  
12          Casey said.

13          Senator Inhofe: I appreciate it. . . .

14          [The information referred to follows:]

15                       [COMMITTEE INSERT]

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1           Senator Inhofe: Mr. Chairman, I think we should get  
2 copies of that. It is a very significant chart.

3           Again, let me just thank you for the great job you are  
4 doing. And hopefully we can -- one last question, Mr. Chairman.

5           Chairman Warner: I have to say, Senator, roughly  
6 calculating, these witnesses have to appear before the House at  
7 2:00.

8           Senator Inhofe: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

9           Chairman Warner: And I am anxious to have all members  
10 have their opportunity.

11          Senator Reed. Senator Reed.

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 STATEMENT OF HON. JACK REED, U.S. SENATOR FROM RHODE  
2 ISLAND

3 Senator Reed: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 General Abizaid, we are at a juncture in this effort that  
5 requires not only military forces, but complementary civilian  
6 forces -- State Department personnel, AID workers -- because we  
7 are in a phase where we have to inspire political engagement and  
8 also reconstruct the shattered infrastructure. Do we have  
9 sufficient forces, civilian -- I should not say "forces" --  
10 civilian personnel throughout the country to do that?

11 I am under the impression that State Department personnel  
12 are volunteers and many are volunteering out of their expertise.

13 Is that your impression?

14 General Abizaid: Senator Reed, I do not know that I can  
15 comment specifically on their authorized strength versus what is  
16 out in the field. But I can say that this war must be fought  
17 with all of the agencies of the United States Government fully  
18 engaged, with people that stay in the field long-term, that are  
19 in the right place at the right time. And I believe that there  
20 are clear indications that we have got to do better in this.

21 Senator Reed: So, without putting words in your mouth,  
22 your impression is they are not fully engaged? Again, that goes  
23 to the overriding issue of how serious we are about winning this  
24 war if a major component of our strategy, the civilian side, is  
25 manned by volunteers and is not fully engaged.



1           General Abizaïd: Well, Senator, of course a State  
2   Department person, for example, is not the same as an  
3   infantryman on the battlefield. But a State Department person  
4   in a PRT in Afghanistan, a Provincial Reconstruction Team in  
5   Afghanistan, or a USAID person in that same sort of a location  
6   is worth an awful lot to us. As a matter of fact, the combat  
7   troops provide the shield behind which their work can be done.

8           I think we need more of those types of dedicated  
9   professionals out in the field. I want to make it very clear,  
10   as you know from the time that you traveled around with me, that  
11   when you find those people out there they are magnificent, they  
12   are every bit as magnificent as our troops. We need to check to  
13   make sure we have got the right ones at the right place for the  
14   right amount of time.

15          Senator Reed: Thank you.

16          General Casey, you are the ground commander. What is your  
17   estimate of how long this level of violence can be sustained,  
18   the car bombing? Again, we are talking about terrorist  
19   activities more than conventional engagements. Is this a year  
20   or 2, given the flow of insurgents, given the access to weapons?

21          General Casey: As several people have commented on over  
22   the course of the hearing here, Senator, political advances will  
23   impact on that, economic advances will impact on that. So it is  
24   very hard to gauge. I will tell you that there is sufficient  
25   ammunition stashed around Iraq purposely that is available to

1 these insurgents. That will be available to them for some time.

2 They are not having to import the ammunition that they put into  
3 these devices.

4 But as the political process takes hold here, I think you  
5 will see a gradual lessening of the insurgency.

6 Senator Reed: General Casey, it is interesting because we  
7 saw the political process take hold with the elections, which  
8 were quite stirring frankly. When I was there over the Eastern  
9 holidays with you and General Abizaid, there was a sense that  
10 perhaps a breakthrough had been made. But since that time they  
11 have shown, the insurgents, great resiliency, cunning, the  
12 ability to supply themselves from indigenous stockpiles, and to  
13 create a level of violence that is extremely disturbing, at  
14 least here in the United States. So I do not know if further  
15 political progress in the next year or 2 will have that much of  
16 a dampening effect.

17 But let me --

18 General Casey: If I could, Senator. I am sorry --

19 Senator Reed: Yes, General.

20 General Casey: That first election was a first step. It  
21 was a great step. It was a magnificent day for the Iraqi  
22 people. But as we discussed when you were there, it is a first  
23 step. I tried to talk to everybody who came over, just to say,  
24 look, this is not over yet; this is a resilient insurgency.  
25 They are committed in their own way and we are in a fight.

1 Senator Reed: Thank you.

2 I am glad General Myers put that chart up, Mr. Secretary,  
3 because if you did the numbers for the American public you would  
4 probably be running exactly the opposite direction. We have a  
5 credibility gap here with the American people, forget people  
6 here on this dais. I think it is obvious why some Americans are  
7 very, very distrustful of what is going on. They were told this  
8 was a war about WMD and there is no WMD. They were told that it  
9 was about terrorism, but there are tenuous links to terrorists.  
10 In fact, there are more international terrorists in Baghdad  
11 today than there were several years ago. They were told that we  
12 would be greeted as liberators. We are engaged in a very fierce  
13 fight that is taking roughly a battalion-sized group of  
14 Americans every month as casualties, killed, wounded, injured.  
15 Your own plans called for a steep reduction in troops  
16 immediately after the conventional efforts. That never  
17 transpired.

18 We have, I think, an erosion of trust which this hearing I  
19 suppose was an attempt to stem. I think they also see at the  
20 end of this process, not this transformed democratic state in  
21 the Middle East, but a fragile client of the United States for  
22 many years to come, and that has given them great concern. The  
23 polls measure that.

24 I think also our moral clarity was seriously undercut by  
25 Abu Ghraib, and I do not feel yet we have held senior officials



1     accountable for what took place there and other parts of the  
2     area of operations and indeed in Guantanamo.

3             Now, at the end also I think we will find a broken Army.  
4     We cannot sustain the tempo of operations for the next year or  
5     2. The comments that Senator McCain made, the comments that  
6     others made about our reserve forces. We still have huge  
7     threats, I would argue much more daunting than Iraq -- North  
8     Korea, Iran, other places.

9             So I guess, Mr. Secretary, the question is what can you  
10    say to try to bridge this credibility gap, given I think what  
11    General Abizaid has said, we are not truly engaged on the civic  
12    side. We have volunteer State Department people. They struggle  
13    to find enough people to go out there. That is not a serious  
14    effort to win a war. I think as General Casey said, this  
15    violence is likely to continue, because of supplies in country  
16    and the commitment of these terrorists, for many, many months  
17    ahead.

18            Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator, you said even my own plan  
19    called for steep reductions. I did not have a plan like that.  
20    I am sure you can find somebody who had a plan like that, and  
21    maybe General Abizaid did or Tom Franks did. But we had not  
22    made judgments. We had a plan that would have flown in as many  
23    troops as were needed to succeed in defeating the Saddam Hussein  
24    regime, and it happened that that occurred at the level where we  
25    stopped it.

1           It was not my recommendation. It was the battlefield  
2 commander's recommendation. They had a variety of sensitivities  
3 as to what they would do with the troop levels. In the event it  
4 got worse, it would go up. If it got better it would go down.

5           But to pull up that and suggest that that is some error or  
6 wrong or mistake is just inconsistent with the facts.

7           The broken Army argument worries me. The United States  
8 Army is the finest in the world, without question. The Air  
9 Force and the Navy and the Marines are in good health. There  
10 are some shortages in recruiting for elements of the Army.  
11 Retention, however, is high. Retention is particularly high of  
12 people who have served in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus far we  
13 have used something less than 50 percent of the reserve  
14 components, the guard and the reserve. That is just a fact.

15           There are people who have, as General Myers said,  
16 undoubtedly served two or three times over there, or in Bosnia  
17 or Kosovo or Afghanistan or Iraq. The process we have is to do  
18 everything humanly possible to see that those are individual  
19 volunteers, and that has been overwhelmingly the case. They are  
20 people who put their hand up and said: I have been there and I  
21 want to go back and I want to serve my country.

22           You are quite right, there are threats in the world, other  
23 threats and dangers. And if you ask General Myers or General  
24 Pace, the people who meet with the chiefs and the combatant  
25 commanders, as to whether the United States is capable of

1 meeting those other demands, they will answer you that we are  
2 capable of meeting those other demands. If you ask what are we  
3 doing about avoiding having a broken Army, the answer is -- we  
4 had yesterday I think another 2 hours on the subject of all the  
5 things we can do to reduce stress on the force. We have got  
6 something like 47 items that we are working on and have been for  
7 well over a year and a half to see that the stress on the force  
8 is relieved. It has involved tens of thousands of people who  
9 have been rebalanced and shifted.

10 The implication that there is an inattentiveness or a lack  
11 of concern about the stress on the force is simply not correct.  
12 We are deeply concerned about it and we are working the problem,  
13 and when this is over we will not have a broken Army.

14 Senator Reed: Well, Mr. Secretary, what I think I heard  
15 you say is if the plan works it is your plan; if the plan does  
16 not work it is the Army officer's plan. I do not think that is  
17 responsible.

18 Chairman Warner: Senator, we are not going to be able to  
19 allow other Senators their opportunity. I want to make certain  
20 that there is a full response to your important question. I see  
21 that the chairman wishes to respond to the question.

22 General Myers: Just 10 seconds. I just need to say my  
23 belief, and my belief is that we really -- in my view, we do not  
24 have a more daunting threat to U.S. national security than  
25 violent extremists. I think that is our primary threat right



1 now. I do not think it is North Korea or other places in the  
2 world. I think it is violent extremism is the most daunting  
3 threat and the one that can have the biggest impact on our way  
4 of life.

5 Chairman Warner: General Abizaid, do you wish to respond?  
6

7 General Abizaid: Mr. Chairman and Senator Reed, I think  
8 it is very important that we never lose sight of this problem  
9 about WMD. This enemy that we are fighting in the region seeks  
10 to obtain a biological, chemical, or nuclear weapon, and if they  
11 can acquire it or develop it they will use it against us. There  
12 should be no mistake about that.

13 Chairman Warner: Senator Sessions.  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

1 STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF SESSIONS, U.S. SENATOR FROM

2 ALABAMA

3 Senator Sessions: Mr. Chairman, thank you.

4 Gentlemen, we appreciate all of your service. Secretary  
5 Rumsfeld, I am particularly pleased that you have committed  
6 yourself to serving this country in the way that you have. You  
7 and the President made a commitment to allow the military to  
8 make honest suggestions about how to fight this war and to give  
9 them the resources they have needed, and I do not think it is  
10 fair to say that you are blaming them for problems if they did  
11 not ask for more soldiers. I think we know how that happened  
12 and everybody understands it, and I certainly do not believe you  
13 should resign and I honor your commitment, your transformation  
14 of the military, your tough, steadfast support for the soldiers  
15 in the field, and for our military efforts in the war against  
16 terrorism.

17 General Casey, this chart that was put up there I think is  
18 rather important. It showed that in December only 6 percent of  
19 the Iraqi people had a great deal of confidence, but as of May  
20 41 percent. With another 43 percent -- with another 31 percent,  
21 74 percent have confidence in their national government.

22 Would you say that that is an absolute critical question  
23 for the future of Iraq, the confidence that the people of Iraq  
24 have in the ability of their government to function? Is that  
25 not a source of encouragement for us of a significant nature?

1           General Casey: It is certainly a source of encouragement  
2 to me in my job. In fact, you recall I mentioned that in my  
3 opening statement, the fact that the confidence of the Iraqi  
4 people in their government is high.

5           Senator Sessions: And this is in light of, in the face of  
6 this newer tactic or repeated tactic of automobile attacks that  
7 hit so many civilians. They move into crowds and have killed  
8 and injured quite a number of civilians in recent months. But  
9 still the numbers are holding firm. How do you evaluate that?

10          General Casey: As I mentioned, we should not  
11 underestimate the commitment of the Iraqi people to wanting  
12 something better. What is happening there with these car bombs  
13 is murder and we ought not forget that. As I said, one tenth of  
14 one percent of the population we think may be supporting or  
15 participating in this insurgency. The rest of the Iraqi people  
16 are moving forward, as this chart here indicates.

17          There is another chart up here, if you do not mind,  
18 Senator. If you would put up the chart there with the four pie  
19 charts on it.

20          [Chart.]

21          General Casey: This is also very important to me here,  
22 because it reflects how the Iraqi people think about their  
23 security forces. You can see up in the top left-hand corner  
24 that they believe that the Iraqi security forces are winning the  
25 battles against the terrorists. If you look on the right-hand



1 side, they believe that their Iraqi security forces are  
2 professional and well trained. And you can follow your way  
3 around that chart.

4 [The information referred to follows:]

5 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 Chairman Warner: Excuse me, General. We will need to  
2 know who prepared that poll and the circumstances under which it  
3 was prepared.

4 General Casey: I will give you that data for the record,  
5 Senator.

6 [The information referred to follows:]

7 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 Chairman Warner: Senator Sessions, please proceed.

2 Senator Sessions: You know, we all value free speech and  
3 people are able to express themselves as they desire in this  
4 great country, and we want to see people around the world have  
5 the opportunity to express themselves. It seems like to me,  
6 however, that we need to be careful about the comments that we  
7 make. We know a false story in Newsweek magazine led to riots  
8 in Pakistan when it was alleged that a Koran had been flushed  
9 down a toilet, whereas the truth is that our soldiers in  
10 Guantanamo wear gloves, they give everyone a Koran that wants  
11 one, and they treat it with respect, and many other things done  
12 to show respect for the Islamic religion.

13 We have had 29 hearings on prisoner abuse and, frankly,  
14 there has been absolutely no proof of any systematic abuse, and  
15 what we have seen is consistent prosecutions and discipline of  
16 soldiers and military people and others who violated our  
17 standards of treating soldiers, prisoners, in a humane way.

18 I would just say that I think the military has handled  
19 that well. But it does appear to me that, if you read the  
20 newspapers, that you would draw a different conclusion.

21 General Abizaid, you have been in the region for some  
22 time. Would you say that, with regard to recruiting these  
23 terrorists to come in the country, the riots in Pakistan, the  
24 ability of our troops in Iraq to win the confidence of the  
25 people there, that that can be adversely affected by false



1 charges against our military, and does it have impact on the  
2 personal safety of the soldiers this Congress has sent in harm's  
3 way to execute our policies?

4 General Abizaid: Senator, this conflict in which we are  
5 engaged is more about perceptions in many respects than about  
6 true battlefield capability. Our enemies want people to believe  
7 that we do not respect them, that we dishonor them, that we are  
8 against Islam. They want to create the impression that we will  
9 steal their resources, that we will ravage their countryside.

10 The truth is that as long as we tell the truth and get  
11 that story out and concentrate, not only about whatever we may  
12 have done wrong, but also telling the story, the great untold  
13 story, about this enemy, I think we will be just fine. The vast  
14 majority of people in the region hate the extremists. They do  
15 not want to follow them. False stories giving them an  
16 opportunity for hope, however, really hurt us very much.

17 It was very interesting to me, in one of Zarquawi's  
18 letters to his followers he gave numerous reports from U.S.  
19 media sources that showed we were losing, that we were losing  
20 our will, that we were unable to fight this fight. I do not  
21 think we should give false hope to this enemy. We will defeat  
22 them.

23 Chairman Warner: Thank you very much, Senator.

24 Senator Clinton.

25 General Myers: Mr. Chairman, if I may, please.

1 Chairman Warner: Yes, General Myers.

2 General Myers: Let me just tag onto General Abizaid's  
3 comments. You know, fundamentally this is going to be about  
4 resolve, the perception issue. It is about resolve, about  
5 staying power, about patience. All war, particularly this  
6 conflict I think, demands that. When it is about resolve and  
7 persistence and patience, I can guarantee you our military is  
8 being very effective over there every day.

9 Our folks know how to fight. Sometimes you hear criticism  
10 about our inability to fight urban warfare. That is rubbish.  
11 We are the best urban warfighters in the world. We are better  
12 than the adversary. We have not made this -- we have not made  
13 this a contest of who kills the most, because in the end I do  
14 not think that serves anybody very well. We have learned our  
15 lessons, and I do not want us to do that.

16 But I think the American public can be assured that our  
17 military is very, very effective at what they are doing.

18 So if resolve is important, then leadership is important,  
19 and we have to be very careful, very, very careful what we say,  
20 all of us. We do not want to say it is too easy, it is too  
21 hard. We want to say as best as we know the facts and present  
22 them.

23 Earlier today we were talking about the threat and there  
24 was a comment made about the threat, that the threat is static  
25 according to General Vines in a Baghdad press conference that he

1 had with the press corps back here. Here is what General Vines  
2 said. He said:

3 "I need to clarify. The reason that I said that I assumed  
4 the condition will remain relatively static" -- and I think the  
5 condition is the insurgency -- remain relatively static, keep in  
6 mind that those elections are only 4 months away. I mean, there  
7 -- I do not have any reason to believe there is going to be a  
8 significant change in 4 months, absent a political  
9 breakthrough."

10 So they were well-qualified statements. We have got to be  
11 very careful when we make statements that we say what we mean  
12 and we portray the facts the best we can.

13 I would like to enter General Vines statement in the  
14 record, please.

15 [The information referred to follows:]

16 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25



1 Chairman Warner: Without objection, General; and I thank  
2 you for that contribution.

3 Secretary Rumsfeld.

4 Secretary Rumsfeld: Mr. Chairman, in that connection,  
5 where we have inaccurate statements or inaccurately cited  
6 statements, President Kennedy cited this statement that we go to  
7 the war with the Army we have. Let me read the full answer that  
8 I responded to a question, and if anyone can find any  
9 implication of callousness in it, I just cannot detect it.

10 Secretary Rumsfeld said: "I talked to the general coming  
11 out here about the pace at which the vehicles are being armored.

12 They have been brought from all over the world, wherever they  
13 are not needed, to a place where they are needed. I am told  
14 they are being -- the Army is, I think, something like 400 a  
15 month are being done, and it is essentially a matter of physics.

16 It is not a matter of money, it is not a matter on the part of  
17 the Army of desire. It is a matter of production and capability  
18 and doing it.

19 "And as you know, you go to the war with the Army you  
20 have. They are not the Army you might want or wish to have at a  
21 later time. Since the Iraq conflict began, the Army has been  
22 pressing ahead to produce the armor necessary at a rate they  
23 believe -- and it is a greatly expanded rate from what existed  
24 previously, but -- a rate that they believe is a rate that they  
25 can accomplish at the moment.

1 "I can assure you that General Schumacher and the  
2 leadership in the Army and certainly General Whitcomb are  
3 sensitive to the fact that not every vehicle has the degree of  
4 armor that might be desirable for it to have, but that they are  
5 working on it at a good clip."

6 "It is interesting. I talked a great deal about this with  
7 a team of people who were working on it hard at the Pentagon.  
8 If you think about it, you can have all the armor in the world  
9 on a tank and a tank can still be blown up, and you can have an  
10 up-armored Humvee and it can be blown up, and you can go down in  
11 the vehicle. The goal we have is to have as many of those  
12 vehicles as is humanly possible with the appropriate level of  
13 armor available for the troops, and that is what the Army has  
14 been working on."

15 And the Washington Post put on the front page: "You go to  
16 war with the Army you have," implying a disinterest. It is that  
17 kind of treatment and the kind of treatment here today, dredging  
18 up that old quote out of context, that I find harmful to what we  
19 are trying to accomplish.

20 Senator Sessions: Mr. Chairman, let me just say, there is  
21 a lot of politics here and we are used to give and take, and we  
22 take people's statements out of context politically a lot of  
23 times. All of us have done it. But this is a war. We have got  
24 soldiers out there, and we need to be particularly careful that  
25 we do not misrepresent things that place our soldiers in more

1    harm's way than they need to be.

2            Chairman Warner: Thank you.

3            Senator Kennedy -- oh, excuse me. Senator Clinton.

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25



1 STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, U.S.

2 SENATOR FROM NEW YORK

3 Senator Clinton: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 Thank you, gentlemen, for being here and thank you for  
5 their service under very difficult circumstances. I think that  
6 one of the challenges we face in our country as well as in the  
7 Congress is that there are grounds for reasonable disagreements  
8 about how we pursue our goals in Iraq and elsewhere. I  
9 absolutely agree that our enemy are violent, nihilistic  
10 extremists. I agree that if we and the Iraqi people and their  
11 government are successful in Iraq it will be a transformative  
12 historic event.

13 I think it is also fair to point out that there are great  
14 risks and dangers associated with this strategy, and that the  
15 young men and women who wear the uniform of our country are put  
16 in harm's way every day. I know how heavily that weighs on all  
17 of us, those of you who command them and those of us who vote to  
18 send them there and vote to try to provide the resources that  
19 they need.

20 So while there might be reasonable disagreements about how  
21 we pursue our goals, I hope, Mr. Secretary, you would agree that  
22 Democrats and Republicans, people of every political belief and  
23 none at all, united after the 9-11 attacks on our Nation. And  
24 that has been especially evident here in this Senate Armed  
25 Services Committee, under the bipartisan leadership of Chairman

1 / Warner and Ranking Member Levin.

2 Mr. Secretary, would you agree with that statement?

3 Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator, there is no question but  
4 that the country and the Congress united after September 11th.

5 Senator Clinton: Mr. Chairman, I am going to read you a  
6 quote from today's newspaper: "Conservatives saw the savagery  
7 of 9-11 and the attacks and prepared for war. Liberals saw the  
8 savagery of the 9-11 attacks and wanted to prepare indictments  
9 and offer therapy and understanding for our attackers."

10 Mr. Secretary, do you agree with that statement by a  
11 senior member of this administration?

12 Secretary Rumsfeld: I do not know who made the statement  
13 or the context of it, and I have just gotten through saying that  
14 when one takes a single sentence or a single comment out of a  
15 longer statement that may have context, I find frequently that  
16 it is harmful. I do not know who said it or what the context  
17 was, and obviously it is not something I said.

18 Senator Clinton: I appreciate that.

19 Well, it is a statement by Karl Rove and it is the kind of  
20 statement that is particularly harmful and painful. It is the  
21 kind of statement that is unnecessary. It is the kind of  
22 statement that pits Americans of good faith, seeking to support  
23 the men and women in uniform, seeking to protect them, seeking  
24 to support you, despite the fact that we might have serious  
25 questions and even disagreements about strategy and tactics.

1           So it politicizes and turns into a partisan game something  
2   as serious as the attack on our Nation on September 11th and  
3   something as deadly as the conflict in which we are currently  
4   engaged.

5           So I would hope, Mr. Secretary, that you and other members  
6   of the administration would immediately repudiate such an  
7   insulting comment from a high-ranking official in the  
8   President's inner circle.

9           It is very disturbing to many of us, increasingly so, that  
10   we cannot have a national conversation about something as  
11   important as the conflict that we face, which I for one believe  
12   is a long-term challenge to our very existence, and is  
13   certainly a challenge that you are attempting to deal with in  
14   the field and in the Pentagon.

15           It is not just people on one side of the aisle who have  
16   raised these issues. A recent bipartisan group of members of  
17   Congress called for an end to the conflict, a withdrawal of our  
18   troops, something I do not agree with. But I understand the  
19   frustration and the concern and anxiety that motivates such a  
20   statement and question, and I would not in any way question the  
21   resolve, the toughness, the patriotism, of anybody who raises  
22   legitimate questions and has disagreements about how we are to  
23   pursue our objectives.

24           With due respect, I think it would be helpful if we would  
25   hear a little bit more of that tone from our President and from



1 our Vice President and from our other high-ranking officials in  
2 the administration. I am old enough to remember how deeply  
3 divided our country was in Vietnam. I never want to see that  
4 again. We may have disagreements about how to engage in this  
5 conflict and how to win it, but I never want to live through  
6 that again and I do not think any of us do.

7 So I would respectfully suggest that perhaps we adopt a  
8 somewhat different tone and approach in discussing these very  
9 critical matters for the benefit of all of us, and particularly  
10 for the benefit of the young men and women who we are so proud  
11 of and so grateful to for their sacrifice.

12 Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator, I certainly agree. I think  
13 you will find the tone in my remarks fit what you are talking  
14 about. I think that it is unfortunate when things become so  
15 polarized or so politicized, and you have heard some of that  
16 here today. It is not helpful.

17 In my remarks I pointed out that there are a number of  
18 questions that are raised by the public, by members of the House  
19 and the Senate, and that is a perfectly proper and legitimate  
20 thing to do. Our democracy permits that. We can live through  
21 it in a wartime period if we do it in an orderly way and a  
22 sensible way and a civil way.

23 Senator Clinton: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

24 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Senator Clinton.

25 Senator Collins, I understand you yield. Senator Graham

1 must soon leave to preside over the Senate, so Senator Graham.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1                   STATEMENT OF HON. LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, U.S. SENATOR  
2       FROM SOUTH CAROLINA

3           Senator Graham: Thank you, Senator Collins, for that.  
4       Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

5           Just recently here in the Senate we have had a lot of time  
6       absorbed about what one member said and that was, I thought, way  
7       out of bounds. That member apologized. That was good. There  
8       was a time when no one seemed to want to correct that statement,  
9       and some of the things that Senator Clinton said are really not  
10      helpful.

11          We talk about losing the war and what it would mean. The  
12      only way, gentlemen, I see that we could possibly lose in Iraq  
13      is to leave the country in shambles, not prepared, not capable  
14      of defending itself and taking care of this new democracy, that  
15      if we left too soon, before they had a chance to get a  
16      functioning army and a functioning police force and to create  
17      honest judges and to have the rule of law that we would put the  
18      whole world at risk.

19          So to anyone, Republican or Democrat, who thinks that a  
20      timetable is the answer, I could not disagree more. How hard is  
21      it to create a country where everybody buys in? It is pretty  
22      hard, and 100 and something years -- do the math; less than 100  
23      years -- we were in a Civil War. It started in my State. This  
24      is hard. How long does it take to get over a 1400-year  
25      religious dispute? Probably a little longer than between now



1 and December.

2 We have bought into a model that is extremely difficult,  
3 but the only answer, because you cannot kill enough of these  
4 people. The model is to leave in Iraq the chance for them to  
5 govern themselves where moderation trumps terrorism, where  
6 mothers have a say about their children, where you can go to  
7 court based on what you did, not who you are. That is a very  
8 big challenge and the only answer.

9 So losing is leaving before the job is done. What would  
10 make us leave? The last time an American lost on the  
11 battlefield was when the Confederacy was defeated. We will not  
12 lose a battle. It is not a military problem in terms of losing.  
13 We will lose this war if we leave too soon, and what is likely  
14 to make us do that? The public going south, and that is  
15 happening and that worries me greatly.

16 So, Mr. Secretary, you have described the dynamic in 1946,  
17 I think very accurately. There was a lot of concern about  
18 reconstructing Europe after World War II. I see this engagement  
19 in Iraq very similar to our World War II endeavor, not Vietnam.  
20 This is not about trying to take sides in a dispute between a  
21 country. This is about taking sides between a dispute between  
22 freedom-loving people and terrorists.

23 Whether we should have been there or not is no longer the  
24 question. We are there. And the people who want us to leave  
25 are the same people who tried to kill us on September 11th.

1           It is a World War II event, but the public views this very  
2   day, Mr. Secretary, more and more like Vietnam. 39 percent in  
3   the last poll support the idea that we should be there.

4           What do you think is going on and how can we correct that?

5           Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator, the members of this  
6   committee and everyone in this room and listening know the  
7   answer to that question as well as I do, and possibly better.  
8   Our system says that we place all our faith, all our hope, in  
9   the people of the country, and that, given sufficient  
10  information, over time they will find their way to right  
11  decisions. And I believe that.

12           I have watched polls go from zero to 55 percent back down  
13  to 15 percent in 6 weeks, and anyone who starts chasing polls is  
14  going to get seasick.

15           Senator Graham: Do you believe this is an acute problem  
16  or a chronic problem, with the public support waning?

17           Secretary Rumsfeld: An acute or a what?

18           Senator Graham: Chronic problem. Because in the last  
19  year, sir, the public support in my State has turned, and I  
20  worry about that because that is the only way we will ever leave  
21  before we should, is if the public loses faith in us. I am here  
22  to tell you, sir, in the most patriotic State I can imagine  
23  people are beginning to question, and I do not think it is a  
24  blip on the radar screen. I think we have a chronic problem on  
25  our hands. If you disagree, I certainly respect that.

1           Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, that is the time that  
2 leadership has to stand up and tell the truth, and if you are  
3 facing a headwind you have got two choices: You can turn around  
4 and go downwind or you can stand there and go into the wind, and  
5 that is what needs to be done. And we have got leadership in  
6 this country that are capable of doing that, let there be no  
7 doubt.

8           I think the American people have a good center of gravity.

9           I think they have, individually they have inner gyroscopes that  
10 may tilt from time to time, but they get recentered, and that  
11 they, given appropriate leadership and given continued success  
12 on the political and the security side in that country, I am  
13 absolutely convinced that we will have the willpower and the  
14 staying power and the courage to do what is right there.

15           The alternative is to turn that region back to darkness,  
16 to people who behead people, and that is not a happy prospect.

17           Senator Graham: I could not agree more.

18           One last thought and I have to go. General Abizaid, based  
19 on the military situation as you know it, what is the likelihood  
20 of the insurgents and the terrorists combined launching a  
21 Tet-type offensive, where there are coordinated attacks  
22 throughout the country that would result in substantial loss of  
23 American or coalition lives? Because if that did happen I  
24 really worry about the response in this country. How likely is  
25 that and what can we do to prevent it?



1           General Abizaid: Senator, I can tell you, and George will  
2 undoubtedly talk about this for Iraq in particular, but there is  
3 always a likelihood of a surprise militarily. There is always  
4 an opportunity for the enemy to figure out a way to inflict  
5 casualties, to grab the headlines.

6           The challenge for us is to stay tough enough when that  
7 happens to see ourself through it. We cannot be defeated by the  
8 headlines. We cannot be defeated by this enemy. No doubt that  
9 they can do us damage. In Afghanistan right now in particular,  
10 we are getting ready to go to an election in September. The  
11 enemy is coming as hard as they can. They have issued orders to  
12 everybody that they can get their hands on to try to disrupt  
13 this election because they are so afraid of the election. But  
14 the violence will not win.

15           Chairman Warner: Thank you very much, Senator.

16           General Casey: I am sorry, Senator; if I could add to  
17 that.

18           Chairman Warner: Yes, General Casey, you may reply.

19           General Casey: Senator, I just respond to that last  
20 question about Tet. I believe we have greatly reduced the  
21 potential or the capability for that to happen.

22           As I have listened here this afternoon there seems to be  
23 some perception that the attacks have increased. Well, they  
24 have from the low levels they sank to after the elections, but  
25 last August the attacks were 800. Last November -- I am sorry:

1 per week -- they were over 900. In the elections, over 800. We  
2 are talking for the last 7 weeks they have been relatively  
3 constant at about between 450 and 500. So we are less than  
4 half, almost half of where we were when it was really hard.

5 So we have brought down that capability, and that is why  
6 the absence of a safe haven becomes so important.

7 Senator Graham: I would like to correct the perception  
8 that some people may have. I did not disagree with what Senator  
9 Clinton said. I am all for us working together, and there are  
10 no bad Americans here. Whether you are liberal, moderate, or  
11 conservative, you are not the enemy. The enemy is the people  
12 trying to kill us.

13 Chairman Warner: Thank you very much.

14 Senator Bayh.

15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

1                   STATEMENT OF HON. EVAN BAYH, U.S. SENATOR FROM  
2     INDIANA

3           Senator Bayh: Gentlemen, I would like to thank all of you  
4     for your service to our country.

5           General Myers, I would like to start with you if I could.  
6     In February, in speaking about the history of insurgencies, you  
7     indicated that they tended to run from 7 to 10 12 years in  
8     length. I would like to ask you about that. If we say that  
9     this one has been going on for about 2 years now, does that mean  
10    we are looking at by historical standards another 5 to 10 years  
11    of this insurgency?

12          General Myers: I think the answer is that we do not know.  
13    One of the things we have not done very well in the hearing so  
14    far is when we talk about the insurgency, describe for a minute  
15    its constituent parts, because it is not homogeneous. You have  
16    got the foreign fighters who, despite what happens politically  
17    in Iraq, will continue to try to do the coalition in, Iraqis in,  
18    and so forth. They will only be persuaded to quit in a  
19    political sense when the Iraqi people say enough is enough and  
20    we are not going to --

21          Senator Bayh: I guess another reason or another way to  
22    ask my question is, knowing what you know about this particular  
23    insurgency, do you have reason to believe that it would take  
24    less time than the average that you cited, the same, or perhaps  
25    more?



1           General Myers: Well, I do not know. I do not know the  
2     answer to that question. I do think that, with the political  
3     progress we have talked about, that the insurgency will crest  
4     and will start to reduce. A lot of these fighters are fighting  
5     because there are foreign forces in the country. Some of them  
6     are fighting because they want to be the next Saddam Hussein  
7     regime. Those will go away. So I think it will lessen over  
8     time. How long it goes on, I do not know. Certainly not at  
9     this scale for 7 to 9 years. That is not anything that I have  
10    in my mind.

11           Senator Bayh: Thank you, General.

12           Mr. Secretary, that leads me to you and a very difficult  
13    question of how do we define success. I think I would associate  
14    myself with the comments of Senator Graham and my other  
15    colleagues that the key here is the American people, our  
16    endurance. I think what they are looking for is two things:  
17    how do we define success; and secondly, some benchmarks for  
18    evaluating our progress toward reaching that goal.

19           What concerns me is -- and I would like to ask you about  
20    both of those things. What concerns me is that this may be an  
21    asymmetric situation, where even though the political process  
22    moves forward, even though the Shia, the Kurds get their act  
23    together, they include some of the responsible Sunnis in this  
24    process, if you have just got a hard-core -- pick a figure -- 5  
25    percent, 4 percent, armed and violent people, are they able to

1     undermine the wishes and the progress of the vast bulk of a  
2     society?

3             So in an insurgency that may go on in some form for a  
4     considerable period of time, when do we determine the country is  
5     stable enough, no longer a threat to its neighbors, not a haven  
6     for terrorists from which to threaten the rest of the world? We  
7     may conclude that the success is something less than perfect.

8             So my first question is, how do we define success? And  
9     then my second question would be, what benchmarks do we look to?

10            General Casey, this may involve you in terms of you mentioned  
11     that there was a surge leading up to the elections, now we are  
12     at about 450 attacks a month. A year from now, what benchmark  
13     can we set? Should it be 350 attacks, 250 attacks? Are there  
14     other, economic benchmarks we should set, numbers of jobs  
15     created, that kind of thing?

16            What objective criteria can we look to to evaluate our  
17     progress toward what we define as success?

18            So, Mr. Secretary, first you on how we define success.  
19     And then you and perhaps the other gentlemen in terms of the  
20     objective benchmarks we should look to to evaluate our own  
21     performance.

22            Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator, I do not know if you were  
23     here when General Casey made a comment estimating the size of  
24     the insurgency, but it is nowhere near 4 or 5 percent of the  
25     population.

1 Senator Bayh: No, I was just using that as an example.

2 Some small number of people and whether -- it is an asymmetric  
3 situation. Half a percent, whatever the figure might be, if  
4 heavily armed --

5 Secretary Rumsfeld: What did you use, George?

6 General Casey: One-tenth of one percent.

7 Secretary Rumsfeld: I will answer. A handful of people  
8 can -- it does not take a genius to kill people. It was 18  
9 people who killed 3,000 people on September 11th. You do not  
10 have to have armies and navies and air forces or large numbers.  
11 A small number of people, determined to give up their own lives,  
12 can go around and indiscriminately kill thousands and thousands  
13 and thousands of human beings.

14 Now, how do you define success? I think I would separate  
15 it between success for the United States and success for Iraq  
16 slightly. In the last analysis, if this does go on for 4, 8,  
17 10, 12, 15 years, whatever -- and I agree with General Myers; we  
18 do not know -- it is going to be a problem for the people of  
19 Iraq. They are going to have to cope with that insurgency over  
20 time. They are ultimately going to be the ones who win over  
21 that insurgency, and I believe they will win.

22 Now, for the United States success is slightly different.  
23 Success for us is liberating those people, which is done,  
24 passing sovereignty to an Iraqi government, which is done,  
25 putting them on a path to fashion a constitution, which is under



1 way, and a path to elect a new government under that new  
2 constitution, helping them get support from the international  
3 community, which they now have from NATO and the United Nations,  
4 helping them raise money from the international community to  
5 help train and equip and organize their security forces so the  
6 security forces can take over the responsibility for the  
7 security of that country.

8 It is not our task to stay there forever. It is not our  
9 task to -- the success will be if you have a single country, a  
10 moderate regime that is respectful of the various elements  
11 within it, even if there is a low-level insurgency that  
12 continues at 300 or 500 or whatever the number may be, but that  
13 they have the people who can cope with that, and that they are  
14 not attacking their neighbors and they are not using chemical  
15 weapons on their own people and they are not giving \$25,000 to  
16 suicide bombers' families after they go out and kill innocent  
17 men, women, and children, as Saddam Hussein was.

18 Senator Bayh: Which leads to the question of the  
19 benchmarks and how we can determine that point at which our job  
20 is done even if the low-level insurgency may continue for some  
21 time. So do you, Mr. Secretary, gentlemen, do you have --

22 Secretary Rumsfeld: We have got dozens of benchmarks in  
23 the security side for our forces and our successes. We have got  
24 dozens of benchmarks that we use for the Iraqi security forces.  
25 The State Department has dozens of benchmarks they look at with

1    respect to electricity and water and schools and those types of  
2    things and the economic things. So you have got political,  
3    economic, and security and they all have to go forward together.  
4    And the benchmarks are there and we would be happy to brief you  
5    on them.

6            General Myers: If I may, let me just go into a little bit  
7    more detail on those benchmarks. In the national security  
8    strategy for Iraq there are now seven strategic objectives. We  
9    just added one. The last one we added was promote strategic  
10   communications.

11           The first one is transition to security self-reliance,  
12   Iraqi self-reliance. So that is one of them, and that is the  
13   objective. Under the objective then we have some objectives and  
14   goals and metrics to measure our progress, just exactly what the  
15   Secretary said.

16           The second one, strategic objective, is a free and  
17   democratic state of Iraq. That has a lot to do with their  
18   political development. And we have objectives and goals and  
19   metrics under that one as well.

20           The third one is provide essential services to the  
21   citizens of Iraq, and we have metrics under that.

22           The fourth one is establish foundation for a strong  
23   economy, and you hit on that. One of the things we track is job  
24   creation. That is one of the things that would be one of the  
25   benchmarks you would want to track.

1           Senator Bayh: General, will we be publishing our progress  
2 toward meeting these benchmarks at regular intervals, so that  
3 the American people can know about our progress?

4           General Myers: I think we would be happy to brief people  
5 on it, sir, yes.

6           The fifth one is promote the rule of law, because that is  
7 so essential to dealing with the situation they have there. The  
8 sixth one is international engagement and assistance, so we  
9 track the international community and how they support a free  
10 and democratic Iraq.

11           So we have done a lot of work in the strategic planning.  
12 It is not just the DOD. This is a U.S. Government. The  
13 objectives came out of the Department of State, as a matter of  
14 fact. But it is an inter-agency effort to develop metrics to  
15 track these objectives and we do that.

16           Chairman Warner: Thank you very much, General.

17           Senator Collins.  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25



1 STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN M. COLLINS, U.S. SENATOR  
2 FROM MAINE

3 Senator Collins: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 General Abizaid, you have a great deal of understanding  
5 and knowledge of the Iraqi people and their leaders. For that  
6 reason I want to pursue with you the very intriguing proposal  
7 that Senator Levin advanced in his opening statement. That is  
8 that we need to find a way to put more political pressure on the  
9 Iraqis to make more progress toward a political solution, and he  
10 has suggested that we do that by, if deadlines are not met,  
11 saying that we would reevaluate all of our options.

12 I share Senator Levin's concern that we need to change the  
13 dynamic in Iraq. It worries me greatly when I read the briefing  
14 that Lieutenant General Vines gave, in which he says that,  
15 quote: "Attacks against the civilian populace in May were the  
16 highest total since major combat operations terminated in 2003."

17 I am convinced that a political solution is the key to ending  
18 support for the insurgency.

19 How do we send a message to the Iraqi leaders that they  
20 must make more rapid, sustained progress toward the kind of  
21 political settlement that is needed to end public support, to  
22 the extent that it exists, for the insurgency? Do you think it  
23 would be useful to send the kind of message that Senator Levin  
24 has suggested?

25 I am not talking about a timetable for a withdrawal, which

1 is oppose, but creating some idea that there would be  
2 consequences if progress is not made.

3 General Abizaid: Senator Collins, actually the person  
4 that knows the Iraqis the best in this room is the guy that  
5 meets with their leadership every day, and that is George Casey,  
6 sitting down there at the end. I defer to him.

7 But I will answer the question to say I think it is our  
8 duty to tell them what we think, to demand in a way that  
9 partners demand of one another proof of principle that they are  
10 serious about what they are doing, that they are serious about  
11 moving forward in a society that includes all Iraqis, serious in  
12 moving forward in a society where they protect human rights. We  
13 have to ask them of it. It is not too much.

14 Senator Collins: General Casey, are we sending that  
15 message very clearly?

16 General Casey: Loud and clear, Senator. The charge and I  
17 meet with the prime minister regularly. He fully understands  
18 that they need to move out with the constitutional development  
19 process. The chairman of the transitional national assembly  
20 fully understands. The director of the constitutional drafting  
21 committee fully understands. That message gets sent loud and  
22 clear, Senator.

23 Senator Collins: General Myers, you and I have talked  
24 many times about the strain that we are placing on our guard and  
25 reserve, and I have to tell you that I think this is getting

1 worse, not better, and that we are simply asking too much of the  
2 guard in particular through multiple, repeated, and lengthy  
3 deployments.

4 I want to give you an example. A constituent of mine who  
5 is a helicopter mechanic, and she is an Army National Guard  
6 staff sergeant, her name is Jessica Wing. She left Bangor,  
7 Maine, last Friday morning for what will be her fourth  
8 deployment overseas in 10 years -- four deployments in 10 years.  
9 She has been deployed to Haiti, to Bosnia twice, and soon she  
10 will be in either Iraq or Kuwait.

11 Now, I understand that the Department's policy mandates  
12 that guard and reserve members must not be deployed for more  
13 than 24 cumulative months unless they volunteer. But the key  
14 here is the word "cumulative." I also know there is the one in  
15 five rule, stipulating that only one 24-month cumulative  
16 deployment can take place within the 5-year period. But even if  
17 the deployments are not for 24 months, it still imposes a  
18 tremendous hardship for a guard member to be deployed overseas  
19 four times in 10 years.

20 What specifically is being done to alleviate repeated  
21 deployments of those, like this staff sergeant, who have  
22 specialty skills in areas that have unusually high demand? In  
23 her case she is a helicopter mechanic and I can see why you  
24 would need helicopter mechanics.

25 I have to tell you, from my personal conversations with



1 guard and reserve members in Maine, we are already seeing the  
2 impact on recruitment and I think we are going to start seeing  
3 it on retention as well.

4 General Myers: Senator Collins, we are all concerned  
5 about that. The health of our reserve component is very  
6 important to the national security of this country. There are  
7 lots of efforts going on. A couple of the major ones -- and I  
8 think we have discussed these in previous hearings perhaps, but  
9 we came out of the Cold War and into this century with a reserve  
10 force that was pretty much set up for the Cold War, the thought  
11 being that you pressed a button -- you are in World War III, you  
12 push the button, the reserves have about 9 months to train and  
13 then they follow forces to defend the North German Plain against  
14 the Warsaw Pact.

15 We find ourselves in this security environment with a much  
16 different threat and a much different need. Even before this  
17 threat, we recognized the need to kind of, to transform our  
18 reserve component. So we are rebalancing over 100,000, I think  
19 it is 115 or 125,000, reservists so we have more of what we  
20 need.

21 Examples are: We clearly have in our reserve components  
22 -- I am talking Army now -- more artillery capability than we  
23 need, less MP's, less intelligence companies, less  
24 transportation companies. So the Army is about, while we are at  
25 war, transforming their reserve components to be configured more

1 appropriately with the needs of today. That will take time.

2 In the meantime, helicopter mechanics are at a premium  
3 because a lot of our capability, by conscious decision back in  
4 the 80s, 70s and 80s, was put in the reserve component. So when  
5 you want to -- when the Nation is at war, that is where you go.

6 Now, we have also tried very hard for the last, well,  
7 since 9-11 -- and we have done this imperfectly at the  
8 beginning; I think we are still not perfect, but we are pretty  
9 darn good at trying to provide predictability to people like the  
10 mechanic you talked about in Maine, because you are right, they  
11 make, reservists make big sacrifices, not only like the rest of  
12 the active duty, but they have employers to worry about and  
13 other situations. So it is more difficult.

14 I cannot talk about her four deployments and how long each  
15 one was and so forth. My guess is some of them were probably  
16 not all that long. The cumulative issue, we do not argue with  
17 the cumulative. We know what the law is, but the policy is, the  
18 Secretary's policy is, we mobilize you one time and you may not  
19 reach your 25 cumulative months, but we are not going to  
20 remobilize you just because you have 6 months or a year left.  
21 We are not going to do that. We have a policy of no  
22 remobilizations of the guard and reserve unless they are  
23 volunteers. And I do not know the status of this young lady, if  
24 she is a volunteer or not. She might very well be a volunteer.  
25 You probably know. I do not. I do not happen to know.

1           So I think as we go forward we need to restructure the  
2   guard and reserve so we do not have shortfalls and have to rely  
3   on a lot of in lieu of training, which means we pick units that  
4   are not particularly trained for a certain skill, MPs for  
5   instance. We will take an infantry unit or we will take an  
6   artillery unit and we will train them in military police skills.  
7   That takes more mobilization time to do that.

8           We have got to reconfigure our guard and reserve. We are  
9   doing that. And I think we are providing very good  
10   predictability. The guard and reserve know they are only going  
11   to be called up one time for this conflict. That is our policy  
12   right now.

13          Chairman Warner: Thank you, General.

14          Senator, it is such an important question. Would you try  
15   and provide for the record the questions raised by the General?

16          Senator Collins: I would be happy to.

17          [The information referred to follows:]

18                       [COMMITTEE INSERT]

19

20

21

22

23

24

25



1 Chairman Warner: Senator Lieberman.  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25

1 STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, U.S. SENATOR  
2 FROM CONNECTICUT

3 Senator Lieberman: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank the  
4 witnesses very much.

5 I want to begin in an unusual place. By total  
6 coincidence, in going through the annual reading of the Bible  
7 that I do, this morning the page turned to a story from the Book  
8 of Numbers where the children of Israel, having been liberated  
9 from slavery in Egypt, having experienced the miracle at the Red  
10 Sea, having been brought to Mount Sinai to receive the Ten  
11 Commandments, are now getting closer to the Promised Land.

12 The people essentially ask Moses to send some  
13 representatives to scout out the Promised Land. As well  
14 remembered, most of them come back with what turns out to be an  
15 unreliably negative report, that there are giants there and that  
16 this is an impossible situation, except for Joshua and Caleb,  
17 who argue: Remember our history, remember what we have just  
18 experienced, remember the promise we have, the purpose we have,  
19 one might even say the destiny we have..

20 The people, unfortunately, listen to the naysayers,  
21 actually ask if they might be returned to Egypt. The lord is  
22 not happy with this response and the rest, unfortunately, is  
23 history, which is they wander for 40 years before they enter the  
24 Promised Land.

25 Now, I am not comparing the situation in Iraq today to

1 that story from the Bible. But as always, I think the Bible is  
2 instructive and offers us some lessons here, and particularly  
3 because we are at a moment, as Senator Graham described, where I  
4 fear that American public opinion is tipping away from this  
5 effort. We have got to, as Joshua and Caleb did, remind them of  
6 the history and of our own national purpose and destiny, that in  
7 fact because of the bravery and brilliance of the American  
8 military the people of Iraq were liberated from a brutal  
9 dictator and a real enemy of ours, a ticking time bomb to us, I  
10 believe; that the Iraqi people came out and voted in great  
11 numbers; that they have formed a government; that they are  
12 working on a constitution; and that they face a brutal enemy,  
13 but one that will never, never defeat the American military on  
14 the field of battle.

15 They will only defeat us, as one of you said earlier, on  
16 the field of American public opinion. We cannot let that  
17 happen. The consequences for our security would be disastrous.

18 I happen to believe, following the State Department, that  
19 Saddam Hussein was a supporter of terrorism. That is what the  
20 State Department said before the war. But many did not believe  
21 that. But today there is no doubt about it, this is the central  
22 battlefield in the global war on the terrorists who attacked us  
23 on 9-11. They are streaming in there. And if we hesitate, if  
24 we do not draw together, if we do not understand how much we and  
25 the Iraqi people have accomplished and that we have a purpose



1 here that is related to our national destiny, the future for our  
2 children and grandchildren is going to be a lot less safe than  
3 we all want it to be.

4 And I believe that is an opinion that is shared broadly in  
5 this Congress. There may be differences of opinion about  
6 tactics, but we have got to draw together to make that case to  
7 the American people, because today most of what they know about  
8 the war is the stories they see every evening about the suicide  
9 bombers. They do not know about the progress on the ground.  
10 They do not know about the political progress, etcetera,  
11 etcetera.

12 So I want to ask, toward a strategy of victory, this  
13 question, Mr. Secretary. We have been over this ground before  
14 and all of us I think have to be honest with each other and with  
15 the American people. I continue to be worried about whether at  
16 this moment we have enough troops in Iraq. I read the stories  
17 in the paper of field commanders saying they take a city but  
18 they do not have enough people to leave, either our own  
19 coalition forces or the Iraqi security forces, to secure it, and  
20 then the insurgents, the terrorists, come back.

21 When I was last in Iraq -- and I have been there three  
22 times in the last year -- so proud of our military, great morale  
23 there. I asked about the stream of insurgents and foreign  
24 fighters coming across the Syrian border, why do we not stop it?  
25 Do not have enough personnel to do it.

1 I want to ask you two questions about that. One, at this  
2 moment -- forget the past; we are talking about now and in the  
3 future -- until the Iraqi security forces are fully where we  
4 want them to be, do we not need -- let me ask it in a more open  
5 way: Do we need more troops?

6 Then I would ask a second way at this. If we had a larger  
7 active duty Army and Marine Corps, would we have more troops  
8 there on the ground? I know you understand the difference  
9 between those two forms of that question.

10 Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator Lieberman, I must say I find  
11 myself in agreement with almost every word that came out of your  
12 mouth and I respect the thoughtfulness of it. I guess the only  
13 thing I would say is, you say you sense the American people are  
14 tipping away from support. I have a feeling they are getting  
15 pushed myself.

16 But it has always been so. George Washington was pounded  
17 and pounded and pounded and almost fired. Abraham Lincoln was  
18 pounded and pounded. It was not popular. There were deep  
19 divisions, deep disagreements, and our country survived them  
20 all.

21 My goodness, in the first part of World War II we lost  
22 battle after battle after battle and people said: Oh my  
23 goodness, is it not terrible; we are going to lose. In the Cold  
24 War, people wanted to toss in the towel in the Cold War. We  
25 have always survived these things. We can do that.

1       The American people are solid, and I do not mean solid in  
2       support of the war. They are solid human beings, and if we tell  
3       them the truth and provide the right kind of leadership, by  
4       golly, they will support a worthy, noble goal. And when it is  
5       done they are going to be able to look back with a great deal of  
6       pride on what has been accomplished, just as the men and women  
7       in uniform.

8       Now, we cannot seal our own borders. It does not surprise  
9       me a bit that you can say some commander in Iraq says we do not  
10      have enough troops to seal the border. But my goodness, think  
11      of the -- that is the plus side. You might seal the border if  
12      you had a solid people along there and all kinds of military  
13      equipment. You would have to have force protection for it, and  
14      you would become a world-class occupying power. You would  
15      immediately assume all the burden of the intrusiveness of  
16      hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of thousands of troops trying  
17      to seal that border.

18      Now, I am not the one to answer your question. The people  
19      at this table are the ones who give military advice as to how  
20      many troops we ought to have in that country. I am the one who  
21      catches the dickens from everyone who says we should have more  
22      or we should have fewer. But the number we have is the number  
23      they have asked for. The number they have is the number I have  
24      agreed with. The number they have is the number I have  
25      recommended to the President, and I happen to believe they are



1 right. I am convinced they are right.

2 There is a tension between too many and too much  
3 intrusiveness and too much of an occupation and alienation of  
4 the population and too few. I think we are about right. And I  
5 would like to hear their answers.

6 Senator Lieberman: So would I. Thank you.

7 General Abizaid: Senator Lieberman, I will certainly  
8 comment about the force levels within the Central Command area  
9 of operations. It sometimes is not readily apparent, but less  
10 is not -- having more troops in the region is not necessarily  
11 the answer to all of our problems out there.

12 First of all, we have got to recognize that we are the  
13 shield behind which politics has got to take place, economic  
14 development has got to take place, diplomacy has got to take  
15 place, etcetera. Too much of a footprint in the region creates  
16 more resistance than I think people generally appreciated. It  
17 is very important that we work the art of this, which is to have  
18 the right number that allows the development of local security  
19 forces to be successful.

20 This is really an insurgency that Iraqis and Afghans will  
21 have to win. This is really a part of the world where the  
22 people of the region will have to show that they want a better  
23 future and they are willing to fight for themselves. We can  
24 help them. We can help them shape that future. But to do it  
25 with too many troops I think creates a burden and a direction

1 that is not necessarily one that will be successful.

2 Senator Lieberman: If I may just shape the question to  
3 General Myers and General Casey: I hear you and my question is  
4 now in this next period of months, very important because of the  
5 constitution-writing, the referendum, the election, when there  
6 is going to be an incentive on the terrorists to escalate, do we  
7 have enough troops there? Are the Iraqi security forces  
8 adequately prepared to take on the responsibility themselves?

9 General Casey: Senator, we do today. As I mentioned, we  
10 are constantly reading the enemy, adjusting, adopting, looking  
11 for ways to affect him. What I have said since my confirmation  
12 hearing before you: If I assess that I need more troops, I will  
13 ask for them. Before the last election, we did our assessment,  
14 saw that we needed more troops, and we asked for them and we got  
15 them, and they made a huge difference in the election.

16 Now, we are certainly looking ahead to October. It is 4  
17 months out. We are looking at that very carefully. You have  
18 the Iraqi security forces who are developing and, as I  
19 mentioned, we have increased our focus on their development with  
20 our transition teams and with partnership relationships between  
21 our units and theirs. So they are getting better faster.

22 We are in the process right now of doing what I mentioned  
23 to you. We are reading the situation and we will make our  
24 assessments, and if we decide we need more, Senator, we will ask  
25 for them.

1 Senator Lieberman: I appreciate that.

2 Thank you.

3 Chairman Warner: Thank you.

4 Senator Ensign.

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25



1 STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN ENSIGN, SERVICE NEVADA

2 Senator Ensign: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

3 I want to address -- obviously we all agree that getting  
4 America and American troops out of there as quickly as possible  
5 is in all of our interests. I am one of those who believe that  
6 our presence there, our very presence there inspires more  
7 insurgents. But frankly, it is obviously way too early to get  
8 us out.

9 I think the Iraqi people, the Iraqi government, they  
10 really appreciate the fact that we are there, that we are  
11 sacrificing, that we are losing some of our troops and others  
12 being wounded, and they appreciate that. But they would like to  
13 see us out as early as possible, but, as has been said, not too  
14 early.

15 To address that, and you all have shared before this  
16 committee many times, the key to doing that is to get the Iraqis  
17 up and trained as quickly as possible. I was just in a meeting  
18 with the Senate leadership and the prime minister of Iraq just  
19 about an hour and a half ago. The whole issue of training came  
20 up and there were several questions addressed with the prime  
21 minister on training.

22 Historically, if you look at what America has done with  
23 Latin America, we have brought a lot of their folks up here and  
24 we have trained them here. It has been something that has been  
25 very effective, not only for the training itself but also

1 post-training and when they are in government we have then a lot  
2 of people who actually think pretty positively about America and  
3 some of the values that we have up here.

4 The question is -- and we posed this to the Iraqi prime  
5 minister. France I guess has offered, although the Iraqi prime  
6 minister does not think that they have been clear on exactly  
7 what they have offered. Some of the other countries have  
8 offered to train in their country. We are doing, obviously, a  
9 huge amount of training. We are trying to get it up as quickly  
10 as possible.

11 But the question remains, how do we get more countries to  
12 step to the table to help us with the training and how do we get  
13 the Iraqis then to accept, if those countries want to do it, do  
14 the training in their country, which with our experience with  
15 Latin America it seems to have had a positive effect, how do we  
16 get the Iraqis I guess to go along with that? Anybody who wants  
17 to answer that I would be more than pleased to hear from.

18 Secretary Rumsfeld: We are already training Iraqis  
19 outside of the country. They are being trained in several  
20 countries for different purposes, and certainly they can be  
21 trained in country, they can be trained out of country. It is  
22 something that is already happening.

23 Senator Ensign: I realize that, but the question -- even  
24 the prime minister answered this morning on, for instance, the  
25 French. The French have supposedly offered to train 1700,

1 taking some of the Baathists who, when we de-Baathified there,  
2 trying to take some of those folks who we have cleared through  
3 and get that officer corps up and trained. That was something  
4 that was addressed with the prime minister and he did not seem  
5 to think that necessarily that the French had made clear exactly  
6 what they have offered. Some of the Senators who were there  
7 thought that the French had made it clear what they had offered  
8 to train on their soil, but the Iraqis were resistant to  
9 bringing them to France to train.

10 General Casey: I am not aware of that, but I will  
11 certainly look into it when I get back.

12 Secretary Rumsfeld: It just came up very recently and I  
13 am sure the Iraqis are sorting it out with the French.

14 Senator Ensign: Let me go down a different line of  
15 questioning, then. I believe, and it has been said today, the  
16 critical piece of this is that the American people -- there is  
17 no question that the American military is the best fighting  
18 military in the history of the world and these insurgents cannot  
19 on a military level defeat us. The only way that they can win  
20 is back here, back home, defeating us politically if we lose the  
21 support of the American people and if the leaders do not stand  
22 up and show the kind of leadership that leaders in the past in  
23 America have shown.

24 General Abizaid, I would like to ask you -- and this may  
25 not be -- with what has happened in these last 2 weeks, this



1 puts you in a tough position, but you are a big boy and you have  
2 been in tough positions before. This is a very political  
3 institution here and I want to ask you a tough political  
4 question, because I think we have responsibilities as political  
5 leaders to be careful when we are at war in the words that we  
6 choose, how we say them and what we say.

7 Recently we have had some leaders here in the U.S. Senate  
8 and the House that have talked about and compared at Guantanamo  
9 Bay what some of our troops have been doing down there, compared  
10 them to the Nazis and others, and other terrible regimes around  
11 the world in the past. Does that damage what is going on to our  
12 war efforts? Does that encourage recruitment, funding for the  
13 terrorists, the morale? Does it hurt our morale of our troops?  
14 Does it help the morale of the other side?

15 I guess I would like to have some honest answers of your  
16 assessment of what some things that have been said up here, and  
17 I know we all know what we are talking about here.

18 General Abizaid: Well, Senator, I have been in a lot of  
19 tough positions, but I am certainly not going to comment on any  
20 specific political person who might have made a specific  
21 political comment.

22 But I will tell you something very important. I travel  
23 around the region a lot and as I was just coming out of  
24 Afghanistan, Iraq, Djibouti, and various places where I talked  
25 to our troops and the troops we are training in the Iraqi and

1 the Afghan security forces, I never sensed the level of their  
2 confidence higher. When I look back here at what I see is  
3 happening in Washington, within the Beltway, I have never seen  
4 the lack of confidence greater.

5 Now, I cannot answer that question. Maybe it is something  
6 we are not doing right in the field. But I can tell you that  
7 when my soldiers say to me and ask me the question whether or  
8 not they have got support from the American people or not, that  
9 worries me. And they are starting to do that. And when the  
10 people that we are training, Iraqis and Afghans, start asking me  
11 whether or not we have the staying power to stick with them,  
12 that worries me too.

13 So I would say we better have a frank discussion with  
14 ourselves. I am not against the debate. We that are fighting  
15 the war think it is a war worth fighting. We are making a huge  
16 difference. The people we are helping think that we are  
17 fighting a war that is worth fighting. We are making a huge  
18 difference. But we cannot win the war, American soldiers cannot  
19 win the war, without your support and without the support of our  
20 people.

21 We cannot ignore the problem. We need to move together to  
22 understand it and fight it together.

23 Senator Ensign: Well, Mr. Chairman, I realize my time is  
24 expired and I appreciate your indulgence. The point that I  
25 think that is important to make here is that all of us as

1 leaders, we have a responsibility in choosing our words very  
2 carefully at a time of war.

3 America is about free and open debate and we should never  
4 back away from that. However, we also, with that free and open  
5 debate, with freedom comes responsibility. We as leaders have a  
6 great responsibility, especially when it comes to the lives of  
7 the men and women who are in uniform who are in harm's way. If  
8 we are endangering those, if we are encouraging the enemy, we  
9 better be careful with the words that we choose.

10 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 Chairman Warner: Senator, that is a very important  
12 question that you have asked and I commend General Abizaid for  
13 your very candid and forthright reply.

14 Senator Byrd.  
15  
16  
17  
18

19 STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT C. BYRD, U.S. SENATOR FROM  
20 WEST VIRGINIA

21 Senator Byrd: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for  
22 this hearing, and I thank our friend here for what he has said,  
23 your ranking member.

24 I think I am sitting in a chair that puts me way down  
25 where I ought to be.



1 But I have been listening to what has been said here, and  
2 there has been a good bit of speechifying on both sides. I  
3 regret that it seems to be a situation in which the witnesses  
4 have all the time they want to talk, but not the Senators, not  
5 the Senators.

6 Mr. Secretary, I watched you with a considerable amount of  
7 amusement. We have to be careful what we say, that is what  
8 everybody is saying, so I am going to try to be careful in what  
9 I say.

10 I have been here a long time, longer than you have. But  
11 that does not make any difference. I have seen a lot of  
12 secretaries of defense that have come before this committee. I  
13 was on this committee years ago when Senator Richard, the late  
14 Senator Richard Russell, was the chairman. I do not think I  
15 have ever heard a secretary of defense who likes to lecture the  
16 committee as much as you do, as much as you appear to do. I  
17 hope I am not wrong in my judgment.

18 I say with all due respect to you, I think you have a very  
19 tough job and in many ways you have been a good Secretary of  
20 Defense.

21 Let me tell you, nobody knows more about the courage of  
22 our soldiers and marines and people, nobody knows more about  
23 that than we do. We know about that. Nobody questions the  
24 ability of our soldiers. They are the finest in the world. Of  
25 course they are. We all know that. Nobody criticizes that. I

1 hope that anything I say never, never leads the people out there  
2 who are risking their lives every day, risking their lives this  
3 very minute, I hope nothing I ever say reduces the respect for  
4 them or makes them feel that we do not respect them. We love  
5 them, our troops. Our troops, yes, they are out there every day  
6 giving their lives.

7 I think we all have to be careful what we say, we here and  
8 you too. There have been a lot of careless statements made by  
9 the administration, and you too, Mr. Secretary, I say most  
10 respectfully. And I make mistakes too. Who does not? But to  
11 come up here and lecture, lecture these people, you seem -- you  
12 are pretty feisty. I kind of like that in a way, but at the  
13 same time I remember that it is we the people that count. And  
14 we are up here, we try to represent the people. We have to run  
15 for election and re-election.

16 I cannot refute a sneer. Who can refute a sneer? Many  
17 times I think that that is what we get when you, Mr. Secretary,  
18 come up here. I cannot refute a sneer. I say that with great  
19 respect.

20 But let me tell you something. The people up here have to  
21 go before the people out there. You may not like our questions,  
22 but we represent the people. This Constitution [indicating],  
23 what is it about? We the people. Now, you may not like our  
24 questions, but we represent the people.

25 I have had my fill of the administration forgetting that

1 this is a constitutional system in which there are three  
2 separate but equal branches. Sometimes I think this  
3 administration forgets that the legislative branch is the first  
4 branch mentioned in this Constitution. We poor Senators, you  
5 can lecture us if you like, but we ask the questions that the  
6 people ask of us, whether you like it or not. And we are going  
7 to ask you.

8 The problem is we did not ask enough questions at the  
9 beginning of this war that we got into, Mr. Bush's war.

10 I know that my time is up, but I have been waiting a  
11 while. That is the problem here, we do not have time. And you  
12 folks have to go to another; I know you have got another  
13 engagement.

14 But we the people -- there are three separate branches,  
15 and about time the administration understands that we have not  
16 asked enough questions. The press did not ask enough questions.

17 The Senate did not ask enough questions when they voted wrongly  
18 to shift the power to declare war, as it were, to one person.  
19 That was wrong. I do not care whether he is a Republican or a  
20 Democrat.

21 But we represent the people of this country. We are  
22 elected. We have to ask questions whether you like it or not.  
23 And these people around here may phrase their questions any way  
24 they want and some of them may be loaded, they may be political.

25 I have heard a good bit of politics on both sides of this



1 question.

2 But when it is all said and done, the men and women out  
3 there who are dying and their people back home, their wives,  
4 their sisters, their fathers, their brothers, their husbands,  
5 their mothers, they are wondering, too.

6 We did not ask enough questions when we went into this  
7 war. The Senate did not ask enough questions and I am ashamed  
8 of my own great body here that it did not ask enough questions.  
9 It was said, well, you will appear to be unpatriotic if you ask  
10 questions.

11 So we are asking questions. The American people are  
12 asking questions. I may not like it, but they are asking  
13 questions. They are the people who are in there -- the American  
14 people have not been told the truth. You say I we tell them the  
15 truth, Mr. Secretary. That is the problem, the American people  
16 have not heard enough of the truth.

17 Forgive me to appear to be perhaps discourteous. I do not  
18 mean to be discourteous. I have just heard enough of your smart  
19 answers to these people here who were elected. We were elected.

20 You are not elected. We are elected. You have been elected.  
21 You know what it is to have to run for office, so you asked  
22 questions too when you were on this side of the table. We have  
23 got to ask questions. The people out there want us to ask  
24 questions.

25 So get off your high horse when you come up here. I have

1 to run for reelection. You do not, I do. This is the  
2 Constitution and we represent the people who send us here. That  
3 is what we are supposed to do.

4 Now let me ask a question. We have been paying for the  
5 war in Iraq on a cash and carry basis from the very beginning.  
6 I have asked these questions before. I do not necessarily hold  
7 you to blame, but somebody, somebody ought to do better. We  
8 have been paying for the war in Iraq on a cash and carry basis  
9 from the very beginning. The administration has consistently  
10 refused to budget for the war in the annual budget -- you have  
11 heard me say this before -- in the annual budget process, opting  
12 instead to present a series of must-pay bills to the American  
13 people in the form of supplemental appropriation requests.

14 When are we going to see some truth in budgeting from the  
15 administration? The cost of the war in Iraq is not just a  
16 one-time pop-up expense. It has evolved into a long-term  
17 financial burden on the American people.

18 Now, Congress is considering proposals to add billions of  
19 dollars in bridge funding to this year's defense authorization  
20 and appropriations bills. Simply put, Congress is being forced  
21 to take up the slack for the administration's refusal to budget  
22 for the war.

23 The American people have not been told the truth. You say  
24 if we tell the American people the truth. The American people  
25 have not been told the truth. I have asked this question from

1 the beginning: What is this war going to cost? Well, I kind of  
2 get a sneer back. What is it going to cost? It is costing, it  
3 is costing the American people in blood and it is costing them  
4 in their treasure.

5 Is this any way to budget for a war? Why will not the  
6 administration send to Congress a detailed budget estimate for  
7 Iraq for fiscal year 2006? That is a good question, Mr.  
8 Chairman. It is a rhetorical question, but we have to face it  
9 here. We do not get a budget from the administration. We just  
10 get supplementals: These are bills we have to pay. The  
11 American people do not really see and understand what we are  
12 paying for this war.

13 Now, if you wish to attempt to --

14 Chairman Warner: Could the witness respond to your  
15 question, Senator?

16 Senator Byrd: Yes, but I a going to have my say, too.

17 If you wish to respond to this, Senator, in your usual  
18 fashion, go ahead. But I am asking questions that the people  
19 back home ask me. All I have said, I hope I have said it with  
20 considerable respect. I respect you. You have a hard job. I  
21 know that. But we have a job, too. We have to ask questions.

22 So what is your answer to that question, if you care to?

23 Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator Byrd, my recollection is  
24 that we did try to budget in advance for the Afghan War and the  
25 Congress refused to allow us to do it and said that the



1 information was too tentative and preliminary because you cannot  
2 know what is going to happen in the future in a war, and they  
3 preferred that we do it in supplemental. It is a matter that  
4 was worked out between the Office of Management and Budget and  
5 the Congress. It is not something that any Department has a  
6 voice in.

7 Senator Byrd: That was at the beginning. That was a long  
8 time ago.

9 Secretary Rumsfeld: Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

10 My understanding is that wars have historically been  
11 budgeted through supplementals.

12 Senator Byrd: That is not exactly the truth.

13 Secretary Rumsfeld: In any event, the American people do  
14 get told the truth. When they are presented with -- Congress is  
15 presented with a budget, and then it is simultaneously  
16 frequently presented with a supplemental and all the information  
17 is there. It is just not integrated into the budget. But it is  
18 not as though that there is something that is not known to the  
19 Congress, because the Congress has the responsibility of  
20 appropriating the funds, as you know better than any.

21 Senator Byrd: Is that your answer?

22 Secretary Rumsfeld: That is my answer, yes, sir.

23 Chairman Warner: I thank you, Senator Byrd. I have to  
24 move on. I have got three other colleagues.

25 Senator Byrd: Mr. Chairman, I thank you. You are a great

1 chairman and I respect you. I know what you are up against. It  
2 is not your fault. Thank you very much.

3 And thank you, thank you. I thank all of you for what you  
4 are doing every day for our country. I respect that. I respect  
5 that uniform that you wear, every one of you. But you too have  
6 to understand that we are the elected representatives of the  
7 people. We have to ask questions and they do not have to be  
8 softball questions.

9 Thank you very much for what you do. Have a little  
10 respect for what we try to do.

11 Chairman Warner: Thank you.

12 Senator Talent.

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1 STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. TALENT, U.S. SENATOR  
2 FROM MISSOURI

3 Senator Talent: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4 Let me just give you my evaluation of what you have been  
5 telling us and then ask a couple of questions --

6 Chairman Warner: Would you allow me an interruption?

7 Senator Talent: Sure.

8 Chairman Warner: The Secretary and the full panel has to  
9 appear before the House of Representatives. So I will recognize  
10 each of the remaining Senators here, then we will have to draw  
11 this hearing to a close.

12 Senator Talent: All right, then maybe I --

13 Chairman Warner: No, please go ahead.

14 Senator Talent: -- better skip my evaluation and just ask  
15 the questions.

16 Chairman Warner: Just in terms of others who would like  
17 to follow.

18 Senator Talent: It seems to me that, in the areas of  
19 economic reconstruction, political activity, and the formation  
20 of a government and political institutions, we are making  
21 progress. I think it is a significant thing that there has been  
22 no ethnic or religious civil war as such there. I mean, that  
23 was always the worst case scenario in my mind. I think maybe we  
24 have Ayatollah Sistani and some other people to thank for that.

25 There has been no attack here, and I think we have to take



1 the cost of the war, a couple hundred billion dollars -- what is  
2 that, one to two percent of the GDP in the last couple of years.

3 I do believe there is a connection between that and the fact  
4 that we have not been attacked here. It is harder for them to  
5 attack us when we are on the offense, and that is a big plus.

6 I also think it is an enormously important strategic  
7 objective for us to gain. All that I think may be on the side  
8 of progress and, if not good news, progress toward accomplishing  
9 the objective. On the con side, if you will, or the negative  
10 side, the IED problem is worse than we anticipated, and I do not  
11 know that we have figured out yet what to do about it.

12 It is striking to me that the training is harder than I  
13 think we maybe thought it was going to be. So let me ask you  
14 this with regard to the training, and I know -- one of my  
15 difficulties is a lot of what I want to ask about I think I have  
16 to ask about in closed session. Is it your sense that a  
17 substantial proportion of the Iraqis that we are training are  
18 willing to stand and fight in a combat situation? Maybe they  
19 are poorly led, maybe they do not have all the sophistication  
20 that our troops have got, but they have got the fire to fight?  
21 That is the first question.

22 If they do not and to the extent that they do not, what  
23 can we do about that? Because wars against terrorism are part  
24 combat, but they are also a lot questions of resolution between  
25 who has the resolve. They are struggles between peoples in that

1 sense.

2 The second is a broader issue. It does seem to me that  
3 this whole enterprise would be easier if we had a larger Army,  
4 simply for a larger rotational base. Mr. Secretary, I hope --  
5 and I liked your comment on this -- that as you do the QDR and  
6 we move forward that we consider this with regard to all the  
7 services, that we do not -- we try and predict with the QDR what  
8 the threats are going to be, but we do not know. I hope that we  
9 will err on the side of having too much rather than too little.

10 I said this all throughout the 1990s, when we went at the  
11 beginning of that decade from 12 divisions to 10. I suspect it  
12 would be, if we had those other two divisions and maybe if we  
13 had done some different apportionment between the reserve  
14 components and the active duty components, this would be a lot  
15 easier now just from a rotational perspective.

16 So first, is it your sense that they are willing to stand  
17 and fight, if you can answer that in an open session? To the  
18 extent that that is not true, what are we doing about that?  
19 What can we do about that?

20 Then, Mr. Secretary, if you would comment on whether the  
21 situation with the Army in Iraq has affected your thinking  
22 regarding the QDR?

23 General Casey: Do you want me to take the first one?  
24 Senator, I will take the first one there. As I mentioned in my  
25 opening statement, after some difficulties last spring the Iraqi

1 security forces are in the fight every day and we have not had a  
2 failure of the Iraqi security forces in the face of fairly  
3 determined opposition since the elections.

4 Again, as I said in my statement, they gained a lot of  
5 confidence in themselves in what they did during the elections.  
6 You have heard the stories about tackling suicide bombers and  
7 falling on top of them to protect the people. So that spirit  
8 has continued on through our training and development.

9 Senator Talent: When you say "have not had a failure,"  
10 you mean that they have not just turned and run or hunkered down  
11 and refused to confront the enemy?

12 General Casey: Just exactly the opposite. They have been  
13 attacked by car bombs, multiple car bombs. They have stood and  
14 they have fought.

15 I will tell you, our strategy to put small teams with them  
16 of coalition forces has also helped to stiffen their will and  
17 their resolve and their capacity.

18 Senator Talent: And that is true when they are  
19 encountering bands of insurgents in small arms attacks and  
20 ambushes and that?

21 General Casey: Everything we have seen so far.

22 Secretary Rumsfeld: Senator, you are quite right, the  
23 Quadrennial Defense Review is under way and one of the key  
24 questions is the size of particularly the ground forces.  
25 Simultaneously we have been doing a series of things that have



1 the effect of increasing the size of the armed forces, and  
2 particularly in the skill sets that are needed.

3 We have been using the -- for example, in the Navy we have  
4 been using sea swaps, where we change crews overseas, so we  
5 maintain a capability and use fewer people for longer times. We  
6 have thus far only used about 40 or 45 percent of the guard and  
7 reserve. The problem is that their skill sets are not properly  
8 balanced, so we have been shifting the balance in the guard,  
9 within the guard and reserve, and as between the active force  
10 and the guard and reserve.

11 Under the new national security personnel system, we are  
12 going to be able to do a much more effective job with our  
13 civilian force and we are going to be able to take a number of  
14 military people out of the jobs they are in, which are  
15 essentially jobs that can be done by civilians. So without  
16 increasing the overall size, we will have a larger number of  
17 uniformed personnel available for military functions.

18 In addition, we have increased the size of the Army. We  
19 are increasing it up by 30,000 troops beyond the increases that  
20 we are achieving through all of these other activities. But in  
21 the process, the QDR should come out with some visibility as to  
22 what might make sense for the period.

23 Senator Talent: I am just talking speaking -- and my time  
24 is up, Mr. Chairman. But I am speaking more in terms of an  
25 attitude as you size all this up. I know this is what I am

1 going to be thinking when we receive the QDR over here, that let  
2 us err on the side -- because if we are wrong, if we cut it too  
3 fine an area, we have to spend a whole lot more to try and deal  
4 with that than we would if we had sustained a somewhat larger  
5 force.

6 I know the force that when I came into Congress in 1993  
7 was recommended was 12 divisions, and I am wondering if we  
8 should not, to take care of all contingencies, just err on the  
9 side of having too much rather than too little. I hope you will  
10 consider that as you consider the QDR.

11 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

12 Secretary Rumsfeld: Thank you.

13 Chairman Warner:

14 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Mr. Talent.

15 Senator Chambliss.

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1                   STATEMENT OF HON. SAXBY CHAMBLISS, U.S. SENATOR FROM  
2     GEORGIA

3           Senator Chambliss: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and  
4     gentlemen. As always, thank you for your appearance here today  
5     and providing the information, but most of all thank you for the  
6     great leadership that you are providing. General Abizaid,  
7     General Casey, when you get back in theater just let your troops  
8     know that we greatly appreciate the great service that they are  
9     providing, not just to our country but for freedom around the  
10    world and the hopeful freedom of the Iraqi people.

11          General Myers, I was interested in your comment in your  
12    opening statement where you said troops understand what is at  
13    stake in Iraq. You are exactly right.

14          General Casey, you were kind enough to host a couple of us  
15    over there several months ago. We were there at Thanksgiving.  
16    When I had the opportunity to go out and look your troops in the  
17    eye, what we saw were very professional men and women who are  
18    committed to freedom, who understand why they are there, and who  
19    would a lot rather be at home, but they know they are there for  
20    the right reason and they are doing great work.

21          You have got a young captain over there who happens to be  
22    from my home town, a young man that I have known all his life.  
23    He is my first West Point graduate. I sent him an email. It  
24    has been about a month or so ago, I guess. He is with the 3rd  
25    I.D. He was in the original March to Baghdad. He is back over



1 now for his second tour.

2 He responded with an email. Mr. Chairman, I would like to  
3 quote a little bit of this email that I got back from this  
4 captain. He said: "Things have been progressing well here in  
5 our sector, although Baquba still seeks its fair share of  
6 violence every now and then. Most if not all attacks are  
7 conducted via car bombs, probably the most cowardly manner in  
8 which a terrorist can become a martyr. We think these car  
9 bombers are mostly foreign fighters." Again, just verifies --  
10 you folks have verified today that exact fact.

11 He talks about, General Abizaid, something called a  
12 q-a-d-a-h. Is that a "qadah"? I do not want to be  
13 mispronouncing that. Apparently it is the equivalent of a  
14 county in the United States. He says: "We have got over \$19  
15 million dedicated to the qadah assistance alone. We have built  
16 countless numbers of schools, roads, mosques, water treatment  
17 plants, switchboards, etcetera. We just recently finished up a  
18 project that will provide fresh drinking water to over 25,000  
19 people in three different villages for the first time in 35  
20 years.

21 "The local governments would be operating completely on  
22 their own if it were not for the lack of a budget. They are in  
23 the process, however, of compiling and submitting budget  
24 requests for fiscal year 2006 to Baghdad by no later than the  
25 end of July, so we are seeing great progress in that area."

1           He then talks about the economy over there and what is  
2   happening in the local community relative to an increase in  
3   economic activity, and he concludes that paragraph by saying:  
4   "Once the security situation is under control, I think we will  
5   see a huge capacity for private businesses investing in the  
6   local economy."

7           Secretary Rumsfeld, in agreeing with you, as I do,  
8   relative to what you say when you say getting pushed, I think  
9   that is exactly right. What this young man says is, he said:  
10   "Most people back home do not hear about all of these things and  
11   I wish the press would do more to cover them."

12          He then goes on to address an issue that a lot of us have  
13   asked questions about and a lot of the press have asked  
14   questions about for the whole time that we have been there. I  
15   did not ask him this in my email to him. He volunteered this.  
16   He says: "Additionally, our equipment is all to standard. We  
17   receive updated material and technology almost weekly and  
18   soldiers feel more than safe with their equipment. The biggest  
19   threat by far is still roadside bombs, followed by vehicle  
20   accidents. The armored Humvee is an excellent machine, however,  
21   and it does its job 99.99 percent of the time. Whenever we  
22   leave the gate, it is standard operating procedure to wear all  
23   protective equipment -- throat guard, shoulder guard, groin  
24   guard, arm guards, kevlar vest, helmet, ballistic eye  
25   protection, and earplugs. It is plenty heavy, but it saves

1 lives."

2 He concludes by saying that: "The bottom line is that we  
3 are making great progress, and we may be replaced by an Iraqi  
4 battalion instead of a U.S. unit. This is in line with reducing  
5 the footprint of coalition forces in Iraq."

6 I wanted to get that in the record just so that we can do  
7 -- we have a job to do here. Senator Byrd is right, we are  
8 required to ask tough questions, but by the same token when  
9 things are being done right over there I think we have an  
10 obligation to tell the American people it is going right.

11 Part of your responsibility in being here today is to  
12 answer those tough questions, but also get the message out that  
13 things are being done right. War is very difficult, it is  
14 nasty, and we are dealing with people who want to kill and harm  
15 Americans every day. That is their sole goal in life. But  
16 thanks to the folks that are operating under each of you every  
17 single day in Iraq today, in Afghanistan and other parts of the  
18 world, we are making progress with freedom. We are going to  
19 continue until we fight -- we are going to continue fighting  
20 until we win this war. And it is all because of the leadership  
21 of you gentlemen here, but it is also primarily because of the  
22 brave men and women that serve under you. So I just thank you  
23 for that.

24 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

25 Chairman Warner: Senator, I thank you for your statement



1 and I wish to associate myself with your observations.

2 Senator Dole.

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1                   STATEMENT OF HON. ELIZABETH DOLE, U.S. SENATOR FROM  
2   NORTH CAROLINA

3           Senator Dole: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

4           I want to thank each of you gentlemen for your tremendous  
5   leadership, for all that you are doing in service to our  
6   country. It is a privilege to have you here and to hear from  
7   you.

8           General Casey, you mentioned in your opening statement  
9   that the Iraqi people make progress every day. I have been  
10   heartened to learn of the Iraqi government television ad  
11   campaigns encouraging the Iraqis to report insurgents'  
12   movements. I have been interested in this very popular Iraqi  
13   television program, "Terrorism in the Hands of Justice," that  
14   profiles captured suspected insurgents and reports apparently  
15   there are hundreds of calls coming in through the insurgent tip  
16   line.

17           Could you comment on this growing trend of the Iraq people  
18   to speak out and not to tolerate insurgents in their midst? I  
19   would be interested in just hearing more of your thoughts on  
20   that.

21           General Casey: We have, Senator, seen quite a large  
22   increase in the willingness of Iraqis to come forward and  
23   provide information on the insurgents.

24           This television program that you mentioned, "Terrorists in  
25   the Hands of Justice," has become a national phenomenon. When

1 you talk to the Iraqis, when they see someone who tries to be  
2 looked at as something to be feared and they see that it is just  
3 a wimpy little man, they feel much stronger than that.

4 On the tips, you mentioned that. We have seen a huge  
5 increase in the tips on these hotlines. We had less than 50  
6 back in January. We are up over 1700 now.

7 I am not sure what this chart here says.

8 [Chart.]

9 General Myers: That is hotline tips and how they -- it is  
10 the number of hotline tips and how they have grown since  
11 January. They have really started to spike since April when the  
12 Iraqi government started to advertise that this service was  
13 available. In an insurgency, of course, intelligence is key and  
14 indigenous intelligence is even more of a key, and that is what  
15 that represents.

16 General Casey: So we have seen them up over 1700 when you  
17 add up the ones from all of the different division areas across  
18 the country.

19 The other thing I would say is people are walking in and  
20 pointing out weapons caches to us in large numbers. We have  
21 picked up over 1300 weapons caches just since the elections.  
22 These are people going out and saying: See that stick right  
23 there; dig underneath there. And there will be tons of  
24 ammunition underneath it.

25 So the Iraq people are taking a stake in the future and



1 are becoming more and more forthcoming.

2 Senator Dole: Thank you.

3 Now, in the past reconstruction projects have been spread  
4 throughout the country. Utilizing this approach can be  
5 difficult because security forces can be spread too thin. The  
6 Iraqi foreign minister is now advocating for a more  
7 geographically focused reconstruction effort in safer areas, as  
8 I understand, where there is less risk and security can be  
9 concentrated.

10 What about this? Secretary Rumsfeld, can you comment on  
11 that? And what do you recommend to better facilitate  
12 reconstruction efforts?

13 Secretary Rumsfeld: Well, as we indicated, Senator, all  
14 three pieces have to go forward together. The security has to  
15 go forward for the economic piece of it and the reconstruction  
16 to take hold, and the political has to go forward for each of  
17 them to take hold.

18 There has been a tension clearly over time of in some  
19 instances trying to put more reconstruction funds into areas  
20 that are the least friendly, on the idea that it will make them  
21 happier and their electricity will be better and their water  
22 will be better. The argument against that, obviously, is that  
23 you are rewarding bad behavior. So there are others who say put  
24 the reconstruction money first into places that are behaving  
25 properly and supporting the government and doing things that are

1 rational, and that is a perfectly legitimate position as well.

2 No matter where you put it, it makes no sense to do  
3 reconstruction funds if it is going to be destroyed immediately  
4 thereafter. As I say, it does not take a genius to blow up  
5 something and to damage something. It takes a genius to build  
6 something.

7 I am not familiar with what you said about the latest  
8 Iraqi government. Are you, George?

9 Senator Dole: The foreign minister.

10 General Casey: No, I am not familiar with that, either.  
11 But I agree with what the Secretary said. There are different  
12 ways of looking at this, but all of our commanders have some  
13 flexibility with the money that they have for economic projects  
14 and they use that to influence support for us rather than  
15 support for the insurgents.

16 General Abizaid: Senator, if I could add just one  
17 comment. It kind of gets back to the points that Senator Levin  
18 was making about asking our partners in Iraq to be accountable.  
19 We really must focus in on the rule of law in terms of justice,  
20 prisons, detainees, etcetera, etcetera. In the long run,  
21 corruption and criminality could be a greater threat to a free  
22 Iraq than terrorism, and it is vital that we focus on the rule  
23 of law.

24 Senator Dole: Thank you.

25 The Center for Army Lessons Learned released a report, it

1 was April, I believe, of 2004. They emphasized: "A missed  
2 intent in local negotiations can mean future significant  
3 problems in dealing with other issues. It is imperative that  
4 communications be clear and effective and that all concerned are  
5 aware of its implications."

6 I would like to ask you just to comment briefly on the  
7 efforts to overcome the cultural barriers; the previous  
8 shortage, for example, in translators, where we are on that.

9 General Casey: We have made great progress in translators  
10 here over the last -- it is me here, Senator. Great progress in  
11 translators over the last 6 months, and I am well over 80  
12 percent of filling our requirements for that. It is especially  
13 important because I added a requirement for an additional  
14 thousand translators for these teams that we are putting out  
15 with the Iraqi units.

16 For all those teams, we have put them through an extensive  
17 training program that emphasized the cultural context, basically  
18 to inform them so they could deal well with the Iraqis. So we  
19 worked that very hard, and I think what we are going to see is  
20 the more time that our folks spend working directly with the  
21 Iraqis the closer the bonds become and the more effective the  
22 working relationships become.

23 Senator Dole: Thank you very much.

24 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

25 Chairman Warner: Thank you, Senator.



1           This concludes the question period. Senator Levin, do you  
2   have a comment?

3           Senator Levin: Just very quickly. Senator Dayton was  
4   really looking forward to the hearing, but he has a BRAC  
5   regional meeting today in North Dakota and he is therefore  
6   unable to be here. But I wanted just to make that note for the  
7   record.

8           I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for convening it. As  
9   you and I think all of us agree, we are deeply appreciative to  
10   the dedication, the service of our witnesses here. These  
11   hearings are always -- should be lively, given the circumstances  
12   that I think are very challenging, and it lived up to that  
13   description.

14          Chairman Warner: Thank you, Senator Levin.

15          I would like to make an observation. I thank you again,  
16   Mr. Secretary and our witnesses, for making possible this  
17   hearing. It really is of historic proportions, and I think we  
18   have had an excellent exchange of views and I commend you on  
19   your responses to a series of tough questions.

20          There remains, General Casey, some material which I am  
21   sure you will provide the committee with regard to the  
22   classified sections relating to the status of the training and  
23   the ability of the current armed forces of Iraq.

24          Senator Byrd mentioned Senator Russell and it reminded me  
25   that I was privileged to be at the Department of Defense at the

1 time he was here in the Senate and occupied a chair not unlike  
2 that which you are in now, Mr. Secretary, before that  
3 distinguished Senator. I have had the privilege of dealing with  
4 every secretary of defense in the 35 years that I have had the  
5 opportunity and really the privilege to associate with the  
6 Department of Defense in one way or another.

7 I want to say, Mr. Secretary, through the years that we  
8 have known each other I have enjoyed our working relationship.  
9 I look forward to continuing that and I have full confidence in  
10 your ability to lead the Department of Defense, under the  
11 direction of a courageous Commander in Chief, our President.

12 The hearing is concluded.

13 [Whereupon, at 1:31 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25