



WASHINGTON REFINE THE GUIDANCE IN REF B TO REFLECT THIS APPROACH. END SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUEST.

3. (U) AS ADDRESSEES ARE AWARE, CZECH GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE MINISTRIES OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE PRESENTED TO EMBASSY PRAGUE A REQUEST FOR U.S. FIGHTER AIRCRAFT SUPPORT FOR THE 21-22 NOVEMBER NATO SUMMIT.

[REDACTED]

JS 1.4(b)

THEY ALSO MADE IT KNOWN THAT THEY ARE REQUESTING NATO AWACS TO AUGMENT AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING (AEW) CAPABILITIES. IN REF B, WASHINGTON DIRECTED EMBASSY PRAGUE TO RECOMMEND TO THE CZECHS THAT THEY SUBMIT A REQUEST THROUGH NATO CHANNELS AND WASHINGTON WOULD SUPPORT NATO ASSISTANCE.

4. (U) AFTER REVIEWING THIS ISSUE WITH SECRETARY GENERAL ROBERTSON, SACEUR GENERAL RALSTON AND WITHIN USNATO, WE NOTE OPERATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS TO CHANNELING THE CZECH REQUEST THROUGH NATO AND RECOMMEND AN ALTERNATE COURSE OF ACTION.

[REDACTED]

JS 1.4(a), (g)

DUE TO THE CONCERNS OF NUMEROUS ALLIES, NATO'S OPERATIONAL CONCEPT FOR AIR DEFENSE AGAINST POSSIBLE TERRORIST ATTACKS CLEARLY STATES THAT ENGAGING A DESIGNATED RENEGADE IS A NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.

5. (U) WHILE NATO CAN PROVIDE SURVEILLANCE, DETECTION AND INITIAL INTERCEPT OF POTENTIAL AIRCRAFT THREATS THROUGH NATO AWACS, THE ACTUAL ENGAGEMENT AND SHOOTDOWN WOULD HAVE TO BE CONDUCTED BY AIRCRAFT UNDER CZECH NATIONAL CONTROL.

[REDACTED]

JS 1.4(b)

ADDITIONALLY, NATO NATIONS MAY WANT TO TAILOR THE COMMAND AND CONTROL ARRANGEMENTS AND RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE), POSSIBLY EXTENDING THE TIME NECESSARY TO RECEIVE PERMISSION TO ORDER AN ENGAGEMENT TO UNACCEPTABLE LEVELS. IN CONTRAST, U.S. NATIONAL AIRCRAFT UNDER THE COMMAND AND CONTROL OF USCINCEUR AND WORKING WITH THE CZECH REPUBLIC WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A BILATERAL AGREEMENT, COULD ACT SWIFTLY AND DECISIVELY AGAINST A RENEGADE.

SECTION 02 OF 02 USNATO 000943

STATE FOR EUR/RPM, EUR, EUR/SCE, PM  
SECDEF FOR CROUCH AND BRZEZINSKI  
JOINT STAFF FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1.6X5  
TAGS: MOPS, NATO, NAC


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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SUBJECT: RFG: CZECH REQUEST FOR U.S. FIGHTER SUPPORT FOR PRAGUE SUMMIT

6. (✓) THERE ARE ALSO PROCEDURAL LIMITATIONS TO INITIATING THE REQUEST THROUGH NATO CHANNELS. THE CZECH REQUEST MADE THROUGH NATO CHANNELS WOULD REQUIRE A NAC TASKING TO THE MILITARY COMMITTEE FOR NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES' ADVICE. MILITARY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS AND NAC APPROVAL WOULD NOT OCCUR UNTIL MID-SEPTEMBER AT THE EARLIEST. FURTHERMORE, SHOULD DEBATE IN NATO BECOME PROTRACTED, IT COULD EAT TIME AND ENERGY NEEDED TO FINISH THE SUBSTANTIVE BUILDING BLOCKS FOR THE PRAGUE SUMMIT.

7. (✓) IN OFFERING THE CZECHS BILATERAL U.S. FIGHTER SUPPORT IN ADDITION TO NATO AWACS, WE COULD PROPOSE THAT



JS1.4(a)

AMBASSADOR BURNS HAS DISCUSSED THIS COURSE OF ACTION WITH SYG ROBERTSON, SACEUR GEN RALSTON AND AMBASSADOR STAPLETON AND ALL AGREE WITH THIS APPROACH AS THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO PROVIDE AIR DEFENSE FOR THE SUMMIT PARTICIPANTS.

BURNS  
RL

JOINT STAFF V1

ACTION

(U, 6, 8, F)

2

INFO SJS-C(\*) SJS-C(\*) NMCC:CWO(\*) CMAS(\*)  
CMAS(\*) JS(\*) USSOCOMWO(\*) SHAPE LNO(\*) JSAMS(\*)  
JSAMS UNCLAS DMS(\*) CHAIRS(1) CHAIRS TESTBED(\*)  
AF-CC-POLAD(\*) BOARDMAN(\*) NOOH(\*) SECDEF-C(\*)  
SECDEF-C(\*) ASD:PA-SMTP(\*) DIR:PAE-RAM(\*)  
ESC-SMTP(1)  
+JCP EMAIL CUSTOMER//CHAIRS//  
+USDP:ESC  
+US SURVEY DIV SHAPE BE

SECDEF V2

ACTION

(U, 6, 8, F)

0

INFO USDAT:STS(\*) DIR-PAE-NATO(\*)  
USDAT-STS(\*)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED

2

BT  
#0943

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NNNN  
<[^^]> 08/06/2002 0821 <[^^]>

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EF2657L/A HOLD

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2600



2002 SEP -3 PM 4: 25

AUG 27 2002

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ACTION MEMO

I-02/011540-NATO  
USDP *copy provided*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (Dr. J.D. Crouch, II) *JDC*

SUBJECT: Czech Request for U.S. Fighter Support for NATO Summit (U)

- ~~(S)~~ The purpose of this memo is to seek your guidance on a Czech request for U.S. fighter support to respond to any terrorist attacks during the 21-22 November NATO Summit in Prague. (Request for guidance from the USMISSION NATO is at Tab A).
- ~~(S)~~ Representatives from the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs informed our Embassy in Prague that the [REDACTED] JS 1.4 (a), (b), (g)
- ~~(S)~~ The Czechs also said they would request NATO AWACs to augment airborne early warning capabilities.
- ~~(S)~~ General Ralston recommends that the U.S. agree to provide fighter support on a bilateral basis rather than directing the Czechs to request fighter support from NATO.
- ~~(S)~~ He notes that the [REDACTED] JS 1.4 (a), (b), (g)
- ~~(S)~~ Under NATO Policy, the actual engagement and shoot down of a renegade aircraft would be a national (i.e. Czech) decision.

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Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Reasons: 1.5 (c) and (d)  
Declassify on: 8 August 2012

07-M-1968

06-28-02 14:27 IN


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SECDEF CONTROL# X02797 /02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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- (C) If you agree to the request to provide U.S. fighter support to the Summit, these aircraft would operate under the command and control of General Ralston in his role as Commander, U.S. European Command.
- (C) The aircraft would operate within the framework of bilateral arrangements with the Czechs that would define the rules of engagement for dealing with renegade aircraft and that would be worked out through U.S.-Czech military-to-military coordination. The rules of engagement will be subject to your review and approval.
- (C) While NATO will probably provide air defense coverage for the Summit, including AWACs,  JS 1.4 (a), (b), (g)
- (C) It is in our interest to provide the best possible security for President Bush and Allied heads of state and government who will be attending the Summit.
- (C) Recommend you approve the request for U.S. fighters to support the Summit, conditioned on appropriate U.S.-Czech bilateral arrangements establishing rules of engagement covering U.S. forces.

SECDEF Decision:

Approve: \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove: \_\_\_\_\_

Other: \_\_\_\_\_

Prepared by Scott Schless, ISP/NATO, 697-8495

Attachments

Tab A - Request for Guidance on Czech Request for U.S. Fighter Support for Prague Summit

Tab B - Coordinations

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# TAB A

Page determined to be Unclassified

Reviewed Ch RDD, WHS

Date:

JAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

JAN 25 2008

# TAB B

Page determined to be Unclassified

Reviewed Ch RDO, WNS

Date:

IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

JAN 25 2008

Coordinations

Date/Initials

General Counsel (William J. Haynes, II)

(Attached)

Director, Joint Staff (Lieutenant General Abizaid)

(Attached)

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
European and NATO Affairs (Ian Brzezinski)

*Jan V* 8/22/02

Director (Acting), NATO Policy (Scott Schless)

8/07/02 *AR*

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Reviewed Ch RDD, WHS  
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IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

ISP

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**THE JOINT STAFF  
WASHINGTON, DC**



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Reviewed Ch RDD, WHS

Reply ZIP Code:  
20318-0300

Date:  
IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5 JAN 25 2008

DJSM-0778-02  
20 August 2002

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY)**

**Subject: Czech Request for US Fighter Support for NATO Summit**

1. Thank you for the opportunity to review the subject memorandum<sup>1</sup> seeking guidance on the Czech request for US fighter support for the upcoming NATO summit. I concur without comment in your proposed Action Memo.
2. The Joint Staff point of contact is Major Schmidt, 614-9436.

**JAMES A. HAWKINS  
Major General, USAF  
Vice Director, Joint Staff**

**Reference:**

- 1 OASD(ISP) memorandum, 1-02/011540-NATO, undated, "Czech Request for U.S. Fighter Support for NATO Summit (U)"

**UNCLASSIFIED**

Coordinations

Date/Initials

*Daniel J. Dell'Oba*  
Acting General Counsel (~~William J. Haynes, II~~)

*as noted*

*WJO 8/22/02*

Director, Joint Staff (Lieutenant General Abizaid)

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for  
European and NATO Affairs (Ian Brzezinski)

Director (Acting), NATO Policy (Scott Schless)

*8/10/02 387*

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Date:  
IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

JAN 25 2008

*G.C. comments  
have been incorporated  
into the memo  
-APD  
8/23/02*

**Glassner, Craig, CIV, WHS/CCD**

---

**From:** Linder, Stephen , LtCol , OSD  
**Sent:** Wednesday, October 09, 2002 10:05 AM  
**To:** Whitmore, James, COL, OSD; Glassner, Craig, CIV, WHS/CCD  
**Subject:** FW: PROPOSAL TO CANCEL PENDING SIGNATURE AND SENT BACK ACTIONS

Gentlemen,  
The table below identifies actions on the Pending Signature/ Sent Back reports that are OBE or are not going forward.

I recommend cancelling these actions. Lauren has reviewed and concurs.

V/R  
Steve

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Ch RDD, WHS  
Date:  
IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

JAN 25 2008

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Linder, Stephen , LtCol , OSD  
**Sent:** Wednesday, October 09, 2002 6:30 AM  
**To:** Haber, Lauren, CIV, OSD-POLICY; Allison, Cara, CIV, OSD-POLICY  
**Subject:** PROPOSAL TO CANCEL PENDING SIGNATURE AND SENT BACK ACTIONS

Lauren,  
Please review the attached table. It recommends cancelling 11 Pending Actions that are either OBE or simply not going forward.

I will scrub the pending signature and sent back actions harder over the next couple of days to try and get the numbers down. We are currently on tap for 50 Actions as Pending Signature; and 15 for Sent Back. After knocking the proposed reductions off our numbers will be at 39 Pending Signature; and 11 Sent Back.

I think we probably have another 10 - 15 outdated actions that we are tracking that can be removed with a bit of research. I'll keep you in the loop.

Semper Fi,  
Steve



Canc-Pending.doc

*Lt Col Steve Linder  
Military Assistant  
Executive Secretariat  
Office of the Secretary of Defense  
(703) 692-7129  
Fax (703) 693-4773*

114  
1300



SEP -3 PM 11:2  
OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ASS

9/6  
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SPECIAL ASSISTANT

USD(P)  
~~SECRETARY~~ - Doug.

EF2657LTA



3 27 2002

If NATO cannot provide air coverage for a NATO summit, it cannot do much of anything. Why should fighter CAP at NATO

NATO provided

INTERNATIONAL

FOR: SECRETAR  
FROM: ASSISTANT  
SECI  
SUBJECT: Czech Requ

be a U.S. responsibility? summit (U)

• (2) The purpose of this seems wrong.

each request for U.S.  
22 November NATO  
N NATO is at Tab A).

LARRY DI RITA  
414

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

9-9-02

From Lt Col Linden  
To: CAD

Please return to Mr Feith  
with Mr Di Rita's note.

s/h  
Jew

: and Foreign Affairs informed



JS 1.4 (a), (b), (g)

AWACs to augment airborne

provide fighter support on a  
fighter support from NATO.



JS 1.4 (a), (b), (g)

shoot down of a renegade

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SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	
SF MA GIAMBASTIANI	
MA BUCCI	
EXECSEC WHITMORE	Jew

06-26-02 14:27 IN

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PATSYUW RUEKJCS8002 2541511-SSSS--RUEKAMH.  
ZNY ~~SSSS~~  
P R 111458Z SEP 02  
FM CJCS WASHINGTON DC  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RUFNOA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
RHMFISS/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
RUCBACM/USCINCJFCOM NORFOLK VA  
RHMFISS/USCINCJFCOM NORFOLK VA  
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
RUPEUNA/USCINCSpace PETERSON AFB CO  
RUCQSOC/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL  
RHMFISS/USCINCSOC MACDILL AFB FL  
RHCUAAA/USCINTRANS SCOTT AFB IL  
RHMFISS/USCINTRANS SCOTT AFB IL  
INFO RHEHWSR/WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEADWD/CSA WASHINGTON DC  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC  
RHMFISS/CMC WASHINGTON DC

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PAGE 02 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~  
RUCAACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL  
RUMIAAAA/USCINCSO MIAMI FL  
RHMFISS/USCINCSO MIAMI FL  
RHCUAAA/HQ AMC SCOTT AFB IL//CC/CV/DO/LG//  
RHCUAAA/HQ AMC TACC SCOTT AFB IL//CC/CV/XOO/XOP//  
RHMFISS/HQ AMC TACC SCOTT AFB IL//CC/CV/XOO/XOP//  
RHFQAAA/COMUSAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE  
RHFQAAA/USAFE AOS RAMSTEIN AB GE//CAT-DIR/XP//  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC//N3/N5//  
RUEAHQA/HQ USAF WASHINGTON DC//XO/XOO//  
RUEACMC/CMC WASHINGTON DC//PP&O/PLJ//  
RHMFISS/CMC WASHINGTON DC//PP&O/PLJ//  
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RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ1/ECJ2/ECJ3/ECJ4/  
RUFGCIN/ECJ5/ECJ6/ECCS/ETCC/ECLA/ECPA//  
RHDLNE/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK  
RHMFISS/CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK  
RUCBLFB/COMMARFOREUR//G3/G4/G5//  
RHMFISS/COMMARFOREUR//G3/G4/G5//  
RUFGSOC/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE  
RHMFISS/COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE

PAGE 03 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~  
RHDIAAAA/HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC/CV/XO/BSO//  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC  
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC  
RUETIAA/DIRNSA FT GEORGE G MEADE MD  
RUEJDCA/DISA WASHINGTON DC  
RHMFISS/DISA WASHINGTON DC  
RUEANQA/NIMA HQ BETHESDA MD  
RUEADLA/DLA FT BELVOIR VA  
RUFGSHB/USCINCEUR ALT SHAPE BE//SPASAC//  
RUEKJCS/HQ USEUCOM LO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAFOC/AFOC WASHINGTON DC  
RUCBLF/CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA//N3//

Page 1

07-M-1968

1

07-M-1968

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RUCOSSA/COMNAVAIRLANT NORFOLK VA//N3/N83//  
RUCBLFB/COMMARFORLANT//G3/5//  
RHMFISS/COMMARFORLANT//G3/5//  
RUCBPAT/COMPATRECONFORLANT NORFOLK VA//N3//  
RUEHNO/USDELTC BRUSSELS BE  
BT

~~SECRET~~ RELEASABLE TO NATO  
MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//

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PAGE 04 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~  
REF/A/DOC/NATO MC 54/1(2ND REVISION)/06FEB02/-/NOTAL//  
REF/B/DOC/NATO MCM-062-02/28MAY02/-/NOTAL//  
REF/C/MSG/USMISSION USNATO/061319ZUG02/-/NOTAL//  
REF/D/DOC/CJCSI 3121.01A/15JAN00/-/NOTAL//  
REF/E/DOC/NATO MC 362/9NOV99/-/NOTAL//  
AMPN/(S/REL) REF A IS NATO INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM. REF B  
IS NATO BI-STRATEGIC COMMAND OPERATIONAL CONCEPT TO INCREASE THE  
ALLIANCE'S AIR DEFENSE POSTURE IN RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE TERRORIST  
ATTACKS. REF C IS US AMBASSADOR TO NATO REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE ON  
CZECH REQUEST FOR US FIGHTER SUPPORT FOR PRAGUE SUMMIT. REF D IS  
CJCS STANDING RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (SROE). REF E IS NATO RULES OF  
ENGAGEMENT (ROE).//  
ORDTYP/PLANORD/CJCS//  
TIMEZONE/Z//  
NARR/(S/REL) THIS IS A PLANNING ORDER. REQUEST COMMANDER, US  
EUROPEAN COMMAND (CDRUSEUCOM), SUBMIT TO THE CJCS BY 30 SEP 02 A  
CONOPS FOR DEPLOYMENT/EMPLOYMENT OF AIR-BASED ASSETS FOR AIR  
DEFENSE AND PROTECTION OF US PARTICIPANTS AND ATTENDEES AT THE NATO  
SUMMIT IN PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC, FROM 21 - 22 NOV 02. THIS  
PRODUCT SHOULD COMPLEMENT AND BE INTEGRATED INTO NATO SUPREME

PAGE 05 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~  
ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE'S, OVERALL PLAN FOR AIR DEFENSE AND THE  
GOVERNMENT OF CZECH REPUBLIC'S PLAN FOR DEFENSE AGAINST RENEGADE  
AIRCRAFT. THE CONOPS SHOULD INCLUDE PROPOSED ROE.//  
GENTEXT/SITUATION/  
1. (S/REL) NATO'S INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM DEFENDS NATO  
AIRSPACE AGAINST CONVENTIONAL MILITARY AIR ATTACK (REF A).  
FOLLOWING THE TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE US ON 11 SEPT 01, NATO  
DEVELOPED AN OPERATIONAL CONCEPT TO DEAL WITH RENEGADE AIRCRAFT,  
I.E., CIVIL AIRCRAFT ASSESSED AS OPERATING IN A MANNER TO RAISE  
SUSPICION IT MIGHT BE USED AS A WEAPON TO PERPETRATE A TERRORIST  
ATTACK. THE OPERATIONAL CONCEPT CALLS FOR NATO TO TURN OVER  
RESPONSIBILITY AND ASSETS TO HOST GOVERNMENT NATIONAL AUTHORITIES  
FOR ENGAGEMENT OF RENEGADE AIRCRAFT (REF B).

[REDACTED] THEREFORE, CZECH REPUBLIC REQUESTED BILATERAL US  
FIGHTER SUPPORT TO SAFEGUARD THE NATO SUMMIT FROM RENEGADES (REF  
C).//

GENTEXT/MISSION/  
2. (S/REL) UPON SECDEF APPROVAL, CDRUSEUCOM WILL PROVIDE AIR

PAGE 06 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~  
ASSETS TO SUPPORT THE AIR DEFENSE OF US PARTICIPANTS AND ATTENDEES  
AT THE NATO SUMMIT IN PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC, 21 - 22 NOV 02.//  
GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

JS  
1.4(g)

- 3. (U) CDRUSEUCOM
  - A. (S/REL) SUBMIT TO THE CJCS BY 30 SEP 02 A CONOPS FOR DEPLOYMENT/EMPLOYMENT OF AIR-ASSETS FOR AIR DEFENSE OF NATO SUMMIT IN PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC.
  - B. (U) KEY ASSUMPTIONS WILL INCLUDE:
    - (1) (U) EXPECTED MISSION DURATION TO COVER ONLY THE PERIOD OF THE NATO SUMMIT.
    - (2) (S/REL) NO INCREASE IN ASSIGNED OR APPORTIONED FORCES.

JS 1.4(a)

- (4) (S/REL) OPERATIONS CONDUCTED AS A RESULT OF THIS PLANNING EFFORT SHOULD BE INCORPORATED WITHIN NATO AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM AND A US-CZECH BILATERAL DEFENSE AGREEMENT.

JS 1.4(a), (b), (g)

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- (6) (S/REL) POTENTIAL AIR THREATS INCLUDE ALL CATEGORIES OF AIRBORNE VEHICLES TO INCLUDE (BUT NOT LIMITED TO) HIJACKED WIDE-BODY AIRLINERS, GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT, AND ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT.

JS 1.4(b)

- (7) (S/REL) US GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WILL PARTICIPATE AND ATTEND THE NATO SUMMIT.//

- C. (U) KEY AREAS FOR EXECUTION-LEVEL CONTINGENCY PLANNING WILL INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

- (1) (S/REL) IDENTIFY REQUIRED FORCES TO EXECUTE CONOPS. INCLUDE AN OPTION FOR 24-HOUR COVERAGE FOR THE DURATION OF THE SUMMIT. HIGHLIGHT ANY ASSETS REQUIRED FOR MISSION SUCCESS IF IN EXCESS OF THOSE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED.
- (2) (S/REL) PROPOSE PROCEDURES TO INTEGRATE US FIGHTER SUPPORT WITH NATO AND CZECH AIR DEFENSE COMMAND AND CONTROL.
- (3) (S/REL) DETERMINE COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS REQUIRED TO EXECUTE CONOPS.
- (4) (S/REL) DETERMINE EFFECT OF EXISTING ROE ON CONOPS AND PROPOSE MODIFICATIONS AS REQUIRED.

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- (5) (S/REL) DETERMINE AIRSPACE RESTRICTIONS REQUIRED TO EXECUTE CONOPS.

- (6) (S/REL) IDENTIFY ESTIMATED COSTS AND MEANS FOR FUNDING REQUIRED TO SUPPORT CONOPS. THIS ANALYSIS SHOULD INCLUDE COST OF LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO THE SUPPORTING SERVICES AS WELL AS ACTUAL DOLLARS.

- (7) (S/REL) DETERMINE INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS PLAN TO GAIN MAXIMUM DETERRENT VALUE FROM CONOPS.

- (8) (S/REL) DETERMINE INTERAGENCY REQUIREMENTS TO EXECUTE CONOPS.

JS 1.4(a)

- (10) (S/REL) IDENTIFY AGENCIES AND CIVIL-MILITARY REQUIREMENTS TO EXECUTE CONOPS.

- 4. (U) CSA, CNO, CSAF, AND CMC PROVIDE SUPPORT AS REQUIRED.
- 5. (U) DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, NATIONAL IMAGERY AND MAPPING AGENCY, DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY, DEFENSE CONTRACTING MANAGEMENT

AGENCY AND DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY ARE SUPPORTING AGENCIES.

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6. (U) OPSEC AND DECEPTION GUIDANCE. OBSERVE OPSEC DURING PLANNING TO PREVENT DISCLOSURE OF CAPABILITIES AND INTENT.
7. (U) COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS
- A. (U) PROPOSED C-DAY, L-HOUR: TO BE DETERMINED.
  - B. (U) TARGET DATE FOR EXECUTION: 21 - 22 NOV 02.
  - C. (U) ANTICIPATED LENGTH OF OPERATION: 2 DAYS.
  - D. (S/REL) RULES OF ENGAGEMENT. CJCS SROE (REF D); NATO ROE MC 362 (REF E). CDUSEUCOM WILL PROPOSE MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING ROE IN ORDER TO INTEGRATE CZECH GROUND SECURITY FORCES AND GROUND SECURITY COMMAND AND CONTROL NOT PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED.
  - E. (U) DIRLAUTH ALCON. KEEP THE JOINT STAFF INFORMED.//  
 GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/
8. (U) THE USE OF JOPES IS DIRECTED.
9. (U) FUNDING. THE JOINT STAFF WILL NOT PROVIDE FUNDING. COMBATANT COMMANDER COMPONENT COMMANDS AND/OR SERVICES WILL FUND ALL COSTS OF THIS PLANNING EFFORT. COMBATANT COMMANDER COMPONENT COMMANDS WILL CAPTURE AND REPORT INCREMENTAL COSTS IN SUPPORT OF THIS PLANNING EFFORT TO SERVICE COMPTROLLERS. SERVICE COMPTROLLERS WILL REPORT INCREMENTAL COSTS TO DFAS-DENVER IAW DOD FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT REGULATION 7000.14R, VOLUME 12, CHAPTER 23, PARA 2308.

PAGE 10 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~

10. (U) CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE. PLANNING FOR THIS OPERATION IS CLASSIFIED SECRET RELEASABLE TO NATO. DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION REGARDING THIS PLANNING EFFORT BY MILITARY UNITS IS NOT AUTHORIZED.
11. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS (PA). USEUCOM MUST SUBMIT PROPOSED PA GUIDANCE CONCURRENT WITH USEUCOM FORWARDING OF CONOPS TO JOINT STAFF FOR COORDINATION WITH DOD AND INTERAGENCY APPROVAL. QUESTIONS BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THIS GUIDANCE SHOULD BE FORWARDED TO OASD(PA)--INFO OCJCS-PA--FOR INTERAGENCY APPROVAL AND DISSEMINATION. CONTACT USEUCOM PA AT COMM 40-711-680-8010, DSN 430-8010; OASD(PA) AT 703-697-5131; AND OCJCS-PA AT 703-695-7678.//  
 GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/
12. (U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. CDUSEUCOM IS THE SUPPORTED COMBATANT COMMANDER. ALL OTHER COMBATANT COMMANDERS ARE SUPPORTING. ALL DOD AGENCIES AND THE MILITARY SERVICES ARE SUPPORTING AGENCIES AND SERVICES.//  
 AKNLDG/YES/INST: CONTACT LTC WARREN E. PHIPPS, DDRO JOD EUCOM, DSN 225-2541, DRS 80-228-2231. DURING NONDUTY HOURS, CONTACT NMCC COT AT DSN 227-8985.//  
 DECL/CLBY: G.S. NEWBOLD, LTGEN, USMC, DJ3; RES: 1.5 (A); DECLON: 20 AUG 12//

PAGE 11 RUEKJCS8002 ~~SECRET~~  
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 ACTION

INFO CHAIRS(\*) CHAIRS TESTBED(\*) SECDEF-C(\*)  
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
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RICHARD B. MYERS  
CHAIRMAN  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

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 CMC WASHINGTON DC//PP20/PLJ//  
 HQ USEUCOM VAHINGEN GE//ECJ1/ECJ2/ECJ3/ECJ4/  
 ECJ5/ECJ6/ECCS/ETCC/ECLA/ECPA//  
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 COMMARFOREUR//G3/G4/G5//  
 COMSOCEUR VAHINGEN GE  
 HQ ACC LANGLEY AFB VA//CC/CV/X0/BSB//  
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MSGID/ORDER/CJCS//

REF/A/ORDER/CJCS/111458ZSEP02//

AMPN/(U) CJCS PLANNING ORDER FOR US SUPPORT TO NATO PRAGUE

SUMMIT.//

REF/B/BRIEF/CDRUSEUCOM/040CT02//

AMPN/(U) CONOPS BRIEFING TO SECDEF//

ORDTYPE/OTR/CJCS//

TIMEZONE/Z//

NARR/~~(S)~~ THIS IS A MOD 001 TO REF A PLANNING ORDER. SECDEF HAS APPROVED CDRUSEUCOM CONOPS (REF B) FOR DEPLOYMENT/EMPLOYMENT OF AIR-BASED ASSETS FOR AIR DEFENSE AND PROTECTION OF US PARTICIPANTS AND ATTENDEES AT THE NATO SUMMIT IN PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC, 21-22 NOV 02, WITH THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE. SECDEF WANTS TO ENGAGE WITH THE CZECHS IN A FORUM TO SHARE OUR EXPERIENCE SINCE 9/11, AND TO DETERMINE COLLECTIVELY THE BEST WAY TO DEFEND THE SUMMIT FROM RENEGADE AIRCRAFT WHILE MINIMIZING THE RISKS. TO

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ACCOMPLISH THIS. USEUCOM NEEDS TO AUGMENT THE BILATERAL PLANNING WITH STATESIDE EXPERTISE ON LESSONS LEARNED FROM CRAWFORD, TX, (INCLUDING HELICOPTER OPERATIONS) AND THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE LAST NATO SUMMIT IN ROME.//

GENTEXT/SITUATION/

1. (U) PER REF A.//

GENTEXT/MISSION/

2. (U) PER REF A.//

GENTEXT/EXECUTION/

3. ~~(S)~~ THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED FOR INCLUSION INTO DETAILED PLANNING. REQUEST UPDATE OF CONOPS NLT 23 OCT 02.

A. ~~(S)~~ ESTABLISH A DIVISION OF LABOR WITH THE CZECHS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE THE BEST CAPABILITIES DURING THE TIMES OF GREATEST RISK WHILE OPTIMIZING THE CZECHS CONTRIBUTION. THIS DIVISION WOULD PROBABLY MEAN US FIGHTERS WOULD FLY DURING DAYLIGHT HOURS AND THE CZECHS WOULD FLY AT NIGHT.

B. ~~(S)~~ NEED TO CLARIFY THE ROLE OF THE CZECH DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER WHEN THE US IS PROVIDING THE ONLY COMBAT AIR PATROLS.

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HOW BEST TO APPROACH THIS ISSUE. JOINT STAFF WILL COORDINATE WITH  
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND USEUCOM CONCERNING NEGOTIATION OF THE  
ARTICLE 9B PORTION OF THE AGREEMENT.//

GENTEXT/ADMIN AND LOG/

4. (U) PER REF A-//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/

5. (U) PER REF A-//

DECL/CLBY: LT GEN N.A. SCHWARTZ, DJ-3; RES: 1.5 (A); DECLON:

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January 18, 2005

**SUBJECT: A Nation and the Civilized World at War in the 21st Century**

Waging war is always difficult and uncertain. However, given the new realities of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, waging the Global War on Terror is a particularly complex and difficult task. And it is a task not only for the Department of Defense, and not only for the USG, but for the entire civilized world.

This is the first war in history being conducted in a world dominated by the particular set of new realities listed below:

- Multiple global satellite television networks
- 24 hour TV news coverage
- Dozens of domestic and international television channels devoted to news, commentary, and analysis
- Live coverage of terrorist attacks, disasters, and combat operations
- 24 hour "Talk Radio"
- A global Internet, with universal access and no inhibitions
- Bloggers, hackers, chatrooms
- Digital cameras and camcorders, wielded by journalists, the public – everyone and anyone
- E-Mails and cell phones with global reach
- Reporters embedded with the military – land, sea and air
- A Congress that stays in session nearly continuously and is on television gavel-to-gavel.
- A House and Senate where fewer and fewer Members have served in the US military.
- A doubling of the number of Congressional staff members, from 8,000 during the Vietnam War to 16,000-plus today

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- An increasingly casual regard for security, resulting in near continuous hemorrhaging of every type of classified information.
- A Freedom of Information statute calling for the USG to provide to media organizations and others documents comprising well over a million pages each year.
- An Executive Branch still organized for the “industrial age” Congressional Committee and Subcommittee structure, not for the “information age;” and, therefore, poorly equipped to cope with multiple issues arriving from every quarter, 24 hours-a-day, seven days-a-week.
- An enemy without a nation and unburdened by bureaucracy and its constraints, and therefore able to turn inside the decision cycles of the USG’s and other nations’ big bureaucracies.
- A pattern where our Government is punished for prompt, but less than perfect responses, to fast-moving events, while competing against an enemy that goes unpunished for its lies and outrages; as has been said, “A lie travels round the world while Truth is putting on her boots.”
- Finally, the Global War on Terror is not conventional:
  - It is not a conflict between large armies, navies, or air forces, which both the military and the public would better understand;
  - The American people, for the most part, do not feel personally engaged in the war, given that there is no need for rationing, no need for a draft, and that the country is not on a wartime footing;
  - Even today the war is being conducted under peacetime constraints, regulations and requirements, which restrict the ability to meet the new challenges posed by an enemy completely unrestrained by constraints, laws or mores; and, as such,
  - Public expectations are still largely oriented to peacetime or, at best, a conventional war.

Those new realities pose difficulties, to be sure, but they also offer significant new opportunities.

Understandably, in part because of these new realities, there is criticism from the press, the public, Congress, and foreign governments, with the attacks clustering around two themes – “incompetence” and “cover-up.”

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But it is important to understand the new realities and the uniqueness of the task, and therefore the urgency needed in finding new ways to better organize, arrange and equip the USG to function successfully in this historically unique environment.

One example of the opportunities the new realities offer is that the media today is not dominated by one or even a few outlets. Indeed, there are multiple channels available to reach the various publics. To take advantage of this opportunity will require that the USG organize and develop the skills and competence to effectively use the various outlets available to assure that the many publics, here and abroad, are provided the facts, in real time, along with the context needed for better understanding.

When one considers the magnitude and nature of the tasks, it is impressive that the USG has been able to cope with these multidimensional problems as successfully as it has. Fortunately, the American people have a good center of gravity and inner gyroscopes that, over time, lead them to right judgments.

These then are the new realities of warfighting. They create new challenges, but also new opportunities for the US Government broadly, as we seek to fulfill our most fundamental responsibility – providing for the security of the American people.

Given these new circumstances, the following are some actions that might be considered:

- Revamp the interagency processes to bring all of its disparate elements together in addressing these new challenges and seizing the new opportunities. This will require new arrangements, some of which may be resisted as not fitting the current Congressional Committee structures;
- Improve public education so that historical context is available and is considered in weighing and judging the actions of today, not in isolation or measured against perfection, but rather as seen against events of a similar nature in earlier times;
- Develop vastly more sophisticated ways of utilizing the multiple channels available to reach the many audiences critical to success – and to do so near instantaneously;
- Develop better access to the non-mainstream media (talk radio, bloggers, etc.), international and domestic, as their growing influence seems to require;

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- Fashion more timely and effective research – “knowing the enemy”;  
and
- Understand that our country (and our values) is in a campaign – a war to be sure, but a prolonged campaign – and to win it, we must organize to win it, and we must develop a new sense of urgency and sustain it for the long, hard slog ahead. Lives are at stake.

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EYES ONLY - SENSITIVE

October 30, 2006

TO: GEN George Casey

CC: Gen Pete Pace  
GEN John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Troop Disposition in Iraq

As you know, every week we have a deployment order meeting. Not too long ago one of those meetings involved your recommendation that we extend the 172nd Stryker Brigade for up to 120 additional days. We did so.

Currently, we are looking at force rotations for the future. Increasingly, they include notice indicating that the dwell times out of Iraq for active duty forces will be less than one year -- by a month or, in some cases, two or three months. The inevitable effect of unexpected extensions and of dwell times of less than one year will be seen in recruiting, retention, and morale. Needless to say, there are risks to continuing on this path for an extended period.

As you will recall, three years ago I started a process called "managing the force more efficiently." We initiated some 35 to 40 different activities to reduce stress on the force, including moving military folks out of civilian posts and the like. We are making headway.

In addition, we are currently considering ways we might accelerate the current program and/or build additional combat, combat support and combat service support capabilities to further reduce stress on the force. We are also working to reduce U.S. forces in other parts of the world. The cumulative effect is that we are finding ways to increase supply. One of the complicating factors is that the Army is modularizing and modernizing the force to brigade combat teams, which means that units are periodically out of the rotation. Lastly, we wisely committed to train Iraqi and Afghan security forces and embed key leaders with them, but this also has resulted in removing some units from the force rotation, thereby adding to the stress.

I mention all of this so you will have it in your mind as we go forward. At your request, we have an assessment team going into Iraq. We are doing the same in Afghanistan. Their task is to see if we can return individuals or units in the

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theater that made sense two or three years ago but may make less sense today. I am sure the assessment will produce benefits, as it did the last time.

As the President said, we want to resource what you and your team need to get the job done. On the other hand, we want to work the system so it will operate efficiently, sustain the long war, and properly balance risk.

I wanted you to have this background as you work with the assessment teams and as you consider the arrangement of the forces you have in Iraq.

Over the recent period, we have gone from very few Iraqi Security Forces to 310,000 trained and equipped. We have gone from 110 U.S. bases down to less than 55, with the remainder closed or turned over to the Iraqis. Today we have the majority of Iraqi Security Forces in the lead, with Coalition forces in support. However, my impression is that we have plus or minus 145,000 troops, with roughly the same number of headquarters, the sizes of the headquarters growing, and what seems to be roughly the same number of engineers, military police, force protection, and the like. This requires a careful look, and I know you will encourage your people to work closely with General Wood's team and lean forward to propose whatever adjustments are possible.

Thanks.

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October 10, 2006

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: A New Construct for Iraq – Establish and arrange a plan for Iraq, with benchmarks, to turn over to the Iraqis responsibility for Governance, Economic Progress and Security, and thereby permit a reduction of Coalition forces

Some months ago, General Pace and I discussed with Generals Abizaid and Casey the desirability of a new construct for Iraq. Several weeks ago, I discussed it in Washington, D.C. with President Talabani. And recently I discussed it with you and the NSC (on the SVTC when you were at Camp David) during our second long discussion on Iraq with Abizaid and Casey. At that meeting, I believe you indicated general agreement with my proposal and asked us to flesh it out. We have done so.

I would characterize our current construct is U.S.-centered and somewhat dependent on our actions. The new construct tips the current approach on its head and focuses on Iraqi efforts to be executed against the projected dates, thereby enabling the Iraqi Government to demonstrate its political will, and publicly fixing accountability and responsibility on the Iraqis, where they belong.

### **The Current Construct for Iraq**

Current U.S. Iraq policy has the following elements:

- "The U.S. will stay in Iraq until we have won (succeeded)."
- "The U.S. will stay as long as we are needed."
- "We oppose a set timetable for withdrawal of Coalition forces, because it would advantage the enemy, since they could simply wait us out."
- "As the Iraqi Security Forces stand up, we will stand down."

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- "U.S. military commanders will determine the number of U.S. troops, not politicians in Washington, D.C."
- "Conditions on the ground will determine the pace at which U.S. and Coalition forces are withdrawn."

The metrics on Governance the U.S. has tracked thus far include:

- Establishing the Governing Council.
- Establishing the Interim Government.
- Establishing the Transitional Government.
- Drafting of the new Iraqi Constitution.
- The referendum on the Constitution.
- Election of the permanent government – executive and legislative branches.
- The appointment of the new Cabinet.
- etc.

To our detriment, Coalition progress currently is being measured not against those types of benchmarks, but instead by the level of violence and the number of US casualties, which, of course, can be determined by the enemy.

**The New Construct or Approach:**

1. We would continue to say:
  - "US troop levels will be based on conditions on the ground."
  - "We oppose setting an artificial withdrawal date."
2. However, the new approach would flip the old construct upside down. It would announce publicly a list of specific goals, benchmarks or projections by the Iraqi Government (IG). The specific goals would be developed by the IG in close coordination with Zal and Casey, and would be announced either by the Iraqi government or jointly as plans for the remainder of 2006 and through 2007. The new element would be that the projections would mark a path of the achievement of major objectives and the planned transfer

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of responsibility to the Iraqi government for many aspects of governance, economic progress, and the security of Iraq.

3. The IG and the Coalition would acknowledge that some of the dates will slip, but that there may also be dates that will be accomplished earlier than projected. In addition, we would acknowledge that in some instances an activity may regress and need to be readdressed by the Coalition. In that case, the Coalition might have to re-establish authority and set a new target date to turn it back again to the Iraqi government.

The Iraqis would announce a specific month (or a two-month span, but not a specific date) when each of the benchmarks or projections are planned to occur.

For example:

- The month each of the 18 Iraqi provinces are planned to be turned over to the Iraqi government.
  - The month each Iraqi division and/or military capabilities will be placed in the Iraqi chain of command.
  - The month key elements of the reconciliation process will be completed and approved by the Iraqi Parliament, etc.
4. Finally, we would state, as we have before, that while these are our joint plans, they are dependent on conditions on the ground. This is not a timetable – it is a forecast. Of course, we will be held to our projections. We expect to be. Therefore, we would qualify it carefully, and say we don't know if the Iraqis can meet the targets, but that it is our current view that they should be able to do so.
  5. We will state that, as more and more responsibility is passed to the Iraqis along the announced schedule, we expect to be able to reduce Coalition forces accordingly.
  6. Using this new construct has the possible disadvantage of offering the enemy a timetable to disrupt. However, it also offers several important advantages:
    - Those Iraqis who want us to stay in Iraq will see that this process is rational, not precipitous, will be dependent upon conditions on the ground, and will be executed at a pace where the Iraqis should be able to assume responsibility;

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- It should demonstrate to neighboring countries – whose help the Iraqis and we need – that there is a workable plan and reasonable prospects for success;
- Those Iraqis who want the Coalition out of Iraq (Sadr, some neighbors, etc.) might see that there is a plan for the Coalition to turn over responsibilities to the Iraqis, and that, as we do so, Coalition forces will “stand down”;
- This approach might help get a new UNSCR passed, which we must have, in that it would demonstrate increasing Iraqi sovereignty; and,
- The publics in Iraq and in Coalition countries would see a bold plan that should persuade them that Coalition involvement in Iraq need not be interminable.

General Casey has an illustrative draft update of the benchmarks and projections, including the dates they should be accomplished. A final list of the benchmarks requires additional inputs by Zal, agreement by the NSC, and buy-in by Prime Minister Maliki and the Iraqi Government.

General Casey and I will be prepared to discuss this with you on Wednesday, October 11, 2006.

Respectfully,

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
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October 10, 2006

**TO:** President George W. Bush

**CC:** Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Stephen J. Hadley

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld 

**SUBJECT:** What To Do When "Succeeding" Requires More Than Military Power Alone

While discussing Afghanistan at a recent NATO meeting, we examined a subject that has been discussed regularly and repeatedly in the Department of Defense since 2002. Simply put, it is as follows: The US military cannot lose militarily, but there are situations where the US military cannot win militarily.

The best judgment of historians and practitioners is that, in irregular warfare, nations cannot prevail by military means alone. This is because there are specific non-military tasks that absolutely must be accomplished for the national effort to be successful. They can include such non-military activities as the functioning of the ministries, the criminal justice system, reconstruction, intelligence, police, health, counter narcotics, etc., and a broad-based reconciliation program.

The military could conceivably take over some or all of the non-military tasks that must be accomplished for the military to succeed. However, currently the military is not authorized, organized, trained, equipped or resourced to perform those tasks. Indeed, some Committees of Congress are actively opposed to the military doing so, since it would infringe on their Committees' jurisdictions.

If it is known that the non-military aspects necessary for victory are not being accomplished and/or are not likely to be successfully accomplished in the timelines of the security functions, what should be done?

Successful unity of effort requires that we identify and try to eliminate whatever restrictions prevent success, whether legal, organizational, legislative, bureaucratic, attitudinal, or cultural. However, even if all restrictions are eliminated, the relevant national non-military institutions would need to be willing, and either are able or can become able, to perform the needed tasks in a timely fashion.

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The development of those capabilities within the non-military US agencies takes time and has uncertain prospects. Moreover, at present, only Ministries of Defense seem to have the necessary, well-developed deliberate planning capabilities, plus a culture of being deployable and expeditionary, each of which is essential.

The USG is pursuing unity of effort in Iraq and Afghanistan, but we are facing too many "restrictions." We are currently lacking unity of command/effort needed to harness and direct USG efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and break down "restrictions" within the USG and those imposed by Congress (statutes, jurisdiction, etc.). We should examine what it will take as a government to achieve the requisite unity of effort/command now and in the future. We should also begin to focus our NATO allies and our high value partners, like Australia, Japan, South Korea, and others, on thinking about the efforts they will need to make for us to collectively succeed in the years ahead.

Respectfully,

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May 1, 2006

**SUBJECT: Some Illustrative New Approaches and Initiatives To Meet the 21st Century Challenges**

In March I spoke at the Truman Presidential Library. It offered an opportunity to reflect on the Truman Presidency and the difficult challenges the country faced at that important juncture in history – the end of World War II and the dawn of the Cold War.

As I considered the many institutions that were fashioned during the Truman Presidency, most of which are still in existence, it occurred to me that the U.S. today is at an important juncture in history. We are past the end of the Cold War and entering a new era of the Global War on Terror – transitioning from the industrial age to the information age, and shifting from an emphasis on conventional war to asymmetric or irregular warfare. In this Administration a great deal already has been initiated to adjust to this new era. For example, see the attached list of some of the initiatives that have been undertaken at the Department of Defense (see Attachment (1)). The other departments and agencies have, of course, taken on new initiatives as well.

The new National Security Strategy is being correctly interpreted as setting out principles as to how to help shape the global environment, directly connecting U.S. policy with the sources of American power – our free economic and free political systems. It has been described as “a grand strategy of transformation.” Now the question is how best to turn that vision into a reality that will outlast this Administration.

The new international system that was created in the immediate post-World War II period favored freedom, free trade and the peaceful resolution of disputes. It was designed to deal with the threats from the ideological and territorial expansion of the USSR. President Truman’s leadership (1945 – 1953) was essential to the success of the many new initiatives and institutions created to enable the United States to cope with their new challenges. The new institutions and approaches they fashioned included the UN, NATO, the World Bank and IMF, Point IV, the Truman Doctrine, the OAS, and the Marshall Plan. They also included many new U.S. Government institutions, such as the CIA, DoD, USIA, Voice of America, and the National Security Council. By establishing those institutions and doctrines, the Truman Presidency literally set the national security framework within which some ten successive Presidential administrations, of both political parties, have operated for more than sixty years.

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For the U.S. to continue to prosper, a secure global order is a necessity. As has been said, isolationism is an option we do not have. The U.S. will need to participate in the global system in significant ways; and, with respect to a number of challenges, participation in effective international organizations will be the only course.

Yet in important ways, existing international institutions have proven inadequate to the task. Further, the U.S. Government is too often paralyzed by bureaucratic inertia and legislative constraints that impede rapid, flexible and creative responses. These facts contribute to governmental ineffectiveness and charges of incompetence.

Given this, it would be useful to consider new initiatives to be undertaken during this period. Such an effort would be a way to set in place the framework for the administrations that will follow, just as the Truman Administration set the framework for subsequent administrations during the Cold War.

The task is to fashion now the needed new institutions that it would be impossible to fashion five or ten years from now. Further, the adverse demographics in Europe and Japan suggest that our key democratic partners are likely to be less helpful to the U.S. in the coming decades, which adds a sense of urgency to our efforts.

Even if the needed bold new ideas are not adopted immediately, which is likely, it is important to initiate a national discussion and raise the current level of the national dialogue to a higher plane.

Attach.

- 1) DoD Transformation Initiatives – Since January 20, 2001 (4/17/06)
- 2) Illustrative New 21st Century Institutions and Approaches (5/1/06)

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**DoD Transformation Initiatives – Since January 20, 2001**

The Department of Defense has undertaken a number of initiatives to meet the challenges of the post-September 11, 2001, world.

They include:

- The new Defense Strategy
- Major Force Posture changes worldwide
- A new military Force Planning Construct
- Established the post of Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
- Established the post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
- Established the new post of U.S. Northern Command
- Merger of the US Space Command and the US Strategic Command, with expanded authorities for cyberspace and strategic communications
- New authorities for an expanded Special Operations Command.
- The Proliferation Security Initiative
- Restructured the Missile Defense System, with an initial capability deployed
- Major refocus of US Strategic Reconnaissance Operations
- Modernized the Unified Command Plan
- New strategic military-to-military relationships in Central Asia, South Asia, and Latin America
- New authorities to train and equip foreign militaries and to provide for post-conflict stabilization efforts
- New Global Security Cooperation Guidance
- New National Security Personnel System
- Leadership to modernize the NATO Command Structure
- Proposed the new NATO Response Force
- Restructured the defense attaché system worldwide
- Strengthening language skills and regional expertise across the Joint Force
- “Reset” US Army into more agile, more capable, and more deployable modular Brigade Combat Teams

## Illustrative New 21<sup>st</sup> Century Institutions and Approaches

### 1. Transformation of International Institutions

Today the world requires new international organizations tailored to new circumstances. Many of the most pressing threats are global and transnational in scope – terrorism, proliferation, cyber-crime, narcotics, piracy, hostage-taking, criminal gangs, etc. Because they cannot be dealt with successfully by any one nation alone, the cooperation of many nations will be vital.

Current institutions, such as the United Nations, NATO, the OAS, the African Union, ECOWAS, ASEAN, and the European Union, to mention a few, were designed at a time when the world's challenges were notably different. Some were formed over half a century ago to further U.S. foreign and security policy purposes. Today, as U.S. goals and the world at large have changed, existing international institutions have failed to adapt sufficiently. Effective international organizations are needed to bring competence in such areas as quick reaction forces, military training, military police training, counter-proliferation, capacity-building for the rule of law, governance and domestic ministries. This may require institutions designed for those purposes, rather than struggling to reform existing institutions to take on tasks for which they are ill-suited.

Examples:

- Peacekeeping and Governance: The world and the U.S. would benefit from a "Global Peace Operations and Governance Corps." A standing capability is needed, ready to respond rapidly to deal with emerging situations before they spin out of control. Such a capability would have been useful in just the past few years in Liberia, Haiti, and perhaps Sudan.

The U.S. and like-thinking nations could help to enable such a capability by training, equipping, and sustaining peacekeepers with military and police capability, perhaps organized regionally, in considerably greater numbers than are currently available. This need is real. It will persist for many years.

Similarly, the U.S. and our friends and allies could help organize and train cadres of international professionals who can assist emerging governments in areas of governance and ministry-building. The cost-benefit ratio of

being prepared in advance and in benefiting from the use of several nations' troops, rather than using solely U.S. military forces, would be substantial.

- Maritime Organizations: A number of the future challenges will be linked to the seas – including piracy, exploitation of resources (oil, gas, fishing, seabed mining), intelligence-gathering from offshore platforms, and the seaborne movement of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics, people, and illegal arms. Some 70 percent of the earth's surface exists beyond the sovereignty of any nation. The U.S. should cooperate with rising nations that have significant naval forces – like India and Japan – to help contribute to the safety of the maritime domain. A clearinghouse institution for the high seas might provide a new level of information-sharing and a means to better facilitate the control of illicit activity on the oceans.
- Cyberspace: Just as the nations of the world have developed understandings and arrangements over time to govern activities on the land and sea and, more recently, in the air and space, the time has arrived to consider how best to approach cyberspace. Technology is racing ahead, while institutions and understandings for cyberspace and cyber-security are lagging dangerously. The challenge will be to define U.S. interests and concerns without stifling – through excessive regulation or control – the enormous advances made possible by this largely unregulated medium.
- Age of Biology. In addition to the information age, the age of biology is emerging. While there are international organizations devoted to health, e.g., the World Health Organization, existing institutions have limited capability. There is no international structure available to address the key issues of biotechnology and bioengineering, both of which hold promise and peril for the world. Everything from crop yields, to cloning, to fighting pandemics, to coping with other increasingly complex and dangerous issues will be a crucial part of the landscape of the 21st century. An entity or organization might be considered to address such issues.
- Counter-Proliferation. With the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the appetites of terrorists to acquire them, the civilized world has no choice but to organize much more effectively against further proliferation. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a good start, but it urgently needs new and sustained energy, as well as a process to institutionalize this effort. This is another area in which we should consider whether a new institution is required.
- Market Economics, Micro-Enterprises, and Opportunity for the People: In addition to organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, a smaller, more agile – and more market-oriented –

institution is needed in this new century. A new international program, perhaps aligned with the Millennium Challenge Account, might focus on micro-loans, which have proven to be effective in stimulating economies in less developed countries. It should be an institution that bypasses the government level, where waste and corruption are often rampant, and deals directly with the individual and the family, thereby providing direct economic opportunity.

- International Law: Mischievous doctrines of international law are developing that are being misused politically and limiting the freedom of action of international players, e.g., the ICC and “universal jurisdiction.” They need to be opposed. Further, international rules such as the Geneva Convention were fashioned for a different era. They may need to be redesigned for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, but the U.S. would need to avoid being roped in by rules and conventions that could unfairly make the U.S. a target for politicized prosecutors.

## 2. Regional Challenges

- Middle East Security Initiative. The threat Iran is posing and will likely continue to pose argues that it may well be time to form a new collective security arrangement for the Middle East and/or the Arabian Sea. Already one or two Middle Eastern nations appear to be wondering if they should develop nuclear programs. This is the moment, first, to reassure key friends of the U.S. commitment to shield them from nuclear blackmail through declaratory policy; and, second, to find other ways to strengthen cooperation with them. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are the key. The U.S. needs to bolster Arab moderates now while they are viable. Some Gulf States are leaning well forward on this idea.
- Asian Security Organization. The U.S. needs to seek ways to be included in more of the key Asian security organizations, or even to consider fashioning new organizations. The question is: What might it be possible to fashion today that would benefit us in the decades ahead, but would be impossible for us to fashion five or ten years from now?
- Latin American Regional Institutions. In Latin America the world has seen swings from colonialism to authoritarianism, to independence, to dictatorships, to democracy, and, most recently, to a leftist revival. It is appropriate to wonder whether existing regional institutions (e.g., the OAS) are up to the challenges ahead.

Corruption is corrosive to democracies. Criminal gangs are increasingly intimidating to free systems. A sustained focus against corruption and for

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free political and free economic systems will be needed if the growing subversion of democracy by Castro's and Chavez's appeal to the populace is to be successfully countered. Central America is either going to come together, as many of its leaders are currently striving to do, or it will be fractured by pressures from Cuba and Venezuela. The U.S. needs to actively foster moderate groupings and aggressively bolster and sustain them.

**3. A Goldwater-Nichols Process for the National Security Portions of the U.S. Government?**

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation led to greater jointness and interdependence in the Department of Defense among the four Services – but it has taken twenty years to begin to fully realize its potential. The broader USG structure is still in the industrial age, and it is not serving us well. It is time to consider a new “Hoover Commission” to recommend ways to reorganize both the Executive and the Legislative branches to put us on a more appropriate path for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Only a broad, fundamental reorganization is likely to enable Federal Departments and Agencies to function with the speed and agility the times demand. The charge of “incompetence” against the U.S. Government should be easy to rebut, if the American people understand the extent to which the current system of government makes competence next to impossible.

— Foreign Assistance. The present structure of USG foreign assistance is an anachronism. A system is needed that recognizes assistance for what it really is: a component of our national security strategy. Organizing assistance in a single “national security account,” rather than the multiple accounts currently being overseen by multiple Congressional committees and sub-committees, would permit government leaders to make better decisions about how to prioritize. In simple terms, DoD has resources, but not authorities; while State has authorities, but not resources. As a result, the President has reduced flexibility to respond to urgent needs. New ways and means to pursue a rational foreign assistance mission are urgently needed. A modest change will not do it. The only choice is to trash the current laws and undertake a total overhaul of the current systems.

— Strategic Communications – A 21<sup>st</sup> Century U.S. Information Agency: A new “U.S. Agency for Global Communication” could serve as a channel to inform, educate, and compete in the battle for ideas. Such an agency would need to be fully aligned with U.S. policies and principles, contrary to what seems to have developed since the dissolution of the USIA and creation of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Those changes have had the effect of divorcing U.S. Government broadcasting from policymakers, just at a

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time when there is an urgent need to get the U.S. message out – broadly, powerfully, and repeatedly.

Today the centers of gravity of the conflict in Iraq and the Global War on Terror are not on battlefields overseas; rather, the centers of gravity of this war are in the centers of public opinion in the U.S. and in the capitals of free nations. The gateways to those centers are the international “media hubs” in the capitals of the world. Zawahiri has said that 50% of the current struggle is taking place in the arena of public information. That may be an understatement. Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri and Zarqawi have “media committees” that consistently outpace our ability to respond. When the USG does try to compete in the communications arena, it runs up against a lack of national consensus and understanding about what means are acceptable to the media and to the Congress, and disagreements as to what is legal.

- **Partner Nation Capacity:** Dangerous enemies are located in countries with which we are not at war. Most of those countries lack the capability to skillfully assist us in dealing with our common enemies. Examples include Pakistan, the Philippines, Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq. This calls for considerably larger and better organized U.S. and international institutional capabilities to train, equip and strengthen the capacity of partners so they can better assist in finding, fixing and finishing the increasingly dangerous threats to their security and to ours.

### **The Way Ahead**

A way to move forward might be to establish mechanisms to refine these thoughts and, in the process, begin to garner support for the kinds of bold changes that seem to be needed.

#### **Recommendations:**

1. First, consider the appointment of a commission of statesmen along the lines of the Hoover Commission of the late 1940s. Its charter could be to re-examine the structure of both the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. Government, or at least the broad national security elements. The commission could be charged with considering a Goldwater-Nichols-like reorganization of the Executive Branch and the Congress; and, specifically, how they might best be restructured to more efficiently cope with the pressing new challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, energizing all elements of national power for the tasks ahead.

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2. Second, consider establishing a high-level commission to make proposals as to how best to restructure existing international organizations and/or create new institutions more appropriate for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The commission could consider such ideas as a "Global Peacekeeping Center," a new maritime organization, a structure for cyberspace, and an organization focused on biotechnology/engineering, human health, and the like.
3. Third, have a team identify a cluster of key issues that could be addressed through either Presidential proposals to the Congress or, preferably, by Executive Orders. Include:
  - a reorganization for national security, counter-terrorism and homeland security in the White House;
  - a new personnel system for the U.S. Government that encourages cross-service between organizations like Defense, State, Treasury, Homeland Security and Justice;
  - a more integrated national approach to build partner nation capacity;
  - better ways to deal with non-state entities; and
  - new methods of engaging the private sector and non-governmental organizations to meet the challenges ahead.

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October 15, 2002  
7:45 AM

**SUBJECT: Iraq: An Illustrative List of Potential Problems to be Considered and Addressed**

Following is an illustrative list of the types of problems that could result from a conflict with Iraq. It is offered simply as a checklist so that they are part of the deliberations.

1. If US seeks UN approval, it could fail; and without a UN mandate, potential coalition partners may be unwilling to participate.
2. A failure to answer this question could erode support: "If the US pre-empts in one country, does it mean it will pre-empt in all other terrorist states?"
3. US could fail to restrain Israel, and, if Israel entered the conflict, it could broaden into a Middle East war.
4. Syria and Iran could decide to support Iraq, complicating the war.
5. Turkish military could move on the Kurds or the Northern Iraqi oilfields.
6. The Arab street could erupt, particularly if the war is long, destabilizing friendly countries neighboring Iraq ~ Jordan, Saudi Arabia, GCC states, Pakistan, etc.
7. While the US is engaged in Iraq, another rogue state could take advantage of US preoccupation—North Korea, Iran, PRC in the Taiwan Straits, other?
8. While preoccupied with Iraq, the US might feel compelled to ignore serious proliferation or other machinations by North Korea, Russia, PRC, Pakistan, India, etc., and thereby seem to tacitly approve and acquiesce in unacceptable behavior, to the detriment of U.S. influence in the world.
9. Preoccupation with Iraq for a long period could lead to US inattentiveness and diminished influence in South Asia, which could lead to a conflict between nuclear armed states.

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10. Oil disruption could cause international shock waves, and with South America already in distress.
11. Iraqi intelligence services, which have a global presence including in the US, could strike the US, our Allies and/or deployed forces in unconventional ways.
12. Countries will approach the US with unexpected demands in exchange for their support (an Israeli request for us to release Jonathan Pollard, Russia asking for free play in the Pankisi Gorge, etc.), which, if the US accepts, will weaken US credibility.
13. US could fail to find WMD on the ground in Iraq and be unpersuasive to the world.
14. There could be higher than expected collateral damage—Iraqi civilian deaths.
15. There could be higher than expected US and coalition deaths from Iraq's use of weapons of mass destruction against coalition forces in Iraq, Kuwait and/or Israel.
16. US could fail to find Saddam Hussein and face problems similar to the difficulty in not finding UBL and Omar.
17. US could fail to manage post-Saddam Hussein Iraq successfully, with the result that it could fracture into two or three pieces, to the detriment of the Middle East and the benefit of Iran.
18. The dollar cost of the effort could prove to be greater than expected and the contributions from other nations minimal.
19. Rather than having the post-Saddam effort require 2 to 4 years, it could take 8 to 10 years, thereby absorbing US leadership, military and financial resources.
20. US alienation from countries in the EU and the UN could grow to levels sufficient to make our historic post World War II relationships irretrievable, with the charge of US unilateralism becoming so embedded in the world's mind that it leads to a diminution of U.S. influence in the world.

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21. US focus on Iraq could weaken our effort in the global war on terrorism, leading to terrorist attacks against the US or Europe including a WMD attack in the US, that theoretically might have been avoided.
22. World reaction against "pre-emption" or "anticipatory self-defense" could inhibit US ability to engage in the future.
23. Adverse reaction to the US could result in the US losing military basing rights in the Gulf and other Muslim countries.
24. Recruiting and financing for terrorist networks could take a dramatic upward turn from successful information operations by our enemies, positioning the US as anti-Muslim.
25. The US will learn, to our surprise, a number of the "unknown unknowns," the gaps in our intelligence knowledge, for example:
  - Iraqi WMD programs could be several years more advanced than we assessed;
  - Iraqi capabilities of which we were unaware may exist, such as UAVs, jamming, cyber attacks, etc.
  - Others one might imagine!
26. Fortress Baghdad could prove to be long and unpleasant for all.
27. Iraq could experience ethnic strife among Sunni, Shia and Kurds.
28. Iraq could use chemical weapons against the Shia and blame the US.
29. Iraq could successfully best us in public relations and persuade the world that the war is against Muslims.

Note: It is possible of course to prepare a similar illustrative list of all the potential problems that need to be considered if there is no regime change in Iraq.

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Iraq List of Problems

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November 13 2004

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *R*  
SUBJECT: Draft Memo

Attached is a draft memo I think might be usefully sent to the President. Do you feel it would be useful?

Thanks.

Attach.  
11/13/04 Draft POTUS memo

*1) Add Rumsfeld after  
before STC  
2) Perhaps had 2/17/01*

DHR:dh  
111304-6

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DRAFT

November 13, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Some Thoughts for Agenda Items for NSC and PC Meetings

It seems to me that, over time, the US interagency process tended to deal with Afghanistan, Iraq and the Global War on Terror (GWOT) primarily as military matters. The reality, of course, is that all are a complex mix of political, security and economic issues, which are intimately interconnected. To succeed, the US Government will need to have all departments and all elements of national power fully engaged and working closely together. To achieve that goal, it might be useful to broaden the approach of the interagency process.

Typically, when an NSC meeting is held on Iraq, the agendas mainly call for State to give a brief update on the political situation and DoD a military update on what has taken place since the last meeting.

There are a number of major strategic issues that could usefully be elevated regularly for NSC consideration, to assure that the USG has strategies and a plan to deal with each of them, to address outstanding issues as they arise, and to ensure that your National Security team keeps an energetic focus on the issues you consider to be crucial.

My suggestion is that you consider elevating and broadening the perspectives of the interagency process, by having a wider range of briefings at the PC level. Following is an illustrative list of some of the issues critical to US success in Afghanistan, Iraq and the GWOT. Some are currently being addressed, while others may not be, at least at the NSC level. They are grouped under several broad categories, with an indication of the likely responsible departments:

### IRAQ

- Department of State (DoS)/DoD – Develop and report regularly on an agreed US strategy to maintain and increase the size of the coalition in Iraq.

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- Include a process to provide a “soft landing” for Coalition partners that may decide they need to reduce their forces for internal political reasons, to keep them from withdrawing completely and causing political harm to Iraq.
- DoS/NSC – Develop and report regularly on an agreed US strategy for the Iraqi elections
  - Develop and report on an agreed US plan to mobilize government and non-government support for pro-democratic groups
- DoS/AID – Reports on progress on an agreed US plan for economic reconstruction in Iraq
- DoD – Reports on the agreed US plan for training and equipping Iraqi Security Forces
- DoS – Develop and report on an agreed US strategy to prevent Iran from destabilizing Iraq
- DoS – Develop and report on an agreed US strategy to stop Syria from destabilizing Iraq
  - How to get Syria to cut off financing, sanctuary, and other support that fuels enemy activity inside Iraq, return of Iraqi assets, etc.
- DoS/DoD/CIA – Develop and report on an agreed Sunni strategy, with updates on implementation
  - Plan to ensure Sunni Arabs in Iraq participate in the political process in a positive way
  - Plan to demonstrate to Sunni areas in Iraq that being cooperative with the government brings acceptable security and prosperity
  - Plan to mobilize more support for Iraq from Sunni Arab countries in the region that are weak or sitting on the fence
- DoD – Develop and report on an agreed military strategy post-Fallujah, including an approach for Mosul and consolidation of gains in Najaf/Samarra
- DoS/DoD/CIA – Develop and report on an agreed US campaign to deal with the extremists’ efforts at intimidation

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- DoS/DoD– Develop and report on progress on an agreed US strategy to include forces from Muslim nations in the coalition in Iraq

### AFGHANISTAN

- DoS – Develop and report on an agreed plan for the US to maintain and increase the size of the coalition in Afghanistan
- DoS – Develop and report on an agreed to raise additional funds for Afghanistan
- DoS/AID – Develop and report on an agreed US plan for economic reconstruction in Afghanistan
- DoD – Report on an agreed US, coalition and Afghan military strategy for Afghanistan post-elections
- DoD – Provide periodic reports on the agreed plan for training and equipping Afghanistan security forces
- DoS/DoJ/DEA/DoD – Develop and report on an agreed US, coalition and Afghan counter narcotics plan.

### GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR

- CIA – Provide regular intelligence assessments
- DoS/CIA/NSC – Develop and report on an agreed US strategy to counter the regional and increasingly global propaganda put out by Al Jazeera and other hostile news sources
- Department of Treasury – Develop and report regularly on an agreed US strategy to stop the financing of terrorists
- CIA – Report periodically on all US covert activity and on potential future operations
- NSC/DoS– Develop and report on an agreed US strategy and plan to improve US and coalition strategic communications to counter the successful perception management by extremists

**CONCLUSION:** Given the importance of the above issues, I believe it would be helpful for the NSC to be regularly updated on what the various USG departments and agencies are doing, and whether progress is being achieved. These important

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threads need to be pulled through the eye of a single needle, if we are to achieve success. Knowing who has the lead responsibility, and having the lead agencies provide plans and regular reports should provide the high level focus these tough issues will need

Respectfully,

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19 Apr 02

Reexamining Premises

Some commonly held views about the Middle East are:

1. Arab-Israeli differences are the primary cause of conflict in the Middle East.
2. All relevant parties agree to the Oslo framework.
3. There is no substitute for Arafat as leader of the Palestinians.
4. All relevant parties agree to "land for peace."
5. There is such a thing as the peace *process*.
6. Terrorism, especially suicide bombing, stems from poverty and despair.
7. Democracy is culturally inappropriate for the Muslim world.

→SD  
 Faxed  
 this morning  
 to Rice  
 VP  
 Tenet  
 Powell  
 Myers  
 Carb

All of these views are incorrect:

1. *Arab-Israeli differences are the primary cause of conflict in the Middle East.*
  - There were numerous intra-Arab conflicts from the 1950s through the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
  - The relative scarcity of intra-Arab conflict since then reflects the increased U.S. presence in the region, and the absence of Soviet involvement.
  - Regimes that have been the most aggressive – such as those of Syria and Iraq – are now focussed on survival.
2. *All relevant parties agree to the Oslo framework.*
  - The Israelis hoped that their concessions at Oslo would induce Arafat to crack down on terrorism and violence in the West Bank and Gaza.

- The idea was that, unhampered by human rights constraints, the Palestinian Authority could keep order more forcefully than the Israelis could.
  - In addition, the Israeli government used Oslo to make it appear that withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza wasn't unilateral, but would be repaid by peace with the Palestinians.
  - Neither benefit to Israel ever materialized and Israel has given up on the Palestinian Authority as its security "subcontractor."
  - Arafat recognized from the outset that Israel was intent on withdrawal from the territories whether or not he kept his promises. Accordingly, he kept none of his promises.
3. *There is no substitute for Arafat as leader of the Palestinians.*
- In every authoritarian system, the leader always looks indispensable, since it is in his interest to make sure that no credible successor can flourish.
  - The Palestinians are the best educated Arab population, with a successful diaspora in the U.S. and elsewhere.
  - Before the current *intifadah*, there was substantial popular dissatisfaction with the corruption and incompetence of the Arafat regime.
  - A successor leadership could emerge quickly once Arafat leaves the scene.
4. *All relevant parties agree to "land for peace."*
- The revival of the "right of return" as an issue at Camp David in 2000 evidences that Arafat never accepted "land for peace."
  - Reviving that issue ensured that no agreement would extinguish further Palestinian claims against Israel. Hence, no agreement would definitively resolve the conflict.
  - The Palestinian Authority never prepared its own people for peace, e.g., by revising school curricula and ending hostile propaganda in government-controlled media.

5. *There is such a thing as the peace process.*

- Peace depends on the major strategic decisions taken by the sides.
  - In particular, it requires a Palestinian leadership willing to give up, in a definitive manner, claims to land that it deems part of its sacred national and religious patrimony.
- This is not a matter of a "process," which can be broken down into a large number of small steps, but of a major strategic and philosophical decision.
  - The Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement didn't result from a "process," but from a single bold decision by Anwar Sadat to go to Jerusalem and speak directly to the Israeli people in favor of peace. The negotiations on treaty terms occurred *after* Sadat renounced war in his speech to the Knesset in Jerusalem. The withdrawals occurred only after the treaty was concluded.
- Until the necessary strategic decisions have been taken, no "process" can produce the desired result.

6. *Terrorism, especially suicide bombing, stems from poverty and despair.*

- Many of the major terrorist figures come from well-to-do, or at least middle class, backgrounds.
  - UBL is a multi-millionaire.
  - Mohammed Atta was a middle-class kid whose parents were able to send him to study at a university in Germany.
- Those involved in the current suicide bombing campaign against Israel are not in despair; rather, they are full of hope, believing that they have discovered a winning strategy.
  - To say nothing of the divine and earthly rewards they expect their act to produce for themselves and their families.

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7. *Democracy is culturally inappropriate for the Muslim world.*

- Over the past century, the Muslim world has been influenced by many ideological trends in the West, e.g., fascism and socialism.
- Hence, there is no *a priori* reason to think that it cannot be influenced by Western liberal democracy as well.
- Turkey proves that such influence is possible; even Bangladesh, despite its poverty and overpopulation, has made progress toward democracy.
- We are too easily seduced by the notion that, when it comes to the Muslim world, a friendly authoritarian regime is better than a democracy.
- As we may see from the state of public opinion in countries like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, this approach may only be building up problems for the future.

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Date: 7 April 2003

### OPERATION DESERT STORM CASUALTIES (U)

- (U) Issue. Provide DJS with information requested on Operation Desert Storm casualties.
- (U) Discussion.
  - (U) Sources.
    - (U) Operation Desert Storm
      - (U) US Casualty numbers from Washington HQ Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports.
      - (U) Coalition and UK numbers from Warfare and Armed Conflicts by Michael Clodfelter. Recommended source from JS History Office.
      - (U) US non-hostile injuries from Conduct of the Persian Gulf Conflict, (S/NF), An Interim Report to Congress, DoD. Service breakout is not available.
      - (U) Operation Iraqi Freedom. Joint Staff J1 Daily Summary Report (as of 7 April 2003).
  - (U) ODS Fratricide.
    - (U) 147 KIA to 35 friendly fire (FF) (24%)
    - (U) 467 WIA to 72 FF (15%)
    - (U) 541,376 serving in theater
    - (U) Total casualties as a percentage of the number in theater: .11%
    - (U) FF casualties as a percentage of the number in theater: .02%
  - (U) OIF Fratricide is TBD. An estimate prior to the completion of all investigations is not recommended.

Prepared by: W. E. Bales, LTC, USA  
PRD, J1, 614-7007

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED IAW EO12958  
April 25, 2007  
CH, WHS R & D Div

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38/4

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*A. Deian Sk. c. l. b. 6 m preceding Storm*

### Desert Storm Casualty Summary

	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	US TOTAL	COALITION	GRAND TOTAL
Killed in Action	98	5	24	20	147	87(24 UK)	234
Wounded in Action	354	12	92	9	467	830(43 UK)	1297
Captured					21	2	23
Missing in Action		1			1		1
Non Hostile Death	126	50	44	15	235		235
Non Hostile Injury					2978		2978
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>578</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>3849</b>		<b>4788</b>

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

7/19

As of 07 0600 EST Apr 03

### OIF Fratricide Casualty Summary

	USA	USN	USMC	USAF	US TOTAL	COALITION	GRAND TOTAL
Killed in Action	37	1	29		67	7UK	74
Wounded in Action	125	5	148	1	279	30 UK	309
Captured	7				7		7
Missing in Action	1	1	7		9	2 UK	11
Non Hostile Death	4	1	16	1	22	19UK	41
Non Hostile Injury	22	2	25	3	52		62
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>196</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>436</b>	<b>68 UK</b>	<b>494</b>

Date: 07 0200Z Apr 03

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Classified by: Multiple Sources

Declassify on: 7 April 2017

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

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May 21, 2004

TO: General Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Force Estimate for Iraq

Questions have been raised about whether US, Coalition and Iraqi force levels in Iraq are adequate. This issue has been raised by some Members of Congress and some retired generals. Most recently, I received a memorandum from Ambassador Bremer asking that the issue be reviewed. This is, of course, an issue that you and I have been reviewing continuously with General Abizaid and the Chiefs as circumstances have evolved.

In light of the new and emerging conditions, it would be useful to develop a current, careful assessment of this question, so that all risks can be properly weighed.

If possible, please get back to me by May 27 with an initial military estimate, based on work with General Abizaid and the Joint Chiefs, of force levels appropriate to accomplish the mission in Iraq, to include the following considerations:

- Respond effectively to violence at the current level and possible alternative levels;
- Provide protection for lines of communication and critical infrastructure;
- Provide force protection for CPA/Mission and selected UN and Iraqi civil officials, as appropriate; and
- Provide support for accelerated training and equipping of Iraqi security forces, if appropriate.

Issues to consider include:

- Availability of forces estimated;
- Sustainability of level of effort estimated that may be required;

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OSD 76673-04

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- Evaluation of any risks in other theaters if the forces estimated were committed;
- Impact on rebalancing the force and the Army transformation; and
- Additional roles Iraqi forces might play if their resources were once again increased.

Please provide your assessment in brigade-level increments.

In addition, please provide a separate assessment of the possible force requirements at the end of this year that might be appropriate to provide security for the planned elections. Include an assessment of:

- Iraqi security forces planned to be available at the end of this year and their capability;
- What capabilities international forces might provide, based on a realistic evaluation of their ROEs and performances to date;
- What role new Coalition partners, including Turkey, Pakistan, and others might play, if that proves possible; and
- What security support Peshmerga, Badr Corps, or other existing Iraqi militia might provide for a temporary period.

Please include any other considerations that you, General Abizaid and/or the Chiefs may feel are appropriate.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
May 04/Force Estimate


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DECLASSIFIED IAW EO12958  
April 23, 2007  
CH, WHS R & D Div

07-M-0569

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CHAIRMAN  
of the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Date: 13 July 2004

MEMO TO: The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense

Subject: Iraqi Force Estimate

Mr. Secretary,

Sir, this package responds to your tasking about force levels in Iraq that resulted from Amb. Bremer's memo.

This is a good product, although slightly out of date given the work we're doing with GEN Casey on the Iraq Strategy. I recommend you review this package with that in mind.

Handwritten signature of Richard B. Myers in black ink.

RICHARD B. MYERS  
General, USAF

DECLASSIFIED IAW EO12958  
April 25, 2007  
CH, WHS R & D Div

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OSD 76673-04

07-M-0569



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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1925-04  
13 July 2004

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers/9*

SUBJECT: Force Estimate for Iraq (U)

- **Question.** (§) "Questions have been raised about whether US, Coalition and Iraqi force levels in Iraq are adequate. This issue has been raised by some Members of Congress and some retired generals. Most recently, I received a memorandum from Ambassador Bremer asking that the issue be reviewed. This is, of course, an issue that you and I have been reviewing continuously with General Abizaid and the Chiefs as circumstances have evolved.

(§) In light of the new and emerging conditions, it would be useful to develop a current, careful assessment of this question, so that all risks can be properly weighed. If possible, please get back to me ... with an initial military estimate ... of force levels appropriate to accomplish the mission in Iraq, ... to include any other considerations that General Abizaid and/or the Chiefs may feel are appropriate. (TAB A)

- **Answer.** (§) Commander, USCENTCOM (CDRUSCENTCOM), constantly evaluates the number of forces required to be successful in Iraq. CDRUSCENTCOM believes forces in theater are adequate to perform the current tasks and has developed options to request more forces should the current environment change.
- **Analysis.** (§) The current force level in Iraq is 18 US brigades and 5 Coalition brigades. This force level will be reduced to 17 US brigades and 5 Coalition brigades by Aug 04 due to previously scheduled troop rotations. Forces are currently resourced at this level through Mar 06 (the end of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM 3). A recent CDRUSCENTCOM estimate, however, provides a more optimistic forecast that predicts by Jul 04, Multi-National Forces-Iraq will begin the transition to local control and by Jan 05 it may be able to transition to regional control, reducing force requirements to only 7 US brigades. TAB B provides amplifying information.

COORDINATION: (U) TAB C

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General N. A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; 697-3702

NOT RELEASABLE TO  
FOREIGN NATIONALS

Classified By: N. A. Schwartz, Lt Gen, USAF; DJ-3  
Reason: 1.5 (a)  
Declassify On: 15 June 2014

# SECRET//NOFORN

OSD 76673-04

TAB A

~~SECRET~~

May 21, 2004

TO: General Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Force Estimate for Iraq

Questions have been raised about whether US, Coalition and Iraqi force levels in Iraq are adequate. This issue has been raised by some Members of Congress and some retired generals. Most recently, I received a memorandum from Ambassador Bremer asking that the issue be reviewed. This is, of course, an issue that you and I have been reviewing continuously with General Abizaid and the Chiefs as circumstances have evolved.

In light of the new and emerging conditions, it would be useful to develop a current, careful assessment of this question, so that all risks can be properly weighed.

If possible, please get back to me by May 27 with an initial military estimate, based on work with General Abizaid and the Joint Chiefs, of force levels appropriate to accomplish the mission in Iraq, to include the following considerations:

- Respond effectively to violence at the current level and possible alternative levels;
- Provide protection for lines of communication and critical infrastructure;
- Provide force protection for CPA/Mission and selected UN and Iraqi civil officials, as appropriate; and
- Provide support for accelerated training and equipping of Iraqi security forces, if appropriate.

Issues to consider include:

- Availability of forces estimated;
- Sustainability of level of effort estimated that may be required;

~~SECRET~~

Tab A

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- Evaluation of any risks in other theaters if the forces estimated were committed;
- Impact on rebalancing the force and the Army transformation; and
- Additional roles Iraqi forces might play if their resources were once again increased.

Please provide your assessment in brigade-level increments.

In addition, please provide a separate assessment of the possible force requirements at the end of this year that might be appropriate to provide security for the planned elections. Include an assessment of:

- Iraqi security forces planned to be available at the end of this year and their capability;
- What capabilities international forces might provide, based on a realistic evaluation of their ROEs and performances to date;
- What role new Coalition partners, including Turkey, Pakistan, and others might play, if that proves possible; and
- What security support Peshmerga, Badr Corps, or other existing Iraqi militia might provide for a temporary period.

Please include any other considerations that you, General Abizaid and/or the Chiefs may feel are appropriate.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
May 04/Force Estimate

Tab A

2

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DECLASSIFIED IAW EO12958  
April 25, 2007  
CH, WHS R & D Div

07-M-0569

# ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

TAB B

17 June 2004

## IRAQ FORCE ESTIMATE (S)

1. (S) In addition to the military estimate for forces required in Iraq, the SecDef requested several issues be taken into consideration.

Issue #1: (S) "Respond effectively to violence at the current level and possible alternative levels"

### (U) Response:

- (S//NF) The current force level in Iraq is 18 x US brigades and 5 x Coalition brigades.
  - (S//NF) This force level will be reduced to 17 x US brigades and 5 x Coalition brigades by Aug 04 due to scheduled troop rotations.
  - (S//NF) In July 04, Commander, USCENTCOM (CDRUSCENTCOM), anticipates beginning transition to local control.
  - (S//NF) By January 05, CDRUSCENTCOM anticipates beginning the transition to regional control, which is estimated to require only 7 US brigades. The transition will take until Jan 06 to complete, if the security environment supports a full transition.
- (S//NF) Current force levels are based on the security situation in Iraq remaining stable or improving.
  - (S//NF) Joint Staff intelligence estimates that the potential exists for sectarian fighting in Baghdad, Karbala, Kirkuk and Mosul, and that an atmosphere of instability remains. Zargawi will consider the Interim Iraqi Government illegitimate and installed by the United States.
  - (S//NF) Additionally, Islamic extremists and transnational terrorists will continue to target the Coalition, Shi'a population, Iraqi security elements and the new Iraqi government to destabilize the environment.
- (S//NF) To counter an increase in violence in Iraq, CDRUSCENTCOM may need up to 4.0 additional brigades.

Tab B

NOT RELEASABLE TO  
FOREIGN NATIONALS

Classified By: Lt Gen N. A. Schwartz, USAF; DJ-3  
Reason: 1.5 (a)  
Declassify On: 15 June 2014

# ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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April 25, 2007  
CFI, WHS R & D Div

07-M-0569

# ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

- ~~(S//NF)~~ These additional brigades would be used to:
  - o ~~(S//NF)~~ Help conduct counterinsurgency operations (a 5 brigade commitment would be increased to 7 brigades) (+2.0 brigades)
  - o ~~(S//NF)~~ Protect lines of communication and key infrastructure (a 4 brigade commitment would be increased to 5.5 brigades) (+1.5 brigades)
  - o ~~(S//NF)~~ Bolster support for the UN should SecDef assign such a mission (a 1 brigade commitment would be increased to 1.5 brigades) (+.5 brigades)
  
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Potential triggers for a request for additional forces are:
  - o ~~(S//NF)~~ Large-scale violent demonstrations
  - o ~~(S//NF)~~ Large-scale rioting or looting
  - o ~~(S//NF)~~ Large-scale multi-ethnic demonstrations
  - o ~~(S//NF)~~ Significant increase in attacks against Coalition forces
  - o ~~(S//NF)~~ A Coalition brigade (+) force withdraws
  - o ~~(S//NF)~~ A general uprising in two major population areas at once
  - o ~~(S//NF)~~ Lines of communications (LOCs) assessments go to RED
  - o ~~(S//NF)~~ Coalition sustainment is degraded by 25 percent due to LOCs instability.
  
- ~~(S//NF)~~ The total number of US brigades required in Iraq, in a worst case scenario, could grow to as high as 25 US brigades.
  - o ~~(S//NF)~~ 17 x brigades for sustainment
  - o ~~(S//NF)~~ 3.5 x brigades for increased violence
  - o ~~(S//NF)~~ 3 x brigades for elections
  - o ~~(S//NF)~~ 1.5 x brigades for UN security
  - o ~~(S//NF)~~ The number of brigades will be dependent upon the security situation, the need for increased security during the elections, and whether or not Coalition forces will provide UN security.

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**Issue #2: (S) "Provide protection for lines of communication and critical infrastructure"**

**(U) Response:**

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Two brigades are dedicated solely to LOC protection and convoy security.
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ Units are also responsible for LOC security within their areas of responsibility.
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ After events in April, a brigade was added in the Babil Province just south of Baghdad to enhance security in an area where LOCs were particularly vulnerable.
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ In the case of increased violence, security for lines of communication will require an additional 0.5 brigades.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Protection of Key Infrastructure
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ Iraqi ministries are currently responsible for facilities protection with support from coalition forces.
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ Fixed security and quick reaction forces are available to maintain security for critical oil and electrical facilities.
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ Coalition forces will augment Iraqi forces to protect ~45 critical nodes with 2.5 brigades beginning 1 Jul 04.
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ In the case of increased violence the number of protected sites will increase to ~70. This will require an additional 1.0 brigade.
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ Multinational Force—Iraq's (MNF-I's) reserve force has been committed, reconstituted and recommitted to missions in Ad Diwaniyah and Karbala.
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ Moreover, forces have been shifted between division sectors for specific missions and precise periods of time. The flexibility, lethality and agility of these forces permit them to cover more missions than specific numbers might indicate.

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**Issue #3: (S) "Provide force protection for the CPA/Mission and selected UN and Iraqi civil/officials, as appropriate"**

**(U) Response:**

- ~~(S//NF)~~ MNF-I projects the need for an additional brigade for UN security if tasked.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ With increased violence, this requirement would grow to 1.5 brigades.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ MNF-I will provide security for the Interim Iraqi Government until 1 Aug 04.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Two battalion HQs with 8 companies and Marine security detachments secure the Baghdad "Green Zone" executing mounted escort duties. This will increase minimally with the stand up of the US Mission in Iraq, but will be sustainable with current forces. Initial work toward US Embassy (USEMB) security agreements began 12-14 May during a DOD and DOS transition conference. Five USEMB Regional Teams will be embedded at Coalition locations and will have fixed and convoy security provided by those forces. Three USEMB Regional Teams will stand alone, using existing CPA governate facilities with contracted security. DOS is requesting US military capability to replace contracted security. The details for security requirements at those locations are being negotiated. Upon agreement, all USEMB security requirements will be solidified with a memorandum of agreement with DOS.

**Issue #4: (S) "Provide support for accelerated training and equipping of Iraqi security forces, if appropriate." What additional roles Iraqi forces might play if their resources were once again increased? What Iraqi security forces will be available at the end of this year and their capability?"**

**(U) Response:**

- ~~(S//NF)~~ The Coalition is looking at numerous options to put Iraqis in charge as soon as possible, wherever possible. The current projection is that the Iraqi Security Forces will not be ready to take control of the country until April 05 (at the earliest), but the Coalition may be able to handover control of specific areas or cities based on the security situation and Iraqi Security Force proficiency. USCENTCOM assesses readiness to handover local control to the Iraqis much quicker in the north and south than in other areas.

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- ~~(S//NF)~~ In April 04, Iraqi Security Forces were employed before they were ready and subsequently sustained significant setbacks. In order to prevent additional difficulties like those experienced in April, training for many units has been re-initialized.
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ The Office of Security Transition (OST), has been given the task of training, mentoring and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces. The OST is currently upgrading its plan for training and mentoring requirements and has indicated that additional specific augmentees may be required to support critical training. The Joint Staff is coordinating with Force Providers to source the additional forces now.
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ Additionally, MNF-I has accelerated contracts for equipment, improved its mentoring program and plans to embed Coalition forces with Iraqi Security Forces on joint patrols. MNF-I will continue to train Iraq Security Forces to standard and will employ them only when they are ready.
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ Iraq Security Forces, when trained and ready, will begin patrols in low threat areas. In medium threat areas, Iraq Security Forces will conduct joint patrols with Coalition forces. Coalition forces will continue to patrol high threat areas using intel driven, precision tactics.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ A projection of where Iraqi Security Forces capability will be at the end of the year (Dec 04) is as follows:
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ Iraqi Armed Forces: 9 brigades, 27 battalions, including 3 Iraqi National Task Force brigades, will be trained and equipped.
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ Iraqi Civil Defense Corps: 45 battalions will be trained and equipped.
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ Iraqi Police Forces: Manning will be at or above the 89,000 + required. Transition Integration Program training will be completed for 50 percent and Academy training will be completed for 20 percent. All equipment will be delivered, and infrastructure improvements will be ongoing.
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ Department of Border Enforcement: Manning will be at or above the 21,000+ required. All equipment will be delivered, and infrastructure improvements will continue.
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ Facilities Protection Service: Fully manned at 75,000 and operational under the control and supervision of the Ministry of Interior.

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Issue #5: (S) "Issues to consider include:"

a. (S) "availability of forces estimated; sustainability of level of effort that may be required; ... impact on rebalancing the force and Army transformation..."

(U) Response:

- (S/NF) A commitment of 20 - 25 US brigades is unsustainable beyond the short term.
- (S/NF) An Iraqi scenario demanding 25 US brigades would leave 16.67 active brigades for global contingency operations:
- (S/NF) Of these brigades, none are available without caveat. Five brigades would have just returned from combat and the remaining 11.67 brigades would be resetting from a previous combat deployment.
  - (S/NF) Active brigades would be the best option for Fall 2004 deployments due to the lead time required to deploy most Reserve Component brigades.
- (S/NF) A commitment of 17 US brigades can be maintained through Mar 06.
- (S/NF) Army is unable to provide specific impacts to transformation and modularization for all levels of effort without further analysis.

b. (S) "Evaluation of any risks in other theaters if the forces estimated were committed"

(U) Response:

- (S/NF) Deploying additional brigades to Iraq would impact follow on deployments in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and would pose additional risk to operations in Korea.
  - (S/NF) Impacts to follow on OIF/OEF deployments include: the requirement for the remobilization of reserve brigades; delayed reset of OIF 2 formations; potential task saturation of the Defense Transportation System; remobilization of port of entry support personnel and aircrews; and increase RC remobilizations for many combat support and combat service support units.

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- (~~S/NF~~) Risk to Korea is as follows: delays the achievement of initial objectives; more depth to initial North Korea attack, but stopped before Seoul; and increased US/ROK equipment losses.

2. (S) In addition, assessments of the possible force requirements at the end of this year that might provide security for the planned elections include the following.

a. (S) Question: "What capabilities international forces might provide, based on a realistic evaluation of their ROEs and performances to date?"

(U) Answer:

- (~~S/NF~~) Additional international capabilities would be welcomed; these nation's troops would be employed in accordance with their ROE and national policies.
  - (~~S/NF~~) International forces could provide effective anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) support and other capabilities.
    - (~~S/NF~~) AT/FP capabilities include: fixed-site security for international organizations and critical infrastructure, convoy security detachments, personal security details, military working dog teams and counter-mine/counter improvised explosive device capability
    - (~~S/NF~~) Support capabilities include: trainers for Iraqi security forces, explosive ordnance disposal, medical support, intra-theater lift and base support
    - (~~S/NF~~) International forces could also provide security for and participate in Joint Coordination Centers, Regional Teams and Governance Support Teams. This would free other Coalition forces with more robust ROE to participate in offensive operations
- (~~S/NF~~) Korea, Great Britain, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Pakistan and other countries are considering increases to OIF troop contributions.
  - (~~S/NF~~) Korea plans to provide a 3600-man "peace and reconstruction" contingent
  - (~~S/NF~~) Britain is considering an addition of approximately 3000 personnel to offset the Spanish withdrawal.

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- ~~(S//NF)~~ Georgia and Azerbaijan may increase their current contributions, however, these are small and any increase in international contributions is unlikely to occur prior to 2005.

b. ~~(S)~~ Question: "What role new Coalition partners, including Turkey, Pakistan, and others might play, if that proves possible?"

(U) Answer:

- ~~(S//NF)~~ A Pakistani troop deployment to Iraq is still not likely, but it may be more feasible now than in the past. Getting Islamabad to provide forces will require the United States to give firm commitments on the four criteria GoP officials have set out, the most notable being the financing of a Pakistani deployment. The United States will also need to respond to a hard Pakistani push for additional military and/or economic aid, since Musharraf will need to respond to political opponents.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ An agreement by the United Nations to provide peacekeeping stipends could convince nations like Pakistan, Bangladesh and India to participate. India's recent change of government, however, could have a negative impact on its willingness to contribute troops.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Given the statements made at the June G-8 summit, it is unlikely that France, Germany or Belgium will end their opposition to OIF and make a troop contribution. Russia is also unlikely to change its position unless it perceives a potential for substantial economic gains.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Turkish participation offers have not been accepted due to the Kurdish situation in the north.

c. ~~(S)~~ Question: "What security support Peshmerga, Badr Corps, or other existing Iraqi militia might provide for a temporary period?"

(U) Answer:

- ~~(S//NF)~~ Initiatives to incorporate the BADR Corps and the Pesh Merga into the Iraqi Security Forces are being pursued. Present plans include forming three Iraqi Civil Defense Corps battalions from the Pesh Merga and recruiting up to 2000 BADR Corps members into the Iraqi Security Forces. There are plans to recruit individuals from other militias and incorporate them into the existing Iraqi Security Force framework.

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3. (S) "Please include any other considerations that you, General Abizaid and/or the Chiefs may feel are appropriate."

(S//NF) Answer: An additional consideration is the transition to Iraqi Sovereignty.

- (S//NF) Following the transition of sovereignty, the majority of Coalition forces are transitioning from counter-insurgency operations to building Iraqi Security Forces and protecting key infrastructure. USCENTCOM re-prioritized tasks while continuing the counter-insurgency fight are: protect the UN should such a mission be assigned; secure the US mission and key infrastructure nodes and/or lines of communication; train and employ capable Iraqi Security Force; conduct intel-driven, precision attacks; and secure and destroy captured enemy ammunition.
  - (S//NF) The Coalition is transitioning to Iraqi-led, joint coalition patrols and providing major coalition support to Iraqi Security Forces.
  - (S//NF) In low threat areas, patrols will consist of Iraqi Security Forces only.
  - (S//NF) In moderate threat areas, patrols will consist of Iraqi Security Forces and Coalition forces. Coalition forces will continue to patrol high threat activity areas.
  - (S//NF) Above all, the Coalition will not allow large-scale failures of the Iraqi Security Forces. Additionally, Iraqi Security Forces should be capable of providing the necessary security for elections and country-wide security not earlier than April 05.
- (S//NF) The following steps are necessary after the transfer of sovereignty: expedite local control (especially in the north and south); recast mission elements; and redeploy/curtail deployment of US forces where and when able. Furthermore, fielding a credible and capable Iraqi Security Force is critical; as is establishing a robust and synchronized US/United Kingdom/Iraq Strategic Communication architecture. These procedures are required to establish an aggressive campaign to articulate Interim Iraqi Government legitimacy and foster international and domestic Iraqi support.

4. (U) Summary

- (S//NF) CDRUSCENTCOM constantly evaluates the number of forces required to be successful in Iraq. The current level of commitment, 17 US brigades, is assessed as sustainable until Mar 06.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

- ~~(S//NF)~~ If the security situation in Iraq deteriorates, additional forces could be committed for a short time period. These forces would most likely come from the United States via the active components of the USA and USMC.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Strategically there is risk to Korea and US ability to react to other global crises without significant dwell time violations in the active component and remobilizations throughout the reserve component.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ CDRUSCENTCOM plans to begin transition to local control in some areas on 1 Jul 04 and, as early as Jan 05; CDRUSCENTCOM will begin the transition to regional control in some areas. The endstate of regional control, to occur on or about Jan 06, security environment permitting, is estimated to require 7 US brigades.

Prepared By: Lieutenant General Norton A. Schwartz, USAF; Director J-3; 697-3702

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

# UNCLASSIFIED

TAB C

## COORDINATION PAGE

USCENTCOM	Col Boozer	21 June 2004
USA	COL Chappell	18 June 2004
USN	CAPT Rush	24 June 2004
USAF	Copy Provided	24 June 2004
USMC	Col Van Dyke	18 June 2004

Tab C

# UNCLASSIFIED



PTTSZYUW RUCADHQ2954 1061503-SSSS--RUEKNMA.  
ZNY SSSSS  
P 161415Z APR 03  
FM USCENTCOM FWD  
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
INFO RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC  
RUCADHQ/USCENTCOM FWD//SUPR//



~~SECRET~~

SUBJ: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (S)

PERSONAL FOR SECDEF

1. MR. SECRETARY, WE HAVE ACHIEVED DECISIVE MILITARY VICTORY IN IRAQ. COALITION ARMED FORCES HAVE DEFEATED IRAQ'S ELITE AND FIELDED MILITARY FORCES, CAPTURED THE MAIN POPULATION CENTERS, PROTECTED IRAQ'S OIL WEALTH, AND DESTROYED THE REGIME'S CAPACITY TO THREATEN THE IRAQI PEOPLE AND REGIONAL NEIGHBORS.
2. BELIEVE NOW IS THE TIME TO OFFICIALLY ACKNOWLEDGE THE END OF DECISIVE COMBAT OPERATIONS (PHASE III) AND THE BEGINNING OF STABILITY OPERATIONS (PHASE IV). I BELIEVE SUCH A MOVE WILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT UPON INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN IRAQI'S POST-WAR STABILITY. THE ARRIVAL OF ADDITIONAL INTERNATIONAL COMBAT AND POLICE/PARAMILITARY FORCES WILL ALLOW US TO ACCELERATE THE WITHDRAWAL OF OUR TROOPS.
3. WITH THE BEGINNING OF PHASE IV, I WILL DESIGNATE THE CFLCC (LTG MCKIERNAN), COMMANDER, CJTF-IRAQ. WHILE THIS IS PRIMARILY A NAME CHANGE, IT ALSO INDICATES TO ALL A NEW BEGINNING. JAY GARNER WILL SIT AT THE SIDE OF DAVE MCKIERNAN AND ORCHESTRATE THE INITIALIZATION OF IRAQI INSTITUTIONS. WE WILL REPLACE MCKIERNAN WITHIN 90 DAYS WITH ANOTHER THREE-STAR HEADQUARTERS - EITHER US OR INTERNATIONAL (E.G. THE ALLIED RAPID REACTION CORPS - ARRC). AS THIS MOVES FORWARD, WE WILL FURTHER REDUCE OUR COMBAT FORCES.
4. IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR VISION, OUR MILITARY ACTION MUST NOW BE MATCHED BY AN EQUALLY DECISIVE CAMPAIGN TO ACHIEVE STABILITY AND TO RETURN IRAQ TO FULL IRAQI CONTROL. THE CHALLENGES AHEAD REQUIRE MORE POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL MUSCLE THAN MILITARY MUSCLE AND WILL DEMAND THE FULL APPLICATION OF OUR NATION'S RESOURCES AND THOSE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. JAY GARNER IS MOVING TO BAGDAD NOW, AND WITHIN 90 DAYS HIS ACTIONS WILL BEGIN TO TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER THAT OF OUR MILITARY COMMANDER. MY SENSE IS THAT THE SPEED WITH WHICH WE ARE ABLE TO REDUCE THE US MILITARY FOOTPRINT IS DIRECTLY TIED TO THE SPEED WITH WHICH WE ARE ABLE TO FUND RECONSTRUCTION AND BUILD THE FUTURE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. VERY RESPECTFULLY, TOM FRANKS.  
CLASSIFIED BY: T. R. FRANKS

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Advances realized since the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom over four years ago have been significant. The Taliban regime in Afghanistan has been toppled, the Al Qaeda network that had been permitted free reign here has lost its primary base for global operations, and the foundation has been established for the emergence of a stable, moderate, Afghan Government committed to denying sanctuary to international terrorism.

When measured against the relevant baselines of late-2001, gains in establishing the conditions for reasonable governance and justice, security, and socio-economic sufficiency needed to underpin democratic rule in Afghanistan have been impressive. A brutal repressive arbitrary government has been replaced by one popularly elected, founded upon a modern constitution. Militias responsible to commanders who ruled with impunity have given way to national security forces responsible to the state and adherent to the rule of law. The denial of basic social services – such as education and female health care – is no longer a function of policy, but of nascent, but still insufficient, government capacity.

Afghanistan's remarkable accomplishments in just four-plus years is all the more impressive given that they have occurred in a nation that had been at war with itself for the past thirty years, suffered the utter destruction of its human capital, was bereft of any viable economic infrastructure, and still remains lacking any easily exploitable economic resources.

Afghans remain optimistic about their future, President Karzai retains his popularity, and the licit economy continues to grow at double digit rates annually. Moreover, the international community's commitment to Afghanistan still appears strong with NATO-ISAF's mission expanding and long-term financial aid pledged at the January 2006 London Conference at levels much higher than many anticipated.

### **Changing Strategic Environment**

At the same time, it is increasingly evident that our campaign will face new and mounting challenges over the next few years. We must be prepared to consider whether and how to accommodate changes in the

strategic environment here through dynamic adaptation or risk meeting goals that are out of time and insufficient to satisfy national objectives. Complex Afghan domestic and Central-South Asian regional counter forces are emerging that threaten to retard progress. The rapidly growing strategic significance of the Pashtun Belt that lies astride the Afghan-Pakistan border must also be reconsidered in terms of its effect on US long-term strategic objectives in Afghanistan and regionally.

Inside of Afghanistan, the grafting of a foreign, democratic governance structure onto a tribal-centered, feudal society has led on occasion to destabilizing social and cultural consequences have created losers among various classes of society – traditional Islamists not reconciled to what they view as the rise of secularism, tribal groups fearful of loss of autonomy at the hands of the state, and factional leaders concerned that the imposition of rule of law will come at the expense of their political and financial power. High rates of unemployment and a pervasive, corrosive, narco-economy provide abundant human and material resources to those who wish to oppose the advance of the central government. Moreover, a xenophobic militant religious ideology widely spread and articulated over the past thirty years of anti-Soviet jihad, civil war, and Taliban misrule serves as a readily available resource to galvanize psychological and political opposition to our own goals.

Regionally, it also appears that counter forces seeking to deny or hinder campaign success are beginning to emerge. From 2001 – 2004, regional powers modestly supported, or at least quietly acquiesced, to Operation Enduring Freedom – Afghanistan. Over the past several years, conditions have substantively changed with regional powers, including Russia and perhaps China, serving as centrifugal forces, variously seeking to counter Western influence or hedging their bets against an early withdrawal of U.S. and NATO military forces. A rising India to the south, counterpoint to the static or declining efficacy of the Pakistan state, will also factor into Afghanistan's still-tenuous future.

Indeed, it might be argued that the gains achieved from 2002 to 2005 were facilitated by two benign factors no longer in play. First, the clear political milestones established by the Bonn process (constitution, presidential elections, parliamentary elections) forced consensus and prioritization of efforts by both the international community and Afghan elites. Second, the domestic and regional counter forces described above

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had not yet emerged and gained coherence. However, the political-military-economic environment now appears to be rapidly transforming. An increasingly rudderless Karzai Administration, and the rise of new and more dangerous internal and external threats, are the distinguishing features of the emerging landscape.

Militarily, the situation remains very manageable. It is true that followers of the militant Taliban ideology are operating in Southern Afghanistan with improved direction, in larger formations, with a more sophisticated insurgency campaign plan than we have previously seen. Monies earned from narco-trafficking and popular support garnered for "protecting" farmers from government eradication have added to their strength. The Taliban enjoy domestic sanctuary and varying degrees local support in some districts of Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, Zabul, and -- of concern of late -- Ghazni Province, all well within the southwest quadrant of the Pashtun Belt. In the east, on the other side of the Pakistan border, sanctuary and fertile ground for recruitment is even more pronounced, as the Taliban grip on the FATA, and in particular its southern agencies, tightens, and as an increasingly alarmed Pakistan gropes for a solution.

However, against these negative trends, the thickening of Coalition and NATO-ISAF forces in the South, new Afghan National Security Force deployments to those same areas, imminent Coalition-Afghan offensive operations, and anticipated Pakistan Army deployments to the Baluchistan Frontier will reverse insurgent gains.

Military operations by themselves are, however, insufficient to achieve counter-insurgency campaign success. Our military efforts are designed to provide visible signs of enduring security behind which the Afghans can build their "middle ground" of civil society, terrain which they will defend themselves if threatened again by militant extremists. This is a longer-term effort and comprises two main tasks: 1) build the capacity of the Afghan State to provide for its own security; and 2) facilitate, through robust economic and social infrastructure investment, the creation of the Afghans' middle ground. The two tasks are interdependent. Inadequate security constrains governance and reconstruction efforts. Insufficient economic development creates insecurity, especially among an Afghan citizenry who naively believed democratic elections would immediately yield significant improvements in their livelihoods.

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## Four Areas for Strategic Review

Against the mounting challenges we are facing in maintaining campaign momentum, I offer four areas in the domain of strategy and policy that should be actively discussed and perhaps acted upon.

- 1. The Role of Pakistan: We have vastly improved operational military coordination over the past year between the U.S., Pakistan, and Afghanistan, yet it is clear Islamabad has not made a strategic choice to eliminate the senior Afghan extremist Taliban leadership resident in Quetta, Waziristan, and Peshawar. Whereas the U.S. views the terrorist threat posed by Al Qaeda and its Associated Movements as strategic and wages war to utterly destroy the network, Pakistan's Punjabi ruling elite views the Pashtun Tribal Belt through the eyes of a colonial overseer battling an insurgency. In short, they are not fighting a counter-terrorist campaign. We aim to destroy an irreconcilable, dangerous enemy; they seek political stability. Our goals are often at odds. Additionally, uncertain about the long-term prospects for stability in Afghanistan, some within senior Pakistan councils may advocate retention of the "Taliban card" in case Afghanistan reverts to a Great Game battlefield with Iran, India, Uzbekistan, Russia, and Pakistan all vying for influence. Under this scenario, the Taliban could provide a weak Pakistan state a cost-effective means of dominating the Pashtun lands on both sides of its border with Afghanistan. With the events of the past year in the FATA, however, others within the Pakistan policy elite may have cause to question its viability. Whatever the rationale for its current strategy, the fact remains that unless Islamabad moves to attack and disrupt the senior Taliban leadership in Pakistan, it will be difficult to defeat the insurgency in Afghanistan, more especially given the regional and other emerging counter forces to our mission mentioned above. At a minimum, Islamabad's failure to act is extending US time, losses, and financial expenditures in the Afghanistan campaign. The single most transformational event that could occur in the short-term to speed progress would be an unambiguous and decisive attack by Pakistan security forces against the senior Afghan extremist Taliban leadership enjoying sanctuary inside their country.
  
- 2. The Karzai Administration and State Building: President Karzai remains indispensable to the future success of Afghanistan. A

charismatic, clean, populist with a "good" vision of the common Afghan man's future, he was a brilliant, albeit well-mentored, consensus-builder as he negotiated the Bonn political roadmap. However, as the distance from Bonn grows, the urgent task at hand is now the establishment of enduring, capable, and respected state and provincial level institutions. We must be clear – Karzai is not by nature or disposition a state builder. Under pressure, he is vulnerable to advisers who see crises in a Pashtun tribal context; he is fully aware of a growing "northern" restiveness and his sensitivities to the need for ethnic balance at the national level show through occasionally, but not consistently; he has failed to engage fully with the Parliament and, critically, its key northern (Uzbek and Tajik) leaders, some of whom, he now fears, may be conspiring against him. He has not led, but rather has been dragged into, facing the problems of severe corruption and of old friends and loyal families whose actions threaten to undermine Afghanistan's national progress. Two examples:

- First, the security situation in Uruzgan has sharply deteriorated over the past two years. However, since 2003, U.S. officials have urged Karzai to remove the extremely venal warlord Governor Jan Mohammed Khan. Karzai, who fought with Khan against the Taliban, did not move until March 2006, with predictable results. Indeed, even today, Jan Mohammed Khan is Karzai's defacto security envoy in the province and we increasingly risk being seen by the people of Uruzgan as fighting on the wrong side. Similar examples exist in Helmand, Ghazni, Konar, and Farah provinces – all areas in which insurgents have gained ground;
- Second, Karzai's unwillingness to associate himself with and publicly support Afghanistan's army and police building programs has retarded the growth of both of these important institutions. Karzai, and his peers, have never in their adult lifetimes seen credible national security institutions – in fact, the ones they did experience served under the command of the hated communist regime. Hence, few Afghan leaders fully understand the importance and attributes of a good army and police force; worse they are suspicious and fearful of such impersonal instruments of power. When threatened, they revert back to what worked for them when fighting as a guerilla force

– relying on bands of fighters connected by family and tribal ties. Hence, Karzai's preference for armed militias versus national police to deal with the current Taliban threat, (though here, the tardiness of the international community in delivering a comprehensive police reform program has not given Karzai, until very recently, much in the way of satisfactory alternatives). On the other hand, his fear of political confrontation is also at play as he continues to delay the tough choices of police reform implementation, while instead enthusiastically embracing the much easier path of activating tribal militias and dispensing political patronage throughout his southern Pashtun power base. The astute Afghan Director of the National Security Directorate, the Minister of Defense, and the Minister of the Interior are all sharply critical of Karzai's seeming indifference to his three major national security institutions. Given the potentially fractious nature of Afghan society, if the central leadership does not embrace these institutions, there are limits to how far they will advance. We are beginning to see signs of this.

The next Afghan presidential election will be in 2009. The event will be Afghan, not UN, organized and led. The Bonn-process will be long-forgotten, and the electorate will be focused on security, the provision of reasonable governance and justice, and the delivery of social services. The tempo of state building must increase or we will suffer a setback and disorder at that time. Karzai desperately needs strategic thinkers and doers in his immediate entourage (a point most Afghan elites and international community leaders agree upon). He also must be made more accountable for reigning in mounting corruption and for building state institutions. Lastly, he must develop, and advertise, a political manifesto for action – his Government's only messages are about the evils of Pakistan, other "external hands" and the Taliban. He has no coherent, simple, positive agenda that would permit him to connect his people to the outlying districts and mobilize the people. As we draw closer to the next Afghan presidential election, Karzai's attention will increasingly be drawn to securing a second term and he will be even less inclined to make difficult or controversial decisions. This has a bearing on the time available to energize Karzai's state building efforts; time for action is limited.

- 3. Inadequate Infrastructure Investment: The military counter insurgency campaign cannot be fully effective if it is isolated from the people it seeks to influence. The most effective means to forge a lasting link in the public mind between the enhanced security environment produced by CFC and ANA and the benign hand of the Afghan government itself is reconstruction and development, and the closer this link in time, the better. I am convinced that the highest dividends in this regard involve roads, power and water. These projects provide visible and tangible security improvements, better governance, and economic livelihood. Ideas travel down roads and break the enemy's grip on isolated villages and districts. With the road comes access to further infrastructure improvements as resources quite literally begin to flow in, markets are accessed, people build, and lives improve – in short, the development of the “Middle ground” -- and association with these benefits accrues to the government. There is also a clear and direct correlation between roads and enhanced security and stability. Roads, in particular, provide a means to expand ANSF presence and kick start the upward security spiral that stabilizes communities. Improved road networks also support the counter-narcotics campaign and facilitate access to schools and health clinics. Finally, roads provide a concrete symbol of central government influence; and their absence advertises limited government influence and sanctuary for insurgents. A program to connect provincial and district roads in the South and East would cost an estimated \$450 million USD. But to lock in their benefits, we must also consider specific capacity-building programs designed to enhance the GOA's ability to maintain these critical transport links in future years. Following the road projects, we must encourage other investment in reconstruction and infrastructure that will provide sustainable, highly visible improvements to quality of life, including power, (including local hydro electric systems where applicable), water provision and irrigation, and essential social services. Right now, if I were offered the choice of either more resources for roads or for the deployment of another infantry battalion, I would choose roads. If, however, current trends continue, I might in the future have no choice but to opt for the infantry battalion. Improvements in border management infrastructure are also a key to Afghanistan's development. Border management as a whole must be addressed in a more coherent and integrated way, especially if it is to realize the potential annual

customs revenue of \$600 million USD that the World Bank believes effective border management might generate. We must invest now in infrastructure to avert the requirement for additional force deployments in future. Infrastructure development is also the critical enabler that can lure private sector investment into Afghanistan and begin to wean the country from reliance on donor funding.

- 4. Strengthening Afghan National Security Forces: Given the low baselines and human capital challenges, from 2001-2005, the ANSF leadership and structures was not capable of taking into service, maintaining and operating more sophisticated equipment than what we initially provided them. Such investment at that time would not have been prudent. The development of affordable, light forces with straightforward capabilities was entirely sensible. Currently, however, as the threat has evolved, the ANSF capacity to take on better equipment has increased, and the need for Afghanistan - given rising counter forces discussed above - to have better, more capable security forces is now of greater urgency than before. To ensure that the emerging ANSF continue to grow in stature and capability to a level that will ensure their enduring success, there is a need to upgrade equipment, salaries, and training. I am not advocating high tech transformation for the ANSF, but the provision of body armor, improved ground mobility, rotor- and fixed wing aircraft for greater tactical and operational mobility, and more reliable and lethal equipment are needed to ensure Afghan forces are able to provide a credible, highly visible, security presence among their people and are able to overmatch their enemies. The problem is affordability and sustainability. Providing better equipment and increasing pay benefits to the security forces of world's fourth poorest nation needs careful consideration. Even under the most optimistic economic scenarios, the Government of Afghanistan will not be capable of providing for its operating expenses for many years. We must consider carefully to what degree and for how long we are willing to subsidize the army and police forces. A less aggressive program in the short-term may result in greater long-term costs as our own presence force will be extended, while rising Afghan frustration with their inability to maintain their own sovereignty further erodes political stability. Cognizant of resource constraints under the existing strategy, we are exploring options beyond current limits

A theme that runs through these observations is timing. The Bonn process provided a clear road map and milestones for the development of a democratic, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. The London Compact provides the way ahead, but its more complex goals are less conducive to straightforward projections in time and, given their difficulty, we risk strategic drift. This is more of a possibility given the transitions that will dominate the coming year, the lack of an Afghan government manifesto, the still embryonic state of the national institutions, the painfully slow expansion of central government influence and the relative proximity to the next Afghan Presidential election.

Given this context and the four observations above, it would be prudent to reconsider now the grand strategy for Afghanistan, to be sure that resource requirements are clearly laid out and made available for action in the 2007/8 window of opportunity before Karzai becomes more focused on preparing for the 2009 Presidential election. Of course, accurate resource prediction will require as clear a vision as possible of where we hope Afghanistan will be developmentally in five and ten years time.

- The most ambitious goal, requiring the greatest investment, projects Afghanistan as a reliable and stable ally, providing a firm base from which to conduct operations against a global ideological movement and insurgency which uses terrorism as its preferred tactic. This vision views Afghanistan as a geo-strategically placed partner in the fight against militant Islam and a fulcrum point at the heart of Central Asia, whose influence and position would be taken into consideration by Russia, China and Iran. Such an Afghanistan would be a stabilizing influence rather than a cause for concern as a potential terrorist haven. While this was the original US strategic vision that emerged after our 2001 intervention here, at current resource levels we are unlikely to be able to realize it.
- Alternatively, a less far-reaching option would be to invest to an extent that Afghanistan is not recidivist, but would likely require future interventions to maintain the security situation. A sort of "strategic raiding" concept, where international forces dip in and out of Afghanistan to help maintain security and stability. Such a strategy requires less initial investment but does carry significantly more risk, including greater Afghan vulnerability to influence from neighboring states, including Iran.

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I believe that, while our original vision for Afghanistan remains sound, we are unlikely to realize it fully without flexible adaptation to the changing strategic environment in which we must operate. In the post 9/11 environment, the failure to do so will have direct consequences for US national interests. Now is the right time to review and determine our strategic goals and the level of ambition we have for Afghanistan. Is just enough, just in time, adequate to prevent Afghanistan from regressing? I sense that we should aim to ensure that enduring security conditions prevail. This review will provide the context within which to pursue the four areas outlined above.

~~SECRET~~

7:19 PM

MEMORANDUM  
April 22, 2002

On April 22, all before 11:34 in the morning, I had heard the following from Condi:

- "The President expects us to have this lunch."
- This is the President's staff (the NSC).
- "I will have to take this to the President" (referring to "detailees").

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PAGE 1/2  
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20 SEP 2007  
IAW E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED

October 28, 2003

SUBJECT: Risk in the Way Ahead in Iraq

In discussing the way ahead in Iraq, all agree that we should give Iraqis more authority quickly. However, several issues have come up where it is clear there are risks that merit careful consideration.

They include the following:

1. There is a tension with respect to the pace at which sovereignty is moved to the Iraqis.
  - To the extent we move quickly and give sovereignty to the Iraqis, there is a risk that the preparations may prove to have been inadequate. As a result, there could be a diminution in the US ability to see that the eventual Iraqi government is within the President's redlines and fits the model he has described. The situation could degenerate into a civil war or slide back to a dictatorship. An advantage of moving quickly is the hope that as the political process goes forward, the Iraqi people might see the Coalition less as an occupier and more as a liberator and they will support our efforts.
  - Moving too slowly with respect to passing sovereignty to the Iraqis risks having the center of gravity of the Iraqi population move against the Coalition, their cooperation decline, Iraqis become afraid of joining the police, the Governing Council, etc. and be more likely to work with our enemies. This in turn risks a security deterioration that could cause a loss of support from the American people, the Congress and/or the international community.
2. Failure to give more Sunnis a stake in the future of Iraq risks further Sunni alienation and greater Sunni support for the extremists. Conversely, giving Sunnis a greater stake in the future of Iraq risks unsettling the Governing Council balance and causing Shias to fear the Sunnis may again take over the country. This tension exists particularly in the question of how much we use former senior officers and how de-Baathification is implemented.
3. Local forces can be recruited and trained more rapidly and cheaper than national forces; but they risk creating local, ethnically- and religiously-based militias.

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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

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30 MAR 06

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Trip Reports for Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey (20-26 Mar 06)

1. The trip went well. Mil to mil relationships with all three nations are positive and trending higher.
2. Individual trip reports are included as attachments A, B, and C.

PETER PACE  
General, United States Marine Corps  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachments  
As Stated

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JUN 17 2008

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USD (A)  
GEN JONES  
GEN ABIZAH  
DTS

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
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JS  
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- Pakistanis are proud of their strong record in UN peacekeeping missions (currently 11K troops, more than any other nation).
- I suggested they consider assigning an LNO to JFCOM to increase the dialogue on key long term issues such as interoperability, transformation, and evolving operational concepts.
- They are very appreciative of the work done by our National Defense University in support of their efforts to recast their National Defense College.
- They asked that we look into an issue involving pay and allowances for 9 officers in Djibouti in support of JTF HOA (officers there receive no per diem as food and housing are provided while LNO's in Tampa receive full per diem). They have recalled the 9 officers to Pakistan in the interim.
- They expressed concern with loss of training air space in SW Pakistan due to high levels of coalition flight activity (UAV's, tankers, long range strike aircraft flowing in and out of Afghanistan).
- They expressed interest in additional IMET funds (FY 06 funding level at \$2M)
- They expressed concern with respect to US Visa requirements for military visits to the US (most problems arise because they seek in weeks what they are consistently advised takes months). Pak Air Force has a standing program to request two year visas for all their senior officers but program has not been adopted by the other Pak services.
- They expressed interest in additional US support for their Coast Guard equivalent (Maritime Security Agency), but no specifics provided.

**Earthquake takeaways:**

- Strong US/Pakistan military cooperation the key. Pak military provided excellent security for relief operations.

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TAB A

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JUN 17 2008

## **CJCS Visit to the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 20-21 Mar 06**

I visited Pakistan at the invitation of my counterpart, Gen Eshan ul Haq, and met with the following key individuals:

- Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz
- Ambassador Ryan Crocker and his country team
- General Eshan ul Haq and his senior staff
- LTG Raza Mohammad Khan (Commandant National Defense College) and students
- MG Farooq Ahmed Khan (Director, Federal Relief Commission)
- RDML Mike LeFever (Commander, Combined Disaster Assistance Center)
- BG "Sandy" Davidson (Chief, Office of Defense Representative Pakistan)


I was provided a helicopter survey of the earthquake affected areas and a briefing on the relief effort.

### **Overall Assessment:**

- The Pakistan military supports continued close ties.
- There is a greater degree of support for America in general, and the US military in particular, as a result of our earthquake relief efforts. All operations on track for 31 March 2006 completion.
- The strengthening US-India relationship and the civil nuclear agreement signed during the President's visit to India were raised repeatedly as issues of concern.
- They want increased or accelerated support from the US (Cobra helicopters; NVG's; refurbished F-16's and associated sensors and weapons; C-130's; and PERRY class frigates). These issues are being worked appropriately although not as quickly as our Pakistani counterparts would like.

### **Takeaways:**

- The Prime Minister indicated that the US-India nuclear agreement "removes a balance which could raise tensions and will promote proliferation."



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1.4 (b) (d)

TAB A

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- CH-47's are the most visible sign of US relief assistance across the country. Chinook now in the vocabulary of all Pakistanis – referred to in Pashtun dialect as "Angels of Mercy."

- US Ambassador lauded the efforts of the Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE). The team produced a superb video documentary, which is currently being reviewed by Gen Abizaid; may be a great vehicle for outreach to a broader international audience.

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TAB A

3

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**CJCS Visit to the Kingdom Of Saudi Arabia  
22-23 Mar 06**

I visited Saudi Arabia at the request of John Abizaid and met with the following key individuals:

- King Abdullah
- Crown Prince Sultan (Minister of Defense and Aviation)
- Prince Miteb bin Abdul (Deputy SANG CDR)
- Prince Khalid bin Sultan (Asst Minister of Defense and Aviation)
- General Salih Al-Muhayya (Chief of General Staff)
- Ambassador James Oberwetter and his country team

**Overall Assessment:**

- I was warmly received at all levels. All expressed a belief that the US-Saudi relationship is on an upswing and are optimistic about its future. Visits by additional leadership from the Department would be of value.

- They expressed concern with respect to their request for helicopters and missile and technical support for their F-15's but indicated they knew the issues were being worked.

- The Saudis are happy with the ongoing mil to mil dialogue and interested in accelerating it (dates for next Military Joint Planning Committee and Military Working Group meetings currently TBD). They are also pleased with ongoing initiatives to increase mil to mil interaction and improve Saudi capabilities (US-Saudi land force training exercises, USAF threat and capabilities assessment team review of the Saudi Air Force, and US CT training teams for Saudi MOI and MOD units).

**Takeaways:**

- Saudi's expressed pride in capturing or killing most of the individuals they initially identified as terrorist threats (Crown Prince opined that Saudi Arabia was now secure and that 90% of their terrorist problem had been eliminated). Their recent successes may lead to complacency - this bears watching.



JS 14 (b)

TAB B

1

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[REDACTED]

JS  
1.4 (b)

- They believe it is important to provide Iraqis with visible indicators that life is improving without Saddam Hussein (i.e. access to water, electricity, education, and employment).

[REDACTED]

JS  
1.4 (b)

- Our ambassador solicited DoD support of Saudi efforts to purchase a comprehensive border surveillance system. This is a DoS lead issue.

- They believe an improved security environment in Iraq will lead to increased donations and loans from other states.

[REDACTED]

JS  
1.4 (b)

- The country team highlighted the insufficiency of the oil protection plan because it focuses on repairing infrastructure rather than on protecting it.

- The Crown Prince asked if American military families would return to the Kingdom, indicating he felt it was important that US military personnel serving in Saudi Arabia be satisfied so they can work well.

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**CJCS Visit to the Republic of Turkey  
23-26 Mar 06**

I visited Turkey at the invitation of my counterpart Gen Hilmi Ozkok to speak at the Defense Against Terrorism Center of Excellence symposium on Counter Terrorism. While there, I met with the following key individuals:

- Prime Minister Erdogan
- General Hilmi Ozkok
- General Yasar Buyukanit (Land Force Commander)
- General Ilker Basbug (Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Army)
- General Aydogan Babaoglu (Commander, Turkish War Academy) and students
- Ambassador Ross Wilson and country team
- Maj Gen Peter Sutton (Chief, Office of Defense Cooperation)

**Overall Assessment:**

- Turkey's leadership at all levels remains dissatisfied with our "inaction" against the PKK in northern Iraq - particularly as they believe they have taken actions contrary to the wishes of their populace to support the US. Turkish military officers acknowledge constraints on our ability to intervene militarily against the PKK, but Turkish political leadership does not.
- All stressed the strategic nature of our relationship and the fact that the WOT has increased the significance of our partnership.
- US/Turkish relations, both political and military, are on an upswing and are at their most positive level since March 2003. Anti-US rhetoric in the Turkish media is also dying down. The Turkish media prominently featured my trip and portrayed the visit in a favorable light.
- Turkey's greatest fear is that we will "walk away" from Iraq at some point and/or that Iraq will splinter and the Kurds will become an independent entity in the North (including Kirkuk).
- Our military counterparts recognize that US success in Iraq increases Turkey's security.

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JUN 17 2008

TAB C

1

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

08-M-0491

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

**Takeaways:**

- The Turks are concerned about a nuclear Iran but urged that the US focus on diplomatic vice military action.

- Gen Oskok asked that as a minimum we impede the movement of the PKK in Iraq and keep them off balance. In every forum in which the issue of the PKK was raised, I indicated that the key to addressing this issue was to first create a stable security situation in Iraq with a stable government. This would enable the governments of Iraq, Turkey and the US to work together against the PKK - which we acknowledge is a terrorist organization.

[REDACTED]

JS  
1.4 (a)

[REDACTED]

JS 1.4 (a)

- PM Edrogan also reiterated Turkey will continue to contribute to ISAF operations in Afghanistan.

- The Turks indicated they have a good relationship with their Syrian neighbors and can be of assistance to the US here.

[REDACTED]

JS  
1.4 (a)

- The Ambassador and DATT raised a concern with respect to US defense companies experiencing difficulty in competing for business with Turkey. More stringent Turkish rules for such contracts (increased technology transfers, increased host nation manufacturing and host nation subcontracting) are apparently leading US companies to forego competition for Turkish sales. I raised this issue from an interoperability and efficiency standpoint with my counterpart, but the Turks felt US companies should develop new concepts for competing in the Turkish market.

TAB C

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

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JUN 17 2008

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

April 24, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Material on B.B. Bell on Korea

I just saw this material from B.B. Bell on Korea. If he is going to turn over those bases and just walk away, there is going to be a problem, and we need to make sure the Interagency is aware that that is the direction we're going, before we do it.

Thanks.

Attach: 4/23/06 E-Mail from GEN Bell re: Korea Update

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

DHR:ss  
042406-09

.....  
*Please Respond By 05/18/06*

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

*08-17-0493*

**DENIED**

OSD 1.4 (b), (4)

DECLASSIFIED MAY 30 2008  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

4/24/2006

**DENIED**

OSD 1.4 (b), (2)

DECLASSIFIED      MAY 30 2008  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

# DENIED

OSD 1.4 (b),(d)

DECLASSIFIED MAY 08 2008  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

~~Classification SECRET NOFORN~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

MAR 8 1976

Honorable Henry Bellmon  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Henry:

Thanks for your thoughtful letter of February 19, outlining the dilemma you feel with regard to the extremely important questions of the existence and the firmness of the connection between "... the outlines of this nation's foreign policy objectives and the military strength necessary to attain those objectives and assure our national security."

The dilemma you raise -- a real one, and a valid one -- is widely shared in the country, not least in the Administration. I have attempted to illuminate many of the connections between policy and strength in the first section of my Annual Defense Department Report for FY 1977, in satisfying the requirements of Section 812 of the FY 1976 Department of Defense Authorization Act. I won't restate that section here in this letter, but let me share with you some of the underlying assumptions.

First, I do not assume that we ought to increase our defense budget in real terms simply because we could do so (without strain on our national economy or federal budget) if we decide to. In other words, it is certainly true that our defense budget is a relatively small percentage of our GNP, that the level of spending for defense in real dollar terms is considerably less than in previous years, and that the national defense share of the total budget is less than it has been. These are considerations which must be kept in mind when dealing with the twin propositions, sometimes put forward within the Congress, (a) that we cannot "afford" an adequate national defense, and (b) that the nation can look to further real cuts in defense as a way of funding further increases in social and economic programs.

Neither is it entirely conclusive, as far as our level of effort is concerned, to point out that the Soviets are doing more than we are. That is certainly a fact, even if it may not be conclusive. The reason it is important is that our military forces -- both nuclear and conventional -- are, and are seen by the external world to be, **deterrent** forces in relation to Soviet military forces. This is so most directly in terms of the relationship between the strategic forces of the two superpowers, between the conventional and nuclear forces of the two superpowers and their allies in

110.01  
(19 Feb 76)

Central Europe, and between the military forces of the US and our allies and the North Koreans and their allies in Northeast Asia. It is also certainly true to a substantial degree in the Mediterranean. In these specific areas, a numerical balance, or rough equivalence; is regarded by all as essential to deterrence and therefore to stability. Of course qualitative aspects of the various parties' military forces also weigh in the balance.

Moreover, numerical (and some qualitative) elements of the strategic nuclear **balance, and of the military balance in Central Europe, are key elements in** SALT negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and in the MBFR negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

In these ways, then, the overall size, the deployments, the capabilities, the modernity, the flexibility and the state of readiness of the US military forces, are importantly and clearly linked to the size and other qualities of the military forces of the Soviet Union (and other potential threat forces).

But in a larger sense, the American political philosopher, Leo Strauss, pointed out the general role of American military power in 1963, when he said:

"The only restraint in which the West can put some confidence **is** the tyrant's fear of the West's immense military power."

Of course the overall military balance in 1963 favored the West so overwhelmingly that there was no question in anyone's mind **anywhere** in the world about the capability of the West to act as a restraint upon tyranny. The balance today is much more even. The USSR has **achieved a broad strategic** equality with the United States. The Soviet Union can today threaten distant places beyond the Eurasian land-mass for the first time in history.

As Secretary Kissinger pointed out on February 3, 1976:

"Our policy must deal with the consequences. The emergence of ambitious new powers into an existing international structure is a recurrent phenomenon. Historically, the adjustment, of an existing order to the arrival of one or more new actors almost invariably was accompanied by war -- to impede the upstart, to remove or diminish some of the previously established actors, to test the balance of forces in a revised system."

No one is suggesting that war is inevitable. But neither is it possible for any of us to proceed on the assumption that the democratic industrialized nations of the world, and our friends and those who share our values, would find themselves as secure, **as** confident, as hopeful, if the United States were to abandon its role as a counterweight to the steady and sustained growth of the military prowess of the Soviet Union.


Your essential point was that "... no matter how much military hardware we have, it is of little value without the **national will** to use it." That is correct, and it is on this key question of national will, in specific situations, that the Congress and the Administration have recently found themselves with differing views. The President and others will continue to do what they can to indicate **the directions** which we think our national policy should take us on the -international stage: Angola and southern Africa; the Middle East; Northeast Asia; Europe; Latin America; the Indian ~~Ocean; East Asia and Pacific; and South Asia.~~

We welcome your support, when you can give it, as well as that of your colleagues in the Congress. But more than that, Henry, we welcome your support throughout the wide spectrum of American life, beyond Oklahoma and beyond the Congress, in which you have such respect and influence.

I am scheduled to appear before your committee on March 9, 1976. I will plan to discuss at that time the relationship between US foreign policy objectives and our proposed force structure, as I have in my Annual Defense **Report**. In the meantime, I hope you and members of your committee will have the opportunity to carefully read Section I of my Defense Report as I am sure it will add to our discussion.

Warm personal regards.

Sincerely,



LA  
PA/E  
Chron  
Compt  
PA  
ISA

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

MAR 8 1976

Honorable Henry Bellmon  
United States Senate  
Washington, D. C. 20510

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Central Europe, and between the military forces of the US and our allies and the North Koreans and their allies in Northeast Asia. It is also certainly true to a substantial degree in the Mediterranean. In these specific areas, a numerical balance, or rough equivalence, is regarded by all as essential to deterrence and therefore to stability. Of course qualitative aspects of the various parties' military forces also weigh in the balance.

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As Secretary Kissinger pointed out on February 3, 1976:

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
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Warm personal regards.

Sincerely,



HENRY BELLMON  
OKLAHOMA

COMMITTEE:  
BUDGET  
APPROPRIATIONS  
AGRICULTURE AND FORESTRY  
POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERVICE  
SELECT COMMITTEE ON  
NUTRITION AND HUMAN NEEDS

## United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20510

11

February 1976

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary  
U. S. Department of Defense  
The Pentagon

Washington, D. C. 20321

Dear Mr. Secretary:

First, let me say that I consider myself to be a strong supporter of this nation's defense efforts. I believe the record will show that I have generally voted to support this nation's essential military efforts. However, I find myself at a loss to know how to proceed so far as the size of future defense appropriations is concerned.

My dilemma arises from the fact that President Ford's arguments for increased military spending seem to be based upon the contention that we are spending a smaller percentage of our GNP now than in previous years and that the level of spending in real dollars is less than in previous years, that the Defense share of the total budget is less than in previous years, and that the Soviets are doing more than we are. In my opinion, none of these arguments are persuasive.

What would make sense would be for the President or the Department of Defense to define for the Congress and the country the outlines of this nation's foreign policy objectives and the military strength necessary to attain these objectives and assure our national security;

Involved in this equation is the impact of detente, the role of Western Europe and China, and this nation's assured access to Middle East oil; as well as other essential minerals from other continents.

What I am really recommending, Mr. Secretary, is the opening of a meaningful debate on the question of this nation's international policies for the balance of this century. The conduct of the debate, if it is well carried on, should be to inform American citizens of questions essential

3244

8 MAR 1976

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
February 19, 1976  
Page Two

to our national survival and, hopefully, gain their support, for actions, both military and diplomatic, which may be essential to preserve our security and our position of world leadership.

~~The fact is that no matter how much military hardware we have, it is of little avail without the national will to use it. I believe your job in the Administration and our job in the Congress is to first decide where we are going and then proceed to acquire both the means and the will to attain our objectives. The arguments presented thus far fall short of this objective.~~

Sincerely,



Henry y Bellmon

HB:cs

IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT TRENDS IN THE  
UNITED STATES AND SOVIET MILITARY BALANCE

3202

DONALD H. RUMSFELD  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

24 March 1976

24 Mar 76

From W.M.  
Orig. T.T.  
Adm. H. L. Lamb

WH 6399

08-17-0727

R-1

IMPLICATIONS OF RECENT TRENDS IN THE  
UNITED STATES AND SOVIET MILITARY BALANCE

Introduction

I believe it is most important that the American people know the facts and properly assess the implications of trends which have developed over the past ten years in the military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. There has been a massive shift of power in the world. To fail to arrest trends adverse to our interests would mean that we could find ourselves, in the future, confronted by an adversary who does not share our most fundamental beliefs and who is able to threaten or intimidate much of the world.-

Forecasting the future inevitably involves great uncertainty. This is especially the case in considering the future overall military balance between the United States and the Soviet Union, since that balance will be determined by the actions taken or not taken by both nations in the context of what is desired of their military forces. One cannot easily calculate a "crossover point," a specific point in time when an objective judgment could be made that one nation had moved unambiguously ahead in the overall military balance. The question becomes more manageable, however, if each of the key balances is considered separately.

For each of the key balances, I will summarize some of the major indications of the trends to date, and discuss their implications for the future. And since the future military balance will depend greatly on the level of resources devoted to the defense programs, and especially research and development, of the United States and the Soviet Union, I will also briefly discuss the trends in the military investment balance between the two nations.

The Strategic Balance

We seek to maintain essential parity in this most critical of the military balances. We believe such parity presently exists, and that the forces we maintain and the development and deployment programs proposed will ensure that it continues to exist.

The crucial considerations are the ability to deter the Soviet Union, preservation of our retaliatory capacity, its adequacy to inflict desired levels of damage, and the flexibility to preserve a measure of deterrence even after the onset of nuclear warfare if initial deterrence should fail.

We must respond to the increasing possibility that major asymmetries will develop between U.S. and Soviet strategic forces because of the momentum in Soviet offensive and defensive programs, and that the Soviet strategic capability could come to be viewed as superior to that of the United States. In terms of quantitative measures, the Soviets lead in numbers of delivery vehicles, megatonnage, and throw weight, while the U.S. has an advantage in, number of warheads. Qualitative factors such as accuracy, reliability, survivability, and command and control probably have as much impact on overall force effectiveness as the more obvious quantitative factors;

Over the past year the Soviets have begun the deployment of three new larger ICBMs and appear ready to deploy a fourth. The new ICBMs, with accurate MIRVed warheads, will improve the capability of the Soviet Union to threaten the survivability of our existing land-based ICBM forces. The Soviets are also going to considerable lengths to protect and harden their new generation ICBMs and their launch control and communications facilities. Every new SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 missile they deploy is going into modernized hard silos, and associated launch control facilities are in silos rather than bunkers; In SLBMs the Soviets have deployed missiles whose 4,200 nautical mile range exceeds that of any deployed U.S. SLBM. Soviet production and deployment of the Backfire heavy bomber enhances their capabilities in long-range bombers.

Meanwhile Soviet advances in technological aspects of weaponry in which the United States has customarily held a substantial lead; such as accuracy and MIRVing, threaten to erode or eliminate that lead in the future. In modernizing our own strategic nuclear forces, we must ensure that there could be no real or fancied Soviet advantage in a first strike attack against the United States, and that no significant real or imagined asymmetry favoring the Soviet Union exists in overall strength and capabilities.

A major possible asymmetry does exist with respect to civil defense. The Soviets have devoted very substantial resources to a civil defense program which includes evacuation of urban populations in advance of hostilities, construction of shelters in outlying areas, and compulsory training in civil defense for much of the Soviet population. They have energetically sought to achieve survivability, in their command and control systems through dispersal; redundancy, hardening, concealment and mobility. And the military industrial base of the Soviet Union is not only expanding, it is being systematically dispersed and features unutilized capacity which constitutes a substantial "surge" capability. The cumulative impression one gains from these activities is that of a nation preparing to fight and win a nuclear war.

I have indicated where we believe the Soviets to be ahead, and where they are making gains. If present trends continue, the U.S. will become clearly, inferior in strategic power at some point in the coming years, and the U.S. would likely be seen as being inferior or becoming inferior some time prior to the crossover point. My concern is what we act now to arrest

the unfavorable trends of the past decade, and to lay the base for a sustained program of increases and improvements in our own capabilities so as to prevent that crossover point from being reached, and to demonstrate clearly our determination to continue to maintain our position:

#### Naval Balance

Assessing the future implications of present trends is more difficult in the naval balance because historically the navies of the U.S. and USSR have had different missions--that is, each nation has, in the past, developed its naval forces for different purposes. Because of our geopolitical position, the U.S. Navy has been charged with two missions: sea control, and projection of power ashore at a distance. The Soviet Union, historically basically a land power, has charged the Soviet Navy with the missions of sea denial, and control of waters peripheral to the homeland. But recent expansion of the Soviet Navy, both qualitatively and quantitatively, indicates that the Soviets may increasingly assign missions to their navy similar to those of our Navy. It is important to keep this point in mind as we attempt to deal with the future.

Sea control and projection of power at a distance require surface ships, and submarines. Sea denial requires the sinking of surface ships and submarines, and this task can be carried out in many ways, including a mix of aircraft; submarines, and surface combatants. Although we cannot predict a "crossover" point when the U.S. Navy would be unable to fulfill its missions, assuming the recent trends were not arrested, the cumulative impact of this prospect can be seen by examining a few key indicators.

The U.S. has concentrated its sea-based standoff offensive weapons in its aircraft carriers. The Soviets, on the other hand, have developed an impressive number of surface and submarine-launched anti-ship guided missile systems. The twelve-to-one advantage which the Soviet Union currently has in numbers of sea-based platforms which can deliver such weapons would be essentially eliminated by the mid-1980s if the programs we are proposing are approved.

While the Soviets will continue to expand their amphibious forces in the future, we do not expect them to eliminate the present U.S. lead in amphibious warfare. They may, however, develop a capability to project power ashore at a distance which is very different from our own. For instance, they may choose to develop some combination of airborne assault and naval forces rather than mirror our Marine Corps and amphibious force. As the future unfolds, we will need to pay attention to the nature of their capability, and to exactly how they go about developing it.

Although there may be a degree of uncertainty regarding the Soviets' plans to develop a power projection capability, the future in the areas of sea denial and sea control seems clearer--and more ominous. Unless arrested,

the trends in surface combatants and attack submarines, when combined with the modernization of the Soviet Naval **Aviation** force with the **Backfire** bomber, suggest **that by the early 1980s the Soviets will possess more than sufficient** numbers of modern and capable naval units to effect **sea control** missions as well as sea denial **missions** in those ocean areas of importance to **them**.

In the last **seven** years, our **active** fleet has **fallen** from over 900 to **about 490** ships, and we have gone from 23 to 14 aircraft **carriers**, with one **additional carrier** scheduled to **retire** from the active fleet this year. The Soviet Union currently leads the U.S. in numbers of major surface **combatants--the Soviets have about 210 while the U.S. has about 175**. Although this lead is small at present, a continuation of the recent trends **would mean** that the Soviets could increase their **margin** to roughly a two-to-one advantage in this area by **the early 1980s**. The **U.S. shipbuilding** program proposed in the FY 1977 Defense budget would provide for rough parity in numbers of ships of this type by the 1980s. **Meanwhile**, the Soviets will continue to modernize their force with newer and more anti-ship and anti-submarine capable **combatants which are able to operate** for extended periods, at great ranges from the Soviet **Union**.

The **trends in the area of attack** submarines are more subtle. The Soviets **have long maintained a larger** submarine force than **has** the U.S.; **over the last decade**, they have held a greater than three-to-one advantage **over the U.S.** in numbers of attack submarines. The quality of their submarines has also been steadily improving. For instance, in 1965 about... 10% of the Soviet attack submarine force was nuclear-powered; **by 1975**, about 30% of this **force was nuclear-powered**. Further, they have deployed a large number of anti-ship missile-equipped submarines, **some of which can launch while remaining** submerged. We **expect** the Soviets to continue, to replace **their older** diesel submarines with new, sophisticated units in the future; **and, should** the recent trends continue, we could expect them to **maintain** their present numerical advantage. The proposed U.S. shipbuilding program would, however, reduce their margin to a two-to-one advantage by **the early 1980s**.

The Central European Balance

In the Central Front the past **decade has** witnessed improvements in **the capabilities of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact**. NATO advances in the **quantity and quality** of tanks, anti-tank weapons and aircraft have led to a **force which provides both a conventional and a nuclear deterrent**. The **Pact, on the other hand,** has substantially **increased its** manpower, even **considering that**, the addition of Soviet troops to **Czechoslovakia was** somewhat offset by the **breakup of national Czechoslovakian forces**. **Most importantly**, the Pact has made major **improvements** in the quality of its weapons and support for those **weapons, markedly** improving its ability to conduct **Blitzkrieg** war.

Forecasting the future balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact contains many complexities. First,, in the Central Front the balance involves many nations, east and west. This is especially so for NATO, where the United States contributes less than half of NATO's standing forces, whereas the Soviets contribute more than 60% of the Pact's manpower and equipment and exert, as we know, far greater influence over the rest. Second, numerical indicators--numbers of tanks, men, aircraft, etc.--do not by themselves provide a high confidence basis to evaluate the balance. History has many examples of seemingly superior forces being defeated,, by an adversary who used better tactics; achieved surprise, or had a plan that exploited the weaknesses of his opponent.

But in comparing the overall manpower and number of weapons, NATO and the Warsaw Pact appear, currently about equal, and in the future only marginal changes should occur. The Pact has a 1.2:1 edge in troops, which should remain unless a slackening of Sino-Soviet tensions or political crises in Eastern Europe, similar to Czechoslovakia, result in Soviet soldiers being sent to the Central Front. Each side has some numerical leadership in the weapons, essential to its primary missions.

The Pact leads in tanks by 2.6:1 and also in artillery, both required to support a Blitzkrieg offensive. In the future it will continue to lead in these areas, but the gap will not increase substantially. A change that is expected is an increase in the number of Pact armored personnel carriers, a prerequisite for rapid combined arms warfare., NATO currently has more APCs, but this could be reversed to the Pact's favor. From NATO's perspective it leads in weapons, such as anti-tank guided missiles and ground attack aircraft, which are major elements of its, defensive strategy. Improvements in ATGMs will continue. The comparative number of the close air support aircraft on both sides may change, however, as the Soviets acquire more of these aircraft while NATO's numbers remain relatively constant.

The trend in the quality of weapons is less favorable to NATO than the quantitative balance. The Soviets have, in the past decade, made great improvements in the technological quality of their equipment. They are closing a gap that has been historically a major source of NATO strength--our qualitative leadership in weaponry. The seriousness of the narrowing of this gap--or the loss of leadership in some areas--is unclear at present.. In some cases NATO produces superior weapons and will continue, to do so: for example, in combat aircraft, guided weapons and anti-tank missiles. In other areas the Soviets have introduced superior equipment--multiple rocket-launchers and tactical air defense systems--which pose threats to our air support capabilities or will provide even greater firepower. In the future, unless changes occur, three trends will continue to operate that are adverse to NATO's position: while the U.S. will lead in laboratory technologies, the Pact will have better weapons in the field; the Soviet force structure will increase in overall capabilities although the numbers of weapons remain unchanged; and Soviet expectations of achieving success in Blitzkrieg war will improve.

DECLASSIFIED 21 NOV 2007

Authority: EO 12958, as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

A major element of the balance which is not frequently treated is the tactical and operational aspect; This has many components--the tactical advantages accruing to the defensive or offensive role of each side, the reliability of the respective allies, the importance of mobilization and surprise, command and control, the capabilities of logistics and the quality and training of manpower. NATO has an edge in several of these--for example, our pilots are better trained and more capable, our communications systems are more advanced, and our logistics organization is more substantial. The Pact has the advantage of a more homogeneous mix of equipment and the choice as to the timing and nature of the attack. This latter advantage cannot be overstated, for the Pact; in focusing on a rapid, one-time major surge into Europe, can gain significant advantages by using surprise, and is now acquiring the type equipment designed to enable it to execute this plan. In the future the Soviets will probably be making changes in their training, logistics and doctrine to exploit their new technical advances. Their pilots, for example, are already training in ground attack roles; they are already beginning to improve their logistics support to front line forces; and their exercises have been testing more variants on war than a simple theater nuclear conflict. NATO will also be improving its forces through standardization and rationalization.

Overall, NATO and the U.S. face a number of challenging tasks in the coming years. A crucial point in the balance may occur in the 1980s when the Warsaw Pact is numerically equivalent to NATO, technically as sophisticated, and tactically proficient in launching and sustaining its force of attack. Whether the United States will maintain an advantage overall--one that will deter both conventional and nuclear war--will depend, on whether programs are supported here and in NATO to deal decisively with these emerging Soviet capabilities.

#### Military Investment Balance

To a very large extent, where the U.S. stands, relative to the Soviet Union in the military balance today is the resultant of decisions which were made many years ago. The future will be similarly dependent on those decisions we will now make, as well as on the decisions made and actions taken by the Soviet Union. In the most general terms, the future military balance will be a function of the overall level of investment we make in future military capabilities, represented in the present by the procurement and RDT&E portions of our overall defense program.

Over the last decade, the annual total allocation of resources to the Soviet military has increased by approximately 3% per year in real terms. During the same period, and in the same real terms, U.S. defense programs rose to a wartime peak in 1968, but have declined continuously since then at an annual rate of about 5%, falling below the 1965 level in 1973 and each year thereafter. As a result of these contrasting trends over the decade, the total real resources devoted annually to the Soviet military came to exceed the U.S. counterpart in 1970; and have done so in every

subsequent year; in 1975 the Soviet programs were more than 40% greater than those of the U.S.

The present pattern of the Soviet military effort outstripping that of the U.S. is reflected in practically every military mission area and resource category. Of major concern are the contrasting trends in Soviet and U.S. investments for future military capability. By approximately 1970 the Soviets' military systems procurement, facilities construction, and RDT&E had exceeded the U.S. counterparts in total, and in the major parts. Moreover, support for our forces in Southeast Asia caused our expenditures, particularly on procurement, to swell out of proportion to their effects on our present military capability. Had it not been for these expenditures, the contrasting trends would be even more apparent. As early as 1967, however, Soviet procurement of weapon systems began to grow absolutely and in relation to the U.S. counterpart, surpassing U.S. procurement by approximately 13% in 1970, and standing approximately 95% above U.S. procurement in 1975. Particularly notable in the Soviet growth have been:

-- The procurement of a new generation of Soviet ICBMs. In 1975 the estimated dollar procurement costs for Soviet ICBMs were about three and one-half times those of the U.S.

-- The procurement of new and more sophisticated Soviet aircraft at a rate which, in 1975, was about 30% higher than the U.S. counterpart.

The procurement of naval ships and boats which, over the 1965-1975 period, exceeded the U.S. by 70%; and by 90% in 1975.

The foregoing systems procurement trends are reflected in the mission categories which those systems are designed to support:

-- Over the 1965-1975 period as a whole, the resources devoted to the Soviet Intercontinental Attack program exceeded the U.S. counterpart by more than 50%; by 70% in the 1970s; and by 100% in 1975.

Soviet resources allocated to General Purpose Forces increased continuously from 1965 through 1975, while, by 1971, the U.S. counterpart had declined from its Vietnam era maximum to the level of 1965. As a result, the estimated dollar costs of Soviet General Purpose Forces surpassed the U.S. level in 1970; over the 1970s they have been 40% greater than, the U.S., and 70% greater in 1975.

All available quantitative measures indicate that Soviet investment in military and space RDT&E, however it is measured, reached the level of the corresponding U.S. RDT&E investment at least five years ago, has been growing at a consistently greater rate, and now exceeds the U.S. effort by a substantial margin. The dollar cost of the Soviet RDT&E program--a

particularly rough measure--has increased continuously in real terms over the past decade, while the U.S. RDT&E program has declined through the 1970s. As a result, the Soviet program measured in these real terms matched ours in 1970, and has exceeded ours in every year, since; by roughly 65% in 1975. In more concrete terms; during the period 1970 through 1974, the Soviet Union increased the number of scientists and engineers in research and development from approximately 600,000 to approximately 750,000. Over the same period, our total R&D- force decreased from 550,000 to 528,000. Moreover, about one-quarter of the U.S. R&D personnel are engaged in military projects, but the proportion of Soviet R&D personnel directed to military projects is estimated to be much larger, perhaps as high as 70%.

The intensive effort to advance Soviet military technology has had a dramatic impact upon the new generations of Soviet weaponry which have been fielded since the mid-1960s, and with increasing tempo in the 1970s. In all major categories--strategic missiles, aircraft, major ground force weapons, and naval vessels--the new Soviet weapons are significantly more capable than their predecessors. Indeed, one of the most important things that has been happening is the degree to which the newer generation of Soviet weapons has closed the earlier large qualitative gap with individual U.S. weapons. Indeed, for the first time there are a few areas where Soviet weapons are distinctly better than anything available in the West. The traditional missions of the Soviet military can now be performed better, and new, more demanding missions can be undertaken.

The ability to exploit technology has been an historic U.S. advantage. Indeed, in maintaining a military balance with the Soviet Union, the U.S. has relied upon the superiority of our military technology to offset the quantitative superiority of the Soviet forces in a number of important areas. That favorable technology lead has not yet been erased, but it is being eroded steadily. If the U.S. is to maintain the military balance, over the long haul, we will need to sustain a continuing, aggressive effort in research and development. It would be exceedingly unwise to restrain ourselves from exploiting new technologies, for in the case of the U.S., to do so would be to cause us to struggle to maintain the balance without the use of one of our greatest competitive advantages.

We cannot predict with certainty how the Soviets will employ the industrial capacity which is devoted to military hardware production. Yet on the basis of DoD planning within current constraints, and our most recent intelligence estimates of Soviet procurement planning, Soviet operational deployed inventories of most major weapon systems will, over the next 18 months, increase the already substantial quantitative leads they now possess. As I have pointed out, these new Soviet weapons are not crude. They embody the results of an intensive Soviet effort to advance their military technology, and provide significant improvements, in military capability over the preceding generation of Soviet weaponry. In most areas of military technology, with certain significant exceptions, the U.S. maintains the lead we have relied upon in the past to achieve a satisfactory military balance. It is true, for example, that the Soviets

cannot field an AWACS, strategic cruise missiles, or precision guided munitions of the quality available to the U.S. However, much of our technological advantages remain on the laboratory bench. Our procurement rates for most major systems are substantially less than those of the Soviets, and procurement affords the only method of deploying technology to the operational units. Therefore, as a result of the combination of Soviet procurement momentum and technological advances, we are in danger of losing the advantage in deployed military technology in the 1980s. It would then be of small comfort to us that we possess potential superiority in military capability.

Conclusions

To say that the future is bleak would be wrong, because to do so would be prejudging the decisions and investments the U.S. will be making in the near term. On the other hand, to say that the future is rosy would also be wrong, because to do so would be to ignore the manifest fact of the trends to date. What can be said is that, in large measure, the future is ours to influence. If the future were ours to control; we would ensure an appropriate and stable military balance through the efficient mechanism of equitable arms limitation agreements, as is our goal for SALT and MBFR. But the future is uncertain; and so complex that even successful agreements will only control some factors that determine the overall military balance. Thus, it is essential that we make those decisions and investments necessary to ensure that the United States will be able to deal effectively with the Soviet Union as future uncertainties unfold.

A question which understandably lingers in the minds of many who consider the future has to do with- whether the programs the President has proposed for the future are sufficient. Put another way, if the trends are of such concern, shouldn't we be taking drastic, or at least more dramatic, steps? Both the President and I, among others, agree that what the U.S. defense programs need is not some massive "shot-in-the-arm," but rather a sustained effort which, will allow us to use resources efficiently and effectively and, as importantly, which will give the U.S. the flexibility to respond to the future as the major uncertainties are resolved.

We now have "rough equivalence" in the military balance, with the Soviet Union. I think the American people clearly have, the will to maintain the balance through any foreseeable future. What the U.S. needs now is to begin to arrest the trends, and to make the commitment for the long haul.

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 Authority: EO 12958, as amended  
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

23 APR 1976

Honorable John C. Stennis  
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510

11/9/11

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have carefully considered the actions of the House of Representatives on H.R. 12438, the Department of Defense Authorization Bill, 1977 and I am pleased to give you my views.

The President requested \$113.8 billion in Budget Authority for the Department of Defense for Fiscal Year 1977, \$112.7 billion in Total Obligation Authority (TOA) and \$100.1 billion in Outlays. In addition, he pointed out that in three respects the budget could be low: (1) In the event the Congress did not support separate legislation to enable him to reduce spending by \$2.5-\$5 billion in lower priority areas through restraints on pay, commissary subsidy and the like; (2) In the shipbuilding area, where he has directed a National Security Council study which could result in an upward revision in the 5-year shipbuilding program; and (3) A possible budget amendment or supplemental which could result from a later assessment of progress in SALT negotiations.

Of the total, \$32,728 million required authorization under H.R. 12438. The House Committee on Armed Services made reductions of \$3,172 million to the request. I urge that the Senate restore the House reductions. Our views on the major program changes and legislative provisions are summarized in this letter, and additional details are attached.

Shipbuilding

The House Bill provides for increases of \$3,689.9 million and decreases of \$2,601.1 million, for a net increase of \$1,088.8 million. The President, with the staff assistance of the National Security Council, is reviewing the shipbuilding program. The study is expected to confirm the need for the ships which the House would delete, and I urge restoration in each instance. The key considerations are summarized below.

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DDG-47. The House deleted all funds for the DDG-47 guided missile destroyer. This new, conventionally-powered destroyer class is designed to operate with carrier task forces and amphibious/logistics forces, and to be equipped with the AEGIS anti-air warfare system. The DDG-47 is required in addition to the nuclear strike cruiser (CSGN), which is designed to perform cruiser missions. Without a mix of conventionally-powered and nuclear-powered combatants, the U.S. will be unable to provide for the buildup of fleet force levels and early introduction of the AEGIS. I urge the Senate to support the \$858.5 million requested in the President's Budget for the DDG-47.

FFG-7. The House reduced the FFG-7 program from eight to four in FY 1977 (and from eight to none in FY 1978). The FFG-7 program has been under development since 1970, and is now reaching fruition with the contract award of nine ships from FY 1975-76 funding. The FFG-7 is designed to remedy the deficiency in total numbers of surface combatants, and more specifically the shortage of area air defense ships required to support convoys, logistic groups and amphibious forces. The FFG-7 is powered by a gas turbine engine and equipped with active sonar, torpedoes and LAMPS for anti-submarine warfare; an area surface-to-air missile system for air defense; and the HARPOON missile system and 76mm gun for surface action. No other ship can be procured in the numbers needed at the costs estimated. Therefore, I strongly urge that the Senate support the procurement of eight ships of the FFG-7 class in both FY 1977 and FY 1978.

Cost Growth. The House deleted \$320 million from the funds requested to cover the settlement of claims in FY 1977. Failure to settle legitimate pending and anticipated claims would result in costly and disruptive litigation. I recommend that the Committee support the full budget request.

Escalation. The House deleted \$833.1 million in escalation funds associated with FY 1975 and prior-year shipbuilding programs. I urge the Senate to restore these funds under the sound full funding principle applicable to all other shipbuilding programs.

USS BELKNAP repair and modernization. The House Bill added \$213 million for the repair and modernization of the USS BELKNAP. After reviewing the Navy plans for the BELKNAP, I fully support repair and modernization of the ship. However, I believe that an early completion date is needed, and that a supplemental budget request in FY 1976 or the Transition Quarter is more appropriate. A supplemental budget request will be forwarded in the immediate future.

#### Research, Development, Test and Evaluation

The Department's FY 1977 RDT&E request of \$10,858 million contains approximately \$736 million in real program growth. The RDT&E budget is our nation's investment in the future. Real growth is needed to sustain our technological leadership, a means by which the United States can

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continue to overcome the numerical superiority of the Soviet Union. The House Committee's reduction of \$498 million would largely eliminate this real growth.

The House reductions would delay implementation of programs which have been approved by the Congress. Many of the cuts would require modification of existing contracts and carefully structured program plans at considerable out year cost increases, a practice which is not consistent with the objectives of the Department.

A detailed appeal for the items reduced by the House is included in the attachment. I want particularly to highlight these items:

- Army programs for Command and Control, Concept Development Validation, STINGER, the Advanced Concept Laboratory, and the Aerial Scout Helicopter (ASH).
- Navy programs for the F-18 aircraft, Cruise Missile, Air-to-Air Missile Component Engineering, Lightweight ASW Torpedo, HARM Missile, CVNX and Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System.
- Air Force programs for the AWACS, F-15 and Airborne Command Post aircraft, Close Air Support Weapon System and Advanced System Engineering and Planning.
- Reductions for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency which is making a major contribution to the strengthening of the technology base.

I am also concerned about the detailed and numerous adjustments in the House markup. Reductions were made in 92 line items, 38 of which were reduced by less than \$2 million. Actions of this type unduly complicate the management processes of the Department, and divert the continuing discussion between the Department and the Congress from the considerably more important, fundamental and substantive issues. I urge the Committee to consider reducing the level of detail employed in the consideration of these complex programs.

In the same vein, we believe the introduction of an RDT&E Emergency Fund, with funds tied specifically to four projects which were not requested in the budget, is unwise. An Emergency Fund of some sort might be desirable, provided DoD were given flexibility in its use. We will be pleased to consider this possibility in connection with the FY 1978 budget proposal.

#### US-3A Carrier Onboard Delivery (COD) Aircraft

The House amendment deleting 12 US-3A aircraft from the Authorization Bill concerns us because it places in doubt Navy ability to meet its future

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air resupply requirements for deployed forces. I have asked the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to provide you any necessary information. Prior to making this budget request, the Department had examined the alternatives for COD aircraft, and the US-3A was the best choice available. I hope that you will give your support to retaining the 12 US-3A's in the Senate Bill.

### Legislative Provisions

Section 101, AWACS. I strongly oppose the restrictive language in the House Bill, which would not permit continuing U.S. AWACS production until a favorable NATO decision is made. The U.S. needs the FY 1977 AWACS buy for U.S. use. Awaiting the NATO decision could mean a production line break which would be inefficient, expensive, and could adversely affect the NATO decision.

Section 702. This section would require that future requests for operation and maintenance appropriations include provision for anticipated pay and price increases. In view of the difficulties experienced in coping with the inflation rates of recent years, this provision would be helpful from the standpoint of the Department. However, we are aware that this provision is contrary to a long-standing policy of Federal budget practice and that the Office of Management and Budget opposes it because of its potential dollar impact on the Federal budget.

Section 706 would require that the Secretary of Defense notify the Congress prior to taking action involving any substantial changes in major training programs. This provision would impose undesirable and unnecessary restrictions upon actions to make military training more effective and economical -- an objective which the Congress has repeatedly urged us to attain. Both the intent of the section and the situations to which it would apply are difficult to interpret. For these and other reasons set forth in the enclosure, I urge that this provision be deleted.

Section 708 would declare it to be the sense of the Congress that the present method of providing appropriated fund support to commissary operations be continued. The FY 1977 budget contemplates the gradual phasing out of direct appropriated fund support, because military compensation is now competitive to compensation in the private sector and such a subsidy is no longer necessary. Under the budget proposals, commissary patrons would continue to realize significantly lower prices than those charged by commercial establishments. It is essential that we reduce costs that can no longer be justified in order to make funds available for more urgent needs. I request that Section 708 be deleted.

Section 709 would expand the scope of the annual legislative authorization to cover all appropriations for military functions.

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If this provision were to be enacted, it would be essential that the authorization and appropriation requests include amounts for future pay and price increases. Because of the many problems with respect to present Executive and Legislative procedures, it would be preferred to defer such a decision until next year, after we have had an opportunity to discuss the subject in detail.

Section 710. This provision states that it is the intent of Congress that civil defense funds granted by DCPA to State and localities continue to be available for use in combatting natural disasters as well as preparation for possible disasters resulting from enemy attack. Further, the Committee report recommends that the civil defense component of the budget be raised to \$110 million, rather than the \$71 million provided for in the budget. The Administration remains committed to a strong civil defense program, but we believe that DCPA efforts can best be concentrated on nuclear attack preparedness objectives.

#### Manpower Cost Growth Restraints

We have tried this year to strike the best possible balance between manpower needs and pressing requirements in the materiel area. The President has proposed significant initiatives to restrain the growth of manpower costs. Taken together these initiatives are equitable proposals and merit support. Therefore, I recommend against the rejection by the House of the President's proposals concerning adjustments in reserve pay practices, the commissary subsidy, Basic Allowance for Quarters, and the paid-drill strength of the Naval Reserve. Given the austere budget proposed and the urgency of arresting the adverse trends of U.S. defense capabilities, it is of the utmost importance that the taxpayers dollars for defense be put, to the maximum extent possible, into capabilities which provide for defense and deterrence, rather than areas that do not directly contribute to our national security.

#### Military Strength

I am opposed to any reduction in our recommended military personnel levels. As you know, U.S. military strength is at the lowest level since 1950. Faced with rising costs, shrinking manpower strengths, and growing Soviet capabilities, the Department has been making extraordinary efforts to achieve economies and efficiencies. For example, nearly 250,000 people have been cut out of the support forces since 1973, while combat forces have been increasing by nearly 30,000. Further cuts are not warranted. Rather, we must maintain our military strength level of 2.1 million while constantly striving to improve combat effectiveness and overall efficiency.

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
Minuteman III

The President indicated in January that the Defense program would be under continuing review, and that increases might be necessary in certain areas. That assessment has led the President to propose a Budget Amendment for FY 1977 which will provide funds for continuing the production of Minuteman III.

In my judgment, we have a Defense Establishment which, while we hope and intend to make improvements in its management, is deserving of the support of the Committee, the Congress, and the country. Such support is essential if the United States is to have an adequate Defense posture.

I wish to express my deep appreciation for this opportunity to present my views.

Sincerely,



Donald Rumsfeld

Enclosures

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
FY 1977 AUTHORIZATION BILL (H.R. 12438)  
ITEMS FOR THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

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Classified by: Fred P. Wacker, PDASD(C)  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF  
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652. EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2.  
DECLASSIFY ON: CANNOT BE DETERMINED.

Note: Items in brackets [ ] indicate classified information.

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SUMMARY OF DOD AUTHORIZATION BILL, FY 1977  
(In Thousands of Dollars)

	<u>Authorization Request</u>	<u>House Bill</u>	<u>Restoration Requested</u>
Title I - Procurement			
Aircraft			
<b>Army</b>	555,500	555,500	0
Navy & Marine Corps	<b>3,032,500</b>	<b>2,987,600</b>	169,900
Air Force	<b>6,344,800</b>	<b>6,344,800</b>	0
Missiles			
<b>Army</b>	552,400	552,400	0
Navy	<b>1,914,900</b>	<b>1,897,900</b>	17,000
Marine Corps	71,900	71,900	0
Air Force	<b>1,599,400</b>	<b>1,599,400</b>	0
Naval Vessels - Navy	<b>6,289,500</b>	<b>7,378,300</b>	<b>2,601,100</b>
Tracked Combat Vehicles			
<b>Army</b>	<b>1,084,300</b>	<b>1,084,300</b>	0
Marine Corps	29,700	29,700	0
Torpedoes - Navy	251,800	251,800	0
Other Weapons			
Army	63,600	63,600	0
Navy	<b>73,000</b>	73,000	0
Marine Corps	3,500	3,500	0
Air Force	2,900	2,900	0
Title II - RDT&E			
Army	<b>2,376,300</b>	<b>2,271,295</b>	105,005
*Navy (including MC)	<b>3,858,865</b>	<b>3,608,048</b>	255,817
Air Force	<b>3,916,600</b>	<b>3,749,200</b>	169,400
Defense Agencies	676,300	652,300	24,000
T&E Defense	30,000	30,000	0

\*Includes \$3,665 for Special Foreign Currency.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
AIRCRAFT, NAVY

(Thousands of Dollars)

Original FY 1977 Authorization Request	3,032,500
House Bill	2,987,600
Restoration Requested	169,900

Requested for Reconsideration:

(Thousands of Dollars)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Original Authorization Request</u>	<u>House Bill</u>	<u>Restoration Requested</u>
us-3A	137,800	0	137,800
US-3A Advanced Procurement	29,000	6	29,000
Aircraft Spares & Repair Parts	338,400	335,300	3,100

JUSTIFICATION

US-3A (Including Advance Procurement and Initial Spares) Air resupply of deployed aircraft carriers, their accompanying forces, and their embarked air units is vital to maintaining a prolonged, high state of readiness for combat operations. The US-3A Carrier **Onboard** Delivery (COD) program will improve the Navy's air resupply system. The US-3A is twice as fast, has three times the range, **and carries** 60% more cargo than the C-1A. The need for longer ranges has been demonstrated during Indian Ocean deployments, and during recent Mediterranean incidents where foreign staging rights needed for our limited range aircraft were withdrawn. If the Navy is not authorized **the US-3A**, the air logistics resupply capability will be significantly lessened.

As a derivative of the S-3A Antisubmarine Warfare aircraft, the US-3A has 90% systems commonality with a modern fleet aircraft and the cost advantages are very good. Notwithstanding the fact that the US-3A production plan delivers a total of only 30 aircraft over a 30-month period, its production cost is \$600,000 less than that of its parent. When compared to a C-130 or a Boeing 737, modified for aircraft carrier support, the cost effective advantages accruing to the **US-3A are excellent.** (Even if modified for carrier landings, a C-130/737 size aircraft would be far too unwieldy.)

The Department of Defense understands Congressional concern over the cost of the COD program. The current US-3A COD program is the product of years of effort to satisfy the priority cargo requirements of the carrier force. Of the viable alternatives evaluated by the Navy, the program unit costs for the other contenders exceeded the US-3A program unit costs from \$3.8 Million to \$12.9 Million per unit. There is no aircraft that will satisfy the requirement at lower **cost.** As regards the cost of the S-3A with full ASW avionics capability compared to the US-3A cost, a meaningful comparison can be made if the procurement cost of 12 **S3-A** aircraft in FY 1977 is compared with the cost of 12 US-3A aircraft in FY 1977 less the peculiar US-3A non-recurring costs for the COD configuration. The difference in fly-away cost would be about \$2.4 Million less for the US-3A-essentially the cost of the ASW avionics **equipment.** The US-3A unit cost appears high compared to the N 1976 S-3A unit cost for a number of reasons but primarily due to a smaller procurement quantity, 41 S-3A versus 12 **US-3A**, and unique start-up costs for the **US-3A.**

Accordingly, it is requested that \$169.9 million be restored in the Aircraft Procurement, Navy appropriation for procurement of the **US-3A**, initial spares, and advance procurement funds for a N 1978 buy.

TITLE I - PROCUREMENT (Section 101)

House Bill

SEC. 101. Funds are hereby authorized to be appropriated during the fiscal year 1977 for the use of the Armed Forces of the United States for procurement of aircraft, missiles, naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, torpedoes, and other weapons, as authorized by law, in amounts as follows:

AIRCRAFT

For aircraft: For the Army, \$555,500,000; for the Navy and the Marine Corps, \$3,157,500,000 of which \$125,000,000 shall be used only for the procurement of the A-6E aircraft; for the Air Force, \$6,344,800,000 of which the \$474,700,000 authorized for procurement of six E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft shall not be expended until a favorable decision is made by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies for procurement of the system.

Department of Defense Position

The Department requests the deletion of "of which the \$474,700,000 authorized for procurement of six E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft shall not be expended until a favorable decision is made by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies for procurement of the system."

JUSTIFICATION

The Department strongly opposes the restrictive language in the House Bill, which would not permit continuing U. S. AWACS production until a favorable NATO decision is made. The U. S. needs the N 1977 AWACS buy for use outside NATO; whether or not NATO makes a production decision. A NATO decision would have no impact upon the N 1977 procurement requirement. Further, there is no assurance that the timing of the NATO decision would be such as to preclude a production line break. It is recommended that this restrictive language be omitted.

# CONFIDENTIAL

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MISSILES, NAVY

(Thousands of Dollars)

Original N 1977 Authorization Request	1,914,900
House Bill	1,897,900
Restoration Requested	17,000

Requested for Reconsideration:

(Thousands of Dollars)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Original Authorization Request</u>	<u>House Bill</u>	<u>Restoration Requested</u>
AIM-7E/F sparrow III	72,200	55,200	17,000

### JUSTIFICATION

AIM-7E/F SPARROW III. If the Navy funds are not restored and current plans regarding second source procurement are continued the \$17 Million budget cut will result in a decrease of 260 missiles (650 to 390) for the Navy. Additionally, the Air Force procurement program will be reduced by 135 missiles (880 to 745) due to the lower procurement quantity resulting in higher unit costs. Costs will increase in the **outyears** also, resulting from the impact of this year's reduction and later procurement of the above quantities to fulfill total inventory requirements.

Procurement cuts at this time **will aggravate** an already serious AIM-7 inventory problem, since the Navy's average yearly noncombatant firing requirement **is [550] (this includes point defense weapons).**

Air Force inventory levels are seriously low. Since the **AIM-7F** is the principal air to air weapon for the F-15, this quantity reduction will have a major impact on Air Force readiness.

# CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
NAVAL VESSELS 1/

(Thousands of Dollars)

Original FY 1977 Authorization Request      **6,289,500**  
House Bill      **7,378,300**  
Restoration Requested      **2,601,100**

Requested for Reconsideration:

(Thousands of Dollars)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Original Authorization Request</u>	<u>House Bill</u>	<u>Restoration Requested</u>
DDG-47	858,500	0	858,500
F F G 7	<b>1,179,500</b>	590,000	589,500
Cost Growth	533,700	213,700	320,000
Escalation	<b>1,089,500</b>	256,400	833,100

1/ The shipbuilding program is the subject of an NSC study now underway.

## JUSTIFICATION

General. The House bill added one TRIDENT submarine, one nuclear attack submarine, four destroyers, one destroyer tender, one submarine tender, one fleet oiler and long lead funding for one nuclear aircraft carrier, two nuclear strike cruisers and the AEGIS conversion of LONG BEACH to the President's FY 1977 budget request. At the same time it deleted one DDG-47 AEGIS destroyer, four guided missile frigates and \$1,153.1 million from the Cost Growth and Escalation request.

At the President's direction, a review of the structure of the fleet in the years ahead has been undertaken addressing ship types, propulsion requirements, and force levels. Following the review within the Defense Department, the findings will be evaluated by the National Security Council and the President will reach a decision on how, if at all, the tentative five-year shipbuilding and conversion program in the FY 77 Defense Budget could be improved.

Detailed comments on the House reductions to the shipbuilding programs in the President's budget are provided in the following paragraphs.

DDG-47. The House removed from the President's budget the entire \$858,500,000 allocated for acquisition of the lead DDG-47 class AEGIS guided missile destroyer. This action, in effect, cancels the DDG-47 program and, in conjunction with other budget revisions, reduces the number of new AEGIS ships by three over the FYDP years. The principal issues are early introduction of AEGIS into the fleet, the added cost of nuclear propulsion, and the number of ships to be procured.

The Navy formulated a major surface combatant program that includes both nuclear and conventionally powered AEGIS ships, considering: (1) the Navy's need for increased numbers of ships to bolster force levels which have dwindled in recent years; (2) the necessity to start building a new class of cruisers and destroyers; (3) the well recognized need to deploy, as quickly as practicable, significant numbers of major combatants carrying the AEGIS weapons system; (4) the important benefits to be gained from nuclear propulsion; and (5) the fiscally constrained shipbuilding budgets. In order to effectively carry out its missions and support national policy objectives in the 1980's and beyond, the Navy requires a balanced fleet which includes highly capable destroyers, as well as strike cruisers.

In light of the projected threat and multiple mission requirements, the DDG-47 must be armed with the most effective anti-air warfare system that can be accommodated by a destroyer hull. This is the AEGIS combat system. Destroyers must continue to be conventionally propelled because within the current and projected funds available for **shipbuilding**, the added cost of nuclear propulsion will not permit the procurement of the numbers required in a balanced shipbuilding program.

The DDG-47 class is designed to operate in a high threat area with carrier strike forces, amphibious task forces, and underway replenishment groups. It will be built using the same hull design as the DD-963. This provides commonality in the gas turbine propulsion plants and sonar systems and minimizes the overall design uncertainties. Besides the **AEGIS** system and two guided missile launchers, the **DDG-47** will have two rapid fire 5" guns and the **HARPOON** surface-to-surface missiles mounted in deck **cannisters**. The ship's anti-submarine warfare suite will include the finest equipments available. This suite provides the **AN/SQS-53** hull mounted active sonar, a passive towed array, **ASROC**, and torpedoes. It will also carry two **LAMPS** helicopters.

The Navy's program is considered the most realistic means of getting the AEGIS weapons system to sea at the earliest practicable time, in the numbers required and with the balance of capabilities needed.

DoD strongly recommends restoration of funds for the DDG-47 N 77 lead ship.

FFG7. The House removed **\$589,500,000** from the President's request and reduced the FFG-7s authorized in N 77 from 8 to 4. The House further reduced the FY 78 authorization request from 8 to 0.

This action limits to 14 ships the FFG-7 class which was designed to resolve specific surface combatant force deficiencies in numbers and capabilities. The **FFG-7** is designed to protect underway replenishment groups, amphibious task forces and military and mercantile convoys. In these convoys the FFG7 will complement the capability and supplement the numbers of other planned and existing surface combatants. The FFG7 class will have a quick reaction anti-air missile system, the **HARPOON** anti-ship surface-to-surface missile, and anti-submarine capability consisting of active and passive sensors, **LAMPS** helicopters and air and shiplaunched weapons. The Navy is depending on these ships to provide the vital area anti-air warfare (AAW) capability needed to protect replenishment groups, amphibious task forces, and military and mercantile convoys. In this role, the **FFG-7** will be complementary to other planned and existing escorts that do not have this AAW capability. Failure to introduce the AAW capability into the fleet in required numbers will represent a significant degradation of **capability**.

In the 1980s, FFG-7s will represent a substantial portion of the sea control forces needed to protect our open ocean sea lanes. Continuity of procurement is desired in order to achieve the benefits of class standardization while at the same time keeping unit cost to a minimum. Deletion of twelve FFGs will result in a **stretchout** of the program causing more ships to be built in later years at higher material and labor costs. Termination will result in a severe adverse impact on force levels, and military capability.

The House added four DD-963s to compensate for the reduction of four FFG-7s in FY 77. However, the present DD-963 class does not have an area anti-air warfare capability required for the convoy protection task. This capability is provided by the FFG7, which **is** specifically designed for the mission and costs about one half as much as the DD-963.

In order to carry out the Navy's mission, it must have a balanced fleet of various type ships and capabilities. The Navy particularly needs frigates in the numbers requested to carry out sea control tasks along the sea lines of communication. DoD strongly supports the Navy's FFG7 class ships **and urges** that the Senate restore authorization for eight ships of the class in both **FY 77 and FY 78** as requested in the President's budget.

Cost Growth and Escalation. House action made substantial reductions in escalation estimates for **FY 1975** and prior year SCN programs and deleted all estimates in the cost growth line for claims.

It appears that the House is under the impression that \$833.1 Million is not needed for Escalation on prior year shipbuilding programs. In fact, these funds are needed to complete the prior year ships and without them, the U. S. Navy will be unable to meet its legal obligations. The Department strongly urges the Congress to restore the needed funds in order to allow completion of the prior year ships just as the budget allows for completion of the new ships funded in the N 1977 shipbuilding program.

In addition, a recent Comptroller General decision of 27 February 1976, B-184830, and Section 3679 of the Revised Statutes create significant doubt as to whether the Department can proceed with N 1975 and prior year programs on an orderly basis if the House action is not reversed.

Failure to provide the requested claims funding could delay settlement of pending and anticipated claims and requests for equitable adjustment. This will result in costly and disruptive litigation and could produce severe financial hardship on contractors as a result of the government's inability to **meet legitimate** government obligations in the N 1977 time period.

The Department strongly urges that the Cost Growth and Escalation requests be fully **funded**.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
RESEARCH, **DEVELOPMENT** TEST AND EVALUATION, ARMY

(Thousands of Dollars)

Original N 1977 Authorization Request	2,376,300
House Bill	2,271,295
Restoration Requested	105,005

Requested for Reconsideration:

(Thousands of Dollars)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Original Authorization Request</u>	<u>House Bill</u>	<u>Restoration Requested</u>
ASH	26,000	0	26,000
Aircraft Survivability	3,620	3,000	620
Advanced VTOL	9,894	7,000	2,894
CHAPARRAL/VULCAN	10,184	8,000	2,184
AFAADS	2,000	200	1,800
BMD Systems Technology	118,040	100,000	18,040
HEL Components	26,490	21,000	5,490
Heliborne Guidance Technology	1,095	0	1,095
Army/Navy Surface-to-Air Technology	4,000	2,000	2,000
STINGER'	19,949	13,449	6,500
Armament Technology	20,178	18,178	2,000
Advanced Concept Lab	4,000	0	4,000
Fuze Technology	5,132	4,632	500
Munitions Technology	8,485	7,985	500
Ballistics Technology	18,453	17,453	1,000
Advanced Multi-Purpose Missile System	3,000	0	3,000
BUSHMASTER	22,512	19,000	3,512
Mechanized Utility Vehicle	4,130	0	4,130
Communications/Electronics	6,345	5,845	500
Combat Surveillance, Target Acquisition & Identification	5,331	4,231	1,100
Electronics and Electronic Devices	14,206	13,806	400
Combat Support Technology	3,677	3,177	500
Night Vision Investigations	5,585	5,085	500

(Thousands of Dollars)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Original Authorization Request</u>	<u>House Bill</u>	<u>Restoration Requested</u>
Counter Mine & Barrier Techniques	4,420	3,920	500
Non-Systems Training Devices	2,600	2,500	100
Technology			
RPV Supporting Technology	2,500	1,000	1,500
Anti-Radiation Missile/CM	4,140	1,000	3,140
Advanced Electronic Technology	1,500	0	1,500
Command and Control	9,581	591	8,990
Evaluation of Foreign Components	2,010	1,000	1,010

#### JUSTIFICATION

Aerial Scout Helicopter. The HASC deleted all \$26.0 Million for this program. This deletion was based on lack of an approved development plan. At a Defense Systems Acquisition Review Council (DSARC) meeting on March 23, 1976, the Department of Defense approved a **phased** ASH program with the initiation of a competitive Target Acquisition Designation System (TADS) and Pilot's Night Vision System (PNVS) development to start in FY 77 and the airframe development to start in FY 78.

The FY '77 funds are required to compete the TADS development in the ASH program against the similar target acquisition designation system developed in the Advanced Attack Helicopter (AAH) program. This competition will avoid sole source development, reduce the development risk, and provide cost leverage for the selection of the TADS to be common to both AAH and ASH. The competitively developed PNVS will also be flown off on the AAH and a common system selected for both aircraft.

The impact of the HASC reduction is that it precludes the initiation of TADS and PNVS competitive development in FY 77, prevents the ASH TADS fly-off against the TADS developed in the AAH program, and places the **AAH-TADS** development in a sole source environment.

The HASC also expressed concern over commonality of aircraft subsystems within the Army's aircraft development programs and expressed an unwillingness to authorize funds for the development of future helicopters until the Army addressed these concerns. In a letter to the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee on March 4, 1976, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Research and Development) addressed these concerns and they were also provided as an Insert for the Record. The Army, therefore, requests restoration of \$26.0 million and relief from the restrictive language.

U.S. Roland. The HASC authorized the \$85.001 million requested by the Army but placed a ceiling limitation of \$220.0 million on the total RDTE program. The \$85.001 million authorization is contingent upon the Army identifying \$3.0 million of fiscal year 1977 RDTE funds and a firm plan to develop a **brassboard/prototype/command** guided or RF guided CHAPARRAL missile for test and evaluation.

The Army is presently restructuring the US Roland program and estimates the current total RDTE program at \$231 million. That estimate has not been subjected to negotiation with the contractor. The final program cost cannot be guaranteed, but the Army will take intensive management action to hold within that estimate. The Army will keep Congress informed as final negotiations are completed late this summer.

The impact of the contingency to identify \$3.0 million to test and evaluate an all-weather version of CHAPARRAL would be to deny requested RDTE funding of an important Army program(s). An all-weather CHAPARRAL proposal was evaluated by the Army during its short range air defense (SHORAD) source selection (fall 1974). That proposal, submitted by the current CHAPARRAL system contractor, was judged less cost effective than the ROLAND system selected by the Army. The Army's decision was reviewed by DOD and Congress., The Army is willing to accomplish the recommended all-weather CHAPARRAL development and test, but additional funds should be authorized and appropriated for this directed action.

Aircraft Survivability. The Army requested \$3.6 million, which was reduced \$0.6 million by the HASC. The impact of this reduction is to delay field testing infrared countermeasures, to curtail aircraft signature measurements, and to delay initiation of passive countermeasure efforts. Development of this technology, described on page 119 of the January 76 Descriptive Summary, is not premature and should not be delayed. This effort is based upon mirror image threat extrapolation because there is little specific threat information on which to base long range countermeasure **investigation**. The Army requests restoration of \$0.6 million.

Advanced VTOL. The Army requested \$9.9 million, which was reduced \$2.9 million by the HASC. The impact of this reduction is to reduce the major Department of Defense broad base program to evaluate and demonstrate unique and advanced helicopter rotor concepts. Specific programs that will be eliminated or reduced are the advanced controllable twist rotor, the bearingless main rotor and the advancing blade concept. Also, the program to evaluate the fly-by-wire concept on helicopters will not be initiated and funds will not be available for the Army's share of the Joint Army/NASA program on helicopter in-flight simulators.

The Army's FY 77 funding request of \$9.9 million is predicated on supporting a balanced and viable helicopter technology demonstration program in advanced rotor concepts, advanced flight controls, advanced composite structures and establishing a Second Generation Helicopter Aeromechanics Model. The rotor concepts included in this program are

ones that offer significant improvements in performance, maintainability and survivability. The program does not duplicate any other Army or DOD program. The planned FY 77 program is required for full scale evaluation and demonstration of new concepts and is critical in validating advanced helicopter concepts for future helicopter design criteria. Funds are essential for the orderly development of advanced rotor systems to permit being responsive to future engineering development requirements. The Army is the only DOD agency or US agency with a major **helicopter technology** demonstration program and for the US to stay internationally competitive, the \$9.9 million is necessary. The Army requests restoration of \$2.9 million.

Chaparral/Vulcan. The HASC reduced the RDTE funding level from the requested \$10.2 million to \$8.0 million.

Such a reduction of funds to support effectiveness improvements for Vulcan could preclude developments of automatic tracking sensors for the system; thus limiting potential effectiveness improvements to those involving a manual tracking system. Since Vulcan will be in the Active or Reserve Forces for many years, the Army is seeking cost effective options to significantly improve its capability; Options available for this improvement include upgrade of the manual tracking system, improvement of ammunition and development of an automatic tracking capability with possible electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM). The HASC reduction will severely limit the options available for this key product improvement. The Army requests restoration of the \$10.2 million originally requested.

Advanced Forward Area Air Defense Systems. The HASC reduced the RDTE funding level requested in FY 77 from \$2.0 Million to \$0.2 Million. The HASC reduction would delay the test of a European production model of **5PFZ-FLAKPANZER** for approximately six months, thus delaying availability of data that is key to the future Army decisions on acquisition of a new air defense gun.

The Army recognizes the need to consider effectiveness improvement of the Vulcan. \$6.0 ~~Million~~ RDTE in P.E. 2.37.32A has been requested to undertake an improvement program if current ongoing studies show that to be a cost-effective course of action.

In response to HASC staff comments, on September 19, 1975 the Army proved an Information Paper to the HASC's professional staff member for R&D which explained why the Army does not plan to limit options in the LOFAAD Gun program to PHALANX fire control and the GAU-8 cannon. The Army is aware that competitive concepts for a new air defense gun have been developed by U.S. industry, using the GAU-8 cannon, and in a separate design, subsystems common to PHALANX fire control. These concepts and those of other U.S. corporations will be considered along with other candidates in the ultimate selection of a new Army air defense gun system.

The Army has gained significant experience in dealing with the difficulties of adapting the Roland for US use. The experience gained should be of benefit to the continuation of the Roland program and to adaptation of any other system such as **FLAKPANZER**. As a candidate **system** already developed, the **FLAKPANZER** must be tested to demonstrate its sufficiency to meet the need. Collection of test data on a European production model should not be dependent on US adaptation of **ROLAND** hardware. It seems imprudent to ignore the possible economic and schedule advantages that could be afforded by a systemlike **FLAKPANZER**. A production model of the system is expected to be available to the US to begin the test, during 4th Qtr FY 77. Planning of the test and acquisition of such items as ammunition and spare parts must begin earlier in the fiscal year. The Army appeals for restoration of the \$2.0 million originally requested.

Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Technology Program. The President's Budget for FY 1977 requested \$118 million for the Ballistic Missile Defense Systems Technology Program to support a **broadened and** sustained program on ballistic missile defense systems technology that is applicable to the defense of a variety of national value targets. The HASC has proposed to fund this program at \$100 million in FY 1977, an \$18 million reduction.

The decrease proposed by the HASC will force a reduction in the effort planned for broadening this program in FY 1977. This reduction is of particular concern since it further lowers the U.S. ballistic missile defense funding at a time when we see increased Soviet BMD development and increasing proliferation of nuclear capability among nations inexperienced in **nuclear** safeguards. Specifically, (a) a reduction must be made in the examination of the concepts for defense against limited ballistic missile attacks and for defense of non-hardened military targets, (b) efforts to advance the technology of interceptors and radars will have to be deferred, and (c) field tests associated with the validation of critical terminal defense issues must be slipped three-to-nine months. The **investigation of** a limited defense against small and unsophisticated ballistic missile attacks was considered **particularly** critical at this time to provide an understanding of the feasibility of this concept and the future requirements for research and development.

The rationale given by the HASC for the reduction was that the Army has not changed the program **content**. The program has been changed significantly by deleting specific system efforts, such as the development of tactical software, and by adding new areas of research, such as the investigation of limited defense concepts that are not related to the previous Site Defense program. That portion of the former Site Defense effort being carried over in the present Systems Technology Program is required to complete a test facility which is essential to both the validation of critical technical issues involving terminal defense and the field testing at Kawajalen of system technologies related to other operating regimes and defense concepts.

# CONFIDENTIAL

The Department of Defense urges that the \$118 million requested for the Systems Technology Program be authorized by the SASC so that this program can be appropriately broadened.

High Energy Laser Components. The Army requested \$26.49 million, which was reduced by \$5.49 million by the HASC. The stated basis for the Committee's action is that there exists work under way and planned by the Navy that will provide the identical data that is essential to the Army. Specific items considered -duplicative have not been identified, except in broad generalities. The Army does not believe that any of the planned utilization of the funds requested duplicates work being performed by the Navy. The DoD High Energy Laser Review Group, through its quarterly meetings and its subpanels, together with direct inter-service coordination and management by the Assistant Director, Space and Advanced Systems, ODDR&E, ensure that duplication does not occur.

In the area of chemical lasers, the Army is pursuing development of a number of components peculiar to Army requirements. These include compact diffuser/ejectors, chemical pumps, special nozzles, and solid fuels. These programs are not duplicative of Navy programs. Any reduction in the chemical laser program will reduce the number of technical alternatives available for inclusion in an Army high energy laser weapon system prototype.

In pointing and tracking, the Army is investigating simpler techniques, different from the Navy approach, for accomplishing hot spot tracking and night time tracking, and is pursuing other developments essential to fieldability in the Army environment. Any reduction in the pointing and tracking program will reduce the technical alternatives available for inclusion in an Army high energy laser weapon system prototype.

In propagation, effects, and vulnerability, the Army is planning joint experiments with the Navy using the Navy's chemical laser. Additional work is planned on target description, probability-of-kill modeling, and theoretical and experimental work with the pulsed carbon dioxide laser. Because this work is essentially tri-service in nature, a reduction in the Army effort will result in the loss of that part of the Army's contribution to the overall DoD data bank in both effects and vulnerability, particularly in the area of pulsed lasers.

The Mobile Test Unit, while not mentioned in the Committee's report, is an area of concern to the Committee. Testing the Mobile Test Unit is required to resolve a number of issues concerning fieldability in an Army environment. Among these many issues is whether cost can be kept down by utilizing the man in the loop to direct the weapon, in particular selecting the aim point on the target, controlling beam duration, and assessing damage to the target. Any reduction in the program will prevent obtaining all of the data necessary to resolve these issues. The Army requests restoration of \$5.49 million.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Heliborne Missile Guidance Technology. The Army requested \$1.1 million. These funds were deleted by the House. The impact of this reduction is to preclude initiation of development efforts on a non-imaging infrared seeker for HELLFIRE. The House Armed Services Committee has eliminated all FY 77 funding for development of a fire and forget seeker for HELLFIRE. This action will deny the AAH the enhanced capability to deliver missiles with minimum exposure. The Army now considers a non-imaging infrared seeker as first priority to provide this capability, but has not timely means to commence its development. Imaging infrared is indeed being worked by the Air Force, but does not promise to be affordable for HELLFIRE use. Likewise, limited laser beam rider (LBR) efforts are underway in DARPA; however, LBR does not offer the fire and forget opportunity to the AAH that an advanced non-imaging seeker does. Laser HELLFIRE represents a quantum increase in versatility over TOW, but fire and forget seeker technology provides a better means of countering our potential enemies' numerical superiority in tank and mechanized forces. The Army requests restoration of \$1.1 million.

Army/Navy Area SAM Technology. The Army requested \$4.0 million, which was reduced \$2.0 million by the HASC. The impact of this reduction is to essentially reduce the Army's portion of the joint advanced development program to a single effort. There are three primary efforts planned: (1) low cost radar phased arrays, (2) active seeker technology for large surface-to-air missiles, and (3) passive target acquisition systems. The reduced funding level will only provide for a meaningful effort for low cost radar phased arrays and from the outset undermine the purpose of this OSD directed program which is to jointly develop SAM technology with the aim of avoiding duplication and promoting commonality. Pursuit of the other efforts are important investigations toward high fire power rates and radar emission control. The Army requests restoration of \$2.0 million.

STINGER. The Army request of \$19.9 million was reduced \$6.5 million by the HASC. The impact of this reduction is to preclude the initiation of engineering development of a necessary Advanced Seeker for STINGER. The Advanced Seeker will provide a highly effective capability [overcoming serious countermeasures vulnerabilities] of the current STINGER design. The Advanced Seeker will provide for greater acquisition ranges and less gunner error in severe [infrared] environments. Accomplishment of engineering development of the Advanced Seeker in the STINGER Program element is necessary to integrate the new seeker design into the STINGER system. Engineering development in N 77 is necessary in order to phase the new seeker into production. A delay in initiation of this development could necessitate future retrofit with a higher attendant cost. The Army requests restoration of \$6.5 million.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

Concept Development Validation. The House Armed Services Committee reduced the Army's request for Concept Development Validation funds by \$7.6 million in the following program elements:

<u>PROGRAM ELEMENT</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>REQUESTED AMOUNT</u>	<u>HASC REDUCTION</u>
6.26.03.A	Armaments Technology	20,178	2,000
6.26.16.A	Fuze Technology	5,132	500
6.26.17.A	Munitions Technology	8,485	500
6.26.18.A	Ballistic Technology	18,453	1,000
6.27.01.A	Communication-Electronics	6,345	500
6.27.03.A	Combat Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Identification	5,331	1,100
6.27.05.A	Electronics and Electric Devices	14,206	400
6.27.08.A	Combat Support Technology	3,677	500
6.27.09.A	Night Vision Investigations	5,585	500
6.27.12.A	Countermine and Barrier Techniques	4,420	500
6.27.27.A	Non-Systems Training Devices Technology	2,600	100

This concept implements an Army Materiel Acquisition Review Committee recommendation to conduct development and testing of "brassboard" or experimental configurations, advanced components, advanced development models, commercial items, foreign or other service items such that existing or potential characteristic of Army needs could be determined prior to development of firm and formal requirements.

The \$7.6 million reduction in the programs listed will severely reduce and hamper the Army's efforts to implement this dynamic concept and provide rapid response in evaluating new equipment before the Army incurs heavy investment costs. In N 1976 sixty-eight possibilities have been investigated and twenty-three have been rejected because preliminary studies have shown them to be infeasible or to have low potential. New ideas are constantly proposed. Some ideas rejected as a result of the concept, before heavy Army investments, are items such as the Helms Mate Compass and a diver propulsion unit. On the other hand, adoption of hand held calculators for artillery observers and TOW under armor systems are directly attributable to the Concept Validation Program.

In evaluating a choice of budgeting a 6.3 versus, 6.2 Army found the concept could be funded in either category and opted for 6.2. If funding in 6.2 is deemed inappropriate, Army requests that the funds be authorized in 6.2 as requested and Army will restructure these amounts to 6.3 category prior to execution'.

The Concept Development Validation program is a valid concept intended to save resources by evaluating new concepts, ideas and items well in advance of incurring the investment which may occur once requirements are

placed in the Required Operational Capability document and a new development initiated. The Army requests restoration of the \$7.6 million in Concept Development Validation funds in the programs listed.

Advanced Concept Laboratory. The Army request of \$4 million was deleted by the HASC. The impact of this reduction is to severely restrict the Army's efforts to develop innovative ideas for future combat and tactical vehicles. A contract was awarded to Battelle and one of their contractors Southwest Research Institute on March 5, 1976 to provide a small core of innovative **engineers** from outside the automotive industry to develop **ideas** and hardware for future vehicles and components. The Army enthusiastically adopted this approach, recommended by the Army Materiel Acquisition Review Committee, to augment its limited in-house talent. The FY 77 program for the Advanced Concept Laboratory will continue this effort and provide funds to convert these ideas to breadboard designs for evaluation. This program will provide hardware for future tank and automotive systems. If the funds for the Advanced Concepts Laboratory are removed, then an equivalent increase should be made to Tank-Automotive Technology, P.E. 6.26.01, so the necessary exploratory development work can be pursued by the in-house laboratory. **This** effort is essential to maintaining our technological position in this vital area. The Army requests restoration of \$4 million.

Advanced Multipurpose Missile. The Army request of \$3.0 million was deleted by the HASC. The impact of this reduction is to halt exploitation of a highly promising concept which would provide a low cost, accurate countermeasures-immune antitank and air defense missile system. The Advanced Multipurpose Missile (AMPM) system will be vehicular mounted to manportable with maximum hardware commonality. It is programmed to be the follow-on replacement of current antitank missiles and could eventually replace shoulder-fired air defense weapons. This program is based on ARPA and Army technology demonstrations which **have shown** the feasibility of such a system. N 77 funds are necessary to capitalize on the ARPA and Technology Base developments and to proceed to the next phase of system prototyping. This program is coordinated with and complements ARPA warhead and seeker work, which will assist in determining the smallest warhead and tracker feasible. The Army requests restoration of \$3.0 million.

Vehicle Rapid Fire Weapon System (BUSHMASTER). The Army request of \$22.5 million was **reduced \$3.5 million** by the HASC. The DSARC on 6 March 1975 approved this urgent competitive program. Further, this weapon system is tied to the MICV, an Army Big Five Program. The House **Armed Services** Committee reduction of \$3.5 million in N 77 causes a severe disturbance in the MICV systems 25mm **armament** program. This decrement will result in a 50 percent reduction in the quantity of 25mm ammunition to be procured in FY 77, thus preventing the completion of necessary Government testing of the 25mm self-powered and externally-powered cannons and ammunition, and

will delay testing by approximately six months. The effects of this delay include: a substantial increase in research and development cost for FY 78, deferred procurement of the ammunition for system tests, an extension of the test program and an increase in engineering support for the tests. These delays will cause a corresponding slip in the Army's comparative **evaluation**, which considers the results of DT/OT II, and in final selection of one of the cannons as primary armament for MICV. Timely decision on the 25mm cannon is necessary to interface weapon production with MICV production. The reduction will so delay the availability of the 25mm cannon that **365** additional 20mm **M139** product improved guns will be placed on MICV pending introduction of the 25mm cannon. The Army requests restoration of **\$3.5 million**.

Mechanized Utility Vehicle (MUV). The Army request of \$4.1 million was 'deleted by the HASC. The Army has an urgent requirement for a tracked carrier for the ROLAND system. Two vehicles, the Mechanized Utility Vehicle (MW) and the **M109**, are currently being considered for this role. At the time that the budget was submitted the Army believe that a MICV derivative vehicle was the most appropriate. Consequently, the MUV program was designed to provide a carrier based on the MICV chassis and was part of a concept to develop a common carrier in the 20 ton class based on MICV. Whether the MUV or the **M109** is selected as the ROLAND carrier, the N 77 funds in the MUV PE are required for necessary development effort. This cut makes it impossible for the Army to provide a tracked carrier as required by the ROLAND schedule, and will have a severe. adverse impact on the ROLAND program. The Army requests restoration of \$4.1 million.

RPV Supporting Technology. The Army request of \$2.5 million was reduced \$1.5 million by the HASC. At present there is no Army 6.2 program for **RPVs** to complement the present 6.3 program, and this reduction severely reduces this needed exploratory development effort. All of the **RPV's** in the 6.3 program require building blocks such as improved engines, **night-vision** sensors, anti-jammable command and control links, and high **reliability** recover techniques. These advances will be directly tested in the 6.3 **AQUILA** program. This funding reduction will cause future program slippages and loss of system performance and **reliability**. The Army therefore urges restoration of \$1.5 million.

Anti-Radiation Missile. The Army request of \$4.1 million was reduced \$3.1 million by the HASC. **ARM-CM** program is a new start in N 1976, and is an Army priority 1 program. Funding programmed: N 76 (**\$.8M**), N 77 (**\$1.05M**), and FY 77 (**\$4.1M**). It is a technology effort, complementing and supporting specific **ARM-CM** efforts in other programs (e.g., **SAM-D**, **HAWK**, **ROLAND**, artillery and mortar radars).

**SAM-D** funded **ARM** simulation work beginning in N 1975, because no **ARM-CM** line existed. **SAM-D** support to this effort will end with N 1977.

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ARM-CM work in N 1977 will include development of generic ARM seekers modelled on Soviet ARM's, for laboratory simulations and flights against all U.S. systems; development of radar decoy technology utilizing the artillery locating radars as a vehicle because of its comparative simplicity vis-a-vis SAM-D; Tri-Service data base support (Threat information, ARM-CM techniques, library of all ARM countermeasures work being done by all Services); develop an instrumented aircraft which will mount the generic seeker, fly the projected path of a threat ARM, and record error signals generated by our countermeasures; project the ARM threat into the 1980-1990 time frame; and develop a dual mode (IR, RF) decoy.

The HASC cut of \$3.1M would reduce ARM-CM efforts to continuation of seeker simulation efforts, Tri-Service data base, and radar decoy.

ARM-CM work is not duplicative of efforts in SAM-D HAWK, et al. Instead it complements and supplements those efforts. Without this technology effort, U.S. major radar systems will not have proper countermeasures applications when they fielded. The Army requests restoration of \$3.1 million.

Advanced Electronic Technology. The Army request of \$1.5 million was deleted by the HASC. The impact of this reduction is that it completely eliminates this effort. It is to be started in N 77, and is necessary to allow transfer of electron device achievements in 6.2 Exploratory Development to systems applications. The Army has continually had a void here, resulting in system cost increases, slipped schedules, and poor reliability. Accordingly, reliability, performance, reproducibility with major emphasis on greater commality of application and lower life cycle costs are the goals of the program. It is oriented towards direct support of, and application to military equipment and systems. Examples include lower cost and a more reliable traveling wave tube for the AN/TPQ-36 radar, a better microwave amplifier tube and a solid state modulator for the AN/TPQ-37 radar.

Also included is the effort to design and fabricate advanced development models of fiber optic cable assemblies that will replace current metallic cable assemblies and accordingly will reduce weight and bulk and use of strategic copper material. Input and output matching of transistorized power devices for 4.4 to 5.0 gigahertz operation will be optimized. Combining of ten watt power modules to the 100 watt power level will improve the operational reliability of the fielded AN/GRC-143 radio and increase the range capability and propagation reliability of the fielded AN/GRC-144 Troposcatter Radio. The Army requests restoration of \$1.5 million.

Command and Control. The Army request of \$15 million was reduced \$9 million by the HASC. The impact of this reduction is an 18 month delay in the Army's urgent requirement to replace the present field artillery

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battery computer (FADAC) with a more reliable system of modern technology. FADAC was designed during the 1950's and certain repair parts (germanium diodes, transistors, etc.) are no longer produced. Maintenance frequently requires circuit redesign to substitute equivalent parts which creates excessive costs and delays in **repairs**. Automated technical fire control is essential to battery effectiveness in terms of time response and **reduction of human errors**. Even with TACFIRE fielded, 60 percent of all batteries rely solely on a battery computer for this support.

The Batter-r Level Computer (BLC) program was initiated in 1976 to provide a highly reliable and low cost system for this role. Consisting of a computer unit **at battery** headquarters and a small display at each gun, the BLC will extend automation to the weapons for further increases in responsiveness and reduction of errors. By interfacing with TACFIRE and the TACFIRE Digital Message **Device**, the BLC will facilitate the integration of reserve components in **to Active** Army units with TACFIRE and provide a stand alone capability for battery autonomous operations. It will make the TACFIRE Battery Display Unit (BDU) unnecessary and permit an estimated **\$16.4M reduction** in that program. The present schedule provides for joint testing in TACFIRE **DT/OT III** to obtain data on which to base the BDU production decision.

The BLC will greatly increase battlefield survivability by providing a distributed system and permitting greater weapons dispersion through **computation of** firing data for each weapon rather than a battery solution. The BLC program will take maximum advantage of **off-the-shelf**, components with minimum actual development. The RFP released on 20 February 1976 requires that bidders demonstrate an operating prototype computer with support software as a pre-award criterion. Some **development efforts** will be required to provide items such as the necessary applications software, interfaces, and the gun display unit. The Army requests restoration of \$9 million.

Evaluation of Foreign Components. The Army request of \$2.0 million, was reduced \$1.0 million by the HASC. Evaluation of Foreign Components is a level of effort program which exploits and evaluates foreign materiel and technology **the U.S. Army** may wish to use or defeat. Data developed through the exploitation is provided throughout **DoD** for information and to assist and support ongoing R&D efforts. A cut of this magnitude will reduce programmed effort by **50 percent**, with a similar reduction in data available to the system. The Army requests restoration of \$1.0 million.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION, NAVY

(Thousands of Dollars)

Original N 1977 Authorization Request	3,858,865
House Bill	3,608,048
Restoration Requested	255,817

Requested for Reconsideration:

(Thousands of Dollars)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Original Authorization Request</u>	<u>House Bill</u>	<u>Restoration Requested</u>
Center for Naval Analyses	8,235	7,235	1,000
A-6 Squadrons	5,630	0	5,630
F-401 Engine	1,000	0	1,000
V/STOL Helicopter Dev.	4,127	3,000	1,127
Advanced Aircraft Propulsion System	13,706	9,706.	4,000
Air Craft Systems	3,264	2,292	972
All Weather Attack	1,000	0	1,000
Aerial Target Systems Dev.	14,477	10,845	3,632
CH-53E	14,043	10,000	4,043
F-18	346,900	300,900	46,000
Strike Warfare Weaponry Tech	42,400	34,000	8,400
Adv. Surf. to Air Weapon Sys.	3,000	2,000	1,000
Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System	16,100	0	16,100
Air Launched/Surface Launched ASM	1,049	0	1,049
Air to Air Missile Component Engr.	29,200	2,185	27,015
Hi Speed Radiation Missile	33,495	20,000	13,495
NATO Sea Sparrow	11,502	5,000	6,502
Cruise Missile (Engr)	164,900	100,000	64,900
Vertical Launch Standard Missile	5,515	515	5,000
Advanced Ident. Techniques	4,300	300	4,000
Hi Perf. Underwater Vehicle	3,000	1,000	2,000
Advanced Command Data System	9,884	3,858	6,026
Combat Systems Integration	3,516	1,437	2,079
Test Bed Dev. & Demo.	22,217	20,000	2,217
CVNX	11,472	0	11,472
Lightweight ASW Torpedo	8,438	0	8,438
Directed Energy Program	3,736	0	3,736

<u>Item</u>	<u>Original Authorization Request</u>	<u>House Bill</u>	<u>Restoration Requested</u>
Adv. Electronic Components	973	0	973
Laser C/M & CC/M	1,980	0	1,980
Foreign Weapons Evaluation	2,031	1,000	1,031

#### JUSTIFICATION

Center for Naval Analyses. A \$1,000,000 reduction from the requested \$8,235,000 for the Center for Naval Analyses means a reduction of 12% or about 17 man-years. At least 5 field billets currently maintained at major operating commands (COMSECONDEFLT, COMTHIRDFLT, CINCUSNAVEUR, DEPCOMOPTEVFORPAC, COMOPTEVFOR) would be eliminated, and 4 or 5 high priority analyses would not be started: Active Reserve force mix; support of deployments with few bases; Soviet efforts to obtain overseas facilities; cost growth in Navy programs; and enlisted training requirements.

The entire CNA program is carefully planned to insure that only appropriate and high priority tasks are undertaken. CNA analysts with the operating forces provide fleet commanders with unique, on-site operational analyses. Restoration of the requested funding would permit continued work on important ASW and ASMD tactics in the SECOND and THIRD Fleets, evaluation of SIXTH Fleet capabilities for NAVEUR, and operational test and evaluation of the DD-963 and LHA, as well as AEGIS, HARPOON, and other new Navy weapon systems.

The study program planned for CNA is developed by the Director of Navy Program Planning, a Vice Admiral with overall responsibility for evaluating future naval forces. To avoid duplication and insure that only high priority studies are done, the CNA program is developed jointly with other Navy study efforts. Unless restoration is approved, the studies planned for CNA would not be conducted at all or would be done at less well-prepared organizations. Restoration to the originally requested level of \$8,235,000 is requested.'

A-6 Squadrons (A6E HARPOON). The deletion by the House of the requested \$5,630,000 for the A-6E HARPOON development program will delay IOC by one year.

The aircraft carrier with its embarked air wing remains the most potent force on the seas. Mating of the HARPOON missile system with the A6E all weather attack aircraft will further enhance the capability of the attack carrier. At this time, the attack carrier does not have a means to strike enemy ships in all weather conditions without penetrating enemy defensive missile envelopes. HARPOON, when mated with the A6E aircraft, will provide this capability to the carrier commander. Restora-

tion of the full \$5,630,000 is therefore requested to provide an Initial Operational Capability of 'this system at the earliest practicable time.

F401 Engine. The deletion of \$1 million for the F401 engine eliminates the Navy's current plan for preserving options for jet engine development, as directed by the FY 76 Congressional Joint Conference Committee. The Navy's plan in FY 77 is two-fold: (1) to monitor the progress of all state-of-the-art engine programs such as the Air Force F-100 and F-101 engines (used in the F-45, F-16 and B-1), assessing their potential applications; and (2) to investigate further the potential of the F401 engine for satisfying projected Navy requirements. Among these requirements would be the Thrust Augmented Wing aircraft, other possible V/STOL applications and providing increased thrust for the F-14. Restoration of the \$1 million is therefore requested.

V/STOL HELO DEVELOPMENT. The House reduced this program \$1,127,000 from the requested \$4,127,000. A small project, Helo Escape and Survival System was deleted. The principal project under this element, Advanced Helo Rotor System, is directed towards design, fabrication, test and demonstration of a circulation control 'rotor (CCR) system, to provide existing and future helicopter airframes with a total vehicle with reduced maintenance levels and increased reliability without any inherent operational limitations. This technology also provides the critical verification of blade manufacturing and control system development for the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) X-Wing concept and can provide increased speed capability for rotary wing aircraft (up to 400 kts). The full scale test of the entire dynamic system will be postponed from February 1977 to September 1977. All fabrication associated with the Ames 40' x 80' wind tunnel test would be eliminated until FY 78 resulting in a 12-month delay. The flight test program would suffer an 18-month slip.

Restoration of the deleted \$1,127,000 is requested in order that a timely flight demonstration of CCR technology may be conducted.

Advanced Aircraft Propulsion Systems. The House reduced the authorization request of \$13.7 million by \$4.0 million, on the basis of excess funds.

This program element covers analytical and experimental work for developing the design technology on which all the future naval aircraft engines will be based. In order to avoid repetition of today's service problems in engines of the future, development testing must be initiated several years in advance of the decision to use such technology for design and construction of actual service engines. Of the \$13.7 million requested, \$3.8 million is the final increment of funding in a program to uprate the T76 engine for the OV-10 aircraft; \$5.0 million is the Navy share of a joint AF/N advanced technology demonstrator engine; and the remaining funds are for continuation of ongoing programs for a new turbine, afterburner, and an electronic fuel control. New starts are a starting and secondary power system as well as a joint Navy/NASA program in nozzle systems.

The House cut would require not only complete deferral of the new starts but would also require delays or complete termination of some of the other. ongoing programs. Any reduction of the joint N/AF demonstrator

program would have an adverse impact on the Air Force development program as well as that of the Navy. We request the Advanced Aircraft Propulsion Systems program be authorized at \$13.7 million.

Aircraft Systems (Advanced). The House reduced this program from the requested \$3,264,000 to \$2,292,000. While the purpose of the reduction was not specified, it appears that it is focused upon the \$972,000 identified with the project for Composite Structures for Advanced Aircraft.

This project is specifically oriented to optimize the application of new composite technologies to aircraft structures. Vast improvements in weight reduction, battle damage survivability, resistance to salt air corrosion, lower production costs and reduced maintenance man hour requirements can be achieved. The funding requested in Fy-77 will commence the design, fabrication and testing of the composite structure, main wing torque box for the AV-8B. Accomplishment of this goal will, for the first time, provide what is considered as a major step in aircraft weight reduction. This factor is of primary concern as the VSTOL concept materializes.

This reduction deletes all composite structure efforts. There is no other service or national program working toward the goal of composite materials for main wing structures.

It is requested that the \$972,000 reduction be **restored**.

All Weather Attack. The House action deleted the \$1,000,000 requested for this program.

The Navy proposes an advanced development technology program to develop an avionics suite capable of striking a wide range of targets in all weather situations. Essential to this avionics technology is a synthetic aperture radar capable of producing high resolution imagery from a maneuvering platform. Synthetic aperture radars in existence today do not have the required resolution and cannot produce imagery from a highly maneuvering platform. Other essential elements of this technology are communications, navigation, identification and electronics countermeasures. In FY 77 the Navy plans to perform three specific tasks: (1) generate an explicit avionics development plan; (2) initiate development of an avionics, system design specification; and (3) investigate promising synthetic aperture radar mechanizations. These tasks will provide the basis for continuing development of **all** weather avionics technology in FY 78 and following years. This program gives the Navy a systematic approach on long-lead technology which paces the development of any all-weather attack avionics system.

Restoration to the requested level of \$1,000,000 is requested in order to prevent a one-year delay in this program.

Aerial Target Systems Development. The House reduced this program from the requested amount of \$14,477,000 to \$10,845,000, with an understanding that the Navy at this time can commence a program to fabricate anti-ship missile targets without investing large amounts of development funds.

The Navy has an urgent need to counteract the threat presented by existing and postulated Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles of the 1980's. Realistic test and evaluation of these weapons is essential to their development and requires a target system capable of replicating the rapidly expanding cruise missile threat parameters of the 1980's. The Navy has assessed the technology and hardware that it has already developed, including targets used in testing the Close-In-Weapons Systems (CIWS), and these systems are limited in the required payload, hardness and performance parameters that the Anti-Ship Missile Target requires. Unless development is initiated now there will be no system to meet the advanced threat of the 1980's. The resulting stretchout of funding prevents unrealistic levels to sustain a viable program. Cancellation or unacceptable delay in providing a threat simulation capability to test and evaluate critical Anti-Ship Missile Defense Systems will result. Unless sufficient funding levels can be maintained, consideration must be given to eliminating realistic Anti-Ship Missile Defense testing of weapons systems.

It is strongly requested that the requested level of \$14,477,000 be authorized.

CH-53E. The House reduced this program from \$14,043,000 to \$10,000,000, with the understanding that the development process is near completion and the most significant effort remaining is operational evaluation.

While operational evaluation is scheduled to commence during this fiscal year, most of the funds requested are designated to provide for the continued development in the following areas: (1) Reliability and Maintainability tests and Analysis program; (2) Extended Life Transmission; (3) Crashworthy fuel system; (4) Engine infrared suppressors; (5) Survivability and Vulnerability; and (6) Two-point external cargo suspension system. These systems were previously unfunded trade-off study items, and could not be funded until completion of the trade-off study effort. Neither schedule nor scope of the program can be compromised without severe long-term cost impact and reduction in system capability and/or reliability. Deletion of \$4 million of the planned FY 77 funding will: (1) require cancellation of development effort of times 3, 4, 5, and 6 above; or (2) slow down all development effort and delay the initial production decision. Cancellation of development effort will not provide the needed operational capability and survivability and is considered unacceptable. The alternative of stretching out the development would result in a program stretchout of approximately six months and would require at least \$5 million additional RDT&E funds in FY 1978.

Restoration of the \$4,043,000 is requested in order to complete the development effort as programmed and provide an aircraft with improved reliability, maintainability, survivability, reduced life cycle costs, and improved operational capability.

F-18. The House reduced this program from the requested \$346,900,000 to \$300,900,000.

A reduction of this magnitude would require extensive revision of the F-18 development and flight test programs. A stretchout of the design effort would delay planned first flight of the F-18 at least several months beyond that originally planned. Subsequent development milestones would be similarly impacted including approximately a two-month delay in preliminary flight rating test for the F-404 engine being developed for the F-18. Exact cost increases associated with these delays are not yet available. It is certain, however, that an amount in excess of that reduced will be required in later years in order to compensate for the economics of stretching the development and flight test programs. The impact on the production schedule of a three month slip in the development has not been fully assessed. It may require restructuring in order to avoid excessive concurrency of development and production. Such a change would increase production cost and delay fleet introduction.

In regards to commonality of subsystems with the F-16, maximum utilization has been made of technology out of the F-16 program. The F-16 radar fly-off will significantly enhance the F-18 program. Similarly, in the Inertial Navigation Set and computer areas, the F-18 will receive benefit from that program. Commonality is a meaningful goal if money is saved in the process --either by reducing acquisition costs, operating and supporting costs or life cycle costs. In a number of equipment areas (e.g. UHF radio, TACAN, radar altimeter), it is more important to be common with existing equipment in other Navy aircraft than with Air Force F-16 equipments. -Therefore, the decision was made to maintain commonality within the Navy where possible. The Navy and OSD (DDR&E) examined the F-18 avionics in detail during August and September 1975 and each equipment was questioned with respect to why it could not be common with its counterpart in the F-16. The resulting decisions by OSD are reflected in the present definition of the F-18 avionics. A number of equipments were dictated by the unique Navy environment (carrier operations) which are not required in the F-16. For example, data link, automatic carrier landing system, and radar beacon fall in this category. These equipments will also be common with other Navy aircraft equipments. The missions which have been defined for the F-18 have dictated the design of some of the larger, more complex equipments. The F-16 radar would be unsatisfactory for use in the F-18 because it is not compatible with the Sparrow Air-to-air missile, could not withstand the gun vibration, acoustical noise, and carrier environment of the F-18. The Stores Management System in the F-16 is not capable of handling all the weapons required on the multi-mission F-18. A Forward Looking Infrared set is required on the F-18 but not the F-16. The F-16 computer was scrutinized in great detail in comparison with the planned Navy approach of developing a standard computer for use in all future Navy aircraft applications. The decision was made to stay with the development of the AN/AYK-14

standard computer for use in all future Navy aircraft. This is particularly true where common software is achieved. F-16 controls and displays are not appropriate for the F-18 for the following reasons: (1) one man operability of an AIM-7F capable weapons system; (2) the multiple mission of the F-18; and (3) improved reliability and maintainability through the appropriate selection and use of technology.

The F-18 development program is **financially** austere and time sensitive in providing the replacement aircraft for the fleet's aging F-4 fighters and A-7 light attack aircraft. At its current planned IOC of FY 82, there will already exist a deficiency in fighter force levels. Any delay to that IOC will only compound the shortages. In order to provide the minimum level of **development** funding to meet this vital operational requirement, the program should be restored to its original level of **\$346,900,000**.

Strike Warfare Weaponry Technology. The House reduced the authorization request of **\$42,400,000 to \$34,000,000**. This represents an approximate 15% reduction in real level-of-effort, as compared to FY 76. Thus, at a time when the DoD finds it essential to strengthen its overall technology base, the important Weaponry Technology program will be sharply reduced in the following areas:

a. The Navy and **DARPA** liquid propellant gun programs have been mutually supporting. In fact, the Navy has been the contract agency and monitor for **DARPA**. In addition the Departmental Directors of Laboratories have agreed that the Navy is the lead Service for liquid propellant gun technology. The Air Force and Army can and do only support liquid propellant gun technology with the concurrence of the Navy. There is no duplicative activity among these Service and **DARPA programs**. Termination of the Navy program would destroy the keystone of this carefully planned structure of liquid propellant gun development activity.

b. The ODDR&E is closely reviewing the Chair Heritage program. The JASON Group has been tasked to examine the total concept and advise **DDR&E** of future program direction; To reduce the funding at this time would preempt the JASON review and would result in unnecessary program delays, if the **JASON review** encourages further investigation and development of the concept.

c. **(SRD)** The ART/STAR program is a critical element of the Tri-Service, ABRES-coordinated exploratory development program aimed at developing re-entry technologies required to **produce** strategic ballistic missile systems capable of **meeting** future mission requirements. Both current technology development work and future plans for the ART/STAR portion of the Tri-Service Strategic Missile Materials and Structures technology base program are aimed at providing means for the development of all-weather, more accurate, and high **performance** maneuvering re-entry vehicles. Failure to continue the ART/STAR program effort will severely damage the long range technology base in re-entry aerodynamics and structures in the country. The development of **future re-entry** systems would be limited by the same technological uncertainties which limit current systems. Ability of this country to design strategic missile systems to meet far term requirements in the areas of high accuracy, all-weather survivability, and ABM evasion **will** be reduced.

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Advanced Surface to Air Weapon System. The House reduced this program by **\$1,000,000** from the original request of **\$3,000,000**. A cut of this size will delay the IOC of the baseline Block I., Dual Mode 5" Rolling Airframe from 1981 to 1982. Without full funding the planned validation of Block I ASMD Missile cannot be completed in FY 77. Effort on the less threat dependent Block II round (which depends on Block I airframe results) directed by the Congress will not be possible. U.S. Navy will be forced to renegotiate tentative funding agreements with the FRG for the proposed joint development of the passive dual mode missile. In the joint effort the FRG will provide **approximately [100 million D.M. (40,000,000)]** to the ASMD development in CY's 76-80.

Urgent need exists to provide an immediate anti-shipping missile self defense capability to a wide variety of fleet ships. The Block I ASMD missile uses a target dependent guidance mode which is designed to counter **[62 percent of]** the current Soviet ASM ready inventory. FY 77 funding is required for the **[less threat dependent IR 'all the way']** mode. Delay in fleet introduction of the ASMD missile further aggravates the current vulnerability of U.S. Navy surface ships to ASM attack.

Request restoration of the **\$1,000,000** reduction..

Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat Systems. The House deletion of the requested **\$16,100,000** for the program terminates all effort for the Shipboard Intermediate Range Combat System (SIRCS). Conceptually SIRCS is a complete shipboard modular combat system which addresses and integrates the role of sensors, weapon systems, electronic warfare and decoy subsystems in the context of the future threat and the total ship mission requirement. As SIRCS represents the only long term **self-defense** combat system development program, the Navy will be forced to continue a near term, quick reaction approach to self-defense intermediate range offense systems into the 1990's. The combat system approach, directed by Congress, will not be possible.

The planned FY 1977 SIRCS effort will complete concept formulation by four contractor teams. At that point the technical and management alternatives will be available for review before proceeding to advanced development in FY 1978. The FY 1977 effort must be completed in order to confirm that the early industry involvement approach does offer significant benefits to the system acquisition process. The contractor teams have been formed and **concept** formulation was to start in late FY 1976. Failure to continue this effort to completion will prejudice industry in further. **commitment** to this acquisition strategy.

The Navy has been severely criticized by Congress for a lack of combat systems approach and for near-term **deficiencies**. SIRCS provides the required systems approach. The Navy has an effective near-term program. The major elements of the near-term efforts are the **PHALANX CIWS, the ASMD Missile, the SEASPARROW** missile improvements and the guided, **projectile**. It is considered that these programs are a significantly more economical approach than expending scarce resources to provide marginal improvements to obsolete systems. The near-term deficiencies we experience tomorrow will be the result of lack of long term system planning and development today. If the Navy is to provide total combat

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systems to the Fleet for self defense and intermediate range offensive strike operations in the 1980's, a total systems oriented development must be pursued now. The Navy therefore strongly supports restoration of the full \$16,100,000.

Air-Launched/Surface Launched Anti-Ship Missile. The House deleted the \$1,049,000 requested for this program in FY 1977. This reduction terminates the only Navy technology program for improvement in Anti-Ship Missiles. Neither technology nor Soviet capability to defense against our Anti-Ship Missiles will remain at today's level. Failure to invest modest amounts today to insure the continued effectiveness of the United States' Anti-Ship Missiles can only result in expensive and inefficient "Crash-fix" programs in the future.

The funds requested for the program will define and structure a technology program compatible with existing and developing Anti-Ship Missiles to insure the availability of modifications needed to meet a changing threat. To achieve this objective, performance and cost trade-off studies will be conducted to identify promising system improvements and techniques. The initial efforts will be directed toward maintaining the effectiveness of HARPOON and TOMAHAWK against improvements in enemy defensive systems. A second objective is the development of a technological base to support future anti-ship missile systems against anticipated Soviet improvements in defense weaponry and electronic warfare systems.

It is therefore requested that this program be restored.

Air-to-Air Missile Component Engineering. The House deleted a total of \$27,015,000 from the requested \$29,200,000. Inasmuch as the funds in this program element would be used to enhance air combat capabilities through significant improvement of three major air-to-air missile programs, the loss of these funds would have a severe and immediate impact on the military capabilities of both Navy and Air Force Tactical Airpower. The \$2,185,000 remaining would be sufficient to perform the necessary engineering on the fuze (ATOD) and seeker for the AIM 9L which has just been released for production by DSARC III. These funds would not be adequate to support either of the other programs, or even a portion of the other programs. If either or both of these programs are to continue, a major portion of the deleted funds must be restored. The impact of the funding on each program is indicated below:

a. AIM-7 SPARROW III. The SPARROW III is the only medium range air-to-air missile in the inventory of the Navy and the Air Force. It is the primary weapon for the F4 and the F15 and will be the primary weapon for the F18. It is the only alternative to the AIM-54 PHOENIX for use with the F14. These aircraft will be in the inventory for at least another 15 years (more likely 20 years) and the only alternative to the AIM-7 would be a new missile development. In the past, the AIM-7 has exhibited deficiencies in low altitude/high clutter conditions,

fuzing, and ECM limitations. These limitations are associated with the basic CON-SCAN **design** of the seeker/GCG. The deleted funds were to be used to develop two competitive monopulse designs which would overcome the limitations of the AIM-7F and reduce cost by improving reliability and being more producible. A total of \$9,200,000 has been invested to date and would be a total loss unless the program continues. Unless the funds are restored, both Navy and Air Force tactical fighters will have to face an increasing threat with primary missile weapons which have degraded capability against highly maneuvering targets at low altitude in a heavy clutter or **ECM** environment. The only other alternative is a new all weather medium range missile program which would require considerable funding support immediately, yet would not produce a replacement for at least 7-10 years.

b. AIM-54A PHOENIX. The PHOENIX has been in full production since FY 1972 and entered fleet service in October 1974. It represents a significant improvement in fleet air defense capability and will be the mainstay of Navy interceptor forces throughout the service life of the F14 (at least another 15 years). Because of its importance, PHOENIX must be improved whenever possible to upgrade its capabilities and enhance its effectiveness. Initial fleet experience, coupled with a changing threat, indicates that current technology offers significant improvements with minimum risk and at an affordable cost. Cancellation of the PHOENIX Improvement Program portion of **this line** item will result in a minimum one year delay in incorporation of improvements in 240 missiles now in production as well as increases in total program costs in the future. Because the improved units are interchangeable, retrofit costs for unmodified PHOENIX missiles would also increase. The PHOENIX Improvement Program involves changes to the Warhead/ fuze components as well as the 'incorporation of digital electronic processing units and autopilots, changes to the radar transmitter and an improved motor. These changes reduce cost, improve reliability and facilitate production in addition to increasing performance.

High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM). The House reduced the requested \$33,495,000 by \$13,495,000, which will force contractor effort to be significantly curtailed during the current prototype phase. A reduction of the prime contractor (Texas Instruments) efforts during this most critical phase of development will necessitate loss of engineering expertise (approximately 140 personnel) from this program. **Outyear** program costs will be increased by approximately \$24,000,000. The funding reduction will cause a major development stretchout and at least a one-year delay in Initial Operational Capability with Navy A-7 and Air Force Wild Weasel aircraft. This delay could cause an unacceptable increase in aircraft attrition in the event of armed conflict.

The House Committee has indicated that it understands that this program is having serious design and development problems. It is true that progress during the HARM Phase I development effort has proceeded more slowly than scheduled and will result in increased R&E cost growth.

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The basic design did not meet a number of the HARM requirements. The design was based largely on **RIKE** components and ERASE technology and did **not encompass design-to-cost**, reliability, producibility, logistic support, documentation. More importantly, this design did not fully develop the flexible software logic which now provides the major aspect of both the missile and avionics, allowing it flexibility to match a changing threat. The present Phase I design encompasses all of the above requirements. Design-to-cost and improved reliability measures have produced various changes in the missile antenna, signal processor, auto-pilot, **actuators** and the missile structure. There is no evidence, however, that these changes have induced any additional risk into the program.

A complete reassessment of the HARM program is underway, and a written report of this assessment will be provided to the Committee as requested. Restoration to the **\$33,495,000** is requested.

SEASPARROW Improvement. The House reduced the requested **\$11,502,000** for this program to **\$5,000,000**. The inventory of SPARROW Missiles for air and surface use is decreasing at the same time as the numbers of point defense systems in the Fleet are increasing. The AIM-7E has **serious low altitude and ECCM deficiencies**. The AIM-7F surface variant (AIM-7F) program is designed to provide a round for point defense systems with the **required low altitude and ECCM performance**. An orderly program including thorough operational evaluation has been defined. The FY 77 procurement is required to provide 30 **RIM-7F** Missiles for final operational evaluation. A joint program is underway to develop a Block II Missile with monopulse seeker. No improvement efforts are being pursued on the AIM-7E because it is no longer in production and attainment of a full point defense capability from SEASPARROW can only be achieved through full continuation of the AIM-7F surface variant program.

The reduction will terminate all monopulse effort for the Block II RIM-7F and will prevent procurement of any missiles for operational evaluation. Failure to restore the reduction will result in inadequate assets (empty launcher cells) and continued reliance on a missile with **serious low altitude and ECCM deficiencies**.

In order to permit continuation of this very important effort, full restoration to the **\$11,502,000** is requested.

Cruise Missile (Engineering). The House reduction from **\$164,900,000** to **\$100,000,000** in FY 1977 will cause a 6-9 month delay in engineering development of the **TOMAHAWK** cruise missile, affecting both the strategic version and its tactical variant as well as all launch mode options. This delay will cause an overall increase of \$5 to 15 million in total program cost.

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The benefits of commonality between the TOMAHAWK strategic and tactical variants, as well as U.S. Air Force Air Launched Cruise Missile, have been used to the fullest extent feasible in reducing development costs. Stretchout of particular portions of either the strategic or tactical TOMAHAWK variants would negate cost effectiveness achieved under present commonality effort. Later development of delayed capabilities or subsequent re-introduction of cancelled efforts are likely to produce peculiar versions vice common missiles. The current parallel development effort is intended to preclude this loss of commonality.

Restoration of \$64,900,000 in FY 77 is requested to permit continued development of the tactical and strategic TOMAHAWK. The tactical TOMAHAWK variant will **comprise** the main offensive battery of the CSGN Weapons System and will provide both submarine and surface platforms with an improved standoff anti-ship weapon. Restoration of funds is required to provide adequate information for decision during DSARC II **currently** scheduled for January 1977.

Vertical Launch Standard Missile. The House reduction from \$5,515,000 to \$515,000 will effectively stop this program at the transition point between prototyping and engineering development, and allow only a minor study effort to continue through FY 1977.

A vertical launch capability is badly **needed** in order to overcome the many limitations of our current generation of **trainable** launchers. In comparison with these launchers, vertical launch will provide a higher sustained rate of fire, reduced vulnerability, more flexible weapon selection, lower maintenance and **personnel costs**, and in general, a much more capable but far less complex launching system. The life cycle costs of a vertical launcher are estimated to be less than half of the installation cost of a MR-26 **GMLS**. Thus the cost-benefit payoff of vertical launch, in addition to the numerous other benefits, will be significant.

Restoration of the full \$5,000,000 is **required** to permit engineering development and initial fabrication of the Engineering Development Model in time to meet the CY-1978 USS NORTON SOUND overhaul.

Advanced Identification Techniques. The House reduced the requested \$4,300,000 to a level of \$300,000 for this program in FY 1977. A reduction of this size will all but stop development of **noncooperativdtarget** identification techniques. Effective utilization of mid and long range weapons absolutely requires that target identification be established no later than the optimum launch range of those weapons. **[Lack of this capability has severely restricted tactical forces]** and its solution has **become** a critical requirement for the Navy. This requirement will only become more critical as missile system ranges grow and multi-shot capability becomes prevalent. **[Lack of this capability]** to identify targets at the effective range of weapons **systems [severely limits employment]** of these beyond visual range weapons. The programmable Target Identification Device (TID) being developed is intended for initial application in the F-14/**AWG-9** weapon system, whose primary armament is the long range Phoenix missile. The House cut would delay development by at least one year. Eventual development costs

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would increase due to the break in development progress and program stretchout. The long range identification capability is recognized by the Navy as an absolute requirement and continuing development of these techniques is critical to successful tactical employment of beyond visual range weapons systems.

Full restoration to the requested level of \$4,300,000 is requested.

High Performance Underwater Vehicle. The High Performance Underwater Vehicle Program has been structured to capitalize on the recent technological breakthrough achieved in the DARPA Laminar Flow Vehicle Program. The House action reducing the requested \$3 million by \$2 million will have the effect of delaying the application of this technology to submarines. The laminar flow approach would yield significantly higher speed for a given power, reduced size for the same power, and reduction in flow noise with a resultant improvement in sonar capability. The benefits that will accrue appear so dramatic that it is requested that the \$2,000,000 reduction be restored in order to expedite the evaluation of high potential payoff applications.

Restoration of funding would allow the orderly and timely development of the necessary support investigations and the desired degree of coordination with ongoing DARPA low drag vehicle technology programs and thereby provide Navy decision-makers with information about low drag technology and its potential for practical application to submarine size vehicles.

Advanced Command Data System. The reduction of \$6,026,000 from the \$9,884,000 requested will completely stop four important programs, each having a high leverage in reducing data processing costs. Elimination of two of these programs would stop the Navy participation in important Tri-Service programs. The first of these programs is the Navy portion of the Defense System Software Management Program aimed at reducing the very high cost of software, particularly the development of an interservice standard High Order Language, in accordance with OSD directions. The second is to evolve a modular building block approach to create a common family of hardware for all Naval data processing applications, the All Application Digital Computer. The third is to achieve a standard procedure for signal processing of sensor signals to reduce and prevent proliferation. The fourth is to insure software compatibility of new software products with existing military computers. Elimination of this work on standardization and commonality will result in reversion back to individual developments and individual computer purchases, with continuing high costs in DoD's computer utilization.

Full restoration to the \$9,884,000 level is requested.

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Combat System Integration. As a result of the House reduction from \$3,516,000 to \$1,437,000, the Navy will be unable to comprehensively investigate the definition of practical techniques for targeting of sub-launched, surface-launched, and air-launched long-range weaponry currently under development. Funding is required to perform the necessary overall trade-off studies of all potential surveillance platforms and to determine the over-the-horizon detection, classification and targeting information requirements each can contribute. [Emphasis will be placed on surveillance concepts for target classification and designation to enhance the flexibility of tactical usage of our offensive weaponry under various rules of engagement.] Similarly, the project will assist in determining the associated command and control necessary to employ the HARPOON and Tactical TOMAHAWK Weapon, Systems. This overall surveillance, command, control, communication and missile system supportive effort will result in a set of alternative targeting concepts and will include their validation and comparison by low cost experimentation. As HARPOON is scheduled to be deployed with the fleet in FY 1976 and TOMAHAWK in FY 1980, this effort should be initiated as soon as possible to define both near-term improvements for HARPOON targeting and ensure an adequate targeting capability for the long range TOMAHAWK when it becomes operational. It is requested that the requested level of \$3,516,000 be authorized.

Test Bed Development and Demonstration. The House reduced this program from the requested \$22,217,000 by \$2,217,000.

The major activities funded under this element are [the Unified Navy Field Test Program (UNFTP) (NACL-NPT and Phenomenology Tests at the Capistrano Test Site) and the procurement of long lead items for the White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility (HELSTF).] The Congressionally directed completion of the [NACL/NPT] tests prior to the end of CY 1977 limits the extent to which this effort can be reduced without sacrificing essential test data. [A reduction in the HELSTF area would have an as yet unknown impact. The overriding importance of the UNFTP on Navy Program decisions will largely govern the distribution of the reduction between the two areas so as to minimize the effect on either.]

Restoration to the requested level of \$22,217,000 is required so as to permit completion of all essential, planned [NACL/NPT brassboard system integration] tests within the Congressionally imposed time frame, and to permit acquisition of long lead equipment/instrumentation [for the HELSTF.] The testing and acquisition are vital to providing acceptable confidence in any subsequent program decisions.

CVNX. The House deleted the \$11,472,000 requested for this program. At the same time, House action provides SCN funding for long lead procurement for a fourth NIMITZ class carrier. This SCN funding does not include the required RDT&E funds necessary to develop the contract package and to properly evaluate the tradeoffs in system improvements, personnel reductions and construction savings. Lack of these funds will force duplication of USS CARL VINSON (CVN-70) and will prevent efforts to reduce overall procurement costs.

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RDT&E funds in the budget request are intended to support development of the contract package including:

- a. Review of detail plans, specifications and drawings of the NIMITZ class to ensure applicability for the period beyond the mid-1980's.
- b. Cost review program to establish firm cost thresholds.
- c. Procurement and production schedule review to establish delivery schedule thresholds for components and ship.
- d. Establish feasibility, cost effectiveness and direct the contractor in integrating newly developed sub-systems expected to be approved for service use such as MK-14 arresting gear, C3 for late 1980s, EW suite, modularized avionics shops and manning reductions.
- e. Integration of the above items into the contract package for a fourth NIMITZ Class carrier.

It is requested that the ~~deleted~~ \$11,472,000 be restored in order to conduct the necessary development effort for this ship.

Lightweight ASW Torpedo. The House action deleting the entire request of \$8,438,000 for this effort will terminate the improvement program for the MK-46 lightweight torpedo.

The MK-46 torpedo is the [only non-nuclear] ASW weapon in use in the P-3, S-3, helicopter, and surface forces. Over [10,000] are in U.S. inventory and the weapon is widely used by allied forces.

An urgent requirement exists to upgrade this weapon developed in the 1960's to meet the [current] threat posed by the deeper diving, **anechoic** coated, counter measure capable Soviet submarine force.) Relative performance has been [particularly degraded] by the extensive Soviet submarine coating program.<sup>3</sup>

\$25,000,000 has been expended to date for development work previously performed. Basic design for a modification kit is essentially complete. Procurement of prototype kits is in process for initial testing with Technical and Operational Evaluation scheduled to commence [in third quarter, FY 77.]

[This program is the sole Navy effort which can provide in the forthcoming decade a viable non-nuclear weapon which can be utilized by the Fleet surface and air ASW weapon launchers] The programmed IOC for a follow-on weapon, the Advanced Lightweight Torpedo, [is 1986.]

Restoration of the full \$8,438,000 necessary to continue this initial program is urgently requested.

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Directed Energy Program. The House has deleted the \$3,736,000 requested for the Directed Energy Program in FY 1977.

The Navy CHAIR HERITAGE Program began in February 1974 with Exploratory Development funding to investigate the feasibility of using a [charged particle beam weapon for anti-ship missile point defense.] This funding reduction will delay by [one year] the transition of CHAIR HERITAGE from Exploratory Development to Advanced Development. Specifically, this [one year] delay will result in an increase in program costs and risk the loss of key scientific personnel to other programs.

Recent [propagation] investigations involving experiments with existing research [accelerators] and computer models predict that a [table propagation\* window] exists for a [weapons-type electron beam.] The validation of this [window] will require the construction of an [Advanced Test Accelerator (ATA)] for which, scientists working on CHAIR HERITAGE have developed an engineering design, and are prepared to start construction of the device in early N 1977 if the deleted funding is restored.

In order to permit commencement of construction of this device in FY 1977, the \$3,736,000 must be restored.

Advanced Electronics Components. The House deleted the \$973,000 requested for this program in N 1977.

This program provides for development of various common electronics components for use in the development of new systems. Economy of development, production and maintenance will accrue from the use of common components in future electronics systems. The effort would add new Standard Electronic Modules to the existing inventory and hence would allow wider applications of these devices.

The reduction proposed would delay transition of prior year exploratory development models into products suitable for approved hardware system use. This action will result in significant delays affecting Standard Electronic Modules designed for use in complex digital circuits, solid state radars, and new development communication systems.

Laser Countermeasures and Counter-Countermeasures. The House deleted the requested \$1,980,000 for this program in 1977. T.V. and Infrared (EO) sensors provide the Navy with very accurate target location and ordnance delivery capability as was very successfully demonstrated in recent combat in Southeast Asia. This capability, representing a quantum improvement in weapon delivery accuracy, is [now seriously jeopardized by a proven effective countermeasure.] For example, tests carried out in June 1975 determined that current operational laser designator systems are capable now of causing damage and system blinding/failure to weapons in our present and near future inventory. ]

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The present N 77 program is devoted entirely to the protection of Navy systems against the low energy laser anti-sensor threat. In order that adequate hardening be provided to protect our weapons systems within the time-frame that potential enemies can field counter-measures to defeat them, it is necessary to commence advanced development without delay. Restoration of the deleted \$1,980,000 is therefore requested.

Foreign Weapons Evaluation. The House reduced this program from the requested \$2,031,000 to \$1,000,000.

Funds requested in FY 1977 were to compare the Netherlands built WM-28 and its U. S. counterpart the MK-92 MOD 1 Fire Control System and to evaluate other foreign candidate equipments. Foreign systems tentatively planned for evaluation include French pyrotechnics, the Italian ASPIDE missile, and a Norwegian small boat fire control/Penguin Missile System.

Restoration of the deleted \$1,031,000 is requested in order that the above evaluations may be carried out in N 1977.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION, AIR FORCE

(Thousands of Dollars)

Original N 1977 Authorization Request	3,916,600
House Bill	3,749,200
Restoration Requested	169,400

Requested for Reconsideration:

(Thousands of Dollars)

<u>Item</u>	<u>Original Authorization Request</u>	<u>House Bill</u>	<u>Restoration Requested</u>
F-15 Squadrons	51,000	6,000	45,000
Aerospace Propulsion	37,700	35,700	2,000
Aerospace Avionics	58,600	56,000	2,600
Low Cost Aircraft	500	0	500
Advanced Tactical Fighter	1,000	0	1,000
Advanced Aerial Target Technology	9,100	6,000	3,100
Tactical AIM Missile	4,700	1,700	3,000
Tactical AGM Missiles	2,000	0	2,000
Tactical Drone Support Squadrons	1,500	500	1,000
Lightweight Radar Missile Prototype	5,000	0	5,000
Advanced ICBM Technology	84,000	80,000	4,000
Advanced SRAAM System Technology	10,700	4,200	6,400
Conventional Munitions	20,800	18,000	2,800
Advanced Tactical Weapons	7,500	0	7,500
Close Air Support Weapon System	41,000	25,000	16,000
<b>Human Resources</b>	3,500	2,500	1,000
Low Cost Avionics	3,100	1,000	2,100
Electronic Warfare Technology	9,300	7,800	-1,500
Advanced Computer Technology	4,100	3,000	1,100
<b>Electro-Optical Warfare</b>	8,000	6,500	1,500
Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare Equipment	14,200	12,700	1,500
Advanced Airborne Command Post	79,000	60,000	19,000
Surface Defense Suppression	28,500	22,500	6,000
Foreign Weapons Evaluation	2,000	1,000	1,000
Applications for Information Processing Technology	2,800	1,500	1,300
Precision Location Strike System	30,000	20,000	10,000
AWACS	109,600	100,100	9,500
Advanced System Engineering and Planning	12,000	0	12,000

### JUSTIFICATION

F-15 Squadrons. The House reduced the request of \$51.0 million by \$45.0 million because no critical systems have been identified for further development and programs have not been well defined.

The following critical systems are programmed for development in FY 1977: Avionics and Tactical Electronic Warfare System (TEWS) intermediate and depot AGE to support the maintenance of the radar; Inertial Navigation System; Armament Control System and the Associated Computers; and TEWS. To achieve the required depot and Organizational and Intermediate (O&I) capability in another manner would require supplemental workaroud procedures and interim contractor support. Industry has not planned for this support which would be very expensive to establish in terms of equipment, manpower, tooling facilities, etc. The development of this capability is properly budgeted in the R&D appropriation rather than the Operations and Maintenance appropriation as suggested.

Unless the funds are restored, all F-15 flight testing would cease. This includes AIM-9L integration and flight testing, all TEWS flight testing and follow-on testing. The shutdown of F-15 flight testing would require the various test centers to reallocate F-15 resources including equipment, spares and trained personnel. The effect of this reallocation of resources, should funding be reinstated in N 78, would be very costly.

The major impact of this proposed reduction in the N 77 F-15 RDT&E funding is that the F-15 aircraft that have been delivered would be unsupportable, unverified, and untested in the areas described above. This would severely degrade our deployment and wartime capability. Further, it is not feasible to support wartime operations with contractor personnel.

The added cost resulting from this reduction is expected to be between \$100 and \$200 million per year. The exact amount is dependent upon when and whether the funds are restored so that development can be completed and expensive contractor Organizational and Intermediate and depot support terminated.

The Department strongly urges support for the amount requested in the President's Budget and requests the F-15 program be authorized at \$51 million in N 1977.

Aerospace Propulsion. The House reduced the request of \$37.7 million by \$2.0 million on the basis of excess funds.

There are no excess funds in this program which provides for gas turbine technology, ramjet technology, power technology, and fuels, lubricants and hazards. A recent report of the USAF Scientific Advisory Board on Gas Turbine Technology, dated January 1976, identified a \$5 million FY 1977 funding deficiency in exploratory development for the gas turbine technology area alone. The total funding deficiency for Exploratory and Advanced Development in FY 1977 was \$50 million. Since this program is concerned with other areas in addition to the gas turbine technology area, the impact of the proposed reduction on propulsion technology is severe.

The development of military propulsion technology is the prime reason the U.S. currently enjoys world leadership in this area. A strong continuing exploratory development program is required to maintain this leadership. This reduction will stretch out the Variable Cycle Engine program and result in the late development of this new technology. The Variable Cycle Engine offers improved performance with reduced fuel consumption and may well be the propulsion system of the future.

Full restoration to the \$37.7 million in FY 1977 President's Budget is requested.

Aerospace Avionics. The House reduced the request of \$58.6 million by \$2.6 million on the basis of excess funds.

There are no excess funds in this program. Of the \$58.6 million requested, approximately \$10 million is included for new starts in technology development, the remainder is required to fund on-going efforts and Avionics Laboratory operations. The reduction of \$2.6 million will cut new starts by approximately 25 percent. To accommodate such a reduction, the area most impacted will be new projects in the electronic devices area. A major thrust of these proposed activities;--which will be adversely impacted--is the development of techniques and components with improved reliability which can be utilized in weapon system and subsystem development programs to reduce overall life cycle costs of avionics equipment. These include such efforts as transistor power combiners to provide low cost and reliable transistor amplifiers to replace medium power thermionic devices.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$58.6 million is requested.

Low Cost Aircraft. The House deleted the request of \$.5 million on the basis of excess funds.

The funds requested in FY 1977 are the minimum required to begin preliminary design efforts leading to the development of a Low Cost Aircraft to supplement simulator and mission aircraft training for

young pilots. This is a follow-on effort to the studies now underway which will provide conceptual aircraft designs and tradeoff analyses to define desired characteristics.

The Low Cost Aircraft is essential to provide flying experience for our young co-pilots. Because of economic conditions and to conserve national energy resources, flying time in mission aircraft has been reduced to the minimum essential to maintain a combat ready force. The result is our young co-pilots are now getting less than the desired actual on-control flying required to fully develop air judgment, decision making expertise under stressed conditions, and self-confidence. We believe our combat capability will ultimately be affected and increased flying in mission aircraft will be required to provide the maturity necessary for full mission qualification. The Low Cost Aircraft will provide the needed on-control flight experience at much lower costs than in the mission aircraft. We believe this experience can only be obtained in actual flight conditions when in command of an aircraft; it cannot be simulated where lesser stress conditions exist, nor can it be gained as a co-pilot who primarily assists in the operation of the aircraft and is only on the periphery of the decision-making process.

We intend to provide this essential experience in a very austere aircraft, with fly-away cost of \$150-200 thousand and approximately \$75 per flying hour operational and support cost (FY 1975 dollars). Preliminary discussions with industry indicate that these costs are achievable. A costly alternative to the Low Cost Aircraft is to provide additional training in mission aircraft.

The Navy has been kept informed of the goals of this program and have been invited to join in the prototype development through the joint Requirements and Development Committee. Working level participation between Air Force and Navy is typified by the Naval Weapons Center having two representatives on the Source Selection Board for this program.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$.5 million is requested.

Advanced Tactical Fighter. The House deleted the request of \$1.0 million on the basis of excess funds.

The FY 1977 funds requested are the minimum to begin this program. Delay in starting the Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program beyond FY 1977 will: (1) delay the IOC beyond FY 1987; (2) eliminate by default solution options that require early management emphasis on certain critical technologies; (3) result in costly technology and development accelerations to get back on schedule; and (4) sacrifice the efficiencies realized through early focusing of the U.S technology base toward a specific objective--the next major USAF fighter weapons system.

The \$1.0 million request in N 77 represents the start of the ATF program. The objective of this program is to ensure a continuing capability within the programmed force structure to perform all-weather air-to-surface strike tasks. Force planning analysis shows a need to introduce ATF into the force structure as early as 1986 to offset projected threat intensities and accommodate natural force aging. The ATF is currently in concept development and is far from hardware design. All potential options remain open to include everything from modification of existing equipment to development of a new airframe. N 77 funds will be used for studies and analysis to provide a judgment basis for focusing technologies toward ATF development.

Recently completed technology plans equate a N 77 start to a N 87 IOC as a most optimistic estimate for the new airframe option. Modification options also require a N 77 start to guarantee efficient blending of any required new technologies with on-going production processes. The ATF program is being started ten years in advance of programmed IOC to permit full realization of potential cost-effectiveness and life-cycle-cost benefits that can accrue from long-range planning.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$1.0 million is requested.

Advanced Aerial Target Technology. The House reduced the authorization request of \$9.1 million by \$3.1 million because of the increased funding over N 76 which did not appear justifiable in **comparison** with other Services' target programs.

This is a high priority Air Force program because of the lack of realistic air-to-air targets and adequate scoring systems. The Air Force has **validated** requirements for the planned program and funding should be evaluated against these requirements.

The increase over FY 76 is because this program has several new projects that were not fully funded during N 76. Flight testing of the HAST will be expanded, and augmentation in scoring projects will be expanded to evaluate and repackage the HAST system.

There are presently four tasks funded in this program; these are High Altitude Supersonic Target (HAST), Vehicle Technology, Augmentation Technology and Scoring Technology. Because of the Tri-Service commitments on the majority of the projects within these tasks, any reduction in funding would be directed at the few remaining tasks which support primarily Air Force requirements.

The Vector Miss Distance Indicator (**VMDI**) Scoring System would be required to absorb a \$1.6 million reduction. This would cause a **stretch-out** in the program of approximately two years and result in additional development costs. This system is programmed to replace the DIGIDOPS scoring system which does not give relative end game geometry between the intercept missile and target. The determination of end game missile performance is important to, properly evaluate weapon effectiveness, and

the VMDI scoring system will provide this capability,

The Aerial gunnery target development program would be reduced by \$1.5 million which would cause a significant delay in the program. Current air-to-air gunnery targets do **not provide** realistic training for our fighter aircrews. Real threat simulated targets will provide realistic training, and the achievement of the skill necessary to be effective in aerial combat. The delay of this project prevents any improvement in the quality of air-to-air gunnery training received by our fighter aircrews.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$9.1 million is requested.

Tactical AIM Missile. The House reduced the request of \$4.7 million by \$3.0 million because of dissatisfaction with the Sparrow AIM-7 series missile program. The committee recommended transfer of Sparrow development to a new Defense Emergency Fund.

The Air Force believes the Sparrow **RDT&E** program should be continued because of the progress being made with the Navy in this joint improvement program. The \$3.0 million reduction will require the Air Force to cancel its participation with the Navy on the test and evaluation of the Advanced Monopulse Seeker for the Joint Service AIM-7F air-to-air missile. This action will cause a one-year slip in the schedule which will result in increased program costs (approximately \$1.5 million).

The Advanced Monopulse Seeker will significantly improve the performance of the AIM-7F in the ECM and look-down clutter environments. With the present schedule, approximately half of the missiles procured would have the new mono-pulse seeker guidance control unit (GCU). Any delay in the test program will directly impact the number of monopulse guidance units which will be procured and will prevent improved mission effectiveness since there are no plans to retrofit the inventory due to the high cost of the GCU.

The F-15 aircraft armament control system was specifically designed to employ the AIM-7F missile. Any perturbation of the AIM-7F program directly impacts the overall effectiveness of the weapon system, which in turn drives up our WRM requirement for all types of missiles.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$4.7 million is requested.

Tactical AGM Missiles. The House deleted the request of \$2.0 million on the **basis of** excess funds.

There are no excess funds in this program. The N 1977 funding is for Air Force participation in the Joint Navy/Air Force High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) development. The Air Force has a requirement for an Advanced Anti-Radiation Missile to counter the improved enemy radar defensive systems. To avoid duplication, the Air Force did

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not develop a missile to meet this need but selected the Navy HARM to satisfy it. The Air Force will fund only those Air Force unique requirements (\$5.5 million total), such as integration test with the F-4G WILD WEASEL and development of Air Force peculiar support equipment. If N 1977 funds are deferred to N 1978, the Air Force will not complete integration of the HARM with the F-4G until the fourth quarter of N 1978. This will be two years after the start of HARM engineering development. It will also be after prototype development and will not allow Air Force requirements to be input into the missiles. It will be too late to join the planned Joint IOT&E/OPEVAL. The end result is the Air Force will not have any input on the Joint Development program during engineering development and initial operational test. This could result in a missile that does not meet needed Air Force requirements.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$2.0 million is requested.

Tactical Drone Support Squadrons. The House reduced the request of \$1.5 million by \$1.0 million on the basis of excess funds.

The FY 1977 request is the minimum required to continue this program. A reduction of this magnitude will delay incorporation of the multiple drone control function into the Drone Flight Simulator (DFS). The Air Force plans to initiate procurement of multiple drone control systems in N 1977 for installation in airborne and ground control stations. It will not be possible to utilize the DFS for training drone controllers in the use of the multiple drone control system until this feature has been incorporated in the simulator. Thus, controller training will require increased flying hours and the attendant increases in operations and maintenance costs.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$1.5 million is requested.

Lightweight Radar Missile Prototype. The House deleted the request of \$5.0 million because it did not intend initiation of a lengthy, high technology program.

The Air Force believes this is the "new, simple, reliable, all weather, air-to-air missile for Navy and Air Force use" recommended by the committee. The Lightweight Radar Missile (LWRM) Prototype Program is a joint Air Force Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) effort initiated with DARPA funds in N 1976.

The objective of the LWRM Prototype Program is to demonstrate the feasibility of an effective, all weather missile at substantially lower cost than current radar missiles; it will be applicable to the F-15, F-14, F-16, F-18 and follow-on fighters. This program has the potential to fill the combined Air Force/Navy radar missile [LWRM] requirement in the mid-1980s.

This proposed reduction will prevent the Air Force from providing its agreed share (\$1.5 million) of this joint effort necessary to

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complete Phase I of the program and will result in a 1-year program slip, plus cost increases associated with program restart (approximately \$3.0 million). The remaining \$3.5 million in FY 1977 is required to continue the program into the desired inter-operability design for Air Force/Navy fighter aircraft, fabrication and prototype performance competition and demonstration.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$5.0 million is requested.

Advanced ICMB Technology. The House reduced the request of \$84.0 million on the basis of excess funds.

The \$4.0 million cut will cause the basing validation work to be decreased. The testing effort on the alternative concepts would be reduced, thereby increasing risk of the selected concept, or the testing effort would be stretched out. Neither of these alternatives is attractive, given that selection of an appropriate basing mode is the key to cost effective MX deployment.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$84.0 million is requested.

Advanced SRAAM System Technology. The House reduced the authorization request of \$10.7 million by \$6.4 million on the basis of excess funds.

There are no excess funds in this program. The proposed reduction precludes the capability to proceed beyond the Air Force/Navy Joint Program (AIMVAL) in N 1977 and will result in termination of the on-going technology effort when AIMVAL is completed. This termination in N 1977 will cause cost and schedule impacts (approximately \$2 million and six months) if the continuing technology investigation is to be reinitiated. The current program is structured to provide an IOC of the Air Force concept missile consistent with the F-16, providing the F-16 with the increased firepower that matches its combat capability.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$10.7 million is requested.

Conventional Munitions. The House reduced the request of \$20.8 million by \$2.8 million on the basis of excess funds.

There are no excess funds in this program. The Conventional Munitions exploratory development program is the only USAF program which addresses the technology required to advance the state-of-the-art in conventional weaponry. These advancements are needed to provide a significantly improved conventional weapons capability for new high performance aircraft. In addition, this program element provides all the support funds to operate the entire Air Force Armament Laboratory. \$9.5 million or 45% of the programmed funds are for this support, which includes salaries, travel, communications, utilities, etc. Specific efforts that will be pursued if the funds are not restored are: all aerial target technology work will be terminated. Consequently, no



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Laser and IIR MAVERICK conducted by the Air Force as requested in last year's Authorization Report. Air Force Studies and Analysis recently completed this evaluation which clearly showed the complementary benefits and roles of each weapon system and determined that for the planned Air Force procurement the life cycle cost of the IIR MAVERICK will be about 1.1 times that of the Laser MAVERICK.

The authorization request fully supports the Tri-Service laser seeker and Laser MAVERICK integration engineering development, permits initiating full-scale engineering development of the Imaging Infrared MAVERICK as early as January 1977, and provides for the start of engineering development of an Advanced Warhead and Single Rail Launcher to enhance the operational flexibility of the MAVERICK missile family of weapons. The Laser MAVERICK will substantially enhance the Services' capability in close air support operations of ground forces and will provide for the earliest introduction of a MAVERICK missile capable of being employed in night operations. The IIR MAVERICK will extend the basic MAVERICK missile operational utility in close air support and interdiction missions for both day and night/ adverse weather operations. In the highly critical defense suppression missile there is a unique synergism between anti-radiation missiles and the IIR MAVERICK capability that provides substantive improvement in our radar destruction abilities. Based on the successful results of the recently completed advanced development IIR MAVERICK test launches and the Air Force's high confidence of the significant tactical utility of this weapon system, preparations are being made to proceed to full-scale engineering development, funding permitting. The Advanced Warhead program will provide a warhead to replace the present 125 pound shaped charge warhead with a [250 pound-class] penetration, blast and fragmentation warhead. This warhead is also being designed to satisfy Navy/Marine Corps requirements for their use with Laser MAVERICK. The Single Rail Launcher is being developed to satisfy Air Force requirements for a launcher compatible with T.V., Laser and IIR MAVERICK for Air Force and potential Navy applications. The Single Rail Launcher will enhance our weapons loading/operational flexibility on lighter tactical aircraft. Initiation of engineering development for the Advanced Warhead and Single Rail Launcher is planned for October 1976.

Based on priorities, the impact of the proposed reduction would be to delay the start of engineering development of both the Advanced Warhead and Single Rail Launcher one year and reduce the IIR MAVERICK engineering development effort in N 77 approximately one-half of that planned. The Laser MAVERICK development would be fully supported to maintain the current development schedule and permit an initial production decision in July 1977. The start of IIR MAVERICK would be delayed until June 1977 and result in a six-month slip in the planned initial production and Initial Operational Capability of this critically needed weapon system. Further, since the IIR seeker is a Joint Air Force/Navy development, any delay in the IIR MAVERICK program will cause a corresponding delay in the Navy's Night Walleye Program.

Delaying the development of the Advanced Warhead and Single Rail Launcher and stretching the IIR MAVERICK development would in turn increase the subsequent year R&D funds required and would potentially

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necessitate increased costs of a production line break between the Laser and IIR MAVERICK production buys. It is essential that the flexibility be provided to support the priority Laser and IIR MAVERICK development efforts to provide our Tactical Air Forces with a close air support and interdiction night/adverse weather operational capability.

Full restoration of the President's Budget amount of \$41.0 million is requested.

Human Resources (Personnel Utilization Technology) The House reduced the request of \$3.5 million by \$1.0 million on the basis of excess funds.

A funding level of \$2.5 million is sufficient to maintain the required level of research and development support for personnel utilization in the Air Force. The proposed reduction would eliminate the contract program. This would severely impact the normal updating and development of selection/classification batteries and the development of occupational analysis tools that lead to increased personnel utilization and reduced training costs. Specific examples of contractual efforts that would not be accomplished are (1) establishment of benchmark scales for mechanical, electronic, and general/administrative aptitudes; (2) evaluation of perceptual motor devices for use in pilot selection and enlisted classification (with emphasis on women in the Air Force); and (3) development of Armed Services Vocational Battery (ASVAB) items. The Air Force is Executive Agent for R&D on the ASVAB which on January 1, 1976 became the common test for entry into the enlisted ranks of all Services. The fund reduction will diminish the in-house effort for development of future forms of the ASVAB. It is important that development of new forms of the ASVAB be continued to improve the test and to minimize opportunity for test compromise through timely replacement of existing test forms.

The reduction of funds would also minimize the capability of personnel assigned to the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory to perform consultative assistance for their primary users, the Air Force Military Personnel Center and the Air Training Command. The reduction will not only impact on the ability of the Air Force Human Resources Laboratory (AFHRL) to support Air Force needs, but will also impact on the ability to continue support to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (M&RA). This consultative support is an essential ingredient in the application of research and development results. The payoff in selection/classification R&D is substantial. Cost avoidance estimates as a result of screening out unqualified personnel are as high as \$100 million per year. Cost avoidance as a result of reducing technical training course length through application of occupation research is estimated at \$15 million per year. These cost avoidances are strong indicators of the strength of the Personnel Utilization program.

The program was cut by 25% in FY 1976. The program was restructured in N 1977 to address congressional concerns. The fiscal 1977 request is level with the fiscal 1976 request and slightly below the fiscal 1975 program level. A reduction in FY 1977 would continue the delay in

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providing a sound R&D program that impacts the personnel and training programs in the Air Force.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$3.5 million is requested.

Low Cost Avionics. The House reduced the request of \$3.1 million by \$2.1 million on the basis of excess funds.

There are no excess funds in this program. The reduction will have significant impacts on a program whose goal it is to develop effective strategic avionics while minimizing life cycle costs. The funds are to develop the engineering design drawings and specifications on subsystems selected for integrating into the prototype of an advanced strategic avionics system. The study effort to define the prototype subsystem was initiated in N 76. The N 77 effort to design the system software, hardware, and interface will have to be cancelled or severely restricted in order to accommodate the proposed reduction. Duration of the program will be extended at least a year, with an accompanying increase in the total R&D program cost. Other individual subsystem development programs which will be integrated into this prototype will also be affected by a program slip. This program directly addresses the problem of ever increasing O&M costs and decreasing effectiveness in our present and proposed strategic aircraft. Neither maintenance costs nor the current and predicted threat environments are diminishing. Only by aggressively pursuing a development program of this type, can efficient and effective avionics for the 1980s be possible.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$3.1 million is requested.

Electronic Warfare Technology. The House reduced the request of \$9.3 million by \$1.5 million on the basis of excess funds.

There are no excess funds in this program. In light of current program commitments, the proposed cut would eliminate six new starts of a proposed nine, and will delay five on-going analysis tasks. Critical technology demonstrations funded at a total of \$770,000 to be canceled will include:

(1) [Suppression of interference in the radar warning receiver caused by jammers on other aircraft or on the ground. Lack of this technology means that combat aircraft crews will not be warned of enemy attack when their warning receivers are jammed unintentionally by friendly aircraft or intentionally by enemy jammers.]

(2) Development of [multiple octave traveling wave tubes.] This technology would lead to the reduction in cost and complexity of current jammer systems by cutting down the number of power amplifiers needed. Delay will prohibit integration of this technology into currently planned jamming systems.

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(3) Standard power amplifier chain modules. This development would reduce the cost of downstream jammer development by demonstrating standard building blocks that could be common to all future jammers.

(4) High power [8 to 18 GHz array] transmitter for Support Jamming Aircraft. Availability of this [array] enhances the capability of support jamming systems against the more precise and more difficult to jam terminal threat radars [in the I/J band.] Delay of this development delays evaluation of [high power I/J band] jamming.

(5) The development of 'countermeasures against [friendly nation developed] SAMs. [The proliferation and sale of surface-to-air weaponry to virtually every nation dictates the USAF be capable of countering not only Soviet developed systems, but also French, British, German, and U.S. built SAMs. This capability is critical if USAF is to maintain world-wide capability.]

Major impact of the remainder of the cut will be accommodated by cutting the electronic warfare analysis effort from \$1.65 million to \$0.92 million (\$730,000). This will eliminate all conceptual analysis for FY 77, limiting analysis activity to technique evaluation. No support to SPOs will be provided.

Full restoration of the President's Budget amount of \$9.3 million is requested.

Advanced Computer Technology. The House reduced the request of \$4.1 million by \$1.1 million on the basis of excess funds.

This reduction will severely affect efforts in support of the tri-Service new programs to reduce the costs and increase the reliability of software and hardware development for weapon systems. Program activities that will be curtailed include the establishment of a high order language controls, prevention and reduction of the proliferation of higher order languages, standardized software tools and programs accessible to all Services through the DARPA sponsored National Software Works, the development of methods and tools to increase programmer productivity, and an analysis of microprocessor technology for application in Air Force systems.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$4.1 million is requested.

Electra-Optical Warfare. The House reduced the request of \$8.0 million by \$1.5 million on the basis of excess funds.

There are no excess funds in this program. In light of current program commitments the proposed cut will eliminate 50% of the analysis and simulator efforts (\$900 to \$450 thousand), cancel four new starts and reduce the scope on the remaining N 77 new start. Critical technology demonstrations, funded at a total of \$750, to be canceled will include:

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(1) Missile Launch Warning for close air support (CAS) aircraft. The shoulder launched IR guided SAM is a prime threat to CAS aircraft. Current warning techniques, [while adequate for low performance aircraft, cannot function in the higher speed and maneuver environment of the A-7, A-10 class of aircraft.] This development [is critical to the survivability of CAS aircraft in a SAM environment, as there is no alternative capability in development or in production.]

(2) Tail warning for lightweight aircraft. Current tail warning systems in development for the B-52 and F-15 are not compatible with size and weight constraints of lightweight aircraft. Technical advances must be made to demonstrate a practical solution to providing tail warning for lightweight aircraft.

(3) Low cost infrared jammer. [A satisfactory alternative for flares as protection against IR missiles does not currently exist. While progress has been made on IR jammers, reliability, flexibility of jamming modulation and cost are still problem areas to be addressed. Cancellation of this effort will force A-7, A-10, and F-16 aircraft to use flares regardless of environment or threat.]

(4) Low cost optical intelligence receiver. [Little data has been collected on Soviet laser systems because of the small number of collection platforms capable of detecting them. This development will lead to a capability of using any aircraft as a collection platform with no permanent modification to the aircraft. Lack of this capability greatly lengthens the time between Soviet deployment of a system and USAF capability to counter it.]

The development of [an electro-optical countermeasure capability against visually aimed threats to strategic aircraft] will be reduced in scope with a one-year resultant delay (\$300 thousand).

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$8.0 million in requested.

Reconnaissance/Electronic Warfare Equipment. The House reduced the request of \$14.2 million by \$1.5 million on the basis of excess funds.

There are no excess funds in this program. The proposed House reduction will severely impact the following projects as indicated: (1) Project 1155, Electro-Optical Collection/Reconnaissance, must be reduced by \$550,000, which will delay flight tests [of the high performance aircraft IR collection pod by six months] and delay radiometer modification for the COMPASS ROYAL subsystem. As a result, an urgently required operational collection capability [against the Soviet "Bear" and "Bison" long-range reconnaissance aircraft] will be delayed by at least six months. Delay of the COMPASS ROYAL collection program will cause a similar slip in the operational deployment of equipment designed to collect data [from Soviet fighter aircraft.] Valuable collection opportunities will be missed. In addition, it will prevent the procurement

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option of the second [laser receiver for C-130] aircraft and delay development of the [RPV] E-0 sensor system by six months. (2) Project 1156, Radiation Intelligence Signatures, must be reduced by \$200,000, which will [terminate] the airborne collection program and stop the only USAF] RINT equipment program in development. (3) Project 2057, Quick Strike Reconnaissance will be reduced by \$400,000. Impact will be to delay the program by a minimum of six months and increase the cost of the project by \$500,000 due to the stretch-out of contracts with four vendors. Operational forces will not have an improved, all-weather targeting and recce/ strike capability until six months after the planned IOC date. (4) Project 2096, TERPES, will be reduced by \$400,000. TERPES IOC will be delayed by nine months due to a reduced level of software development which is scheduled to begin in FY 77. Delay of the TERPES IOC will significantly limit TAC's capability to exploit ALQ-125 (TEREC) tactical ELINT processing capability for world-wide deployments until the TERPES equipment is made available.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$14.2 million is requested.

Advanced Airborne Command Post. The House reduced the request of \$79.0 million by \$19.0 million because it, considered it an overly ambitious program not in consonance with resolution of development problems and establishment of an operational baseline system.

The Air Force does not consider this to be an overly ambitious program. On the contrary, a major restructuring of the program has been made to assume the most effective use of resources. The N 77 funding is critical to maintaining the E-4B AABNCP development schedule and costs. The impacts of such a reduction are: (1) renegotiation of the recently negotiated command, control and communications (C3) development contract with the Boeing Company; (2) a 12-month slip in the E-4 program schedule; and (3) a total program cost increase of at least \$73.0 million.

Given the national importance of this program, and the past programmatic problems, DoD has gone to extraordinary lengths during CY 1975 to realign the program. As a result, a major program restructuring has been accomplished. A decision to reduce the program funding at this time would result in severe program cost and schedule impacts.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$79.0 million is requested.

Surface Defense Suppression. The House reduced the request of \$28.5 million by \$6.0 million because it does not believe that this capability for the B-52 is desirable or practicable.

Attainment of this capability is quite feasible and within the state of the art. The B-52D anti-ship capability is an interim measure to match the ever increasing capabilities of an expanding Soviet Naval Force. As such, it fulfills an Air Force collateral mission to support

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the US Navy in the anti-shipping role.

This reduction would seriously impact the B-52D anti-ship capability by deleting the R&D efforts which include studies, simulations, test and purchase of development weapons for testing. Denial of these funds will delay the deployment of this anti-ship capability by one year. Additionally, the Defense Suppression Program is composed of five interrelated tasks. This reduction will adversely affect the other tasks and the entire Defense Suppression Program.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$28.5 million is requested.

Foreign Weapons Evaluation. The House reduced the request of \$2 million by \$1.0 million on the basis of excess funds.

Funds requested are not excess to the program. This reduction will seriously **impact** our ability to conduct a meaningful international cooperative R&D effort. We are vitally interested in finding **methods** of improving weapon system commonality and standardization, achieving a higher level of operational interservicability and interoperability, and in reducing **R&D costs** and duplication. To accomplish this objective we have sought to expand out involvement in nation-to-nation cooperative, research, development and test programs with an eye toward weapon systems which can be manufactured and used jointly. The reduction of funds in this area will seriously degrade our ability to expand this effort and, hence, reap the benefits of more direct R&D coupling with our allies.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$2.0 million is requested.

Applications for Information Processing Technology. The House reduced the request of \$2.8 million by \$1.3 million on the basis of excess funds.

The DoD has undertaken a major program to reduce the costs and improve the reliability of software; The proposed reduction will dilute the Air Force role in this tri-Service initiative. The activities in this program affected by the reduction involve the demonstration of software programming aids in specific computing systems, validation of software engineering methodologies, merging of programming tools and programs to achieve **commonality** and standardization, and investigations in multi-level security protection for command and **control** and logistics computer systems. Reduction of this program will result in continued high software expenses.

Full restoration to the President's budget amount of \$2.8 million is requested.

Precision Location Strike System. The House reduced the Air Force budget request of \$30 million for the Precision Location Strike System in N 1977 by \$10 million. The House based its action on concern over

the requirement, complexity, and projected costs of the PLSS. They stated that the Air Force has alternatives such as the F-4G WILD WEASEL to search out and destroy hostile radar systems. The House recommended termination of the emitter locating effort, without **impacting** the Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) guidance capability.

The Air Force recently restructured this program into a two phase effort to accommodate the concerns of Congress and OSD. Phase I competitive design/trade-off study contracts for the Precision Emitter Location Strike System (PELSS) were awarded on March 5, 1976 to teams headed by Lockheed and Boeing. These studies will provide technical and design data, expected performance data, costs, and schedules for several system configurations. Phase I is aimed at providing structured alternatives including the use of conventional combat aircraft to reduce PLSS platform costs, to be presented at DSARC II in April 1977. The objectives are to achieve acceptable performance at lowest life cycle cost; to reduce system complexity; and to maximize use of available or developmental technology, systems, components, and software to reduce development risks and costs. The program restructuring also deferred initiation of full-scale engineering development (Phase II) until N 1977. The proposed House reduction and recommended termination of emitter locating efforts essentially preempts the Air Force's ability to take the program options to DSARC II following completion of Phase I PELSS studies. Since these options range from relatively limited and austere system configurations to those with full capabilities, it is untimely and premature to restrict the Air Force's development options now. Funding estimates provided Congress in the FY 1977 documentation match a baseline configuration with full capabilities. They do not necessarily represent the program option which the DSARC II will select.

The requirement for PELSS, the major effort under PLSS, has been reexamined as requested by Congress, together with expected cost effectiveness. Several intensive studies examined the requirement for PELSS and its effectiveness in relation to other tactical systems. The National Security Council Ad Hoc Panel on NATO Force Improvements recommended that the Air Force accelerate acquisition of PELSS. A study of close air support by the Institute for Defense Analyses concluded that a PELSS-type all-weather, standoff capability would significantly reduce attrition of friendly aircraft through improved defense suppression and standoff strike. A recent USAF Scientific **Advisory** Board study supported emphasis on defense suppression in tactical air operations, and placed particular weight on development of the Time of Arrival/Distance Measuring Equipment (TOA/DME) techniques employed by PELSS. An Air Force study examined the relative cost effectiveness of PELSS, WILD WEASEL, and other tactical systems in various force mixes. It concluded that PELSS should be cost effective relative to systems examined, and that a **combination** of PELSS and WILD WEASEL was particularly attractive because of their complementary capabilities. The requirement for PELSS was also reaffirmed by the Commanders of the TAC and USAFE who urged that the development be expedited to meet critical deficiencies in our defense suppression

and all-weather tactical location/strike capabilities. The studies cited above support the Tactical Air Force's position that a combined force of PELSS and WILD WEASEL, operating as a coordinated team, are required for defense suppression. This combination is essential to insure that current and projected surface-to-air threats, including short duration and agile emitters, can be located and destroyed under all-weather conditions. Each system has unique capabilities, and the combination is both complementary and synergistic.

PLSS is important for tactical force modernization. It is the key to accurate all-weather location and standoff strike of a wide variety of ~~targets--both~~ emitters such as radars and non-emitters such as bridges and airfields. No alternative systems provide the needed capability, and PLSS will support many tactical operations such as defense suppression, close air support, interdiction and counter air.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$30.0 million is requested.

AWACS. The House reduced the request of \$109.6 million by \$9.5 million on the basis of excess funds.

The AWACS program has been carefully structured to obtain maximum benefit from programmed RDT&E funds. The schedule impact of this reduction will be that the expanded C3 enhancement effort will be reduced to a study effort only and there will be a one-year delay of in-line incorporation of this enhancement into the production line. In addition, the start of ECCM development effort will be delayed approximately four months with a possible production line incorporation impact. Total program cost increases will be generated by this reduction due to **forecast** economic escalation and inefficient application of resources in the development and production of enhancements. This reduction, coming' on the heels of a \$11.0 million RDT&E reduction FY 1976 and \$19.4 million in the TQ appropriation, will force yet another rephasing of the program before the full impact of the previous cut can be assessed. Operationally, this cut will deny to the users early exploitation of AWACS inherent C3 flexibility and enhanced ECCM technology identified during the congressionally directed ECCM studies.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$109.6 million is requested.

Advanced Systems Engineering and Planning. The House deleted the request of \$12.0 million on the basis of excess funds.

This program element is new in FY 77 but does not represent an increase in funding for overall Air Force planning effort, since like reductions were made in funds for the Federal Contract Research Centers (FCRCs), which had provided such support in prior years. This realignment is part of an overall DoD FCRC review **now underway**. The work in this program element is necessary to provide the critical

links between threat assessment, weapon system requirements, state of the art of technology, and weapon systems selection and development. The selection and the nature of every weapon system program are the result of many studies of the type to be provided by this program. Major improvements now being developed within the requirements process will depend even more on extensive and sophisticated planning to home in on the best approaches for new system development. This program also provides for Air Force efforts in technology development, the identification of new technology needs and foreign threat analysis. FY 1977 efforts will provide critical requirements analysis and technology planning support in such areas as strategic command, control and communications, space and missile defense, space survivability, electronic countermeasures, computer design, low cost electronics, and others. **These** efforts go hand-in-hand with a strong requirements process, and provide important options for selecting new systems for development.

Much of the professional capability needed for this kind of planning is not available to the Air Force from in-house resources. These funds **will** provide that support. A reduction of effort would be directly contrary to the need for improvement in this area, and to the recommendations of important acquisition management studies, including that of the Commission on Government Procurement.

Full restoration to the President's Budget amount of \$12.0 million is requested.

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST AND EVALUATION,  
DEFENSE AGENCIES

(Thousands of Dollars)

Original FY 1977 Authorization Request	676,300
House Bill	652,300
Restoration Requested	24,000

Requested for Reconsideration:

(Thousands of Dollars)

	<u>Original Authorization Request</u>	<u>House Bill</u>	<u>Restoration Requested</u>
Defense Advanced Res. Projects Agency	246,400	231,400	15,000
Defense Communications Agency	31,005	29,505	1,500
National Security Agency	[198,169	192,169	6,000]
Defense Mapping Agency	15,719	14,219	1,500

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## JUSTIFICATION

DARPA. The Advanced Research Projects Agency has concentrated its planned budget for **FY 1977** around seven major thrusts. Each one could have a major impact on future **DoD** systems and missions. Plans were formulated to allow more technology demonstration to respond to the expressed guidance from the Senate Armed Services Committee. The Director, Defense Research and Engineering, after his review of the **FY 1977** program decided to fully support these major thrusts, which are outlined in the Statement to Congress, and increased the total DARPA budget 15% over **FY 1976**. Priorities were vigorously pursued on the existing programs so that in **FY 1976**, \$37.0 million worth of programs were decreased or cancelled to also support these major thrusts.

The total budget for all the program areas cited in the House report, as the rationale for the \$15.0M cut, add up to less than \$4.5M. Contrary to the **stated House findings**, all R&D effort in the DARPA program have high technology pay-off with broad **DoD** implications, or was requested by the Office of Secretary of Defense. For example, in the Software Specification Language area, which is one area cited, virtually all other **DoD** and industry work is concentrated on developing standard information formats which is inherently limited to routine bookkeeping functions. This is a short term solution to this software problem. On the other hand, **DARPA's** approach is to develop software tools that would enable checking of specification, as well as, the bookkeeping function. This work is being carried out at MIT, Carnegie Mellon, and the University of Southern California and has received wide recognition in the technical community.

Half of the increase requested for **FY 1977** is needed to pay for inflation. The proposed House action to **reduce the** DARPA budget, is more than twice the proportion of the cut proposed for the rest of the **DoD** Research and Advanced Technology program. In order to keep a critical level in the major thrusts and considering the internal cuts already made, the overall impact of additional cuts proposed by the House will be in the elimination of new initiatives and the premature termination of existing efforts. This will cause a serious erosion of the **total** DARPA program base that has already been trimmed to the bone. Programs that would be affected are as follows:

Military Sciences. The proposed \$2.0M House cut would result in terminating research efforts in Materials Sciences, Human Resources Research, and Technical Studies.

1. Materials Sciences will be cut \$1.1 Million. X-Ray Laser effort would be terminated by a cut in funding. The development of x-ray lasers is presently on schedule and will bring a unique and important measurement capability to bear on DoD materials and processing problems. X-ray sources of the brightness and coherence attainable only by laser action have unique uses.

The **Strong** Optical Fibers Program would be terminated. This program has as its goals the simultaneous attainment of the theoretical fiber tensile strength and the lowest possible optical transmission loss in a graded-index fiber waveguide. Attaining fibers at or near these goals will make possible fiber optic communication links that will revolutionize military communications in critical areas such as undersea surveillance where **no present** systems will serve the need.

The unique DARPA Solid Electrolyte Program would be terminated. The program objective is to develop a battery to meet military requirements of weight, life, size and energy density which are important since they affect logistics.

2. Human Resources Research would be cut \$0.6 Million. **Efforts** in the Performance Evaluation program will have to be terminated immediately. The program was conceived partially in response to General **DePuy's** request for a joint **TRADOC/DARPA** program in this area and, as a consequence, involves the direct interfacing of those doing the research with those who have the problem. Thus, a "final exam" is built into the program such that the progress and products from this program will be both measurable and easily transferable to the Services. Since many of the projects in this program are being jointly funded with the Services, the termination of this program will cause a slippage or stoppage in these critical Service-related projects.

3. Technical Studies would be cut \$0.3 Million. This program area supports studies and analyses performed by the Institute for Defense Analyses, as directed by the Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering. This reduction would necessitate curtailment of some ongoing effort and obviate all intentions to embark on new studies contemplated in the area of High-powered Laser Technology and Countermeasures and Configurations, and Commonality in a Possible DoD Family of Helicopters.

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Missiles and Related Equipment. In the Strategic Technology Program, a reduction of \$4.0 Million would result in the premature termination of ongoing efforts in low angle track technology, long range imaging radar, laser propulsion, and active radar cross section technology.

Low Angle Track Technology will be cut \$0.4 Million. [While this nation has generally abandoned low cost command guided systems due to the low angle track problems, other nations including the Soviet Union have continued to develop and deploy such systems and have initiated vigorous programs in adjunct sensors (optics) and high frequency operation to improve the performance of such systems.] In FY 1975, DARPA initiated a measurement and data analysis program to **formulate** a data base, taking into account both the diffuse and specular multipath contributors to low angle track errors, and to use the data base to predict the expected performance of foreign SAM systems. The results of the low angle track program have and will continue to identify new technology issues and approaches, exploration of which can be used to develop advanced non-susceptible effective air defense concepts as well as improved penetration techniques. The FY 1977 funding reduction of \$450K will terminate this program.

Long Range Imaging Radar will be cut \$1.670 Million. The objective of this task is to **develop** national capability to determine from the ground the purposes of foreign spacecraft at the **higher altitudes** by means of radar **imaging**. The program is to develop a **10 GHz** radar system (1000 MHz bandwidth) **capable** of imaging satellites at **altitudes** of **200 km to 40,000 km** with **25 cm range** and cross-range resolution. This **unique satellite imaging technology** base would provide for the first time a capability for timely characterization of Soviet space activity at **synchronous altitudes**. Instead of the program being completed as planned in FY 1977, the reduction will result in program termination.

Laser Propulsion Program will be reduced \$510 Thousand. This would terminate efforts to determine the extent to which High Energy Lasers (HEL) offer an economically and technically attractive alternative to chemical booster propulsion for launching military payloads into space. Contractor teams are currently executing detailed designs of key physics experiments which will permit a competitive evaluation of the two most promising laser propulsion concepts in FY 1977. The laser propulsion effort seeks to spin off the DoD HEL developments **into** a propulsion technology which could potentially insert such payload packages as low as \$10-30/1b, opening whole new frontiers

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of space exploitation. Ongoing DARPA programs in laser devices, optics, propagation, and material laser interaction already provide much of the technology base required by such a laser system.

Active RCS Reduction Technology will be cut \$1.37 Million. [Soviet air defense early warning presently appears to be based upon the TALL KING VHF radars operating at 170 MHz, and evidence now indicates that this system could be supplemented by HF skywave OTH-B radars in the near future, analogous to the OTH-B system presently undergoing development and test by the U. S. The Soviet early warning systems represent a considerable threat to the viability of present and future U. S. strategic air vehicles. This air defense radar capability is particularly formidable since present technology does not provide adequate countermeasures in the HF and VHF frequency ranges. A promising new approach to cross section redirection that may be applicable to both HF and VHF has recently been investigated by DARPA and its feasibility demonstrated in limited tests against HF Surface Wave Radar. This technique involves exploitation of the circumstance that aircraft structures have dimensions of relatively few wavelengths at these frequencies. The applications for active RCS-reduction technology extends beyond the OTH strategic bomber case and includes defense of cruise missiles and RPVs against HF and VHF detection systems satellite concealment, and submarine EW mast concealment. The FY 1977 funding reduction of \$1.370 Million will terminate this program. Adequate evaluation of planned adaptive canceller techniques and surface current control concepts would not be achieved, representing a major roadblock in demonstrating this high risk high payoff technology.

Other Equipment. The proposed \$9.0 Million cut would have an impact as follows:

1. Nuclear Monitoring Research would be cut \$0.750 Million. Almost 80% of the planned FY 1977 research in nuclear monitoring is directed toward solving the problem of discriminating between underground nuclear explosions and earthquakes. Work currently in progress, initiated in 1973/74, is in an advanced and critical stage such that a \$750,000 reduction would cause undesirable diplomatic repercussions in collaborating countries where new seismic observatories, procured with prior year funds, are being installed. Furthermore, a large increase in the total cost of the program would result from cascading inefficiencies in all other parts of this closely coordinated program should an important disruption of any one part take place. As a consequence, any such large reduction of funds would have to take place in the smaller (20%) portion of the program where its impact would be correspondingly magnified.

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The affected research would be that aimed at developing improved national means for verifying compliance by the Soviet Union to terms of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974, and to terms of the treaty currently being negotiated in Moscow on limitations to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

2. Tactical Technology would be cut \$2.0 Million and result in the termination of the following three efforts:

X-Wing, an advanced technology aircraft concept which has the potential for a major breakthrough in VTOL capability, providing both helicopter hover efficiency and high subsonic cruise speed. While the Navy has an on-going 6.3 program with the Circulation Control Rotor (CCR), the combined application of these technologies into a high speed VTOL represents a substantial risk and thus substantial Service funding is premature. Deletion or depletion of the FY 1977 DARPA funding would probably terminate the program since the Services are unwilling to commit much funds at this stage to this highly innovative and risky program.

HIM&-B, an innovative 15-21 ton variable parameter test bed is designed to be tested at the same time and under the same conditions as the 30-40 ton HIMAGA in order to maximize common sharing of test instrumentation and facilities. The primary objective for both HIMAG-A and HIMAG-B is to provide mobile test beds for the DARPA 75mm solid and liquid propellant guns and to explore to the fullest extent, the novel vehicular options that such a weapon might now make possible. It is essential that such weapons be tested on a light-weight chassis to determine feasibility and to quantify the effectiveness. If the HIMAG-B is dropped, the option for tank-equivalent firepower on such small combat vehicles will probably not materialize.

Solid or Liquid Propellant Gun Program. The elimination of one of the two brassboard guns called for in HIMAG programs would result from the proposed cut. However, it is extremely doubtful that either program could be completed with only one gun. Each program requires the firing of up to 40-short bursts to determine barrel erosion and to characterize sustained rates of fire and tube life. The HIMAG schedule requires some parallel test firing with both guns. If all of the test firing had to be completed by the gun contractors prior to delivery of a single gun, the test bed contract would have to be **stretched out** by up to six months.

3. Distributed Information Systems would be cut \$3.1 Million affecting two programs:

A \$2.0 Million cut in the Software Technology program will force DARPA to terminate its efforts to develop very high level software specification languages which computers can understand. DARPA has pioneered in this area, and recent results produced by DARPA sponsored researchers at MIT, Stanford, and the University of Southern California suggest that a major technological breakthrough is eminent. Once computers understand specifications which state precisely what is to be done without the details of how it will be accomplished, they can be used to verify that software does what is intended. These new tools are expected to provide an effective control on both software cost and reliability. DoD is increasingly dependent on computers for decision support in command and control and logistics, and there are computers embedded in almost every weapons system, thus this technology will have a major impact on all parts of DoD.

The Speech Understanding program has been developing the technology base required for the natural, continuous (not isolated word) speech input of information to computers. The goal is to improve the man/machine interface by enabling computers to communicate in human terms instead of forcing humans to communicate in machine terms, as typified by card punches and teletypes. The funding level of this program has averaged approximately \$3.5 Million a year for the past five years. The \$1.1 Million planned for FY 1977 is to thoroughly test and evaluate the results of the five year research program which include two prototype speech understanding systems which are currently operating. The impact of a \$1.1 Million cut in this program would be to prematurely end this problem by eliminating the test and evaluation phase completely.

4. Training, Forecasting and Decision Technology would be cut \$2.0 Million and prevent the initiation of a new initiative and the termination of two programs:

The proposed organizational new dynamics program is aimed at developing new methods for and approaches to an understanding of the organizational aspects of the weapons acquisition process. Results of the program, if successful, would be used to formulate recommendations for changes in policies and procedures relating to the weapons acquisition process. It is expected that defense costs in this area could be substantially reduced as a consequence. This effort was a new initiative and the proposed reduction would delay the start for at least one year or longer.

~~SECRET~~

The major lesson learned from evaluations in DoD contexts of our computer-based training system is that the major costs of such systems are not that of hardware or software but of development of **computer-based instruction**. Thus, authoring is the major bottleneck in developing cost-effective **computer-based** training systems. The proposed **authoring** effort is designed to reduce by 40% the time to develop **validated curriculum** materials. This **DARPA program** constitutes the major **DoD efforts in** authoring and no alternative approach exists for **DoD to pursue** this problem.

De'fense manpower has become one of the single most important issues in defense planning and budgeting. Despite the major importance of the problem, the DARPA Manpower Research program is the only DOD-wide, **broad-based program** on what has become known as the "\$50 billion per year problem." The DARPA Manpower Research effort is explicitly directed to the major **DoD** manpower issues -- issues that cut across all of the military Services and frequently transcend the **responsibilities** and authority of individual organizations. As an example, retirement costs have grown from \$477 Million in **FY 1956** to \$8.4 Billion in **FY 1977**, and the growth will continue unless alternative ways **are found to structure** and manage the military retirement system. A considerable investment has been made in this research effort, and some significant payoffs have already been realized, e.g., it has provided the first known actuarial cost model for measuring the economic cost of military retirement which is the basis for new legislation this year. A reduction of \$0.8 Million will cause the research in this and other areas to be precipitously halted.

5. Technology Assessments would be cut \$1.150 Million and cause two program terminations. The targeting concepts program develops methods to relate industrial damage to economic and military recovery so that the **DoD** can assess the adequacy of strategic forces and deployment plans for responding to National Security Decision Memo 242 which introduced targeting guidelines to maximize difficulty of economic recovery. These methods are being used by the Joint **Strategic Target Planning** staff and will contribute to the ability of the **DoD** technical community to select for development those technologies and systems which can best contribute to improvement in U. S. capabilities. A funding reduction will eliminate this program, and preclude the evaluation of alternative 1985 concepts for weapon accuracy requirements, higher survivability, and enhanced reconnaissance and retargeting system capabilities.

~~SECRET~~

The perceptions program through a series of research tasks, is developing techniques to incorporate the perceptions held by other nations' military forces explicitly **into the** allocations for U. S. Forces and the options available for the political use of military force in crisis management. Deterrence is **the** restraint exercised by the opponent because of his perception of the military balance. A funding reduction of \$400 Thousand in FY 1977 will eliminate this program, and throw away the opportunity for application of the prior two years' work.

DCA. The DCA FY 1977 **RDT&E** budget submission includes two major new **programs** as well as ongoing efforts. Support for the ongoing efforts was held to minimum levels and in some cases reduced from the previous year to support the new programs.

If the \$1.5 Million cut by the House is not restored, one of these two newly assigned missions will have to be cancelled, curtailed, or deferred, or an ongoing effort in which DCA has already made a substantial investment and which is vital to **DoD's** telecommunications and command and control program will have to be discontinued, curtailed, or deferred.

One of the new starts scheduled **for** FY 1977 supports the newly established Office of WWMCCS Systems Engineering (WSE). The WWMCCS is currently an essentially unstructured set of assets belonging to the Services and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). A contractual effort has resulted in the specification of an overall architecture of these assets with identification of gaps and misfits.. If WSE funding is not provided we will not be able to ensure that the architecture is implemented so as to increase our capabilities and eliminate duplication inherent in an unstructured program.

The other new start for FY 1977 concerns the survivability of command and control facilities in view of new threats posed by advances in Soviet technology. The WWMCCS Architecture has examined survivable command facilities and judged that a well-defined R&D program is mandatory to assess the requirements and true costs of the various options. \$1.5 Million is needed to structure such an R&D program to identify the feasible alternatives at minimum cost. If this effort is not funded, we cannot be assured of survivable command and control facilities thereby risking loss of control of our strategic forces.

Among the ongoing program for developing new capabilities which may be affected by the \$1.5 Million cut are a new and improved secure voice capability, a new common-user computer network, addressal of security problems in **WWMCCS computers**, and efforts in support of WWMCCS exercises. These programs were designed to modernize the current DCS to satisfy new needs and to improve command and control, while achieving dollar and manpower savings. In addition, subsequent to the budget submission, two new tasks were given to DCA in the secure voice and data communications areas. Curtailment or deferral of these programs can result in failure to acquire these new capabilities and will result in greater expenditures in future years.

NSA. A request is made for the restoration of \$6 Million of FY 1977 NSA RDT&E funds which have been deleted by the House Armed Services Committee.

In order to determine the impact of this reduction and the effect it would have on the Agency's **ability** to attain established objectives in the timeframe required, we examined both the signals intelligence and communications security proposed RDT&E projects for FY 1977.

The NSA SIGINT RDT&E proposed program **is designed** to compensate for the appreciable manpower reductions already achieved and future projected losses in the number of SIGINT stations. As a result of these fiscal and political pressures, development efforts are urgently needed to insure our capability to collect essential information, allow for more effective manpower utilization and improve the timeliness of reporting the collected data. Our HF modernization program, as an example, is well underway and reductions in this area will seriously deter our efforts to realize the full manpower savings projected by:

- a. reducing planned efficiencies and capabilities in signals acquisition and processing for the large remoted systems;
- b. delaying our small site modernization efforts, and
- c. delaying the development of an automatic morse processor.

With respect to COMSEC, the reduction will delay the attainment of the DoD Secure Voice and Interoperability objectives by at least one year. Planned new starts in support of the Joint Tactical Communications (TRI-TAC) Program and the Defense Communications System (DCS) Phase II Secure Voice Program will have to be deferred at least one year. These deferrals will require TRI-TAC Program and DCS Phase II Program schedule adjustments.

The deferred new starts supporting the TRI-TAC Program would have provided secure interoperability between the Secure Tactical Switched Voice Network, now nearing the Services' Operational Testing Phase, and Mobile Subscribers; secure interoperability between the Secure Tactical Switched Voice Network and Combat Net Radios; and secure interoperability within the Secure Tactical Switched Voice Network using satellites.

These deferrals will retard an orderly progression of secure voice initiatives which started with providing voice security at the lowest tactical echelons, and is progressing up the chain of command to the highest levels of command. Although the tactical secure voice program uses common key generators to allow cryptographic intercommunication, other communications related technical factors must be solved before totally secure tactical communications' is a reality.

The deferred new starts supporting the DCS Phase II Secure Voice Program would have provided secure interoperability between the Strategic Narrowband Secure Voice Subscribers and the Strategic **Wideband** Secure Voice Subscribers; and secure conferencing among the DCS Secure Voice Subscribers. These deferrals delay the resolution of communications related technical problems. Until these are solved, the Strategic Network cannot meet its stated security objectives.

DMA. The **Defense Mapping Agency** was reduced from **\$15,719,000** to **\$14,219,000**.

The stated Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MC&G) requirements of the Unified and Specified Commands and the Military Departments are the driving forces dictating the activities in the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) **RDT&E** Program. The program is keyed to the **technology** needs of DMA so it may rapidly and effectively satisfy current and projected military requirements.

This reduction will impact primarily on **DMA's** capability to support the gravity data and geodetic positioning needs of strategic weapons in the post-1977 time frame. In order for strategic weapons to meet precise targeting accuracies and a **flexible** multi-targeting capability, **DMA** must rapidly produce launch-region gravity and positioning data, geodetic target positions, deflection of the vertical data and in-flight geophysical corrections. Another area of impact will be in the photogrammetric exploitation development effort for special equipment and software to permit current data processing equipment. to accept new imagery and supporting information. This will permit the precise measurement of accurate positions.

The **\$1,500,000** reduction will curtail these efforts to the point where **DMA's** capability to support these military MC&G **requirements will** be delayed a year. Accordingly, it is requested that **\$1,500,00** be restored to the **DMA** program.

CERTIFICATION OF CLAIMS, REQUEST FOR CONTRACT ADJUSTMENT  
AND REQUEST FOR OTHER RELIEF BY COMPANY OFFICIALS  
(Section 701)

House Bill

Section 701 prohibits paying "any contract claim, request for equitable adjustment to contract terms, request for relief under Public Law 85-804, or other similar request which exceeds \$100,000" unless there is a certification by the senior company official at the time of submission that the claim and supporting data are accurate, current and **complete**. Outstanding claims will obtain a similar certificate within 120 days after the Act becomes a law.

Department of Defense Position

The Department requests the deletion of this section.

JUSTIFICATION

The language "any contract claim . . . or other similar request which exceeds \$100,000" is so broad that it would cover the most routine of requests for payments under contracts. It would include vouchers periodically submitted during contract performance for payments under cost type contracts and for progress payments under fixed price type contracts. It would also cover routine requests for equitable adjustment under the many clauses of the standard form contract which provide for an adjustment where the Government has taken or not taken some form of action. To impose such a requirement on a "senior company official" applicable to such day to day routine matters would be unreasonable.

Secondly, section 701 makes no distinction between a certification as to the accuracy, completeness and currency of factual data in support of a claim and the conclusions to be drawn therefrom as to the amount owed. The latter, particularly in a complex claim, is generally a matter of opinion or belief and because of its subjective nature is not susceptible to the type of certification which section 701 would require. Such opinion or belief, if the contracting parties disagree, may ultimately be decided only through litigation.

Furthermore, in view of the current statutory provisions concerning false claims against the Government as found in 18 U.S.C. 287 and 31 U.S.C. 231, the Department is of the view that section 701 is unnecessary.

FUTURE BUDGET REQUESTS FOR OPERATION AND MAINTENANCE FUNDS  
(Section 702)

House Bill

Sec. 702. All requests for appropriations subsequent to fiscal year 1977 under the Department of Defense Operation and Maintenance title shall include amounts sufficient to cover the anticipated total program costs, including expected escalation in labor, material, and other expenditures, in both the private and public sectors, for the period concerned.

Department of Defense Position

This section would require that future requests for operation and maintenance appropriations include provision for anticipated pay and price increases. We are aware that this provision is contrary to a long-standing policy of Federal budget practice and that the Office of Management and Budget opposes it because of its potential dollar impact on the Federal budget. Nevertheless, in view of the difficulties experienced in the Defense Department in coping with the high inflation rates of recent years, we support this provision.

AUTHORIZING THE NAVY TO PROCURE LEGAL SERVICES  
(Section 703)

House Bill

Sec. 703. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the Department of the Navy is hereby authorized for a period not to exceed 5 years from the date this Act becomes law, to procure legal services from attorneys in private practice at rates no higher than those prevailing in their communities, to aid in the disposition of **contract** claims, request for equitable adjustments to contract terms, relief under Public Law 85-804, contract disputes or other contract-related matters. Selection of attorneys for such legal services shall be based on the professional qualifications necessary for the satisfactory performance of the services required, rather than on competitive bidding procedures.

Department of Defense Position

The Department of Defense recommends that section 703 be deleted.

JUSTIFICATION

The Department of Defense has authority to obtain the services of lawyers under normal Civil Service procedures. To the extent that such authority is inadequate to meet the urgent needs of the Department, the Department of Justice, on behalf of the Department of Defense, has **authority** to hire outside lawyers on a regular professional basis pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 514.

The Department of Defense has not requested the Attorney General to exercise this existing special authority in connection with contract claims and the like for a number of reasons. First, the contracting procedures within the Department are highly complex because of numerous statutory requirements within the process. The Department, therefore, has developed law offices with the necessary expertise to deal with this complex subject matter. Although it is possible to obtain this type of expertise outside the Government, **it** very likely would exist only in law firms representing private contractors in contract proceedings or claims against the Government, and the possibility of conflict of interest would be considerable. In addition, the hiring of outside counsel would probably have to be at hourly rates considerably in excess of the average hourly cost of Government lawyers with specialized contract expertise.

Further, from the standpoint of continuing management control, the lawyers within the Department of **Defense** are organized into various units but are subject to the ultimate professional authority of a single chief

legal officer, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense. This arrangement permits an interchange of information and expertise and also provides consistency in legal interpretation and support of Defense Department policy. These advantages would be more difficult to achieve consistently with outside counsel who would be more single case oriented and under substantially looser control.

DOD JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADVERSE ASBCA DECISIONS  
(Section 704).

House Bill

Sec. 704. Subsequent to any decision on any case or proceeding by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, the Department of Defense, its departments and agencies shall have the identical rights to appeal such decisions to the courts of the United States as are accorded to any other party in any case or proceeding before such Board.

Department of Defense Position

The Department requests ~~the~~ deletion of this section.

JUSTIFICATION

The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) is the authorized representative of ~~the~~ **Secretary** of Defense and the Departmental Secretaries, acting for them, and therefore it would be anomalous for the Secretary of **Defense** or the Departmental Secretaries to appeal their own decisions. Additionally, in order to maintain the integrity of the present disputes process and to protect contractors from unwarranted prolonged reviews of disputes, the right of judicial review should not be granted to Department of Defense. The Department of Defense position assumes that the ASBCA will continue to remain a part of the Department of Defense. The position of the Department of Defense would have to be reevaluated if the ASBCA were to have independent authority ~~in~~ its own right and no longer be acting for the Secretary of Defense and the Departmental Secretaries. In this connection, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy has adopted a position which could have this result.

DEFERRED ORDERING OF TECHNICAL DATA  
(Section 705)

House Bill

Section 705. After September 30, 1976, all contracts for the development or procurement of major weapons systems, entered into by the military department shall include a deferred ordering clause permitting the procuring authority to purchase technical data packages', and computer software when required, in the course of contract performance or for purposes of procurement of major weapons systems or subsystems from competitive sources. Exceptions to the inclusion of the deferred ordering clause may be made by the procuring authority in appropriate cases but only after giving due notice to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the House and Senate and a full explanation of the reasons for the exception.

Department of Defense Position

The Department of Defense requests modification of this section.

JUSTIFICATION

The Armed Services Procurement Regulation. (ASPR) has for some time contained a prescribed deferred ordering clause for technical data, and has authorized its use on an optional basis. While we see no necessity for legislation, the Department of Defense has no objection to making the present optional deferred ordering clause mandatory on major systems procurements.

It is suggested that the objectives of Section 705 could be achieved by modifying the last sentence as follows:

"Exceptions to the inclusion of the deferred ordering clause in major weapons systems contracts may be made by the procuring authority only where such contracts initially require by their terms the delivery of a technical data package suitable for competitive procurement."

NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS BEFORE MODIFICATION  
OF TRAINING PROGRAMS  
(Section 706)

AMENDMENT OF TITLE 10, U.S.C. TO  
INCREASE THE NUMBER OF JUNIOR ROTC UNITS  
(Section 707)

House Bill

Sec. 707. Section 2031(a) of title 10, United States Code, is amended by striking the figure "1,200" at the end of the second sentence and substituting therefore the figure "2,000"; and by striking the period at the end of the third sentence and substituting therefore a comma and adding the following: "except that more than one unit may be assigned to military institutes."

Depart of Defense Position

The Department of Defense is opposed to this provision.

JUSTIFICATION

The Department of Defense is opposed to this resolution for the specific reasons outlined below:

1. The removal of the limitation on the number of Junior Reserve Officers Training Corps (JROTC) units could result in an increase in the number of units and could increase the funding requirement for this program at the expense of other DoD training or educational programs.

2. The proposed bill eliminates a provision of the current law which provides for the fair and equitable distribution of such units throughout the nation by limiting the number of JROTC units to one per institution. The elimination of this provision could lead to unequal distribution of units in the nation, thus being detrimental to the national flavor and basic objectives of the JROTC program. Additionally, the objective of the Junior ROTC is to provide "an opportunity for secondary school students to learn about basic elements and requirements for national security and their personal obligations as Americans to contribute to national security..." A single Junior ROTC program, regardless of which Service administers it, fulfills this objective on any campus. Thus, establishing other Junior ROTC units on a campus seems largely redundant and, more importantly, denies the educational advantages of the program to other schools which do not have a program.

3. Competition associated with obtaining and maintaining a viable unit is an important quality factor in this program. Removal of the unit limitations could result in the lessening of an essential quality control mechanism from the program,

CONTINUE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS TO MEET THE PAYROLL COSTS OF  
CIVILIAN AND MILITARY COMMISSARY STORE EMPLOYEES - SENSE OF THE CONGRESS  
(Section 708)

House Bill

Sec. 708. It is the sense of the Congress that the present method of providing financial support for commissary stores operated by agencies of the Department of Defense through appropriations of funds to meet the payroll costs of their civilian and military employees is a rational and appropriate way of assuring to personnel of the armed services the convenience and economic benefit which such stores were established and are intended to provide. Any move to eliminate this support, and to require instead (either on an immediate or gradual basis) that the full costs of the payrolls involved be borne by the commissary patrons themselves, is neither justified nor desirable.

Department of Defense Position

The Department recommends the deletion of Section 708.

JUSTIFICATION

The intent of this section is to prevent the gradual phase-out of direct appropriated fund support of commissary store operations as provided in the FY 1977 President's Budget.

This proposed phase-out over a three-year period beginning in FY 1977 is predicated on the fact that military compensation is now approximately comparable with compensation in the private sector. Therefore, this subsidy is no longer necessary.

Additionally, because of indirect appropriated support in the areas of maintenance and base support services, it is expected that commissary prices would continue to be lower than those in the private sector. Although the price differential would not be as great as in the past, a relative price advantage would continue to exist if the budget proposal were accepted.

ANNUAL AUTHORIZATION FOR EXPENDITURE OF FUNDS FOR ALL MILITARY FUNCTIONS  
ADMINISTERED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (Section 709)

House Bill

Sec. 709. (a) Effective December 31, 1976, section 138, title 10, United States Code, is amended to read as follows:

"§138. Secretary of Defense: Annual authorization of **appropriations** for military functions administered by the Department of Defense

"No funds may be appropriated for any fiscal year or obligated or expended, beginning with fiscal year 1978, for military functions, administered by the Department of Defense unless funds have been specifically authorized by law."

(b) Notwithstanding the foregoing amendment, the requirements of subsection 138(a) of title 10, United States Code, shall remain in effect until September 30, 1977.

(c) The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 4 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by deleting the item for section 138 and substituting in lieu thereof the following:

"138. Secretary of Defense: Annual authorization of **appropriations** for military functions administered by the **Department** of Defense."

Department of Defense Position

Section 709 would expand the scope of the annual legislative authorization to cover all appropriations for military functions. If this provision were to be enacted, it would be essential that the authorization and appropriation requests include amounts for future pay and price increases. Because of the many problem areas, with respect to Executive and Legislative procedures, it might be wise to defer such a decision until next year after we have had an opportunity to discuss the subject in detail.

CIVIL DEFENSE (Section 710)

House Bill

Sec. 710. (a) Section 2 of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C., App. 2251 et seq.) is further amended by adding at the end thereof the following sentence: "Without in any way modifying the provisions of, this Act which require that assistance provided under this Act be furnished basically for civil defense purposes, as herein defined, it is the intent of Congress that the needs of the States and their political subdivisions in preparing for other than enemy-caused disasters be taken into account in providing the Federal assistance herein authorized."

(b) Section 408 of the Federal Civil Defense Act, as amended (50 U.S.C., App. 2260) is amended by striking the period at the end of the first sentence and inserting the following: ", and, for programs of the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency such amounts as may be specified for each fiscal year in an Act as required by section 138 of title 10, United States Code, which provides annual authorizations of appropriations for the Armed Forces, or an equivalent Act."

(c) The second proviso of subsection 201(e) of the Federal Civil Defense Act, as amended (50 U.S.C. 2281(e)) is deleted.

(d) The words "that until June 30, 1976" in the fourth proviso of subsection 201(h) of the Federal Civil Defense Act, as amended (50 U.S.C. 2281(h)) are deleted.

(e) Subsection 205(h) of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C. 2286(h)), is deleted.

Department of Defense Position

This provision states that it is the intent of Congress that civil defense funds granted by DCPA to state and localities continue to be available for use in combatting natural disasters as well as preparation for possible disasters resulting from enemy attack. Further, the Committee report recommends that the civil defense component of the budget be raised to \$110 million, rather than the \$71 million provided for in the budget. The Administration remains committed to a strong civil defense program, but we believe that DCPA efforts can best be concentrated on nuclear attack preparedness objectives.



COMPTROLLER

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

9 APR 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Appeal to Senate on HASC Action on FY 1977 Authorization  
Bill - ACTION MEMORANDUM

We have drafted the appeal letter to Mr. Stennis in accordance with your instructions of 6 April. The proposed letter for your signature is attached. It has been reviewed, in pertinent part, by DDR&E, ISA and I&L. The General Counsel and Legislative Affairs have reviewed it in its entirety. Mr. Clements has a copy for his review. It has not yet been coordinated with OMB. Previous appeals letters have not been cleared with OMB, principally because of the time limitation. For this particular appeal letter, there may be a greater interest on the part of OMB because of the DoD positions on section 702 which provides for pay raise and purchase inflation, and section 709 which subjects all military functions appropriations to annual legislative authorization.

In brief, the appeal letter does the following things:

- Appeals all dollar reductions -- \$2,601 million in shipbuilding; \$17 million for SPARROW; and \$554 million for RDT&E.
- Rejects all dollar add-ons: \$49 million for RDT&E Emergency Fund; \$125 million for A-6E; \$5 million for Navy gun systems improvement; and \$2 million for two small RDT&E projects.
- Supports the President's shipbuilding program, while suggesting that shipbuilding requirements are under review and that a budget amendment is a possibility.
- Informs that an FY 1976 supplemental will be requested for the BELKNAP.
- Rejects the personnel add-ons (5,000 civilians and 50,000 Naval Reservists proposed by the HASC).
- Supports the President's budget on the commissary subsidy phase-out.



- Opposes the provision which would stop U.S. AWACS production until NATO decides to produce AWACS.

- Supports the provision requiring that O&M appropriation requests include amounts to cover future pay and price increases, suggesting that this be extended to all appropriations, noting that this conflicts with OMB position.

- Is silent on the merits of subjecting all DoD appropriations to the authorization process, but suggests certain steps to simplify procedures if such a provision is to be enacted.

- Opposes provisions which would: (1) require notice to the Congress prior to closing or curtailing training activities; (2) permit Navy to retain attorneys in private practice to aid in disposition of contract claims; (3) require certification of claims in an impractical manner; (4) give DoD the right to appeal findings of our own Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals; and (5) raise the limit on JROTC units from 1,200 to 2,000.

- Does not oppose in principle the provision requiring a contract clause enabling the Government to buy data packages, but notes this is unnecessary because we are taking action to achieve it.

- Does not mention the HASC provision of Civil Defense.

In addition, the letter addresses certain general matters, not specifically involved in actions taken by HASC. These include:

- the importance of the President's manpower cost restraint initiatives

- the need to maintain our manpower strength levels

- the possibility of a budget amendment to continue MM III production

- the need to reduce the volume of detailed line-item control by the Congress.

Recommendation: that you approve the appeal letter attached.

*Terence E. McClary*

Terence E. McClary  
Assistant Secretary of Defense

Enclosures

~~SECRET~~

February 3, 2004

TO: Jerry Bremer  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Iraqi Police Training

You told me I was being misinformed by my staff. I checked. I keep getting the same story. Maybe you ought to check with your staff and see if you have correct and current information.

For example, I am again being told that "most of the police training outside of Baghdad is being done by the military with CERP funds."

I am still being told that "much of the training in Baghdad is by the military people who have been certified by the civilian trainers."

There are a variety of sources of funds for security. I am told they include CERP funds, Supplemental funds, DFI funds, donated equipment from countries like Japan, and OFF funds. My concern is that unless we have some control over the budget, the security task won't get done, in which case our troops will have to remain there, as they have in Bosnia and Kosovo.

My suggestion is that we have CENTCOM as the executive agent. The civilians can set the training standards, and the police can report to the Ministry of Interior after they are trained and equipped and deployed. We would still need unity of command in some way, so that we don't get the blue-on-blue problems we talked about on the phone.

DECLASSIFIED BY  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS  
DEC 7, 2007

~~SECRET~~

OSD 75311-04

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

08M-HOGEI R-1

My recommendation is that you sit down with your CPA police advisors. Get whoever has any voice on police in a room, and see if we can get to ground truth.

Doug Feith and Skip Sharp produced the attached paper as a possible solution off of our phone conversation today. It would be helpful and possibly save us two or three iterations if you think through what I said and the attached paper, and then meet with your folks to see if in fact we can get closer to the same set of facts.

Thanks.

Attach.

2/3/04 Policy/J-5 paper: Iraqi Police: Reconciling Eikenberry Assessment and Bremer Comments

DHR:dh  
020304-5

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED BY  
Chief, Declass B  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS  
DEC 7, 2007

~~SECRET~~  
DRAFT

OSD Policy/J-5  
3 Feb 2004  
12:00 PM

## **Iraqi Police: Reconciling Eikenberry Assessment and Bremer Comments**

### **SD key considerations:**

- The USG "belly-button" for train and equip work is CJTF-7 (or its successor, the Combined Force Command-Iraq)
- SD can look to CFC-I Commander, not to the new US ambassador, to ensure results on police train and equip.
- Policy issues about substance of police training – e.g., curriculum, amount of training, etc. – continue to be handled by State Department experts.

### **Bremer's key considerations:**

- Maintain principle of civilian control of the police.
- Do not disrupt police training apparatus now in place.

### **Proposed way ahead:**

- The Iraqi police are (and will remain) under the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (i.e., the police will be under civilian control).
- The CFC-I Commander should have a team working on police train-and-equip issues, and team will include a U.S. embassy representative.
- CFC-I Commander will look to State Department experts (in its INL Bureau) for guidance on policy issues about substance of police training.
- Operational control of police after sovereignty is with the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, not the CFC-I Commander—again, civilian control is preserved.
- CFC-I Commander will coordinate/deconflict police operations with CFC-I operations.
  - The term "CFC-I operations" covers operations of CFC-I, ICDC, and the new Iraqi army.
- CPA resources (from Supplemental) must be fenced for CFC-I Commander's use for police train-and-equip.

DECLASSIFIED BY  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS  
DEC 7, 2007

~~SECRET~~  
DRAFT

08-M-1061

July 12, 2004

TO: Paul Butler  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: What Did Not Happen Memo

This memo from Ryan Henry on what did not happen is classified confidential. Please give me an unclassified version of it. I cannot imagine what on there is classified.

Thanks.

Attach.

6/7/04 PDUSD(P) memo to SecDef, "What Did not Happen"

DHR:dh  
071204-6

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

Doc 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUN 07 2004

INFO MEMO

I-04/006916  
EF-9633

DSD \_\_\_\_\_

USDP \_\_\_\_\_

*Handwritten:* 1/11/04  
R. Henry

*Handwritten:* Paul Butler



*Handwritten:* PWB  
6/14

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

SUBJECT: "What Did Not Happen?" (U)

(U) You asked for a list of the things for which we planned in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM that did not happen.

- Turkey, Iran, or Israel are drawn into the conflict or become too adventurous.
- Saddam uses WMD against U.S. or allied forces.
- Saddam attacks Israel; Israel retaliates.
- Iraq descends into anarchy.
- Iraq becomes balkanized.
- There is a prisoner of war or hostage crisis.
- Saddam uses WMD against rebellious areas in Iraq.
- U.S. forces pursue high value targets into Syria or Iran.
- There is widespread vigilante justice.

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AUTHORITY FO 12958

JAN 24 2008

Decl. Declass Br  
& Fac. Div. WHS

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Derived from multiple sources.  
Declassify on: X1

Prepared by: Bill Bruner, NESAs, 692-4906

OSD 77862-04

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- Shi'a holy sites are damaged or destroyed.
- There are mass food shortages.
- There are large numbers of internally displaced people and international refugees.
- "Fortress Baghdad" holds out indefinitely.
- There are mass Iraqi casualties.
- The oil infrastructure is severely damaged or destroyed.
- Disruption of oil production causes widespread economic problems.
- Another state (e.g. North Korea) takes advantage of U.S. focus on Iraq.
- Saddam's intelligence services conduct unconventional strikes against U.S. forces in the Middle East or elsewhere.
- We are unable to find Saddam.
- Saddam escapes.
- U.S. focus on Iraq weakens GWOT efforts worldwide; terrorists attack broadly.
- There is a dramatic surge in terrorist recruitment.
- Saddam is able to persuade the world that the U.S. is waging a war on Islam.
- A revolt of the "Arab street" in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, or Jordan causes political instability.

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08-M-1505

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- Coordinated Palestinian attacks on Israel precipitate a high-profile response.
- Special Operations Forces fail to neutralize or contain conventional forces in northern/western Iraq.
- There is armed conflict with the Badr Corps during major combat operations.
- Gulf states deny U.S. forces the freedom of action required to conduct combat or post-combat operations.
- Iraqi missile attacks cause mass casualties in Kuwait or Saudi Arabia.

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Prepared by: Bill Bruner, NESA, 692-4906

08-M-1505


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July 20, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



Mr. President—

You will recall the attached paper I sent you, "What Are We Fighting? Is It a Global War on Terror?"

I sent it to John Abizaid, and here is his response. I thought you would find it interesting.

Respectfully,

Attach.

7/16/04 Cdr, CENTCOM memo to SecDef

6/18/04 SecDef paper: "What Are We Fighting: Is It a Global War on Terror?"

DHR db  
072004-1

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Doc 2

OSD 77353-04

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JAN 24 2008

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P& 7/22



Chief, Declass BU **UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND**  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS **OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER**  
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD  
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

CCCC

July 16, 2004

**MEMORANDUM FOR The Secretary of Defense and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**SUBJECT: Response to 18 June Paper**

1. Mr. Secretary, Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your 18 June paper, "What Are We Fighting? Is It a Global War on Terror?" I very much appreciate the broad strategic importance of the paper. Some points for consideration:

- I absolutely concur that we face an ideologically based challenge that requires clear, unambiguous definition.
- The term GWOT does not define the war or the problem but identifies the method the enemy uses.
- The enemy sees this war almost entirely in religious terms. We stay away from such religious terms because we are not culturally comfortable using them.
- The enemy is Sunni, Islamist, Salafist, and extremist. Every one of the terms except "extremist" has a religious connotation. These terms are not very user friendly and do not lend themselves to easy public understanding. The term "Radical Islamists" used on the first page of your note is too broad because it can include both Shia Islamist and Sunni Islamist groups, some of which are legitimate. This term could become an unhelpful pathway to declaring Islam the enemy, which it is not.
- We need to get some experts together to help us define the enemy further. Extremists works for now, but we need to get the Arab Sunni community to help us put the right label on an enemy they all recognize. Many of the Iraqi and Gulf leaders use the term "Salafists" to describe the enemy.

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OSD 77353-04

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- Europe needs to get the point before it is too late. Same for the UN. There is no neutral ground in this conflict because that is how our enemies have defined it. There are entirely too many "negotiations" with terrorist groups which give these groups enhanced credibility and recruitment prospects.
  - Not sure I agree that Israel is the ultimate target in the Middle East. The ultimate target is Mecca and Medina, the heart of Islam.
  - The conflict is both a "Grand Insurgency" and a "Civil War Within Islam." But ... the main fight will be fought and won within Islam. Our problem is to figure out how to aid the moderates without inadvertently undermining their stature and credibility. We should champion women's education, not women's rights. With education, Islamic women will gain their rights. Our focus on the "women's rights" makes the argument Western.
  - Agree completely with page three's third paragraph.
  - Do not agree that the Iranian regime should be mixed in with the "main enemy." Ultimately the Shia of Iran and the rest of the Middle East are on the Sunni extremist target list. We need to work for moderate Shia and Sunni leadership to be successful. This is not a struggle about nation states, but rather one of ideology. It is Salafist extremism vs. mainstream Islam.
2. Look forward to continuing the dialogue on this issue, but after speaking at the Hoover Institution in California, it is clear to me that people are ready to put the broader war in context. There is a clear understanding that an ideological enemy is in front of us and a long war lies ahead. People are beginning to see that this struggle could define us as a nation in the next 20 years. Our immediate challenge is to define this enemy and this fight in a manner that gives our nation the ability to both grasp the danger and muster the courage to stay the course.

Very Respectfully,

JOHN

DECLASSIFIED  
AUTHORITY EO 12958

JAN 24 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
Div. & Rec. Div, WHS

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~~CLOSE HOLD~~

June 18, 2004

SUBJECT: What Are We Fighting? Is It a Global War on Terror?

Are we fighting a "Global War on Terror"?

- Or are we witnessing a "global civil war within the Muslim religion," where a relatively small minority of radicals and extremists are trying to hijack the religion from the large majority of moderates?
- Or are we engaged in a "global insurgency" against us by a minority of radical Muslims in the name of a fanatical ideology?
- Or is it a combination of the two?

How we describe and set up the problem determines how we will deal with it – what priorities we establish and, in short, what we and our allies do to deal with the problem.

Since September 11, 2001, the US has moved from addressing terrorism as a "law enforcement," where we must find and arrest the terrorists, casting it as a "war" against terrorism, where we need to use our military might against the terrorist networks and their safe havens. That was an important and useful advance, freeing us and our coalition to use more vigorous responses.

The question now, however, is should we refine the problem further? What we may be facing is not only simply a law enforcement problem, it is also not a global war against generic terrorists, but rather a war by a radical extremist strain of Islam, a minority of that religion, first against the moderates in that religion, but also against much of the rest of the civilized world. The extremists' grand objective seems to be to reshape the world – to cripple the US, to drive us out of the Middle East, to overthrow all moderate pro-Western governments in the Arab and Muslim worlds, and, in their dreams, to restore a "Caliphate" over large portions of the globe and reestablish an Islamic superpower.

The important point is that what we face is an ideologically-based challenge. Radical Islamists may be centered in the Middle East, but their reach is worldwide and their goals are global. They are currently making inroads in different ways in Europe, Central and Southeast Asia, and Africa, as well as the Western Hemisphere, including the United States.

Europe, it seems, does not understand the problem. Some Europeans seem to think they can make a "separate peace" (the "Spanish syndrome"). The UN Secretariat does not seem to get it either. For us to be successful – for the world to be successful – the US, the UN and the Europeans must have a reasonably common perception of what is happening – of what the threat is. The UN was the second target of the 1993 World Trade Center bombers. Yet the UN in Baghdad declared itself "unprotected" because they fancied themselves as "innocents." But they were again attacked by extremists, very likely because the UN stands, in a general way, for the existing international system. To top it off, radical Islamists have recently put a price on Kofi Annan's head. The reward is in gold to show the extremists do not depend on nation states.

It is likely that, over time, Europeans will be even more threatened than the US given their demographics. Israel, of course, represents the ultimate target in the Middle East – and is seen as an outpost of democracy, progress and Western values. It seems reasonable to conclude that the radicals' goal is an ideological goal, and that terrorism is simply their weapon of choice.

We should test the proposition as to whether it might be accurate and useful to define our problem a new way – to declare it as "a civil war within Islam" and/or a "global ideological insurgency" – and find ways to test what the analytical results would be depending on how we set up the problem.

A number of things follow from this analysis.

If it is an ideological challenge, our task is not simply to defend, but to preempt, to go on the offensive, and to keep the radicals off balance. We learned this lesson in the Soviet Union cold war case.

For one thing, we will need to show the moderates in the religion that they have support. We will need to find ways to help them. But they must take up the battle and defend their religion against those who would hijack it. Only if moderate Muslims actively and effectively oppose the global insurgency will the extremists be defeated.

Moderate Muslim leadership needs to create opportunities for their people. We can help. Their attitude with respect to women results in a population explosion and denies their nations one-half of the energy, brainpower and creativity that other nations benefit from. It is a formula for certain failure. Moreover, championing women's rights has a strategic importance: education of women in developing countries correlates closely with shrinking families, "middle class" values, economic progress and likely erosion of the more extreme forms of religious orthodoxy.

We must encourage oil-producing Muslim states to diversity their economies and not use oil as a crutch. Oil equals wealth, but that they happen to be sitting on sand over oil detaches them from the reality that effort and investment lead to wealth for all of the rest of the world that does not happen to be sitting on sand over oil. Too often, oil-rich Muslims are against physical labor, so they bring in Koreans and Pakistanis to do the labor, while their young people remain idle. An idle population is vulnerable to radicalism, particularly when they conclude it is prudent to pay off the extremists so they can maintain their preferred positions.

It is desirable, if not a necessity, for Middle Eastern nations to reform and institute representative systems that are respectful of all their people, including women. The President's initiative is not "do-goodism," but wise calculation: It is advice to moderate states that political reform is a way to strengthen themselves – to co-opt middle classes against the extremists.

Finally, ideologies can be defeated. The Soviet collapse teaches us this. If Islamism's goal is the fantasy of a new "Caliphate," we can deflate it by, over time, demonstrating its certain futility. Simply by not giving in to terrorist blackmail – by not being driven out of the Middle East – we will demonstrate over time that the extremists' ideology cannot deliver. At some point, its futility will become clear and the present enthusiasm will wane. Right now they are on a high, but what if 5 to 10 years from now they have achieved none of their goals (as Arafat has failed)? This is in our own hands.

The failure of the Iranian regime would also be a blow to the ideology, discrediting that ideology in the way that the collapse of the USSR discredited Marxist-Leninist parties most everywhere, except North Korea and Cuba. This, too, should be a strategic goal of ours in the struggle.

So if what is occurring is not a war against terrorism, we need to consider changing how we describe it and seek to get others to see the problem in a new way, because it will affect their attitudes and how they and we approach the critical problem of this decade.

DHR:dh  
Current MFRs/GWOT

# ESCD Instructions

**Classified Attached**

**OSD Control #** 77353-04

**Date: Signed**

**Approved**

7/20/04

**SOM: Yes**

**No**

**DR**

**DHR**

**Don**

**Donald Rumsfeld**

**Don Rumsfeld**

**PW**

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- Front Office Doc





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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

OCT -9 2008

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY  
DEPARTMENTS  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
UNDER SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE  
COMBATANT COMMANDERS  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
COMMAND, CONTROL, AND  
COMMUNICATIONS  
GENERAL COUNSEL

000.5

SUBJECT: Strategic Guidance for the Campaign Against Terrorism (C)

(C) Attached is the approved strategic guidance for the Department of Defense to develop campaign plans against terrorism. Effective immediately, recipients of this memorandum will ensure that campaign plans align with this guidance and address all elements contained therein.

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AUTHORITY EO 12958

JAN 29 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
Int. & Rec. Div, WHS

3 OCT 01

OSD CY NO. 1 OF 14

Classified by: Hon. Douglas J. Feith  
Reason: 1.5 (a) and (d)  
Declassify on: X4

SECDEF CONTROL # X01530 / 01

Memorandum is CONFIDENTIAL without attachment.


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# *CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM*

## Strategic Guidance

### for the US Department of Defense



Chief, Declass Br  
Mr. J. Don. Div. W/114

JAN 29 2008

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AUTHORITY EO 12958

CLASSIFICATION: ~~TOP SECRET~~

Classified by: Hon. Douglas J. Feith, USD(P)

Reason: 1.5(a) and (d)

Declassify on: X4

October 2, 2001

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08-M-1641

# *Purpose*

To provide strategic guidance to the Department of Defense for the development of campaign plans.

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Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

# *Outline*

- Threats
- Strategic Objectives
- Means
- Strategic Concept
- Campaign Elements

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## *Threats*

- Terrorist organizations with global reach, including the al Qaida network, that threaten the US, its people, their interests, territory and way of life.
- States that harbor, sponsor, finance, sanction or otherwise support those terrorist organizations.
- Non-state actors (e.g., banks, corporations, criminal organizations, and foundations) that sponsor, conceal, protect, finance, or otherwise support those terrorist organizations.
- The capacity of terrorist organizations or their state supporters to acquire, manufacture or use chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons or the means to deliver them.

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## *Strategic Objectives*

- Against terrorist organizations with global reach that threaten US interests:
  - Disrupt, damage and destroy them through actions against their leaders, forces, support personnel and networks of state and non-state supporters.
  - Deny them access to or the ability to use weapons of mass destruction.
  - Deny them support from state and non-state entities.
- Against states that support those terrorist organizations by providing safe haven, finances, diplomatic cover or other assistance:
  - Convince or compel states to sever all ties and terminate terrorist activity within their borders.
  - Isolate states from the international community and weaken regimes that support or harbor terrorists.
  - Disrupt, damage or destroy internal control mechanisms and the military capacity, including WMD, of regimes that continue to support terrorism.
- Against non-state entities (e.g., financial institutions, criminal groups, corporations, foundations and other entities):
  - Persuade or compel them to end their support to the terrorist organizations.

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## *Strategic Objectives (cont.)*

- Protect the US and prevent further attacks against the US or US interests.
- Support the creation of an international political environment hostile to terrorism to dissuade individuals, non-state actors, and states from entering into or initiating support for terrorism.
- Deter aggression or the use of force against the US, allies, friends and partners, and defend their populations, forces and critical infrastructures.
  - If deterrence fails, defeat aggression or the use of force.
- Prevent or control the spreading or escalation of conflict.
- Assist other instruments of national power as directed to encourage populations dominated by terrorist organizations or their supporters to overthrow that domination.

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## *Means*

- Marshal, coordinate and synchronize all instruments of US national power - diplomatic, financial, intelligence, military and other - in the planning, execution and exploitation of a global campaign against terrorism sustainable for the foreseeable future.
- Partner, as appropriate, with the people or institutions of other states on particular elements of this campaign, recognizing that our missions should determine the composition of multinational efforts and operations.
- Protect US and coalition partners' populations, forces and critical infrastructures, in order to maintain (among other things) the ability to conduct combat operations.
- Be prepared to conduct humanitarian operations as required.

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## *Means (cont.)*

- Expose terrorists, state militaries and non-state supporters that are concealed or dispersed to create opportunities to break their networks and determination, and to destroy them.
- Discredit terrorists and their motives, disrupt their operations, favorably influence public views around the world, create disincentives for supporting or endorsing terrorism, and create uncertainty in the minds of terrorists through influence, psychological, and information operations.
- Provide, as required, support to allies, partners, other groups and agencies combating terrorism or state or non-state supporters of terrorism.

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Dir of Sec Div WHS

*Strategic Concept: Multiple Agencies, Multiple Fronts, Multiple Instruments, Multiple Methods and Extended Duration*


- To achieve the Strategic Objectives (set out above), the US Armed Forces, in concert with other elements of the US Government and in cooperation with allies and friends, as appropriate, will conduct a global campaign against terrorism.
- Campaign will consist of a series of continuing, synchronized actions conducted in parallel along multiple lines of operations to:
  - Break the determination of terrorist leaders, states and non-state actors that support terrorism.
  - Deny their ability to react effectively.
- This campaign will capitalize on the following:
  - US patience, power and creativity to act in unexpected ways and thereby surprise enemies and keep them off balance.
  - Integrated functional and geographic Joint Operational Areas for coordinated military, political, intelligence, economic and other actions.
  - Superior intelligence, defense, and information technologies to create an extended capability to sustain our objectives.
  - Multinational cooperation on specific missions.
  - USG interagency contributions.
  - Affecting behavior through information and influence operations, and electronic warfare.
  - Creative, unconventional operational concepts designed to shock, overwhelm, intimidate, and demoralize the enemy and affect the calculations of other foreign states and entities.

# Campaign Elements

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Dir. & Rec. Div, W...



- Simultaneous operations, multiple lines of operations.
- Create opportunities for further attacks.
- Iterative planning and operations that can exploit sudden opportunities on a global scale as terrorists reveal themselves.

## *Set Initial Strategic Conditions*

- Detect, prevent, and/or mitigate further attacks.
- Determine and publicize declaratory policy.
- Prepare for sustained military campaign comprising multiple global, concurrent actions:
  - Establish worldwide functional and geographic joint operational areas.
  - Conduct global, integrated Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace analysis.
  - Mobilize and deploy required forces.
  - Establish global C4I mechanisms.
  - Establish initial rules of engagement, defeat mechanism and criteria for measuring progress/success.
- Keep enemies off guard and isolated from international support:
  - Demonstrate strategic patience, while displaying global reach.
  - Conduct limited operations and be prepared to strike at targets of opportunity.
  - Employ strategic, operational and tactical deception.
- Promote and organize international support for campaign:
  - Secure required host nation support, overflight, access, and basing.
  - Determine national roles in conducting particular assignments.
  - Determine combined command and control arrangements.
  - Arrange multiple coalitions, each tailored to a specific purpose.
  - Promote public awareness that coalition members may support aspects of our war effort and not support (or even oppose) other aspects.
- Discredit and undermine enemies, influence international public opinion. Degrade and corrupt enemy information and communications networks:
  - Conduct influence, psychological and information operations.

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Aim: Further attacks prevented or mitigated; forces in place; multinational and interagency command and control determined; state sponsors and terrorists uncertain; joint operational areas established; C4I infrastructure operational.

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## *Plans and Operations for Homeland Security*

- Homeland defense: Prevent further terrorist attacks against the United States.
- Support civil authorities: As directed, in managing consequences of terrorist attacks.

Aim: Further attacks on the United States are prevented; capability in place to mitigate effects of terrorist attacks.

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## *Plans and Operations Against Terrorist Organizations*

- Attack terrorist leaders, forces, other personnel, facilities and assets, especially WMD capacity.
- Otherwise disrupt terrorist planning, financial and other support structures, command and control, and operations worldwide.
- Create and exploit opportunities for further attacks on terrorists.
- Corrupt their information and deny them access to accurate information and secure and effective communications.
- Discredit terrorists, turn populations and governments against them, and isolate terrorists in international politics.
- Develop diplomatic, economic and military plans to disrupt and attack terrorist networks in non-hostile states possibly including Colombia, Lebanon, and the Philippines.

Aim: Terrorist organizations no longer capable of conducting attacks; states eliminate terrorist activities within their borders.

## *Plans and Operations Against State Supporters of Terrorism*

- Develop plans for operations against hostile regimes in Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Libya, Sudan and possibly elsewhere and be prepared to execute plans if directed.
- Convince or compel states to sever all ties and terminate terrorist activity within their borders.
- Isolate states from the international community and weaken regimes that support or harbor terrorists.
- Destroy internal control mechanisms and the military capacity, including WMD, of regimes that continue to support terrorism.

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JAN 29 2008

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Aim: No state has the resolve or ability to continue harboring, sponsoring or otherwise supporting terrorists of global reach.

## *Plans and Operations Against Non-State Entities That Support Terrorism*

- Render non-state entities unwilling or unable to provide support to terrorists.
- Sever links between terrorist and non-state entities that support them.
- Seize non-state supporters' resources and threaten their own means of support.

Aim: Non-state entities do not support terrorism or are no longer viable; terrorist organizations cut off from other non-state entities and unable to receive financial and other types of support.

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHHS

JAN 29 2008

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JAN 29 2008

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Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

October 10, 2006

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: A New Construct for Iraq – Establish and arrange a plan for Iraq, with benchmarks, to turn over to the Iraqis responsibility for Governance, Economic Progress and Security, and thereby permit a reduction of Coalition forces

Some months ago, General Pace and I discussed with Generals Abizaid and Casey the desirability of a new construct for Iraq. Several weeks ago, I discussed it in Washington, D.C. with President Talabani. And recently I discussed it with you and the NSC (on the SVTC when you were at Camp David) during our second long discussion on Iraq with Abizaid and Casey. At that meeting, I believe you indicated general agreement with my proposal and asked us to flesh it out. We have done so.

I would characterize our current construct is U.S.-centered and somewhat dependent on our actions. The new construct tips the current approach on its head and focuses on Iraqi efforts to be executed against the projected dates, thereby enabling the Iraqi Government to demonstrate its political will, and publicly fixing accountability and responsibility on the Iraqis, where they belong.

### **The Current Construct for Iraq**

Current U.S. Iraq policy has the following elements:

- "The U.S. will stay in Iraq until we have won (succeeded)."
- "The U.S. will stay as long as we are needed."
- "We oppose a set timetable for withdrawal of Coalition forces, because it would advantage the enemy, since they could simply wait us out."
- "As the Iraqi Security Forces stand up, we will stand down."

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- "U.S. military commanders will determine the number of U.S. troops, not politicians in Washington, D.C."
- "Conditions on the ground will determine the pace at which U.S. and Coalition forces are withdrawn."

The metrics on Governance the U.S. has tracked thus far include:

- Establishing the Governing Council.
- Establishing the Interim Government.
- Establishing the Transitional Government.
- Drafting of the new Iraqi Constitution.
- The referendum on the Constitution.
- Election of the permanent government – executive and legislative branches.
- The appointment of the new Cabinet.
- etc.

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Dir. & Rec. Div. WHS

To our detriment, Coalition progress currently is being measured not against those types of benchmarks, but instead by the level of violence and the number of US casualties, which, of course, can be determined by the enemy.

#### **The New Construct or Approach:**

1. We would continue to say:
  - "US troop levels will be based on conditions on the ground."
  - "We oppose setting an artificial withdrawal date."
2. However, the new approach would flip the old construct upside down. It would announce publicly a list of specific goals, benchmarks or projections by the Iraqi Government (IG). The specific goals would be developed by the IG in close coordination with Zal and Casey, and would be announced either by the Iraqi government or jointly as plans for the remainder of 2006 and through 2007. The new element would be that the projections would mark a path of the achievement of major objectives and the planned transfer

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of responsibility to the Iraqi government for many aspects of governance, economic progress, and the security of Iraq.

3. The IG and the Coalition would acknowledge that some of the dates will slip, but that there may also be dates that will be accomplished earlier than projected. In addition, we would acknowledge that in some instances an activity may regress and need to be readdressed by the Coalition. In that case, the Coalition might have to re-establish authority and set a new target date to turn it back again to the Iraqi government.

The Iraqis would announce a specific month (or a two-month span, but not a specific date) when each of the benchmarks or projections are planned to occur.

For example:

- The month each of the 18 Iraqi provinces are planned to be turned over to the Iraqi government.
- The month each Iraqi division and/or military capabilities will be placed in the Iraqi chain of command.
- The month key elements of the reconciliation process will be completed and approved by the Iraqi Parliament, etc.

4. Finally, we would state, as we have before, that while these are our joint plans, they are dependent on conditions on the ground. This is not a timetable – it is a forecast. Of course, we will be held to our projections. We expect to be. Therefore, we would qualify it carefully, and say we don't know if the Iraqis can meet the targets, but that it is our current view that they should be able to do so.
5. We will state that, as more and more responsibility is passed to the Iraqis along the announced schedule, we expect to be able to reduce Coalition forces accordingly.
6. Using this new construct has the possible disadvantage of offering the enemy a timetable to disrupt. However, it also offers several important advantages:
  - Those Iraqis who want us to stay in Iraq will see that this process is rational, not precipitous, will be dependent upon conditions on the ground, and will be executed at a pace where the Iraqis should be able to assume responsibility;

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JAN 29 2006

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- It should demonstrate to neighboring countries – whose help the Iraqis and we need – that there is a workable plan and reasonable prospects for success;
- Those Iraqis who want the Coalition out of Iraq (Sadr, some neighbors, etc.) might see that there is a plan for the Coalition to turn over responsibilities to the Iraqis, and that, as we do so, Coalition forces will “stand down”;
- This approach might help get a new UNSCR passed, which we must have, in that it would demonstrate increasing Iraqi sovereignty; and,
- The publics in Iraq and in Coalition countries would see a bold plan that should persuade them that Coalition involvement in Iraq need not be interminable.

General Casey has an illustrative draft update of the benchmarks and projections, including the dates they should be accomplished. A final list of the benchmarks requires additional inputs by Zal, agreement by the NSC, and buy-in by Prime Minister Maliki and the Iraqi Government.

General Casey and I will be prepared to discuss this with you on Wednesday, October 11, 2006.

Respectfully,

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JAN 29 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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October 23, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: New Construct

I hope you folks are working hard in the interagency on the new construct I proposed.

*New Construct For Iraq*

Thanks.

DHR dh  
SF102306-31

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/02/06*

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10 Oct 06

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OSD 77490-06  


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NOV

INFO MEMO

DepSecDef  
USD(P) *[Signature]*

NOV 02 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *[Signature]*

NOV

NOV

SUBJECT: New Construct (U)

- (FOUO) You asked us to make sure we were working with the interagency on the new construct you proposed.
- (FOUO) On Thursday, October 26<sup>th</sup> 2006, we presented the benchmarks to the Iraq Steering Group (ISG).
  - The ISG had a general discussion and decided to present the benchmarks to the Deputies Committee.
- (FOUO) The benchmarks are on the agenda to be discussed at the next Deputies Committee meeting.

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JAN 29 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

Attachments:

Tab A: New Constructs info paper

Tab B: Coordination Sheet

Prepared by: Peter McVety, ISA/ME-Iraq, 571-2490



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08-M-1641

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SF102306-31

.....  
*Please Respond By 11/02/06*

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08-M-1641

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October 10, 2006

**TO:** President George W. Bush

**CC:** Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Stephen J. Hadley

**FROM:** Donald Rumsfeld 

**SUBJECT:** A New Construct for Iraq – Establish and arrange a plan for Iraq, with benchmarks, to turn over to the Iraqis responsibility for Governance, Economic Progress and Security, and thereby permit a reduction of Coalition forces

Some months ago, General Pace and I discussed with Generals Abizaid and Casey the desirability of a new construct for Iraq. Several weeks ago, I discussed it in Washington, D.C. with President Talabani. And recently I discussed it with you and the NSC (on the SVTC when you were at Camp David) during our second long discussion on Iraq with Abizaid and Casey. At that meeting, I believe you indicated general agreement with my proposal and asked us to flesh it out. We have done so.

I would characterize our current construct is U.S.-centered and somewhat dependent on our actions. The new construct tips the current approach on its head and focuses on Iraqi efforts to be executed against the projected dates, thereby enabling the Iraqi Government to demonstrate its political will, and publicly fixing accountability and responsibility on the Iraqis, where they belong.

#### The Current Construct for Iraq

Current U.S. Iraq policy has the following elements:

- "The U.S. will stay in Iraq until we have won (succeeded)."
- "The U.S. will stay as long as we are needed."
- "We oppose a set timetable for withdrawal of Coalition forces, because it would advantage the enemy, since they could simply wait us out."
- "As the Iraqi Security Forces stand up, we will stand down."

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To our detriment, Coalition progress currently is being measured not against those types of benchmarks, but instead by the level of violence and the number of US casualties, which, of course, can be determined by the enemy.

The New Construct or Approach:

1. We would continue to say:
  - "US troop levels will be based on conditions on the ground."
  - "We oppose setting an artificial withdrawal date."
2. However, the new approach would flip the old construct upside down. It would announce publicly a list of specific goals, benchmarks or projections by the Iraqi Government (IG). The specific goals would be developed by the IG in close coordination with Zal and Casey, and would be announced either by the Iraqi government or jointly as plans for the remainder of 2006 and through 2007. The new element would be that the projections would mark a path of the achievement of major objectives and the planned transfer

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of responsibility to the Iraqi government for many aspects of governance, economic progress, and the security of Iraq.

3. The IG and the Coalition would acknowledge that some of the dates will slip, but that there may also be dates that will be accomplished earlier than projected. In addition, we would acknowledge that in some instances an activity may regress and need to be readdressed by the Coalition. In that case, the Coalition might have to re-establish authority and set a new target date to turn it back again to the Iraqi government.

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General Casey and I will be prepared to discuss this with you on Wednesday, October 11, 2006.

Respectfully,

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Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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B

**POLICY COORDINATION SHEET**

**Subject:** New Construct  
**Snowflake Number:** 102306-31

<b><u>Title/Organization</u></b>	<b><u>Name</u></b>	<b><u>Date</u></b>
PDASD/ISA	<u>Mary Beth Long</u>	<u></u>
DASD, ME	<u>Mark T. Kimmitt</u> Mark Kimmitt	<u>10/21/06</u>
Director, ME-NG	<u>John J. Trigilio</u> John Trigilio	<u>10/31/06</u>
Special Advisor	<u>Abe Shulsky</u> Abe Shulsky	<u>10/21/06</u>

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December 08, 2006

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Stephen J. Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Iraq Policy: Proposal for the New Phase

Mr. President,

You have asked for the views of a wide range of people with respect to the new phase you have decided is required in Iraq.

Attached is a proposal from the Department of Defense. It is generally consistent with the views of the Chairman, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Generals Abizaid and Casey.

It addresses the challenges that the U.S. faces in Iraq and the region, and puts forward promising suggestions to achieve your stated objectives. It is rooted in the conviction that failure in Iraq will place the American people in even greater danger.

The U.S. military is prepared to do its tasks as recommended in the proposal. The test will be whether or not the non-military tasks -- the critically needed political objectives -- can be achieved and whether we are able to get the necessary cooperation from the Government of Iraq.

Respectfully,

Attach. 12/8/06 Iraq Policy - The New Phase: A Proposal

DHR:as  
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AUTHORITY EO 12958

JAN 29 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
Int. & Rec. Div. IAWHS

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JAN 29 2008

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Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

**Iraq Policy – The New Phase – A Proposal**

**“Accelerate the Transition, Refocus the Partnership, and Stabilize the Region”**

Success in Iraq remains critical to U.S. national security and to success in the global struggle against violent extremists. Failure would have truly disastrous consequences for the U.S. and for the region. The consequences of failure would likely include:

- an emboldened al-Qaeda movement;
- strengthened Iranian and Syrian influence;
- a loss of confidence in the U.S. among key allies in the region; and
- A severe setback to American credibility, freedom of maneuver, and influence in the region and throughout the world.

In short, U.S. failure would put the American people’s safety at still greater risk.

It is critical to U.S. national security that Iraq achieve the ability to govern, secure and sustain itself, and be an ally in the struggle against extremism. It is also critical that the U.S. aggressively prosecute the fight in Iraq against al-Qaeda and its associated movements.

The two ends of the extremist spectrum – Sunni and Shi’a – work today in Baghdad as a microcosm of the dynamic at work in the region as a whole. It portends the possibility for greater regional conflict.

U.S. objectives in Iraq should be seen in this regional context – where the U.S. seeks a sustainable regional presence to secure U.S. interests, to protect allies, to deter adversaries, and to be ready and able to respond rapidly to possible crises in Iraq or elsewhere. Interference by Iran and Syria inside of Iraq and Lebanon, rising concerns of Iranian nuclear and regional ambitions, and numerous other causes of instability mandate the following U.S. objectives for Iraq:

1. Ensure that no terrorist safe haven is allowed to exist in Iraq;
2. Strengthen Iraq’s institutions and its capacity to govern;
3. Accelerate Iraqi assumption of political and security responsibilities;

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4. Counter subversive activity in Iraq by its neighbors, especially Iran, which seeks hegemony in the region; and
5. Foster improved relations between Iraq and the region.

The U.S. strategic position today is threatened by:

- the failure thus far of an Iraqi government to assert its authority sufficiently to establish a state monopoly on the use of coercive force,
- impatience among some Iraqi elements,
- fierce sectarian violence, and a resilient insurgency in the Sunni community,
- Impatience among U.S. allies and the American people.

There is a need to refocus the current approach in Iraq -- and in the region -- to accelerate progress and assure the U.S.'s ability to succeed. A shift in U.S. Iraq policy to this new phase should enable the U.S. to meet the above multiple challenges.

### The Next Phase:

#### 1. Within Iraq -- A Division of Labor:

- Coalition forces will reduce their presence and activities in major cities, with a new division of labor whereby:
  - the ISF will be principally responsible for quelling sectarian violence, and will lead in the effort against JAM, with Coalition support as required,
  - Coalition forces, with Iraqi forces in support, will be responsible for operations to defeat al-Qaeda and associated movements.
- The GoI will assume command and control of the Iraqi Army not later than Jun 2007, with :
  - three divisions under GoI command by Dec 2006,
  - seven divisions by Mar 2007,
  - nine divisions by Apr 2007, and
  - The tenth division by Jun 2007.

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- The GoI will take prompt action to rein in and demobilize militias, and to defeat extremist elements that fail to comply with GoI requirements. The GOI will approve and announce a militia law by Jan 2007.
- U.S. forces will shift their main effort to the support of Iraqi Security Forces and triple the number of advisory personnel from within existing Coalition forces.
- The GoI will increase the contributions and presence of Iraqi Security Forces. Fifty percent of Iraqi army divisions and 75 percent of brigades and battalions will operate independently by the end of 2007.
- The U.S. will accelerate transfer and closing of U.S. operating bases from:
  - 55 to 37 by Dec 2007, and
  - 37 to 20 - 25 in 2008.
- Coalition forces will accelerate attacks against hostile networks in Iraq, in particular those from Iran and Syria. Iraqi and Coalition forces will increase activities along to roll up hostile foreign proxies and elements in Iraq.
- The GoI will assume control of all 18 Iraqi provinces not later than Nov 2007.
  - Three provinces will be under Provincial Iraqi Control by Dec 2006,
  - twelve provinces by Jun 2007, and
  - all 18 provinces by Nov 2007.
- The GoI will accelerate its pursuit of national reconciliation and political accommodation, with benchmarks to be agreed upon and announced publicly no later than Jan 2007, to include, *inter alia*:
  - a Reconciliation Conference in Dec 2006,
  - a hydrocarbon law by Jan 2007,
  - revision of de-ba'athification policy by Mar 2007,
  - hold provincial elections by Jun 2007, and
  - a constitutional amendment referendum by Aug 2007.

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- The U.S. will refocus within Iraq, and, as may be appropriate, surge civilian and/or military resources in support of clear and well-defined Iraqi political and military objectives, possibly to include efforts to help Iraq build more effective police, justice, and prison systems and/or to better protect their borders.
- By Apr 2007, the U.S. and Iraq will reach agreement on the terms of a longer-term arrangement to assure Iraq's political sovereignty and territorial integrity. This arrangement would include necessary security, diplomatic, economic, and informational elements. This is essential to build a centrist coalition in the country and ensure Iraq is secure among its neighbors.
- Formally conclude the MNF mission by Dec 2007.
- No increase in the level of U.S. forces can substitute for successful diplomacy in the region and in getting the Iraqi Government to act.
- The above goals will be fashioned as benchmarks, jointly agreed on by the U.S. and the GOI and announced publicly.

## 2. Regionally:

- The U.S., in concert with regional partners, will further strengthen the regional security posture to deter Iran's pursuit of hegemony and nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver them.
- The U.S. will reinvigorate cooperative security arrangements in the Gulf.
- The U.S. will encourage the GoI to fashion a strategic partnership with Turkey and seek resolution of the PKK problem.
- The U.S. will help to mobilize international support for the Government of Lebanon to sustain its political sovereignty and independence from external threats – including its efforts to withstand Syrian political pressure and Iranian support for Hezbollah – and to establish an international tribunal on the murder of Rafiq Hariri and, potentially, Pierre Gemayel.
- The U.S. will leverage the above initiatives to counter the hostile policies of Iran and Syria, seek to split Syria from Iran, and create a balance of forces that could ultimately make possible a more constructive relationship with both of these countries. Importantly, we must be wary of any initiative that could increase the power of Iran in the growing Sunni-Shi'a split in the region.

**3. Additionally:**

- The U.S. will continue to expand the U.S. Armed Forces and increase overall the proportion of the operational Army ("tooth") – vice the institutional Army ("tail").
- The U.S. will consolidate U.S. political, diplomatic, economic and military initiatives related to Iraq under a single U.S. individual in Washington D.C., with appropriate staff, who will report to the U.S. President by Feb 2007. There will be a corresponding consolidation of efforts at lower levels.
- The U.S. will identify current obstacles within the U.S. government to full resourcing of the execution of these objectives and remove the obstacles.
- The U.S. will fully coordinate the above changes in strategic direction with:
  - the Government of Iraq,
  - Coalition partners,
  - key U.S. security partners, and
  - Regional states.
- As appropriate, the U.S. will communicate this new phase to national and international audiences through a vastly strengthened information campaign to achieve public understanding by U.S. partners and U.S. publics. The thrust of the message should be that these benchmarks are designed to provide an impetus to progress on all sides – not as deadlines to be observed regardless of conditions on the ground.

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JAN 29 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div. WHS

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Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Cables Division  
CMN-Fax Cover Sheet - Site 12  
Message # 003356



From: OSD Cables

12/8/2006 9:11 AM

Office: Secretary of Defense

Phone Number: 703-692-7000

Subject: Iraq Policy: Proposal for the New Phase

Pages (including cover): 7

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JAN 29 2008

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Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

IMMEDIATE DELIVERY

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL NAME	OFFICE	ROOM NO.	PHONE NO.	FAX NO.
WHSR	President George W. Bush				
WHSR	VPOTUS Richard B. Cheney				
WHSR	Stephen J. Hadley				

Additional Special Instructions:

Immediate Delivery Required

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~~FOUO~~  
~~SECRET//NOFORN ATTACHMENT~~

December 07, 2006

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Stephen J. Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraq Policy: Proposal for the New Phase

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AUTHORITY EO 12958

JAN 29 2008

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Respectfully,

Attach. 12/7/06 Iraq Policy - The New Phase: A Proposal

DHR:es  
SF120706-12

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JAN 29 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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JAN 29 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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  - a Reconciliation Conference in Dec 2006,
  - a hydrocarbon law by Jan 2007,
  - revision of de-ba'athification policy by Mar 2007, and
  - A constitutional amendment referendum by Jun 2007.
- The U.S. will refocus within Iraq, and, as may be appropriate, surge civilian and/or military resources in support of clear and well-defined Iraqi political and military

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JAN 29 2008

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objectives, possibly to include efforts to help Iraq build more effective police, justice, and prison systems and/or to better protect their borders.

- By Apr 2007, the U.S. and Iraq will reach agreement on the terms of a longer-term arrangement to assure Iraq's political sovereignty and territorial integrity. This arrangement must include necessary security, diplomatic, economic, and informational elements. This is essential to build a centrist coalition in the country and ensure Iraq is secure among its neighbors.
- The above goals will be fashioned as benchmarks, jointly agreed on by the U.S. and the GOI and announced publicly.

## 2. Regionally:

- The U.S., in concert with regional partners, will further strengthen the regional security posture to deter Iran's pursuit of hegemony and nuclear weapons, and the means to deliver them.
- The U.S. will reinvigorate cooperative security arrangements in the Gulf.
- The U.S. will encourage the GoI to fashion a strategic partnership with Turkey and seek resolution of the PKK problem.
- The U.S. will help to mobilize international support for the Government of Lebanon to sustain its political sovereignty and independence from external threats – including its efforts to withstand Syrian political pressure and Iranian support for Hezbollah – and to establish an international tribunal on the murder of Rafiq Hariri and, potentially, Pierre Gemayel.
- The U.S. will leverage the above initiatives to counter the hostile policies of Iran and Syria, seek to split Syria from Iran, and create a balance of forces that could ultimately make possible a more constructive relationship with both of these countries.

## 3. Additionally:

- The U.S. will continue to expand the U.S. Armed Forces and increase overall the proportion of the operational Army ("tooth") – vice the institutional Army ("tail").

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4

- The U.S. will consolidate U.S. political, diplomatic, economic and military initiatives related to Iraq under a single U.S. individual in Washington D.C., with appropriate staff, who will report to the U.S. President by Feb 2007. There will be a corresponding consolidation of efforts at lower levels.
- The U.S. will identify current obstacles within the U.S. government to full resourcing of the execution of these objectives and remove the obstacles.
- The U.S. will fully coordinate the above changes in strategic direction with:
  - the Government of Iraq,
  - Coalition partners,
  - key U.S. security partners, and
  - Regional states.
- As appropriate, the U.S. will communicate this new phase to national and international audiences through a vastly strengthened information campaign to achieve public understanding by U.S. partners and U.S. publics.


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# ~~FOUO/SECRET/NOFORN~~ ATTACHMENT

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Cables Division  
CMN-Fax Cover Sheet - Site 12  
Message # 003354



**From:** The Office of the Secretary of Defense

12/7/2006 6:54 PM

**Office:** OSD Cables

**Phone Number:** 703-692-7000

**Subject:** Iraq Policy: Proposal for the New Phase

**Pages (including cover):** 7

**Delivery Instructions:**

- Hold for normal duty hours
- IMMEDIATE DELIVERY**

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JAN 29 2008

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WHSR	President George W. Bush				
WHSR	Vice President Richard B. Cheney				
NSA	Stephen J. Hadley				


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# ATTACHMENT

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Cables Division  
CMN-Fax Cover Sheet - Site 12  
Message # 003354



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<b>Pages (including cover):</b> 7	
<b>Delivery Instructions:</b>	
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

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL NAME	OFFICE	ROOM NO.	PHONE NO.	FAX NO.
WHSR	President George W. Bush				
WHSR	Vice President Richard R. Cheney				
NSA	Stephen J. Hadley				

Additional Special Instructions:

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JAN 29 2008

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WHSR	President George W. Bush				
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NSA	Stephen J. Hadley				

Additional Special Instructions:

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
08-M-1641

~~SECRET~~

October 5, 2006

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Declaratory Policy and the Nuclear Programs of North Korea and Iran

Increasingly, it appears that it is not only difficult, but possibly impossible, for the US to gain the international diplomatic support sufficient to impose the leverage on Iran and/or North Korea required to cause them to discontinue their nuclear programs. While one or both conceivably might stop, as did Libya, for example, it seems probable that neither will stop. Therefore, we need to face the reality that one or both likely will have nuclear weapons sometime before or in the next decade.

It is reasonable to assume that when one or both successfully develop nuclear weapons, they could transfer those technologies to terrorist organizations, just as Iran has so aggressively been supplying Hezbollah. Each of these countries is a supporter of terrorists. Each is a known proliferator of sensitive technologies related to lethal weapons.

Given the above, it is possible that, at some point in the years ahead, a terrorist or non-state entity with nuclear weapons could threaten and/or use those weapons against the US and/or US interests. Deterrence against a nation state with nuclear weapons is today reasonably well understood, in that a nation state has something at risk – national leadership, population, an industrial base, etc. Conversely, the threat or use of WMD by a non-state entity leaves the nation at risk -- the US or a US interest – with no high value targets to threaten with retaliation and therefore little deterrent leverage. Further, it must be noted that deterrence against a state led by a leader with a religiously-based millenarian ideology is, at the minimum, questionable.

Classified by: Donald H. Rumsfeld  
Reasons: (b), (d)  
Declassify on: 5 Oct 2031

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### Declaratory Policy

Given this new circumstance, I believe it is appropriate to consider fashioning a new US declaratory policy. An illustrative example follows:

*It is the declared policy of the US that it will hold fully accountable any nation that supplies WMD support – e.g., expertise, technology, materials – to a non-state entity or a terrorist organization that uses them against the US and/or US interests. The US will determine the source of the weapons. The US will act appropriately to defend its interests.*

Possible advantages of such a declaratory policy include:

- It could have the effect of deterring an Iran or a North Korea from supplying weapons of mass destruction to non-state entities.
- It would widely publicize what increasingly appears to be the fact that North Korea and Iran are going to eventually have nuclear weapons, and thereby caution the world that it should either get used to that unpleasant reality, or start getting serious in their diplomacy to put leverage on North Korea and Iran to stop their nuclear programs and to stop dealing with terrorists.
- Next, it would warn the international community that, because of their lack of cohesion and their failure to put sufficient pressure on North Korea and Iran to discontinue their programs, they are, in effect, contributing to a world where there is a growing likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used against them or their interests, and, further, that the world nuclear threshold will be lowered because of the declared policy of retaliation against any nation that is the source of nuclear weapons used by a non-state entity or terrorist organization. In addition, there would be an increased need for pre-emptive actions – nuclear or conventional – by the US or others.
- In addition, as the prospects for North Korea and Iran gaining nuclear weapons become more apparent, as they will, it seems likely that other nations will make a decision that they can no longer afford to not develop their own nuclear weapons, thereby further increasing the likelihood of the spread of such weapons.

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- Further, a declaratory policy could increase the likelihood that populations in North Korea and Iran might increase their opposition to the development, use, or proliferation of such weapons.

Disadvantages of such a declaratory policy:

- In the event of a nuclear weapon being used against the US or its interests, the US would have little choice but to respond promptly or lose its credibility.
- Second, there is no guarantee that any declaratory policy would deter a leader or state that embraces martyrdom.

The world has been enormously fortunate that nuclear weapons have not been used in anger since 1945. I cannot think of another time in history where a major new weapon came on the scene, was used, and then not used for a period of 60+ years.

NOTE: It might be useful to refine these thoughts, and carefully study the pros and cons to see if something along this line might be not only refreshing in its truthfulness, but usefully disturbing to the international community, given the obvious current ineffectiveness of international diplomacy.

The international community should be forced to face the reality that either they pull up their socks and become cohesive and effective, or, by their lack of cohesion and their fecklessness, continue contributing to the certainty that North Korea and Iran will have nuclear weapons, that those weapons will eventually find their way into the hands of a terrorist non-state entity, and that thereby they are contributing to the likelihood that other nations will see the obvious and feel they must develop their own nuclear programs to survive - whether Japan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Turkey, or others.

Respectfully,

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July 18, 2001 9:51 AM

000000 18 JUL 2001 09:51:13

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*  
SUBJECT: Iceland

Here is a note on the situation in Iceland.

Please come back to me with a proposal after you have read the material.

Thanks.

Attach.

7/12/01 SecState ltr to SecDef re Iceland [X01044/01]

DHR:dh  
071801-13

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X01051 /01

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08-M-1641



THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

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2001 JUL 17 08 50 03

SECRETARY OF STATE

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DECL: 07/12/01

Don

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for your July 11 note. We share the same goals for our presence in Iceland: to maximize the impact of our military presence in Iceland while seeking to reduce that presence, to obtain relief on U.S.-funded costs associated with purely commercial use of the Keflavik field and to preserve access to the base while continuing our mutually beneficial relationship with this NATO ally.

The State Department's assessment is that raising the removal of the aircraft in the context of base talks would not allow us to achieve these shared goals.

I believe it would be more effective to separate the discussion of the fighter aircraft, search and rescue, and support personnel from a renegotiation of our base agreement. To accomplish this, I propose we hold talks with the Icelanders in the fall, during which we would thoroughly review our security posture and brief them on the results of the Zero-Based Review. Through these talks we would aim at removal of the fighter aircraft. We would pursue cost cutting as well as flexibility and restructuring of our military presence in the separate base negotiations.

PS - Don, <sup>AMBASSADOR'S</sup> <sup>LAYS</sup>  
see our <sup>LETTER (ATTACHED)</sup>  
LETTER (ATTACHED) <sup>CASE.</sup>  
OUT THE <sup>CHAT</sup>  
LET'S <sup>LEAD.</sup>  
you've <sup>AFULL</sup>  
CP  
16/7

Sincerely,

Colin L. Powell

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AUTHORITY EO 12958

JAN 29 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

The Honorable  
Donald H. Rumsfeld,  
Secretary of Defense,  
The Pentagon,  
Washington.


X01044 /01

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SECDEF CONTROL#

July 11, 2001 2:17 PM

TO: Secretary Colin Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Iceland

As we have discussed, we are trying to reduce our military presence in Iceland. We have F-16s, search and rescue, and support personnel.

DoD has been trying for several years to reduce our presence. However, we get resistance from Iceland, and then we get that resistance reflected back from the State Department.

I would appreciate it if you would engage the subject for me and get the State Department helping us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071101-15

Iceland

11 50101

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**SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CORRESPONDENCE ROUTING SLIP**

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Action Required: **INFORMATION AND RETENTION**  
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February 15, 2002 8:16 AM

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*Dave 3/5*

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iceland

Here is this memo on Iceland. You may want to get talking points to Colin Powell if he doesn't already have them.

Thanks.

Attach.

ISP/EUR Paper for AS/S Beth Jones: Redeployment of F-15s in Iceland

DHR:dh  
021502-7

.....  
Please respond by 02/15/02

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FEB 15 2002

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div. WHS

POINTS FOR AS/S BETH JONES TO USE WITH SECRETARY POWELL

*Y 2/14*

SUBJECT: Redeployment of F-15s in Iceland

**The Request**

- 10 November 2001: Air Combat Command (ACC) reported that the continued deployment of four F-15s to Iceland is not supportable given its F-15 commitment to Operation NOBLE EAGLE (ONE).
- 21 November 2001: Joint Forces Command agreed with the ACC determination and asked CJCS for relief from CJCS EXORD tasking to maintain AF assets in Iceland.
- Relief sought for 1 December 2001 until conclusion of ONE and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF).

*CSAR*

*part of this*

**The Rationale**

- ACC commitments have increased substantially in the last five months.
- The fighters are required in their highest state of readiness in the highest threat environments. The assessed air threat for Iceland is low, especially compared to the other ACC missions.
- Rank order of ACC current commitments:
  1. ONE (homeland defense)
  2. OEF
  3. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH (OSW)
  4. Operation NORTHERN WATCH (ONW)
  5. Icelandic defense (the lowest risk alert location of these five missions)
- The addition of OEF and an increase in existing commitments (primarily OSW) reduced ACC's ability to support ONE.
- A continued requirement to support Keflavik will have a detrimental impact on F-15 unit readiness and training.
- Within ONE, F-15s are supporting two of three active air defense caps over Washington and New York.

*Package also.*

*OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE*

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~~SECRET~~

- Long term support of the cap requires units to support both their Aerospace Expeditionary Force contingency period and an additional ONE commitment during their training period.
- Four of the five state-side Air National Guard F-15A units are mobilized, inhibiting their ability to support Keflavik.
- Assessed air threat level in Iceland is adequately low to allow withdrawal of air defense forces without placing the safety of Iceland at risk.
- USCINCFCOM will maintain the capability to re-deploy to Iceland within 96 hours of the identification of an emerging air threat to Iceland.

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Action  
3/20

March 11, 2002 4:17 PM

03/11/02 04:17 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
CC: Gen. Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Iceland

I better get a briefing on what our relationship with Iceland is. Please take a look at this intel report.

If I learn all the pieces—who pays for what—maybe we could propose a reduction and a co-payment arrangement of some kind that is more equitable and still preserves the use of the base.

Please get your head into the facts, and then set up a meeting and see that I get briefed.

Thanks.

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Attach.  
03/08/02 Senior Executive Memorandum re: Iceland

JAN 29 2008

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Dir. & Rec. Div. WHS

DHR:dh  
031102-61

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Central Intelligence Agency

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MAR 11 2002

8 March 2002

## Senior Executive Memorandum

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### Memorandum

*In response to a question on Iceland's attitude toward the US presence:*

*The 11 September terrorist attacks reinforced Iceland's determination to keep US fighter aircraft on the island.* Iceland has no military forces of its own and under a 1951 bilateral defense agreement relies on the US-manned Icelandic Defense Force headquartered at Keflavik to defend it.

- Foreign Minister Asgrimsson late last month publicly said the four F-15 fighters at Keflavik are the bare minimum, according to local press reports. Icelandic leaders are prepared to raise the F-15 issue with President Bush and to follow up with complaints to NATO, if necessary, according to US diplomats.
- Iceland has threatened to close the US naval base on the island, eliminating the terminal the US Navy uses to monitor submarine operations in the North Atlantic, if the US further reduces the number of F-15s. At the end of the Cold War, the US maintained a squadron of aircraft there. (C//NF)

Iceland has no defense budget and incurs no cost for using part of the airfield at Keflavik for civilian purposes. According to US diplomats, it might be willing to share the costs of running the base to preserve the US Air Force presence.

- Icelandic officials fear that any reduction in US forces would undermine public confidence in the US commitment to Iceland's defense, according to US diplomats.
- Local press reports say Reykjavik could assume some missions, such as search-and-rescue operations, that would free up a squadron of US HH-60 helicopters. (C//NF)

Reykjavik, concerned that it has lost strategic influence following the Cold War, in recent years has sought to increase its profile with the US and NATO by hosting exercises, allowing low-level flight training, and contributing to peacekeeping.

- Last September the Foreign Ministry created a corps of disaster relief and police personnel to engage in international operations.
- The corps has six civilian specialists serving with NATO in Bosnia and Kosovo and plans to increase the number to 50 in the next few years, according to press reports. (C//NF)

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For further information, contact the Europe Issue Manager at 39239 secure.

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February 15, 2002 8:16 AM

2002 FEB 15 PM 12:51

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*Dug 3/5*

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DHR:dh  
021502-7

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Please respond by 02/15/02

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POINTS FOR AS/S BETH JONES TO USE WITH SECRETARY POWELL

*Y 2/14*

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*OPERATION NOBLE EAGLE*

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Dir. & Rec. Div. WHS

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*ACR 11/14/01*

November 9, 2001 3:05 PM

007 SEP 12 01 5:26

TO: ~~Doug Feith~~ DEPT OF DEFENSE  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iceland

Please draft a memo from me to Colin Powell so that we can do the Iceland thing the way you think we ought to do it, recommending whatever you think we ought to recommend.

Thanks.

Attach.  
08/07/01 SecDef memo, Iceland [080701-9]

DHR:dh  
110901-13

.....  
*Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_*

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AUTHORITY EO 12958

JAN 29 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
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August 7, 2001 10:43 AM

2001 SEP 12 PM 5:26

TO: Doug Feith OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iceland

*THH*

Please give me the precise information on Iceland as to what this agreed minute is going on, who is negotiating it and when will it be over that we can move on the planes.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/6/01 INR info sheet on Iceland

*To CP  
will do it*

DHR:dh  
080701-9

DECLASSIFIED  
AUTHORITY EO 12958

JAN 29 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div. WHS

X02897 /02

SECDEF CONTROL 6

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08-M-1641

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

August 7, 2001 10:43 AM

SEP 12 11 51 26

TO: Doug Feith  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Iceland

*[Handwritten signature]*

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Thanks.

Attach.  
8/6/01 INR info sheet on Iceland

*T. CP  
will do it*

DHR:dh  
080701-9

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JAN 29 2008

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Dir & Rec. Div. WHS

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INR

SECDEF HAS SEEN

AUG -7 2001

**(C) Iceland: Old Friend on Base, Not on Whales, Climate**

*(C) Foreign Minister Asgrimsson expects to be received as an old family friend, trusted NATO ally, worried EU non-member, disappointed whaler, and concerned environmentalist. He will follow an informal Icelandic tradition of stubbornness in negotiating with Washington, a posture that plays well in Reykjavik. Like his fellow Icelanders, he does not like to feel that his country is taken for granted.*

**(C) Iceland's dependence on the United States for defense makes rumors of changes to the US Naval Air Station at Keflavik cause for concern. The May 4-5 celebration of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the 1951 Bilateral Defense Agreement included a well-attended open house at Keflavik.**

**(C) Prime Minister Oddsson and Asgrimsson used the celebration to emphasize that the base was at the "minimum capability necessary" and to oppose further reductions, such as withdrawing the four F-15 fighters operating there. Asgrimsson will seek assurance of no US changes without prior consultation and a commitment to keep the F-15s. He may suggest Iceland will consider sharing some costs at Keflavik, whose civilian air traffic has increased in recent years and could provide increasing economic benefits to Iceland. At the back of his mind is a concern that US MD plans could exclude Iceland. Reykjavik agrees there are new threats, has avoided opposing US MD ideas, and wants to be covered by any MD system the United States may build.**

#### ■ EU hopes and fears

**(C) Not an EU member, Iceland shares many of the US, Norwegian, Canadian, and Turkish concerns about EU efforts to build a European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) that could undermine NATO. Iceland wants to avoid the EU-Turkey dispute but is sympathetic to Ankara's view that ESDP should complement, not duplicate or compete with, NATO. Iceland worries that EU leaders will make decisions on ESDP that harm its interests and that EU**

enlargement to the east will weaken the European Economic Agreement linking Iceland and other non-members to the EU.

**(C) Prime Minister Oddsson strongly opposes joining the EU, while Asgrimsson wants to keep that option open; possible EU membership is a discussion topic in Iceland. Though fishing is still the major Icelandic industry, Reykjavik intends to benefit further from EU trade, tourism, and investment, as well as growing economic ties to the United States, now the largest foreign investor. Icelanders would like to create another Irish high-tech miracle, perhaps in thermal energy and biotech genomics. The Icelandic Gene Decoding Company (40% US-owned) conducts world-class research into the population's unique genetic makeup, looking for the causes of common diseases; it has a \$150 million contract with Hoffman-Laroche. Iceland intends to privatize the national telephone company and wants to attract US investors.**

#### ■ Environment, the sea, whales

**(C) Icelanders are vulnerable to potential climate change and environmental problems. Reykjavik supports the Kyoto Protocol, a global assessment of the marine environment, and sustainable development based on social, economic, and environmental pillars. But it seems to have miscalculated how much opposition it would encounter in its recent attempt to rejoin the International Whaling Convention with a reservation to protect its rights to possible future whaling.**

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AUTHORITY EO 12958

JAN 29 2008

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
August 6, 2001

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir & Rec. Div. WMS

08-M-1641

July 11, 2001 2:17 PM

TO: Secretary Colin Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Iceland

As we have discussed, we are trying to reduce our military presence in Iceland. We have F-16s, search and rescue, and support personnel.

DoD has been trying for several years to reduce our presence. However, we get resistance from Iceland, and then we get that resistance reflected back from the State Department.

I would appreciate it if you would engage the subject for me and get the State Department helping us.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071101-15

Iceland

11 50/01

08-M-1641

U12279 /01

#0

Approved

D/20  
0922

September 19, 2001 4:47 PM

\* Copy provided to CJKS by  
Bob Berri

TO: General Hugh Shelton

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Memo for CINC's

*Complete RV  
CJCS EA  
9/24  
0921*

I sent you a Top Secret memo concerning some targeting suggestions. I sure hope that gets to the Tommy Franks, Charlie Holland, possibly the other CINC's and also down to the Dahlgren people in some form. I don't care how you send it to them.

I think those thoughts and any thoughts you want to add might be useful for those folks.

What do you think?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091901-14

*FF  
Shelton*

*19  
Sep  
01*

U12036 /02

January 2, 2004

381

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Counterinsurgency

I read your November 11 memo on elements of successful counterinsurgency.

You are right—it is interesting.

What do you propose?

Thanks.

Attach.

11/11/03 CENTCOM memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
010204-22

.....  
Please respond by 1/31/04

2 Jan 04

OSD 00108-04

CCCC

November 11, 2003

11/12  
C 4/13

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FROM GEN ABIZAID

Mr. Secretary:

Counter-Insurgency

Sir, our doctrine states: "Counterinsurgency—those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency." (Joint Pub 1-02) Clearly we must integrate elements of national power in any effort to defeat an insurgency.

Attached is "Elements of Successful Counterinsurgency" (Low Intensity Conflict) worthy of your time to digest

V/R

John

Copy to: CJCS

②  
Walt Pogue

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## Elements of Successful Counterinsurgency (U)

Counterinsurgency (COIN) practitioners and academic experts on insurgency generally agree on an interrelated set of prerequisites for a successful counterinsurgency strategy:

Separate the insurgent cadre from the rank and file by addressing local grievances that feed the insurgency. Calculated reforms, such as infrastructure and social service enhancements and land reform, that address material grievances are widely viewed as effective in undercutting insurgent appeal and gaining support for the government.

**Strengthen the rule of law.** To foster legitimacy, experts maintain that COIN operations and policies must be legal. Insurgency specialists should take appropriate steps to the threat with appropriate legal safeguards established.

Develop a coordinated, integrated plan based on an accurate assessment of the insurgency's goals, techniques, and strategies. Successful plans blend political, judicial, administrative, diplomatic, and economic policies with appropriate security and military measures and clearly delineate roles and responsibilities.

**Unify COIN management.** Although some differences in the degree of centralization necessary, all praise the development of an organizational structure capable of coordinating all aspects—civilian and military—of the COIN effort.

Demonstrate a will to win by devoting adequate resources to the COIN effort, assigning the best and brightest to work on COIN, and exhibiting a willingness on the part of the public and government to sacrifice to support the COIN effort.

**Enhance political legitimacy and develop a track record for political resolution**

Accomplishing these goals, according to COIN experts, often requires open and honest elections.

Ensure civilian oversight and authority over military operations. Experts insist that successful COIN campaigns require that political goals take precedence over military goals if they conflict. An apolitical military, concentrating on the military aspects of the conflict, and healthy political-military relationship are required.

**Control weapon behavior and firepower.** All-terrain, all-weather discriminate firepower drive the population back to the marketplace. Precise control of firepower and troops to prevent damage and injury to the civilian population will minimize inadvertently feeding the insurgency.

Employ sound COIN tactics. An insurgency relying on low-level guerrilla tactics is best confronted, according to COIN experts, by employing unconventional strategies and tactics that emphasize small-unit operations, sustained and aggressive patrolling, and rapid-reaction forces.

**Establish an effective intelligence apparatus** that targets insurgent organizational and leadership structure and shares intelligence among the military services and echelons and the police.

Employ integrated psychological operations that are tailored to domestic, insurgent, and international audiences.

**Field popular militia.** Firmly controlled and adequately equipped local defense forces free up regular forces and increase security for local officials and a government presence.

Eliminate the insurgents' foreign support. Through diplomacy, international information operations, and possibly military action, deny the insurgents foreign sanctuary and material assistance.

O 121817Z MAR 01  
FM AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3972  
INFO ALL NATO POST COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE  
SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
COMICEDEFOR KEFLAVIK IC IMMEDIATE  
USCINCPAC NORFOLK VA//POLAD// IMMEDIATE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ REYKJAVIK 000146

EUR FOR A/S DOBBINS, USMISSION NATO FOR VERSHBOW  
JOINT FORCES FOR KERNAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/11

TAGS: PREL, MARR, IC

SUBJECT: REFRAMING THE ICELAND DEBATE: DO WE VALUE  
- ICELAND AS AN ALLY?

REF: (A) Reykjavik 0128 DTG 071817Z MAR 01  
(B) Reykjavik 0043 DTG 311610Z JAN 01  
(C) 00 Reykjavik 1165 DGT 151526Z DEC 00

CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR BARBARA GRIFFITHS, REASONS 1.5 (A), (D)

1. ~~(S)~~ Summary: The USG is in the final stages of preparing goals and strategy for negotiations to produce a new Agreed Minute on our military operations in Iceland. The current Agreed Minute was signed in 1996 and will expire on April 8. Military analysis derived from the zero-base review (ZBR) has identified radically new options for the defense of Iceland, including a "Synchronized Presence" that envisions the defense of Iceland from CONUS. None of these options has been briefed to the GOI. Such proposals cross a red line for Iceland, which argues that the four fighters currently on island are the minimum required to demonstrate a credible defense of Iceland to the Icelandic people and to maintain public and political support for the presence of Keflavik base. We now need to assess whether crossing that red line as an opening gambit in negotiations and thereby challenging the political consensus in Iceland for the US presence has merit as a negotiating tactic.

2. ~~(S)~~ We believe it is time to reframe the debate on US goals and tactics for the upcoming negotiations. If the future holds a Synchronized Presence or other Air Force posture that fundamentally alters the understanding of the past 50 years, then we need to initiate consultations outside the Agreed Minute framework to prepare and persuade the GOI to accept our position and to give the GOI an opportunity to sell the new concepts to a skeptical public and hostile political opposition. Meanwhile, we should concentrate our efforts in this Agreed Minutes on reaching agreement in principle to cost share expenses at Keflavik airport in such a manner as to not jeopardize our operational control requirements and to establish a process for identifying and achieving cost sharing asap. End summary.

What Do We Want?

JAN 24 2008

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Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

3. ~~(C)~~ Military analysis derived from the ZBR has provided valuable data on options for deployment of military assets and personnel to achieve our bilateral commitment for the defense of Iceland. Changes of the ZBR magnitude go to the heart of bilateral understandings crafted over decades and would require serious consultations with the GOI to pave the way for such fundamental changes. No such consultations have taken place at any level. If Synchronized Presence (SP) may ultimately become the USG position, then it is too important to use merely as an opening gambit at the Agreed Minute (AM) negotiations.

4. ~~(C)~~ Aside from the four fighters, we already enjoy considerable flexibility in the deployment of supporting USAF assets, specifically helos and tankers. The GOI has never to our knowledge denied a request in recent times to gap the helos or tankers, and gaps have been for long periods. The GOI even indicated informally that it was prepared to review favorably a request for gapping the fighters for a training exercise. Efforts to quantify such flexibility, or to achieve unilateral control over the movement of assets, again go to the heart of GOI's need to be seen as a relevant player in the defense of Iceland.

5. ~~(C)~~ We all agree on the need to address cost sharing at Keflavik airport. We would argue that it is preferable to secure agreement in principle from the Icelanders for this objective and create a process (e.g., an expert working group) to accomplish the detailed negotiations for what and how much to cost share, without jeopardizing our operational control requirements. A monitoring arrangement would be required to ensure progress. We believe this strategy will get us what we want in an acceptable timeframe, whereas handing the GOI a "fait accompli" on a dollar or percent basis will not dispose them, or allow them in a political sense, to cooperate.

Where Is Iceland Coming From?

6. ~~(C)~~ The US access to Iceland's territory has never been popular with the average Icelander and our strong ties have been the result of decades long effort by the Independence

Party (IP), which has governed Iceland as the dominant coalition partner for much of the last 50 years. The only two times the IP was out of power, including once in the 1971-74 period, resulted in Iceland invoking Article 7 of the '51 bilateral agreement with a view to remove US forces from Iceland. Both efforts were withdrawn and damage controlled by the IP. The Independence Party has been willing to take hard political decisions to accommodate US requirements, and the current IP Prime Minister David

08-M-1641

Oddsson is a strong supporter of the transatlantic alliance and Keflavik. The IP has 37 percent public support, and faces strong pressure from the Left/Green party, which has 29 percent public support and opposes both Iceland's membership in NATO and the presence of Keflavik base.

7. ~~(C)~~ The IP has crafted public support for Keflavik around the presence of USAF fighters to defend Iceland's air sovereignty, which was challenged as recently as June 1999 when two Bear bombers were escorted away from the island by USAF F15s. The logic is that this is the one tangible defense benefit for Icelanders, since the dominant Navy presence at Keflavik is devoted largely to classified ASW and surveillance that rarely penetrate the public conscious. Crossing Iceland's red line in the hope of gaining leverage in the negotiations is in our judgment a vain hope, with the risk of jeopardizing the important US goals in this negotiation. It also exposes the IP to domestic political pressure that is not helpful to military or broader USG objectives.

#### The Broader Considerations

8. ~~(C)~~ There are additional considerations in defining our Agreed Minute (AM) strategy which we believe justify keeping the deployment of USAF assets outside the current AM framework:

-- Iceland is capable of all the excesses of a small sovereign state that perceives it's being trodden on by the world power. However, their vote is as important as any other in NATO and other fora, and that vote is generally in support of USG objectives. It is no accident that China's Li Peng culminated a long series of Chinese officials visiting Iceland last year as part of China's quest for votes in international fora. However, Iceland is a reliable supporter of US Missile Defense objectives; US ESDP/ESDI goals; preserving the transatlantic character of NATO; Nato's engagement in the Balkans; as well as US objectives in other fora ranging from trade and human rights to the environment.

-- Iceland's contributions to NATO objectives in recent years are further examples of PM Oddsson's efforts to increase the value of Iceland's role in NATO. Iceland contributes to NATO's civil and military budgets; joined the Military Committee; and contributed police, forensic and medical personnel in Bosnia and Kosovo. Moreover, Iceland welcomed refugees from the Balkans in higher proportions than most other NATO allies. Iceland's contribution at the CCC to Europe's Headline Goal consisted of a Rapid Reaction Force of civilian peacekeepers, and was consistent with US goals.

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Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

JAN 24 2006

-- There has been considerable interest in the outcome of the Agreed Minute negotiations on the part of locally-based NATO-member ambassadors, particularly those whose militaries are present at Keflavik, and by visitors, most recently SecGen Robertson (ref A). Their radar went up last spring, when Iceland indulged in unilateralism regarding many aspects of Keflavik's operations. They are clearly looking for any sign of stress in the relationship and any hint of lessening US support for the base.

#### Losing Gains Already Won

9. (S) If we trigger the GOI's red line of fighter presence in Iceland, or attempt to quantify the already flexible arrangement regarding gapping the helos and tankers, we will not likely find the GOI willing or able to address a further round of cost cutting. They have signaled a willingness to begin a process of sharing airport costs, but such an effort would not be possible if we are stuck on the question of AF assets and the GOI's fundamental goal to provide for the defense of Iceland.

10. (S) Moreover, the most significant advance we have made to date on cost cutting, the MOU on Contracting, has languished in the C-175 process for months notwithstanding its strong support within the USG. This MOU is also critical to overturn the GOI's law passed last spring, which created unacceptable operating conditions at Keflavik. The US achieved advances in the MOU that translate into the greatest cost reductions we have realized in decades. Other unacceptable aspects of the GOI's law, including access to Keflavik base, are being satisfactorily worked and are also at risk. Confrontational tactics in the AM negotiations will make it politically impossible for the GOI to sign the Contracting MOU and to continue their excellent cooperation to repair the damage, including on sealift, caused by their adventurism last spring.

11. (S) In short, we have an important agenda for the upcoming agreed minute negotiations and we do not believe that crossing Iceland's red lines will get us where we need to be on cost cutting and locking in the gains achieved in the MOU on Contracting. If Synchronized Presence is a serious US goal, it needs to be treated seriously and not as a negotiating scare tactic that has every potential to damage our credibility and ultimate success. Too much is at stake and tactics are not worth destroying our overall positive bilateral relationship and the support of a partner in the transatlantic alliance.

GRIFFITHS

JAN 24 2008  
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Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

08-M-1641

~~SECRET~~

~~FOUO~~

ATTACHMENT

January 3, 2005

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Porter Goss  
The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Human Capital

Attached is an interesting memo from John Abizaid. He makes a good point.

We will take action in the Department of Defense with respect to this, but it is a matter that is much broader and will need to involve the interagency.

Attach.

12/3/04 Cdr CENTCOM memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
010305-6

DECLASSIFIED  
AUTHORITY EO 12958

FEB 08 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

08-N7-1780 R-2

OSD 75023-05

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT

08-M-1780

~~FOUO~~

*SECRET*  
*SENT EMAIL*  
*TO XO 12.4.4*

*(091125-10NR WAR)*

*02/14/21*

3 December, 2004

Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Subj: Investing in Human Capital for the Long War

Mr. Secretary and Chairman: At the height of the Cold War, our military employed literally tens of thousands of Soviet and Eastern European linguistic and cultural experts. We studied the enemy's techniques, procedures and organization in every military school. We understood their ideology and motivation. We beat them because we knew them. Knowing the enemy was a requirement for every serious professional military officer.

Three years in to this war with many years of confrontation against the Salafist Jihadists ahead, we are lucky if we can claim hundreds of specialists and linguists. Our officers gain some understanding of the enemy through service in the combat zone, but I do not believe we have a serious program of educating our people about the threat we face. As we fight the enemy across broad parts of the Middle East, Central Asia and the Horn of Africa, we remain largely ignorant of who fights us, why they fight and what their weaknesses are.

It is my belief that we must stop regarding our current condition as temporary. Our need to confront this foe with intelligent and culturally

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AUTHORITY EO 12958

FEB 08 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~SECRET~~

atuned military professionals will increase. It is important to invest now in the human capital that we need to face this enemy over the decades ahead. Since educational and personnel policies which shape our force largely are shaped by our services, I urge you and the Chairman to sponsor an effort which begins to satisfy the huge demand for the skills needed to fight the "Long War" ahead.

V/R  
John

Copy to:  
DEPSECDEF  
VCJCS  
Chief of Staff of the Army  
Chief of Staff of the Air Force  
Commandant of the Marine Corp  
Chief of Naval Operations

DECLASSIFIED  
AUTHORITY EO 12958

FEB 08 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

2 ~~SECRET~~

# ESCD Instructions

**Classified Attached**

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Date: Signed  Approved  1/3/05

SOM: Yes  No

DR  DHR  Don  Donald Rumsfeld

Don Rumsfeld  PW  Paul Wolfowitz  With Best Wishes

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FROM SECDEF RUMSFELD      TO VP WH CIA  
SUBJECT HUMAN CAPITAL  
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COMMENTS CAF - NO DISTRO AUTHORIZED WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL  
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SUSPENSE STATUS			INCOMING
			FRONT OFFICE DOC

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## Illustrative New 21<sup>st</sup> Century Institutions and Approaches

### 1. Transformation of International Institutions

Today the world requires new international organizations tailored to new circumstances. Many of the most pressing threats are global and transnational in scope – terrorism, proliferation, cyber-crime, narcotics, piracy, hostage-taking, criminal gangs, etc. Because they cannot be dealt with successfully by any one nation alone, the cooperation of many nations will be vital.

Current institutions, such as the United Nations, NATO, the OAS, the African Union, ECOWAS, ASEAN, and the European Union, to mention a few, were designed at a time when the world's challenges were notably different. Some were formed over half a century ago to further U.S. foreign and security policy purposes. Today, as U.S. goals and the world at large have changed, existing international institutions have failed to adapt sufficiently. Effective international organizations are needed to bring competence in such areas as quick reaction forces, military training, military police training, counter-proliferation, capacity-building for the rule of law, governance and domestic ministries. This may require institutions designed for those purposes, rather than struggling to reform existing institutions to take on tasks for which they are ill-suited.

Examples:

- Peacekeeping and Governance: The world and the U.S. would benefit from a "Global Peace Operations and Governance Corps." A standing capability is needed, ready to respond rapidly to deal with emerging situations before they spin out of control. Such a capability would have been useful in just the past few years in Liberia, Haiti, and perhaps Sudan.

The U.S. and like-thinking nations could help to enable such a capability by training, equipping, and sustaining peacekeepers with military and police capability, perhaps organized regionally, in considerably greater numbers than are currently available. This need is real. It will persist for many years.

Similarly, the U.S. and our friends and allies could help organize and train cadres of international professionals who can assist emerging governments in areas of governance and ministry-building. The cost-benefit ratio of

being prepared in advance and in benefiting from the use of several nations' troops, rather than using solely U.S. military forces, would be substantial.

- Maritime Organizations: A number of the future challenges will be linked to the seas – including piracy, exploitation of resources (oil, gas, fishing, seabed mining), intelligence-gathering from offshore platforms, and the seaborne movement of weapons of mass destruction, narcotics, people, and illegal arms. Some 70 percent of the earth's surface exists beyond the sovereignty of any nation. The U.S. should cooperate with rising nations that have significant naval forces – like India and Japan – to help contribute to the safety of the maritime domain. A clearinghouse institution for the high seas might provide a new level of information-sharing and a means to better facilitate the control of illicit activity on the oceans.
- Cyberspace: Just as the nations of the world have developed understandings and arrangements over time to govern activities on the land and sea and, more recently, in the air and space, the time has arrived to consider how best to approach cyberspace. Technology is racing ahead, while institutions and understandings for cyberspace and cyber-security are lagging dangerously. The challenge will be to define U.S. interests and concerns without stifling – through excessive regulation or control – the enormous advances made possible by this largely unregulated medium.
- Age of Biology. In addition to the information age, the age of biology is emerging. While there are international organizations devoted to health, e.g., the World Health Organization, existing institutions have limited capability. There is no international structure available to address the key issues of biotechnology and bioengineering, both of which hold promise and peril for the world. Everything from crop yields, to cloning, to fighting pandemics, to coping with other increasingly complex and dangerous issues will be a crucial part of the landscape of the 21st century. An entity or organization might be considered to address such issues.
- Counter-Proliferation. With the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the appetites of terrorists to acquire them, the civilized world has no choice but to organize much more effectively against further proliferation. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a good start, but it urgently needs new and sustained energy, as well as a process to institutionalize this effort. This is another area in which we should consider whether a new institution is required.
- Market Economics, Micro-Enterprises, and Opportunity for the People: In addition to organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, a smaller, more agile – and more market-oriented –

institution is needed in this new century. A new international program, perhaps aligned with the Millennium Challenge Account, might focus on micro-loans, which have proven to be effective in stimulating economies in less developed countries. It should be an institution that bypasses the government level, where waste and corruption are often rampant, and deals directly with the individual and the family, thereby providing direct economic opportunity.

- International Law: Mischievous doctrines of international law are developing that are being misused politically and limiting the freedom of action of international players, e.g., the ICC and “universal jurisdiction.” They need to be opposed. Further, international rules such as the Geneva Convention were fashioned for a different era. They may need to be redesigned for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, but the U.S. would need to avoid being roped in by rules and conventions that could unfairly make the U.S. a target for politicized prosecutors.

## 2. Regional Challenges

- Middle East Security Initiative. The threat Iran is posing and will likely continue to pose argues that it may well be time to form a new collective security arrangement for the Middle East and/or the Arabian Sea. Already one or two Middle Eastern nations appear to be wondering if they should develop nuclear programs. This is the moment, first, to reassure key friends of the U.S. commitment to shield them from nuclear blackmail through declaratory policy; and, second, to find other ways to strengthen cooperation with them. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are the key. The U.S. needs to bolster Arab moderates now while they are viable. Some Gulf States are leaning well forward on this idea.
- Asian Security Organization. The U.S. needs to seek ways to be included in more of the key Asian security organizations, or even to consider fashioning new organizations. The question is: What might it be possible to fashion today that would benefit us in the decades ahead, but would be impossible for us to fashion five or ten years from now?
- Latin American Regional Institutions. In Latin America the world has seen swings from colonialism to authoritarianism, to independence, to dictatorships, to democracy, and, most recently, to a leftist revival. It is appropriate to wonder whether existing regional institutions (e.g., the OAS) are up to the challenges ahead.

Corruption is corrosive to democracies. Criminal gangs are increasingly intimidating to free systems. A sustained focus against corruption and for

free political and free economic systems will be needed if the growing subversion of democracy by Castro's and Chavez's appeal to the populace is to be successfully countered. Central America is either going to come together, as many of its leaders are currently striving to do, or it will be fractured by pressures from Cuba and Venezuela. The U.S. needs to actively foster moderate groupings and aggressively bolster and sustain them.

**3. A Goldwater-Nichols Process for the National Security Portions of the U.S. Government?**

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols legislation led to greater jointness and interdependence in the Department of Defense among the four Services – but it has taken twenty years to begin to fully realize its potential. The broader USG structure is still in the industrial age, and it is not serving us well. It is time to consider a new “Hoover Commission” to recommend ways to reorganize both the Executive and the Legislative branches to put us on a more appropriate path for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Only a broad, fundamental reorganization is likely to enable Federal Departments and Agencies to function with the speed and agility the times demand. The charge of “incompetence” against the U.S. Government should be easy to rebut, if the American people understand the extent to which the current system of government makes competence next to impossible.

- Foreign Assistance. The present structure of USG foreign assistance is an anachronism. A system is needed that recognizes assistance for what it really is: a component of our national security strategy. Organizing assistance in a single “national security account,” rather than the multiple accounts currently being overseen by multiple Congressional committees and sub-committees, would permit government leaders to make better decisions about how to prioritize. In simple terms, DoD has resources, but not authorities; while State has authorities, but not resources. As a result, the President has reduced flexibility to respond to urgent needs. New ways and means to pursue a rational foreign assistance mission are urgently needed. A modest change will not do it. The only choice is to trash the current laws and undertake a total overhaul of the current systems.
- Strategic Communications – A 21<sup>st</sup> Century U.S. Information Agency: A new “U.S. Agency for Global Communication” could serve as a channel to inform, educate, and compete in the battle for ideas. Such an agency would need to be fully aligned with U.S. policies and principles, contrary to what seems to have developed since the dissolution of the USIA and creation of the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Those changes have had the effect of divorcing U.S. Government broadcasting from policymakers, just at a

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time when there is an urgent need to get the U.S. message out – broadly, powerfully, and repeatedly.

Today the centers of gravity of the conflict in Iraq and the Global War on Terror are not on battlefields overseas; rather, the centers of gravity of this war are in the centers of public opinion in the U.S. and in the capitals of free nations. The gateways to those centers are the international “media hubs” in the capitals of the world. Zawahiri has said that 50% of the current struggle is taking place in the arena of public information. That may be an understatement. Osama bin Laden, Zawahiri and Zarqawi have “media committees” that consistently outpace our ability to respond. When the USG does try to compete in the communications arena, it runs up against a lack of national consensus and understanding about what means are acceptable to the media and to the Congress, and disagreements as to what is legal.

- Partner Nation Capacity: Dangerous enemies are located in countries with which we are not at war. Most of those countries lack the capability to skillfully assist us in dealing with our common enemies. Examples include Pakistan, the Philippines, Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq. This calls for considerably larger and better organized U.S. and international institutional capabilities to train, equip and strengthen the capacity of partners so they can better assist in finding, fixing and finishing the increasingly dangerous threats to their security and to ours.

### The Way Ahead

A way to move forward might be to establish mechanisms to refine these thoughts and, in the process, begin to garner support for the kinds of bold changes that seem to be needed.

#### Recommendations:

1. First, consider the appointment of a commission of statesmen along the lines of the Hoover Commission of the late 1940s. Its charter could be to re-examine the structure of both the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. Government, or at least the broad national security elements. The commission could be charged with considering a Goldwater-Nichols-like reorganization of the Executive Branch and the Congress; and, specifically, how they might best be restructured to more efficiently cope with the pressing new challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, energizing all elements of national power for the tasks ahead.

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2. Second, consider establishing a high-level commission to make proposals as to how best to restructure existing international organizations and/or create new institutions more appropriate for the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The commission could consider such ideas as a "Global Peacekeeping Center," a new maritime organization, a structure for cyberspace, and an organization focused on biotechnology/engineering, human health, and the like.
3. Third, have a team identify a cluster of key issues that could be addressed through either Presidential proposals to the Congress or, preferably, by Executive Orders. Include:
  - a reorganization for national security, counter-terrorism and homeland security in the White House;
  - a new personnel system for the U.S. Government that encourages cross-service between organizations like Defense, State, Treasury, Homeland Security and Justice;
  - a more integrated national approach to build partner nation capacity;
  - better ways to deal with non-state entities; and
  - new methods of engaging the private sector and non-governmental organizations to meet the challenges ahead.

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contact). Finally, as described above, the current policy included a number of safeguards, which were not specifically enumerated in the December 2, 2002 policy.

Conclusion

(U) While the foregoing discussion lays out a detailed and often complicated debate surrounding the evolution of approved interrogation techniques for GTMO, several relatively simple themes emerge. First, the push for interrogation techniques beyond those found in FM 34-52 came from GTMO itself, not from the Secretary of Defense or others in his office. The GTMO leadership and interrogators on the ground felt that they needed counter resistance techniques, beyond those in FM 34-52, in order to extract intelligence from high value detainees who had been trained to resist standard interrogations. Moreover, based on their experience with the counter resistance techniques -- especially Kahtani's interrogation -- the GTMO leadership felt that such techniques were essential to mission success when interrogating resistant, high value detainees.

(U) Second, when formulating GTMO interrogation policy, the Secretary of Defense did not make decisions in a vacuum, but rather solicited meaningful input from military service lawyers. This was most evident in the establishment of the Walker Working Group in January 2003 and the ensuing, lively debate among the Working Group representatives. While many of the representatives levied strong objections to the OLC memorandum -- objections that turned out to be entirely justified, especially in light of the White House's and DoJ's repudiation of the memorandum in June 2004 -- their specific concerns (or at the very least, the spirit of their concerns) ultimately carried the day when the Secretary dramatically cut back on the Working Group's recommendations and accepted only 24 interrogation techniques for GTMO on April 16, 2003. Similarly, when JTF 170 initially requested counter resistance techniques in October

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2002, the Director of the Joint Staff solicited input from all the services. While all of the services expressed serious reservations about approving these techniques without further legal and policy review, these views undoubtedly played a role in the Secretary's ultimate decision to reject the three most aggressive Category III techniques.

(U) Third, when considering requests for additional interrogation techniques beyond those in FM 34-52, the Secretary was a moderating force who cut back on the number and types of techniques under consideration. Again, this was most evident in the promulgation of the April 16, 2003 policy, which included only 24 of the 36 techniques recommended by the Walker Working Group, and included none of the most aggressive techniques. But this was also true to a lesser extent in the December 2, 2002 policy, which included only one of the requested Category III techniques. This policy netted valuable intelligence, especially from the 20th hijacker, Kahtani, and yet the Secretary took a relatively cautious approach by suspending this policy on January 15, 2003, largely in response to Mr. Mora's concerns, and establishing the Walker Working Group.

(U) Fourth, the April 16, 2003 interrogation policy for GTMO (which is still in effect) was a conservative policy that was closely tied to FM 34-52 and contained none of the interrogation techniques -- such as stress positions, removal of clothing, or the use of dogs to induce stress -- that previous investigations have identified as possibly leading to detainee abuse. As noted above, the first 19 techniques in the current policy were virtually identical to the techniques found in FM 34-52. Of the remaining techniques, dietary manipulation simply consisted of feeding detainees military field rations instead of hot meals; sleep adjustment did not entail depriving detainees of sleep, but rather adjusting their sleep cycles from night to day; and false flag involved the sort of nonviolent trickery or ruse that is inherent in many of the FM

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34-52 techniques. The last two techniques, environmental manipulation and isolation, were the most aggressive of the 24, but were to be implemented only with appropriate safeguards.

(U) Finally, in our view, the unifying theme among all participants in the debate surrounding interrogation policy for GTMO -- from the Secretary of Defense, to the Joint Staff, to the Walker Working Group, to the leaders at SOUTHCOM and GTMO -- was the sincere desire to do what was right for the United States under exceedingly difficult circumstances. Much of the debate on interrogation policy took place when the memory of 9/11 was much fresher than it is today, and many of the participants felt that the United States would be attacked again, and that the detainees at GTMO had information that could prevent such attacks. While it is impossible to quantify how many American lives have been saved by the intelligence gathered at GTMO, it is undoubtedly true that lives have been saved. As the Schlesinger Panel wrote, "[t]he interrogation of al Qaeda members held at Guantanamo has yielded valuable information used to disrupt and preempt terrorist planning and activities," and in fact "[m]uch of the 9/11 Commission's report on the planning and execution of the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon came from interrogation of detainees." The interrogation policy development process, we think, reflected the honest efforts of our country's military and civilian leaders to come up with the right solution -- one that would both protect our nation and our values.

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08-M-2626  
DoD IG 191  
Page 54 of 54 10411

21 Jan 02

CJCS issues guidance clarifying the Status of Taliban and Al Qaida. References and restates SECDEF memo dated 19 Jan 02. (Tab 18)

24 Jan 02

USCINCCENT forwarded DoD guidance that AQ and TB under DoD control would be treated humanely and to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions (USCINCCENT 240701Z Jan 02) (Tab 19)

2002

*Kandahar Airfield was expanded*

04 Feb 02

CENTCOM issues Appendix I to Annex E to Campaign Plan for Operation Enduring Freedom: Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW), Retained Persons, Civilian Internees and Other Detainees.

- Detainees will be treated humanely but with professional detachment and control at all times. High standards of discipline must be exercised by MPs and capturing forces. Mistreatment or abuse is a violation of the UCMJ.
- Detainee operations will be conducted in compliance with the 1949 Geneva Conventions and applicable US military regulations.
- Charges component/supporting commanders with responsibility to ensure detainees treated IAW GCs and implementing measures to ensure awareness and compliance with the Law of war.  
(Tab 20)

7 Feb 02

POTUS issues memorandum Subject: Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees.

- GCs do not apply to conflict with al Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world.
- Al Qaeda and Taliban detainees are "unlawful combatants" and are not EPWs for GC III purposes.
- As matter of "policy", US will continue to treat detainees humanely, and to extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in manner consistent with principles of GCs.  
(Tab 21)

25 Feb 02

USCINCCENT msg 251314Z Feb 02, Subject: Detainee Operations Guidance.

- Implements/disseminates POTUS pronouncement on al Qaeda and Taliban detainees. (Tab 22)

010980

4 Mar 02

*Detainees 128 and 129 allege abuse before, during and after transfer to US forces from AMF*

17 Apr 02

CJCS issues Policy and Guidance for Transfers of Detainees to Foreign Government Control (**Tab 23**)

19 Apr 02

CENTCOM sends memorandum to Joint Staff commenting on Detainee Release and Transfer Policy (**Tab 24**)

21 May 02

*Bagram Airfield became the primary collection point and JIF*

May 2002

*The OORDER establishing CJTF 180 stated the continuing mission to conduct intelligence exploitation of detainees. CFLCC retained responsibility for detainee programs (USCINCCENT 282044Z May 02)*

4 June 02

CJTF 180 publishes FRAGO 6 to Operations Order 02-01 Detainee Operations (**Tab 25**)

July 02

*A and B Company 519<sup>th</sup> MI BN, 525<sup>th</sup> MI Bde and 6 RC soldiers from the Utah ARNG are the military interrogators at BCP*

10 July 02

USCINCCENT issues Delegation of Authority to Release Persons under U.S. Control Who Do Not Meet SECDEF Criteria (**Tab 25A**)

Aug 02

*377<sup>th</sup> MP Co assumes duties as the MP guards at the BCP*

11 Oct 02

Memo from MG Dunlavey, JTF-170 Commander, to COMSOUTHCOM, Subject: Counter-Resistance Strategies.

- Request for approval to use new interrogation techniques with graduating levels of severity: Categories I (e.g., yelling at detainees); II (e.g., stress positions; isolation; sensory deprivation; use of hood; removal of clothing; exploiting phobias such as fear of dogs), and III (death scenarios; exposure to cold weather/water; use of wet towel to simulate suffocation; and mild physical contact).

010981

- Included with the request is a lengthy legal review that finds all the techniques legal, but recommended further review before implementation.  
(Tab 26)

25 Oct 02

Memo from CDRSOUTHCOM to CJCS, Subject: Counter- Resistance Techniques.

- Forwards CJTF-170 request to the Chairman. He finds the first two categories of counter-resistance strategies to be legal and humane and seeks further review of Category III.  
(Tab 27)

29 Oct 02

Director, Joint Staff assigns lead to JCS-J5.

19 Nov 02

Asst SECDEF issues the charter for the Detainee Assessment Team (Tab 28)

27 Nov 02

DOD/GC recommends approval of all of category I and II (which includes stress positions and removal of clothing), but only recommends approval of one technique from Category III (mild, non-injurious physical contact).

2 Dec 2002

SecDef approves per DOD/GC recommendation (Tab 29)

4 Dec 02

PUC death at Bagram Collection Point

10 Dec 02

PUC death at Bagram Collection Point

15 Jan 03

SECDEF rescinds his approval of Category II and III counter-resistance strategies. Directs a working group in DOD review issues relating to the interrogations of detainees held by U.S. Armed Forces in the war on terrorism. (Tab 30)

9 Jan 03

CJCS issues Mod 1 to SCDEF Implementing Guidance Delegates release authority to COMUSCENTCOM for detainees not meeting SECDEF criteria for GTMO (Tab 31)

21 Jan 03

CDR JTF-GTMO (MG Miller), in response to a tasking from working group, writes to COMSOUTHCOM requesting approval for modified Category II techniques. Stress positions are dropped from the list. (Tab 32)

010982

24 Jan 03

CJTF-180 Memo responding to DJS e-mail tasker from 21 Jan 03,  
Subject: CJTF-180 Interrogation Technique

- Comprehensive report of Battlfield and Bagram Control Point (BCP) interrogation techniques and practices.
- BCP interrogation techniques include Safety positions; isolation; sensory deprivation; use of hood during interrogation; mild physical contact; and sleep adjustment.  
(Tab 33)

10 Feb 03

CENTCOM issues Clarification Message to Modification 1 to SECDEF Implementing Guidance to clarify the use of the term "Enemy Combatant"  
(Tab 34)

Undated

Memo- JCS-J2 advocates for return of Category II and III techniques and documents success implementation with a senior AQ member (ISN 63)  
(Tab 35)

3 Mar 03

CJTF 180 issues change to PUC processing requirements (Tab 35A)

21 Mar 03

COMSOUTHCOM writes the Chairman seeking reinstatement of the Category II and III techniques previously granted. (Tab 36)

4 April 03

CJCS issues Standing EXORD for Detainee Transfers and Release Orders (Tab 36A)

16 Apr 03

SECDEF approves Counter-Resistance techniques. (Does not include stress positions) (Only for GTMO) (Tab 37)

*16 Apr 03 SECDEF memo directing CENTCOM to use certain interrogation techniques with specified safeguards and limited their use to the Bagram Collection Point—This memo apparently was never signed nor issued yet it serves as the reference supporting the Mar 04 CJTF 180 approved interrogation techniques. (Tab 38)*

21 Apr 03

SECDEF memo to SECSTATE on Making Afghans Responsible for Holding "Low-Level" Enemy Combatants in the Afghan System and memo to CJCS amending screening criteria for detainee transfers to GTMO (Tab 39)

010983

3 June 03  
*3 PUCs (BT601, BT602, BT603) Allege abuse at Gardez*

21 June 03  
*PUC death at Asadabad Fire Base while in OGA custody*

18 Jul 03  
*PUCs 633 and 634 allege abuse at Khowst (CJSOTF)*

25 July 03  
*CJTF 180 issues Detainee Handling Guidance (Tab 39A)*

6 Nov 03  
*PUC death at Firebase Gereshk—SOF received detainee from AMF*

Aug-Sept 03  
*General allegations by PUCs to ICRC of abuse at CJSOTF firebases and outposts*

Nov 03 and Dec 03  
*Allegations of abuse by PUCs 780 and 745 to ICRC. Alleged to have occurred at Orgun-E Outpost (CJSOTF)*

15 Dec 03  
*Detainee 808 alleges abuse by ODA or AMF at Gardez and Khowst to ICRC*

23 Dec 03  
*Detainee 807 alleges abuse by ODA at Gardez to ICRC*

26 Feb 04  
*CJTF 180 issues FRAGO 274, Detainee Handling, Movement and Temporary Transfer Guidance (Tab 40)*

16 Mar 04  
*CJTF 180 CJ2 publishes the CJTF 180 Authorized Interrogation Approaches and Strategies (Tab 41)*

18 Mar 04  
*Detainee abuse alleged by witnesses against DIA personnel at Miam-Do*

20 Mar 04  
*Detainee T864 alleges abuse at SHKIN*

28 Mar 04  
*CJTF 180 DCG publishes Consolidated Detainee Operations Standard Operating Procedures (Tab 42)*

O/A 20-28 Apr 04

*Detainee (Patient 134) arrived at BCP with head trauma and was taken to Bagram Hospital. He was captured by Afghan Police and was turned over to US SOF*

18 May 04

*COMCFC-A directs CJTF 76 to conduct a Special Inspection of Detainee Operations with a General Officer (COMCFC-A 180945Z May 04)*

25 May 04

*CENTCOM establishes a Tiger Team to Monitor Detainee Abuse Information*

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December 21, 2001 4:42 PM

①  
Action  
01/02  
12/21

SEP 13 AM 8:32

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TO: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Memo to VP on Detained Persons

*[Handwritten signature]*  
01/02

I think this memo the Vice President has been overtaken by events. Please let me know.

Thanks.

Attach.

12/07/01 GC memo to SecDef w/VP ltr to sign

DHR:dh  
122101-40

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

12/21 -  
Yes. It is  
no longer timely or  
relevant.  
Di Rita

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WHEN SEPARATE

08-M-2628



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED SEP 08 2008  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

CC: Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable John Ashcroft  
Honorable George Tenet  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

SUBJECT: Persons detained in Afghanistan

(S) Here are my intentions for dealing with (1) the current and any future American detainees acquired in Afghanistan, (2) Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar, if captured, and (3) other Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders, if captured.

(1) (S) American detained at Mazar-e-Sharif and any future American detainees –

- Transfer to Rhino (airfield area where Marines are located)
- Continue detention as long as necessary to decide on further action (the current detainee is an unlawful combatant who may be detained without charges until the end of hostilities)
- Do not allow press access
- Continue treatment consistent with protections provided to enemy prisoners of war. These protections include but are not limited to:
  - Humane treatment, including adequate quarters, food, and clothing
  - Necessary medical attention
  - Protection against unlawful acts causing death or bodily injury
  - Removal from the combat zone
  - Visits by representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
  - Limitations on labor (cannot be related to war efforts)
  - Basic guarantees as to fairness for judicial proceeding
  - Respect for the person; e.g., protection from insults and public curiosity

General Franks is beginning the criminal investigation in cooperation with FBI.

(2) (S) Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar –

- Transfer to U.S. Navy ship in Arabian Sea for short-term detention
- Treat consistent with protections provided to enemy prisoners of war



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- Do not allow press access to them
- Prepare cases with a view to trial by Military Commission
- Continue detention outside the United States pending trial by Military Commission – options include Republic of the Marshall Islands (Kwajelein or Tinian), Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, and a U.S. Navy ship in international waters


(3) (S) For other Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders, I will consider whether the same course of action as for bin Laden and Omar is appropriate. Large numbers of detainees may require an additional short-term detention facility besides the U.S. Navy ship. Other factors to consider for these Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders include:

- Whether nationals of other countries should be taken by a country other than the United States, such as Egypt, Jordan, etc.
- Whether some should be considered for trial in U.S. District Court pursuant to existing or future indictment.

(S) The CIA apparently has a list of over 100 names of Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders of interest. I think that John Ashcroft, George Tenet, Colin Powell, and I should have a small team of experts from our Departments review available information. We need to get a fix on what we're dealing with and what our options are should some of these people come into our hands. The best way to do this is to direct the right people to do the job on a sustained and focused basis, rather than try to accomplish this through one or more of the existing campaign planning groups.

(S) I will keep you informed as we move ahead with plans for dealing with the American detainee. I will call John, George, and Colin to set things up for the needed review of the list of Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders.

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**SIGN  
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September 10, 2001 2:35 PM

2001 SEP 13 PM 12: 21

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TO: General Jones  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraq

Thanks so much for your memo of August 31. I am working the problem and certainly agree with your concern.

Thanks.

Attach.  
8/31/01 CMC memo to SecDef re: Iraq

DHR:dh  
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
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
2 NAVY ANNEX  
WASHINGTON, DC 20380-1775

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
1000  
CMC  
31 Aug 01

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subj: U.S. MILITARY RESPONSES IN IRAQ

1. It is my opinion that our current strategy of responding to Iraqi provocations, threats, and actions with limited attacks by Operation Southern and Northern Watch aircraft is a high risk strategy without clear objectives or a discernable end state. The negligible effect on the Iraqi leadership as well as the effect on our Arab allies is at odds with the risk we are taking. Sooner or later, either by mechanical failure or hostile action, one or more of our aircrews will be killed or captured over Iraqi territory. We have been fortunate to date but we cannot, in my view, continue in this manner indefinitely at an acceptable level of risk.
2. As we have discussed in the past our military response options are being limited by host nation concerns and by our own delicate position vis-à-vis the Israel, Palestinian and Arab world relationship. The result is a "tit-for-tat" approach that is at odds with our status as a great power. It is also an approach that is not working in halting the risk to our aircrews and one that has the added downside of alienating many within the Arab world.
3. Our response to Iraqi attack has become all too routine. It has become a campaign without purpose. The cycle of attack and response is being repeated without debate among our national security leaders and without a clear appreciation of its long term impact on our interests in the region. I would welcome additional discussions at future JCS meetings on this subject. We need to ensure that the risk we are directing our aircrews to take is consistent with the end state we desire to achieve. I would appreciate your consideration of my position as non-concurring with our current military response options.
4. I look forward to discussing and formulating a strategy that will allow us to create a more effective military response to consistent Iraqi provocations.

  
J. L. JONES

General, U.S. Marine Corps  
Commandant of the Marine Corps

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08-M-2628

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GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
1600 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-1600

2002 SEP 13 AM 8:23 ACTION MEMO

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

December 7, 2001, 9:30 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJ Haynes II 12/7/01*

SUBJECT: Memo to the Vice President on detained persons

*DIRITA*

*12/7 1020*

- (S) You asked me to prepare a memo for the Vice President on your intentions for dealing with (1) the current and any future American detainees acquired in Afghanistan, (2) Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar, if captured, and (3) other Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders, if captured.
- (S) Regarding the third category, CIA's December 6 list of wanted Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders has over 100 names on it. I recommend an ad hoc approach for working the list rather than leaving the job to one or more of the various interagency groups that seem to be handling it now. The memo indicates that you, the AG, the DCI, and SecState would have a small group focus on available information and develop options for you to consider.

RECOMMENDATION: Sign the memo at Tab A.

COORDINATION: None

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Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Classified by: Multiple Sources  
Declassify on: X1



X02906 /02

08-M-2628

**SECFILES FULL RECORD DETAIL**

Print Date: 9/13/2002

OSD CONTROL **X02907-02** DOC **12/21/2001** DOR **9/20/2002** SIGNATURE CASE:  
FROM **SECDEF RUMSFELD** TO **TSA**  
SUBJECT **MEMO TO VP ON DETAINED PERSONS**  
KEYWORDS  
COMMENTS **REF X02906-02--CAF--SD SNOW FLAKE--NO RELEASE WITHOUT FRONT OFFICE APPROVAL--RCV'D FRO**  
**ES 091202**

FN SEC S OCN**122101-40** RDD

STATUS CODE DECISION DECISION DATE PRIORITY ACTION REPORT:  
AGENCY ACTION ASSIGNED SUSPENSE  
SUSPENSE COMPLETE ACD COORDINATION  
SUSPENSE STATUS

INTERIM REPLY INT .REPLY TO REPLY IS REPLY TO  
REPLY TO 2 CYS RCD 1 PAGES 1 ENCLOSURES 1

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6/18/2001

OFFICE OF THE  
MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of Defense

From: Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs, CGUSAREUR

Subject: Answers to SecDef "23 Questions"

Sir,

SEC HAS SEEN

JUL 23 2001

Thank you for the opportunity to offer some input. These views stem from spending five of the last six years in command in the field, two of them in peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. I suspect that the perspective from these trenches may differ from those you receive from inside the Beltway, but the tension may be useful.

1. Key paragraph "Core Capabilities" revised:

US armed Forces must shape the security environment in support of US interests, counter threats to the homeland, and respond to regional crises that threaten our vital interests either directly or indirectly. Concurrently, our forces must deter adversaries from escalating crises to a war. Deterrence requires ready forces, demonstrated capability across the spectrum of conflict and avoidance of the potential for operational and strategic surprise. When deterrence fails, we must preempt escalation of the conflict into a multi-theater war and defeat the original opponent and any successors by destroying their forces and their means of supporting them wherever they exist in a way that collapses the will of their political leadership and sets the conditions for peace.

2. Sample Strategy Paper:

This "Sample Strategy" is pretty thin gruel. It does not address the critical tension between strategic objectives, available funding, and risk. I think General Ralston had it about right when he recommended that we must look sequentially in priority at what we want our military to do in terms of strategic tasks and available resources. Work

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through the hierarchy from most essential to less essential and avoid confusing tasks with attributes. My categories are probably defined a bit differently from his but, at acceptable risk...

- What must we do to deter nuclear conflict or to preempt an attack with weapons of mass destruction by a rogue state or transnational terrorist organization?
- What must we do to deter and if necessary contain and win conventional wars?
- What must we do to be able to resolve regional contingencies...by intervention...by long term involvement prior to a crisis?
- What must we also have available to ensure defense of the homeland and of critical strategic assets?
- What must we do to ensure technological and operational superiority?

The tension between these tasks, operating costs, investment capital, and operational risk always makes the statement of strategy very difficult. The descriptive approach in the "Sample Strategy" only becomes useful once the tension above has been defined.

As you can see in the rewrite of the "core capabilities" in paragraph 1 above, I reordered the sequence to start with the lesser and build to the worst case. Some clarifications of intent:

- The crisis in Bosnia did not threaten a US vital interest directly. But the escalating crisis in the Balkans did threaten those of our European allies. A growing European sentiment that NATO was irrelevant to our allies' basic security needs posed a painful strategic dilemma for us. NATO, so vital to US security, could well collapse. The war in Bosnia and its growing potential for spillover within the region threatened the US vital interest in NATO indirectly, though powerfully. We must face the fact that the NCA will at times send our forces in

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harm's way for interests that are not on the surface, vital.

- The dynamics of conventional deterrence have not evolved much, but nuclear deterrence has changed fundamentally in the XXIst Century. We must deter general nuclear war with prospective opponents who have the sophisticated capability for a massed attack. We must now also deter a limited attack on us by a rogue state – say a nuclear-armed Iran - and help to prevent attacks by third states on one another. An exchange between two states like India and Pakistan would have enormous consequences and the added complexity of involving Russia and China. Furthermore, we must address the prevention of attacks on the US by transnational, terrorist/criminal organizations. I use the verb address because in this case we must understand that we are attempting to deter and, if necessary, must preempt an irrational actor whose assessment of acceptable loss is very different than a nation state, however dogmatic or totalitarian. The threat may not be simply a nuclear one. Cyber warfare could threaten our electric power grids, our air traffic control networks, or our systems for transfers and accounting in our markets for securities and financial instruments. Our people in uniform and out of it do not yet realize the threat from cyber warfare. The recent offensive against DOD systems by the Chinese Hackers is largely unappreciated.
- Ready forces, continuous demonstration of intent, and avoidance of surprise are challenging to achieve and difficult to sustain. They are vital attributes of our strategic and operational capability. They underpin the quality of the force and its training readiness. They specify levels of OPTEMPO once in the field. They mandate levels of capability in strategic and operational intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. And they define the degree of investment we must make in technology in order to obviate strategic and operational surprise due to technological asymmetry. But we should

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not confuse attributes that define quality with strategic tasks the forces must accomplish.

- I realize the two MTW scenario is not sacrosanct. But the relation of assumptions about warning and the robustness of our force building scenarios to strategic risk are vital. As a warplanner in the Joint Staff, I often observed that we would never execute the scenario in the Defense Planning Guidance. In '89 we were not able to execute 10 divisions in 10 days; it was more like 10 in 30 with 14 days warning. In DESERT STORM we did not execute the SWA excursion to the Base Case of the 89-90 JSCP. We did not execute anything resembling a DPG or JSCP task in our entry to Bosnia in '95 or in ALLIED FORCE. The question is simply that in a strategic environment that has to date defied prediction, how do we derive a force building scenario for resourcing that is robust and flexible enough to ensure we have the kind of forces to achieve the tasks we agree are non-negotiable? How do we work the resource equations without overlooking the fact that we have in the past and will in future confront operational and strategic challenges we did not anticipate when we built the force. I offered a scenario that foresees a conflict starting in one theater, a requirement for escalation dominance over a second opponent or the original opponent or his allies, and simultaneously winning in the second theater if necessary. If we have a serious shooting problem in the Pacific, an aggressive, fundamentalist, and opportunistic Iran or Iraq, armed with weapons of mass destruction, would surely be tempted to cause trouble in the Middle East. If a war starts in one theater, we simple need the capability to take that temptation away from an actor in a second region by presence or by offensive action if escalation dominance fails. Behind this concern lies the awareness that in the Base Case in '89, we did not have the lift, below-the-line forces, and smart weapons to do what our plans said we would do.
- If the Joint Chiefs have recently advised Congress that the risk of accomplishing our objectives in a second MTW

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is high, we still don't have them. In ALLIED FORCE we strained Air Mobility Command and our fighter inventory in ways still being felt. We used a much larger amount of our weapons for precision strike than we ever predicted a "regional contingency" would require. What if our opponent had a contiguous area much larger than Ohio, capable second generation Air Defenses, ground forces really threatening to allies, weapons that could sink capital ships at long range, and the toughness the Serbs demonstrated? Among other things, the lessons of ALLIED FORCE should throw up red flags about consumption factors in a real professional championship bout instead of a three round intercollegiate match.

- A caution. We Americans tend to be technological optimists. Since DESERT STORM we have filled the evening news with "Playstation II" images of warfare when forces have been committed. The prospect of "winning" using precision strike alone provides a pleasing, strategic siren song that suits our national predisposition. Historically, we put great emphasis on strategic air campaigns with the goal of bringing our adversary to his knees. Our conception of the use of air power did not work as intended in WWII, Viet Nam, or in DESERT STORM. And if one reads the results of EUCOM J-2s After Action Report and notes the tally of Yugoslav Army (VJ) equipment destroyed by the air strikes, it is clear that the air campaign had very little impact on the VJ and MUP ground units which constantly moved and struck and hid successfully. No question the air operations in question had a major impact on the joint campaigns of which they were a part. The performance of our Air Force, Navy, and Marine air units has often been phenomenal. ALLIED FORCE provides a prime example. But attacking fixed targets with air operations based on precision strikes is only a necessary condition of operational success. We must always confront an opponent with the full synergy of our Joint capabilities air, maritime, and ground. We may only need to invade his capitol in the worst case, but we must be able to

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destroy his essential warfighting capability decisively, and attain key strategic position on land in ways that he did not expect or anticipate and that threaten his continuity of government. Rely too heavily on precision strike, and a really tough opponent working in complex terrain with decent air defense and good passive protection for disciplined ground units, who does not care about how you rip up his infrastructure and what hardship it creates for his people, will win by making the campaign too costly in economic and political terms. We have seen this before. Strategic reality and historical memory should temper technological optimism.

3. List Key Capabilities, in priority:

We have not exploited the full possibility of Title 10 to ensure that Joint assessments for warfighting dominate Service perspectives and perceptions of institutional self interest. JFCOM's exercise program is a step in the right direction, but we need to go farther. We must conduct exercises and experiments in which operational capabilities in our simulations are based on an unbiased Joint assessment of system capabilities posited by the Services.

We could do a better job of ensuring disciplined interoperability in our Joint C4ISR and the primacy of the fungibility of a Joint common operational picture to all components and vice versa. In EUCOM prior to ALLIED FORCE, we did not have a theater HQ rehearsed and capable of running a campaign. Our capability for theater command was put together on the fly. We must ensure that regional CINCs have the validated means for operational command of a theater campaign and the service component command HQs to support them.

We are way behind on fielding JSIMS and its supporting Service architectures, the confederated simulation Joint commanders could use for the exercises that would allow us to "see" more clearly into the opaque future of our new Century.

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Our support from national intelligence agencies is wanting in the areas of operational HUMINT, rapid prototyping, close up SIGINT and adaptation to the changing threat environment in which cyber warfare, organized crime, and outlaw Secret Intelligence Services are a component part of the changing threat to our forces.

We do not have enough strategic airlift and capability for opening Lines of Communications (LOCs). Power projection is not just a function of ready US-based forces in being. It must involve forces in being, strategic mobility, access ensured by forward deployed forces that can themselves move between theaters, and capability for Reception, Staging, Onward movement and Integration (RSOI.)

We should go to school on the predatory activities of information age outlaws like the "Chinese Hackers " and better secure DOD's information systems. We need stronger perimeter defenses, better intrusion prevention, and a corps of network administrators selected and highly trained to administer and protect a developing network of capability always under attack. This system must be tied to a central command capability that can within legal limits quickly shift from defense to offense.

4. "Training and Exercising as we Fight:"

As I understood the strategic vision of the former Bush Administration when I departed the Joint Staff in '90, JFCOM was to become the Joint Force Provider with proponency for the exercises and experiments that would shape component capabilities in support of CINC needs. If we are serious about that course, we should put all CONUS forces under JFCOM - East Coast and West - Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine. To ensure focus, separate SACLANT from JFCOM. We should give the CINC the authority under Joint Staff/CJCS proponency to adjudge the exercise parameters under which forces will be measured and assessed in Joint wargames,

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exercises, and experiments. This proponenty should include either in the Joint Staff or in JFCOM with Joint Staff coordination and CJCS approval, the control of utilities for Service weapons systems to be used in JSIMS and its supporting Service architectures. In other words the operational capabilities attributed to a weapons system to be played in exercises in JSIMS and in experiments should be validated by an impartial Joint assessment not affected by the Service advocacy for procurement of that system. This point may seem like a small one, but the capabilities demonstrated in the simulations which drive the big exercises, become by fiat the capabilities we tend to use in war planning and in our strategic assessments. If we do not get these right, we'll make some spectacular mistakes.

I don't believe the Combatant Commands need major revision, other than the mandate that they maintain a headquarters capable of running a campaign. Nor do I believe we need some standing JTF at national level to be prepared to move out and take on regional contingencies. In EUROMAC our CINC has required each component to provide for small and large JTFs and Service Component Commands HQs to support them in the field. For instance, USAREUR's Southern European Task Force (SETAF) provides a standing two star JTF, with communications, ready to deploy in less than 48 hours anywhere in the area of operations. JFCOM validates SETAF's capability in a Joint Exercise annually. V Corps is creating an Army Forces HQ (ARFOR) with similar capability to be validated by JFCOM next winter. Why create a parallel capability which does not have the situational familiarity in the theater borne of exercises in the area in which they may be employed?

5. Service Sizing:

I should probably not comment on other than Army force structure. But in US Army Europe, I am not sure how we can do what we do in the region with a smaller force. We could reshape what we have. Some investment capital would be

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necessary, but the added efficiency and utility would be impressive. At 480K, with the operational tasks now on the plate and the levels of training readiness expected and needed, our Army is running very hard. Make it smaller and OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO go up. Cut the tasks and a wide array of things we expect to be done or to have ready to be done will fall off the plate.

In the Army we have been in drawdown for 10 years. Many of our field and company grade officers have known nothing but reductions on the one hand and increasing OPTEMPO on the other. If we cut into the Army, will we have the force we need in a really tough contingency let alone a war. How would we regenerate the capability we now have. It takes years to grow NCOs and officers. You simply cannot buy an Army by the yard. Reaping the investment capital we need for avoiding strategic surprise and modernization can come from other sources I'll mention later in the paper.

#### 6. MTW models:

I've posited an adaptation of the two MTW force building scenario above, one that allows more gaming of the connectivity of the start of conflict and probable escalation to a second theater. But in any force building scenario, we should be very sure we are looking honestly at "below the line forces," lift and RSOI, logistic throughput, levels of consumption of smart and brilliant weapons, and casualties and medical operations, things that traditionally we have overlooked. In addition it might be useful to do a very quick study of how shortcomings in "global wargames" work their way into the risk assessments once resourcing levels are set by OSD Comptroller and OMB.

When does the subjective assessment of moderate and high risk obfuscate shortfalls that are really show stoppers? In J-8's wargaming of the Base Case in the '89 - 90 JSCP, for instance, we ran out of essential smart weapons in about a week, well before the air campaign had sufficiently torn up the

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Soviet air operation to allow the swing aircraft to go after deep operational targets to allow the the ground campaign to prevail against the second and third strategic echelon of the Pact's ground forces. Nor could we reenergize the industrial base to provide replacements of essential weapons systems in time to influence the initial months of fighting. Along these lines, there is some fine print in the Sample Strategy worth noting:

“The risk identified in this context is not that of winning or losing a combat scenario. Instead it is focused on the ability to execute plans according to the timelines developed by the CINCs.”

In warfighting the principle is very simple, get there first with the most combat power and supporting capability and sustainment, apply it wisely, and you win. Arrive late with inadequate combat power, with your opponent massed and ready to fight on his own terms, and you lose. Risk is about losing, not about a closed loop assessment of execution parameters.

7. Country or Regions to shape:

Moving from general to specific, the concern about the PRC emerging as a strategic competitor is valid. Though I see dealing with that threat as one mostly dependent on diplomatic and economic factors backed up by a containment strategy that depends fundamentally on maritime presence and capability. Any sense that we would anticipate a ground campaign against China on its mainland seems ill advised. Far better to deter the problem. If a war breaks out contain them to their landmass with operations on the periphery to secure specific pieces of real estate to support that end. Engagement fills a role in the Pacific as well as other theaters in the deterrence phase. Army and Marine forces in the Pacific Command play a huge part in this effort as well as in the actions to seize real estate and gaining position once the fighting in the Pacific began.

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A nuclear armed Iran with the capacity to foment trouble in the Middle East through bullying, terrorism, and aggravating the Sunni - Shiite rift could pose a major threat to US vital interests. Armed Islamic fundamentalism - to some extent also abetted by Pakistani cupidity - also threatens Russia's stability, not to mention access by world markets to energy in the Middle East and in the now developing Caucasian oilfields as well. These strategic axes require great attention, and the prospect of the use of air and ground forces in a crisis. But in addressing these issues, we must not take our eye off Europe.

NATO remains the only structure through which we can obtain the quick support of 18 nations, their leaders, and the weight of their economies in support of common interests. Many Americans seem to overlook the fact that the risk to these 18 parliamentary governments of NATO that participated in ALLIED FORCE was far more severe than to our own with its fixed terms of office. Yet they followed the US lead. However, ALLIED FORCE left scar tissue in the capitals of NATO. Many felt American leadership was halting and sent mixed signals. The public tension between State and Defense caused concern and was exploited by the French.

Ironically, French and Russian interests vis a vis NATO now resemble the parallel interests those countries held in past centuries. Both want to diminish the role of the US "outsider" in Europe and to depreciate NATO and to foster a shift of strategic weight to the EU and ESDI where their pressure can be better applied. The degree to which the Europeans cleave to ESDI depends fundamentally on the degree to which they perceive a waning of the US interest in and commitment to NATO. NATO is our best counterbalance to Russian strategic resurgence or to its implosion. We had best foster its evolution and growth. President Bush's recent comments during his visit to Europe will be helpful. But we must not forget that military presence is critical to NATO's viability.

In 1991 and '92 then General Powell and subsequently General Shalikashvili committed the US to investment of a

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"Corps" in NATO. They left undefined the force mix in that commitment, but in '93 in support of that commitment USAREUR adopted its current less optimal force structure of a Corps with two divisions each with a brigade dual based in the US, each subordinated to a NATO Corps.

In the ensuing years NATO governments based their internal consensus for forces on the structure of Corps that make up NATO's forces. Currently, as part of their reshaping of their Army, the Germans are scrambling to ensure a rationale exists for continued US participation in their II US/GE Corps. Loss of the participation of a US division is seen as the initiation of loss to Berlin's budget cutters of II Corps itself.

No one will argue that the Europeans have done all that they could or should have done in terms of maintaining full up Corps forces. But, for the US to pull out or to precipitously change its commitment to NATO's Corps based structure would undermine the whole political consensus upon which NATO's force investments are based. In the wake of ALLIED FORCE, while attempting to sell our allies on Missile Defense, with our interest in a strategic counterbalance to Russia and a point of strategic stability for nations wanting to join NATO, we must ensure the basis of our leadership in NATO, our force contribution and strategic leadership remain robust.

Containing Chinese military influence, countering pan Islamic armed and terrorist ventures and balancing and working with Russia seem to be the primary strategic roles after assuring deterrence of nuclear war and preemption of an attack by a rogue state. A country like the Ukraine becomes a key supporting effort.

Recently I visited Poland. Their Army Chief asked me in a worried tone whether the US would let the Ukraine, 'go back under Russia?' His concern underlines the necessity for ensuring the Ukraine and countries like it go their own way in Europe. EU, NATO, and US involvement can focus on a

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common goal. The effort must largely apply diplomatic and economic instruments that counter the Russian attempts to manipulate the corrupt, oligarchs and former party bosses that surround Mr. Kuchma. It must attempt to give moderates the support over time that provides an opportunity to gain control of government.

Our military involvement provides a useful adjunct to our diplomatic efforts in that Ukrainian senior military cadre cannot get enough of the professional development we provide in our contacts and exercises. That exposure creates an understanding of democratic norms that over time can be felt in Ukrainian corridors of power in terms of how their military relates to its government. While our more powerful tools are diplomacy and economic aid with State lead, involvement or engagement provides a very useful dialogue with senior Ukrainian leaders and a means of fostering change in one important sphere of the society. We should focus diplomatic support on the Ukraine and economic aid that undermines its economic dependence on Russia, particularly in the area of energy debts. But we should continue a concerted effort to maintain contact with its military leadership through multinational and bilateral activities.

#### 8. OPTEMPO:

What's wrong with the current OPTEMPO? A case can be made that the drain of OPTEMPO on our units is not the root problem. Some observations:

- With 13% of Army force structure, USAREUR has over the last 6 years daily fielded from 40% to 60% of the Army's deployed soldiers. Yet reenlistments in USAREUR continue to lead the Army by a wide margin. Our officer attrition is also somewhat less than that of the Army at large. In addition USAREUR has traditionally spent all of its OPTEMPO funding on training. If field duty is a problem, why not in the most heavily committed part of the Army?

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- Soldiers surveyed down range report higher job satisfaction than back in garrison.
- The data we are gathering on PERSTEMPO, ie days away from home, indicate that the proportion of high PERSTEMPO falls more heavily on the population of officers and senior NCOs than on soldiers.
- Our young officers complain as much about lack of predictability and a sense of control over and ownership of the time of their units as they do about OPTEMPO. In fact the feedback is very positive about USAREUR's innovative, more challenging collective training events that require major deployments to places like Hungary and Poland.

Soldiers enjoy challenging missions that are "real." Granted one can wear them out. Managing recovery and repetitive tours must be done very carefully. The Bundeswehr, for instance, argues in its force structure design, that a five to one ratio of committed to employed brigades is needed to assure two year breaks between six month deployments. A smaller US Army will have far more trouble maintaining a sustainable pace in the current strategic environment, especially if we agree that the NCA will always confront unexpected contingencies and that we will probably yield to strategic and political pressures to use military forces on occasion to respond to indirect threats to vital interests.

How to address the problem then of the feedback that in the Army's new Leadership Study:

- The uniformed leadership of the force, must provide to our soldiers and families predictability in the demands placed on their time and energy. A guarantee of two year breaks between deployments would be very helpful. We must also provide to our young leaders a sense of ownership in the operational effort. General Shinseki is working that issue very hard in the Army's responses to our own Leadership Survey.
- We need help in resourcing programs for Quality of Life and capital to reverse the significant erosion of Real Property

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Maintenance across the Army. Annually Forbes Magazine lists the 10 Best Companies to work for in US industry. One of the critical common denominators is "world class facilities." Our workplaces are in general often substandard. In Germany our soldiers can be seen in places working in unheated motor pools built in the Thirties for horse drawn units. We have alternatives to turn in old facilities for new, but need the investment capital that will allow us to build the facilities to pay back the investment by avoiding costs of renovating and then running the old.

- Across all parts of the Army we have examples of housing that are "undeveloped world" class. Last year in an Army survey for instance, a student at our Command and General Staff College - our professional equivalent of graduate business school - allowed that his housing at Ft Leavenworth was so bad, he was too embarrassed to have his parents visit. We now have a \$1+B program to renovate housing in USAREUR, but with a completion date of 2010. I recently visited the Arvin Gym at West Point. We have better exercise facilities in Bosnia and Kosovo in temporary locations in the field that at an institution where we attempt to instill fitness as a hallmark of leadership. Arvin Gym is on its way to being remedied after long effort, but how we got to this state is instructive.
- We have run our gear hard over the last ten years. In USAREUR we have tanks and trucks that are veterans of DESERT STORM that have not yet seen a major rebuild. We have rebuilt tanks coming in at about a battalion equivalent per year and new tank engines to be fielded in 2004. But we remain behind the problem. The troops keep our equipment off deadline at rates above Army average, but they know the gear needs renovation. The Army desperately needs recapitalization of its fighting formations and the investment capital to modernize its key systems, particularly Crusader and Comanche. I know these two systems are under the spotlight, but on the merits of combined arms as a tenet of ground operations, the argument for them is sound.

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- We'll need help altering and resourcing career patterns to give officers and NCOs emerging from years in the field an opportunity for professional development opportunities that provide a break, time with families, and invest in them education that becomes more important to their potential as they advance in grade and levels of responsibility.

With good leadership, we can handle a heavy load of OPTEMPO as long as we can rotate units at reasonable intervals, but we need help with investment capital for programs to enhance Quality of Life and monies for RPM and MILCON to give our hard working soldiers and their supporting families the 'world class' facilities any major corporation would provide. We must recapitalize our fleets of equipment. We can be run hard, but not put away wet and be expected to come out fresh. Some kind of 140 or 180 day standard for Perstempo would cut across our culture of selfless service. We don't want an Army of soldiers and young leaders who check out after so many days away from home and raise the yellow card because they are at their PERSTEMPO limit. We need men and women who follow the sound of the guns and who aggressively seek the challenging and risky work. But we must have a first class quality of life for them and opportunities to recover. And we must provide them with a sense of ownership in the enterprise.

9. Incentives to create sensitivity to not wasting taxpayer dollars:

USAREUR is about to return to DA \$200M of conops dollars from the '01 Budget. We garnered these efficiencies in our funding for the Balkans out of a sense of stewardship as the only incentive. Why not let us keep 33% and reinvest it this year for MILCON that our soldiers and families know we need to fix? Flash to bang time counts. Recently we tabled an efficient basing initiative, the trading of old for new I mentioned above. Why couldn't initiatives like that be automatically moved up the priority lists for MILCON. If we can pay back the MILCON in 12 years and give constant

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savings in terms of avoiding O&M costs after the 12 year point, why not get Congress to help reward that kind of initiative?

10. Strengthening the Tooth to Tail Ratio:

In USAREUR we have already squeezed out of our logistic units 350 spaces to buy an additional airborne battalion for the 173d Abn Bde in Vicenza Italy. We are working through the Congressional approval for the MILCON to do the stationing of the unit. We will continue to look for efficiencies as we review force structure. But two considerations need to be remembered. First, much of our so called combat support structure is actually teeth, Military Police for instance. Often when the calculations are done, this fact is overlooked. Second, technology offers tremendous potential in this area, but that potential cannot be exploited without investment capital.

The Army knows how to use asset visibility and velocity management and network linked in-vehicle diagnostic equipment to reduce parts inventory and to create "near just in time" parts management. But that capability requires purchase of the gear to free up the soldiers now doing those tasks by hand. In addition we know how to reduce the ground footprint of signal units, but that initiative requires purchase of the satellite communications gear and data radios to allow the bandwidth to tactical level required to replace the signal units providing the current microwave coverage. Give us the investment capital and for unit cost allow us to plough displaced soldiers back into combat units and we'll make the technology work for us. In fact the Army has done a good deal of this kind of work in the design of its new Force XXI division structure.

13. More Joint:

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Focus "more joint" on functional elements of combat service support and operational command that can be done more efficiently and appropriately by a Joint commander or a Joint agency than by a Service component. For instance in paragraphs 3 and 4, I argued we should strengthen JFCOM's role as the national provider of conventional forces of all types and as the proponent for how they will be exercised and for the simulations architecture which drives those exercises and experiments. But we should not interfere in Service functions like the Staff Judge Advocate Corps and Inspectors General which are so important to the chain of command's administration of discipline and so dependant on a knowledge of Service culture and responsiveness to the commander. Joint commanders don't need to worry about General Courts Martial business in component commands. That's appropriately a Service function and should remain so. IGs and legal are not broken, in fact they work well in the Army; don't "fix" them.

14. Readiness measurements:

The current system is better than advertised. If one reads carefully what commanders say in their subjective readiness assessments, one can determine unit status fairly clearly. We report availability of systems and fill of personnel. We report on states of training readiness. We have fixed the problem of reporting in a unit in which elements are detached on duty away from the flag. One improvement which would be very useful once we improve asset visibility across the Services involves mean time between failure of critical systems and cumulative cost of repair across the fleet over time. This data would allow visibility of the now hidden cost of, for instance, keeping truck fleets for decades without rebuild or replacement. In addition recording incidence of safety of flight messages and costs of remediation of the problems indicated would indicate the soundness of aircraft. We should also routinely make visible the reports of units whose ALO is lower than the possible REDCONs (which go from 1 to 4 for units not in reorganization.) Many of our Combat Support and

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Combat Service Support units have ALOs below 3 or 4. If the rule is that only units with REDCON below ALO are scrutinized, the readiness of many units never hits the screen.

16. What ought we be doing with Allies:

I've given a view of the strategic priority of NATO as a counterbalance to the effect on Europe of either the return by Russia to its old aggressive imperial aims or to an implosion. We must keep NATO viable, and our military presence and role in it is the crucial element that enables political leadership. Along with allies in the Middle East to counter a prospective threat from a nuclear armed Iran and allies in the Pacific Rim to help contain Chinese military influence and aggressive tendencies, NATO remains one of the three critical pillars of US conventional strategy.

Engagement or whatever we want to call it from here on is a crucial adjunct to US diplomatic policy. Partnership for Peace, In Spirit for Partnership for Peace, and increasingly bilateral activities particularly with Armies newly joined to NATO are powerful means of cementing strategic consensus and promoting democratic norms. If they can be regulated so as not to impinge on normal training for war or peacekeeping and recovery, and our CINC is doing a good job of attacking that problem, these programs can be very useful and should be continued.

17. Forward Basing and limits to access:

Forward positioned forces provide access. Recently when we wanted to put a large Corps-based Task Force into Poland for an exercise we call VICTORY STRIKE, we needed to cross a border never before crossed by US forces. We moved 25 trains across the laender of former East Germany and into Poland with very little friction. Similarly, we can now move a heavy brigade to the Balkans by train in less than two weeks moving through seven countries like Slovakia, Hungary, and Rumania. Recently, we brought the Brigade now making up

6/18/2001

TF FALCON in Kosovo from Savannah, Georgia, through the port of Burgas, Bulgaria. This kind of strategic agility into new locations not used since at least WWII if then comes only from familiarity with the region and access to its officials and politicians. Move the forward deployed forces out and that ease of access and ready capability for RSOI goes with it.

However we should do more to enhance the availability of forward deployed forces in one theater to adjoining theaters to meet CINC requirements. Routinely, for instance, we could demonstrate the availability of USAREUR forces from EUROM to CENTCOM.

18. Transformation of DOD:

This administration by temperament and experience seems to have a unique potential for transforming the business model of OSD. We could recoup from what we now use for O&M and industrial processes the investment capital needed to enable many of the improvements mentioned above. Our argument in DOD should not be about brigades versus divisions or how to reduce OPTEMPO to gain discretionary dollars. Aside from our aging infrastructure and recapitalization needs, our operating forces are in very good shape. Our training is on the mark. Our record in a wide variety of contingencies from Rwanda to DESERT STORM to Bosnia to ALLIED FORCE has been excellent. And in the Army a not very well understood effort at experimentation and transformation begun in 1994 is now allowing leap ahead improvements in tactical and, if we can get the dollars, operational C4ISR of a scope not seen since WWII.

We should not spend energy and political capital on fixing operational aspects of the Services which are actually in good shape and very innovative. Rather focus on streamlining the logistic and administrative infrastructure of DOD in a way that recoups some of the investment capital we need to modernize and to create new strategic capability in space and missile defense and in Joint C4ISR and in combat systems. The

6/18/2001

dollars in stock funds and other capital accounts that lurk under the tip of Service and DOD icebergs dwarf the monies we use for the operating forces.

19. Interoperability and standardization:

This process may be easier functionally than it seems. The solution lies in open architectures for C4ISR with agreed upon protocols for transfer of data, message formats for instance. It lies in agreement in DII-COE rules for C4ISR systems across national boundaries. Politically, this kind of discipline will be tough, since firms in different nations will generate political pressure to have proprietary systems and protocols that ensure those firms have a long term lock on providing that nation's command and control equipment.

In addition we must conduct exercises with our Allies to ensure we mutually understand operating procedures. As in our own Joint operations, we cannot invent these procedures in a crisis. Nor can we instill the confidence across national military cultures that ensures smooth multinational operations in the face of operational risk unless we practice in peacetime. In the final analysis the major leaps in warfighting capability now being enabled by technology lie in the realm of C4ISR, not in new platforms. Interoperability then becomes a function of the fungibility in real time of operational data in our systems for situational awareness and an understanding and familiarity of the procedures we need to work together in the field.

20. Intelligence:

The thrust of our national intelligence effort now seems to focus on space linked systems and connectivity from sanctuary to commanders in the field. This capital infrastructure is a crucial backbone of the strategic component of intelligence. But it is only part of the capability we must build to support commanders at the operational level, the JTF and CJTF commanders who will actually conduct our

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6/18/2001

campaigns in the field. In SFOR in normal peacekeeping operations and in special operations, we frequently made our moves without adequate intelligence support. We found that intelligence fusion done forward was usually more relevant and timely than that done in sanctuary.

In today's operational environment Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) equipment used by our adversaries exploits Moore's Law in a way that our five to ten year procurement cycles do not. In the Republika Srpska, for instance, the new innovative microwave backbone they began constructing in '98 is now being replaced by a much more capable and secure fiber backbone. In addition they are exploiting, as are the Kosovar's, the usefulness of cell phones in a way that we have not countered. In defense intelligence in support of commanders in the field, we must adopt the ability continuously to template the changing electromagnetic spectrum and to use rapid prototyping to keep up with the changes our opponents are making by exploiting COTS.

In addition our HUMINT effort is wanting. Granted the Former Yugoslavia poses a particular challenge in that it was a region of low priority all during the Cold War. It takes time to build HUMINT networks. But in 97 - 98, several years after we became interested in the region, routinely in SFOR we received our best HUMINT from Special Operations elements or Army Counter Intelligence personnel. National Agencies in our area of operations were usually amateurish and not very capable and had questionable tradecraft. It may be that this level of capability was a function of national priorities, and that more capable assets were employed on other tasks. But if we are going to play in the "Anywhere...Anytime" business, we had best address this problem. Improving DOD capabilities to fill in operational needs placed on low priority by national intelligence agencies must be part of the solution.

In addition, field commanders have a difficult time tailoring the teams of expertise needed in this new operational environment. In Bosnia and Kosovo, and I suspect in most

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contingency operations, along with traditional military capability the nature of the intelligence challenge requires skills normally used against organized crime. To keep our commanders from fighting with only one eye open, DOD should negotiate the agreements that allow us when needed to include in our National Intelligence Support Teams experts from the FBI, Customs, and DEA.

21. Ms Flournoy's Alternatives:

Given the comment in paragraph 2 above, I'm not sure these alternatives are relevant until we walk through the derivation of essential strategic tasks and the allocation of the risk of failure we are willing to assign to each. Only then can we understand how to allocate the limited funds we can expect for defense from OMB and the legislature. But justifying an abstract strategic statement not tied to a sense of acceptable risk and likely funding levels, seems like a pretty sterile exercise.

23. No new questions, just a summary:

In summary, three things seem to stand out. The first is how to garner the investments to ensure dominance in space-based capability and the development of the capabilities for missile defense and for preemption of employment of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist organizations.

The real source of discretionary income to be reaped for this effort and modernization of Service capabilities lies in the streamlining of DOD infrastructure and new efficiencies in its operation. This process means a BRAC and application of business standards across all of our industrial processes in DOD. Additional savings in the form of cost avoidance can be reaped in the Services if incentives are created allowing commanders to keep a portion of the savings and plough them back into Quality of Life, RPM, and MILCON.

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We should also move aggressively to exploit Title 10 by giving JFCOM the proponency for exercising, experimenting, and validating forces provided to Joint commanders that Services maintain for themselves. This proponency should include the last say in capabilities of weapons systems played in the Service simulations on which Joint simulations architectures depend. In addition we should strengthen the voice of Joint commanders in the evaluation of what warfighting capabilities are needed in future. Services will always fight for their new systems to the exclusion of each other. We need more jointness and balance controlling the competition for resources in pursuit of warfighting efficiency.

Finally, a review of strategy and how we do business provides a useful debate and new ideas. I have yet to hear in Army circles a reluctance to change to make things better. I do hear frustration that much of what we are doing operationally in harm's way and in our training base and in our efforts at transformation are not understood by the experts who are doing most of the analysis.

We must remember, the Army has been in drawdown for 10 years. Many of our officers and NCOs have known nothing but uncertainty about the future of this institution for their whole time in the Service. We cannot expect them to sustain this operational pace, frequently leave their families and go in harm's way, serve in workplaces with low standards, live in housing that represents throwbacks to the fifties, serve without a sense of our contract with them about their future, and expect them to remain around for a career. I find general support for change as long as we do not break what is not broken, and we quickly decide on the way ahead so we can make a contract with our youngsters on the professional future they can expect in their years in uniform. Drag this process out, engender continued uncertainty about the future and the value of the Service, and we will have an even tougher time keeping our best and brightest in the ranks.

MCM

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24 of 25

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25 of 25

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~~CLOSE HOLD~~ February 4, 2002 7:45 AM

*Maryanne - 7th Floor*

*Cheryl*

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Geneva Convention

Attached is the staff draft—not read by SecDef or CJCS.

Attach.  
02/03/04 Geneva Convention Paper

DHR:dh  
020402-10

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February 3, 2002

**Points for 2/4/02 NSC Meeting on Geneva Convention****The options as to law and policy:**

- US is applying the Convention to *all* detainees as a matter of *policy*.
  - All detainees are getting the humane treatment to which they would be entitled if the US were legally bound to apply the Convention to them.
  - None is entitled to POW status under the Convention.
- All USG agencies (though State's position is unclear) agree that US is *not legally bound* to apply the Convention to *al-Qaida* detainees. (Convention applies only to wars between states or to civil wars, not to a war between a state and al-Qaida worldwide.)
- The question for the President: What should USG say about whether the US is *legally bound* to apply the Convention to *Taliban* detainees.
  - There are three options:
    1. Declare that US is *not* legally required to apply Convention to Taliban.
      - Option 1 – not a good option, given DOD's interest in universal respect for the Convention for the benefit of our own forces.
    2. Declare that US is legally required to apply Convention to Taliban.
      - Option 2 – a good option. Would help dampen criticism.
    3. Declare only that US is applying the Convention to Taliban (and to al-Qaida, for that matter), though USG has not resolved the difficult (but academic) question of whether we are legally required to do so.
      - Option 3 – also a good option.

US could make a virtue of its analytical conundrum by noting that the legal question is difficult precisely because our war on terrorism is unique and does not fit neatly into the categories of war envisioned in 1949 by the Convention's drafters. (Meanwhile, as noted, the US is applying the Convention to all detainees.)

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~~CLOSE HOLD~~**DOD interest in the Geneva Convention**

- **Important that the President appreciate DOD's interest in the Convention.**
- **The Convention is a good treaty.**
  - **One could quibble about details, but the Convention is a sensible document that requires its parties to treat prisoners of war the way we want our captured military personnel treated.**
- **US armed forces are trained to treat captured enemy forces according to the Convention.**
  - **This training is an essential element of US military culture. It is morally important, crucial to US morale.**
  - **It is also practically important, for it makes US forces the gold standard in the world, facilitating our winning cooperation from other countries.**
- **US forces are more likely to benefit from the Convention's protections if the Convention commands is applied universally.**
  - **Highly dangerous if countries make application of Convention hinge on subjective or moral judgments as to the quality or decency of the enemy's government. (That's why it is dangerous to say that US is not legally required to apply the Convention to the Taliban as the illegitimate government of a "failed state.")**
- **A "pro-Convention" position reinforces USG's key themes in the war on terrorism.**
  - **The essence of the Convention is the distinction between soldiers and civilians (i.e., between combatants and non-combatants).**
  - **Terrorists are reprehensible precisely because they negate that distinction by purposefully targeting civilians.**
  - **The Convention aims to protect civilians by requiring soldiers to wear uniforms and otherwise distinguish themselves from civilians.**
  - **The Convention creates an incentive system for good behavior. The key incentive is that soldiers who play by the rules get POW status if they captured.**
  - **The US can apply the Convention to the Taliban (and al-Qaida) detainees as a matter of policy without having to give them POW status because none of the**

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detainees remaining in US hands played by the rules.

- In sum, US public position on this issue should stress:
  - Humane treatment for all detainees.
  - US is applying the Convention. All detainees are getting the treatment they are (or would be) entitled to under the Convention.
  - US supports the Convention and promotes universal respect for it.
  - The Convention does not squarely address circumstances that we are confronting in this new global war against terrorism, but while we work through the legal questions, we are upholding the principle of universal applicability of the Convention.

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May 8, 2002 7:57 AM

2002 OCT 10 PM 5: 24

TO: ~~SECRETARY OF DEFENSE~~ Andy Marshall

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: . Thoughts About the World

Thanks for your thoughts about the world. Would you please go back to my memo, using the same format and edit it the way you think it ought to read, incorporating the thoughts you have.

Thanks.

Attach.

05/02/02 Andy Marshall memo to SecDef, "Thoughts About the World"

DHR:dh  
050802-11

SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN 24 2002

.....  
Please respond by 05/31/02

*Ed - give me the memo he is reacting to - DR*

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DIRECTOR OF  
NET ASSESSMENT

WORKING PAPERS

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

1920 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1920

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2002 OCT 10 PM 5:23

MAY 08 2002

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

May 2, 2002

MEMORANDUM TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*DR +*  
*5/3*

*Asst 4*

FROM ANDY MARSHALL *Amr*

SUBJECT: Thoughts About the World

I agree with your list of countries to pay special attention to, here are some additional points that I would make:

- With respect to Mexico, I would add that we also have a special interest in Mexico because it might become a Columbia on our border given the drug traffic there and the corruption that goes with it.
- With respect to Europe/NATO, I would add that while we wish to keep this base secure we may need to think of streamlining the NATO bureaucracy and possibly some shift of forces from Europe to Asia or to the Moslem World. We nonetheless want to maintain our foothold there and to have excellent relations with as many of the countries in that region as we can.
- I would group together several of the Asian areas because we need to think about all of them together. The central issue in Asia is the future of China and we need, as you say, to try to favorably effect China's entry into the world. To do that we need a strategy which hedges against less favorable outcomes, indeed positions us for a long term competition between the US and China for influence and position within the Eurasian continent and the Pacific Rimland. Your comments on the various countries fit very well into such a hedging strategies.
- With respect to the Moslem nations, which are a sub part of the Asian area, I would add Iran to the list. If we can promote favorable developments in Iran it would make an enormous difference: so it ought to be seen as a place that we pay a lot of attention to. If we can, we should hasten the shift toward a more democratic regime in Iran, where the public is in any case well disposed towards the US.

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*5/3*  
*5/4*

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- India, I would add to what you say the point that India is also a potentially important partner for us in any strategy in which we hedge against a more competitive relationship with China.
- China, while it is very likely a competitor of the U.S. over the longer term, there are also great uncertainties with respect to its development over the next two or three decades. So if you are listing not just friendly countries that we need to pay attention to, but countries that we need to focus attention on in order to follow their development, China in some ways is at the head of the list. This is so not only in terms of its military development, but also its economic and social development. China may go through a period of considerable troubles over the course of the next couple of decades. In addition to potential economic problems there are major water problems that can limit its growth. They may well have a significant AIDS epidemic as well.

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*Rock*

April 30, 2002

SUBJECT: COUNTRIES FOR U.S./DOD TO EMPHASIZE – AND WHY

Americas

- ~~Mexico/Canada~~ – Homeland security depends on our neighbors being reasonably successful politically, economically and orderly and helpful from a security standpoint.
- ~~Mexico~~ – Homeland security depends on Mexico not becoming a Colombia or an empowered army given the 2001 traffic and groups that go with it.
- Central/South America – We can't tolerate extremism or mass disorder

Europe/NATO (Always keep our base secure)

- Italy – Government is leaning our way; can help counter EU et.al; can assist in moving NATO and Europe in the right direction.
- Norway – same as Italy.
- UK – U.S. special relationship – it is helpful.
- Poland – Can be the NATO transformation centerpiece and help shift NATO's weight east; special relationship with Ukraine; is realistic about Russia from experience.
- Spain – Need one or two more countries in NATO and Europe to be helpful; U.S. basing in Spain is important.

- ~~Sec. Gen. of NATO~~ – Lord Robertson can be helpful. *US must streamline the NATO bureaucracy and probably shift some focus from Europe & Africa to the Middle East.*
- Other? *50 pce*

East Asia (Needed to favorably affect PRC's entry into the world)

- Japan – The single most important factor to moderate China's behavior is a successful Japan, with a booming economy. U.S. must focus to help make it happen.
- Korea – North Korea will collapse or get pushed one day. A united Korea will have a period of years coping with the disaster in North Korea, but thereafter it will have a powerful economy and can help serve, with Japan, as a moderating influence on China.
- Australia – A special relationship; valued location.

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- **Singapore** – In our camp; with same geo-strategic views.
- **Vietnam?** – Could help to moderate the PRC; important location.
- **Other?**

Muslim Nations (So many nations with so many people, with a mix of harmful views and real needs – they cannot be ignored; we need to work to create some successful models.)

- **Turkey** – A democracy and a Muslim success; we must help keep it so.
- **Pakistan** – A potential “poster boy” for the Muslim world; we must help.
- **Indonesia** – Too big with too many people to ignore; has serious extremist problem.
- **Jordan** – A friend, with the right instincts; we must help it survive.
- **Egypt** – Still a leader in the Muslim world.

South Asia (Large populations)

- **India** – A democracy and a Muslim success; we must help keep it so.

Central Asia – (Evolving, looking for counterweight to Russia and PRC; enormous energy potential, secular muslims v. religious extremism)

- **Kazakhstan** – Big; oil-rich; leading our way; see the U.S. as counterbalance to PRC and Russia.
- **Azjerbaijan** – Friendly, potential as war on forward operating base
- **Kyrgyzstan** – Friendly
- **Uzbekistan** – concerned about Russia, has chosen the U.S.
- **Afghanistan** – A potential liability; U.S. has a stake in it not failing.

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Sep 18, 2008

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EF/650

May 17, 2002 7:40 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TR  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Opposition

NESEA  
gr 5/20

I think an info memo to the senior people in the NSC on the subject of Rodman's memo here might be useful. Why don't we get one fashioned.

Thanks.

Attach.

05/09/02 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: Support for Iraqi Opposition

DHR:dh  
051702-5

.....  
Please respond by 5/21/02

USDP

ISA has l

5/17/02

5/19/02

→ PWR

This shd go out on Monday 5/20.

Glad that SD liked your memo. Do it as a memo from SD to Principals (VP, Powell, Rice, Tenet) DJP

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Sep 18, 2008

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

EF 1536

BCM  
5/9

INFO MEMO

I-02/007190

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, 695-4351)

09 MAY 2002

SUBJECT: Support for Iraqi Opposition (U)

(U) Organizing the Iraqi Opposition to assist with regime change is needed for two basic reasons:

- legitimacy, particularly in the region, and
- making sure the wrong people don't fill the vacuum.

Legitimacy

(S) Regional leaders seem to be of the view that Iraqis need to be seen as participating in the liberation of their country. It should not be seen as just an "American invasion." (I heard Saudi ex-intelligence chief Prince Turki say this on 31 January.)

- This is likely to be an important factor in obtaining regional support.

Filling the Vacuum

(S) Even more important may be the need to ensure that the post-Saddam vacuum is filled quickly by the right people.

A historical analogy is instructive:

- In 1943-44, FDR and Churchill had plans for an Allied Military Government for postwar France (i.e., an occupation government for France as well as Germany). They considered deGaulle a phoney. Only when deGaulle was greeted by millions of cheering Frenchmen in June 1944 did they conclude that he indeed represented free France.

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Sep 18, 2008

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CLASSIFIED BY ASD/ISA-PETER W. RODMAN  
Reason(s) 1.5(d)  
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- Had FDR and Churchill stuck to their plan, the **Communists would have been the only significant political force in the country**. The Gaullists would have been neutered, and the Communist-dominated resistance would have ruled the countryside.
- DeGaulle, in power from 1944-47, was able to build up his own political movement and effectively neutralize the Communists.

(S) In Iraq, there are many undesirable opposition elements – a Communist faction, Sunni fundamentalists, and radical Shia – all with presumably some support around the country and in some institutions. Organizing the groups we favor is essential to preempt these groups, avoid a vacuum, and avoid a chaotic post-Saddam free-for-all.

(U) An international presence or interim international “commission” would not be an adequate substitute for helping friendly indigenous forces establish their political authority quickly on the ground.

COORDINATION: TAB A

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08-M-3282

COORDINATION

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Mr. Douglas J. Feith

4/8/13/12

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Sep 18, 2008

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September 12, 2002 4:26 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz *DN*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Evaluating Intelligence

Please take a look at the attached memo, edit it for me and get Rich Haver to go over it. Then get it back to me.

Thanks.

Attach.  
091202-3S SecDef memo to DCI re: Evaluating Intelligenc

DHR:dh  
091202-37

.....  
Please respond by 10/04/02

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Sep 18, 2008

*Back to  
you  
from  
Dr. Wolfowitz*

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SECDEF CONTROL# X00827 /03

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DRAFT

September 13, 2002 1:38 PM

TO: Honorable George Tenet  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Evaluating Intelligence on Iraq

In the event that we end up on the ground in Iraq and we have the opportunity to see precisely what is going on on the ground, it would be enormously helpful if we today developed clarity on some benchmarks as to what the U.S. intelligence community assesses the situation to be in various areas before we go in.

We could select specific categories, and indicate what the IC assessment is, what it was based on and why. Then, with the advantage of being on the ground, where we could see exactly what the situation is, we could compare our benchmarks against what we find and determine why the IC assessment was different from the actual facts, if that proves to be the case.

We know something about their denial and deception capabilities, their work underground, dual use technologies, etc.

Learning precisely what the differences are between our assessment and the ground facts, and second, attempting to learn precisely why our assessments were different, if they were different, could conceivably enable us to make major strides in training intelligence analysts and in developing new techniques. Also, it might help us do a better job of making assessments with respect to the "known unknowns" and "unknown unknowns," as well as the "known knowns."

If we do it right, it could serve as a controlled laboratory model and opportunity to make significant improvements in how we do our work.

Any thoughts?

DHR/dh  
091202-3S

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Sep 18, 2008

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

September 9, 2003

Subject: Visit to Iraq, Afghanistan and Kuwait

- **IRAQ.** The Iraq I visited was a different Iraq from many of the press reports. Conditions have improved since my visit in April, with progress on both the civil and security sides. Hospitals and schools are open. Some 5,000 small businesses have opened since liberation. The Iraqi Central Bank is open. A new currency has been introduced. The Coalition has completed some 6,000 civil affairs projects—with many more underway. We have gone from zero to 55,000 Iraqis assisting in security activities—police, border patrol, facilities protection forces, Army and Civil Defense Corps – an impressive accomplishment. This has taken place in less than 5 months.
- I visited troops in Tikrit, Mosul, and Baghdad, and the Polish Multinational Division in Babylon. Your military commanders are talented and innovative. The spirits of the troops are high. They seem to know they are doing important work.
- The security situation is improving, and better than reported. General Sanchez says that in July he was dealing with 20-25 engagements a day; today it is down to 14-15, and most last only 2 or 3 minutes. As he put it: “There is no tactical, operational or strategic threat. A platoon of any one of my battalions could defeat the threat readily. I don’t need more forces. We need the Iraqi people to give us intelligence.” The commanders report more Iraqis coming forward with intelligence.
- The Polish Division has taken over from the Marines in the sector between Baghdad and Basra. It includes forces from 17 countries and staff from four—a total of 21 nations. It will be a tough management task, but the charge the U.S. is “going it alone” is false.
- I visited a mass grave in Hillah, where the remains of some 3,000 Iraqi men, women and children have so far been recovered, and a prison where the regime tortured and executed their political opponents. All of that was still taking place just five months ago. It no longer is—torture and massacres have stopped.
- The Iraqi leaders in Mosul and Baghdad asked me to thank you for freeing them from Saddam’s brutality. I had a good meeting with the Iraqi Governing Council—they also expressed their appreciation to you and to the American people.

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Sep 18, 2008

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
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- Iraqis are eager to take on increasing responsibility for security and governance of the country. I am convinced that our challenge is not to flood Iraq with more American soldiers, as many critics in the U.S. are urging, but to deal with the threats by increasing the number of Iraqi security forces so the Iraqis can increasingly take responsibility for their own security.
- Iraq is a country with good potential. They have water and an elaborate system of irrigation canals. It is currently poorly maintained and managed. In the north, there are wheat fields to rival those in Kansas. Their biblical sites have potential for tourism (ancient Babylon where Daniel was said to have entered the lion's den). However, while I am concerned that the Iraqi people will need some time to overcome the physical and psychological effects of three decades under a Stalinist system, the ingredients for success are there.
- AFGHANISTAN. I met with President Karzai and his cabinet, and expressed our support for his efforts to strengthen the central government, deal with warlords, and extend government authority in the provinces. Fortunately, Karzai's move to replace the Governor in Kandahar went smoothly.
- I visited the U.S.-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Gardez, near the Pakistani border. We now have four PRTs deployed across the country, including teams led by the UK and New Zealand, and four more coming on line in the months ahead. The PRTs – a U.S. concept – seem to be working.
- In Gardez, I met a Special Forces team that had just returned from battle—they said they counted 60 Taliban dead in their area alone. As the Taliban attempt to regroup, as they are, they are being killed. Coalition forces are fighting side-by-side with Afghan soldiers. The success of recent operations is an indication of the progress that has been made in training the Afghan National Army. I met a group of the ANA in Gardez—they are impressive.
- Karzai extended a warm invitation to the First Lady to visit Afghanistan.

While there is measureable progress in both Iraq and Afghanistan, challenges exist – turnover is a problem; actionable intelligence is scarce; there is a shortage of skilled Arabic speaking interrogators: our media effort is improving, but not good enough, to mention a few examples. In the weeks and months ahead, we will encourage members of the cabinet to travel to Iraq to see the work being done by people from their Departments. Finally, the men and women in uniform, the folks in the CPA and our coalition partners are doing a first rate job under difficult circumstances.

Respectfully,



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CC: The NSC

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IAW EO 12958 as amended

Sep 18, 2008


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July 27, 2005

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Trip to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Iraq, 24 - 27 July 2005

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1. Kyrgyzstan. The capital, Bishkek, is calm following the turbulence of the March revolution. I congratulated the leadership team of the President-elect on their successful, free and fair election. We discussed the future of US operations at Manas Air Base where we have 1,000 US Airmen running a key logistic hub supporting Coalition efforts in Afghanistan. The government is amenable to our continued presence, despite the Russian and PRC public urgings at the Shanghai Cooperation Agreement meeting that the US be asked to leave.

The President-elect gave credit to the US for the success of their election and their liberty, and sent his regards to you. They are strongly supportive of our efforts to support the Afghan government. It was an upbeat visit with a small, but optimistic, moderate Muslim country that wants to deepen its already healthy relationship with the US.

2. Tajikistan. This poor, moderate Muslim country sits in a rough neighborhood - China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan all surround it - yet President Rahmonov has done good work settling a civil war and managing the considerable pressure from Russia to stay in the Kremlin's "sphere of influence." Last fall Putin heavy-handedly told him, "Protect Russian interests or we will find someone who can." Despite this, and after the meeting where Russia and China told the Central Asian nations to adopt a timeline for removal of US bases, Tajikistan was the *only* country to put out a public statement noting that it does not appreciate propaganda that attempts to harm its relations with the US.

In a wide-ranging meeting, we discussed the Tajiks' border with Afghanistan, where good counter-narcotics work is recently underway. The US is building a new bridge to connect Afghanistan and Tajikistan that should be a boost to both economies. The president sent his regards to you, and said: "We will always remember the great efforts of the US in eliminating the Taliban and encouraging Tajikistan to move forward economically and politically after our independence." We can count on Tajikistan for continuing support in the war on terror.

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3. Iraq. In meetings with the Iraqi political leadership, I was accompanied by your newly installed Ambassador, Zal Khalilzad - who is having an immediate and tangible positive effect. Zal, George Casey and I met with: the Prime

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Minister, MoD, and MoI; President Talabani; former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi; and the senior constitutional drafting committee members.

All were cautiously optimistic that they will have a draft constitution on time. From each I felt sincere thanks for what the US is doing and a quiet but palpable sense of determination to prevail in rebuilding their nation and overcoming the insurgency. Former Prime Minister Allawi remains usefully involved. The points I made were:

- There must be no delay on the constitution; delay would cost US and Iraqi lives.
- Iraqis must step up and begin taking charge of their country and providing leadership at all levels.
- The Iraqi government must budget for the court system, the Iraqi Security Forces and managing the detainees.
- Iraq must help "tin cup" for reconstruction funds internationally.
- Senior leaders in Iraq must speak out strongly against Syria and Iran and show appreciation for the work of our Coalition partners.

In meetings with US military leadership I found encouraging progress on the training and equipping of the Iraqi Security Forces. Iraq remains a recruiter's dream, with lines around the block every time positions are announced – despite the threats and casualties. Today 85% of security operations the US is conducting are either led or co-led by Iraqis, up sharply from six months ago. Clearly, embedded trainers are having a significant effect. I emphasized to our team that we need to continue "taking our hand off the bicycle seat" and let the Iraqis take over more and more in what is, after all, their country, not ours. We need to curb our natural American tendency to fill every vacuum and dig every ditch. The senior military team gets it and will work hard in that direction.

I saw an impressive Iraqi Special Operations unit and held an upbeat "town hall" meeting with US troops at Balad Air Base, one of our largest installations in Iraq. I finished the day by presenting six Purple Hearts at a field hospital to brave Soldiers wounded in a roadside bombing that morning. Our troops' morale is high, and their questions positive. I came away feeling the Iraqis have a darn good crack at winning this fight if we stay the course and prevail in the test of wills back home.

All in all, it was an excellent trip and refreshing to get away from Washington and be with folks who are enormously proud of what they are doing.

Respectfully,

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MAY 5 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Visit to the Persian Gulf, Iraq, Afghanistan & United Kingdom

I returned Friday evening from the Gulf—the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait—as well as Iraq, Afghanistan and London.

- **THE GULF.** All Gulf leaders expressed relief that the war was over so quickly and had gone so well. In the UAE, our Ambassador warned me that Crown Prince Khalifa was shy and I should expect to carry the conversation. To the contrary, he was effusive in his praise.
- The notion that Arab leaders oppose a democratic Iraq is wrong. In the UAE, Crown Prince Khalifa said: “It is the natural instinct of all human beings to yearn for freedom.” A number of these countries are making democratic reforms themselves—the Qataris held a referendum the day after our visit on a new constitution establishing an elected parliament.
- However, the Gulf leaders and King Abdullah are eager to see Iraqis begin to take charge of their own affairs. It will help ease the apprehension of their people of a long-term U.S. occupation—a good reason for us to continue moving forward on the Interim Authority.
- Conversely, the leaders are nervous that, with the Iraqi regime removed, the U.S. may leave too soon. I reassured them that, while the size of the U.S. presence in the region can now be reduced, the U.S. commitment to their security is undiminished. Our joint announcement with the Saudi Defense Minister of the drawdown of U.S. forces in the Kingdom went well. Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah spoke at length about his confidence that he has a “special bond” with you because you are “both men of faith.”
- In Kuwait, the Foreign Minister said the Syrians asked him to pass word to us that they are not doing the kinds of things we know they are doing. We heard similar pitches in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. The Syrians are feeling the heat. We need to keep up the pressure.

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Sep 18, 2008

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Reason: 1.5(h)  
Declass on: May 5, 2013



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- **IRAQ.** Traveling from Kuwait to Iraq was like crossing from Western Europe to communist Eastern Europe during the 1970s. Three decades of tyranny and Stalinist economics have devastated the country. Leaving Saddam's opulent palace to drive through dilapidated Baghdad was heartbreaking. With so much oil and an educated population there is no reason Iraq should not be as prosperous as its Gulf neighbors. Thanks to your leadership, Iraqis now have at least a chance to build a free society and a better life.
  - It is not scientific, but the results of the "road poll" in Baghdad were positive. When Iraqis saw our convoy coming, many waved enthusiastically and cars riding alongside raced forward to honk and give us the thumbs-up. In one car the driver gave us the thumbs-up while the fellow in the backseat gave us the thumbs-down. In Iraq, only Saddam "wins" with 100% of the vote.
  - I stopped first in Basra to thank UK troops for the fine job they did. The British commander said in some places it was a tough fight—Fedayeen fighters climbing on tanks, engaging his forces in hand-to-hand combat. He also said: "There is no humanitarian crisis, except the one the regime caused by turning off the electricity and water—and we turned it back on."
  - We visited a Baghdad power plant, and were told power is nearly back to pre-war levels. Iraqi officials in charge are on the "gray list"—they were privileged under the old regime—but it is best to work with them.
  - In Baghdad, I met with our troops—they are living in rough conditions, but morale is high and they are doing a truly magnificent job. What fine young people they are.
- Declassified By Ch RDD, ESD WHS  
IAW EO 12958 as amended  
Sep 18, 2008
- **AFGHANISTAN.** Impressive changes for the better since my last visit. Then, the city looked miserable and the people ragged. Today, kiosks are open, commerce is bustling, construction is taking place. There is a vibrancy to Kabul.
  - Karzai asked for U.S. political and military backing to get the warlords to disarm, saying force would not be necessary since the threat of U.S. backing would be enough. I told him the U.S. cannot make threats which could require the use of force, without being ready to use force to carry them out.
  - **ENGLAND.** I met with King Abdullah of Jordan. He took a big risk supporting us, reversing his father's support of Iraq in 1991. I told him the majority of coalition forces in Jordan would be withdrawn by June 1. The King said: "We're fine at home—we have no problem." On Syria, he said Bashar Assad is clever and


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will play a game of giving us just enough, and then waiting for the next opportunity to go back to his old ways. He warned that Arafat is maneuvering to "bring power back to him" in an attempt to delay the roadmap process. He said Jordan would coordinate with us to strengthen the Prime Minister, Abu Mazen. I told him it would be helpful if Arab states stepped in and said that it is time for Arafat to yield power over finances and security.

- I had an excellent private visit with Prime Minister Blair. We shared our hopes for Afghanistan and Iraq, our concerns about France and the transatlantic relationship, and our appreciation for the wonderfully close military-to-military relationship we enjoy.

Mr. President, we were concerned that going to war in Iraq could alienate our allies in the Gulf—today, our relationships with the governments there are stronger than ever. There was concern about the U.S. acting unilaterally. Instead, you formed a 65-nation coalition and in the process strengthened the bonds of friendship with Britain and many other nations in Europe, both old and new.

Respectfully,



- cc: Vice President
- Secretary of State (by hand)
- White House Chief of Staff
- Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

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IAW EO 12958 as amended  
Sep 18, 2008

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: Donald Rumsfeld



Date: December 12, 2002

Subject: Visit to Horn of Africa and Qatar

I have just returned from Eritrea, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Qatar. Qatar is already a strong U.S. defense partner in the Gulf, and all three countries in the Horn of Africa are eager to develop stronger defense relationships with the U.S.

- **ERITREA.** Eritrea has offered the use of its territory and airspace, as well as troops for both Afghanistan and Iraq. President Isaias is a blunt-spoken man who spent decades in the bush fighting for Eritrea's independence. He asked: "Why do you go through the UN? It's a waste of time." In addition to war-related assistance, they have also offered us the use of Baka'a Island as a range for live-fire exercises—something we may need with the loss of Vieques.

Eritrea is worried by the threat of Islamic fundamentalism, especially from neighboring Sudan. They shut down all Saudi schools, and President Isaias said, "We don't allow Islamic charities to operate in our country, period."

We offered a proposal to help improve naval capabilities and coastal security cooperation among Eritrea, Djibouti and Yemen (the area is a strategic chokepoint).

- **ETHIOPIA.** Prime Minister Meles was enormously pleased by his visit with you in Washington last week. He said Ethiopia will be with us on Iraq: "We have joined the war on terror. Rest assured, we will be there for all the battles." They have offered basing, overflight, intelligence, and forces to backfill in Afghanistan so we could free up forces for Iraq.

Ethiopia is having a slow and difficult transition from communism—they still do not permit private property or private banking. They do have one of the more capable military forces in Africa. We discussed the need for some mechanism that could help countries with skilled forces, but few resources, to help in peacekeeping operations around the world.

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IAW EO 12958 as amended  
Sep 18, 2008

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Reason: 1.5(d)  
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- **DJIBOUTI**. Djibouti is the headquarters for our special operations forces in the CENTCOM region. We visited our troops—they are enthusiastic. Their message to you is: “We’re ready.” I met with President Guellah. He too supports us on Iraq, but wants some economic help.

Djibouti is desperately poor. We are putting a lot of money into our facilities there, but that money is not reaching the local economy. The Djiboutians feel they are doing everything we ask of them—and are taking the risk of attracting terrorist attention to their country—but are not getting economic benefits from those efforts. We are looking at ways to give them more assistance.

- **QATAR**. Our relations with Qatar are excellent. The Foreign Minister and I signed an agreement that will allow us to rapidly expand our facilities and our military presence in the country.

I visited CENTCOM’s forward headquarters in Qatar, and observed the exercise which is enabling CENTCOM to test its communications, procedures and strategies for a possible contingency with Iraq. I also had a good session with Gen. Franks on Iraq planning, which is advancing well. I will brief you on the well-established link up between DoD and CIA.

One of the benefits of the global war on terror is the historic opportunity it presents to new build relationships with countries that, until recently, would have been virtually unthinkable. A little over a decade ago, Ethiopia and Eritrea were swarming with Soviet and Cuban military advisors. Today they are seeking friendship and alliance with the United States. With last month’s decision to invite still additional former Warsaw Pact adversaries into NATO, we are building new relationships across Central Europe. We are developing similar relationships across Central Asia, and now the Horn of Africa.

A lasting legacy of your Presidency will not only be your prosecution of the global war on terror, but also how you used that struggle to redraw the map of the world and build friendships that can benefit the American people for many decades to come.

Respectfully,

cc: The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The National Security Advisor

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IAW EO 12958 as amended  
Sep 18, 2008

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

October 6, 2001

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

Subject: My Visits to Saudi Arabia, Oman, Egypt, Uzbekistan and  
Turkey

Saudi Arabia (October 3)

NON RESPONSIVE TO REQUEST

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IAW EO 12958 as amended  
Sep 18, 2008

  
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RESPONSIVE

#### **Oman (October 4)**

Sultan Qaboos received us in an open tent in the middle of a very hot and humid desert. He vowed continued support for US efforts against terrorism, stressing that Oman is pleased to assist discretely, but wholeheartedly. Oman has been easy to work with compared with most other Gulf states. He referred in passing to those in the region who are friends when they need assistance, but not when the US requests assistance ("hypocrites," he called them).

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Qaboos – thoughtful, British educated, soft-spoken – focused on the need to transform the moral climate as to terrorism. He urged me to “hint” to the Egyptians that their leading clerics should be more vocal about Islamic prohibitions against killing innocent people, because that could change the way young Moslems think about the morality of terrorist acts.

Noting that terrorists “live in shadow and plan in darkness,” he asked how we can “prevent these people from having facilities and funds to do their evil work.” He said the US effort against them will take time, but if it is *sustained* – he stressed the key word – perhaps we’ll see a great decline in these activities.

This tragedy, Qaboos observed, can be an important opportunity. Perhaps God has arranged that it happened, in this way, at this time, to prevent even worse things from happening in the future. Perhaps because of this tragic warning, we will have an opportunity to prevent weapons of mass destruction from being used by terrorists.

He said that Islamic terrorists aim to overthrow governments such as his to create an Islamic Khalifate – religious rule by a single “Deputy of Allah” over the whole Moslem world. Oman rejects this, he said, as a country proud of its long independence.

Qaboos took pains to note that Oman was never part of the Ottoman Empire. Oman kept its independence for a few hundred years by linking itself to the leading Western power (Britain then, the US now) to protect itself against the Saudis, Persians, and other strong neighbors. The last point was, I think, his implied message when he spoke of doing all he can to help the US in the war against terrorism.

Qaboos repeatedly returned to the problems caused by Arab media reports, in particular from the al-Jazira television station, that promote the terrorists’ point of view. He urged the US to highlight the humanitarian aid aspects of our campaign and to refrain from action during Ramadan.

He summarized his views succinctly: “We trust you. We’re allies. I have nothing else to add.”

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Sep 18, 2008

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### **Egypt (October 4)**

In my lively talks with President Mubarak, before and during dinner, he had his agenda and I had mine. Mine included conveying the Omani Sultan's suggestion about Egyptian religious leaders speaking out against terrorism. For his part, Mubarak made repeated and forceful calls for U.S. pressure on Israel's PM Sharon to "solve" the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Mubarak asserted that 60 to 70 percent of the terrorism problem would go away if that conflict were solved. I suggested through my questions that I was skeptical of that and that I see the terrorists as aiming beyond Israel to overthrow moderate regimes throughout the Arab and Moslem world. He agreed with that view, but thought that greater success on the peace process would reduce support for the terrorists.

Mubarak offered much advice on the war on terrorism: The U.S. should use intelligence operations as an alternative to "too much bombing." "Don't be in a hurry, take it easy." Bombing of caves by the U.S. in Afghanistan will be ineffective, like Egypt's bombing of caves in Yemen in the 1960s. "Put your money into buying allies on the ground in Afghanistan."

I told Mubarak: "We will do something in Afghanistan," but our action will be measured. I said President Bush is determined and purposeful about this effort and is declaring by word and deed that our enemy is not Islam or the Afghan people, but terrorism and its state supporters. I highlighted that states supporting terrorism are also pursuing weapons of mass destruction. He agreed, saying that the effort against terrorism "is necessary to save the planet."

Immediately after the September 11 attacks, Mubarak had made several unhelpful comments and suggestions. For example, he said Egypt's cooperation would hinge on proof of the US case against bin Laden. Mubarak also proposed an international conference as a way to head off US action against the terrorists. But in my discussion with him, no mention was made by him (or me) of his earlier comments.

Mubarak is an ebullient man and seemed pleased with our meeting and dinner talk. Though his agenda (the Israel-Palestinian issue) and my agenda (fighting terrorism) diverged somewhat, the exchanges were friendly and should foster a higher degree of cooperation than would we get in the absence of such face-to-face consultations.

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Sep 18, 2008

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## Uzbekistan (October 5)

Though Uzbek President Karimov began, Soviet-style, with a half-hour speech, delivered from notes, which was not charming, he eventually loosened up and engaged well. He was so upbeat and complimentary in our post-meeting joint press conference that the US press corps was asking me what's up with Karimov.

Karimov opened by listing what he *has* agreed to allow US forces to do and what he *has not* agreed to. The latter category includes land operations and air strikes from Uzbek territory, all of which he said were "not quite ripe, not quite ready."

He clearly had Russia on his mind. He said that Moscow is pressuring all the Central Asian states to work through Russia if they are going to help the US in the war on terrorism. Russia seeks thereby (1) to stymie Uzbekistan's independence and (2) to win US concessions in return for the Central Asia states' cooperation. Russia seeks dividends regarding Chechnya and the ABM Treaty, he said. He said we should deal directly with Uzbekistan and not through Russia. I pointed out that I had come to Uzbekistan, not Moscow.

He warned that Russia's offer to share intelligence is a "no-lose game" for Russia. In a private side comment to me, Karimov said the intelligence from Russia will be worth little, or worse. The Uzbek MOD, also in a side comment on the ride to the airport, cautioned that the US should take care of the information it gets from Russia, for Russia had relationships with the major terrorist networks and still does.

Karimov stated that toppling the Taliban would require only isolating them from Pakistan. He said that Pakistan's intelligence service is still helping the Taliban.

Echoing Mubarak's advice, Karimov said: "You can buy and sell anything in Afghanistan." Humanitarian aid will do a lot of good and will produce results more effectively than weaponry will. "You can buy any war lord and neutralize him. You don't need to persuade him to join the Northern Alliance, just neutralize him." He pressed his point: "In Afghanistan, only Afghans should fight."

When I got to reply, I noted that Uzbekistan registered in my mind as important well before September 11, which is why I arranged a one-on-one

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meeting with the Uzbek Defense Minister in Brussels last spring. I said that US policy is to deal directly with Uzbekistan, not through Moscow or any other party. As we value our own sovereignty and independence, so we value Uzbekistan's. Our hope and intention is for a long-term relationship with Uzbekistan and we seek no quid pro quo with any other countries.

As for cooperation in the war effort, I said that we are content to continue to work on the written agreement now under negotiation. "We've indicated what would be helpful to us but what you do is clearly your choice. If greater cooperation ripens (to use your word), it could be helpful to us. If not, we'll go about our task as best we can."

Karimov brightened and said he is "very satisfied" with our measured approach. "I'm happy to deal with you directly."

He concluded the meeting with an interesting point about how modern Moslem countries like Uzbekistan "must save traditional Islam from radical elements."

At the press conference, he restated before the cameras most of the points about cooperating with the US – what he has agreed to and what he has not *yet* agreed to – in more or less the same language that he used in our private meeting. The US reporters picked up on his "not yet" formulation regarding agreement on the possible use of Uzbek territory for US Special Operations Forces action into Afghanistan. When they asked him about this, he said that more discussion is required about the developing relationship with the US. I am told his candor before the journalists was unusual and that the local press was surprised he took questions from them.

### **Turkey (October 5)**

At my meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, the Foreign and Defense Ministers and the Chief of the General Staff, the Turks made the following two major points:

First, the Taliban regime is a menace to Islam, Turkey and the world. "Even if bin Laden disappears, we shouldn't let this cruel regime in Afghanistan continue," though land operations in the rough terrain there are difficult. The Northern Alliance groups should be made to cooperate with the US, Turkey and each other. These groups need arms and supplies and

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they can then deal with the Taliban themselves. Turkey can provide military training in northern Afghanistan. Turkey will cooperate with the US "with all of our facilities."

Second, the Turks expressed concern and indeed fear that Russia's role in the coalition with the US will undermine their interests. They see Russia as trading its cooperation for US permission, as it were, to keep troops on Russia's southern flank in violation of the existing conventional forces treaty, to isolate Turkey from the Central Asian states, to undo the Caspian Sea-Turkey oil pipeline, to win a free hand in Chechnya and to launch military operations in Georgia.

The Turks received well my assurances that we shared their interests and would be attentive to their concerns. They were eager to help us, clear-sighted and tough-minded as always. They are superb allies. Would that all our NATO friends worked with us as Turkey does.

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Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith, who accompanied me throughout, split off after the Turkey meeting and is on his way to visit officials in Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates.

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IAW EO 12958 as amended  
Sep 18, 2008



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July 14, 2006

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Trip to Tajikistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq, July 9-12, 2006

**TAJIKISTAN.** Up until recently, Tajikistan has been our strong ally in the War on Terror. Unfortunately, President Rahmonov is now reluctant to agree to any increase in the U.S. use of Tajik bases. He stated honestly that he is afraid of repercussions from Russia and China. He said the pressure from Russia on Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to distance their countries from the U.S. is "enormous." He anticipated that Russia would retaliate by using its influence with Uzbekistan, Tajikistan's enemy, to cut off Tajik gas supplies, as has happened previously. Russia is continuing to aggressively bully and intimidate many former Soviet republics, as it has Ukraine and Uzbekistan. The U.S. is getting run out of Central Asia by Russia. Russia is much better at bullying its neighbors than the U.S. is at countering its bullying. Indeed, on occasion, U.S. actions unintentionally help Russia in its efforts against us.

I believe the U.S. needs a policy for Central Asia that will result in a proper balance in our political, economic and military interests. We cannot afford to continue to be outmaneuvered and bullied out of that important neighborhood.

On another note, President Rahmonov said that while his relations with Iran are historically friendly, he called President Ahmadi-Nejad "a little guy" and "a fanatic."

**AFGHANISTAN.** President Karzai assembled key members of his Cabinet, and we had a good discussion. Karzai seemed more at ease and not as tired as reports indicated previously. He was reassured when I told him that your commitment to the country is as strong as ever. He is worried that NATO's increasing role could mean a declining U.S. role. I pointed out that the U.S. is the largest contributor to NATO and that we will remain actively engaged in Afghanistan. He should view NATO's involvement as a strong positive, in that it means that the U.S. stays committed and, in addition, 25 NATO allies come in as friends committed to Afghanistan's success.

Karzai continues to be worried about Pakistan. He asked that you consider finding an opportunity to pull Musharraf and him aside, perhaps before or after the next U.N. meeting in September, possibly at Camp David, so they can spend some time together with you as a facilitator. The hope is that extended discussions could help to disabuse them of some of the theories they seem to have about each other.

Classified by: Donald Rumsfeld

REason: 1.4(a)

Declassify on: 14 Jul2031

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OSD 76693-06



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08-M-3284

Declassified By: Ch RDD, ESD WHK  
IAW EO 12958 as amended  
Sep 18, 2008

1709100000

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I visited the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in the province of Zabul, Afghanistan. The provincial Governor -- who once was a mujahadeen and had worked with our current enemy, Hekmatyar -- is a talented man and excellent Governor. He strongly backs Karzai and is publicly grateful to the U.S.

I remain concerned about the lack of civilians in the PRTs. In three-and-a-half years, 23 PRTs have been established in Afghanistan, 18 of them by the U.S. Today, after transferring 7 PRTs to the leadership of other Allies, we still retain the lead in 11. Unfortunately, our PRTs are still not broadly supported by our government. The PRT in Zabul Province had 90 U.S. military personnel, one USAID employee, and one DoS employee. Yet the work being done, except for force protection, is exclusively non-military. That after all these years there are so few non-DoD personnel in the PRTs is evidence that the task of fixing the U.S. Government is more difficult than anticipated.

**IRAQ.** I held a town hall with troops from several locations. The reception was overwhelmingly enthusiastic. There were strong words of support for you and their mission. The troops are outstanding, and they are proud of what they are doing.

Prime Minister Maliki is worried about the durability of the U.S. commitment in Iraq, particularly after a visit he had with Senators Joseph Biden and Jack Reed. According to DCM Satterfield, Biden left Maliki shaken by his contention that our country wants to withdraw. I reaffirmed your commitment to Iraq and expressed support for the way the Prime Minister is tackling some tough issues. He is looking forward to visiting you in Washington.

We talked about the security situation in Baghdad. Both he and General George Casey are focused on the problem. Casey may increase U.S. and Iraqi forces in Baghdad in the near future. I recently sent you a memo on Baghdad. Increasingly, Baghdad is a political problem, not a security problem.

A final thought. At a press conference in Baghdad with the Minister of Defense, I was impressed by the number of television cameras and the many Iraqi reporters who were free to ask questions about their country's future. It was a tangible sign of the political progress that has been made since 2003.

Respectfully,

CC: Vice President  
National Security Advisor

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

June 24, 2002 12:02 PM

JUN 26 11 7: 21

TO: Gen. Franks  
CC: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Background on Ayatollah

Attached is some background on the Ayatollah Sistani that I mentioned to you the other day.

Regards.

Attach.  
06/24/02 CJCS Memo to SecDef re: Background on Ayatollah Sistani

DHR:dh  
062402-30

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 28 2010

Doc. 1

09-M-0050  
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Date: OCT 28 2010

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CH-380-02  
24 June 2002

700 JUN 26 AM 7: 23  
OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

*Dep Sec Def*

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

JUN 24 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 6/21*

SUBJECT: Background on Ayatollah Sistani

- (C) Ayatollah Sistani is the most highly regarded Shia cleric among Arab Shias
  - (C) Born in Iran at least 70 years ago, Sistani has spent the last 50 years living in the Shia religious center of Najaf, Iraq.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ [REDACTED]  
Sistani had criticized Saddam and even dared the Iraqi dictator to assassinate him.

OSD 1.4 (c)(d)

- (C) Ayatollah Sistani tends to follow the Shia "quietist" tradition and is not normally politically active. Limited information suggests that Sistani lives under virtual house arrest, a by-product of his desire not to endorse regime policies.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ Ayatollah Sistani could prove to be a valuable ally during regime transition in Iraq.
  - (C) His support, even if subtly worded, could help defuse tensions and garner support for efforts to replace Saddam with a more participatory system.
- ~~(S//NF)~~ As a traditional Muslim cleric, Sistani is probably suspicious of the Christian West and would likely oppose an active, deliberate and protracted role for non-Muslims in shaping Iraq's post-Saddam future.
- (C) In addition, he likely opposes US support for Israel and the idea of peaceful coexistence with Israel.

COORDINATION: None

Prepared By: RDML [REDACTED] USN, Vice Director for Intelligence, J2

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

~~Classified By: RDML [REDACTED]  
Reason: 1.5 (b)  
Declassify On: X1~~

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FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

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09-M-0050

*Handwritten initials*

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~~CLOSE HOLD~~

July 1, 2002 6:11 PM

TO: Larry Di Rita  
Col. Bucci

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Programs

Please set up a meeting with you, VADM Giambastiani, Steve Cambone, Paul Wolfowitz and Dov Zakheim to talk about this Zakheim memo dated 12 March.

It has to be handed to people personally and not floated around. It is radioactive.

Thanks.

Attach.  
03/12/02 USD(C) memo to SecDef re: Programs

DHR:dh  
070102-56

.....

Please respond by 07/26/02

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Date: OCT 28 2010

*Late July for Dealy*

*WR*

*[Signature]*

8/20

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09-M-0050 Doc.2

R-2

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~~EYES ONLY~~

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JUL 01 2002

07/01/02 AM 10:50

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

March 12, 2002 3:05 p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim *js*

SUBJECT: Key Weapons Programs

I asked Ron Garant, the best, and most iconoclastic, weapons expert in the Comptroller office (as opposed to PA&E), to assess several key weapons programs.

He prepared the attached assessment independent of PA&E, but pretty much confirmed PA&E's long-standing arguments.

He recommends that:

*2 wings of 60 w/ spare*  
~~SECRET~~

*S-64*

• F-22 be held to a buy of 150 aircraft

• JSF concentrate on the air-to-ground mission;

*N/m.c. = 1150 - 680.  
AF - 1200 - 1200 - 1400.*

• V-22 be limited to 50 aircraft for the Special Operations Forces, and

*127/6000*

*60 bil  
after 1/17*

• Comanche be terminated.

I have highlighted key elements of his detailed, but generally readable, analysis.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
As stated

cc: DepSecDef

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 28 2010

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
SECDEF CONTROL#

09-M-0050

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Date: OCT 28 2010

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


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
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Date: OCT 28 2010



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
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Date: OCT 28 2010

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
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Date: OCT 28 2010

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OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

February 25, 2002 11:39 AM

2002 MAR 14 PM 2: 56

TO: Gen. Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Steve Cambone  
Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 28 2010

How do we see that these "lessons learned" get implemented in the Defense Planning Guidance and the budget process?

Thanks.

Attach.  
01/28/02 CJCS info memo to SecDef: "Lessons Learned Regarding Afghanistan"

DHR:   
022502-27

.....

Please respond by 03/22/02

09-M-0050 Doc. 3  
R-3

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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20315-0000

SECDEF HAS SEEN 108  
FEB 25 2002

INFO MEMO

CM-144-02  
28 January 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBM 1/27*

*Per 11*

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned regarding Afghanistan (Executive Summary)

A detailed response (~~TABLE~~) to your request (~~TABLE~~) is attached. Highlights follow.

• SOME GOOD NEWS:

- Quality people, first-class technology and equipment, access, special operations, precision air power, synchronization, success of joint forces and unmanned aerial vehicles operations.

• STRATEGIC OBSERVATIONS:

- Information Operations: Successes hard to measure due to a lack of public opinion baseline. However, the Ramadan Influence Campaign was deemed successful.
- Deployment of Forces: Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) process remain an issue.
- Homeland Security: Lack of doctrinal definitions and contingency planning.
- Linguists: Not enough qualified linguists.
- Coalition Building: Uncoordinated requests for coalition forces.
- Intelligence Firewalls: Barriers remain with respect to intelligence firewalls and coalition information sharing.

• CINC/SERVICE/JOINT STAFF OBSERVATIONS:

- Precision-Guided Munitions: A lack of resources may impact other campaigns.
- Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Lack of resources may impact other campaigns.
- Augmentation/Mobilization of the Reserve Component: Rapid, large-scale mobilization is not supported by current processes.
- Enemy "Detainees": Lack of early planning and policy.
- Multinational Planning and Force Integration: Over classification of documents and lack of secure equipment.
- Force Protection: Contingency plans do not reflect additional manning requirements for increases in force protection levels.

~~Without attachment, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED~~

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● **THE ROAD AHEAD: JOINT LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS:**

- On 10 March, CINCs are required to begin to develop their Joint After Action Reports (JAARs).
- CINCs will subsequently submit their JAARs to the Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) on or before 8 June.
- The JCLL will develop "lessons learned" after a thorough analysis of these JAARs.

● **COORDINATION:** NONE

Attachments:  
As Stated

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Date: OCT 28 2010

Prepared by: MajGen [REDACTED] USMC, DJ-7, [REDACTED]

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

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Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: OCT 28 2010

Tab A  
6 pages

UNCLASSIFIED COVER SHEET

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## Lessons Learned Regarding Afghanistan (U)

### • (U) SOME GOOD NEWS:

- (U) The Joint Warfighting Team: First and foremost, quality people, combined with first-class technology and equipment, continue to give America's Armed Forces the decisive edge. Service men and women simultaneously and successfully conducted both combat and humanitarian operations in a truly professional manner.
- (U) Joint Operations: The initial phase of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) depended upon: area of operation access, special operations and precision air power. Access was achieved through carrier battle group presence, special operation forces (SOF) insertion, long-range bombers and coalition support. While requirements for additional coordination exist, the synchronization and success of joint forces, in the aggregate, at all levels, have been significant.
- (U) Access: Regional engagement initiatives (i.e., joint exercises, International Military Education and Training, Regional Centers, etc.) continue to foster relationships that assist in required support needed for basing, overflight rights and coalition building.
- (U) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) Operations: Thorough planning, airspace deconfliction, and improvements in technology resulted in near real-time data collection, dissemination and targeting from UAVs. UAVs, in concert with SOF units on the ground and Navy/USAF aircraft, detected and targeted enemy positions, collected Battle Damage Assessment, and reattacked as required. The successes have validated the requirement for developing and fielding UAVs.
- (U) Information Operations Task Force (IOTF): The development of themes, suggestions for special technical operations in caves and unique terrain, radio drops and Commando Solo tactics contributed to the success of the overall campaign. This is especially significant when considering the IOTF was formed after 11 September 2001, but is now a vital participant in campaign planning.

### • (U) STRATEGIC OBSERVATIONS:

- (S) Information Operations (IO) Campaign: The eventual successes of the strategic IO/public diplomacy campaign - which was initially plagued by a lack of planning, experienced changes in lead agencies and which had early delays in execution - will be hard to measure due to the lack of a public opinion baseline prior to the start of the Ramadan Influence Campaign (RIC). However, the RIC proved successful by shifting the media and the Islamic world toward a position supportive of the United States. Proceeding to the next phase of the war, we must

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Classified by: MajGen [REDACTED] USMC, DJ-7  
Reason: 1.5 (a) and (g)  
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5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(1)

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expand the public diplomacy and strategic influence campaign beyond a specific country or region to a global, multi-CINC level.

- (U) Deployment of Forces:
  - (S) Time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) sourcing, validation, movement planning and force tracking were not executed efficiently during the initial stages of OEF due to the lack of a published OPLAN/CONPLAN. In an effort to save time, leaders and planners frequently compressed the first four phases of the six-phased Crisis Action Planning process into a single phase. As a result, DOD processed numerous requests for forces and corresponding deployment orders. The volume of staffing actions and the associated incremental decision making was time intensive, and second/third order effects negatively influenced timely TPFDD validations and related scheduling of strategic lift. Of note, OEF to date has processed 122 DEPORDs, a significantly higher number than those processed for Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.
  - (S) A lack of understanding about Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the difficulty implementing JOPES processes and procedures outlined in the TPFDD require continued command discipline, timely decisions, and accurate data entry.
  
- (U) Homeland Security (HLS): Several observations within this category require additional analysis and continuous mission reevaluation, which is ongoing. For example:
  - (U) Lack of HLS, Homeland Defense, and Civil Support doctrinal definitions and contingency planning hampered the understanding of HLS roles and missions.
  - (U) The use of NORAD as a planning and execution headquarters for crisis action constituted a radical departure from its normal mission requirements.
  - (U) Critical Infrastructure Protection is not a well-defined concept. We built critical infrastructure lists from multiple sources that lacked prioritization.
  
- (U) Intelligence Firewalls: While the joint community has made strides in overcoming the intelligence firewalls that once existed between agencies, the combination of an external threat with the requirement for HLS necessitated greater intelligence coordination between agencies supporting military actions (CIA and FBI). That coordination has steadily improved as the campaign has continued, but for the long term a National Intelligence Agency Task Force (NLATF) or similar national-level coordination group, might contribute to intelligence fusion.

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Date: OCT 28 2010

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- (U) Linguists: Recent reductions in the scope, variety and extent of foreign language training at various DOD schools and training centers became apparent as we began operations in an area with several languages and various dialects. This will be a continuing challenge as we expand the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Additionally, the association of trained linguists to analysis and dissemination of human intelligence products will pose related challenges.
- (U) Coalition Building: Following an appeal for international support in the GWOT, 48 countries volunteered specific forces. Additionally, USCENTCOM requested specific coalition force capabilities, which in many cases did not align with the coalition country force offerings. In each case, the request for forces, or the forces offered, required staffing through the Joint Staff, OSD, and the State Department. A total of 16 countries provided forces to the OEF coalition. Initially, there was no set process to smoothly reconcile the requested and offered coalition forces, but the process did evolve as the campaign developed.
- (S) CINC/SERVICE/JOINT STAFF OBSERVATIONS: The following observations are based on interviews with Joint Staff leadership and a review of over 250 CINC, Service, and Joint Staff "observations" from Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM submitted prior to 30 December 2001. The GWOT presents the need for global coordination, which influenced many of the observations identified by CINCs and Services. For instance, the supported Combat CINC's request for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to achieve his regional campaign pulls ISR assets from other supporting CINCs, limiting the supporting CINC's capability to prepare the battlefield in their area of operations. Reserve augmentation is focused on the supported regional Combatant CINC with little global coordination to ensure assets exist to augment future operations in a different theater. These are just two examples of areas where there is the need for additional vetting of observations before they are accepted as true "lessons learned."
- (U) ISR
  - (S) ISR and associated infrastructure (including tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED)) are not adequate for supporting sustained combat operations, worldwide CINC requirements, and intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
  - (S) ISR aircraft are low-density/high-demand assets and the GWOT has greatly increased requirements on already stressed platforms.
  - (S) As the campaign evolves, there is a need to reevaluate the ISR support plan with regard to anticipated changes in objectives and requirements. ISR assets must be quickly reallocated globally as requirements change.

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Date: OCT 28 2010

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- (U) Augmentation/Mobilization of the Reserve Component
  - (U) Processes and information systems (personnel and pay) supporting reserve and active components vary greatly between Services and between components within Services. These factors hinder rapid response to crisis situations, and confuse the mobilization process for Service members and augmented commands.
  - (U) Reserve mobilization is not coordinated within the context of regional warplans. By necessity and due to the need for specific occupational specialties, Reserve/Guard capabilities requested to augment USCENTCOM have been from units designed to support other CINCs. As we continue with the GWOT, this will influence future operations in other theaters.
  - (U) Many of the reserve component personnel required to augment a joint headquarters are provided as Individual Reservists based on rank, warfare specialty and security clearance and are not slotted, in many cases, against positions by training, background and experience. There is a need for a more thorough tracking of joint education and training at the individual level and within the Reserve Component.
  
- (U) Enemy "Detainees"
  - (U) Early planning for the detention of Enemy Detainees did not occur. Additionally, a lack of timely policy guidance often caused significant difficulty in the planning and execution of a solution. A detainee plan requires early promulgation and incorporation into the planning process, both by the military and other government agencies.
  - (U) The identification of additional security personnel and equipment, designation of short- and long-term confinement facilities (and whether the detainees should be under control of military forces or federal prison authorities), interagency guidance, and establishment of transshipment points will continue to be an area of concern in the shipment, detainment and treatment of detainees.
  
- (U) Precision-Guided Munitions (PGM)
  - (U) DOD's munitions requirements definition process does not provide decisionmakers with timely and accurate joint data to properly support assessment and resource decisions. The current process is not mutually embraced by CINCs and Services and is not responsive to current events.
  - (S) PGM stockpiles did not fully support major theater OPLAN requirements prior to OEF. PGM expenditures exacerbated already strained inventories.
  - (S) The ordnance industrial base is not configured for rapid surge. There is a [REDACTED] required to offset expenditure impacts on global PGM inventories, and this will be a continuous area of concern and tracking.

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Date: OCT 28 2010

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- (U) Multinational Planning and Force Integration
  - (U) Classification of OEF plans made it difficult to integrate members of coalition forces into the planning process and many countries were excluded from initial planning efforts. The coalition approach to combating terrorism requires a more rapid, responsive capability to share actionable information and adjust classification procedures with relationships to evolving coalitions.
  - (U) The classification process (often resulting in over-classification) and the overuse of "Personal For" messages caused unique challenges. The classification of planning directives, such as Humanitarian Assistance Plan, created barriers for the coordinating process with the UN and other international organizations.
  - (U) Availability of secure equipment networks in USCENTCOM HQs delayed and degraded the full integration of coalition efforts. Secure phone availability was limited and some US organizations lacked familiarity with secure phone distribution policy. While secure inherent protocol (IP) services are available via LOCE, COLLAN, and the CINCUSNAVEUR SIPR/JOCS bridge, these systems are stovepiped to the countries for which they were designed. No common secure IP solution is available. The lack of a common IP warfighting tool resulted in degraded communications between US and coalition forces.
  
- (U) Force Protection
  - (U) Contingency planning currently does not calculate the additional forces required to augment headquarters for upgrades in force protection levels. For example, in USEUCOM, the Area Support Groups and Base Support Battalions are manned at Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) 6 levels, which means additional personnel requirements for increased force protection levels must come from USAREUR and USEUCOM staffs. The lack of a contingency plan for those units directed to the force protection mission at the time of the initial crisis - and as the campaign evolves - degrades commanders' ability to conduct ongoing operations.
  - (U) The lack of a uniform DOD policy concerning the establishment of force protection conditions and inconsistencies in force protection terminology to include CINC force protection standards that apply to all supporting forces, are currently not included in Joint Doctrine.
  
- (U) THE ROAD AHEAD: JOINT LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS
  - (U) In accordance with CJCSI 3150.25A, *Joint Lessons Learned Program*, 1 October 2000, "each real-world operation precipitated by an Execute Order or Deployment Order requires an interim report if the operation is greater than 180 days. Combatant commands are required to submit an "Interim" Joint After-Action Review (JAAR) to the Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) for operations exceeding 180 days in duration."

~~SECRET~~

- (U) The Joint Lessons Learned Program is a process established for the collection and dissemination of observations, lessons learned and issues generated by joint operations, exercises, training events and other sources.
- (U) While this paper is one of many "first reports" on observations concerning the GWOT, on or about 10 March 2002, all CINCs are required to begin development of JAARs. CINCs will subsequently submit JAARs to the JCLL on or before 8 June 2002. A message will be dispatched reminding the CINCs of this requirement.

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Date: OCT 28 2010

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09-M-0050

11/27 3:00pm  
November 26, 2001 5:46 PM

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
CC: Doug Feith  
Gen. Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

I want to see a first report on lessons learned from Afghanistan by December 20.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
112601-24

.....  
Please respond by December 20.

SECDEF:

1/29  
30

RESPONSE ATTACHED

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: OCT 28 2010

V/R  
Ed

U04682 /02

09-M-0050



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES  
1155 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1155



DHR-LLC  
Attention: Ms. Victoria Coates  
1718 M St. NW #366  
Washington, DC 20036

Nov 5, 2008

Subject: OSD MDR Case 09-M-0051

Dear Ms. Coates:

The document *Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs* can be found online at [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB129/nie\\_first%20release.pdf](http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB129/nie_first%20release.pdf)

If you have any questions, contact me by phone at 703-696-2197 or by e-mail at [storer.robert@whs.mil](mailto:storer.robert@whs.mil).

Robert Storer  
Chief, Records and Declassification Division



09-M-0051

FINAL CUT PAWS

#3

~~SECRET~~



Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Cables Division  
CMN-Fax Cover Sheet - Site 12  
Message # 00 2149



From: OSD Cables

Office / Desk: *Secretary of Defense*

Phone Number: [REDACTED]

Subject: *Response to McCain Letter*

Pages (including cover): *8*

Delivery Instructions:

Hold for normal duty hours

IMMEDIATE DELIVERY

2005 SEP 21 11:11:40

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL NAME	OFFICE	ROOM NO.	PHONE NO.	FAX NO.
	<i>(Steve Hadley Paul Haente)</i>	<i>NSA</i>			

Additional Special Instructions:

OSD 77555-05

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

DECLASSIFIED  
AUTHORITY EO 12958  
October 06 2008

Chief, Declass Br.  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

(This document is UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachment)

**ACTION MEMO**

I-05/012650-ERA

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY *fy*

SUBJECT: Response to (McCain letter) (U)

- (U) You asked us to respond (to Senator McCain's) letter dated 19 September 2005 regarding Coalition Support Fund (CSF) reimbursement to Uzbekistan (Tab C).
- (U) Attached for your review are draft unclassified (Tab A) and classified (Tab B) responses.
- (U) We have drafted press points that we coordinated with OSD-PA (Tab D).

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the attached letters.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Approve with changes \_\_\_\_\_

**Attachments:**

Tab A - Unclassified response to [Sen. McCain]

Tab B - Classified response to [Sen. McCain]

Tab C - Original letter from [Sen. McCain]

Tab D - Press points for OSD-PA

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October 06, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div. WHS

~~SECRET / NOFORN~~

(This document is UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachment)

*f* ASD-ISP *pm 9/20*

Prepared by: Dr. Amer Latif, ISP/Eurasia, 692-0144  
Classified by: DASD Eurasia  
Reasons: 1.4 (b) & (d)  
Declassify On: 20 September 2015

09-M-0086

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*This shall be  
reversed by  
Gene Hodby*

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
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AUTHORITY E.O. 12958  
October 06, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN SD 77555-05

**DRAFT**

(The Honorable John McCain  
Russell Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510-6050)

Dear (Senator McCain:)

The United States has three broad strategic objectives in Central Asia: political/economic reform, regional security, and commercial and energy development. Central Asia is a complex region and we need to pursue these objectives simultaneously.

The Government of Uzbekistan has provided important support to the United States and its coalition partners that helped us liberate the Afghan people. There is still much work to be done in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the Government of Uzbekistan exercised its right to end the agreement that provided us access to the Karshi-Khanabad airbase. We will comply with their request to leave this facility by the end of January 2006.

U.S. policy is to use Coalition Support Funds to pay our bills to coalition partners for expenses they incur in supporting U.S. forces. The bills we have from the Uzbeks are for services rendered in the War on Terrorism. Our national policy, as a general rule, is to pay legitimate bills presented for goods and services by other nations. Paying these bills is an important demonstration to all nations of our reliability as a Coalition partner.

We still do not have a clear understanding of the violent events in Andijon in May 2005. This is why we have supported calls for an independent, international investigation. In the meantime, we believe it is important to continue to work with the Uzbek military to assist them in reforming their military establishment and developing the ability to fight terrorists. Our work with Uzbek military personnel exposes them to the democratic values and principles such as civilian control of the military, freedom of speech and religion that our citizen soldiers cherish. Ending all military to military contacts would not be in either nation's interest.

Thank you for your interest in this strategically important country.

Sincerely,



**DRAFT**

DECLASSIFIED  
AUTHORITY E.O. 12958  
October 06, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

09-M-0086

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN

*This shall be  
reverted by  
Gene Hodby*

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

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AUTHORITY E.O. 12958  
October 06, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~SECRET~~ NOFORN SD 77555-05

**United States Senate**  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

SEP 19 2005 11 51 AM

September 19, 2005

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Department has notified the Congress that it intends to pay \$22.985 million in coalition support funds to the Government of Uzbekistan. This payment is intended to cover past costs associated with the base in Karshi-Khanabad, from which the Government of Uzbekistan recently evicted the United States. We strongly object to making a payment to Uzbekistan at this time, and urge that the payment be placed into an escrow account, to be disbursed only when Uzbekistan shows that it is again willing to work in partnership with the United States.

The current Uzbek regime is one that has expelled our forces from its country, massacred hundreds of demonstrators at Andijan, and is disregarding U.S. concerns on a host of issues. To turn over millions of taxpayer dollars to such a government at this time risks undermining the clarity of America's message in the region, and would be seen as a sign of weakness.

Coalition support funds are designed to assist countries working with us in the war on terror. America keeps its promises to coalition partners, but we also expect our partners to keep their promises to us. Uzbekistan has not done so. For example:

- Uzbekistan agreed to host U.S. forces on its soil to support continuing coalition combat efforts in Afghanistan. Our troops in Afghanistan are still fighting the Taliban; insurgents have killed hundreds of people, including dozens of Americans, in the last few months. Yet at this critical moment, with our mission clearly unfinished, Uzbekistan has ordered our troops to leave.
- Uzbekistan pledged in 2002 to begin opening its society and economy, consistent with the President's call for democratic reform in the Muslim world. It has reneged on that pledge. In May, government security forces in the city of Andijan massacred hundreds of peaceful demonstrators, and since then the government has defied U.S. calls for an independent investigation.
- The Uzbek government has recently launched a campaign of anti-American propaganda, staging rallies to denounce the United States, and accusing the U.S. of fomenting Islamist extremism in the guise of promoting democracy.



OSD 18841-05


We support the principle of America paying its bills, but we also support America standing up for itself in the world; for spending taxpayer dollars wisely; for avoiding the misimpression that we overlook massacres; and for avoiding cash transfers to the treasury of a dictator just months after he permanently evicts American soldiers from his country.

Thank you for your consideration of this issue.

Sincerely,




John McCain  
U.S. Senate



Joseph Biden  
U.S. Senate



Mike DeWine  
U.S. Senate



Patrick Leahy  
U.S. Senate



John Sununu  
U.S. Senate



Lindsey Graham  
U.S. Senate

CUT PAGES

#4

~~SECRET~~

October 21, 2002 7:53 AM

TO: ADM Fargo  
CC: GEN. MYERS  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Contingency Plans

I sent General LaPorte the attached memo after meeting with him on the Korea contingency plan. You might want to think about this, since you are in that part of the world.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/18/02 SecDef memo to Gen. LaPorte re: Meeting on North Korea Contingency Plan  
10/17/02

DHR:dh  
102102-4

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

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AUTHORITY EO 12958  
October 06 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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SECDEF CONTROL# \_\_\_\_\_

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A common understanding of these assumptions should contribute to contingency plans and agreement as to how to best migrate our capabilities over the coming 4 to 6 years to fit the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Finally, given the pace of change in our world, our contingency plans should be reviewed and adjusted annually.

Please let Gen. Myers, Doug Feith and me have your thoughts after you have a chance to think over these suggestions. Clearly, this is not solely your responsibility. Some of the work I have outlined will need to be done here in the Pentagon, with our allies and with your planners as we think this through.

Thanks.

DHR/dh  
101802-1S

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February 25, 2002 1:45 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Counter Terrorism

*✓*

I need a meeting with Steve Cambone and whoever else is appropriate—probably Paul Wolfowitz, Gen. Myers, Gen. Pace and you—to discuss this memo from Steve Cambone.

Thanks.

Attach.

01/21/02 Cambone memo to SecDef re: Counter Terrorism Campaign

DHR:dh  
022502-40

.....

Please respond by 03/15/22

*To: DeLoon*

*Please put these in folder for SecDef as "read aheads" for the meeting later this week with Cambone on "Multiple Issues (Monday?) Dirlik*

DECLASSIFIED  
AUTHORITY EO 12958  
October 06 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

09-M-0086

X04883 103

▶ However, the impact of Holland's support group will be much greater if SOCOM plans and executes operations based the insights the support group generates.

• If Holland's support group is confined to supporting other CINCs I question the value of the group. For example:

- ▶ DIA has the Joint terrorism intelligence center.
- ▶ CIA has the Counterterrorism Center.
- ▶ Each command has its own Joint intelligence center.
- ▶ One more command chewing on the same data may not add much value; the many tasks Holland foresees for the group could be assigned to DIA.

I suggest that Thursday's meeting should have one of two results:

1. Direction that Holland revise his concept to include support to SOCOM to plan and execute a global campaign
  - ▶ This would elevate Holland to an independent, and more equal, stature relative to the other CINCs, providing SECDEF with an alternative command for operations.
  - ▶ De-conflicting SOCOM's plans with those of regional CINCs should be assigned to the Chairman, who can advise the SECDEF on courses of action.

*I REC. AGAINST THIS CONSTR. A INCSOC SHOULD BE A SUPPORTING CINC TO A REGIONAL CINC.*

2. Direction that Holland's group report to the SECDEF through the Chairman

- ▶ Holland proposes the group report to the Chairman who then provides the information to the CINCs.
- ▶ Because the SECDEF provides the global direction for the campaign, he needs the information the group will develop to give the CINCs direction.

*THE "GLOBAL" CINC IS SECDEF ABUSED BY CJCS.*

~~SECRET~~

SECDEF HAS SEEN  
FEB 25 2002

**INFORMATION BRIEF TO THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY  
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY  
ON A PROPOSAL FOR A COUNTERTERRORIST  
CAMPAIGN SUPPORT GROUP (CTCSG)**

DERIVED FROM: JSOC MANUAL 380-5  
DECLASSIFY ON: SOURCE MARKED OADR  
DATED: 1 June 2001

17 JANUARY 2002

~~SECRET~~


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AUTHORITY E.O. 12958  
October 06, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

09-M-0086

*See Def on used  
Other on Photos*

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# The Global War on Terrorism



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AUTHORITY E.O. 12958  
October 06, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
nrc & Rec. Div, WHS

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# Key Points of USSOCOM's 9 January 2002 Brief to JCS

- A permanent organization with a global perspective should be formed to support the planning of the counterterrorist portion of the global war on terrorism
- A Common Intelligence Picture (CIP) upon which planning will be based is needed

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October 06, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS


09-M-0086

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# Developing the Common Intelligence Picture

HIGHEST PRIORITY

LOWEST PRIORITY



NO ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE



ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE  
COULD BE DEVELOPED  
IN THE SHORT TERM



ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE

**ANALYSIS**

INTELLIGENCE,  
SURVEILLANCE, AND  
RECONNAISSANCE

ADVANCE FORCE  
OPERATIONS

**ACTIONABLE INTEL**

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UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

February 25, 2002 1:45 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Counter Terrorism

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Attach.

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DHR:dh  
022502-40

.....  
Please respond by 03/15/22

*To: DeLoach*

*Please put these in folder for SecDef as "read aheads for the meeting later this week with Cambone on "Multiple Issues" (Directory?) Diphk*

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AUTHORITY EO 12958  
October 06 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

X04883 / 03

▶ However, the impact of Holland's support group will be much greater if SOCOM plans and executes operations based the insights the support group generates.

• If Holland's support group is confined to supporting other CINCs I question the value of the group. For example:

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*I REC. AGAINST*

▶ This would elevate Holland to an independent, and more equal, stature relative to the other CINCs, providing SECDEF with an alternative command for operations.

*THIS CONSTR*

▶ De-conflicting SOCOM's plans with those of regional CINCs should be assigned to the Chairman, who can advise the SECDEF on courses of action.

*CINCSOC SHOULD BE SUPPORTING*

*CINC TO*

*A REGIONAL*

*CINC.*

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*THE "GLOBAL" CINC IS*

▶ Because the SECDEF provides the global direction for the campaign, he needs the information the group will develop to give the CINCs direction.

*SECDEF*

*ABUSED*

*BY CJCS.*

~~SECRET~~

- See Def on used  
- Other on Plans

SECDEF HAS SEEN  
FEB 25 2002

# INFORMATION BRIEF TO THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY ON A PROPOSAL FOR A COUNTERTERRORIST CAMPAIGN SUPPORT GROUP (CTCSG)

DERIVED FROM: JSOC MANUAL 380-5  
DECLASSIFY ON: SOURCE MARKED OADR  
DATED: 1 June 2001

17 JANUARY 2002


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AUTHORITY E.O. 12958  
October 06, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

09-M-0086

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# The Global War on Terrorism



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DECLASSIFIED  
AUTHORITY E.O. 12958  
October 06, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

09-M-0086

~~SECRET~~

# Key Points of USSOCOM's 9 January 2002 Brief to JCS

- A permanent organization with a global perspective should be formed to support the planning of the counterterrorist portion of the global war on terrorism
- A Common Intelligence Picture (CIP) upon which planning will be based is needed


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AUTHORITY E.O. 12958  
October 06, 2008  
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09-M-0086

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# Developing the Common Intelligence Picture



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October 06, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
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obtain the release of 14 Kuwaiti detainees; the interagency has reviewed their cases and believes they should not be released in the near future.

**INDIA.** In India, the genuine warmth of the meetings with all the new top leadership was extraordinary. They were grateful to have the first Cabinet-level visit so quickly after our election. We are clearly at an opportune moment in US-Indian relations to take our relationship – a critical one for the world – to a new level. The Minister of Defense, the Minister of External Affairs, the National Security Advisor, and the Prime Minister – all were on a single sheet of music. Each warmly congratulated you on your re-election and spoke hopefully about your visiting India in the near future. Their key points were a strong desire to deepen and expand defense cooperation; satisfaction with the course of events in Afghanistan; a sincerely expressed hope that Iraq will stabilize soon; and a desire that we not allow our obviously close relationship with Pakistan to create issues with India – particularly with regard to arms sales.

All four, and especially the Prime Minister, spoke hopefully about the Indian-Pakistan relationship and their respect for President Musharraf. Each also emphasized that India's 145 million Muslims are an important force within their country, and that India is the second largest Muslim country in the world. The Prime Minister seems committed to pursuing better relations with Pakistan, saying he could "take Indian popular opinion with me when the time is right."

I left India with a strong sense that relations between our nations have never been better. I hope you will be able to visit India soon. Your presence could further facilitate a rapprochement between India and Pakistan, as well as encourage India to continue on a pro-Western path.

Respectfully,

Enclosure a/s

- CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
- Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
- Honorable Porter Goss
- Dr. Condoleezza Rice

~~SECRET~~

FINAL CUT DOC

#7



~~SECRET~~  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

MAR 26 2003

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJ: Prime Minister Blair's Visit and the UN Role in Post-war Iraq

The Coalition will win the war. But, if we lack the proper degree of freedom of action in post-war Iraq, we may find that we won the war but cannot win a strategic victory -- that is, implement your concept of a free Iraq -- or even stabilize the situation enough to allow us to remove our forces in a reasonable period of time. The US has made this mistake before.

Prime Minister Blair, for domestic political reasons, may urge you to agree to an extensive UN role in post-war Iraq. As much as we would like to help him, we have important interests in preserving certain redlines regarding the UN.

The UN could usefully provide support for Coalition post-war operations in Iraq, but the UN *must not*, in my view, control those operations. UN authorization is *not* required for the Coalition to exercise governmental authority in post-war Iraq and we should, I believe, do nothing to imply it is. In the statement following the Atlantic Summit, you and Prime Minister Blair correctly delineated the idea by saying that you will seek UN Security Council resolutions that "*endorse* an appropriate post-conflict administration for Iraq." "Endorse" is the right word; we should oppose using words like "authorize."

I believe it is particularly hazardous to mix the UN in with the Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA). As the IIA will be the seedbed of a future Iraqi government, we plan to use it to give a head start to those Iraqis who are committed to your concept of a free Iraq. Some UN Security Council Members and some key UN officials do not (to put it mildly) share your commitment to building democratic institutions in Iraq. Thus, the UN should not have a role in selecting IIA members or in guiding the IIA's evolution, though we may be open to *advice* from appropriate UN officials.

As you have repeatedly said, the UN cannot possibly be allowed to control the oil revenues. These will be needed for reconstructing the country, and the way they are allocated will help determine how quickly the economy revives.

DECLASSIFIED  
AUTHORITY EO 12958  
October 06 2008

Classified by DASD Luti  
Reason 1.5(a)  
Declass on 24 Mar 13

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

Doc #2

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09-M-0086

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UN functions in post-war Iraq will likely be exercised by a UN Special Coordinator (or UN Special Representative). It would help to define that official's role in a way that makes best use of his ability to attract support from other countries for post-war humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts. His main function should be that of coordinating among non-governmental organizations and the specialized UN agencies that will be active in post-war Iraq, and between them and the provisional authority that General Franks will head in the post-war period. A greater role than that for the UN Special Coordinator would limit our freedom of action to achieve the goals you have set.

Prime Minister Blair may argue that he needs UN "cover" for our post-war activities in Iraq. We should do everything reasonable to accommodate him. However, it is neither in his nor in our interest to give the UN a role that would interfere with our ability to win the peace or to accomplish what we need to do to allow us to withdraw our forces from Iraq at the appropriate time.

The key point is that we must *not* separate the civil from the military responsibilities. That is what was done in Kosovo and Bosnia and, because the civil side was not developed aggressively enough, our forces are still there – eight years later in Bosnia and four years in Kosovo. Only the countries whose troops are doing the military tasks have the incentive to get the civil side done promptly and properly so they can get their troops out. In the case of Iraq it will be US troops that will be carrying the load. We cannot be dependent on others to do what is necessary to get them out.



CC:  
Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable George Tenet  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

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February 25, 2002 11:39 AM

2002 MAR 14 PM 2: 56

TO: Gen. Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Steve Cambone  
Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

How do we see that these "lessons learned" get implemented in the Defense Planning Guidance and the budget process?

Thanks.

Attach.  
01/28/02 CJCS info memo to SecDef: "Lessons Learned Regarding Afghanistan"

DHR:ab  
022502-27

.....

Please respond by 03/22/02

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AUTHORITY EO 12958  
October 06 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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02 FEB 26 1:02 PM  
SECDEF CONTROL#

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NOFORN

April 21, 2003 9:05 AM

2003 JUL 21 AM 9:10

TO: Torie Clarke  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Pre-war Iraq Baseline

Here is a benchmark of baseline of pre-war Iraq. I don't know quite how we begin to measure, but if it is true and accurate and we then measured the progress against it, it would be an interesting thing.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

Attach.

4/10/03 "Relief and Reconstruction Baseline" A/S State Arthur Dewey

DHR:dh  
042103-15

.....  
Please respond by 5/2/03

*Doc #1*

DECLASSIFIED  
AUTHORITY EO 12958  
October 06 2008

Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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DECL: 4/10/13

4/15/03  
SECDEF HAS SEEN  
SD  
Fu  
C  
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Fork

APR 21 2003

Relief and Reconstruction Baseline

The table below provides the best available statistics on the pre-war situation in Iraq, with a focus on the provision of services.

Health		
Hospitals	270	USAID, 2003
Hospital beds (per 1,000 persons)	1.5	N/A (USAID)
Hospital beds	27,000	UNICEF, 2/2002
Physicians (per 100,000 persons)	55	WHO, 1998
Nurses (per 100,000 persons)	236	WHO, 1995
Primary Health Care Centers	929	UNICEF, 2002
Population with Access to Primary Health Care		CESR, 2003
Urban	97%	
Rural	71%	
Infant Mortality Rate (deaths per 1,000 live births)	103	UNICEF, 1999
North	59	
South	107	
<5 years Mortality Rate (deaths per 1,000)	125	UNICEF, 1999
Diarrheal Diseases (cases per child/year)	15	UNICEF, 1996
Crude mortality rate (per 1,000 population)	6.02	DIA estimate, 2002
Births attended by trained person	< 50%	WHO, 2002
Maternal mortality (per 100,000 live births)	291	WHO, 2003
Water/Sanitation		
Liters of Safe Water (per person/day)		UNICEF, 2002
Baghdad	150	
Other Urban Areas	110	
Rural Areas	65	
Population with Access to Safe Water	85%	UNICEF, 2002
Urban	96%	UNICEF, 2002
Rural	48%	
Population with Adequate Sanitation	79%	UNICEF, 2002
Urban	93%	
Rural	31%	
Garbage Trucks in Baghdad	80	UNICEF
Food/Agriculture		
Persons Dependent on Rations Distributions	60%	UN, 2002

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Classified by A/S Arthur E. Dewey  
E.O. 12958 Reason 1.5 (b) (d)

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09-M-0086

Food Imports under OFF (per month)	450,000 MTs	USAID/FFP
Annual Grain Production (metric tons)	2 mil	CIA, 2003
Chronic Malnutrition (under 5 years)	23.1%	UNICEF, 2002
<b>Infrastructure</b>		
Electrical Generating Capacity	10,000 MW	CIA, 2003
Available Electrical Power from System	5,500 MW	CIA, 2003
Road Network	45,000 km	USAID (secret)
Paved	38,400 km	
Unpaved	7,100 km	
Rail Network	2,300 km	USAID (secret)
<b>Education</b>		
Primary School Enrollment	76.3%	UNICEF, 2000
Girls	69.8%	
Boys	82.5%	
Secondary School Enrollment	33%	UNICEF, 2000
Post Secondary	12%	CIA, 2003
<b>Adult Literacy Rates</b>		
Female	45%	
Male	71%	

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DECL: 4/10/13

PRE-WAR HUMANITARIAN BASELINE IN IRAQ

(U) Food

- Sixty percent of the population was fully dependent on the monthly Oil-for-Food (OFF) ration to meet their basic needs, while the remaining population had nearly eighty percent of their needs met through the program.
- Approximately 23 percent of children under age five suffered from chronic malnutrition.
- Withholding food was a central component of the government of Iraq's expulsion campaigns targeting the Marsh Arabs and Shi'a communities, as well as in the Arabization campaign in Kirkuk governorate.

(U) Water and Sanitation

- The quality of untreated water throughout the country varies widely but generally is poor. Only 48 percent of the rural population had access to safe drinking water. 
- Iraq's rivers contain biological materials, including raw sewage, pollutants, and are laden with bacteria.
- Adequate sanitation was available to only 7 percent of the population. Cases of diarrhea have increased from an average of 3.8 episodes per child per year in 1990 to 15 episodes per child per year in 1996.
- According to UNICEF, there were 960 water treatment plants and 17 sewage treatment plants in need of rehabilitation by the end of 2001. 
- In Baghdad, the entire water system has deteriorated since 1991 to 50 percent of normal efficiency rates due to the absence of human and financial resources, as well as a lack of spare parts, maintenance, equipment and electrical power.
- Sewage pumping stations in Baghdad were functioning at less than 40 percent of normal efficiency before the conflict.
- About two-thirds of garbage collected between residences was not being removed due to significantly diminished capacity.

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- 2 -

(U) Health

- Although most Iraqis have access to primary health care, Iraq's health infrastructure has been in a continuous state of deterioration since 1991 due to lack of resources from the local authorities to repair or maintain facilities, as well as absence of trained staff (nurses in particular) who left because of insecurity in the region.
- According to UNICEF, approximately one-third of all primary health centers (300 of 929) are in urgent need of rehabilitation. During the past ten years there have been outbreaks of diseases that are attributable to the deterioration in living conditions (particularly water and sanitation), such as typhoid fever, cholera and leishmaniasis.
- Vaccine-preventable diseases such as measles, diphtheria, and poliomyelitis were also on the rise among children, largely due to periodic shortages in vaccine supplies.
- The infant mortality rate is currently 108 per 1000 live births, much higher than the least developed country (LDC) average of 60, and life expectancy at birth is only 58 years, shorter than the LDC average of 65. Less than 50 percent of births were attended by a trained attendant.

(U) Power/ Electricity

- Iraq's electric power capacity is approximately 10,000 megawatts (MW); however, available power was only 5500 MW before the conflict due to inadequate facilities and lack of spare parts.
- Outside of Baghdad, residents routinely experienced outages of up to 18 hours per day, because of technical problems and possibly political decisions to limit electricity.

(U) Agriculture

- Iraq required 5 million MT annually to meet minimum grain needs, yet was only able to produce 2 million MT. Private marketing was discouraged.

(U) Education

Prior to the conflict, there were approximately 5 million primary and secondary students in Iraq. Over 76 percent of

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- 3 -

children were enrolled in primary school, with 33 percent in secondary school.

- Roughly 80 percent of schools nation-wide were in poor physical condition. Over 8,000 needed to be urgently rehabilitated, while an additional 5,000 schools were needed to meet the growing population of primary school children.
- For those children completing primary school, the quality of education is so poor and the motivation of teachers so low (due to low and inconsistent pay) that many do not have basic literacy and numeracy skills.

**(S) Transportation**

- Iraq contains 45,500 kilometers of roadway, the majority of which is paved.
- The rail network consists of 2,300 km of track radiating from Baghdad, which is especially important for bulk grain and fuel transport.
- There are over 100 airports in Iraq, of which 3 received scheduled commercial flights prior to the conflict

**(U) Displaced populations**

- Prior to the conflict, there was already a significant IDP and refugee problem in and around Iraq.
- There were 800,000 IDPs in Iraq, including 700,000 displaced (in some cases more than once) in the north, and 100,000 Shia Arabs in the south. All have been dependent on food rations distributed through the OFF program.
- Iraq hosted more than 127,000 refugees, including 90,000 Palestinians living in Baghdad and other cities in central Iraq, 23,600 Iranians (12,000 Kurds in camps in the north, 6,700 Shia Arabs in the south, 4,600 in Erbil and Sulaymaniya) and 13,000 Turks.
- Iraq's neighbors currently host a total of 840,000 old caseload refugees, broken down as follows: Jordan - 300,000, Syria - 40,000, Turkey - 100,000, Iran - 380,000, Kuwait - 15,000 and Saudi Arabia - 5,000.

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25 March 2003

### What the UN Should and Should Not Do

The UN should:

- *Endorse* the Coalition Provisional Authority (when created).
- *Endorse* the Coalition's establishment of an Iraqi interim authority.
- Recognize the Coalition Provisional Authority as acting for the government of Iraq for purposes of the "Oil for Food" program.
- Encourage member states, NGOs, etc., to contribute to meeting the needs of the Iraqi people.
- Appoint a UN Special Coordinator to coordinate among the UN specialized agencies and NGOs, and between them and the Coalition, and provide advice to the Coalition.

The UN should **not**:

- Create a UN-based governing authority for Iraq.
- *Authorize* the Coalition Provisional Authority (we don't need UN authorization and seeking it could imply that we do need it).
- *Authorize* the Iraqi interim authority, or determine its composition or structure.
- Control future oil revenues.
- Empower the UN Secretary General's Special Representative to deal directly with Iraqi interim authority or coordinate between it and the UN specialized agencies and NGOs.

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Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Cables Division  
CMN-Fax Cover Sheet - Site 12  
Message # 002149



From: OSD Cables

Office / Desk: *Secretary of Defense*

Phone Number: *[Handwritten]*

Subject: *Response to McCain Letter*

Pages (including cover): *8*

Delivery Instructions:

- Hold for normal duty hours
- IMMEDIATE DELIVERY

2005 SEP 21 AM 11:49

DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL NAME	OFFICE	ROOM NO.	PHONE NO.	FAX NO.
	<i>(Steve Hadley Paul Haente)</i>	<i>NSA</i>			

Additional Special Instructions:

*Doc #3*

OSD 77555-05

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(This document is UNCLASSIFIED when separated from attachment)

**ACTION MEMO**

I-05/012650-ERA

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY *EL*

SUBJECT: Response to (McCain letter) (U)

- (U) You asked us to respond (to Senator McCain's) letter dated 19 September 2005 regarding Coalition Support Fund (CSF) reimbursement to Uzbekistan (Tab C).
- (U) Attached for your review are draft unclassified (Tab A) and classified (Tab B) responses.
- (U) We have drafted press points that we coordinated with OSD-PA (Tab D).

RECOMMENDATION: Approve the attached letters.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Approve with changes \_\_\_\_\_

**Attachments:**

Tab A - Unclassified response to [Sen. McCain]  
Tab B - Classified response to [Sen. McCain]  
Tab C - Original letter from [Sen. McCain]  
Tab D - Press points for OSD-PA

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Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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*ASD-ISP PM 9/20*

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*This shall be  
reverted by  
Gene Hadley*

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DRAFT

(The Honorable John McCain  
Russell Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC 20510-6050)

Dear (Senator McCain:)

The United States has three broad strategic objectives in Central Asia: political/economic reform, regional security, and commercial and energy development. Central Asia is a complex region and we need to pursue these objectives simultaneously.

The Government of Uzbekistan has provided important support to the United States and its coalition partners that helped us liberate the Afghan people. There is still much work to be done in Afghanistan. Unfortunately, the Government of Uzbekistan exercised its right to end the agreement that provided us access to the Karshi-Khanabad airbase. We will comply with their request to leave this facility by the end of January 2006.

U.S. policy is to use Coalition Support Funds to pay our bills to coalition partners for expenses they incur in supporting U.S. forces. The bills we have from the Uzbeks are for services rendered in the War on Terrorism. Our national policy, as a general rule, is to pay legitimate bills presented for goods and services by other nations. Paying these bills is an important demonstration to all nations of our reliability as a Coalition partner.

We still do not have a clear understanding of the violent events in Andijon in May 2005. This is why we have supported calls for an independent, international investigation. In the meantime, we believe it is important to continue to work with the Uzbek military to assist them in reforming their military establishment and developing the ability to fight terrorists. Our work with Uzbek military personnel exposes them to the democratic values and principles such as civilian control of the military, freedom of speech and religion that our citizen soldiers cherish. Ending all military to military contacts would not be in either nation's interest.

Thank you for your interest in this strategically important country.

Sincerely,



DRAFT

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Senator John McCain  
Russell Senate Office Building  
Washington, DC, 20510

Dear Senator McCain:

(S) We have focused our efforts in Uzbekistan and the other Central Asian States to achieve the United States' three broad strategic objectives. Uzbekistan is a strategically important state. It is located in heart of Central Asia, possesses the largest population in the region, has the region's most capable military, it is the center point of regional transport, communication, and trade. Due to these factors the US with other regional powers has a keen interest in what happens in Uzbekistan.

~~(S/NF)~~

(U) U.S. policy is to use Coalition Support Funds to pay our bills to coalition partners for expenses they incur in supporting U.S. forces. The bills we have from the Uzbeks are for services rendered in the War on Terrorism. Our national policy, as a general rule, is to pay legitimate bills presented for goods and services by other nations. Paying these bills is an important demonstration to all nations of our reliability as a Coalition partner.

Classified By: Secretary of Defense  
Reason: 1.4 (a) & (d)  
Declassify On: 20 September 2015


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Chief, Declass Br

09-M-0086

~~(S/NF)~~ Our defense cooperation activities also work towards developing a new generation of Uzbek military officers who are not tied to legacy, Soviet-era thinking, and practices. Through these contacts we are working to create the future leaders of the Uzbek military who would respect the rule of law and civil leadership when the current regime is no longer in power. Although this is a long-term enterprise, the results will directly support moving Uzbekistan towards democratic norms.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be "R. A. [unclear]", written in a cursive style.

**United States Senate**  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510

September 19, 2005

The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
Department of Defense  
Washington, DC 20301

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Department has notified the Congress that it intends to pay \$22.985 million in coalition support funds to the Government of Uzbekistan. This payment is intended to cover part costs associated with the base in Karahi-Khanabad, from which the Government of Uzbekistan recently evicted the United States. We strongly object to making a payment to Uzbekistan at this time, and urge that the payment be placed into an escrow account, to be disbursed only when Uzbekistan shows that it is again willing to work in partnership with the United States.

The current Uzbek regime is one that has expelled our forces from its country, massacred hundreds of demonstrators at Andijan, and is disregarding U.S. concerns on a host of issues. To turn over millions of taxpayer dollars to such a government at this time risks undermining the clarity of America's message in the region, and would be seen as a sign of weakness.

Coalition support funds are designed to assist countries working with us in the war on terror. America keeps its promises to coalition partners, but we also expect our partners to keep their promises to us. Uzbekistan has not done so. For example:

- Uzbekistan agreed to host U.S. forces on its soil to support continuing coalition combat efforts in Afghanistan. Our troops in Afghanistan are still fighting the Taliban; insurgents have killed hundreds of people, including dozens of Americans, in the last few months. Yet at this critical moment, with our mission clearly unfinished, Uzbekistan has ordered our troops to leave.
- Uzbekistan pledged in 2002 to begin opening its society and economy, consistent with the President's call for democratic reform in the Muslim world. It has reneged on that pledge. In May, government security forces in the city of Andijan massacred hundreds of peaceful demonstrators, and since then the government has defied U.S. calls for an independent investigation.
- The Uzbek government has recently launched a campaign of anti-American propaganda, staging rallies to denounce the United States, and accusing the U.S. of fomenting Islamist extremism in the guise of promoting democracy.

OSD 18841-05


We support the principle of America paying its bills, but we also support America standing up for itself in the world; for spending taxpayer dollars wisely; for avoiding the misimpression that we overlook massacres; and for avoiding cash transfers to the treasury of a dictator just months after he permanently evicts American soldiers from his country.

Thank you for your consideration of this issue.

Sincerely,




John McCain  
U.S. Senate



Joseph Biden  
U.S. Senate



Mike DeWine  
U.S. Senate



Patrick Leahy  
U.S. Senate



John Sununu  
U.S. Senate



Lindsey Graham  
U.S. Senate

~~SECRET~~

October 21, 2002 7:53 AM

TO: ADM Fargo  
CC: GEN. MYERS  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Contingency Plans

I sent General LaPorte the attached memo after meeting with him on the Korea contingency plan. You might want to think about this, since you are in that part of the world.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/18/02 SecDef memo to Gen. LaPorte re: Meeting on North Korea Contingency Plan  
10/17/02

DHR:dh  
102102-4

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

*Doc #4*

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October 18, 2002 7:15 PM

TO: Gen. LaPorte

CC: Gen. Myers Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Pace Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Meeting on North Korea Contingency Plan—10/17/02

I am a bit concerned that the work that is to be done as a result of our meeting yesterday may not start at a high enough level, and, without the benefit of some discussion of our overall strategy for NE Asia, that the product could prove to be too narrowly focused. I realize that a war plan is not the place to fashion a regional defense strategy. Nonetheless, our contingency plans would likely benefit from consideration of our broader strategy for the region.

For that reason, I suggest that we establish some additional and more basic assumptions. That will enable those engaged in your planning process to ask themselves whether they have given appropriate attention to factors such as the following:

- We are in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, and we need a 21<sup>st</sup> century plan—not simply a modest revision of the 20<sup>th</sup> century plan—a great deal has changed over the past 50 years of our alliance and is still changing.
- September 11, 2001, happened—with all its implications—and the US and some 90 nations are now engaged in a global war on terrorism.
- South Korea has a population of 48 million, more than twice that of North Korea's 22 million.
- South Korea has a GDP of \$746 billion, almost 34 times larger than North Korea's GDP of \$22 billion.
- In FY 00, South Korea spent \$12.8 billion on defense (2.8% of GDP)
- South Korea has 8.9 million fit for military duty, [almost three times as many as North Korea's 3.5 million.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

- South Korea has a military of 702,000—North Korea has a military of

- [REDACTED]
- The United Nations umbrella continues to be an advantage to South Korea and the US.
- US military capabilities have greater lethality each year as we utilize increasingly advanced technologies.
- Japan has an increasingly capable Navy.
- There is growing pressure in South Korea for the US to have a smaller, more consolidated footprint, given that the environment is less hospitable for US forces than it was in the earlier post-Korean War period.
- The US has approved a new defense strategy and has emphasized the increasing importance of Asia to the US and the emergence of China as a growing regional power.
- South Korea, Japan and the US continue to be less than successfully engaged in various efforts to try to persuade North Korea to alter its erratic and threatening behavior.

The US and South Korea need to work together to fashion a common understanding of how the geostrategic and military circumstances have changed. Our countries need to develop appropriate contingency plans, including a “win decisively” plan and a “swiftly defeat” plan, as required by our Contingency Planning Guidance. They should reflect the above realities, as well as any additional items that may be added as we think this through. I am sure there are some factors I have unintentionally neglected.

We need to fashion plans that will place our strategies, force structures, force compositions, and military capabilities on a trajectory so that South Korea will assume the appropriate tasks and the appropriate portion of the military manpower burden on the peninsula, and so the US will be better arranged with its new capabilities to fulfill our responsibilities in deterring and defending on the peninsula, as well as our other responsibilities in the region.

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

A common understanding of these assumptions should contribute to contingency plans and agreement as to how to best migrate our capabilities over the coming 4 to 6 years to fit the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Finally, given the pace of change in our world, our contingency plans should be reviewed and adjusted annually.

Please let Gen. Myers, Doug Feith and me have your thoughts after you have a chance to think over these suggestions. Clearly, this is not solely your responsibility. Some of the work I have outlined will need to be done here in the Pentagon, with our allies and with your planners as we think this through.

Thanks.

DHR/dh  
101802-1S

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DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

February 25, 2002 1:45 PM

TO: VADM Giambastiani

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Counter Terrorism

*✓*

I need a meeting with Steve Cambone and whoever else is appropriate—probably Paul Wolfowitz, Gen. Myers, Gen. Pace and you—to discuss this memo from Steve Cambone.

Thanks.

Attach.

01/21/02 Cambone memo to SecDef re: Counter Terrorism Campaign

DHR:dh  
022502-40

.....  
Please respond by 03/15/22

*Doc # 5*

*To: DeLoonie*

*Please put these in folder for SecDef as "read aheads" for the meeting later this week with Cambone on "Multiple Issues (Thursday?) Disch*

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October 06 2008

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▶ However, the impact of Holland's support group will be much greater if SOCOM plans and executes operations based the insights the support group generates.

• If Holland's support group is confined to supporting other CINCs I question the value of the group. For example:

- ▶ DIA has the Joint terrorism intelligence center.
- ▶ CIA has the Counterterrorism Center.
- ▶ Each command has its own Joint intelligence center.
- ▶ One more command chewing on the same data may not add much value; the many tasks Holland foresees for the group could be assigned to DIA.

I suggest that Thursday's meeting should have one of two results:

1. Direction that Holland revise his concept to include support to SOCOM to plan and execute a global campaign
  - ▶ This would elevate Holland to an independent, and more equal, stature relative to the other CINCs, providing SECDEF with an alternative command for operations.
  - ▶ De-conflicting SOCOM's plans with those of regional CINCs should be assigned to the Chairman, who can advise the SECDEF on courses of action.
2. Direction that Holland's group report to the SECDEF through the Chairman
  - ▶ Holland proposes the group report to the Chairman who then provides the information to the CINCs.
  - ▶ Because the SECDEF provides the global direction for the campaign, he needs the information the group will develop to give the CINCs direction.

*I REC. AGAINST THIS CONSTR*  
*CINCSOC SHOULD BE A SUPPORTING CINC TO A REGIONAL CINC.*  
*THE "GLOBAL" CINC IS SECDEF ADVISED BY CJCS.*

~~SECRET~~

- See Def on used  
+ Other on Plans

SECDEF HAS SEEN  
FEB 25 2002

# INFORMATION BRIEF TO THE PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY ON A PROPOSAL FOR A COUNTERTERRORIST CAMPAIGN SUPPORT GROUP (CTCSG)

DERIVED FROM: JSOC MANUAL 380-5  
DECLASSIFY ON: SOURCE MARKED OADR  
DATED: 1 June 2001

17 JANUARY 2002


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# The Global War on Terrorism



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# Key Points of USSOCOM's 9 January 2002 Brief to JCS

- A permanent organization with a global perspective should be formed to support the planning of the counterterrorist portion of the global war on terrorism
- A Common Intelligence Picture (CIP) upon which planning will be based is needed


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# Developing the Common Intelligence Picture



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# Why a CTCSSG with a Global Perspective?

- The Enemy is Global:
  - Some terrorist organizations have branches and cells that cross several regional CINCs' AORs [ ]
  - There are terrorist organizations located in every regional CINC's AOR [ ]
  - Some terrorist organizations network with other terrorist organizations across multiple regional CINCs' AORs [e.g. ]

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# INTEL CONFERENCE, 10-14 Dec 01

## Key Points

- Common CT database does not yet exist
- Widespread duplication of effort exists
- "NOFORN" was hurting coalition intelligence sharing
- [ ]

USSOCOM, in conjunction with ( ) is currently hosting another workshop focusing on establishing a CIP on WMD, terrorist leaders, and terrorists

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# Why a CTCSG with a Global Perspective?

- The Enemy is Global:
  - Some terrorist organizations have branches and cells that cross several regional CINCs' AORs [ ]
  - There are terrorist organizations located in every regional CINC's AOR [ ]
  - Some terrorist organizations network with other terrorist organizations across multiple regional CINCs' AORs [e.g. ]

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# Developing the CIP

- Intelligence Conference 10-14 Dec 01
- Co-hosted by SOCOM and DIA
- Attendees included:

JS J-2

CIA

DIA

FBI

NSA

NRO

DoS

CINCS

ARMY INTELLIGENCE  
SUPPORT COMMAND

NATIONAL IMAGERY  
and MAPPING AGENCY

JOINT SPECIAL OPNS  
COMMAND

TREASURY

SERVICES

IMMIGRATION

DEF HUMINT SERVICE

JOINT INFO OPNS CTR

AIR INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NAVAL INTEL

LAND INFO WARFARE ACTIVITY

NATIONAL GROUND INTEL CTR

JOINT WARFARE ANALYSIS CTR

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
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# Counterterrorist Campaign Support Group

**DIRECTOR**



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October 06, 2008  
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Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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# Proposed Duties of a CTCSG with Global Perspective

- Help the Intelligence Community to develop the common intelligence picture for the GWOT
- Translate strategic guidance into recommendations to help shape counterterrorist campaign planning
  - Look long term past the current “next steps”
  - Identify operational centers of gravity and enemy critical capabilities
  - Recommend targets within each critical capability and region
  - Facilitate horizontal coordination among CINCs

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# **Proposed Duties of a CTCSG with Global Perspective cont.**

- Guide apportionment of Low Density/High Demand (LD/HD) assets**
- Using effects-based approach, recommend best timing, phasing, sequencing for actions**
- Recommend the best way to integrate military plans with other Federal Agencies' efforts (especially the CIA)**
- Provide expertise to Regional CINCs as required**
- Measure and assess trends in the counterterrorist portion of the GWOT and recommend adjustments**

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# Proposed Mission Statement

**The CTCSG translates strategic guidance into operational recommendations that support the Geographical CINCS and the Joint Staff in their Counterterrorism Campaigns to Defeat Terrorist Organizations with Global Reach, and Terrorists' Capacity to Acquire or Use WMD**

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# Discussion

**Would the Counterterrorism Campaign Support Group be value added to support the Joint Staff and CINCs in planning of the counterterrorist portion of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)?**

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## What Has Changed?

July 2003

### **Counter-terrorist focus**

Neutral population

4 x Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Sanctuary

Attacks on the Coalition

Minimal cooperation with

Afghan National Army training

Warlords empowered

Disarmament, Demobilization and  
Reintegration (DDR) Concept

No Constitution

No political process

Minimal Afghan Sovereignty

December 2004

### **Counter-Insurgency focus**

Supportive population

19 x Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Sanctuary

Attacks on soft targets

Cooperation & engagement with Pakistan

Afghan National Army fighting now

Warlords diminished

Disarmament, Demobilization and  
Reintegration (DDR) underway

Moderate Islamic Constitution

Presidential Election complete

Growing Afghan Sovereignty

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February 25, 2002 11:39 AM

2002 MAR 14 PM 2:56

TO: Gen. Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Steve Cambone  
Dov Zakheim  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Lessons Learned

How do we see that these "lessons learned" get implemented in the Defense Planning Guidance and the budget process?

Thanks.

Attach.

01/28/02 CJCS info memo to SecDef: "Lessons Learned Regarding Afghanistan"

DHR:   
022502-27

.....  
Please respond by 03/22/02

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 CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
 WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9998

SECDEF HAS SEEN 108

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INFO MEMO

CH-144-02  
 28 January 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *PHM 1/27*

*PHM 11*

SUBJECT: Lessons Learned regarding Afghanistan (Executive Summary)

A detailed response (~~TPFDD~~) to your request (~~TPFDD~~) is attached. Highlights follow.

● **SOME GOOD NEWS:**

- Quality people, first-class technology and equipment, access, special operations, precision air power, synchronization, success of joint forces and [unmanned] aerial vehicles operations.

● **STRATEGIC OBSERVATIONS:**

- Information Operations: Successes hard to measure due to a lack of public opinion baseline. However, the Ramadan Influence Campaign was deemed successful.
- Deployment of Forces: Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) process remain an issue.
- Homeland Security: Lack of doctrinal definitions and contingency planning.
- Linguists: Not enough qualified linguists.
- Coalition Building: Uncoordinated requests for coalition forces.

● **CINC/SERVICE/JOINT STAFF OBSERVATIONS:**

- Precision-Guided Munitions: A lack of resources may impact other campaigns.
- Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance: Lack of resources may impact other campaigns.
- Augmentation/Mobilization of the Reserve Component: Rapid, large-scale mobilization is not supported by current processes.
- Enemy "Detainees": Lack of early planning and policy.
- Multinational Planning and Force Integration: Over classification of documents and lack of secure equipment.
- Force Protection: Contingency plans do not reflect additional manning requirements for increases in force protection levels.

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- **THE ROAD AHEAD: JOINT LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS:**
  - On 10 March, CINCs are required to begin to develop their Joint After Action Reports (JAARs).
  - CINCs will subsequently submit their JAARs to the Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) on or before 8 June.
  - The JCLL will develop "lessons learned" after a thorough analysis of these JAARs.
  
- **COORDINATION: NONE**

Attachments:  
As Stated

Prepared by: MajGen H. P. Osman, USMC,

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Tab A  
6 pages

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## Lessons Learned Regarding Afghanistan (U)

- (U) SOME GOOD NEWS:
  - (U) The Joint Warfighting Team: First and foremost, quality people, combined with first-class technology and equipment, continue to give America's Armed Forces the decisive edge. Service men and women simultaneously and successfully conducted both combat and humanitarian operations in a truly professional manner.
  - (U) Joint Operations: The initial phase of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) depended upon: area of operation access, special operations and precision air power. Access was achieved through carrier battle group presence, special operation forces (SOF) insertion, long-range bombers and coalition support. While requirements for additional coordination exist, the synchronization and success of joint forces, in the aggregate, at all levels, have been significant.
  - (U) Access: Regional engagement initiatives (i.e., joint exercises, International Military Education and Training, Regional Centers, etc.) continue to foster relationships that assist in required support needed for basing, overflight rights and coalition building.
  - (U) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) Operations: Thorough planning, airspace deconfliction, and improvements in technology resulted in near real-time data collection, dissemination and targeting from UAVs. UAVs, in concert with SOF units on the ground and Navy/USAF aircraft, detected and targeted enemy positions, collected Battle Damage Assessment, and reattacked as required. The successes have validated the requirement for developing and fielding UAVs.
  - (U) Information Operations Task Force (IOTF): The development of themes, suggestions for special technical operations in caves and unique terrain, radio drops and Commando Solo tactics contributed to the success of the overall campaign. This is especially significant when considering the IOTF was formed after 11 September 2001, but is now a vital participant in campaign planning.
- (U) STRATEGIC OBSERVATIONS:
  - (S) Information Operations (IO) Campaign: The eventual successes of the strategic IO/public diplomacy campaign - which was initially plagued by a lack of planning, experienced changes in lead agencies and which had early delays in execution - will be hard to measure due to the lack of a public opinion baseline prior to the start of the Ramadan Influence Campaign (RIC). However, the RIC proved successful by shifting the media and the Islamic world toward a position supportive of the United States. Proceeding to the next phase of the war, we must

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Reason: 1.5 (a) and (g)  
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expand the public diplomacy and strategic influence campaign beyond a specific country or region to a global, multi-CINC level.

- (U) Deployment of Forces:
  - (S) Time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) sourcing, validation, movement planning and force tracking were not executed efficiently during the initial stages of OEF due to the lack of a published OPLAN/CONPLAN. In an effort to save time, leaders and planners frequently compressed the first four phases of the six-phased Crisis Action Planning process into a single phase. As a result, DOD processed numerous requests for forces and corresponding deployment orders. The volume of staffing actions and the associated incremental decision making was time intensive, and second/third order effects negatively influenced timely TPFDD validations and related scheduling of strategic lift. Of note, OEF to date has processed 122 DEPORDs, a significantly higher number than those processed for Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.
  - (S) A lack of understanding about Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the difficulty implementing JOPES processes and procedures outlined in the TPFDD require continued command discipline, timely decisions, and accurate data entry.
- (U) Homeland Security (HLS): Several observations within this category require additional analysis and continuous mission reevaluation, which is ongoing. For example:
  - (U) Lack of HLS, Homeland Defense, and Civil Support doctrinal definitions and contingency planning hampered the understanding of HLS roles and missions.
  - (U) The use of NORAD as a planning and execution headquarters for crisis action constituted a radical departure from its normal mission requirements.
  - (U) Critical Infrastructure Protection is not a well-defined concept. We built critical infrastructure lists from multiple sources that lacked prioritization.
- (U) Intelligence Firewalls: While the joint community has made strides in overcoming the intelligence firewalls that once existed between agencies, the combination of an external threat with the requirement for HLS necessitated greater intelligence coordination between agencies supporting military actions (CIA and FBI). That coordination has steadily improved as the campaign has continued, but for the long term a National Intelligence Agency Task Force (NIATF) or similar national-level coordination group, might contribute to intelligence fusion.

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- (U) Linguists: Recent reductions in the scope, variety and extent of foreign language training at various DOD schools and training centers became apparent as we began operations in an area with several languages and various dialects. This will be a continuing challenge as we expand the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). Additionally, the association of trained linguists to analysis and dissemination of human intelligence products will pose related challenges.
- (U) Coalition Building: Following an appeal for international support in the GWOT, 48 countries volunteered specific forces. Additionally, USCENTCOM requested specific coalition force capabilities, which in many cases did not align with the coalition country force offerings. In each case, the request for forces, or the forces offered, required staffing through the Joint Staff, OSD, and the State Department. A total of 16 countries provided forces to the OEF coalition. Initially, there was no set process to smoothly reconcile the requested and offered coalition forces, but the process did evolve as the campaign developed.
- ~~(S)~~ CINC/SERVICE/JOINT STAFF OBSERVATIONS: The following observations are based on interviews with Joint Staff leadership and a review of over 250 CINC, Service, and Joint Staff "observations" from Operations NOBLE EAGLE and ENDURING FREEDOM submitted prior to 30 December 2001. The GWOT presents the need for global coordination, which influenced many of the observations identified by CINCs and Services. For instance, the supported Combat CINC's request for Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to achieve his regional campaign pulls ISR assets from other supporting CINCs, limiting the supporting CINC's capability to prepare the battlefield in their area of operations. Reserve augmentation is focused on the supported regional Combatant CINC with little global coordination to ensure assets exist to augment future operations in a different theater. These are just two examples of areas where there is the need for additional vetting of observations before they are accepted as true "lessons learned."
- (U) ISR
  - ~~(S)~~ ISR and associated infrastructure (including tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED)) are not adequate for supporting sustained combat operations, worldwide CINC requirements, and intelligence preparation of the battlefield.
  - ~~(S)~~ ISR aircraft are low-density/high-demand assets and the GWOT has greatly increased requirements on already stressed platforms.
  - ~~(S)~~ As the campaign evolves, there is a need to reevaluate the ISR support plan with regard to anticipated changes in objectives and requirements. ISR assets must be quickly reallocated globally as requirements change.

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- (U) Augmentation/Mobilization of the Reserve Component
  - (U) Processes and information systems (personnel and pay) supporting reserve and active components vary greatly between Services and between components within Services. These factors hinder rapid response to crisis situations, and confuse the mobilization process for Service members and augmented commands.
  - (U) Reserve mobilization is not coordinated within the context of regional warplans. By necessity and due to the need for specific occupational specialties, Reserve/Guard capabilities requested to augment USCENTCOM have been from units designed to support other CINCs. As we continue with the GWOT, this will influence future operations in other theaters.
  - (U) Many of the reserve component personnel required to augment a joint headquarters are provided as Individual Reservists based on rank, warfare specialty and security clearance and are not slotted, in many cases, against positions by training, background and experience. There is a need for a more thorough tracking of joint education and training at the individual level and within the Reserve Component.
  
- (U) Enemy "Detainees"
  - (U) Early planning for the detention of Enemy Detainees did not occur. Additionally, a lack of timely policy guidance often caused significant difficulty in the planning and execution of a solution. A detainee plan requires early promulgation and incorporation into the planning process, both by the military and other government agencies.
  - (U) The identification of additional security personnel and equipment, designation of short- and long-term confinement facilities (and whether the detainees should be under control of military forces or federal prison authorities), interagency guidance, and establishment of transshipment points will continue to be an area of concern in the shipment, detainment and treatment of detainees.
  
- (U) Precision-Guided Munitions (PGM)
  - (U) DOD's munitions requirements definition process does not provide decisionmakers with timely and accurate joint data to properly support assessment and resource decisions. The current process is not mutually embraced by CINCs and Services and is not responsive to current events.
  - (S) PGM stockpiles did not fully support major theater OPLAN requirements prior to OEF. PGM expenditures exacerbated already strained inventories.
  - (S) The ordnance industrial base is not configured for rapid surge. There is a 12 to 18-month lead-time required to offset expenditure impacts on global PGM inventories, and this will be a continuous area of concern and tracking.

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- (U) Multinational Planning and Force Integration
  - (U) Classification of OEF plans made it difficult to integrate members of coalition forces into the planning process and many countries were excluded from initial planning efforts. The coalition approach to combating terrorism requires a more rapid, responsive capability to share actionable information and adjust classification procedures with relationships to evolving coalitions.
  - (U) The classification process (often resulting in over-classification) and the overuse of "Personal For" messages caused unique challenges. The classification of planning directives, such as Humanitarian Assistance Plan, created barriers for the coordinating process with the UN and other international organizations.
  - (U) Availability of secure equipment networks in USCENTCOM HQs delayed and degraded the full integration of coalition efforts. Secure phone availability was limited and some US organizations lacked familiarity with secure phone distribution policy. While secure inherent protocol (IP) services are available via LOCE, COLIAN, and the CINCUSNAVEUR SIPR/JOCS bridge, these systems are stovepiped to the countries for which they were designed. No common secure IP solution is available. The lack of a common IP warfighting tool resulted in degraded communications between US and coalition forces.
  
- (U) Force Protection
  - (U) Contingency planning currently does not calculate the additional forces required to augment headquarters for upgrades in force protection levels. For example, in USEUCOM, the Area Support Groups and Base Support Battalions are manned at Authorized Level of Organization (ALO) 6 levels, which means additional personnel requirements for increased force protection levels must come from USAREUR and USEUCOM staffs. The lack of a contingency plan for those units directed to the force protection mission at the time of the initial crisis – and as the campaign evolves – degrades commanders' ability to conduct ongoing operations.
  - (U) The lack of a uniform DOD policy concerning the establishment of force protection conditions and inconsistencies in force protection terminology to include CINC force protection standards that apply to all supporting forces, are currently not included in Joint Doctrine.
  
- (U) THE ROAD AHEAD: JOINT LESSONS LEARNED PROCESS
  - (U) In accordance with CJCSI 3150.25A, *Joint Lessons Learned Program*, 1 October 2000, "each real-world operation precipitated by an Execute Order or Deployment Order requires an interim report if the operation is greater than 180 days. Combatant commands are required to submit an "Interim" Joint After-Action Review (JAAR) to the Joint Center for Lessons Learned (JCLL) for operations exceeding 180 days in duration."

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- (U) The Joint Lessons Learned Program is a process established for the collection and dissemination of observations, lessons learned and issues generated by joint operations, exercises, training events and other sources.
- (U) While this paper is one of many "first reports" on observations concerning the GWOT, on or about 10 March 2002, all CINCs are required to begin development of JAARs. CINCs will subsequently submit JAARs to the JCLL on or before 8 June 2002. A message will be dispatched reminding the CINCs of this requirement.

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December 9, 2004

TO: President George W. Bush  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Trip to Afghanistan Inauguration, Kuwait and India  
December 5 - 9, 2004

**AFGHANISTAN.** Attending the inauguration of Hamid Karzai, the first freely elected leader in the 5,000-year history of Afghanistan, was an extraordinary experience. [

In Kabul the Vice President, Zai Khalilzad and I had an upbeat bilateral with President-elect Karzai before his inauguration. He said, "Now life is working. Before the US came to Afghanistan, we were like a still-life picture; when you arrived, everything came to life. With your help, we have come so far." I've attached a slide that captures the progress in Afghanistan.

Much of our discussion focused on dealing with counter-narcotics, the need for an ongoing strategic partnership between our two nations, and the Afghan economy. Karzai is focused on stopping the narcotics trade in his country.

The inauguration was moving. President Karzai's speech pledged his life and honor to serving his native land, and he graciously thanked the US. He hosted a private lunch for the US delegation. It was a day I will never forget. You can be extraordinarily proud of what you have accomplished in Afghanistan.

**KUWAIT.** The Kuwaiti Prime Minister and Minister of Defense expressed happiness at your re-election and sent along their best wishes to you and your family. On Iraq, the Prime Minister cautioned against reposing too much hope in the long-term chances for peace and stability, given the disparate religious and ethnic factions. He said, "Beheadings are nothing new in Iraq," and that he felt the security situation would deteriorate further after elections. He advised us to get our troops out of the Iraqi cities and get the Iraqi Security Forces fully into the fight. I told him you are strongly against a delay in the elections.

On the Palestinian issue, he spoke hopefully of the chances for a new peace process. He closed by railing against Al-Jazeera, encouraging us to press the Qataris to "slam them hard." His parting comments centered on his desire to

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obtain the release of 14 Kuwaiti detainees; the interagency has reviewed their cases and believes they should not be released in the near future.

**INDIA.** In India, the genuine warmth of the meetings with all the new top leadership was extraordinary. They were grateful to have the first Cabinet-level visit so quickly after our election. We are clearly at an opportune moment in US-Indian relations to take our relationship – a critical one for the world – to a new level. The Minister of Defense, the Minister of External Affairs, the National Security Advisor, and the Prime Minister – all were on a single sheet of music. Each warmly congratulated you on your re-election and spoke hopefully about your visiting India in the near future. Their key points were a strong desire to deepen and expand defense cooperation; satisfaction with the course of events in Afghanistan; a sincerely expressed hope that Iraq will stabilize soon; and a desire that we not allow our obviously close relationship with Pakistan to create issues with India – particularly with regard to arms sales.

All four, and especially the Prime Minister, spoke hopefully about the Indian-Pakistan relationship and their respect for President Musharraf. Each also emphasized that India's 145 million Muslims are an important force within their country, and that India is the second largest Muslim country in the world. The Prime Minister seems committed to pursuing better relations with Pakistan, saying he could "take Indian popular opinion with me when the time is right."

I left India with a strong sense that relations between our nations have never been better. I hope you will be able to visit India soon. Your presence could further facilitate a rapprochement between India and Pakistan, as well as encourage India to continue on a pro-Western path.

Respectfully,

Enclosure a/s

- CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney
- Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)
- Honorable Porter Goss
- Dr. Condoleezza Rice

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OCT 15 2004

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Trip to Bahrain, Iraq, Macedonia, and NATO Ministerial Meetings in Romania

**BAHRAIN.** Flying out of Bahrain, we hosted a unique gathering of 18 Ministers of Defense, all from countries in our Iraq coalition, aboard the carrier **KENNEDY**, underway . The visit was highlighted by a SVTC briefing by General Casey on his campaign strategy, which helped them understand our path forward. They were most appreciative.

The King of Bahrain said something that evening quite eloquent about the U.S. effort in Iraq:

"You Americans have given the best of everything to the Iraqis. You have sent the bravest and best soldiers in the world to help them. You rebuilt their schools and hospitals. You have provided electricity and water and helped put their oil industry back together. You have given them everything they need. Now the Iraqis must take what you have given them and finish the job themselves. The Iraqis must be the ones to make their country work. People should stop blaming the Americans. It is the Iraqis' responsibility to make it work. No one can make it work for them."

**IRAQ.** We covered much of the country 

 where U.S. Marines are conducting operations throughout the Sunni triangle. The Marines were superb and motivated. I had the Iraqi Defense Minister with me and brought him on the stage during my Town Hall meeting. He was warmly greeted and touched by the welcome. The Marines are a significant part of General Casey's plan to take Fallujah and are ready to go.

Viewed from the air, Baghdad is a vibrant, seemingly thriving city – full of commerce, traffic jams, and satellite dishes. We had a good meeting with Prime Minister Allawi and his national security team. I emphasized my view that he and we cannot allow the Fallujah safe haven for terrorists to continue, and, once we start to clean it out, we must finish the job. There is no way there could be an acceptable "negotiated solution" as the endgame. He seems to understand, but his national security adviser is counseling to wait for more Iraqi forces. I'm convinced we should not wait. If we do, the risk is that the Sunnis will believe they can oppose the Iraqi government and therefore stay out of the January elections, where they worry they will be marginalized. Only if they see they

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have no choice will they get into the political process. We discussed his letter to you asking for more mechanized Iraqi forces and are working on some options for moving in that direction.

I also went up north to [REDACTED] the highlight was hearing about some encouraging operations, including a mission involving 1,500 Iraqi security forces breaking up a significant kidnapping ring -- with minimal U.S. assistance. I spent time with senior Iraqi Security Force commanders, who are leading aggressive operations against criminals and insurgents. Their determination is impressive. I also reviewed some of their troops -- Police, National Guard, (and Special Operations) [REDACTED] I was impressed with the Korean Division -- over 3,000 strong. They had 17 volunteers for every opening in the force, according to their General.

**MACEDONIA.** My stop in Macedonia included pinning a Bronze Star on a Macedonian Special Forces sergeant who had saved several U.S. soldiers during an ambush in Iraq. The Macedonians are enthusiastic about their participation in the Global War on Terror and their desires to join NATO. Although a small nation, they are solid in their support.

**ROMANIA.** In Bucharest, I found the Romanian President upbeat about their participation in the GWOT. They are stalwart allies. I met with Romanian troops who had recently returned from Iraq and Afghanistan. Proud of their service, the Romanians remain strong supporters of and contributors to our work in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are offering an interesting basing opportunity for us on the Black Sea, which would afford good access to the CENTCOM area of operations. They hosted two days of NATO Defense Ministerial meetings, where the main themes were Afghanistan and Iraq. While the French and Germans continue to be obstructionist, we are making progress on several key points, including focusing allies on greater involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, and better use of the NATO Response Force in real world contingencies.

**RUSSIAN DISCUSSION.** Prior to departing the NATO meeting, I had a long, interesting, forward-looking meeting with Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov. We discussed a variety of topics, ranging from the success of recent joint U.S. and Russian Naval Exercises in the North Atlantic, to further cooperation in the GWOT. I will report separately on the details of that meeting.

It was a very good trip.

Respectfully,

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

~~OVERALL CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL~~



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October 31, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
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# *Gaps and Seams in Protecting the US Homeland*

**Briefing to the President  
August 11, 2005**

**Ryan Henry, Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy**

7/19/05

~~OVERALL CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL~~

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# Purpose

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- Discuss DoD's homeland defense roles and missions
- Identify current gaps and seams in protecting the US homeland
- Propose recommendations for closing gaps and seams

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Reviewed Ch RDD, WHS  
Date: Oct. 31, 2008  
IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

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# Assumptions

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Over the time span of the QDR (20 years), an effective defense of the homeland would have the following elements:

- **Clear lines of authority and responsibility among DoD, other Federal agencies, and state and local partners**
  - Focused and clearly delineated responsibilities across the US Government
- **Government-wide shared situational awareness for threats to the US**
  - Including intelligence sharing
- **Integrated and adaptive planning efforts in the interagency**
  - Including proactive DoD capability and capacity building efforts for civilian partners
    - Planning, training, exercises, operational command and control, niche capabilities
- **Active/reserve component mix optimized for meeting the nation's overseas and homeland responsibilities**
- **Civilian (short- and long-term) manpower surge capacity for medical, transport, etc.**
  - Analogous to Civil Reserve Air Fleet / Civil Air Patrol / Coast Guard Auxiliary-type arrangements

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# Homeland Defense and Civil Support Strategy

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DoD Objectives for Protecting the United States are organized within the “*Lead, Support, Enable*” construct:

- **Lead**: Defend the United States from armed attack
  - Achieve maximum **awareness** of potential threats, in coordination with the intelligence community
  - **Intercept and defeat** threats at a safe distance from US, its territories and possessions
  - Achieve **mission assurance** (including our capability to project power when directed)
- **Support**: At the direction of the President or the Secretary of Defense, provide defense support of civil authorities
  - Ensure DOD’s ability to **support civil authorities** in domestic chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear or high explosive (CBRNE) consequence management
- **Enable**: Improve domestic and foreign partner capabilities for homeland defense and homeland security
  - Share expertise and technology

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Date: OCT. 31, 2008  
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# Homeland Security: What DoD Does Not Do

## The Department of Homeland Security's primary mission is to

Source: Homeland Security Act of 2002

- Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States
- Reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism
- Minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur

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## DoD does not have the responsibility or authority to:

- Stop terrorists from coming across or operating clandestinely within our borders (DHS/DOJ Lead)
- Stop terrorists from coming through US ports of entry (DHS Lead)
- Stop terrorists from hijacking aircraft, vessels, and vehicles inside or outside the United States (DHS/DOJ Lead)
- Conduct law enforcement activities in the United States (DHS/DOJ Lead)



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# DoD Lead: Homeland Defense

- **Homeland defense is the protection of U.S. sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression.**
  - These threats can be nation-states or non-state actors.
- **Authorities:**
  - U.S. Constitution, Article II, Section 2, Clause 1 (Commander-in-Chief)
  - War on Terror (P.L. 107-40)
  - Presidential Directives
- **Examples of HD missions include:**
  - Maritime Intercept Operations
  - Combat Air Patrols
  - Ballistic missile defense
  - Defense critical infrastructure protection
  - Use of military forces, when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, to protect the U.S. from attack.



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# DoD Support: Defense Support of Civil Authorities

- **DoD provides defense support of civil authorities (civil support) when:**
  - Civil authorities are overwhelmed
  - DoD has unique capabilities
  - Directed by the President or Secretary of Defense
- **Authorities include:**
  - Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act, 50 USC 2314
  - Stafford Act, 42 USC 5121 et. seq.
  - Economy Act, 31 USC 1535-36
  - Insurrection Act, 10 USC 331-334
  - Presidential Directives
- **Examples of DOD Civil Support missions include:**
  - Consequence management for catastrophes, including CBRNE attacks
  - Equipment, training, and other materiel support to domestic law enforcement
  - Navy support to U.S. Coast Guard for law enforcement and homeland security



## Areas of Increased DoD Emphasis:

- **Work with other agencies to increase their manpower surge capacity**

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Date: *Oct. 31, 2008*  
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# DoD Enable: Interagency Partners

- **DoD works with the US civil sector (federal, state, local, tribal, and private) to improve Homeland Security capabilities**
  - DoD shares its unique technology and expertise
  - DoD acquires skills from the law enforcement, medical, and other communities



- **Authorities:**

- 2003 National Defense Authorization Act, Section 1401(Technology Transfer)

- **Improve interagency partner capabilities, to include:**

- CBRNE response
- Intelligence analysis
- UAV capabilities
- Biometric technologies
- Counter-MANPADS research and development

### Areas of Increased DoD Emphasis

- **Improve interagency strategic and operational planning**
- **Share DoD expertise (command and control; exercises)**
- **Strengthen shared situational awareness and intelligence fusion**
- **Develop a "civilian reserve" for homeland security**



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# Remaining Gaps and Seams: Recommendations

---

- **Land Defense and Border Security**

- HSC draft a presidential directive defining responsibilities to prevent land attacks (e.g., conventional bombs) and strengthen border security

- **Air Security**

- HSC draft a presidential directive defining responsibilities and cost-sharing to provide:
  - Air surveillance capabilities
  - Common operating picture
  - Real-time communication for emerging threats
- DoD prioritize domestic air defense activities; determine prudent investment vs. risk

- **Render-Safe**

- NSC/HSC draft a presidential directive clarifying responsibilities for rendering safe weapons of mass destruction. In particular:
  - Assign responsibilities for render safe actions within our territorial waters
  - Clarify current distinction between DoD and DoJ for domestic response

- **Domestic Counterterrorism**

- NSC/HSC draft updated counterterrorism policy to:
  - Reflect the creation of DHS and clarify domestic counterterrorism responsibilities among DHS, DoJ, and DoD

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# Way Ahead

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- **NSC/HSC direct and DoD facilitate an interagency analytic effort based on National Planning Scenarios (focus on four of the most significant scenarios)**
- **DoD, working with DHS and DoJ, provide recommendations for the development of a National Homeland Security Plan focused on the prevention of terrorist attacks**
  - Similar in scope to the National Response Plan, which is focused on response to terrorist attacks
- **DoD work with interagency partners to identify innovative ways to meet manpower surge requirements and current capabilities shortfalls**

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# Back-Up Slides


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# DoD's Homeland Security / Defense Paradigm

## Active, Layered Defense of the United States





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# Key Initiatives

---

- **Improve interagency strategic/operational planning**
- **Share DoD expertise**
  - CBRNE response
  - Command and control, operation centers
  - Exercise design, integration, analysis, and evaluation
- **Shared situational awareness / Intelligence fusion**
- **Development of “civilian reserve”**
- **Leveraging the private industry**
- **Research and development for genetically engineered biothreats and detection of fissile material**

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# Possible End State Highlighting Gaps / Seams

	<p><b>LEAD</b></p>	<p><b>SUPPORT</b></p>	<p><b>ENABLE</b></p>
<b>Current</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Air Defense</li> <li>• Maritime Defense</li> <li>• Land Defense</li> <li>• Continuity of Operations</li> <li>• International Defense Cooperation</li> <li>• Mission Assurance (force protection &amp; force projection)</li> <li>• Overseas intelligence sharing</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All-hazards disaster mitigation</li> <li>↑ CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces</li> <li>• 55 WMD-Civil Support Teams (NG)</li> <li>↓ 1 Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (USMC)</li> <li>• 12 CBRNE Enhanced Response Forces (Guard CERFPs)</li> <li>• Law Enforcement Support</li> <li>• Continuity of Government</li> <li>• National Security Special Events</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• DHS intelligence analysis capabilities</li> <li>• Training and simulation technologies</li> <li>• UAV technologies</li> <li>• Counter-MANPADS research and development</li> <li>• Biometric technologies</li> </ul>
<b>Adjustment</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>↑ Overseas intelligence collection</li> <li>↑ CBRNE detection at DoD installations</li> <li>↑ Low altitude air threats (point/area defense)</li> <li>↑ Defense critical infrastructure protection</li> <li>↑ National Guard performance of homeland defense missions in Title 32</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>↓ DoD role in distribution of prophylactic and medicine</li> <li>↔ DoD role in support for border security (e.g., Winter Freeze)</li> <li>↔ NORTHCOM (JTF-North) role in domestic counterterrorism</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>↑ Improvement of interagency strategic/operational planning and interoperability</li> <li>↑ Share DoD expertise               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>↑ Command and control</li> <li>↑ Exercise design, integration, analysis, and evaluation</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>QDR Focus</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>↑ Genetically engineered biothreats</li> <li>↑ Detection of fissile material</li> <li>↓ Reassessment of air defense and domestic force/installation protection</li> <li>↑ Maximize air and maritime domain awareness</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Analysis to specify DoD capabilities for domestic CBRNE Consequence Management</li> <li>• Evaluation of National Guard assets for domestic Consequence Management</li> <li>↓ Manpower Surge Force</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>↑ Development of civilian CBIRF-like capability in NCR</li> <li>↑ Enhanced int'l partner capacity for maritime security / interdiction</li> <li>↑ Horizontal integration</li> <li>↑ Information assurance</li> <li>↑ Development of "civilian reserve"</li> </ul>

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MAY 24 2006

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AUTHORITY E.O. 12958  
Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

INFO MEMO

DSD \_\_\_\_\_

USDP EG MAY 25 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *PRM* MAY 24 2006

SUBJECT: Disbanding the Iraqi Army

- You asked that we review relevant briefing and meeting notes from 2003 to determine how the decision to disband the Iraqi army was made and approved.
- The relevant material is attached.
- Our review yielded the following chronology:
  - ~~(S)~~ 21 Jan 2003: OSD Policy/Joint Staff produced a draft brief "Rebuilding the Iraqi Military" recommending the elimination of organizations tainted with crimes of the Ba'ath regime (e.g., the security services) but retaining the regular army.
  - ~~(S)~~ 3 Mar 2003: OSD Policy produced a "Draft Agreement between USG and Iraqi Interim Authority" which called for disestablishing the Ba'ath party and the military and security agencies tainted with the crimes of the Ba'ath regime (but retaining the regular army).
  - ~~(S)~~ 7 Mar 2003: The Joint Staff produced an updated version to the 21 Jan 2003 brief. The new brief, renamed "Reshaping the Iraqi Military," recommended that, following combat operations, Iraq's regular army should "maintain its current status in assembly areas and permanent garrisons."
  - ~~(S)~~ 7 May 2003: OSD Policy produced a draft De-Ba'athification policy guidance paper recommending dismantling Saddam-era organizations tainted with the crimes of the Ba'ath regime (not including disbanding the regular army).
    - Note: The above papers and briefings were discussed at daily Executive Steering Group meetings held in the Pentagon and chaired by the NSC staff.
  - 19 May 2003: Ambassador Bremer informed you that he intended to issue an order dissolving Iraqi military and security organizations (including the regular army) as part of the de-Ba'athification effort.
  - 23 May 2003: Ambassador Bremer signed CPA order #2 officially dissolving key Iraqi security ministries including the regular army.
    - Note: Ambassador Bremer did not vet/coordinate CPA order #2 or the decision to disband the army with OSD Policy or the Joint Staff.

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
**Contents**

- Tab A: "Rebuilding the Iraqi Military" (OSD Policy/Joint Staff)
- Tab B: "Draft Agreement between USG and Iraqi Interim Authority" (OSD Policy)
- Tab C: "Reshaping the Iraqi Military" (Joint Staff)
- Tab D: Draft De-Ba'athification policy guidance (OSD Policy)
- Tab E: "Dissolution of the Ministry of Defense and Related Entities"  
(Bremer memo)
- Tab F: CPA Order Number 2
- Tab G: Walter Slocombe, "To Build an Army," Washington Post, 5 Nov 2003

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Prepared by: [REDACTED]



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**POLICY COORDINATION SHEET**

**Subject: Disbanding the Iraqi Army**  
**Control Number: I-06/005073-ES**

<b><u>Title/Organization</u></b>	<b><u>Name</u></b>	<b><u>Date</u></b>
JCS J-5 Iraq Division	<u>Has seen</u> LTC Roger Watkins	<u>5/23/06</u>

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Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~FOUO~~

APR 24 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
Eric Edelman  
LTG Skip Sharp

CC: Larry Di Rita

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Disbanding the Iraq Army

Here is a statement in an article in the April 21 *New York Times* that does not ring true to me.  
The full article is attached.

"The decision of L. Paul Bremer III, the head of the occupation authority, to disband the Iraq army only added to the deficit of forces. That decision was approved by Mr. Rumsfeld. Neither Condoleezza Rice, then the national security adviser, nor the Joint Chiefs were consulted about the decision."

It is difficult for me to imagine that I approved something of this nature without the kind of interaction we normally have around here that involves the Chairman or the Vice Chairman.

It would be helpful if people who may have been involved at the time (probably May 2003) would review briefing and meeting notes from that period to refresh all of our memories on the way this issue may have been discussed with Jerry Bremer.

Please give your material to Larry Di Rita, so he can organize it and give it to me all at one time.

Thanks.

Attach. Gordon, Michael R. "Criticizing an Agent of Change as Failing To Adapt," *New York Times*, April 21, 2006.

DSRL:G  
042106-10

.....  
Please Respond By 05/25/06

~~FOUO~~

OSD 08468-06

New York Times  
April 21, 2006

News Analysis

## Criticizing An Agent Of Change As Failing To Adapt

By Michael R. Gordon

In defending himself against his critics, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld has described himself as an agent of change and suggested that the complaints come from old thinkers who oppose reforming the military.

"Change is difficult," Mr. Rumsfeld said Tuesday. "It also happens to be urgently necessary."

It is true that since the day he arrived at the Pentagon, the defense secretary has been a man on a mission. Convinced that the generals were locked in a cold-war mindset — "legacy thinking," he dubbed it — Mr. Rumsfeld promoted the virtues of relying on precision weapons and fast-paced operations instead of huge numbers of troops.

Instead of endorsing Clinton-style nation building, Mr. Rumsfeld said the United States should rely more on the locals to shoulder the burden after "regime change."

But as a half-dozen retired Army and Marine generals have called for Mr. Rumsfeld's resignation, some criticize him in his own terms. The change-agent defense secretary, they say, is resistant to change.

Mr. Rumsfeld, the critics assert, was slow to acknowledge a growing insurgency in Iraq and to counter it. The military is overstretched by the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan, but Mr. Rumsfeld has also resisted expanding the Army and Marines.

Paul D. Boston, a retired two-star Army general who used to command the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Ga., and later helped train the new Iraqi military, said in an interview, "I was stunned," when a Pentagon review did not call for enlarging the Army and Marines. General Boston, who called for Mr. Rumsfeld's resignation in March, said, "They failed to account for the contemporary operating environment."

While the conduct of the war has provoked the critics, tensions between officers and their civilian bosses began long before Iraq. Mr. Rumsfeld's pursuit of his "transformation" agenda stirred some of it.

So did the manner in which he executed it, viewed by many officers as overbearing. Calling himself "genetically impatient," Mr. Rumsfeld gave a talk the day before the Sept. 11 attacks in which he said the Pentagon bureaucracy was a threat to national security.

Douglas Macgregor, a retired Army colonel who has long argued that Army leaders were unimaginative and too cautious, recalls a Rumsfeld aide's jesting that the defense secretary thought the Army's problems could be solved by lining up 50 generals and gunning them down.

Certainly, there are experts who have argued that the Pentagon has long been in need of change. Mr. Rumsfeld's agenda to reshape the military, in fact, has long been shared by President Bush.

In a 1999 speech, Mr. Bush pledged to develop light, mobile and lethal units that could be quickly deployed. He vowed to appoint a secretary of defense who would change the military structure. Once in office, Mr. Bush decided that the strong-willed Mr. Rumsfeld was the man.

The new secretary wasted no time promoting his program. He was enamored of missile defense and precision weapons. He was skeptical about the Army leadership, which he considered old-fashioned, wedded to heavy forces and slow to change. The Army was pursuing its own version of transformation, but it fell short of what Mr. Rumsfeld had in mind.

### Tension Developed

Some longstanding critics of the Army leadership felt they finally had an ally at the top with Mr. Rumsfeld in charge. But soon there was friction between the new defense secretary and the generals he viewed as Clinton holdovers. As the United States began to plan its Afghan operation, Gen. Hugh Shelton, an Army general who was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when Mr. Rumsfeld first took up his post at the Pentagon, became concerned that Mr. Rumsfeld's transformation agenda would get a field test before the military was ready.

Days before he retired, General Shelton ran into Maj. Gen. Deil Dailey, the two-star head of the Joint Special Operations Command, in the White House parking lot. The Afghan war plan depended heavily on Special Operations forces, and General Shelton warned that the military had to resist the defense secretary's push to pare forces. Lives and the success of the mission hung in the balance, he argued.

Mr. Rumsfeld would later argue that the Afghan operation had been a major success as the United States toppled the Taliban and eliminated Al Qaeda's camps by relying on Special Operations forces, Afghan allies, air strikes — and by avoiding the commitment of substantial ground forces. Critics, though, argued that the absence of adequate American soldiers had made it easier for Osama bin Laden to escape.

By the time the Iraq war approached, Richard B. Myers, an Air Force general, had been installed as the new Joint Chiefs chairman. Mr. Rumsfeld's supporters considered General Myers and his eventual successor, Gen. Peter Pace of the Marine Corps, to be helpful in overcoming deeply entrenched institutional resistance to transformation.

### Dissent Discouraged

Critics say Mr. Rumsfeld discouraged dissent by elevating those who supported his program. "He tended to surround himself with those that support his agenda," said Maj. Gen. John Batista, former commander of First Infantry Division and one of the retired generals who has criticized Mr. Rumsfeld. "He was involved with the selection of flag officers to an unprecedented level."

With his team in place, Mr. Rumsfeld summoned the senior military leadership to his Pentagon office in late 2001 to review the military's contingency plan for war with Iraq.

As Greg Newbold, the retired three-star general who served as chief operations deputy for the Joint Chiefs, outlined the plan, which called for as many as 500,000 troops, it was clear that Mr. Rumsfeld was increasingly irritated. He said he did not see why more than 125,000 troops would be required.

"My regret is that at the time I did not say, 'Mr. Secretary, if you try to put a number on a mission like this you may cause enormous mistakes,'" General Newbold recalled in an interview. "Give the military

the task, give the military what you would like to see them do, and then let them come up with it. I was the junior military guy in the room, but I regret not saying it."

Former aides to Mr. Rumsfeld said he never told Gen. Tommy Franks, the head of the Central Command, how many troops to deploy. But Mr. Rumsfeld repeatedly asked why the force could not be smaller and deployed more quickly. He also planted ideas and sent papers — a process his aides called "suasion" — in line with his agenda. General Franks initially proposed a force of up to 385,000 troops. That number shrank as the war plan morphed from a version called the Generated Start, to the Running Start, to the Hybrid, to Cobra II. Newt Gingrich, the former House speaker who was an adviser to Mr. Rumsfeld, described the discussions between General Franks and the defense secretary as one of "constant negotiation."

In a departure from typical practice, President Bush gave Mr. Rumsfeld and not the secretary of state responsibility for post-war Iraq. A month before the invasion, Mr. Rumsfeld outlined his philosophy in a speech called "Beyond Nation Building." By avoiding a large troop presence and major reconstruction, the United States would guard against the creation of a culture of dependence on the part of the Iraqis.

Eleven days after that speech, Gen. Eric K. Shinseki, the Army chief of staff, appeared before Congress and was asked how many troops might be required to secure post-war Iraq. His response was several hundred thousand. On Mr. Rumsfeld's instruction, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz complained about the remark to Thomas E. White, the Army secretary, the next morning. General Shinseki, Mr. Wolfowitz said, had spoken out of turn and was off base. (Mr. White dug in his heels in support of the general and was fired by Mr. Rumsfeld soon after Baghdad fell.)

#### Rumsfeld's Plan Different

For all of the controversy, General Shinseki's numbers were similar to those generated by the Central Command. General Franks had projected that the attack would begin with just a portion of the invasion force, which would grow to 250,000 troops by the time Saddam Hussein's force was defeated and the United States began to stabilize Iraq. There was, however, a subtle but significant difference. Secretary Rumsfeld hoped to off-ramp — that is, cancel the deployment — of some units if the Iraqi military's resistance crumbled, and he wanted to reduce the occupying force as quickly as possible.

As the war unfolded, there were enough troops to defeat the Republican Guard and take the Iraqi capital. But as American forces advanced on Baghdad, Secretary Rumsfeld pressed the question of off-ramping the First Cavalry Division, which was the final division in the war plan. General Franks went along. Lt. Gen. David McKiernan, the chief allied land war commander, was unhappy about the move, but did not protest.

The United States soon found there were not enough soldiers to control the borders, establish order in the capital or deprive the enemy of sanctuaries. The decision of L. Paul Bremer III, the head of the occupation authority, to disband the Iraq army only added to the deficit of forces. That decision was approved by Mr. Rumsfeld. Neither Condoleezza Rice, then the national security adviser, nor the Joint Chiefs were consulted about the decision.

For months, Mr. Rumsfeld and General Myers refrained from describing the resistance in Iraq as an insurgency. Finally, on July 16, 2003, Gen. John P. Abizaid, who succeeded General Franks at the Central Command, told a Pentagon news conference that the United States was dealing with a "classical guerrilla-type campaign."

Some former generals say that General Franks and other military leaders bear responsibility for many of the miscalculations in Iraq. Gen. Jack Keane, the former acting Army chief of staff, said that the Bush administration's aversion to nation building was wrong for Iraq. But he faults the generals, including himself, for failing to develop a comprehensive plan for a potential insurgency.

"The fact is that the Ba'athist insurgency surprised us and we had not developed a comprehensive option for dealing with this possibility," he said. "This was not just an intelligence community failure, but also our failure as senior military leaders."

In an Op-Ed article last month in *The New York Times*, General Eaton wrote that another factor contributed to the problems: "I have seen a climate of groupthink become dominant and a growing reluctance by experienced military men and civilians to challenge the notions of the senior leadership."

*Michael R. Gordon is the chief military correspondent for The New York Times. Reporting for this article is drawn from the book "Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq," which was published by Pantheon Books. He is the co-author with Bernard E. Trainor, a retired Marine lieutenant general and former military correspondent for the newspaper.*

A

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUL 27 2005

TO: Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

~~SUBJECT:~~ Uzbekistan

I think there has been conflicting information around as to what may have taken place in Andijon, Uzbekistan.

I would like somebody to do a quick 72-hour look at all the available information and let me see what we actually know and what we don't know. We would not want policy to be made off of what people think happened, and not what may have actually happened.

Thanks.



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Joint Staff  
and OSD per  
21 Jan 2




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Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

# Rebuilding the Iraqi Military

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


## *A Phased Transition*

Rebuilding the Iraqi military will involve a phased transition:

- **Phase I: US military dominance to provide stability, security, and order.**
- **Phase II: Transitional process involving a growing role for civilian administration. Over time, there will be a gradually increasing transfer of responsibilities for various functions to other countries in the coalition, possibly to UN organizations, and ultimately to Iraqis (who will initially be in an advisory role).**
- **Phase III: All post war responsibilities are in the hands of a popularly supported, broad based, Iraqi government**


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Dec 1, 2008  
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## *Variables: Reforming vs. Creating a New Army*

- How regime change is effected.
  - If military leadership plays a positive role in effecting regime change, more of the existing military structure will survive the conflict.
  - U.S. emphasis would be on reforming structure, perhaps reducing its size.
- How the conflict is terminated.
  - Formal surrender by a high-ranking military officer may preserve some of the existing military structure from disintegration.
- What happens to the Iraqi military in the process.
  - Desertions may reduce size of the Iraqi military – whole units may disappear.
  - If so, U.S. emphasis might be on creating a new army.

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# PHASE I

**Provide Stability, Security, and Order**


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Date: ON 18 January 2013



# De-Ba'athifying the Military (Phase I)

- Eliminate current intelligence/security organizations and elite military units.



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x1

- Determine fate of personnel from these organizations.

x5

- Prosecute some for [REDACTED]
- Retrain in various civilian skills facilitating reintegration.
  - Employment is crucial to averting crime and terrorism.
  - Must ensure they do not engage in subversion against a post-Saddam government.

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Chief, Declass. Br.  
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


## *Retain Forces to Build Upon (Phase I)*

- Retain (after vetting).
  - Civilian police.
  - General Security (reorganized as a domestic security).
  - General Intelligence (reorganized as a civilian foreign intelligence organization).
  - Military Intelligence.
  - Republican Guard (disestablish the Republic Guard, but integrate some of the personnel into the new Iraqi army).
  - Regular Army.
  - The Border Guard.
- Suspend conscription.

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


## *Disarm, Demobilize, Reintegrate (Phase I)*

- **Disarm:** Troops to return to and stay in garrison.
  - U.S./coalition forces to collect and stockpile arms or supervise destruction in place.
- **Demobilize:** How many troops must be demobilized will depend on what happens to the Iraqi army during the conflict.
  - Desertions may have already reduced the size of the force sufficiently.
  - If not, may wish to maintain a larger force than ultimately desirable.
    - Troops may be used for reconstruction projects in the interim.
- **Reintegrate:** Pace of demobilization determined by
  - Ability to provide training for civilian jobs.
  - State of the economy (number of jobs available).

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


## PHASE II

# Increase Role of Civilian Administration

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
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## *Civilian Police (Phase II)*


- Civilian police force will gain the internal security role.
  - Armed Forces will not retain this responsibility.
  - Civilian police may have atrophied under Saddam -- may require rebuilding.
- After dismantling by coalition, all police and security forces will need reform.
  - Vet all members of the police and security forces and remove human rights offenders.
  - Make forces more professional and effective.
  - Establish the rule of law.
  - Create mechanisms for accountability to community/elected representatives.
- Campaign to induce Iraqis to turn in weapons (e.g., buy-back program).

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


## *Establishing a New Military (Phase II)*

- Principle: professional force based on merit, not ethnicity or religion.
- However, in the interim, ensure all sectarian, and ethnic blocs are represented.
  - Accomplish through an informal quota-type system.
    - Over time, the officer corps should reflect the make-up of Iraqi society.
  - This will require recruitment or promotion of Shi'a and Kurdish officers.
- Re-establish and re-organize regular army units after thorough vetting.
  - Release arms from stockpiles to these units.
- Provide professional military education.
  - Inculcate respect for civilian control over the military.
  - Support new political institutions, and respect for human and civil rights.



# Establishing New Security Organizations (Phase II)



E6129SC • Principle: Establish professional security organizations:

XS - ( [REDACTED] )

- Focus on issues of national security:

x1 • Detecting and preventing interference from ( [REDACTED] )



x1 • Dealing with threats from ( [REDACTED] )

• Preventing criminalization of the economy (i.e., avoiding problems faced by Russia in aftermath of fall of Communism.)

• Will required close supervision by the Civil Administrator.

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


## PHASE III

Nearly all post war responsibilities passed  
to free Iraqi government.

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
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
## *Variables*

- What defense relationship will the U.S. have with the new Iraqi government?
- Will Iraq depend in part on a U.S. commitment to its security?
    - If so, its own forces can be smaller than would otherwise be required.
  - Will Iraq be a sufficient close ally that it would be in the U.S. interest for Iraq to be strong militarily?
    - Should the U.S. try to limit the Iraqi military to a defensive role?
    - Or should the U.S. encourage Iraq to play a major military role in Middle East?
  - Will the U.S. seek to base forces in Iraq for the long term?
    - If so, need SOFA.
  - Will the U.S. seek an agreement with the new Iraqi government that constrains its decisions on military matters?

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# Overall Approach (Phase III)



Two basic alternatives:

- Defensive military doctrine and force structure.
  - Orient toward defending Iraq from external threats 
  - Reorganize logistical system to support forces deployed along Iraq's borders.
- Robust force structure, designed to shoulder part of U.S. burden in the Middle East.
  - Help protect shipping in Persian Gulf.
  - Help U.S. exert influence in region.
- Briefing proceeds on basis of the first alternative:
  - Uncertain whether Iraq would be a sufficiently reliable ally to be a candidate for "burden sharing" in the Middle East.
  - Iran unlikely to pose a major threat to Iraq, given Iran's military deficiencies and internal problems.

**NOTE:** These slides describe a vision of the future Iraqi army based on the first alternative.

- If U.S. negotiates an agreement to constrain future Iraqi military capabilities, this vision would inform U.S. negotiating strategy.
- If not, this vision would inform U.S. efforts in phase II, and U.S. advice to Iraq in Phase III.


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# Sizing the Military - "How Much is Enough" (Phase III)



- Firmly establish a defensive posture; avoid robust offensive capabilities.
- Ensure no internal security role for military; civilian police responsibility.
- Establish a military large enough to counter an Iranian offensive operation, however,

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- Should be unable to threaten vital [REDACTED]

- A key tenet of U.S. policy remains the region's oil flow.

X1

- U.S. should not build up Iraq's navy to counterbalance [REDACTED]

- In a future war, such a capability could be used to disrupt the flow of oil from the Gulf.

X1

- For the foreseeable future, the job of countering the [REDACTED] will be fulfilled by the U.S. Navy.

- Do not allow Iraq to rebuild its missile arsenal.


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## *Increase Reliance on Defensive Systems (Phase III)*

- A defensive Air Force.
  - Short-range fighters, no bomber aircraft or ballistic missiles.
- A defensive Army.
  - Armored forces with short logistical trail (limited HETS).
  - Towed vs. self-propelled artillery.
- A coastal Navy.
  - Patrol craft and missile patrol boats.
  - Mine counter-measure craft.
  - Coastal missile batteries.

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## *Reserve System Structure (Phase III)*

- Create reliance on a reserve system.
  - Frees up personnel for employment in civilian sector.
  - Rebuilds civilian infra-structure essential to reserve mobilization.
    - Communications, road system, rail networks, etc.
  - Hinders the formation of a military class that has a distinctive ideological outlook and corporate interests.

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## *WMD Challenge (Phase III)*

- Enhance Iraq's missile and WMD defenses.
  - Involve Iraq in the Cooperative Defense Initiative (CDI).
  - Enhance Iraq's missile early warning and defense capabilities.
- Implement regional arms control procedures.
  - U.S. must work to reverse the slide toward proliferation in the Gulf.
  - Will make Iraq's renunciation of WMD more acceptable.
- Establish U.S. mil-mil contacts, security cooperation, and security guarantees.
  - U.S. as Iraq's primary patron and supplier of arms.
  - Iraq's willingness to fore swear long-range missiles and WMD assets could depend on formal U.S. security guarantees.

B

**Draft Agreement between USG and "Iraqi Interim Authority" (IIA)**

- **USG recognizes IIA as the legitimate governmental authority of Iraq, pending the ratification by the people of Iraq of a new constitution and the election of a new government in accordance with that constitution.**
  - **USG recognizes IIA as the legitimate governmental authority of all of Iraq, including those areas north of the "green line."**
  - **The term "Government of Iraq" in this agreement refers to the government of which the highest authority is the IIA.**
- **IIA will ensure that the Government of Iraq will:**
  - **Treat all Iraqis equally, regardless of religion or ethnicity.**
  - **Strive to institute in Iraq the rule of law.**
  - **Renounce WMD and support for terrorism.**
  - **Seek to live in peace with its neighbors.**
  - **Return all individuals and property illegally held in Iraq.**
  - **Determine, in cooperation with USG, the whereabouts or fate of Captain Speicher.**
  - **Respect Iraq's international obligations.**
- **IIA will ensure that the Government of Iraq will:**
  - **Disestablish the Ba'ath party.**
  - **Disband military and security agencies that are tainted with the crimes of the Ba'ath regime.**
  - **Break all ties to terrorist groups and prosecute or extradite all terrorist suspects in Iraq.**
  - **Vet all military, security and law enforcement personnel to remove any who are tainted with the crimes of the Ba'ath regime.**
- **IIA undertakes to hold elections for local officials, at least at the town and district level, as soon as possible.**

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OSD Policy  
3 Mar 03

- IIA will remove barriers to travel and commerce between the areas of Iraq north and south of the "green line" and will begin negotiations aiming at the political reunification of Iraq with the authorities in power north of the "green line."
  - The new constitutions to be drafted will apply to the entire territory of Iraq, with no distinctions made between territories south and north of the "green line."
- IIA will, in consultation with USG and other friendly governments, establish a system of courts for prosecuting those who committed atrocities, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, in the service of the Ba'ath regime.
  - IIA may establish a "Truth and Reconciliation" Commission to handle the cases of those who might otherwise be subject to prosecution as above, but whose offenses are judged to be of lesser magnitude.
- USG will vigorously support IIA's claims with respect to:
  - Iraq's seat at the UN.
  - Iraqi assets, including embassies and "frozen" assets, outside of Iraq.
  - All assets, located outside of Iraq, of Saddam Hussein, his family and other members of the Ba'ath regime.
  - All other benefits resulting from being the internationally-recognized government of Iraq.
  - Together with other friendly countries, USG and IIA will jointly develop a proposal for the modification and eventual repeal of all UN Security Council resolutions resulting from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
- USG will support Iraq's right to sell oil on the international marketplace as it sees fit.
  - Pending the rescheduling of Iraq's indebtedness, USG will support the maintenance of Iraqi oil's immunity from seizure currently provided by UN Security Council resolutions.
- USG will work with IIA to:
  - Eliminate UN sanctions against Iraq.
  - Reschedule Iraq's indebtedness to other countries.

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OSD Policy  
3 Mar 03

- Settle, on terms favorable to Iraq, all outstanding claims by other countries for damages suffered as a result of actions of the Ba'ath regime.
- Help Iraq rejoin the international community as a respected member.
- IIA invites USG to lead a coalition military force that will enter Iraq and remain therein until both parties agree that it is no longer necessary or until the new Iraqi government takes office on the basis of the new constitution. This force will:
  - Help maintain law and order.
  - Help maintain the territorial integrity of Iraq and protect it against overt or covert aggression.
  - Effect the elimination of WMD facilities and capabilities, and oversee UNMOVIC and IAEA's efforts to verify the complete elimination of same.
  - Help eliminate terrorist infrastructure in Iraq.
- IIA invites USG to lead a group of friendly countries to assist with humanitarian relief efforts and the economic and political reconstruction of Iraq.
  - IIA will invite USG to send a "Civilian Advisor" to Iraq, who will head an "Office of Civilian Assistance" (OCA).
  - Members of the OCA will come from the U.S. and from other friendly countries.
  - The OCA will provide advisors to departments and agencies of the Iraqi government, as well as to the governors' offices of the areas south of the "green line," in order to assure that these departments, agencies and offices conduct their affairs in accordance with the spirit of this agreement.
  - The ITA and the OCA will appoint the heads of ministries and other major agencies of government. Their respective roles in these appointments are set out in the annex to this agreement.
  - Depending on circumstances, ITA and USG will agree to modify the annex by enhancing the authority of the ITA.

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OSD Policy  
3 Mar 03

**Draft Statements to Accompany the Agreement**

**By the IIA**

- **Proclaims a bill of rights – a list of rights to be enjoyed by all Iraqis. E.g.,**
  - **Freedom of speech and press.**
  - **Freedom of conscience**
  - **Freedom from arbitrary arrest; due process protections.**
  - **Equality under the law.**
- **Announces intention to organize local elections as soon as feasible, depending on local circumstances.**

**By the USG**

- **Congratulates the IIA on its proclamation of a bill of rights.**

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OSD Policy  
3 Mar 03

### Annex on Appointment of Major Officials

- Ministries and other major agencies of government will be divided into three categories.
- Category I: Appointment by ITA in consultation with OCA.
  - Foreign Ministry
  - Religious Affairs
  - Culture
- Category II: Appointment by ITA subject to OCA veto.
  - Health
  - Transportation
  - Agriculture
  - Other infrastructure
- Category III: Appointed by OCA with consent of ITA
  - Finance
  - Oil
  - Defense
  - Interior
- Depending on circumstances, ITA and USG will agree to modify the annex by enhancing the authority of the ITA.

FOI ACT

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Prepared by [REDACTED]

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
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# RESHAPING THE IRAQI MILITARY


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**US GOALS AND STRATEGIC TASK**



"Goals, Objectives, Strategy" Paper on Iraq

29 Aug 02

**US GOALS:**

- MAINTAIN IRAQ'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
- ACCOUNT FOR AND DISMANTLE WMD CAPABILITY
- END IRAQI THREAT TO ITS NEIGHBORS AND FOSTER REGIONAL STABILITY
- END TYRANNY OVER IRAQI PEOPLE AND DEVELOP CAPACITY FOR TRUST OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY LEADERS
- CUT IRAQI LINKS TO AND SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM

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**KEY TASK:**

**REFORM THE IRAQI MILITARY AND DISMANTLE SECURITY INSTITUTIONS**

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**DISARM, DEMOBILIZE AND REINTEGRATE**



**DOWNSIZE THE ARMED FORCES AND DEMILITARIZE  
SOCIETY. CREATE A DE-POLITICIZED ARMED FORCES  
THAT IS:**

- AN APOLITICAL FORCE, SUBORDINATE TO CIVILIAN CONTROL.
- REPRESENTATIVE OF IRAQ'S ETHNIC AND SECTARIAN MAKEUP.
- ABLE TO DEFEND THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE COUNTRY.
- NO LONGER CAPABLE OF POSING AN OFFENSIVE THREAT TO ITS NEIGHBORS.

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
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**MAJOR ISSUES**



- IRAQ IS ONE OF THE MOST HEAVILY MILITARIZED & ARMED SOCIETIES IN THE WORLD.
- DISARMING, DEMOBILIZING AND RE-INTEGRATING (DDR) THE CURRENT FORCES & RE-SHAPING THE NEW MILITARY WILL NOT BE A SIMPLE OR SHORT-TERM PROGRAM.
- DDR TRAJECTORY MUST TAKE ACCOUNT OF:
  - HOW MUCH OF THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES AND SECURITY SERVICES WILL REMAIN INTACT ON CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES?
  - WHAT RESOURCES -- HUMAN, MATERIEL, FINANCIAL -- WILL BE AVAILABLE TO IMPLEMENT DDR?
  - WHAT TYPE OF FORCE SHOULD A NEW IRAQ MAINTAIN?



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**DDR TASKS -- Paramilitary/Security Services**



***DISMANTLE PARAMILITARY FORCES:***

- BATH PARTY MILITIA
- JAYSH TAHRIR AL-QUDS (JERUSALEM LIBERATION ARMY)
- FEDAIYIN SADDAM (SADDAM'S MARTYRS)

***DEMOBILIZE & CONSOLIDATE INTELLIGENCE AND PUBLIC SECURITY SERVICES:***

- GENERAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (GID)
- GENERAL DIRECTORATE OF PUBLIC SECURITY (GDPS)
- MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (MI)
- MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS)

***DISARM AND DEMOBILIZE SOME OPPOSITION FACTIONS:***

- ARMED CIVILIANS, PRO-REGIME TRIBES & KURDISH PRO-REGIME FORCES
- DISMANTLE BADR FORCES
- POSSIBLY INTEGRATE PESHMERGA INTO NEW FORCE

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**DDR TASKS -- The Army**

**REINTEGRATION OF REGULAR ARMY:**

- MAINTAIN CURRENT STATUS IN ASSEMBLY AREAS AND PERMANENT GARRISONS
- CANNOT IMMEDIATELY DEMOBILIZE 250K-300K PERSONNEL AND PUT ON THE STREET
- USE AS NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION FORCE DURING TRANSITIONAL PHASE
  - RECOSTRUCTION IS LABOR INTENSIVE
  - SKILLS MATCH
  - HELPS IDENTIFY LEADERS/UNITS TO RETAIN
  - USES ARMY TO REBILD NATION AND ASSIST POPULATION
- 3-5 REGULAR ARMY DIVISIONS WILL FORM NUCLEUS OF NEW ARMY

**SPECIAL REPUBLICAN GUARD AND REPUBLICAN GUARD:**


- DISARM, DETAIN, DISMANTLE
- PROSECUTE WAR CRIMINALS
- RE-INTEGRATE INTO CIVILIAN LIFE AND PROVIDE PRODUCTIVE EMPLOYMENT (WHERE/IF POSSIBLE)

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
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**RESHAPING STRATEGIES -- National Security Institutions**



**INSTITUTIONAL REFORM TO INCLUDE PROCESS REFORM:**

• **NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL**

CONTROLLED BY NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITY AND CIVILIAN DEPUTIES  
MILITARY & INTELLIGENCE REPRESENTATION

• **MINISTRY OF DEFENSE**

ALL MILITARY FORCES TO BE HEADED BY A CIVILIAN DEFENSE MINISTER  
ALL MILITARY INTELLIGENCE TO BE CONSOLIDATED INTO ONE ORGANIZATION

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ESTABLISH A [REDACTED]

• **MINISTRY OF INTERIOR CONTROLS INTERNAL SECURITY INSTITUTIONS**

NATIONAL POLICE

BORDER GUARDS PARAMILITARY FORCE

SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE BRANCH: MADE UP OF CONSOLIDATION OF GID AND GDPS

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

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**RESHAPING STRATEGIES -- *The Armed Forces***



***RESHAPING ARMED FORCES IMPERATIVES:***

- ENSURE A PROFESSIONAL, APOLITICAL FORCE BASED ON MERIT.
- ABOLISH DISCRIMINATION AND MAKE ARMED FORCES REPRESENTATIVE OF ALL ETHNIC & SECTARIAN GROUPS.
- REVAMP CURRICULA AT MILITARY ACADEMIES, OFFICER TRAINING COURSES, AND STAFF COLLEGES.
- ESTABLISH A PROFESSIONAL NCO CORPS AND EDUCATION SYSTEM.
- MILITARY EDUCATION MUST STRESS ACCEPTANCE OF CIVILIAN CONTROL, RESPECT FOR RULE OF LAW/CIVIL RIGHTS.

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## *A TRAIN AND EQUIP PROGRAM FOR IRAQ?*

### *THE TRAIN AND EQUIP PROGRAM FOR BOSNIA:*

- WAS A SEVEN-YEAR PROGRAM (1995-2002), FUNDED AT ABOUT \$500 MILLION, FROM US AND INTERNATIONAL DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS;
- PROVIDED TANKS, APCS, HOWITZERS, HELICOPTERS AND TRAINING TO A BOSNIAK-CROAT FORCE THAT WAS EVENTUALLY DOWNSIZED TO 45,000;


*IN CONTRAST, IN IRAQ, TRAINING PROGRAM SHOULD BE FUNDED BY THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT. NO EQUIPPING PROGRAM IS NEEDED. IRAQI FUNDING IS INADEQUATE, COALITION FUNDING MAY BE REQUIRED.*

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## DRAFT POLICY GUIDANCE: DE-BAATHIFICATION OF IRAQ

### The Problem:

- Under Saddam Hussein, the Baath Party played a key role in enforcing the writ of the regime, monitoring the population, mobilizing popular support, and socializing Iraqi youth.
  - The Party included approximately 70,000-100,000 full members, and 700,000-1 million affiliates.
  - The Baath Party maintained a pervasive presence in every institution and every city, town, and village in Iraq.
- Former regime Baath Party networks are believed to have organized violence against Coalition forces, and may subvert the Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA), intimidate Iraqis working with the Coalition, and engage in criminal activities.
- Baathist practices and ideology could hinder the transition to democracy in Iraq.
- Failure to implement de-Baathification with urgency and to sever contact with former regime figures trying to reestablish themselves, could turn popular Iraqi opinion against the Coalition.

### Overall Objectives:

- Break the barrier of fear created by the Baath that continues to hold many Iraqis in thrall, hinders cooperation with the Coalition, and precludes effective de-Baathification.
- De-Baathification of Iraqi government and society, by dismantling the Baath Party and its popular and youth organizations, eliminating the party's influence, and breaking up surviving party networks.

### Policy Guidance:

- The following section consists of two parts.
  - The first part provides guidance regarding breaking the barrier of fear—the first step toward de-Baathification.
  - The second provides guidance regarding de-Baathification of Iraqi government

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
and society.

**Policy Guidance—Breaking the Barrier of Fear:**

- **Seek Information:** Actively seek information from Iraqis concerning the identity of Baath Party members, and the crimes and abuses of the Baathist regime, to demonstrate Coalition commitment and obtain information critical to the de-Baathification effort.

— Devote special effort to obtaining Baath Party membership rolls.

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- **Actively Pursue De-Baathification and De-Saddamization of the Government and Society:** Identify and vet party members, senior ministry officials, government and party minders, and former members of the intelligence and security services, IAW guidance set forth below.
  - **Publicize De-Baathification Measures:** Publicize the surrender or detention of senior members of the Baath Party, through press releases to the local media and Commando Solo broadcasts.
  - **Initiate Rewards Programs:** Offer public rewards for information leading to the capture of senior members of the Baath Party, and individuals complicit in the crimes of the former regime.
  - **Ban Symbols of the Old Order:** Ban the display of the image or likeness of Saddam Hussein or other readily identifiable members of the former regime, or symbols of the Baath or the former regime, in government buildings or public spaces.
  - **Reinforce Coalition Presence:** Increase the overall Coalition presence in Iraq—to permit a rapid reaction capability for all cities and larger towns—while minimizing the fixed force footprint in heavily populated areas.
- The augmented presence will reassure Iraqis inclined to work with the Coalition and IIA, and provide a capability to deal with a likely backlash

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against de-Baathification in some areas.

- Whenever possible, routes taken by fixed and rotary wing aviation assets should pass close to population centers to multiply the effect of the Coalition presence, and provide comfort to those Iraqis friendly to the Coalition.
- **Shut Down Arms Bazaars:** Crack down on public arms bazaars, which may provide income for Baathist networks, and which contribute to an ongoing sense of insecurity and lawlessness in Iraq.

**Policy Guidance—De-Baathification of Iraqi Government and Society:**

- **Baath Party Hierarchy:** All full members of the Baath Party (i.e., those holding the rank of 'udw, 'udw 'amil, 'udw firqah, 'udw shu'bah, or 'udw far') will be banned from employment in the public sector or as teachers. They should be removed from any public sector or teaching job they hold, and interviewed;
  - Those who cooperate with the Coalition will be free to return home. Those who are uncooperative, may be detained and held IAW international law, including Geneva Convention III and IV, as appropriate.
  - Exceptions to the ban on employment in the public sector or in teaching jobs will be considered (e.g., for individuals who clandestinely worked for the opposition or the Coalition, who acted to prevent atrocities, or who are deemed acceptable by non-Baathi colleagues and neighbors).
  - More junior party associates may be banned from public sector employment upon acquisition of sufficiently adverse information.
  - In considering the impact of such actions, de-Baathification will take precedence over administrative efficiency or convenience.
  - Those banned from public sector employment may be re-employed in the private sector. Some will require retraining, and assistance in finding gainful employment.
  - The efficacy and impact of these steps should be re-evaluated within two years.
- **Government Ministries:** Individuals holding positions in the top three layers of management at every government ministry (down to the level of Assistant Secretary—or the equivalent US government rank) should be interviewed regarding their relationship to the Party.

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- Full Baath Party members (i.e., those holding the Baath Party rank of 'udw, 'udw 'amil, 'udw firqah, 'udw shu'bah, or 'udw far'), will be removed from their jobs.
- Those in the top three layers of management who are not full party members, should be eligible for reinstatement.
  - Character references should be sought from workplace colleagues and neighbors.
  - Adverse information could lead to the banning of such individuals from public sector employment and, if appropriate, criminal prosecution.
  - Absent adverse information, those who cooperate with the Coalition should be reinstated, or remain eligible for public sector employment elsewhere.
- Those who are uncooperative, may be detained and held IAW international law, including Geneva Convention III and IV, as appropriate.
- More junior ministry members may be banned from public sector employment upon acquisition of sufficiently adverse information.
- **Minders:** Government or party "minders" are to be identified and removed from their jobs, effective immediately.
  - Exceptions will be considered (e.g., for individuals who clandestinely worked for the opposition or the Coalition, who acted to prevent atrocities, or who are deemed acceptable by non-Baathi colleagues and neighbors).
  - Members of the Iraq Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC), assisting the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), will assist with all aspects of the vetting process for Baath Party members, government ministry officials, and government or party minders.
- **Expunging Baathist Ideology:** Text books reflecting Baathist views used by civil and military schools and institutions will be replaced by proper texts.
- **Dismantling Saddamist Institutions:** De-Baathification should also entail "De-Saddamization"—the dismantling of Saddam-era intelligence and security services, including the Special Security Organization, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, General Directorate for Military Intelligence, and Feda'iyyi-Saddam, and the vetting of personnel from these organizations.


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- Those banned from public sector employment may be re-employed in the private sector. Some will require retraining, and assistance in finding gainful employment.
- De-Saddamization will result in the banning of large numbers of individuals from particular tribal groups from Tikrit and nearby towns and villages.
- Special efforts must be made to cultivate individuals and tribes from these areas who were at odds with the former regime, to discredit potential efforts to cast de-Saddamization as a cover for a vendetta directed against these tribal groups, or the Sunni Arab community at large.
- Members of the Iraq Reconstruction and Development Council (IRDC), that are assisting the Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), will assist with all aspects of this vetting process for members of the former regime's intelligence and security services.
- *Vetting New Appointees:* Before appointing an Iraqi to any "significant position" of responsibility as defined in "Implementing Guidance for Appointing Iraqis to Positions of Responsibility," the individual's name, along with as much biographical information as can be obtained (IAW standard biographic reports), should be forwarded to OSD Policy, via USCENCOM, for vetting and approval.
- ORHA, in consultation with local IIA officials, will be responsible for vetting all other applicants (lower- to mid-level positions).
- Should incriminating evidence subsequently be found, the individual should be removed from his job, and tried, if appropriate.
  
- *Complementary Supporting Actions:* To succeed, de-Baathification shall be coupled with:

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19 May 2003

**MEMO FOR:** Secretary Rumsfeld  
**FROM:** Paul Brendel 5/19/03  
**SUBJECT:** Dissolution of the Ministry of Defense and Related Entities

In the coming days I propose to issue the attached order (Tab A) carrying forward the de-Ba'athification effort by dissolving Saddam's key security ministries. I could also implement the policies in Tab B on payments related to the dissolved entities. I believe it is desirable to issue these orders as soon as possible to maintain the momentum of our de-Ba'athification campaign.

The entities to be dissolved were the core of the Saddam system. The property of these entities will vest in the CPA and their employees will be dismissed. The order also makes clear we will begin the process of establishing new armed forces for the new Iraq to provide for legitimate self-defense needs.

The generally positive reaction to the earlier de-Ba'athification order of 16 May 03 leads me to believe this order will generate a good deal of public support, despite its impacting many more people. In any event, it is a critical step in our effort to destroy the underpinnings of the Saddam regime, to demonstrate to the Iraqi people that we have done so, and that neither Saddam nor his gang is coming back.

Some organizations that were undoubtedly in large part also part of the system are left in existence for now. For example, I do not at this time propose to dissolve the Ministry of Interior because it oversees the police, which we are using to help restore order, as well as customs and, incredibly, the sewer system; the Ministry (or commission) of Military Industrialization, because it runs state-owned enterprises with significant civil functions; and the Ministry of Higher Education and Science because it administers universities that we are working to re-open. Elements of those entities will likely be dissolved after further review.

The order will affect large numbers of people: There were some 400,000 employees of the MOD alone. Therefore it is necessary to establish a policy on payments to employees and retirees of the dissolved entities. I intend to adopt the payment policy outlined in Tab B.

That policy continues pension payments for people who were drawing a pension from dissolved entities before the war ended, provides for a termination payment to employees of dissolved entities, and authorizes employment of such persons as individuals in civilian jobs by other Iraqi and Coalition agencies. All this is subject to the overriding principle that no payments will be made to "disqualified persons," i.e., people barred

from government employment by the de-Ba'athification order (notably those in the top three ranks of the party). All military officers with the rank of Colonel and above will be presumed to be Disqualified Persons, unless they can establish otherwise. Moreover, the policy reserves our right to revoke pensions as a penalty for past or future illegal conduct, and to modify pension arrangements to eliminate special privileges granted by the old regime.

There is obviously something that catches in the craw about paying anything to people who worked at the heart of Saddam's regime. Against this, however, we must balance the risks of serious discontent, increased terrorism, and much higher crime rates that may result if we cut off all military and security sector pensioners in a heavily militarized society. For this reason, I recommend that we pay most pensions--to include military retirees who retired before 16 April--the date of Gen Franks Freedom Message dissolving the Ba'ath Party. I also recommend severance payments to employees of dissolved entities. Disqualified persons, of course, would receive neither type of payment. If you concur with this policy in principal, the next step is development of payment plans.

There will be some delay in making these payments, because, in contrast to the situation for most civilian agencies, we do not have employee rosters, or contacts with administrative officials of the dissolved entities. In conjunction with the intelligence community, we are starting to assemble the necessary data and make the necessary mechanical preparations for the payments. When we have those data, at least in approximate form, we will estimate the likely costs and request, pursuant to the procedures for civilian agency payments, an allocation of Iraqi funds needed for payment. The mechanics of payments will follow, in so far as possible, the process that has worked fairly well in the case of the "emergency" and salary payments to civil servants in civilian agencies.

In short, I believe these policies, taken together, are necessary to show both our determination to root out Saddamism, at the same time mitigating the risks to our broad objectives for security which these measures might otherwise cause.

**Attachments:**

- 1 Order of the ACPA
- 2 Outline of Policy Repayments to Former MOD Personnel

CC: Paul Wolfowitz, Doug Feith, Jim Haynes

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**Order of the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority**

**Dissolution of Iraqi Entities**

**May 20, 2003**

**The following Entities (the "Dissolved Entities") are hereby dissolved:**

**The Ministry of Defence  
The Ministry of Information  
The Ministry of State for Military Affairs  
The Iraqi Intelligence Service  
The National Security Bureau  
The Directorate of National Security (Amn al-'Am)  
The Special Security Organization**

**All Entities affiliated with or comprising Saddam Hussein's bodyguards to include:**

**-Murafaqin (Companions)  
-Himaya al Khasa (Special Guard)**

**The following military organizations:**

**-The Army, Air Force, Navy, the Air Defence Force, and other regular military services.  
-The Republican Guard  
-The Special Republican Guard  
-The Al Quds Force  
-Emergency Forces (Quwat al Tawari)**

**The following paramilitaries:**

**-Saddam Fedayeen  
-Ba'ath Party Militia  
-Friends of Saddam  
-Saddam's Lion Cubs (Ashbal Saddam)**

**Other Organizations:**

**-The Presidential Diwan  
-The Presidential Secretariat  
-The Revolutionary Command Council  
-The National Assembly  
-The Youth Organization (al-Futuwah)**

**All organizations subordinate to the Dissolved Entities are also dissolved.**

**Additional Entities may be added to this list in the future.**

All assets, including records and data in whatever form maintained, wherever located, of the Dissolved Entities are the property of the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority as Receiver and Trustee. Those assets will be used for the benefit of the Iraqi people by the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority and transitional interim authorities as they from time to time exist, pending the establishment of full representative self-government by Iraqis of Iraq. In appropriate cases such assets may be transferred to civilian agencies or privatized.

The Coalition Provisional Authority may delegate his powers and responsibilities as Receiver and Trustee to such person or persons, or entity or entities, as he determines appropriate.

All employees of the Dissolved Entities are dismissed effective April 16, 2003.

All persons employed, in any capacity or in any form, by the Dissolved Entities remain subject to the penalties for acts committed during their tenure as such.

All military or other ranks granted to employees and functionaries of the Dissolved Entities by the former Regime are hereby cancelled.

All financial obligations of the Dissolved Entities are suspended. Procedures will be established whereby persons claiming to be the beneficiaries of such obligations may apply for lifting the suspension. Pensions being paid before 16 April 2003 will continue to be paid, including to war widows, provided that the power is reserved to the CPA and to the future Iraqi government to revoke or reduce pensions as a penalty for past or future illegal conduct or to modify pension arrangements to eliminate improper privileges granted by the Baathist regime.

Persons in possession of the assets of the Dissolved Entities shall preserve those assets, promptly inform the Receiver and Trustee, through the local Coalition military or civilian authorities, of the assets in their possession, and immediately turn the assets over to the Receiver and Trustee, as directed by the local Coalition authorities.

After the date of this Order, continued possession, or attempts to transfer or to conceal such assets of whatever character, will be subject to arrest and punishment.

Persons who provide information to the Coalition authorities relating to the Dissolved Entities, or their assets or personnel, shall be suitably compensated as the Receiver and Trustee may determine.

**The Coalition Provisional Authority plans to create in the near future a New Iraqi Corps, as the first step in the process of forming a national self-defense capability for a free Iraq. That Corps will be under civilian control, professional, non-political, militarily effective, and representative of all Iraqis. Former employees wishing to be considered for employment by the Receiver and Trustee will be informed of procedures for application.**

**All provisions of General Franks' Freedom Message to the Iraqi People of 16 April 2003 and all prior orders of the Coalition Provisional Authority are reconfirmed and remain in effect.**

### Outline of Policy Re Payments to Former Military/MOD and related persons

- No further payments will be made to persons disqualified for government service under the de-Baathification policy announced on 16 May 03 ("Disqualified Persons" or "DPs"). Officers COL and above will be rebuttably presumed to be DPs, and will not be paid until they establish that they are not DPs.
- Employees of Dissolved Entities, i.e., those entities dissolved by CPA Order of May —, [the order dissolving the MOD, intelligence agencies, armed forces, etc.] will be terminated effective the date of that order.
- Those terminated employees will not be eligible to claim a pension, regardless of retirement rules that may be alleged to entitle them to retire on pension rather than be terminated. Unless they are Disqualified Persons, they will, however, be paid a one-time "transition payment" (equivalent to a month's pay at new scales). Disqualified Persons will not be paid a termination payment.
- Pensions of former employees of the Dissolved Entities, including military pensions and pensions to survivors (including war widows), that were being paid prior to 16 Apr 03 will be continued. Purported retirements after that date are ineffective, and do not entitle a person to a pension. CPA reserves the power for itself and the future Iraqi government to end or modify a person's pension as a penalty for illegal conduct, before or after 16 April 03, and to modify pension arrangements to eliminate improper privileges granted by the Baathist regime.
- Former employees of dissolved entities (other than Disqualified Persons) are eligible for employment by other Iraqi government agencies. For example, military medical personnel can be employed by civilian health agencies and paid as such. Former employees of Dissolved Entities do not, however, have any special eligibility or other privileges for such employment by reason of their service for Dissolved Entities.
- Similarly, former employees of dissolved entities (other than Disqualified Persons) can be hired as individuals by Coalition military or civil authorities, for example as security guards. They are not hired as reconstituted old units, as soldiers, or as part of the future Iraqi military.
- A New Iraqi Corps will be established as the first stage of creating a self-defense capability for the new Iraq. Former military personnel, below the rank of COL and not otherwise disqualified, will be eligible for the NIC. However, recognize that numbers will be limited, especially for officers.
- Note: Payments to police and other employees of entities other than the Dissolved Entities will continue as announced and being implemented already.

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## **COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 2**

### **DISSOLUTION OF ENTITIES**

*Pursuant* to my authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war,

*Reconfirming* all of the provisions of General Franks' Freedom Message to the Iraqi People of April 16, 2003,

*Recognizing* that the prior Iraqi regime used certain government entities to oppress the Iraqi people and as instruments of torture, repression and corruption,

*Reaffirming* the Instructions to the Citizens of Iraq regarding Ministry of Youth and Sport of May 8, 2003,

I hereby promulgate the following:

#### **Section 1 Dissolved Entities**

The entities (the "Dissolved Entities") listed in the attached Annex are hereby dissolved. Additional entities may be added to this list in the future.

#### **Section 2 Assets and Financial Obligations**

- 1) All assets, including records and data, in whatever form maintained and wherever located, of the Dissolved Entities shall be held by the Administrator of the CPA ("the Administrator") on behalf of and for the benefit of the Iraqi people and shall be used to assist the Iraqi people and to support the recovery of Iraq.
- 2) All financial obligations of the Dissolved Entities are suspended. The Administrator of the CPA will establish procedures whereby persons claiming to be the beneficiaries of such obligations may apply for payment.
- 3) Persons in possession of assets of the Dissolved Entities shall preserve those assets, promptly inform local Coalition authorities, and immediately turn them over, as directed by those authorities. Continued possession, transfer, sale, use, conversion, or concealment of such assets following the date of this Order is prohibited and may be punished.

**CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02**

**Section 3**  
**Employees and Service Members**

- 1) Any military or other rank, title, or status granted to a former employee or functionary of a Dissolved Entity by the former Regime is hereby cancelled.
- 2) All conscripts are released from their service obligations. Conscriptions is suspended indefinitely, subject to decisions by future Iraq governments concerning whether a free Iraq should have conscription.
- 3) Any person employed by a Dissolved Entity in any form or capacity, is dismissed effective as of April 16, 2003. Any person employed by a Dissolved Entity, in any form or capacity remains accountable for acts committed during such employment.
- 4) A termination payment in an amount to be determined by the Administrator will be paid to employees so dismissed, except those who are Senior Party Members as defined in the Administrator's May 16, 2003 Order of the Coalition Provisional Authority De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society, CPA/ORD/2003/01 ("Senior Party Members") (See Section 3.6).
- 5) Pensions being paid by, or on account of service to, a Dissolved Entity before April 16, 2003 will continue to be paid, including to war widows and disabled veterans, provided that no pension payments will be made to any person who is a Senior Party Member (see Section 3.6) and that the power is reserved to the Administrator and to future Iraqi governments to revoke or reduce pensions as a penalty for past or future illegal conduct or to modify pension arrangements to eliminate improper privileges granted by the Ba'athist regime or for similar reasons.
- 6) Notwithstanding any provision of this Order, or any other Order, law, or regulation, and consistent with the Administrator's May 16, 2003 Order of the Coalition Provisional Authority De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society, CPA/ORD/2003/01, no payment, including a termination or pension payment, will be made to any person who is or was a Senior Party Member. Any person holding the rank under the former regime of Colonel or above, or its equivalent, will be deemed a Senior Party Member, provided that such persons may seek, under procedures to be prescribed, to establish to the satisfaction of the Administrator, that they were not a Senior Party Member.

**Section 4  
Information**

The Administrator shall prescribe procedures for offering rewards to person who provide information leading to the recovery of assets of Dissolved Entities.

**Section 5  
New Iraqi Corps**


The CPA plans to create in the near future a New Iraqi Corps, as the first step in forming a national self-defense capability for a free Iraq. Under civilian control, that Corps will be professional, non-political, militarily effective, and representative of all Iraqis. The CPA will promulgate procedures for participation in the New Iraqi Corps.

**Section 6  
Other Matters**

- 1) The Administrator may delegate his powers and responsibilities with respect to this Order as he determines appropriate. References to the Administrator herein include such delegates.
  
- 2) The Administrator may grant exceptions any limitations in this Order at his discretion.

**Section 7  
Entry into Force**

This Order shall enter into force on the date of signature.



L. Paul Bremer, Administrator  
Coalition Provisional Authority

## **ANNEX**

### **COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 2**

#### **DISSOLUTION OF ENTITIES**

**Institutions dissolved by the Order referenced (the "Dissolved Entities") are:**

- The Ministry of Defence**
- The Ministry of Information**
- The Ministry of State for Military Affairs**
- The Iraqi Intelligence Service**
- The National Security Bureau**
- The Directorate of National Security (Amn al-'Am)**
- The Special Security Organization**

**All entities affiliated with or comprising Saddam Hussein's bodyguards to include:**

- Murafaqin (Companions)**
- Himaya al Khasa (Special Guard)**

**The following military organizations:**

- The Army, Air Force, Navy, the Air Defence Force, and other regular military services**
- The Republican Guard**
- The Special Republican Guard**
- The Directorate of Military Intelligence**
- The Al Quds Force**
- Emergency Forces (Quwat al Tawari)**

**The following paramilitaries:**

- Saddam Fedayeen**
- Ba'ath Party Militia**
- Friends of Saddam**
- Saddam's Lion Cubs (Ashbal Saddam)**

**Other Organizations:**

- The Presidential Diwan**
- The Presidential Secretariat**
- The Revolutionary Command Council**

**CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02**

- The National Assembly
- The Youth Organization (al-Futuwah)
- National Olympic Committee
- Revolutionary, Special and National Security Courts

All organizations subordinate to the Dissolved Entities are also dissolved.

Additional organizations may be added to this list in the future.

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**Op-ed column by Walter B. Slocombe, CPA director for national security, defense**

**(This column by Walter B. Slocombe, who is director for national security and defense in the Coalition Provisional Authority for Iraq in Baghdad, was published in the Washington Post November 5 and is in the public domain. No republication restrictions.)**

**To Build an Army  
By Walter B. Slocombe**

**Baghdad -- As the first battalion of the New Iraqi Army moves to assume its duties and the first units of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps start operating with U.S. units, it's being argued by some that the creation of these military units is a bad idea, or at least unnecessary -- that the United States could and should have relied on Saddam Hussein's old army and saved itself the trouble of creating a new one. Some even say we should try to do that now by recalling the old army to service some six months after its defeat.**

**It's an argument that doesn't add up. Given our objective of replacing Hussein's regime, and not just its leader, it would have been a mistake, I think, to try to convert an army that was a principal tool of his oppressive system into the armed guardian of a new democracy. Using soldiers to keep civil order is never easy, and the old Iraqi army wasn't exactly noted for its discipline and subtlety in dealing with civilians or for its capacity to cope with challenges. There is also the question of reliability and loyalty to the new Iraq. While many Iraqi officers no doubt served for honorable reasons and thought of themselves as defending their nation rather than the regime, the army was deeply penetrated by Hussein loyalists.**

**I suppose one could argue that with close vetting, extensive retraining, lots of U.S. advisers and the like, we might have taught the old dog new tricks. But that hypothetical question will have to remain a topic for war college symposia, because the simple fact is that turning to the old Iraqi army wasn't an option in April and it is not one now.**

**By the time coalition forces reached Baghdad, Hussein's army had ceased to exist. Faced with the superbly equipped and highly trained professionals of the coalition, and knowing the nature of the regime they were commanded to defend, Iraqi soldiers disappeared. The numbers are telling: In Operation Desert Storm, when the Iraqi army, though defeated, hung together, we took about 80,000 prisoners; this time there were only 7,000. There was not a single organized unit intact when major combat ended. All Iraqi soldiers who survived had, in the Pentagon's jargon, "self-demobilized," i.e., gone home.**

Some observers concede that uncontested point but go on to say that we should have called the departed soldiers back. Hussein's army, however, consisted entirely of conscripts below officer level, most of them Shiites, who were badly mistreated by the overwhelmingly Sunni officers. Those conscripts were delighted at the opportunity to escape the abuse, corruption and misery of the old army. They certainly weren't going to heed the call of their officers to return, and we were not about to send press gangs out to round them up.

Thus any recalled "army" would have consisted almost entirely of officers from the absurdly top-heavy senior ranks. The Iraqi army -- with a payroll of 500,000, almost exactly the size of the American Army -- had 11,000 generals (the United States has 307) and 14,000 colonels (the United States has 3,500).

And, if by some miracle, we had called, and enough able-bodied men had responded to form useful units, it would have been a disaster. The reason? When the Iraqi army took off for home, its soldiers took any gear of possible worth along with them -- not just military equipment but trucks, furniture and everything else of any use. What the fleeing soldiers did not take, the civilian population looted from abandoned bases and camps. Looters and scavengers literally took not just the kitchen sinks but the pipes from the walls and the tiles that covered the kitchen floors. Rehabilitating these facilities for use by coalition forces or new Iraqi security organizations has taken months of hard work and millions of dollars.

Had a recall somehow evoked a response, we would have found ourselves not with 500,000 disciplined soldiers ready to impose order under U.S. command but with 500,000 refugees needing shelter, food, uniforms, weapons and a good many other things -- just to survive. Instead of being a help to the American and other forces, they would have been a huge burden.

All this does not mean we should spurn the many individual Iraqi veterans willing to serve the new Iraq. On the contrary, they have been welcomed and even actively recruited. About 60 percent of the privates in the New Iraqi Army, and virtually all the officers and NCOs, have military experience. Other new security forces, such as the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps and the Facilities Protection Service, have taken in many thousands of former soldiers. Only those who served in Hussein's inner circles of security and control forces, or who reached the top four ranks of the Baath Party (about 8,000 out of nearly a quarter-million officers and NCOs in the old army) are ineligible to join the New Iraqi Army and other security forces. Although we have not so far recruited officers whose former rank was above lieutenant colonel, that is because we have not yet needed more senior ranks. As the army (and other security forces) grow, higher-ranking officers with clean records will be considered, along with potential promotions from the new organizations.

**At the core of both coalition policy and Iraqi aspirations is the need for Iraqis to take ever-increasing responsibility for the security of their country. The coalition is moving as fast as it responsibly can to recruit, train and equip a national army, a professional police service, a locally based civil defense corps and personnel to guard key facilities and infrastructure. Already some 100,000 Iraqis are on duty in these organizations. Within a year, the number is to exceed 200,000. Many will be former soldiers, but they will be effective because they are rallying to the cause of serving in new organizations to defend the new Iraq, not the chimera of reviving the military of the old.**

**(The writer is director for national security and defense in the Coalition Provisional Authority for Iraq. From 1994 to 2001 he was undersecretary of defense for policy.) Created: 05 Nov 2003 Updated: 05 Nov 2003**

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ <sup>FOUO</sup> Attachment

AUG 18 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Staffing PRTs in Afghanistan

From time to time the Interagency has discussed the staffing of PRTs in Afghanistan. My impression is that there has been a good deal of confusion and, indeed, confusing information presented.

We have spent some time and, I believe, have talked to everybody. Attached is a memorandum that describes precisely, as of August 1, 2006, the individuals who are staffing PRTs in Afghanistan. It is instructive and, I think you will find, notably different from the impressions that our meetings have left.

It seems to me you have to address this issue. It is an Interagency issue. It is an issue for the US Government overall. We have constantly talked about the engagement of all elements of national power. It clearly is not being accomplished.

Thanks.

Attach. 8/11/06 ASD(ISA) memo to SD re: PRT Staffing in Afghanistan (OSD 77023-06)

DHR.dh  
SF081706-11

.....

DECLASSIFIED  
AUTHORITY E.O. 12958  
Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ <sup>FOUO</sup> Attachment



OSD 77023-06

8/18/2006 1:32:50 PM

09-M-0320

2/14  
1400

2/14  
8/17

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~  
(FOUO when separated from attachment)

INFO MEMO

DSD  
USDP *[Signature]*

AUG 11 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)

SUBJECT: PRT Staffing in Afghanistan (U)

*M* →

- ~~(FOUO)~~ You asked for aggregate data on staffing levels at PRTs in Afghanistan.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ The information in the table at TAB A was provided by the respective agencies and shows the following tally of civilian and military representatives at PRTs in Afghanistan:
  - 10 State, 8 USAID, 6 USDA, and 758 military representatives at the 11 U.S. PRTs;
  - 7 State, 7 USAID, 1 USDA, 15 U.S. military, and 2110 ISAF military at the 12 non-U.S. PRTs; and
  - 5 State, 13 USAID, and 1 USDA providing management of PRT programs from Kabul or coordinating with Coalition and ISAF forces.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ While most U.S. PRTs have at least one civilian representative, they tend to be generalists and do not have technical skills that are needed in the provinces.
- (U) Length of tour for most State officers going to PRTs this summer is a year or slightly less; a few are on six-month TDYs; one is staying for a second year.
  - Length of tour for USAID representatives is usually a year, sometimes six months.
  - For USDA it is usually nine months; one representative is there for twelve months.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ We have not been able to acquire a tabulation of civilian staffing at non-U.S. PRTs.

Attachments: As stated.

Prepared by Madeline LePage, OSD-ISA-NESA, 703-571-2498.

Classified by: Multiple Sources  
Declassify on: August 2, 2021

OSD 77023-08



8/14/2006 10:17:58 AM

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

MA SD	<i>[Handwritten]</i>	SMA DSD	
ISA SD	<i>[Handwritten]</i>	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	<i>[Handwritten]</i>	1345	<i>[Handwritten]</i>
ESR MA	<i>[Handwritten]</i>	STF DIR	

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Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS



\* 0 6 / 0 0 9 0 8 2 - N E S A \*

**STAFFING OF PRTS IN AFGHANISTAN as of August 1, 2006**

<b>U.S. PRTS</b>	<b>U.S. State*</b>	<b>USAID*</b>	<b>USDA*</b>	<b>U.S. Military</b>	<b>ISAF Military</b>	<b>ISAF Civilian</b>
Asadabad	1	***		78		
Farah	1	1	1	106		
Gardez	1	1	1	75		
Ghazni	1	1	1	74		
Jalalabad	1	1	1	78		
Khost	1	1		81		
Mehtarlam	1	***		75		
Panjshir	1	1		24		
Parwan/Bagram			1	23		
Qalat	1	1	1	65		
Sharana	1	1		79		
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>758</b>	<b>0</b>	
<b>Non-U.S. PRTs</b>	<b>U.S. State*</b>	<b>USAID*</b>	<b>USDA*</b>	<b>U.S. Military</b>	<b>ISAF Military</b>	<b>ISAF Civilian</b>
Baglan (Netherlands)					185	
Bamyan (New Zealand)	1	1		6	122	
Chagcharan (Lithuania)		***			132	
Faizabad (Germany)		1			290	
Herat (Italy)	1	1			126	
Kandahar (Canada)	**	1		3	200	
Kunduz (Germany)	1				384	
Lashkar Gah (United Kingdom)	1	1	1	6	95	
Mazar (Sweden)	1	1			94	
Meymana (Norway)					73	
Qal-eh-now (Spain)	1 (TDY)**				136	
Tarin Kowl	1	1		0	273	
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>2110</b>	

TAB A

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Other	U.S. State*	USAID*	USDA*	U.S. Military	ISAF Military	ISAF Civilian
Regional Command East Advisor	**	1				
Regional Command South Advisor	1	1				
Liaison to CJTF-76		1				
Liaison to Special Forces		1				
Liaison to ISAF Headquarters		1				
PRT Field Engineers (floating)		2				
PRT Senior Engineer (Kabul)		1				
PRT Field Program Director (Kabul)		1				
PRT Deputy Field Program Director (Kabul)		1				
PRT Program Specialist (Kabul)		1				
PRT Budget/HR Specialist (Kabul)		1				
PRT Director (Kabul)	1					
PRT Deputy Director (Kabul)	1					
PRT Management (Kabul)	1					
PRT Administrative Services (Kabul)	1					
PRT USDA Program Manager (Kabul)			1			
<b>SUBTOTAL</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>72</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>210</b>	

\* As reported by the sourcing agency

\*\*Position will be filled in late August

\*\*\*Position will be filled as soon as designates pass medical and security clearance

788 A

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~~FOUO~~

February 23, 2005

TO: The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Afghan National Police

Please take a look at the attached pages 41 and 42 of the Afghanistan Security Update. This is the Afghan National Police situation. It is a serious problem.

My impression is that these two pages were written in as graceful and non-inflammatory a way as is humanly possible.

D11R:ss  
022305-8

~~FOUO~~

030 03708-05

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09-M-0320

Afghanistan

2005



## ANP Horror Stories

- Current Basic Training Course insufficient to produce quality police officer – 8 week course does not include weapons or drivers training
- Of the 34,000 "trained" police officers only 3,900 have been through the 8 week course, the rest have been through two week transition courses, 4 week illiterate course or similar type courses
- ANP demonstrated basic logistical planning shortcomings on its recent operations in Shindand when it deployed police without food, water, sufficient ammunition, cold weather clothing, blankets, etc
- Unlike for the ANA, where OMC-A provides over 1500 field mentors, the ANP has no formal field mentor program; the Germans provide approximately 6 mentors and UNAMA 9 mentors
- Lack of ANP Literacy seriously impacts on the MoI's objective of achieving a quality police force; and yet the only ANP Literacy program is a German program in Konduz for 200 officers
- Lack of formal recruiting plan for the ANP is contributing to the under utilization of capacity at four of the five RTCs
- The ANP currently only has approximately 50% of the required rolling stock on hand



## ANP Horror Stories

- The **ANP** currently only has less than 15% of the required communications equipment on-hand
- The **ANP** is currently "Rank Heavy" with one officer for every two sergeants/patrolmen; to implement pay reform, thus raising the quality of recruits, will require immediate reform
- Basic infrastructure to include border crossing points, police station, training ranges, maintenance facilities is either lacking or in need of renovation; the **IC** estimates the need for over 800 projects
- The **ANP** has less than 15% of the required weapons on-hand (one can not rely upon the **AK-47s** that it currently possesses as DDR results have shown that a majority of them are, in fact, unserviceable
- **INL** currently issues limited clothing to a police officer that graduates from the RTC/CTC – pants, shirt, utility belt, hat; the **IC** estimates a need for approximately 3.4 million items to include cold weather gear, boots, sleeping bags, etc
- Basic ammunition for training and operations is required

~~FOUO~~  
~~SECRET~~  
ATTACHMENT

APR 20 2005

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: PRTs in Afghanistan

I have taken a look at this PRT paper from Bill Luti. If you could tell me what we would like to have from each of the U.S. Departments and Agencies, and from other countries in each of the PRTs, we could go after the Cabinet and other countries and try to get them.

It seems to me that is what we ought to be doing.

Thanks.

Attach.  
04/15/05 SecDef memo to Bill Luti

DHR:ss  
041905-29

.....  
Please respond by 5/5/05

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~~FOUO~~  
~~SECRET~~  
ATTACHMENT

OSD 77134-05

09-M-0320

APR 20 ENT'D

~~SECRET~~  
FOUO

2005 APR 15 2:29

ES-2998  
05/005293

APR 15 2005 --

SEE ATTACHED

*W.A. Feith*  
*4/18/05* *4/19*

TO: Bill Luti  
CC: Doug Feith

SIGNED by  
next under →

SUBJECT: PRTs

Let's get a list of the people at PRTs across Afghanistan - how many American military, how many Defense civilians, how many civilians from every other Department or Agency, and how many foreigners in each PRT - and then aggregate them all up, and let's see what it says.

Thanks.

DHR:db  
041405-2 (to laptop)

.....  
Please respond by 4/21/05

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AUTHORITY E.O. 12958  
Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~SECRET~~  
FOUO

OSD 77134-05

15:42 IN

~~FOUO~~

ES-~~2998~~ 3020  
05/005293

APR 15 2005 --

TO: Bill Luti  
CC: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: PRTs

Let's get a list of the people at PRTs across Afghanistan – how many American military, how many Defense civilians, how many civilians from every other Department or Agency, and how many foreigners in each PRT – and then aggregate them all up, and let's see what it says.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
041405-2 (to laptop)

.....  
Please respond by 4/21/05

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Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~FOUO~~

QSD 15211-05

09-M-0320

~~SECRET~~

April 19, 2005

**Status of Civilianizing PRTs in Afghanistan\***

Location	US Military	DoD Civilian	State	USAID	USDA	UK AID	Afghan MOI / Contractor	TOTAL
Asadabad	95	0	1	0	0	0	24	120
Farah	65	0	0	0	0	0	20	85
Gardez	70	0	0	0	0	0	86	156
Ghazni	76	0	1	1	0	0	27	105
Herat	81	0	1	1	1	0	66	150
Jalalabad	101	1	0	1	1	0	59	163
Kandahar	87	1	1	1	1	1	76	168
Khowst	64	0	0	1	0	0	50	115
Lashkar Gah	91	0	0	0	0	0	37	128
Parwan	36	0	0	1	1	0	7	45
Qalat	77	0	0	0	0	0	36	113
Sharana	78	0	0	0	0	0	8	86
Tarin Kowt	75	0	0	1	0	0	44	120
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>996</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>540</b>	<b>1,554</b>

\* Based on information provided by US Central Command, dated March 17, 2005, for the 13 US-led PRTs.

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Multiple Sources  
Reason: 1.5(b)  
Declassify: X6

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APR 19 ENTD

09-M-0320

~~FOUO~~

JAN 3 2005

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
CC: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Views from Generals

IRAQ

I would like to know what the general officers, and possibly ~~some~~ key colonels, in Iraq think about the various options we face. I don't need to know their names, but we need to know what they think. ~~Except~~ for you, Myers, Abizaid, Casey and Metz, the rest can be anonymous.

What I'd like to know is the following:

- Whether or not they believe the U.S. and the coalition:
  - 1) Are doing about the right things overall, and with about the right number of troops in their respective areas of operation (*specify AOR*).
  - 2) Need more troops, and if so, where and for what purpose.
  - 3) Would be better off with fewer U.S. troops (*where*) and having the coalition do less of *what*.
  - 4) Would be better off with the same number of troops, but we should put *X* number - i.e., 10%, 50%, 90% of the forces we have organizing, training, equipping, mentoring, or other with Iraqi Security forces.
  - 5) Should cut back dramatically on U.S.-only patrols and focus totally on joint patrols and mentoring Iraqi Security forces.
  - 6) Put more U.S. Forces on Syria and Israel's borders but remain available to do raids throughout the country as required.
  - 7) Other?

Thanks.

DHR:as  
122904-6 (ts)

.....  
Please respond by 2/3/05

3 JAN 05

~~FOUO~~

TAB A  
~~FOUO~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECURITY ASSISTANT  
DEFENSE

1037

2005 JUN 22 AM 8:37

June 3, 2005

TO: Gen Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Idea of Petraeus Visiting Afghanistan

I think it might be a good idea for Petraeus to go over and spend several days in Afghanistan taking a look at their training of security forces, and see if he has learned anything that might be helpful to them. And then give us an assessment on it.

Thanks.

DHR:ms  
060205-25 (TS)

.....  
Please respond by 6/17/05

Tab A

~~FOUO~~

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Dec 1, 2008  
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Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

OSD 12000-05

09-M-0320

**TAB B**

COORDINATION

USCENTCOM

GEN Abizaid

6 June 2005

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Ch RDD, WHS  
Date: 12/1/08  
IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

**Tab B**



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF OFFICE OF THE  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 JUN 22 AM 8:37  
CH-2566-05  
21 June 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *rbm/rlm/05*

SUBJECT: Idea of Petraeus Visiting Afghanistan (SF 1037)

- **Answer.** In response to your issue (TAB A), the Commander, US Central Command, endorses the idea and Lieutenant General Petraeus will visit Afghanistan. The visit is tentatively scheduled for the first week of July 2005.
- **Analysis.** General Petraeus will provide to you his review and assessment of the training program for Afghan **security** forces upon completion.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared **By**: Lieutenant General Walter L. Sharp, USA, Director, J-5; 703-695-5618

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Dec 1, 2008  
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Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

OSD 12000-05

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

09-M-0320

~~SECRET~~

NOV 15 2005

TO: GEN John Abizaid  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Presence in Cities and Training Officers

Chalabi was in and he, along with everyone else who has been in during the last two months, says we ought to reduce our presence in the cities -- that it is causing a problem. Is George sensitive to that?

He also urged that we train some military officers in the US. I would be curious to know where that proposal stands at the present time.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
111405-40

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/08/05*

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Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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OSD 78046-05

09-M-0320

~~FOUO~~

IRAO

November 28, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman

CC: Gen Pete Pace

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

SUBJECT: Decision to Not Go After Sadr

Dan Senor was on Fox yesterday saying that the decision to not go after Sadr was made in Washington. My recollection is that the decision was made in Baghdad, the Iraqi Governing Council was against it, and Bremer made the decision.

On the other hand, it is entirely possible Condi made the decision, and I just was not aware of it.

Please check with Doug Feith and find out what the facts are.

Thanks.

DHR db  
SF112806-01

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/07/06*

28 NOV 06

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AUTHORITY E.O. 12958  
Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~FOUO~~

OSD 77955-06

~~SECRET~~

Unclassified when separated from attachment

4

INFO MEMO

DepSec Action  
USD(P)                       
DEC 07 2006

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)                      6 2005

SUBJECT: Decision Not to Go After Sadr

- (U) You asked for the facts on the decision not to go after Sadr. We checked with Doug Feith, reviewed our files, and read relevant passages in Ambassador Bremer's book.
- (U) There is no indication that anyone in DoD or in the Washington interagency denied any request from Bremer to go after Sadr.
- (U) There were at least three occasions during which proposals to go after Sadr were discussed: August 2003, October 2003, and April 2004.
  - On August 7, 2003, Bremer reported that Sadr would be arrested in about a week. On August 18, Feith indicated to Bremer on your behalf that it would be helpful if he (Bremer) provided certain information before carrying out the arrest (Tab A).
    - An August 19 Bill Luti memo to Doug Feith (Tab B) shows OSD's views on the arrest.
    - Later that day, the UN building in Baghdad was bombed; Sergio de Mello was killed. Bremer's book implies that the UN bombing was the reason the Sadr arrest was not made. There is no indication that anyone in DoD or the Washington interagency forbade Bremer to arrest Sadr.
  - On October 11, 2003, Bremer informed you that it was time to move against Sadr, and that Sadr's arrest would be an Iraqi operation. Bremer says that because you were on vacation he spoke with DSD Wolfowitz about the arrest.

Prepared by: C. Straub, OUSDP/ISA-ME, 571-2517  
Classified by: Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Reason(s): 1.4 (d)  
Declassify On: (5 Dec 2016)

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Unclassified when separated from attachment



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Dec 1, 2008  
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Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS



12/7/2006 11:16:46 AM

09-M-0320

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Unclassified when separated from attachment

- o Wolfowitz asked questions and told Bremer that the decision to arrest Sadr “will have to be your call.” Wolfowitz and General Abizaid also discussed the Sadr arrest, and Bremer later spoke with Abizaid. Bremer reports in his book that Abizaid told him of his impression that Wolfowitz was “going soft.” Bremer does not indicate that Wolfowitz told him or Abizaid not to arrest Sadr, nor does he recount any effort to determine for himself Wolfowitz’s position on the matter.
  
- In April 2004, Bremer again determined to act against Sadr. However, he was persuaded by the Iraqi Governing Council that because of the twin crises of Fallujah and Najaf, going after Sadr at that time would be unwise. Instead, Bremer opted for a policy of “squeezing” Sadr, seeking his apprehension for an outstanding criminal warrant based on his involvement in the murder of al-Khoie. Bremer does not report any Washington support for this decision. In fact he reports that Chairman Myers believed that “we should just finish the job.”

COORDINATION: Tab C.

Attachments:

As stated

~~SECRET~~

Unclassified when separated from attachment

~~FOUO~~

November 28, 2006

TO: Eric Edelman  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: Decision to Not Go After Sadr

Dan Senor was on Fox yesterday saying that the decision to not go after Sadr was made in Washington. My recollection is that the decision was made in Baghdad, the Iraqi Governing Council was against it, and Bremer made the decision.

On the other hand, it is entirely possible Condi made the decision, and I just was not aware of it.

Please check with Doug Feith and find out what the facts are.

Thanks.

DHR dk  
SF112806-01

.....  
*Please Respond By 12/07/06*

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Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~FOUO~~

OSD 77955-06

09-M-0320

A

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Ch RDD, WHS  
Date: 12/1/08  
LAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

~~SECRET~~

August 18, 2003

MEMO TO: Paul Bremer

FROM: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Muqtada al-Sadr

I agree with you, considering the circumstances outlined in your memo, that Sadr should probably be arrested. Before you take further action, it would be helpful if you could share with me your broad operational plan and provide me with the following information:

- Who would arrest Sadr? If an Iraqi, then would it be a Sunni or a Shi'a?
- Who would detain Sadr and where?
- What is your plan to inform and guide Iraqi opinion about the arrest?
- Have you consulted with the Shi'a clerical leadership in the Howza (seminary) in an-Najaf? As you know, Ayatollah Sistani and the Howza are monitoring Sadr's behavior.
- Would Sadr's arrest make him more or less popular among the Shi'a?
  - Would his organization find effective leadership in his absence?
- What would be the role – if any – of the Governing Council?
- Is this something that must be done now? Or can it wait for the results of your campaign to inform Shi'a opinion?
- Do you plan to consult with the UK?

To a large extent, our fortunes in Iraq and the success of our rebuilding effort rise and fall with Shi'a sentiment. For this reason, I want to consider all the ramifications of this important arrest.

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AUTHORITY E.O. 12958  
Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~SECRET~~

09-M-0320

B

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Ch RDD, WHS  
Date: 12/1/08  
IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

~~SECRET~~

OSD Policy 19 Aug 03

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY**

**FROM: DUSD Bill Luti**

**SUBJECT: Muqtada al-Sadr**

Ambassador Bremer's responses to the Secretary's questions (attached) give me confidence that he and the CPA staff have consulted with the appropriate parties and have fully coordinated the Sadr arrest.

- Because Iraqi police in Najaf have devised a plan and because Shi'a religious leaders and Governing Council President Jaafari are aware of our consideration (if not our intent) of arresting Sadr, we should permit the Iraqis to move quickly to arrest him. Each passing day provides more opportunity for Sadr to become witting and prepare defenses. CPA's consultative process has effectively foreclosed the Secretary's ability to postpone the arrest.
- One concern not yet addressed is the continued viability of Sadr's organization once he is in custody. It may be necessary to arrest subordinate leaders as well.

When the arrest occurs, it is important that the Shi'a religious leaders with whom CPA has consulted publicly condemn Sadr; the followers of these leaders should block Sadr's people from seizing or taking refuge in shrines.

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Declassify 19 Aug 13

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

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Reviewed Ch RDD\_WHS  
Date: 12/1/08  
IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

POLICY COORDINATION SHEET

**Subject:** Decision Not to Go After Sadr  
**Snowflake Number:** SF 112806-01

<u>Title/Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
PDASD (ISA)	 Mary Beth Long	12/6/06
DASD ME	 Mark Kimmitt	12/5/06
Special Assistant to USDP	 Abe Shulsky	12/5/06
Director, ME-NG	 John Trigilio	12/5/06

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Reviewed Ch RDD, WHS  
Date: 12/11/08  
IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

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JUL 10 2006

INFO MEMO

DSD  
FDUSD(P) *[Signature]* JUL 10 2006

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *[Signature]* JUL 7 2006

SUBJECT: Michael Vickers's Paper on Counterinsurgency Strategy in Iraq

- ~~(FOUO)~~ You asked for thoughts on the attached paper by Michael Vickers, which recommends transitioning to an "indirect approach" in Iraq.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ Vickers's central contention is that the insurgency can be defeated only by increased Iraqi intelligence and security capabilities; and, therefore, that our main effort should be to enable the Iraqis to take the lead in the counterinsurgency fight.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ This view coincides with our own, and forms the basis of our strategy for Iraq.
- ~~(FOUO)~~ However, Vickers believes that our implementation of the strategy is inadequate in the following respects:
  - too few U.S. advisors, of insufficient quality and with insufficient training;
  - insufficient equipment, supplies and secure facilities for the ISF; and
  - incomplete integration of the ISF into the operational planning process.
- ~~(S)~~ Prodded by Prime Minister Maliki, MNF-I and Embassy Baghdad are reviewing our program to bolster the ISF. (See Baghdad cable 2170, attached).
  - You might want to ask the Joint Staff to review personnel practices with respect to the assignment of ISF trainers (including embeds), to ensure that high-quality officers and senior enlisted have incentives to participate in the training mission and are assigned to it.

Prepared by: Abe Shulsky, 571-2509

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Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS



OSD 76644-06



7/11/2006 10:00:23 AM

09-M-0320

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

July 14, 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
CC: Gen Pete Pace  
Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Update on Security in Baghdad

Attached is an update on Baghdad. It is clear that General Casey and the Iraqis are still sorting through precisely what they are going to do. I know Casey believes it requires a political component, and I suspect that is what the pacing item is.

Attach: 7/13/06 Paper on Security in Baghdad

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~~SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

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OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
206 JAN 18 AM 10:15

ACTION MEMO

USDP  
I-06/000097  
ES-5084

FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
**Robert Range**

cc  
1/18

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) *WR* JAN 13 2006

SUBJECT: Sadr Pressure for MNF-I Withdrawal (S)

- (S) If the intelligence reports summarized in the attached slide (Tab B) are correct, the two leading Shi'a Islamist politicians (PM Jaafari and SCIRI leader al Hakim) are willing to support Moqtada al Sadr's demand for a timetable for the withdrawal of Coalition forces.
- (S) Were the main Sunni Arab party to join the call for a timetable, the pro-timetable position would have a comfortable majority in the new legislature.
  - To prevent such a majority from forming, Ambassador Khalilzad should remind Jaafari and al Hakim of the seriousness of U.S. opposition to a timetable.
  - The same message should be delivered to Sadr. The best messenger might be Ahmad Chalabi, who has been able to tone down Sadr in the past.
- (S) Sadr's reported threat of a Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM) armed "revolt" appears to be pre-election bombast. A serious JAM alliance with the Badr Corps is unlikely, given Badr Corps' rivalry with the JAM in southern Iraq and Badr Corps' identification with SCIRI, one of the biggest winners in the December elections.

RECOMMENDATION: that you sign the attached memo to National Security Advisor Hadley (Tab A).

Attachments: as stated

DirNG *J. Taylor*

PD NESA *Per 1/19*

PDASD (ISA) *6 Jan 2006*

Prepared by C. Straub, ISA-NESA, 571-2517

MA SD	<i>1/19</i>	SMA DSD	<i>1/18</i>
ISA SD	<i>1/18</i>	SA DSD	
EXEC SEC	<i>1/18</i>	<i>1445</i>	<i>1/19</i>
ESR MA	<i>1/18</i> <i>1346</i>		

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SENSITIVE

JAN 20 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
CC: Eric Edelman  
GEN John Abizaid  
GEN George Casey  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Iraq Force Level Discussion

I would like to see a schedule for the rest of this year reflecting decision points where we could examine whether or not we should adjust force levels in Iraq. In late fall, based on George Casey's assessment and resultant recommendation, we decided we could reduce forces; and we are now in the process of doing so.

When will we decide on the next round of adjustments?

If we are going to adjust the forces, it takes several months to do the evaluation, move the decision through the deployment order process, work with the interagency, and ultimately alert the units involved. We need advance planning to make sure the process flows smoothly.

Please get back to me within a week with a date for the next assessment by George Casey, subsequent follow-up action, and the overall timeline throughout the year. I suggest he do a review every two months, so we don't get focused on two or three big dates in 2006 and 2007. Better to do it regularly and more frequently.

Please see me on this before you launch out on it.

Thanks.

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*Please Respond By 01/26/06*

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NOV 14 2006

**INFO MEMO**

DepSec Action  
VO USD(P) *R* NOV 16 2006

**FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

**FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)** *PR* NOV 15 2006

**SUBJECT: Memorandum for the Record – Iraq Study Group**

- (U) Attached is the memorandum for the record of your discussion with the Iraq Study Group on Monday, November 13<sup>th</sup>, 2006.

**COORDINATION: TAB A**

**Attachment:  
As stated**

Prepared by: Chris Straub, ISA/ME, 571-2517

Classified by: Mark Kimmitt  
Reason or Reasons: 1.4 (d)  
Declassify On: 13 Nov 2016

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MFR

FROM: Chris Straub

SUBJ: SecDef Meeting with Iraq Study Group (ISG)

DATE: Nov 13 2006

- SecDef met the principals of the ISG at their invitation at 2:10 PM on November 13, 2006, in the Roosevelt Room of the White House. The Secretary was accompanied by Under Secretary for Policy Edelman, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Pace, and Chris Straub (note-taker). The ISG principals present were: Co-chairs James Baker and Lee Hamilton, Charles Robb, Leon Panetta, Edward Meese, Sandra Day O'Connor, William Perry, and Vernon Jordan. Alan Simpson and Lawrence Eagleburger (recently appointed to succeed Robert Gates, resigned) were absent. ISG staff present were Edward Djerejian, John Williams, Ben Rhodes, and Chris Kojm.
  
- SecDef made these initial points:
  - the security assistance process is too slow;
  
  - police training was under the State Department at first, and so the police are two years behind (DoD took over police training in October 2004 but only got responsibility for the Ministry of Interior in October 2005). A single agency should be responsible for all security training and equipping. Mr. Meese asked if this problem was now fixed. SecDef responded that it was fixed in Iraq, but not in Washington, because different Congressional committees review police and army programs.
  
  - the civilian side of the government lacks a culture of deployability and finds it almost impossible to surge. For example, several months ago DoD had about 285 advisors with the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior. All the other ministries of government had only 86 advisors between them. The lack of a civilian surge capacity affects security because ministerial capacity is not built and the Iraqi government can't execute its programs or help its provinces. We need deployable people in the U.S. government who can surge. We can't lose a battle out there, but we can't win without the non-military skills that help produce effective government and a growing economy.
  
  - GEN Pace seconded this point and added that Iraq is a three-legged stool, the legs being security, economic, and political. The military can do the security, but "we need a government that can create jobs." GEN Pace said that the entire process of military deployment should be reviewed, with the appropriate characteristics extended to civilians to make them deployable.

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- GEN Pace added that if U.S. forces were deployed to Afghanistan and not Iraq, we would see the same threats we are now seeing in Iraq.
- Justice O'Connor asked if there was hope for reconciliation. Secdef answered that our hope is reconciliation, and that religious and government leaders must convince their people to stop killing each other.
- Secretary Perry asked about three priorities: increasing the size of the Iraqi army, increasing Iraqi army professionalism, and resetting U.S. forces on their return. He asked what is the right size, should we increase the number of embedded advisors, and do we think Congress will pay for the reset. SecDef. answered that expert groups review the plans periodically, and that a group headed by LTG Petraeus had increased the Iraqi security forces (ISF) objective from 325,000 to 362,000, of which the army would grow from 135,000 to 165,000. SecDef added that capability is more important than numbers, and embedded advisors are professionalizing these forces. On resetting, SecDef described the modularization process and costs for resetting the new brigades which the army has created without increasing end strength. GEN Pace added that Congress has been supportive so far and has set aside a \$70 billion bridge for this purpose.
- Secretary Perry asked how these plans would be affected if some equipment were left behind in Iraq. Gen Pace said that we would probably leave some equipment behind, noting that we had gone from 1200 up-armored humvees to 14,000. He and SecDef added that training is another part of resetting the force; our forces are combat-hardened but have not trained recently in combined arms operations.
- Secretary Perry asked about the differences in Iraq tour lengths among the services. GEN Pace responded that the current Marine and Army tour lengths (seven and twelve months, respectively) fit the deployment patterns of each service – but the differences are not good for morale.
- Mr. Edelman described the growing role of security assistance in Iraq and the problems in moving more of Iraq's requirements to FMF: the price, which scares State Department and the fact that over 90% of FMF is earmarked. The DoD budget is bearing most of the burden now. But Iraq has ordered equipment from FMS and has made a large deposit to that end.
- SecDef added that NATO partners have donated Warsaw Pact equipment to Iraq.

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- GEN Pace said that it would take about two years to backhaul and restore the U.S. equipment now in Iraq.
- Mr. Hamilton asked if ISF training was our top priority. SecDef added that training was in fact the most important task, bearing in mind that operations against Al Qaeda and other terrorists in Iraq is also at the top. SecDef added that ISF training should result in the drawdown of U.S. forces.
- Mr. Hamilton asked the effect of surging more U.S. and Iraqi troops into Baghdad. GEN Pace responded that while surging is possible for a while, in July 2007 either the one-year break between combat tours would have to be reduced or additional reserves would have to be called up. SecDef added that increasing U.S. troop levels would reduce pressure on the Iraqis to take responsibility and would also extend the notion that we are occupiers. "So I am not sure you want to increase troop numbers." SecDef said that neither GEN Abizaid nor GEN Casey had asked him for more troops, except in September 2005 in preparation for the election, and they got the added troops. Mr. Panetta recalled that GEN Casey had told the ISG that troop increases got you only a temporary benefit, and at a price.
- Mr. Hamilton asked about casualties, which he had been briefed earlier to average two KIA per day. SecDef responded that cutting the number of bases (from 110 to 55 now, enroute to 5 or 6) resulted in fewer troops and less exposure to the remaining troops, and that fewer casualties would be the outcome. SecDef added that GEN Casey is adjusting the mission so that Iraqis do more.
- Mr. Robb asked about increasing military end strength as part of a troop surge into Iraq. SecDef described the Army's internal transformation (from the institutional to the operational Army) and its growth to 42 brigades under current end strength. GEN Pace added that the Army had an end strength waiver to add 30,000 troops but could only recruit 20,000. Marine recruiting is much the same. The services hit limits.
- GEN Pace said that with 42 Army brigades in the active force and 28 brigades in the reserves, 18-19 brigades can be deployed at any time. The current demand is 25 brigades. Raising the demand further would reduce the breaks between tours to less than a year.
- Mr. Panetta asked about the Baghdad security plan. GEN Pace responded that until Sunnis and Shi'a decide to stop killing each other, Baghdad will not be

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peaceful. He added that the Baghdad operation is preventing some attacks and calming the city somewhat, and we should continue it. Also, there is a need to balance Prime Minister Maliki's approach to the Shi'a militias, which is political dialogue and compromise, with his approach to the Sunnis, which is to conduct combat operations.

- Mr. Meese asked about logistics training for Iraqis. GEN Pace answered that Iraqi logistics training would be complete by the end of 2007, as would be the provision of their logistics equipment. SecDef added that the Iraqis have money for military equipment and they are spending it.
- Secretary Perry asked about tribal help to the mission in Anbar province. GEN Pace said that the tribes have been delivering on their promises. He added that the Iraqi division there is building up slowly because it initially had too many Shi'a troops relative to Anbar's Sunni majority. SecDef added that U.S. Special Forces are working in Anbar and are in contact with the tribes.
- Mr. Baker asked about whether he supported declaring that we seek no permanent bases for Iraq. SecDef answered that he would prefer the matter not be raised publicly, that there might at some future point be good reasons to be based in Iraq, but that his preference was to respond to Iraqi requests for help with their security with stationing in the region, or at sea, or "by words." He added that in future years he expected the Iraqi government to see their need for outside help but "I'd like to do it with as little basing as possible." SecDef added, in response to Mr. Hamilton, that Iraq was a good base from which to fight Al Qaeda.
- Mr. Panetta asked about our plan to build up the ISF and then draw down our forces. SecDef said that was in fact our plan. Our conviction has been that a timetable would encourage the enemy to wait us out, while benchmarks reverse the process and put pressure on the Iraqis. By setting mutually-agreed upon benchmarks by month rather than date, by being clear that benchmarks can move in either direction, and by helping the Iraqis achieve the conditions required for the benchmark, we can accelerate the process.
- Mr. Baker asked, "what if they fail?" SecDef responded that benchmarks will put structure into Iraqi thinking. If they fail, "it's everybody's problem." Iraq would be a regional and global problem. SecDef added that ultimately the Iraqis will deal with it; "Iraqis will get sick of this and support their police and army."
- GEN Pace added that benchmarks are agreed as objectives among friends.

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POLICY COORDINATION SHEET

**Subject:** Memorandum for the Record – Iraq Study Group  
**I- Number:** 06/015265-ME

<u>Title/Organization</u>	<u>Name</u>	<u>Date</u>
PDASD/ISA	 Mary Beth Long	14 Nov. 06
DASD, ME	<u>HAS seen</u> Mark Kimmitt	13 NOV 06
Director, ME-NG	 John Trigilio	13 NOV 06
Special Advisor	_____ Abe Shulsky	_____


~~FOUO~~

November 29, 2005

IRAQ

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT The "Clear, Hold and Build Bumper Sticker"

Mr. President,

I continue to be concerned about the use of the "Clear, hold **and build**" bumper sticker. When McCain and people of his view use it, they mean the US should clear, hold, and build.

That is not what we **are** doing, **nor** is it what we want to do. Rather, we are working with Iraqi Security Forces so they can "clear," so that they can "hold," and I **am** of the view that Congress is not going to appropriate any more money for the US to "build." Iraq has oil money, and they will have to rebuild themselves over time. They **are** charging pennies for a gallon of gasoline. How could we explain that to Americans if we were to ask Congress for still more money to help Iraq rebuild its country?

I hope this bumper sticker will be reconsidered and dropped before the Iraq Strategy paper goes out on Wednesday.

In the edits I sent over to Steve Hadley I have left the words **in** the document because of our prior discussions, but I --throughout-- have tried to shift the language so it is clear it **will not** be the US doing those things, but the Iraqis doings those things.

29 NOV 05

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However, I **am** afraid that that won't be good enough, given the echo chamber that that phrase already has developed. I **am** convinced the public will not see it as the Iraqis doing those things, but will see them as US. activities. And that's not **our** strategy, it's not what we are doing, and I don't think it is what we ought to be doing. Generals Pace, Abizaid and Casey all agree.

Respectfully,

DHR:s  
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Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~FOUO~~

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~~FOUO~~  
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JUN 22 2006

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Stephen J. Hadley

*DHR*  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Abizaid's Comments on the Paper by Mike Vickers

Mr. President,

You will recall Mike Vickers gave us a paper during the Camp David meetings. I sent the paper to John Abizaid to get his reaction.

Attached is Abizaid's response, which I found interesting.

Respectfully,

Attach: 6/21/06 CDR CENTCOM memo to SecDef

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Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
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CCCC

June 21, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Paper by Michael Vickers

Mr. Secretary,

Thank you for sharing Mike Vickers' work. It is interesting that much of our current strategy is captured here. You will recall the word "indirect approach" from early CENTCOM strategy sessions on the Long War Strategy.

Looking at George's strategic and operational plan it largely follows much of what Mike Vickers is suggesting. George clearly understands Mike's point on page two that the "drawdown of U.S. forces while the insurgency is still raging must continue." That is precisely what George is doing. Time and the enemy affect the speed of the process. More important, the quality of the Iraqi military force coupled with credible, legitimate governance are prerequisites for success. The art in all of this is to reduce US forces at a rate that is neither too fast nor too slow. If we move too fast, we will undermine our investment in Iraqi security forces and erode confidence in the new government. If too slow, we will generate dependency and perhaps fuel the insurgency. In addition, it remains crucial to keep reinforcement options open and easily activated from outside Iraq below a certain threshold of ground brigades. Finally we do need to keep an eye on how we are resourcing what Vickers calls the main effect.

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Look forward to discussing this work with you when I see you in person.

V/R John

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Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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~~FOUO~~

061306-19  
Exec Sec

June 13, 2006

TO: Gen Pete Pace  
Eric Edelman  
GEN John Abizaid

Distro To PT, NB

Date 6/15/06

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D.R.*

Time 1133

**SUBJECT** Paper by Michael Vickers

Attached is a paper Michael Vickers gave the President, which I found interesting.

*Any* thoughts?

Thanks,

Attach: **6/12/06** Vickers memo to POTUS

DHR.as  
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Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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6  
June 12, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR THE **PRESIDENT**

FROM: Michael G. Vickers *MV*

SUBJECT: Transitioning to an Indirect Approach in Iraq

This memorandum expands upon my earlier memo regarding the transition to an indirect approach in **Iraq**. It builds on our May 30<sup>th</sup> discussion in the Oval Office, and seeks to address the questions you raised.

One of the many paradoxes of modern counterinsurgency is that less is often more. This paradox applies to strategy and tactics, to external powers supporting counterinsurgencies, and to internal governments fighting an insurgency. Successful counterinsurgency operations are characterized by an emphasis on intelligence, the discriminate use of force, a focus on building popular support for the government and protecting the population, and on political reconciliation, including **amnesty** and rehabilitation for insurgents. Police are in the lead, with the military in support. Unsuccessful counterinsurgency efforts are characterized by a military focus on large-scale sweep and kill-capture operations, with forces concentrated in large bases for protection. Building indigenous capacity has been a low priority in unsuccessful operations. Intervention by outside powers in insurgencies in the past half century has been far more successful when an indirect, small footprint approach is used.

**Our** strategic predicament in Iraq **can** be summarized as follows: For three years, we have pursued a direct approach to counterinsurgency that **has** eroded American public support for the war (our center of gravity) more than it **has** reduced Iraqi support for the insurgency (our enemy's center of gravity). By almost all measures, the insurgency has gotten worse. Insurgent attacks are at historically high levels (**3,500 per month**), with twice as many attacks occurring daily in May 2006 **than** in May **2004** and 2005. The security situation in Baghdad has deteriorated. Al Qaeda in Iraq forces and other **Sunni** insurgents are seriously contesting Ramadi. Insurgent attacks on Iraqis have increased substantially. Independent militias have grown in numbers and influence **as** a result of intra-Shia **power** struggles and Sunni-Shia sectarian violence.

Given Iraq's unsettled politics, it is highly unlikely that American forces, even with growing Iraqi security force assistance, will be able to defeat the insurgency within the next **2-3** years. The current level of insurgency, moreover, is likely to be insensitive across a wide range of force levels. The assertion **by** many critics that more troops in **2003** could have nipped this insurgency in the bud or fundamentally altered its course is not credible. Likewise, increasing the number of U.S. troops now is highly unlikely to be decisive. The insurgents will still control the initiative, and they **can** always temporarily decline to fight. Insufficient intelligence and continued strong support for the insurgency among the **Sunni** population will limit the strategic success of any near-term efforts. As

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Date: 12/1/08  
IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

long as the political grievances fueling the insurgency remain, the insurgency will remain.

Because of the direct approach's inability to produce decisive near-term results and its increasing **cost**, the longer we stay with it, the more we place our long-term goals in Iraq at risk. Continuing with **this** approach, moreover, does not play to American **strengths**. The insurgents and the states supporting them (i.e., Iran and Syria) retain the strategic initiative in Iraq, while we suffer from significantly reduced strategic freedom of action.

It is imperative that we accelerate our shift to an indirect approach, with Iraqis in the lead and Americans in support. Transitioning to an indirect approach will require that we **begin** and continue the drawdown of U.S. forces while the insurgency is still raging. It will require additional resources for Iraqi security forces. Most importantly, we must make **our** stated 'main effort' our actual main effort.

The Iraqi insurgency will not be particularly difficult to defeat over the longer **term**. It is imperative, however, that we shift the focus from why we seem unable to defeat the insurgency in the short run, to why the new Iraqi government, with our support, will prevail in the long run. The indirect approach has defeated far more formidable insurgencies (i.e., El Salvador in the **1980s**) than the one currently being waged in Iraq. The transition to an indirect approach has also been successfully accomplished in the face of much greater insurgent threats and following more dire failure of direct approaches (i.e., by the U.S. in Vietnam after **1971**, and by the Soviets in Afghanistan after 1989; the indirect approach failed **only** when the supporting government collapsed).

Insurgencies are protracted contests of wills. There are no counterinsurgency blitzkriegs. We and the Iraqi government will win in the long run simply by not losing, and by driving the insurgency to lower and lower levels until the insurgents' political will to continue has been broken. We **can** defeat the insurgency in Iraq the same way we will win the broader Global War on Terrorism, by game-changing, direct operations early in the war (i.e., the overthrow of the Taliban and elimination of the Al Qaeda sanctuary in Afghanistan), followed by protracted indirect and clandestine operations that leverage the capabilities of our partners. The Iraqi insurgents do not offer a viable political alternative. Unless **America** abandons Iraq, Iraqi insurgents will remain incapable of massing and conducting large-scale, decisive operations. The Iraqi insurgency will be defeated by increasing Iraqi **security** and intelligence capabilities, the Iraqi population's eventual rejection of insurgent violence, political reconciliation, and continued American political, military and economic support.

American support, however, must be sustainable **across** administrations. There is no more important task for the administration than to hand off **an** Iraq strategy that is sustainable politically by its successors. The strategic imperative is to transition before perceived failure with the direct approach forecloses otherwise viable options. (This **was**

one of the major mistakes we made in Vietnam.) **Our** objective should be to hand over primary **security** responsibility to Iraqi forces no later than summer **2008**.

Transitioning to **an** indirect approach in Iraq is emphatically not an exit strategy. Nor does it mean that we must adjust our goals downward **as** we hand off security responsibility to Iraqis. It is imperative that we and others not **confuse** means with ends. **Our** goals in Iraq should remain our goals. We have long recognized that our goals there **cannot** be achieved overnight, and that they can only be achieved **if** the Iraqis take ownership of them.

Zarqawi's death and the formation **of** the new Iraqi government provide the events **on** which a transition can begin. **This** unusual meeting at Camp David provides another potential turning point. The challenge will be to conduct the transition **so as** to build support among the **American** people **for** a sustainable strategy while assuring the new Iraqi government and signaling our **enemies** that decisive **American** support will continue. Iraqi security forces have **been** stood up to **80-85** percent of their targeted levels, and will reach 100 percent by the end **of** the year. We have killed or captured nearly all former regime elements, and in addition to killing Zarqawi, **we** have significantly degraded Al Qaeda in Iraq. The insurgency **has** been successfully contained to **Iraq**, and it is driven primarily by domestic Iraqi political disputes.

Operations in the near term should focus on eliminating the insurgent sanctuary in Ramadi and on improving the security situation in Baghdad. Substantially reducing the insurgent presence in Ramadi will likely require a combination of clandestine operations by JSOC and the CIA, coupled with direct operations similar to those conducted in Fallujah. Because of sectarian divisions and **Sunni** rejectionism, U.S. forces **will** have to take the lead in Ramadi, **though as** much **of** an Iraqi face **as** possible should be put on operations. Because it is the heartland **of** **Sunni** rejectionists, Al Anbar is an area **ripe** for **an** indirect and clandestine approach over the longer term. Our objective should be to peel **off** the reconcilable **elements** of the **Sunni** insurgency and assist Sunni **irregular** forces in fighting the irreconcilable elements.

Demonstrated victories are vital to the credibility of the new Iraqi government. It must take the lead in securing Baghdad. **We** should not, however, create unrealistic expectations about what can be achieved in **the** near **term**. Security will stem **in large** part from political accommodation and reconciliation. **We** should seek to incorporate rather than disband militias wherever possible. U.S. advisers and material assistance can play **an** important role in this process.

More broadly, a regional, rather than country-specific approach is imperative. In Central America, we pursued an offensive indirect approach through covert action in Nicaragua – the Sandinistas were providing sanctuary to Salvadoran insurgents and other Central American Marxist groups – in conjunction with our indirect approach to counterinsurgency in the other Central **American** countries. We should do the same today with regard to Iran and **Syria**.

**Our** advisory effort must become the a d , and not just the stated main U.S. effort in Iraq. Support for Iraqi security forces, police **as** well as army, needs to be increased in several areas: equipment, supplies and secure facilities. They also need responsive operational support. Iraqi security forces must take the lead in planning operations, and not serve **as** last-minute adjuncts to U.S. operations. As T.E. Lawrence observed, "better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly. It is their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them." Giving the Iraqis something to defend, **moreover**, is essential. Economic assistance is as important **as** security assistance.

We need **to send** our best personnel as advisors, and they require proper training. We are currently not doing very well in this area. Senior advisory positions (Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel) should be command-equivalent and centrally selected. The same situation applies **to** personnel **from** other agencies and departments. Iraqi police will become the **main** counterinsurgency effort **over** time. Accordingly, we need to substantially increase our advisory presence with them. (**Currently**, our effort is heavily weighted toward the Iraqi army.) The overall advisory effort, currently around 5,000 personnel, needs to be doubled.

As part of the transition, we should achieve unity of command and signal our shift to an Iraqi-led approach by putting the U.S. Ambassador in charge of the U.S. effort there. A Special Operations Forces three-star should be selected to head the military assistance command. The current **SOF** advisory effort in **Iraq**, with the exception of its support for the Iraqi SOF Brigade, is being constrained by its subordination to conventional forces.

The drawdown of U.S. combat forces, it goes without saying, should occur gradually, and will almost certainly not be completed by the time the administration leaves office. It must begin, however, and it will have to occur while the insurgency is still raging. Significant reductions are feasible and essential, and over the coming two years, the role of remaining **U.S.** combat forces should shift from a direct combat force to a Quick Reaction Force in support of Iraqi Security Forces. **Over** time, command of the QRF should be reduced to a two-star position and subordinated to the military assistance effort. A continued clandestine presence (i.e., JSOC) will also be required for some time, and should directly report to the senior military commander.

U.S. combat forces that remain in **Iraq** after Iraqi forces assume primary security responsibility should be high-leverage, theater-ranging assets: airborne surveillance and strike and air mobility to move rapid reaction ground forces, both U.S. and Iraqi. The **entire** quick reaction force should not exceed 40,000 troops, about half of which would provide air support. The ground component of the QRF should not be involved in day-to-day counterinsurgency operations.

To politically facilitate the transition, Prime Minister Maliki's goal of accepting security responsibility in 18 months should be supported. A four-star-led assessment team might also be convened to provide recommendations on the transition to **an** indirect approach.

~~FOUO~~

January 3, 2005

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Colin Powell  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
The Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Muslim Force for Iraq

I believe we should seriously pursue the idea of a Muslim military contingent in Iraq. The idea was proposed initially by the Saudis, and we've subsequently heard similar suggestions from the Qatari leadership. As he has traveled in the area, John Abizaid has heard support voiced for the idea from various regional leaders.

There has not been unanimity within the interagency on this topic, but I believe it has merit and we should investigate it more fully. It would potentially:

- Demonstrate U.S. willingness to work effectively with Muslim allies;
- Provide additional military forces for missions in Iraq;
- Eventually provide relief for U.S. and other coalition forces; and
- Provide a counter to Al-Jazeera claims of U.S. anti-Muslim posture.

While this would be a complicated arrangement to bring to closure, I believe we should work this aggressively. John Abizaid, who spends a great deal of time with the leaders involved, agrees strongly. Needless to say, he would want to get the Iraqis in the lead in requesting it.

Respectfully,

DHR:dh  
010305-7

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AUTHORITY E.O. 12958  
Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~FOUO~~

OSD 00262-05

09-M-0320



~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Potential Iraqi Demands for Coalition Withdrawal

- (S) Recent intelligence reports indicate a willingness on the part of Prime Minister Jaafari and SCIRI leader al Hakim to support Moqtada Sadr's call for a Coalition withdrawal timetable. The Sunni Arabs previously asked for a timetable. If the Sunni and the Shi'a Islamists combine on this issue, a majority of the new assembly may vote for a timetable.
- (S) The politicians involved need to know the seriousness of our opposition to a timetable. Ambassador Khalilzad could emphasize the point in his conversations with Jaafari and al Hakim.
- (S) Sadr is harder to reach. One option might be to ask Ahmed Chalabi to tell Sadr. Chalabi reportedly has had some influence on Sadr.

~~Classified by multiple sources  
Reason: 1.4(c,d)  
Declassify on: 5 Jan 2015~~

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DECLASSIFIED  
AUTHORITY E.O. 12958  
Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

OSD 75118-06

09-M-0320

~~FOUO~~

December 13, 2006

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Quality of Iraqi Police

IRAQ

Mr. President.

There is a lot of information flowing out there about the quality of the Iraqi police. I asked about it, and received the attached response from General Marty Dempsey. I found it to be interesting and helpful.

Respectfully,

Attach. 12/8/06 CJCS memo to SecDef (OSD19013-06)

13 Dec 06

DHR:ss  
SF121306-03

8 Dec 06

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AUTHORITY E.O. 12958  
Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~FOUO~~



CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-0000

CM-0619-06  
8 December 2006

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *VR-Peter Pace 8 Dec 06*

SUBJECT: Capability Assessment of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Police

You asked' about recent contradictions between Civilian Police Assistance Training Team statements and public reporting concerning the Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the Iraqi Police Services (IPS).

- Attached (TAB A) is a memorandum from Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, Commander, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, explaining his assessment of the MOI and IPS.
  - Corruption exists at every level of the MOI, for political and personal gains.
  - Police forces include personnel who are passive, permissive, or complicit in militia activity.
  - Minister of Interior Boulani is taking action to combat corruption and militia infiltration.

COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Reference:  
1 Verbal tasking of 24 October 2006

Prepared By: Lieutenant General John F. Sattler, USMC; Director, J-5; 703-695-5618

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AUTHORITY E.O. 12958  
Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~



OSD 19013-06

12/11/2006 1:10:17 PM

09-M-0320



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MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-IRAQ  
BAGHDAD, IRAQ  
APOAE 09348

MNSTC-I-CG

29 October 2006

MEMORANDUM THRU

Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Baghdad, Iraq APO AE 09342  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 999 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC 20318-9999

FOR Secretary of Defense, 1000 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1000

SUBJECT: Response to Request for Information on the Extent of Corruption in the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI)

**1. Disparity between open-source and MNSTC-I statements on Ministry of Interior progress.** Open-source reports almost exclusively highlight security force failures and are focused at the tactical level. The Ministry of Interior is a very complex organization with **hundreds** of thousands of employees working in four major aspects of civil security: Ministry Headquarters, Provincial Police Services, Border Forces, and National Police Forces. Imprecisely, misconduct and corruption are broadly described in open-source as “problems in the Mol.” There is progress at every level of the Ministry of Interior, and there **are** challenges at every level.

**2. The extent of corruption in the Ministry of Interior.** Corruption exists at every level of the Ministry of Interior and its forces. It is manifested in **two** ways:

- **Corruption for political gain.** The accommodation of political parties in the distribution of cabinet positions is reflected at sub-cabinet level as well. As a result, political party loyalties run deep into the Ministries in general and the Ministry of Interior in particular.

**ACTIONS ON-GONG TO COMBAT CORRUPTION FOR POLITICAL GAIN**

- ✓ Minister of Interior Boulani has embarked on a Ministry Reform Program that will reduce the number of Deputy Ministers from 6 to 4 and **that** will establish better balance among “groups” in order to reduce external political influence inside his ministry
- ✓ Minister Boulani has also initiated a National Police Transformation Program that has flattened the organization through the elimination of two headquarters. that is re-training National Police units to give them police skills they have been lacking, and that is vetting leaders at Battalion Commander and above for loyalty
- **Corruption for personal gain.** The long history in Iraq of corruption for personal gain is **evident** in most financial transactions and contracting actions.

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MNSTC-I-CG

SUBJECT Response to Request for Information on the Extent of Corruption in the Iraqi Police Service (IPS) and the Ministry of Interior (MOI)

ACTIONS ON-GOING TO COMBAT CORRUPTION FOR PERSONAL GAIN

- ✓ Minister Boulani has approached us with a request to adopt US Foreign Military Sales as his ministry's acquisition strategy. He recognizes that this will eliminate corruption in his procurement actions. He is also keenly aware that he remains vulnerable to corruption in pay and life support activities.

3. **The extent of militia infiltration of the Ministry of Interior Forces.** There has been infiltration of militias into the Iraqi Security Forces. However, the larger problem is competing loyalties and militia influence. This manifest itself in several ways.

- **Police who are passive to the militia agenda.** In the most contested areas of Iraq, many local police and some National Police turn a blind eye to militia misconduct. This occurs for a variety of reasons including intimidation and, in some cases, sympathy for the militia's activities.
- **Police who are permissive to the militia agenda.** There are police in these same contested areas who do not engage in extra-judicial activity themselves but who assist the militia by providing safe passage, uniforms, equipment, and information.
- **Police who actively participate in a militia agenda.** Some police actively participate in extra-judicial, sectarian crime.

ACTIONS ON-GONG TO COMBAT MILITIA INFLUENCE IN THE POLICE FORCES


- ✓ It is important to note that there are at least as many positive reports of police conduct as reports of militia influence. Several recent examples include:
  - Police and Army working together in Mosul attacked an AIF ambush site killing and capturing over 40 enemy
  - Police in Amarah fought for more than 24 hours to defend their police station against Jaysh al-Mahdi attack
  - Police in Ramadi working with local tribal leaders have begun to regain control of Al Anbar Province and in the past month have captured over 70 tons of munitions
- ✓ Nevertheless, Minister Boulani is aware of the problems posed by militia influence, and he understands that he must address it through the careful selection of leaders at police station and above. He has begun this process in Baghdad with

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local and National Police. and he is seeking additional authorities to influence the selection of leaders at Provincial level.

- ✓ Minister Boulani also understands that he must hold police and their leaders accountable for misconduct. Several recent examples of his willingness to tackle police misconduct include:
  - Using his Internal Affairs Directorate, he has directed investigations against more than 2,000 Ministry employees resulting in the conviction of **122**, the administrative punishment of **1,450** and the firing of **1,228**.

  
MARTIN E. DEMPSEY  
Lieutenant General, US Army  
Commanding

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TAB B

COORDINATION

USCENTCOM

MG Ghormley

14 November 2006

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Ch RDD, WHS  
Date: 12/1/08  
IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

Tab B

~~SECRET//Eyes Only//NOFORN//MR Attachment~~  
~~FOUO~~

OCT 18 2006

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Stephen J. Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memo on Baghdad

Attached is a memo from John Abizaid, which includes an e-mail from George Casey. Because of your periodic conversations with Maliki, I thought you would want to be aware of this.

Respectfully,

Attach. 10/16/06 Abizaid memo; 10/16/06 Casey e-mail w/attachments

DHR.dh  
SF101706-04

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AUTHORITY E.O. 12958  
Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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~~FOUO~~



OSD 77555-06

10/18/2006 8:15:19 AM

09-M-0320

~~SECRET~~  
~~EYES ONLY - SENSITIVE~~

October 30, 2006

TO: GEN George Casey

CC: Gen Pete Pace  
GEN John Abizaid

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Troop Disposition in Iraq

As you know, every week we have a deployment order meeting. Not too long ago one of those meetings involved your recommendation that we extend the 172nd Stryker Brigade for up to 120 additional days. We did so.

Currently, we are looking at force rotations for the future. Increasingly, they include notice indicating that the dwell times out of Iraq for active duty forces will be less than one year -- by a month or, in some cases, two or three months. The inevitable effect of unexpected extensions and of dwell times of less than one year will be seen in recruiting, retention, and morale. Needless to say, there are risks to continuing on this path for an extended period.

As you will recall, three years ago I started a process called "managing the force more efficiently." We initiated some 35 to 40 different activities to reduce stress on the force, including moving military folks out of civilian posts and the like. We are making headway.

In addition, we are currently considering ways we might accelerate the current program and/or build additional combat, combat support and combat service support capabilities to further reduce stress on the force. We are also working to reduce U.S. forces in other parts of the world. The cumulative effect is that we are finding ways to increase supply. One of the complicating factors is that the Army is modularizing and modernizing the force to brigade combat teams, which means that units are periodically out of the rotation. Lastly, we wisely committed to train Iraqi and Afghan security forces and embed key leaders with them, but this also has resulted in removing some units from the force rotation, thereby adding to the stress.

I mention all of this so you will have it in your mind as we go forward. At your request, we have an assessment team going into Iraq. We are doing the same in Afghanistan. Their task is to see if we can return individuals or units in the

OSD 77992-06



12/13/2006 2:21:08 PM

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Dec 6, 2006  
CH RDD, ESD WHS

09-11-0321 

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~~EYES ONLY - SENSITIVE~~

theater that made sense two or three years ago but may make less sense today. I am sure the assessment will produce benefits, as it did the last time.

As the President said, we want to resource what you and your team need to get the job done. On the other hand, we want to work the system so it will operate efficiently, sustain the long war, and properly balance risk.

I wanted you to have this background as you work with the assessment teams and as you consider the arrangement of the forces you have in Iraq.

Over the recent period, we have gone from very few Iraqi Security Forces to 310,000 trained and equipped. We have gone from 110 U.S. bases down to less than 55, with the remainder closed or turned over to the Iraqis. Today we have the majority of Iraqi Security Forces in the lead, with Coalition forces in support. However, my impression is that we have plus or minus 145,000 troops, with roughly the same number of headquarters, the sizes of the headquarters growing, and what seems to be roughly the same number of engineers, military police, force protection, and the like. This requires a careful look, and I know you will encourage your people to work closely with General Wood's team and lean forward to propose whatever adjustments are possible.

Thanks.

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Dec 6, 2006  
CH RDD, ESD WHS

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JUL 24 2006

## INFO MEMO

USDP ~~SE~~ JUL 24 2006  
I-06/009451-ISA

## MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), 695-4151 ~~MR~~ JUL 24 2006

SUBJECT: Saturday 22 Jul 2006 SVTC on Iraq (U)

(U) You asked my assessment of the Saturday SVTC.

(S) Our friends in Baghdad, especially Zal, seemed to lack their usual self-confidence, which was disturbing. More encouraging, however, was that a shift of strategy seems to be underway, which I think is right.

(S) When you went to Baghdad, our strategy was to urge PM Maliki to pursue the Sunni politically (via Reconciliation) and to crack down harder on the Shia militias. Implicit in Saturday's discussion was a shift:

- (S) The center of gravity of the **military** problem is still the Sunni insurgency. They are the main drivers of the sectarian violence (e.g., Samarra), and may think their strategy is succeeding.
  - (S) As someone said on Saturday, some Sunni leaders have one foot in the political process and the other foot in the violent camp. They should be made to choose.
  - (S) The Reconciliation effort has stalled, for a variety of reasons. We have yet to see strong evidence that any of our Sunni interlocutors are able to deliver a reduction in the level of insurgent attacks.
- (S) Meanwhile, the Shia problem is mainly **political**: The center of gravity here is Sistani's ability to rein in Sadr and our ability to build up Shia counterweights to Sadr.
  - (S) I take seriously Qasim Daoud's warning not to take on Sadr militarily. If we lose Sistani, we are out of business in Iraq.

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CLASSIFIED BY: ASD/ISA PETER W. RODMAN  
Derived from MULTIPLE SOURCES  
DECLASSY ON: 19 JUL 2016

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Dec 1, 2008  
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Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS



- (S) As Zal suggested, we should pursue a political strategy, in collaboration with Sistani, to build up SCIRI, Dawa, and others.
  - (S) GEN Casey's more surgical approach to JAM is therefore appropriate—focusing on certain “death squad” leaders. Coordinating with Maliki (and in some cases deferring to him) also makes sense in this perspective. (Be aware that, to some extent, this may imply obtaining Sadr's acquiescence in going after “death squad” leaders within the JAM that he regards as threats to his control. At least as a start.)
- (S) You may want to discuss this concept with Maliki.

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~~FOUO~~  
~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20161031 Attachment~~

October 31, 2006

TO: J.D. Crouch  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Data on Iraq

In response to your phone call yesterday morning, I am sending the attached brief with data on what has been going on in Iraq.

If you can figure out a way to use it, we can figure out way to declassify it on some basis that is appropriate. Why don't you take a look at it and let me know what you think we should do.

Thanks.

Attach. MNF-I "Weekly Summary 21 - 27 Oct 06"

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SF103106-15

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~~SECRET//REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI//20161031 Attachment~~



# Weekly Summary

## 21 - 27 Oct 06

- Weekly Operations Total: 178 / 191
- 125 / 130 were Combined Operations with ISF
- 37 / 45 were Independent ISF Operations
- 16 / 16 were CF only Operations
- 68 % were Combined Operations
- 24 % were Independent ISF Operations
- 8 % were CF only Operations

Blue: 14 - 20 Oct 06  
Red: 21 - 27 Oct 06

- All Operations resulted in AIF:
  - Caches Found = 87 / 44
  - IEDs Found & Cleared = 219 / 187
  - AIF Detained = 267 / 344
  - Bomb Makers Captured/Killed = 0 Captured; 0 Killed / 0 Captured; 0 Killed
  - Foreign Fighters Captured/Killed = 5 Captured; 21 Killed / 3 Captured; 8 Killed
  - HVIs Captured/Killed = 0 Captured; 0 Killed; 0 Captured; 0 Killed


	Monthly Average	Month Totals (Oct 06)	1 Apr 06 to Date
AIF Detained	1,168	1,154	8,024
AIF Killed	348	406	2,391
IED F/C	930	848	6,390
Cache	229	289	1,572
FF Det /Killed	19/ 47	15/ 48	130/ 323



SECRET // REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI // 20161031



# Caches Found 1 Apr 06 – 27 Oct 06



Cache discoveries have increased at a steady rate over the last three months primarily due to OTEI. October is projected to show a significant increase in cache discoveries. A database scrub resulted in additional caches being identified; however, the resultant trends are generally the same as the trend before the scrub.




SECRET // REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI // 20161031



# Enemy KIA

## 1 Apr 06 – 27 Oct 06



Assess that increased AIF attacks and activity during Ramadan exposed AIF to CF and US operations resulting in higher enemy KIA in October.

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DATA SOURCE: FUSION NET


57



SECRET // REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI // 20161031



# Total Tips (Combined National/Regional/Baghdad Tips) 1 Apr 06 – 27 Oct 06



Tips are projected to increase this month. Tips continue to deliver valuable information. Most Iraqis view these as a valid mechanisms for providing information about possible terrorist or criminal activity.


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# National Tips Hotline 1 Apr 06 – 27 Oct 06




National TIPS Hotline trends remain relatively steady since April, but have increased recently. Numbers reflect sustained confidence by the Iraqi people in the utility of the national-level tips hotline.



SECRET // REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFI // 20161031



# Foreign Fighters Killed 1 Apr 06 – 27 Oct 06



September reflected an increase over August and is comparable to June and July. October projections are similar to the previous months.

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DATA SOURCE: FUSION NET/C2 FF TRACKER




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# Monthly IED Trends

1 Apr 06 – 27 Oct 06



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X5

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


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IED,

[REDACTED]

Monthly Totals



1 Apr 06 - 27 Oct 06

[REDACTED]

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09-M-0321

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FEB 03 2005

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
c c : Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Transferring Responsibilities to Afghanistan and Iraq

I need you to develop an approach for the interagency whereby the Afghans and the Iraqis will build the prisons, train the guards, and establish the civil justice systems they need, so the U.S. can offload the Afghan and Iraqi prisoners and detainees we have.

DoD ought not to be the jailer for the GWOT. These countries ought to step up and develop the capacity to manage their own detainees and prisoners.

The only way this is going to be accomplished is if you push it hard and get the Departments of Justice, State and Defense, and the Embassies in those countries to establish very high priorities to see that this is accomplished.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
020205-9

*Afghanistan*

*3 Feb 05*

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OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

0179

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

2005 JAN 19 PM 2:11

January 18, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: "Accelerating Success in Afghanistan" in 2004: An  
Assessment

The President's 2004 "Accelerating Success in Afghanistan" initiative led to transformative changes in governance, security, and reconstruction in Afghanistan. This memorandum assesses process, progress made this year, and challenges ahead. The Executive Summary, used by Deputies and Principals to measure our performance in Afghanistan, is attached to provide additional detail.

**Process.** Guided by the President's "Accelerating Success" vision, the United States Government developed and implemented Afghan policy using interagency organizations tailored for the task.

- **Leadership.** The President's determination to show results, exemplified by his promise to Karzai to build the Kabul-to-Kandahar road by December 2003, motivated the interagency to produce results.
- **An Emphasis on Implementation.** Program and activity metrics, published biweekly in the "Afghanistan Status: Executive Summary," provided Deputies and Principals the information they needed to intervene when necessary to drive the interagency to produce results.
- **Interagency Organizations.** The Afghanistan Interagency Operations Group (AIOG) met under NSC-chairmanship to provide a single body to generate policy and provide direction. The AIOG met under State-chairmanship to integrate programmatic support and coordinate efforts with international donors. The Embassy organized a companion interagency group. Senior

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advisers to the Ambassador helped him direct the interagency effort in Kabul.

**Progress this year.** The achievements which follow together transformed Afghanistan's political, security, and reconstruction landscape.

- **Elected Government. Constitution approved; over 10 million Afghan voters registered; over 8 million voted in the Presidential election October 9.** Every United States Government department and agency in Afghanistan combined efforts with the Afghan Government, the U.N., and the donor community to register voters, to conduct the elections, and provide security. The successful election weakened the Taliban insurgency.
- **19 Provincial Reconstruction Teams.** Interagency teams, built around military civil affairs and security units, improved security, facilitated reconstruction in the less secure areas, improved local government capacity, and provided secure bases for State, USAID, Agriculture, and other agency officers. The Afghan people came to see them as reliable agents of change.
- **16,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) troops.** The Afghan Government (in coordination with the Embassy and Coalition) deployed the ANA regionally to defang factional conflict, check local militias through presence, extend the reach of the national government, and conduct counterinsurgency operations.
- **25,000 Police.** Individual police training programs provided the trained police needed to secure the election and installed the regional training capacity necessary to increase police effectiveness.
- **Warlord Strategy.** The Afghan Government, consulting closely with the Embassy, progressively undercut warlord power and influence by checking an attempt by Dostum to use illegitimate force, keeping Fahim Khan off the Presidential ticket, and removing Ismael Khan from his power base in the West.
- **Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reconstruction (DDR): 6,176 heavy weapons cantoned; 27,669 troops Disarmed; 26,171 troops Demobilized; 25,151 troops Reintegrating.** Dogged Japanese, U.N., and Embassy pursuit of DDR pilot programs led to rapid progress late in the year as the Warlord Strategy bore fruit and elections became more of a certainty. By the early fall

Afghans were increasingly convinced that warlordism had no future in Afghanistan and the only path to power lay in the political realm.

- **Kabul to Kandahar Road completed in December 2003.** USAID completed the road early despite insurgent attacks. The road yielded economic and security access benefits. More importantly, it signaled U.S. and Afghan determination to succeed in the face of Taliban attempts to shut down reconstruction.

**Challenges ahead.** We will pursue a broader, better integrated, and better resourced counternarcotics strategy to help Afghanistan reduce its narcotics economy. We will broaden police programs to focus on organizational training. We will press other donors to make good on their Afghanistan pledges.

*Condoleezza Rice*

Condoleezza Rice *CR*  
Assistant to the President  
For National Security Affairs

Attachments

- Tab A Afghanistan Status: Executive Summary
  - Tab 1 Other Police Sector Contributors
  - Tab 2 Donor Contributions to the Presidential Elections
  - Tab 3 Afghan Reconstruction Trust Fund Contributions
  - Tab 4 Donor Pledges Since 2002

Year End - December, 2004



**AFGHANISTAN INTERAGENCY  
OPERATIONS GROUP**

# *Afghanistan Status: Executive Summary*

*Year End 2004*



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*Year End - December, 2004*



## **Stoplight Charts: Definitions**

- **Green**: Programs or activities met their September 2004 goals.
- **Yellow**: Programs met September 2004 goals with difficulty, did not meet program goals, with explanation, or concerns regarding the programs or activities remain in 2005.
- **Red**: Programs or activities missed goals or milestones.
- **White**: New strategy adopted.
- **Lead Agency** is the implementing office; **Oversight Agency** is the office responsible for tracking progress in Washington, DC
- **Accelerated programs** were designed to produce an effect prior to the Afghan election, originally scheduled for June, 2004. Included September 2003 figures provide baseline information.

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# Status of Programs and Activities in Afghanistan

	<p><u>Goal for June 2004</u>  <u>September 30 Milestone:</u>  <u>Today/Year End</u></p>	<p>USG &amp; Donor Funding</p>
<p><b>Violence Against Coalition, Afghan Forces, and Non-Combatants; also Factional Fighting</b> CFC-A/JS J2                  Metrics slides 5-11                  [Sept 2003: By category: Coalition 30, Militia 34, Non-combatants 44, Factional 14. UN maps assess risk in south and southeast provinces as medium.]</p>	<p><u>GOAL:</u> Security permits presidential elections and UN/NGO permissive operations (UN Go/No Go map reflect improved access compared to Sep 03).   <u>By September 30:</u> See GOAL above.   <u>Year End:</u> Presidential election was held with no major incidents of violence. Violence by category for week ending Dec. 29: Coalition-19, Non-combatants-5, Factional-0, Militia forces-5.</p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> – 2004 Afghan portion of OEF expenditures: \$-6.2 Billion.  <u>Donor Funding</u> – 43 Nations support OEF and/or ISAF. Financial contributions take various forms:                  -Deployment costs                  -Logistics costs                  -Salaries                  - Equipment donations</p>
	<p><u>GOAL:</u> 20,000 individually trained police (including 6000 Border and 2600 Highway police)   <u>By September 30:</u> 29,000 trained national police.   <u>Year End:</u> INL surpassed the MOI goal to train 20,000 police prior to the October Presidential Election by 5,000. As of December 20, INL has trained and provided non-lethal equipment packages to over 32,000 police, provided salary support through the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan and expanded training programs to include highway and border police training.                  Training will be expanded to police organizations in 2005.</p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> - FY 2004 funding \$160 million (INCLE).  <u>Donor Funding</u> – See “Police – German Efforts” for German contribution to police; in addition to USG and Germany, other donors that have contributed to LOTFA (to pay police salaries) include the following: the EC, World Bank, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Switzerland.</p>
<p><b>A – Highway and Border Police</b>                  INL Kabul/State INL                  Metrics slide 16                   [Sept 2003: 0 police]</p>	<p><u>GOAL:</u> 20,000 individually trained police (including 6000 Border and 2600 Highway police); changed by MOI.   <u>By September 30:</u> MOI asked INK to concentrate on training national police prior to the presidential election. MOI Goal for June 2005 is 25% of force trained (Highway (650 of 2600) and Border (1500 of 6,000)).  <u>Year End:</u> INL trained 767 Border Police and 389 Highway police (all US-trained).</p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> – Included in Police funding above.  <u>Donor Funding</u> - See “Police – German Efforts.”                  Assessed yellow in 2004, awaiting MOI goals for 2005.</p>

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## Status of Programs and Activities in Afghanistan

	<p><u>Goal for June 2004</u> <u>September 30 Milestone:</u></p> <p><u>Today/Year End</u></p>	<p>USG &amp; Donor Funding</p>
<p><b>Police – German Efforts</b> Metrics slide 15</p> <p>(Sept. 2003: 400 border police)</p>	<p><u>GOAL:</u> No MOI requirement.</p> <p><u>Year End:</u> Lead Nation Germany has trained 750 border police and 3600 Afghan Police Officer/NCO. 1500 police in training.</p> <p>Germany supports trains the Afghan Police Officer/NCO Corps at Kabul Police Academy and has provided infrastructure, equipment and salary support. During 2004, Germany has increased its police program staff in Kabul, deployed police training staff to Konduz and Herat, managed donor assistance through improved G-8 and other multilateral coordination mechanisms, and coordinated a regional security conference on police in Doha.</p>	<p><u>USG Funding – N/A.</u></p> <p><u>Donor Funding –</u> Germany has spent \$123 million on training and police salaries (thru Law and Order Trust Fund–Afghanistan) from the program's inception in 2002 through December 2004. For other contributors to police sector, see Tab 1.</p> <p><i>Assessed yellow because Germany could do more to follow through on improving international donor support and generating near-term police capacity.</i></p>
	<p><u>GOAL</u> 13,000 troops by Sept 30.</p> <p><u>Year End:</u> Strength 16,627 troops. ANA soldiers deployed to Mazar-e-Shariff, Maimans, Herat, Qala Naw, Deh-Rawod, Geresk, Kandahar, Qalat, Tarin Kowt, Gardez, Orgun-e, Zormat, Lwara, Spin Buldak, Deh Chopan and Shinkay. Four Regional Commands established in Herat, Mazar-e-shariff, Kandahar, Gardez.</p> <p><u>Analysis:</u> ANA training exceeded goals and developed the capacity to train to five battalions simultaneously. While immature, ANA Command and Control processes are becoming more robust as intermediate commands and sustaining institutions develop. Field assessments have been universally positive; the ANA performs well in both stability and combat operations.</p>	<p><u>USG Funding –</u> FY 2004 funding \$719 million. (\$413m FMF, \$150m DOD T&amp;E, \$135m '03 AFSA, \$20m PKO, \$1m IMET).</p> <p><u>Donor Funding –</u> 33 nations have made financial or personnel contributions to the ANA training programs. Contributions included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-Lethal and non-lethal equipment</li> <li>-Transportation</li> <li>-Infrastructure</li> <li>-Training</li> </ul> <p>Total value is approximately \$120 Million.</p>



## Status of Programs and Activities in Afghanistan

	<p><u>Goal for June 2004</u> <u>September 30 Milestone:</u></p> <p><u>Today/Year End</u></p>	<p>USG &amp; Donor Funding</p>
	<p><u>GOAL:</u> 17 PRTs operational; \$52M Economic Support Funds (ESF) obligated.</p> <p><u>By September 30:</u> 19 PRTs operational (OEF and ISAF).</p> <p><u>Year End:</u> <i>Achieved goal: 19 operational PRTs, including 5 under ISAF. 7 of the 14 OEF PRTs have DoS representation; 10 of the 14 are staffed with USAID personnel. All PRTs have obligated more than \$38M in economic support funds. ISAF is now a NATO command.</i></p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> - 13 USG-led PRTs (OEF), FY 2004 funding \$97 million (\$50m ESF, \$40m CERP, \$7m DOD OHDACA).</p> <p><u>Donor Funding</u> - 1 New Zealand-led PRT (OEF), 2 German-led PRTs (ISAF), 2 UK-led PRTs (ISAF), 1 Dutch-led PRT (ISAF).</p>
<p><b>A – Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration</b> Embassy Kabul/State SA Metrics slide 24</p> <p>[Sept 2003: 0 demobilized]</p>	<p><u>GOAL:</u> Register 100,000 combatants and demobilize and disarm 50,000 combatants by elections.</p> <p><u>By September 30:</u> DDR 20% of combatants (20,000). Sustain heavy weapon cantonment; begin transfer to centralized Kabul location.</p> <p><u>Year End:</u> <i>(as of 15 Dec) Disarmed: 27,669; Demobilized: 26,171; Reintegrating: 25,430. Heavy Weapons Cantonment: over 90% of known weapons have been cantoned: 6,176 heavy weapons. Heavy Weapons Cantonment (HWC) in Kabul and Kandahar complete; underway in Herat. DDR accelerated prior to the elections and has continued very well following the linkage of DDR progress with the registration of political parties.</i></p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> - FY 2004 funding \$15 million (\$15m ESF) obligated, but only \$6m expended to date.</p> <p><u>Donor Funding</u> - Japan has committed \$60 million to DDR from 2002-2004.</p> <p><i>Assessed yellow because of continued resistance to DDR in the Panjshir Valley.</i></p>
<p>Counternarcotics—U.S. funded Eradication State INL &amp; DoD/OSD Metrics slides 25-31</p> <p>[2003 Opium Crop 61,000 ha – (UN estimate was 80,000 ha)]</p>	<p><u>GOAL:</u> Phase II USG-supported, Afghan Central Poppy Eradication Force (CPEF) reduces the 2004 opium crop by 10-15% (8,000-12,000 hectares), compared to the 2003 benchmark.</p> <p><u>By September 30:</u> Not applicable. (Eradication season ended mid-summer.)</p> <p><u>Year End:</u> <i>Total USG-led poppy eradication was 950 ha, all in Wardak &amp; Bamian provinces. Poppy cultivation increased to 206,000 hectares in 2004. CPEF surveying potential areas for eradication for next year. Surveys in Nangarhar, Mazar-e-Sharif, &amp; Bamian complete.</i></p> <p>Embassy will pursue a 5 pillar integrated strategy in 2005.</p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> - FY 2004 \$123 million (\$50m INCLE, \$73m DOD CN).</p> <p><u>Donor Funding</u> - See "Counternarcotics – British Efforts" for UK contribution to CN.</p>

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## Status of Programs and Activities in Afghanistan

	<p><u>Goal</u> for June 2004 <u>September 30 Milestone</u></p> <p><u>Today/Year End</u></p>	<p>USG &amp; Donor Funding</p>
<p><i>Counternarcotics – British Eradication and Interdiction</i></p> <p>Metrics slides 25-31</p>	<p><u>Programs:</u> UK-supported governors' eradication reduces crop. UK-trained Afghan Special Narcotics Force (ASNF) Interdiction unit targets labs and drug bazaars.</p> <p><u>Year End:</u> Governor eradication reports assessed as not credible. Afghan Special Narcotics Force proved effective. UK will increase the force by 150 to 250 personnel in 2005.</p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> – N/A.</p> <p><u>Donor Funding</u> - UK has committed \$93 million to counter-narcotics programs from 2002-2004.</p>
	<p><u>GOAL:</u> Increase Afghan counternarcotics enforcement capacity: intelligence, interdiction, border surveillance, and police communications</p> <p><u>Year End:</u> FY 2004 funding obligated and programs underway. Plan supports the Embassy Counternarcotics Strategy Implementation Plan.</p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> - Included in counter-narcotics funding amount above.</p> <p><u>Donor Funding</u> – See "Counter-narcotics – British Efforts" for UK contribution to CN.</p>
	<p><u>GOAL:</u> Develop ethnically balanced and professional MOD.</p> <p><u>By September 30:</u> Complete the Execution Order directing OMC-A to develop a plan of action and end states for implementation of MOD reform beyond ANA Phase I.</p> <p><u>Year End:</u> MOD approved force structures for Regional Commands and Supporting Commands and adopted a National Military Strategy.</p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> – see "Afghan National Army" for USG funding figures.</p> <p><u>Donor Funding</u> - see "Afghan National Army" for donor contributions to the ANA.</p>

Year End - December, 2004



## Status of Programs and Activities in Afghanistan

	<p><u>Goal</u> for June 2004</p> <p><u>September 30 Milestone</u></p> <p><u>Today/Year End</u></p>	USG & Donor Funding
<p><b>Ministry of Interior Reform</b></p> <p>INL Kabul/State INL</p> <p>Metrics slide 17</p>	<p><b>GOAL:</b> Support GOA/MOI reform plan.</p> <p><b>By September 30:</b> All 32 police station sites selected and construction timelines set. All 30 USG MOI advisors deployed.</p> <p><b>Year End:</b> MOI revised its original figure (32 stations) to 13 police stations. It has submitted organizational priorities to US advisors. INL deployed 30 senior U.S. advisors to the MOI to implement an institutional reform initiative to augment and complement training and infrastructure support. The advisors are focusing on rank and pay structure reform, management, and specialized fields.</p>	<p><b>USG Funding</b> - see "Police" for USG funding figures.</p> <p><b>Donor Funding</b> - See "Police" and "Police - German Efforts" for German contributions and list of donor contributions to LOTFA.</p> <p>Assessed yellow based on the need to continue to improve police organizations.</p>
<p><b>Warlords</b></p> <p>Embassy Kabul/OSD NESA</p> <p>Metrics slide 38</p>	<p><b>June 30 GOAL:</b> Remove major warlords from power; maximum feasible warlord militia forces demobilized.</p> <p><b>Year End:</b> DDR of militias in Herat underway, including irregulars loyal to Amanullah Khan. (Dec 04) Significant disarmament by Gen. Dostum on 11/21/04; he cantoned 45 operational tanks, disarmed 330 soldiers, and surrendered 40 ammunition depots.</p> <p>President Karzai has significantly reduced warlord influence: by replacing warlords in key posts, by choosing not include Fahim on his Presidential ticket and by bringing Ismael Khan to Kabul. In November, Karzai successfully conditioned the political party registration on DDR compliance. Warlords who ran in the Presidential elections peacefully conceded after the Afghan vote. Warlords increasingly seek influence through the democratic process. Many now plan to seek legislative seats in 2005.</p>	<p><b>USG Funding</b> - See "DDR" for USG funding.</p> <p><b>Donor Funding</b> - See "DDR" for Japanese funding contributions to DDR.</p> <p>Assessed yellow based upon pending outcome of parliamentary elections and existence of irregular militias.</p>
	<p><b>GOAL:</b> Meet the Bonn and Constitution timetables for Presidential and Parliamentary elections. An estimated 9.9M voters must be registered.</p> <p><b>By September 30:</b> More than 10M voters registered. (Over 8M voted.)</p> <p><b>Year End:</b> Karzai sworn in as President on December 7. International observers agreed that, while some administrative and logistical difficulties were evident, the election expressed public will.</p>	<p><b>USG Funding</b> - FY 2004 \$95 million (\$95m ESF) directly related to funding for presidential elections.</p> <p><b>Donor Funding</b> - See Tab 2 attached for international community contributions to Afghanistan's elections.</p>

Year End - December, 2004



## Status of Programs and Activities in Afghanistan

	<p><u>Goal</u> for June 2004</p> <p><u>September 30 Milestone</u></p> <p><u>Today/Year End</u></p>	USG & Donor Funding
	<p><u>GOAL:</u> 16 Judicial Facilities; training and assistance programs underway.</p> <p><u>By September 30:</u> INL justice contacts awarded. 10 judicial facilities built. 120 judicial personnel trained (judges, lawyers, and court personnel).</p> <p><u>Year End:</u> Twelve facilities are complete; thirteen others are under construction. USAID training and assistance programs are in progress. Three-year INL grant to US Law School to support Afghan LLM candidates from Kabul University to improve legal education in Afghanistan.</p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> - FY 2004 \$26 million (\$10m INCLE, \$9m ESF, \$7m DA).</p> <p><u>Donor Funding</u> - See "Justice/Rule of Law - Italian Efforts" for Italy's contribution to justice/rule of law.</p>
<p><b>Justice/Rule of Law - Italian Efforts</b></p> <p>Metrics slide 40</p>	<p><u>Programs:</u> Complete Interim Criminal Procedure Code and ensure proper implementation, including staffing of courts; national legal training center; bar association; legal aid development.</p> <p><u>Year End:</u> Italian construction contract now in Rome for approval. Site at Kabul University selected. Construction start date is uncertain. Completion expected by October 2005.</p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> - N/A.</p> <p><u>Donor Funding</u> - Italy has committed \$36.5 million to the justice sector in Afghanistan from 2002-2004.</p>
	<p><u>GOAL:</u> -200 deployed in Afghanistan (Sr. Advisors will determine need)</p> <p><u>By September 30:</u> N/A - goal reached in 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter FY04.</p> <p><u>Year End:</u> 130 USAID advisors (as of Oct. 20)</p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> - FY 2004 \$14 million (\$14m WWS).</p> <p><u>Donor Funding</u> - World Bank, EU, and others also provide technical advisors.</p>
	<p><u>GOAL:</u> 19 Total: 10 Senior Advisors (SA) &amp; 9 support staff in Embassy.</p> <p><u>By September 30:</u> Ten Afghan Reconstruction Group Senior Advisors</p> <p><u>Year End:</u> 12 Senior Advisors (Agriculture, Political, Economic Coordinator, Elections, Health &amp; Finance, Mines &amp; Industry, Rule of Law, Higher Education, Education, Privatization, Transportation &amp; Infrastructure, Private Sector Development) and 10 support staff members.</p> <p>Four of the 10 staff positions are vacant, and Afghanistan Reach-back Group is currently recruiting to fill vacancies.</p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> - FY 2004 \$43 million (\$43m DC&amp;P).</p> <p><u>Donor Funding</u> - USG project only.</p>

Year End - December, 2004



# Status of Programs and Activities in Afghanistan

	<p><u>Goal for June 2004</u> <u>September 30 Milestone</u></p> <p><u>Today/Year End</u></p>	USG & Donor Funding
	<p><b>GOAL:</b> Obligate \$75M to GOA for civil salaries and fund provincial telecommunications links.</p> <p><b>By September 30:</b> Not applicable- goal reached in 2<sup>nd</sup> quarter.</p> <p><b>Year End:</b> Goal reached by second quarter with a total transfer of \$124 million.</p>	<p><b>USG Funding - FY 2004 \$88 million (\$84m ESF, \$3m DA, \$1m Treas Tech).</b></p> <p><b>Donor Funding - See Tab 3 attached for international community contributions of budgetary support to the GOA.</b></p>
	<p><b>GOAL:</b> 20% GDP growth March 2003-March 2004.*</p> <p><b>By September 30:</b> Not applicable.</p> <p><b>Year End:</b> 16% GDP growth in March 2003-2004; projected 7.5% March 2004-2005.</p> <p>*Source: International Monetary Fund; growth number considers only the legitimate economy.</p> <p>( <b>March 2004-2005 GOAL:</b> 9.5% GDP growth from March 2004-March 2005 (FY 1383))</p>	<p><b>USG Funding - N/A.</b></p> <p><b>Donor Funding - N/A.</b></p> <p><b>IMF figures are approximate, based on the immaturity of the Afghan economy. Afghanistan has a very immature economy. Therefore real growth from March 2002-2003 lead to the apparent decline in percent growth in the year ending march 2004. The Afghan economy is growing in real terms.</b></p>
	<p><b>GOAL:</b> Domestic revenue of \$200 million during March 2003-March 2004.</p> <p><b>Year End:</b> March 2004 goal met. Current goal calls for domestic revenue of \$310 million during March 2004-March 2005. As of December 18, 2004, Total Domestic Revenue Generation is \$164.9 million, an increase of \$29.15 million from last year. The \$310 million target is within reach.</p>	<p><b>USG Funding - FY 2004 \$18 million (\$18m ESF).</b></p> <p><b>Donor Funding - World Bank (\$30 million) and UK (\$13 million) have committed funding to reform and modernize Afghanistan's customs revenue collection.</b></p>
<p><b>International Donations</b></p> <p><b>Afghan Gov't/State SA</b></p> <p><b>Metrics slides 45-46</b></p>	<p><b>GOAL:</b> Meet GOA budget requirements for FY 1383 at International Conference on Afghanistan in Berlin.</p> <p><b>Year End:</b> Goal met. Berlin Conference successful. Donors pledged \$4.5 billion for FY 1383, thus meeting over 100% of the GoA's budgetary requirements. Donors pledged \$8.2 billion for Afghan fiscal years 1383-1385, 69% of Ghan's \$11.9 billion target.</p>	<p><b>USG Funding - FY 2004 over \$2.4 billion (from 27 funding accounts/sources).</b></p> <p><b>Donor Funding - See Tab 4 attached for total international donor pledges to Afghanistan since 2002.</b></p> <p><b>Assessed yellow: not all pledges met.</b></p>

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Year End - December, 2004



# Status of Programs and Activities in Afghanistan

<p>Yellow Concerns</p>	<p><u>Goal for June 2004</u> <u>September 30 Milestone</u></p> <p><u>Today/Year End</u></p>	<p>USG &amp; Donor Funding</p>
	<p><u>GOAL:</u> Kandahar-Herat road construction underway.</p> <p><u>Year End:</u> Kabul-Kandahar: Road is fully functional. Phase II 99% completed.</p> <p>Kandahar - Herat: Km 231-356: Equipment being mobilized. Km 356 -406: Work camp operational, asphalt camp being erected, equipment plant being tested, and road grading starting. Km 406 - 456: Road widening, grading, diversion road work, rubblelization, and culvert work continues. Asphalt Treated Base (ATB) work begun. Km 456 - 557: Contractor erecting work camps, surveying about 50% complete, and crushers in operation preparing crushed material.</p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> - FY 2004 \$232 million (\$220m ESF, \$12m DA).</p> <p><u>Donor Funding</u> - See "Japanese Efforts" and "Saudi Efforts" below; ADB rebuilt Kandahar-Spin Boldak road for \$25m; World Bank rebuilt 15% of Kabul-Pul-i-Khumri road; Pakistan rebuilt 10% of Jalalabad-Torkham road; EC rebuilding Kabul-Jalalabad road.</p>
<p>Major Roads - Japanese Efforts</p>	<p><u>Programs:</u> 116 kms. Kandahar - Herat Road; Kabul-Kandahar road - 50 km.</p> <p><u>Year End:</u> 50 Km of Kabul - Kandahar road finished. Japanese contractors are significantly behind on their section of the Kandahar-Herat road. However, contractors are mobilizing for construction to begin.</p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> - N/A.</p> <p><u>Donor Funding</u> - Japan has committed \$120 million total to rebuilding the Kabul-Kandahar-Herat highway. Assessed yellow: Japan is behind.</p>
<p>Major Roads - Saudi Efforts</p>	<p><u>Programs:</u> 115 kms.</p> <p><u>Year End:</u> Saudi Arabia has indicated its willingness to fund \$56 M needed for this section, but has not transferred funding to GOA. USAID staff working with MPW and MoF on contracting arrangements.</p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> - N/A.</p> <p><u>Donor Funding</u> - Saudi Arabia has committed \$50 million total to rebuilding the Kandahar-Herat highway. Assessed yellow: Saudi Arabian money remains a promise.</p>
<p>A - Secondary Roads USAID Kabul/DC Metrics slide 62 [Sept 2003: Kabul-Kandahar road - 37km]</p>	<p><u>GOAL:</u> Construction underway on 1,000 km of secondary roads.</p> <p><u>By September 30:</u> Work will have begun in all 10 secondary road projects.</p> <p><u>Year End:</u> Work is underway on 551 km of secondary roads. 4 of the 10 secondary road projects have been suspended pending additional funds.</p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> - FY 2004 \$116 million (\$108m ESF, \$8m DA).</p> <p><u>Donor Funding</u> - USG project only.</p>

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Year End - December, 2004



## Status of Programs and Activities in Afghanistan

	<p><u>Goal for June 2004</u> <u>September 30 Milestone</u></p> <p><u>Today/Year End</u></p>	<p>USG &amp; Donor Funding</p>
	<p><b>GOAL:</b> 100 market centers constructed by June 2004.</p> <p><b>By September 30:</b> 131 facilities constructed.</p> <p><b>Year End:</b> Construction of 141 sites is now complete.</p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> - included in agriculture funding amount below.</p> <p><u>Donor Funding</u> - USG project only.</p>
	<p><b>GOAL:</b> Irrigation projects underway serving 300,000 ha by June 2004.</p> <p><b>By September 30:</b> No new goal.</p> <p><b>Year End:</b> Irrigation rehabilitation projects serving 310,500 ha now complete.</p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> - FY 2004 \$51 million (\$49m DA, \$2m ESF).</p> <p><u>Donor Funding</u> - UK (\$18.4 million), World Bank (\$18 million), Iran (\$10.4 million), and the European Commission (\$7.4 million) have committed funding to various aspects of Improving Afghanistan's agriculture sector.</p>
	<p><b>ORIGINAL GOAL:</b> Three industrial parks established by June 2004.</p> <p><b>REVISED GOAL:</b> Three industrial parks under construction by June 2004.</p> <p><b>Year End:</b> Construction underway at all three industrial park sites. At the Bagrami park, local businesses have purchased 34 lots.</p>	<p><u>USG Funding</u> - FY 2004 \$10 million (\$10m ESF).</p> <p><u>Donor Funding</u> - Japan has committed \$43 million for the rehabilitation of the Kabul East GT Industrial Park.</p>



## Status of Programs and Activities in Afghanistan

	<p><u>Goal for June 2004</u> <u>September 30 Milestone</u></p> <p><u>Today/Year End</u></p>	USG & Donor Funding
<p><b>A – Education</b></p> <p>USAID Kabul/DC Metrics slide 55</p>	<p><b>ORIGINAL GOAL:</b> 517 Schools by June 30, 2004.</p> <p><b>REVISED GOAL:</b> 275 additional schools built or renovated under the new contract signed in April 2004; and 14,500 teachers trained through distance education. (203 schools were renovated prior to April 2004.)</p> <p><b>Year End:</b> 78 schools have been built or rehabilitated. An additional 254 schools are under construction or renovation. 25,500 teachers have been trained.</p>	<p><b>USG Funding - FY 2004 \$104 million (\$101m ESF, \$3m DA).</b></p> <p><b>Donor Funding - World bank (\$12 million), Germany (\$9 million), and Italy (\$2.5 million), have committed funding to various aspects of improving Afghanistan's education sector.</b></p>
<p><b>A – Health</b></p> <p>USAID Kabul/DC Metrics slide 56</p>	<p><b>ORIGINAL GOAL:</b> 360 clinics constructed by June 30 2004.</p> <p><b>REVISED GOAL:</b> 219 additional clinics constructed under the new contract signed in April 2004. (144 clinics were renovated prior to April 2004.)</p> <p><b>By September 30:</b> 20 clinics constructed.</p> <p><b>Year End:</b> 20 clinics complete, and an additional 199 are under construction or rehabilitation.</p>	<p><b>USG Funding - FY 2004 \$77 million (\$46m ESF, \$31m CSH).</b></p> <p><b>Donor Funding - Japan (\$16 million), World Bank (\$46.2 million), European Commission (\$54.1 million), Italy (\$2.5 million), and Canada (\$2 million) have committed funding to various aspects of improving Afghanistan's health sector.</b></p>
<p><b>Strategic Communications</b></p> <p>CFC-A/OSD SOLIC Metrics slides 61-64</p>	<p><b>GOAL:</b> Coalition messages are reaching Afghans.</p> <p><b>Year End:</b> 67% of Afghans polled support presence of US forces*. 74% credit U.S. for providing security. Psychological operations continue to promote Afghan Government legitimacy, while disrupting, discrediting and defeating threats to the Afghan people and the international community in Afghanistan. These efforts enhance the resolve among the U.S., its Allies, partners, and friends.</p> <p>*Preliminary findings from DOS INR July 2004.</p>	<p><b>USG Funding - Information not available.</b></p> <p><b>Donor Funding - N/A.</b></p>

## Appendix A

### Other Contributors to Police Sector



Australia	\$1.46 million	for training				
EU Commission	\$83 million	for LOTFA, Equipment, Election Security, infrastructure and				
		Training, and Advisors				
China	\$1.5 million	for equipment				
Japan	\$12.3 million	for election security and equipment				
Netherlands	\$9.45 million	for infrastructure and LOTFA				
Norway	\$3.3 million	for infrastructure, training, and LOTFA				
UK	\$12 million	for infrastructure and training				
World Bank	\$21.6 million	for LOTFA				

*Contributed to Police Sector (less than \$1 million each): Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Switzerland*

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# Appendix B: International Community Contributions to Afghan Elections

## Donor Contributions to Presidential Elections



**Appendix C:**  
**International Community Contributions of Budgetary Support to the GOA**

TABLE 1 - ACTUAL AND EXPECTED DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS  
As of October 22, 2004  
Paid-In, Committed, Pledged  
US\$ Million

Donor	SY 1381	SY 1382	Total Paid-In	SY 1393		Total Expected	SY1381-3 Total Expected
	Total Paid-In	Total Paid-In		Signed Pledges	Unsigned Pledges		
Australia	\$0.000	\$2,835	\$2,835	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$2,835	\$8,802
Bahrain	\$0.000	\$0.504	\$0.500	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.500	\$0.504
Canada	\$11,898	\$50,097	\$5,491	\$0.000	\$20,346	\$26,837	\$87,927
Denmark	\$5.000	\$5.000	\$0.800	\$0.000	\$5.000	\$5.000	\$15.000
EC	\$15,871	\$52,686	\$20,304	\$38,360	\$0.000	\$58,663	\$127,220
Finland	\$2,792	\$2,454	\$0.000	\$3,197	\$0.000	\$3,197	\$8,442
Germany	\$10,088	\$11,443	\$15,941	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$16,941	\$37,452
India	\$0.200	\$0.200	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.400
Iran	\$0.000	\$0.989	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.989
Ireland	\$1.000	\$1,733	\$1,814	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$1,814	\$4,546
Italy	\$17,000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$17,000
Japan MoF	\$2,500	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$2,600
Japan MoFA	\$2,500	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$2,600
Korea	\$2,000	\$2,000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$4,000
Kuwait	\$5,000	\$5,000	\$5,000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$5,000	\$15,000
Luxembourg	\$1,020	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$1,020
Netherlands	\$33,667	\$41,151	\$0.000	\$44,753	\$0.000	\$44,753	\$119,570
New Zealand	\$0.800	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.800	\$0.800
Norway NORAD	\$6,818	\$27,630	\$0,024	\$8,604	\$14,862	\$23,490	\$67,837
Norway MOFA	\$0.000	\$2,000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$2,000
Portugal	\$0.000	\$0,457	\$0,725	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0,725	\$1,182
Saudi Arabia	\$10,000	\$5,000	\$5,000	\$0.000	\$5,000	\$10,000	\$25,000
Sweden	\$3,103	\$5,982	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$24,796	\$24,796	\$33,881
Switzerland	\$0,673	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0,673
Turkey	\$0,500	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0,500
UK	\$15,079	\$47,096	\$64,457	\$36,782	\$1,839	\$103,078	\$165,253
USA	\$36,000	\$20,000	\$75,491	\$13,100	\$0.000	\$88,591	\$147,691
UNDP	\$0.000	\$2,411	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$0.000	\$2,411
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>\$184,787</b>	<b>\$286,463</b>	<b>\$201,514</b>	<b>\$144,795</b>	<b>\$72,443</b>	<b>\$418,751</b>	<b>\$890,082</b>

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## Appendix D: International Donor Pledges to Afghanistan Since 2002



### Resources Available to Finance Afghanistan Reconstruction (Based on information provided by donors to Ministry of Finance as at 1 April - 15.00)

Donor	2002-03		2003-04		2004-05		2005-06		2006-07	
	Jan 02-Mar 03	Apr 03-Mar 04	2002-03	2003-04	2004-05	2005-06	2006-06	2006-06	Jan 06-Mar 07	2007-07
Aga Khan	25.0	25.0								75.0
ADB	25.0	25.0	10.0	10.0			10.0	10.0		138.0
Australia	33.7	13.7								62.3
Austria	3.0	1.0	1.2							7.6
Belgium	11.7	8.0	5.8	6.2						33.5
Canada	83.0	93.0	75.0	45.0			37.5	30.0		440.7
China	27.0	20.0	13.0							75.0
Denmark	28.0	25.2	25.8	20.2						130.2
EC	218.4	282.1	240.0	240.0						1,284.3
ECHO	73.5	63.5	0.0							136.5
Finland	13.2	11.2	12.0	12.0			12.0			72.4
France	32.0	30.2								88.4
Germany	142.0	107.5	96.0	96.0			96.0	96.0		739.5
Greece										3.0
India	40.0	60.0	74.0	80.0			40.0	35.0		469.0
Iran	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0						264.0
Ireland	4.0	5.0	3.0							16.0
Italy	43.0	32.8	56.0	56.0						263.2
Japan	367.5	142.2	200.0							660.0
Korea (Rep of)	10.0	15.0								45.0
Kuwait	15.0	30.0	0.0							49.0
Luxembourg	5.0	1.0								7.2
Netherlands	100.5	95.3	42.0	36.0						286.5
New Zealand										9.3
Norway	40.0	53.0	29.3	29.3			29.3	29.3		253.0
Oman	3.0	3.0	0.0							6.0
Org Islamic Conf										15.0
Pakistan	50.0	20.0	15.0	10.0						165.0
Poland										0.1
Portugal										1.2
Qatar	20.0		0.0							39.0
Russian Fed.	30.0	30.0	0.0							60.0
Saudi Arabia	35.0	35.0	5.0	5.0						230.0
Spain	25.7	62.0								147.7
Sweden	30.0	35.8	39.3	39.3						144.2
Switzerland	12.0	15.0	12.5	11.7						64.5
Turkey	2.2	2.0	1.0	1.0						9.2
UAE	30.0	22.0								79.7
United Kingdom	137.8	144.0	215.9	137.3						650.0
UN Agencies										
USA	836.3	1,300.0	600.0							6,639.3
World Bank	103.3	160.0	105.0	100.0						663.3
Other	12.1	10.5	0.0							22.5
<b>Total Grants</b>	<b>2,786.1</b>	<b>3,626.7</b>	<b>1,926.8</b>	<b>926.6</b>	<b>2,366.6</b>	<b>1,346.6</b>	<b>416.0</b>	<b>381.3</b>	<b>18,264.8</b>	
<b>RESOURCES THROUGH LOAN FINANCING (US\$ 1998-1997 (Jan 2002 estimate 2006-07))</b>										
ADB	150.0	150.0	150.0	150.0	150.0	150.0	150.0	150.0		1,346.0
China			25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0				75.0
Islamic Dev Bank	10.0		20.0		20.0					70.0
World Bank	105.0	200.0	205.0	205.0	205.0	205.0				319.0
<b>Total Loans</b>	<b>265.0</b>	<b>350.0</b>	<b>400.0</b>	<b>430.0</b>	<b>400.0</b>	<b>400.0</b>	<b>150.0</b>	<b>150.0</b>		<b>2,540.0</b>
<b>Total Resources (Grants + Loans)</b>	<b>2,878.1</b>	<b>3,779.7</b>	<b>2,366.6</b>	<b>1,346.6</b>	<b>2,366.6</b>	<b>1,346.6</b>	<b>416.0</b>	<b>381.3</b>		<b>18,264.8</b>

1. Loan financing is highly concessional and often includes grant components.  
 2. Includes in the USA pledge a \$1.2 billion that requires approval by Congress. Half of this amount is scheduled in 1999 and half in 1994.  
 3. Many grants are made in currencies other than US dollars. The figures shown here are approximations using current exchange rates.  
 4. Please send any updates to these figures to the Director General Budget, Ministry of Finance, [seema@chaar.org](mailto:seema@chaar.org), [copying@chaar.org](mailto:copying@chaar.org), [chaar@chaar.org](mailto:chaar@chaar.org)

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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310-9999

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 MAR 14 AM 11:11

CM-2374-05

14 March 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*RBM 3/11*

SUBJECT: Vacant Iraqi Ministry of Defense / Ministry of Interior Requirements (U)

- (S) The Joint Staff was asked (TAB A) to fill 13 of 18 Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior requirements. A contractor subsequently filled 1 position, leaving 12 vacant positions.
- (S) Multi-national Force-Iraq (MNF-I) met with Iraq Reconstruction Management Office leadership and determined that only three Ministry of Interior and two Ministry of Defense positions require immediate temporary fill. MNF-I also agreed to fill an additional personnel defense officer position. Five of the six billets were filled on 7 March. The remaining one position will be filled by the end of March.
- (S) On 1 March, the American Embassy in Iraq released a cable (TAB B) that clarified the final requirement requesting DOD temporarily fill the six civilian billets identified above for 90 days.

COORDINATION: (U) NONE

Attachments:

As stated

Prepared By: RADM Donna L. Crisp, USN; Director, J-1;



*FOIA B6*

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Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~Classified By: RADM Donna L. Crisp, USN; Director, J-1  
Reason: 1.4(a)  
Declassify On: 15 February 2015~~

~~SECRET~~

*09M-0327*  
OSD 75675-05 R-2

~~SECRET~~

09 February 2005

INFORMATION PAPER

Subject: Personnel Fills for Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior Advisor Positions

1. (U) Purpose. Provide the Secretary of Defense with current status of personnel fills for advisors to the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior. Department of Defense's obligation is the immediate fill of vacant positions and providing personnel for enduring requirements.

2. (§) Bottom-line.

- (S) Department of State identified 18 permanent ministry advisor positions and requested Department of Defense assistance. Thirteen are currently vacant. DJ1 coordinated with Mr. Dubois, Director, Administration and Management OSD on 9 February 2005. He is reviewing the below short-term and long-term solutions and will provide comments NLT morning of 10 Feb.
- (§) Proposed action for short-term solution: Joint Staff is prepared to release a message to US Central Command requiring fill of the 13 currently vacant advisor positions by 18 Feb 2005. The Services will be advised to review their assigned personnel to US Central Command for nominations to these critical positions. US Central Command will review the position requirements and provide greater detail for the enduring positions. Temporary personnel will be expected to be in place until relieved no earlier than 15 April 05
- (U) Proposed action for long-term solution: Mr. Dubois is coordinating with the Defense Support Office for contracting options in the long-term. If a contracting option does not work, the Services will be tasked to provide both military and civilian.

3. (U) Background.

**(U) Ministry of Defense**

- (U) Department of Defense is being asked to fill nine positions, five are filled and four are vacant. One is currently filled by a Coalition ally. Joint Staff J-5 is coordinating for a Coalition replacement. Two are filled with new arrivals, but will require backfills in February 2006. Two are temporarily filled with contractors, but require backfills in June 2005. US Central Command will fill the four vacant positions by 18 February 2005.

**(U) Within the Ministry of Interior:**

- (U) Department of State is requesting Department of Defense fill nine positions. All nine are unfilled. US Central Command will fill by 18 February 2005.

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Dec 1, 2008  
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Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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Derived From: ~~Multiple Sources~~  
Declassify On: ~~04 Feb 2015~~

09-M-0327

TAB B

\*\*\* UNCLASSIFIED \*\*\*  
\*\*\*\*\* This Message Has Been Altered \*\*\*\*\*

Page 1 of 3



OTHHZYIM RUEHGRA0861.0600625-UUUU-~~RUERKJCS~~  
ZNR UUUUU ZZK  
O 010626Z MAR 05  
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5076  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE  
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

Tab  
B

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000861

E.O. 12958: DECL: N/A  
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PML, PCRM, ECON, MARR, IZ

SUBJECT: U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL SUPPORT FOR IRAQI DEFENSE  
AND INTERIOR MINISTRIES

1. SUMMARY: EMBASSY BAGHDAD APPRECIATES THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE'S OFFER TO PROVIDE MILITARY PERSONNEL SUPPORT TO TEMPORARILY FILL CRITICAL VACANCIES IN THE IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT OFFICE (IRMO). THIS CABLE CLARIFIES THE FINAL REQUIREMENT TO TEMPORARILY FILL SIX CIVILIAN BILLETTS WITH SHORT-TERM DETAILEES FROM THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. THESE DETAILEES WOULD SERVE FOR NOT MORE THAN 90 DAYS IN SUPPORT OF THE IRAQI MINISTRY OF INTERIOR (MOI) AND MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (MOD). DETAILS REGARDING THESE POSITIONS FOLLOWS. THIS CABLE HAS BEEN CLEARED BY MNF-I. END SUMMARY.

2. BACKGROUND: THE JANUARY 2005 ASSESSMENT PERFORMED BY GENERAL GARY LOCK DETERMINED THAT CRITICAL VACANCIES WITHIN IRMO NEEDED TO BE FILLED IMMEDIATELY. IT WAS ASSESSED THAT IRMO'S ABILITY TO EFFECTIVELY TRAIN AND EQUIP IRAQI SECURITY FORCES (ISF) WITHIN THE IRAQI MOI AND MOD IS BEING HAMPERED BY DELAYS IN RECRUITING AND DEPLOYING PERMANENT CIVILIAN PERSONNEL FOR VACANCIES WITHIN THE IRMO MOI AND MOD TEAMS. END BACKGROUND.

3. TEMPORARY FILLS OFFERED: IN EARLY FEBRUARY, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OFFERED THE SUPPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO TEMPORARILY FILL KEY VACANCIES. SINCE THEN, THE JCS, CENTCOM, AND MNF-I HAVE BEEN WORKING WITH POST TO IDENTIFY KEY VACANCIES AND PROVIDE SUITABLE MILITARY DETAILEES.

4. CURRENT PERSONNEL LEVELS: SINCE JANUARY 2005, THE NUMBER OF VACANCIES WITHIN IRMO MOI AND MOD HAVE BEEN REDUCED AS

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

SECDEF: 1 DEPSEC: 1 EKCSEC: 1  
C&D: 1 CCD: 1 CABLE CR: 1 FILE: RAF  
USDP: 1 DIA: \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER: IRAQ X  
USDI: 1 PER SEC: \_\_\_\_\_ COMM: \_\_\_\_\_

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Dec 1, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

Tab B

05D 04105-05

\*\*\* UNCLASSIFIED \*\*\*  
\*\*\*\*\* This Message Has Been Altered \*\*\*\*\*

THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S RECRUITING PROCESS HAS ACCELERATED  
THE DEPLOYMENT OF PERMANENT AND CONTRACTOR FILLS.

A. IRMO MOI PERSONNEL STRENGTH: THE CURRENT AUTHORIZED  
POSITIONS FOR IRMO MOI IS 51 OF WHICH 34 (67 PERCENT) ARE  
ON HAND IN IRAQ. THIS LEAVES A TOTAL OF 17 VACANT  
POSITIONS, OF WHICH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS IDENTIFIED  
13 PERMANENT CIVILIAN FILLS (TITLE 5 SECTION 3161  
EMPLOYEES).

MOI  
51 TOTAL  
34 - Filled  
17 - Vacant  
- 13 DOG LAND  
(4) - Vacant  
MOD.  
22 TOTAL  
20 - Filled  
2 - Vacant

B. IRMO MOD PERSONNEL STRENGTH: THE CURRENT AUTHORIZED  
POSITIONS FOR IRMO MOD IS 22 OF WHICH 20 (90 PERCENT) ARE  
ON HAND IN IRAQ. THIS LEAVES A TOTAL OF TWO VACANT  
POSITIONS, OF WHICH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS IDENTIFIED  
NO PERMANENT CIVILIAN FILLS (TITLE 5 SECTION 3161  
EMPLOYEES).

5. CURRENT PERSONNEL REQUIREMENTS: AS OF FEBRUARY 26, IRMO  
AND MNF-I HAVE AGREED THAT SIX POSITIONS WITHIN IRMO MOI  
AND MOD REQUIRE IMMEDIATE SHORT-TERM FILLS BY DOD  
DETAILEES. THESE POSITIONS MUST BE FILLED FOR UP TO 90  
DAYS PENDING THE COMPLETION OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT  
RECRUITMENT AND DEPLOYMENT PROCESS FOR PERMANENT CIVILIAN  
FILLS. THE POSITIONS AND CURRENT STATUS ARE LISTED BELOW:

Immediate  
Short-term

A. LOGISTICS PROGRAM COORDINATOR (03/04/E7/8 LEVEL). WORKS  
ON BUILDING LOGISTICS CAPACITY AT MOI. TO BE FILLED BY A  
MAJOR FROM R AND S LATER THIS WEEK. THE CANDIDATE IS  
ALREADY IN THE INTERNATIONAL ZONE.

B. LOGISTICS PROGRAM COORDINATOR (2). SECOND BILLET WITH  
THE SAME JOB DESCRIPTION AS PARA 5A. WILL BE FILLED BY AN  
INBOUND U.S. MARINE CORPS GUNNERY SERGEANT WHO IS SCHEDULED  
TO ARRIVE IN THEATER LATER THIS WEEK.

C. FACILITY PROTECTION SERVICE DIRECTOR - (05/6). OVERSEE  
FPS PROGRAM, CRITICAL WITH MOI LEADING ROLE IN ITS  
PROTECTION. TO BE FILLED BY COLONEL CHUCK MITCHELL NL1  
MARCH 7TH WHO IS CURRENTLY SERVING AS THE IG. REPLACEMENT  
ARRIVES THIS WEEK.

D. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT TECHNICAL ADVISOR - (03/4, E7/8).  
CREATE INFORMATION MANAGEMENT FOR MOI HUMAN RESOURCES,  
FINANCE AND LOGISTICS. WILL BE FILLED BY MNF C1S MAJOR  
MATTINGLY WHO IS CURRENTLY IN THE INTERNATIONAL ZONE.  
EXPECT TO REPORT NO LATER THAN MARCH 5TH.

E. MOD ADVISOR TO THE DIRECTOR OF LOGISTICS (05/06).  
THIS POSITION WAS ADDED FEBRUARY 27TH AND WILL BE FILLED BY  
A MNSTC-I COLONEL PROVIDED FROM CFLEC. HE WILL BE ABLE TO  
REPORT THIS WEEK.

F. MOD ADVISOR TO THE DIRECTOR OF ACQUISITION- (05/06).  
REQUEST THAT JCC-I IDENTIFY A NAME TO SERVE IN THIS 90-DAY

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\*\*\*\*\* This Message Has Been Altered \*\*\*\*\*

Page 3 of 3

TASKER. MNF-I NO LONGER HAS ACQUISITION OFFICERS ON THEIR DOCUMENT.

6. THIS CABLE HAS BEEN JOINTLY CLEARED BY THE DIRECTOR OF IRMO AND MNF-I (DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR POLITICAL MILITARY AFFAIRS).

7. POINT OF CONTACT. THE POINT OF CONTACT WITHIN IRMO FOR THESE POSITIONS IS



FOIA  
b6

NEGROPONTE

SECDEF V2

ACTION

INFO CHAIRS(\*) SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(\*)  
ASD:PA-SMTP(\*) DIR:PAE-RAM(\*) USDP:ESC(\*)  
ESC-SMTP(\*) ESC AGENT EURASIA(\*) SECDEF-C(\*)  
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Tab B

09-M-0327



~~SECRET//REL TO USA and MCFI~~

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2005 DEC 22 AM 10:20  
CH-0113-05  
21 December 2005

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Peter Pace, CJCS *VR, PR 20 Dec 05*

SUBJECT: Counterinsurgency Strategy (SF 111405-62) (U)

• ~~(S//REL)~~ Answer. In response to your question (TAB A), we can benefit from this paper in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as in future counterinsurgency efforts. In addition to coordinating with USSOCOM, I have forwarded the survey to the Service chiefs and combatant commanders for study and feedback.

(U) COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General V. E. Renuart, Jr., USAF; Director, J-5; [REDACTED]  
*FOIA b6*

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Dec 1, 2008  
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Dir. & Rec. Div, WMS

RELEASABLE TO MULTI-  
COALITION FORCE-IRAQ

~~Classified By: Lt Gen Victor E. Renuart, USAF; DJ-5  
Reason: 1.4 (a)  
Declassify On: 5 December 2015~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA and MCFI~~

OSD 78041-05

# **Afghanistan at a Crossroads: Challenges, Opportunities, and a Way Ahead**

**Marin Strmecki**

**August 17, 2006**

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# ***Bottom Line***

- **Mission summary:**

- Undertook a two-week research trip to Afghanistan to interview Afghan and international officials in order to analyze why the security situation deteriorated this year and to develop recommendations for adjustments in U.S. policies

- **Bottom line up front:**

- The deteriorating security situation in 2006 was principally the result of the combination of two factors:
  - A decision by the Taliban and its external supporters to escalate the scope and character of enemy operations
  - Weak or bad governance, particularly in southern Afghanistan, that created a vacuum of power into which the enemy moved
- These developments have put Afghanistan at a crossroads:
  - Looking down one path, an escalating threat and the crisis in governance would if unchecked likely produce a secular trend of increasing enemy activity and deteriorating security
  - Looking down the other path, these negative trends can be reversed through an asymmetrical counter-escalation by the Afghan government and its international supporters
  - This counter-escalation does not require more U.S. or international military forces but does require new diplomatic initiatives vis-à-vis Pakistan, renewed energy and urgency in shaping the U.S. partnership with the Afghan government, and more resources for security and development programs

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# Research and Assessment

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# ***Selected list of meetings***

## **Afghan leaders and officials**

- President Karzai
- First Vice President Massoud
- Vice President Khalili
- Speaker Qanooni
- Speaker Mojaddedi
- Minister of Defense Wardak
- Minister of Commerce Arsala
- Minister of Education Atmar
- Minister of Rural Development Zia
- Minister of Counternarcotics Qaderi
- National Security Adviser Rassoul
- Chief of the Presidential Staff Ludin
- National Directorate of Security Director Saleh
- Marshall Fahim
- Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Gen. Bismullah Khan
- Deputy Minister of Finance Shahrani
- Deputy Minister of Health Kargar
- Director of Human Rights Commission Samar
- Zabol Governor
- Logar Governor Hamimi
- Ghazni Governor Alam
- Balkh Governor Atta
- Local elders:
  - South: Kandahar, Helmand
  - East: Laghman, Nangarhar, Kunar, Khost, Paktia, Paktika
  - Central: Kabul, Wardak, Logar

## **International officials and officers**

- LTG Eikenberry (CFC-A)
- Amb Neumann (U.S. Mission)
- MG Freakley (CJTF-76)
- MG Durbin (CSTC-A)
- BG O'Brien (CSTC-A)
- CJ2 (CFC-A)
- CJ3 (CFC-A)
- CJ5 (CFC-A)
- LTG Richards (NATO-ISAF)
- CJ2 (NATO-ISAF)
- CJ3 (NATO-ISAF)
- Deputy Commander TF Aegis (Kandahar)
- Chief of Afghanistan Engineering District Col. Toomey
- USAID Deputy Director Rahmaan
- Chris Wood (OGA)
- Kirk Meyer (Justice)
- Rule of law roundtable (U.S. mission)
- Pul-e-lam FOB briefing (Logar)
- PRT and TF Iron Gray briefing (Ghazni)
- PRT briefing (Mazar-e-Sharif)
- UNAMA Deputy Special Representative Alexander
- Minister Cetin (NATO senior civilian representative)
- Ambassador Frick (German police program)
- Ambassador Vendrell (European Union)
- Ambassador Azizuddin (Pakistan)
- Ambassador Sood (India)
- Ambassador Evans (United Kingdom)

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# Assessment

- **The deteriorating security conditions in 2006 resulted from an enemy decision to escalate its operations in a way that exploited a vacuum of governance in the southern Afghanistan**
  - Since 2002, the Taliban has enjoyed a sanctuary in Pakistan that has enabled recruitment, training, finance, equipping, and infiltration of fighters
    - Pakistan's ISI provides some operational support to the Taliban, though the level at which this assistance is authorized within the Pakistani government remains unclear
    - During this period, Taliban leaders have pursued a classic insurgency strategy
      - From 2002 through late 2004, they were risk averse and focused on survivability
      - From late-2004 to the present, they have aggressively sought to expand their scope of action through increased kinetic and non-kinetic activities
  - Since 2002, the government of Afghanistan has generally failed to project good governance to the provincial and district levels
    - Too often, corrupt or ineffective governors and district administrators have been appointed for patronage or political reasons
    - Despite U.S. and German training and assistance programs, police forces typically have been understaffed and ill-equipped and have been involved in corruption and illegal activities
    - In areas with weak and bad governance, the Afghan population has become demoralized and is less willing to run risks to support the Afghan government against enemy encroachments

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## Assessment (cont.)

- In addition, the Taliban is attempting to provide some services – dispute resolution and security – in some areas as a “shadow government”
- In 2006, the Taliban and its sponsors choose to escalate the insurgency, with the assistance of al Qaeda, other insurgent groups, and external support networks, in order to take advantage of opportunities they saw to set the conditions for a return to power
  - The Taliban sought to strike NATO-ISAF forces in order to induce European and Canadian parliaments to pull out of Afghanistan
  - The Taliban campaign plan was designed to seize control of key regions in the south in order to isolate and seize control of Kandahar city
  - Beginning in spring 2006, the Taliban implemented the first elements of this plan by concentrating larger elements in Helmand province and elsewhere and attempting on at least 42 occasions to seize key district centers (Sangin, Musa Qala, Garmser, Kajaki, Nawa, and Khan Shin) by overrunning undermanned and outgunned Afghan security forces
- A key point of consensus among Afghan and international interviewees: “It is not that the enemy is so strong but that the Afghan government is so weak.”
- **The Taliban has not achieved its campaign objective of laying siege to the city of Kandahar but has undermined security conditions in the south**
  - Areas in which the population provides coerced support or is subject to Taliban “shadow government” have expanded, and larger areas are non-permissive for civilian or small-unit military activity

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# Scenarios

- **Looking forward, the key question is whether the enemy's escalation in 2006 represents a single-year surge or a secular trend of year-on-year increases in capability**
  - Some interviewees said that the increase in activity taxed the limits of the Taliban's logistical and other capabilities and that operations likely would fall back down toward previous plateau's in the future
  - Other interviewees said that, looking back over the past five years, there is a secular rising trend or spiral development in the Taliban insurgency, with each year's activity representing an increase over that of the previous year
- **Key judgment: The evidence more strongly supports the view that the Taliban is mounting steady year-on-year improvements in its capabilities**
  - In 2005, the effort to increase terrorist attacks, particularly suicide bombings, bolstered morale and garnered greater press coverage and was followed by increases in financial, material, and manpower support – which paved the way for further escalation in 2006
  - In 2006, the Taliban's success in challenging the Afghan government's control in the south has given them greater visibility and prestige and has enabled further development of financial, logistics, and recruitment networks
    - Indications are increasing that the Taliban's logistic networks now extend not only to Pakistan but also to Central Asia and Iran

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## Scenarios (cont.)

- Taliban commanders believe that they have adequate levels of funding to sustain their current elevated levels of operations
- In 2006, the Taliban enjoyed a surge in recruitment, allowing the movement to increase and sustain high levels of violence
  - In the south, the Taliban has achieved psychological momentum, with the Afghan people in many areas fearing the worst and starting to adopt a neutral position between the Taliban and the government for the sake of survival
- **Key implication: If unchecked, the Taliban threat is likely to grow in 2007 and beyond, further undermining security and eventually imperiling the legitimacy of the Afghan government**

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# Recommendations for a Way Ahead

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# ***Strategic approach***

- **The Afghan government and its international partners can counter and defeat the Taliban's rising capabilities through two approaches:**
  - Inducing Pakistan's leaders to deprive the Taliban of sanctuary and support, to arrest its key leadership, and to dismantle training and other infrastructure in Pakistan
  - Hardening Afghanistan against insurgent activities by escalating efforts to develop Afghan National Security Forces, to improve governance, and to stimulate economic development
- **In partnership with the Afghan government, the United States should increase efforts to move along both of these lines simultaneously**
  - Hardening Afghanistan against the insurgency reinforces efforts to induce changes in Pakistani policy, and inducing a change in Islamabad's approach to the Taliban reduces the threat and makes hardening Afghanistan against remaining insurgent capability easier
- **However, this must involve a change in the mindset of Afghanistan's partners and friends**
  - The military escalation by the Taliban means that Afghanistan should not be viewed as a country engaged in "post-conflict stabilization" but rather one facing an active insurgency
  - This in turn means that U.S. civilian and military policies, as well as those of other friends of Afghanistan, must be resourced and pursued with an urgency appropriate to war

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# ***Inducing cooperation from Pakistan***

- **President Musharraf has not made the strategic choice to cooperate fully with the United States and Afghanistan to suppress the Taliban**
  - There are some positive signs of greater cooperation as a result of recent U.S entreaties
  - However, these initial actions by Pakistan are insufficient to end the cross-border insurgent threat
- **The United States, working with President Karzai, should undertake a new diplomatic initiative vis-à-vis Pakistan to achieve a rapprochement between the two countries that includes an end to destabilizing Pakistani actions**
  - It should be grounded in an understanding of potential Pakistani motivations for providing sanctuary and support to the Taliban and other insurgents
  - It should take advantage of President Karzai's willingness to reach out to Pakistan and to address any and all of Islamabad's legitimate concerns
  - It should take advantage of the multiple sources of leverage that the United States has over Pakistan
  - It should present President Musharraf with a deal that takes into account all of the possible motivations for Pakistan's conduct and that enables Musharraf to act against the interests of those elements in the Pakistan government that seek restoration of imperial control over Afghanistan

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# ***Pakistani motivations***

- **Though Pakistan's reasons for giving the Taliban sanctuary are unclear, the following set of potential motivations exist:**
  - Fear of the political pull of a strong and successful Afghanistan on the 25 million Pushtuns who live in Pakistan and the resurrection of the Pushtunistan issue
  - Fear of the possibility that key regional rivals – India, Iran, or Russia – will secure dominant influence over the new Afghan government and use Afghanistan as a platform to work against Pakistan's interests or stability
  - A desire to hedge against the possibility of U.S. withdrawal by retaining the Taliban as an instrument for what would be an inevitable subsequent proxy competition among regional powers
  - An imperial aspiration to control Afghanistan as a satellite state and to secure "strategic depth" against India
  - An aspiration to control the land and trade routes to Central Asia
  - A domestic political imperative to serve the interests of radical Islamic parties in Pakistan, which represent the principal social base for Musharraf's regime
  - A geopolitical imperative to create insecurity in order to obtain benefits by helping reduce insecurity – the logic of a "strategic rentier state"
- **In all likelihood, different elements in Pakistani regime are acting on the basis of differing motivations**

# *Karzai's new posture*

- **In a one-and-a-half-hour meeting, President Karzai set forth a rationale for and proposed a coordinated U.S.-Afghan approach to Pakistan**
  - He indicated that Iran and Russia were becoming more assertive in Afghanistan and adopting more adversarial postures
  - He said that while Pakistan was supporting the Taliban and other insurgents, Afghanistan needed to find a way to achieve a rapprochement with Pakistan that would end such destabilizing activities and create a balance against Iran and Russia
  - He suggested that the United States mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan – “your two main allies in the region” – in order to resolve the issues that resulted in the current adversarial relationship
  - He argued that, based on a variety of their actions, Pakistani leaders betrayed a fear that secular Pushtuns, who historically have been the “dominant political group” in Pushtun areas of Pakistan, felt the political attraction of the new Afghanistan
  - He asked that as a first step the United States “engage deeply and in a smart way” with Pakistan to find out “what the Pakistanis want from us”
  - He pledged that he would present for consideration in Afghanistan’s democratic process whatever issues the Pakistanis wanted to put on the table, even including the sensitive question of the future of the Durrand Line

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## ***Karzai's new posture (cont.)***

- Karzai stressed that the United States needed to engage Pakistan first – “Musharraf will not be honest with us in the room” – and then begin a “Camp David-style mediation” to find ways to address Islamabad’s interests if possible
- **This new approach represents an opportunity to move Afghanistan-Pakistan relations off the confrontational posture of recent years**

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# ***Sources of U.S. leverage***

- **Although Pakistani leaders have historically proven to be difficult to shift from a committed course of action, the United States has a wide variety of points of leverage:**
  - Diplomatic leverage:
    - Ability to provide Pakistan with relationship to a second major power besides China
    - Ability to organize NATO countries in a coordinated diplomatic campaign to pressure Pakistan to curtail insurgent sanctuaries or to reward Pakistan for positive action
    - Ability to disclose information about Pakistan's ambiguous role on issues related to the Taliban and the global war on terrorism
  - Direct assistance:
    - Ability to increase or decrease access to modern weapons needed by Islamabad to pursue a regional military balance with India
    - Ability to increase or decrease assistance for economic reform and development
    - Provision of Coalition operations support funds (totaling more than \$8 billion during past five years) that are central to the funding of Pakistan's armed forces
    - Ability to fund at a high level programs to enable Musharraf to pursue his professed goal of putting Pakistan on a trajectory to become a moderate, progressive country
  - Leverage on Afghanistan related issues:
    - Ability to influence Afghanistan to address border issues (Durrand Line and Pushtunistan)

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## ***Sources of U.S. leverage (cont.)***

- Leverage on Afghanistan-related issues (cont.):
  - Ability to influence Afghanistan on issues related to the positions of Pakistan's rivals in Afghanistan (Indian consulates, Northern Alliance influence, etc.)
  - Ability to influence Afghanistan to calibrate the relative influence in key regional powers in the building of the new Afghanistan (determining whether Kabul favors one country over another)
- Leverage on regional balance of power:
  - Ability to increase the level of U.S.-Pakistan bilateral relationship to the levels of U.S.-Afghanistan and U.S.-India relationships (strategic partnership, cooperation in key technology sectors, etc.)
  - Ability to upgrade U.S. ties with Afghanistan and/or India to put pressure on Pakistan's regional position
  - Ability to appeal to New Delhi on India-Pakistan issues (e.g., Kashmir, normalization of relations, gas pipelines, etc.)
  - Ability to appeal to Beijing to press Pakistan on Afghanistan-related issues, particularly in light of constructive stances China has taken in recent meetings with Afghan leaders
  - Ability to fund infrastructure that affects Pakistan's economic and political influence in Central Asia
- Leverage on internal Pakistani politics:
  - Ability to pay attention to military officers other than Musharraf and create a more competitive climate to address U.S. interests
  - Ability to press the military regime to open up political space for civilian parties, to grant greater authority to parliament, or to move rapidly toward democratic elections

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# ***Proposed Initiative***

- **The United States should work with Afghanistan to put together an initiative designed to result in a quid pro quo deal with Pakistan to suppress the Taliban and other insurgents**
  - First, the initiative should begin with an engagement between U.S. and Afghan leaders to come to a common understanding on the approach to Pakistan
  - Second, the United States should then engage Pakistan bilaterally to probe what goals or fears are motivating Pakistan's destabilizing actions in Afghanistan
  - Third, the United States should mediate discussions between Afghanistan and Pakistan to find ways that Kabul can address whatever legitimate issues or fears Pakistan might raise
  - Fourth, the United States should drive discussions toward a quid pro quo deal along the following lines:
    - Pakistan must suppress the Taliban and other insurgents on Pakistani territory, including turning over to Afghanistan the top 20 to 40 leaders of the insurgency
    - In exchange, Afghanistan would find ways to allay Pakistani concerns on issues such as Pushtunistan and the influence of other regional powers, including a de facto tilt toward Pakistan in regional relations
    - In addition, the United States should offer to fund or finance the building of infrastructure to privilege the Afghanistan-Pakistan corridor to Central Asia:
      - Roads, tunnels, bridges to route ground traffic from Central Asia toward the Pakistani port at Gwadar (and away from the Iranian port at Chabahar)

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## ***Proposed Initiative (cont.)***

- Hydrocarbon pipelines from Central Asia through Afghanistan into Pakistan (including spurs to stimulate economic development in Pakistan's tribal areas) and extending to Gwadar and India
- Railroads connecting Central Asian rail networks through Afghanistan to the Pakistani railhead near Quetta
- Tribal groups along the routes of this infrastructure should receive key employment and economic development benefits in exchange for guaranteeing security in their areas
  - The building of this infrastructure, which should be a cooperative trilateral undertaking, should be made contingent on the prior cessation of the cross-border insurgency directed at Afghanistan
  - (It should be noted that construction of this infrastructure would simultaneously serve U.S. policy interests vis-à-vis Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, and Central Asia)
- Fifth, the United States should utilize, as necessary, its other sources of leverage in the course of the negotiations to induce Pakistan to accept the deal
  - To encourage Beijing to influence Pakistan positively, China should be given a role in construction activities and enabled to link up its infrastructure development with the new north-south routes
  - NATO nations should be mobilized at the appropriate time to link their relations with Pakistan to implementation of such a bargain
  - Other positive and negative incentives should be used based on assessments of what issues are holding back Pakistan's acceptance of this framework
- Effectively, this creates a common U.S.-Afghan approach to address all of Pakistan's fears and interests, without giving ground to any potential desire to subordinate Afghanistan

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## ***Proposed initiative (cont.)***

- **Initial implementation step:**
  - Utilizing Karzai's September visit: The United States should propose that Karzai's travel plans accommodate a visit to Crawford to develop with President Bush and the Principals a common understanding of how to approach the Pakistani leadership along the lines of this overall initiative

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# ***Hardening Afghanistan***

- **Because the Taliban threat is escalating and sufficient cooperation from Pakistan is not yet forthcoming, the United States should lead an effort to mount a counter-escalation that will overwhelm the prospective insurgent threat**
  - This escalation does not require additional U.S. or other international forces, though it will require new financial resources
  - Instead, it should leverage Afghan political and military capabilities and non-military instruments of power, particularly improvements in governance and economic development
- **Key baskets for new actions:**
  - Increasing the effectiveness of Karzai's leadership
  - Developing a multi-year Afghan/U.S./NATO counterinsurgency strategy and plan to secure contested areas
  - Escalating the development of the Afghan National Security Forces
  - Building on effective counterinsurgency techniques
  - Resolving the crisis of weak and bad governance
  - Establishing a record of successes for the election in 2009

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# ***Increasing Karzai's effectiveness***

- **Karzai is still the same Karzai – an indispensable player with major strengths as a political leader but with limitations as a state-builder – but the United States needs to restore the close partnership with him that was the foundation of his most effective periods as president**
- **There is a three-part formula for maximizing Karzai's effectiveness as a leader**
  - Ensure he is confident of his relationship with the United States
  - Coordinate closely with him on a political action plan to deal with spoilers and to pursue reforms needed to normalize the country
  - Organize joint processes involving Afghans and the international community to compensate for Karzai's limitations as an institution builder (e.g., the Joint Election Management Board that organized national elections)
- **Karzai is currently underperforming – for example, making bad decisions that have harmed the quality of governance – because the United States and the international community have departed from the formula that produced past successes**
  - Unlike other figures on the Afghan political landscape, Karzai has opted not to keep in the field the kind of informal instruments of power that other Afghan actors have sought to maintain (e.g., militias, patronage networks, narcotics-based financial capabilities, links with foreign intelligence services, etc.)

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## ***Increasing Karzai's effectiveness (cont.)***

- As a result, his power as president depends on still-developing formal institutions (such as the police, the army, and state ministries) and on his relationship with the United States and the international community
  - When Karzai has been confident of his relationship with the United States, he has been willing to take strong and risky actions in dealing with potential spoilers (such as the sequence of actions needed to disarm warlords by political means in 2003-2005)
  - When he is not confident of his ties with the United States, Karzai becomes a balancer, with a tendency to accommodate spoilers who have strong informal instruments of power
  - Key interviewees said that Karzai believes his linkage with the United States has been lost and that Karzai has drifted into a detrimental reliance on advice from potential spoilers such as Rabbani, Sayaf, and Fahim
  - A critical example of the negative consequences of this drift was the undermining of the reform process of the Ministry of Interior by the appointment, at Fahim's suggestion, of 14 senior police officials who have links to criminal networks
- **Needed actions:**
    - Appoint Amb. Zalmay Khalilzad as a special presidential envoy for Afghanistan: In one move, this would restore the vital U.S. connection with Karzai and enable the United States to catalyze good decisions on his part

## ***Increasing Karzai's effectiveness (cont.)***

- **Needed actions (cont.):**
  - Persuade Karzai of the value and importance of the new Policy Action Group (PAG) structure that can provide joint staffing of needed strategies and action plans
    - The PAG is a planning and implementation structure under Afghanistan's National Security Council that will be composed of officials of the Afghan government and the international community
    - The PAG will help the Afghan government staff and operationalize strategies and plans in key areas related to successful counterinsurgency efforts
    - The PAG has four operational groups: intelligence fusion cell, security operations group, strategic communications group, and outreach reconstruction group
    - Though it has just begun work, this structure has great promise in enabling President Karzai to plan and carry out complex initiatives
  - Support the creation of a national reform movement composed of national and local leaders from all communities to support actions by Karzai to counter corruption and to serve as a political counterweight to spoilers who pressure Karzai to maintain the status quo

# ***Developing a multi-year COIN plan***

- **The transition to NATO-ISAF control of military operations in Afghanistan is an optimal moment to develop a synchronized Afghan/U.S./NATO strategy and plan to prevail over insurgents elements over a projected period of time**
- **Positive developments to build upon:**
  - CFC-A has steadily improved its counterinsurgency operations since the shift from a counter-terrorist strategy in late 2003 and recently has had positive enduring security effects through its “engage, clear, hold, and build” approach
  - NATO-ISAF has developed a complementary concept for counterinsurgency operations – establishing and expanding Afghan Development Zones – that focuses on creating enduring security in specific locations to enable development and then incrementally pushing out security to outlying areas over time
  - The Afghan Ministry of Defense is eager to engage with NATO-ISAF to develop a multi-year plan to expand security zones step-by-step until all contested areas are fully secured
  - CSTC-A is postured to provide steadily growing and increasingly effective Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police forces – which are the essential instruments needed to effect the above-noted security strategies

## ***Multi-year COIN plan (cont.)***

- **Needed actions:**

- Utilize the Policy Action Group, and specifically the Security Operations Group, to develop an integrated, synchronized, multi-year counterinsurgency plan to guide the building of ANSF and the deployment and operations of ANSF and NATO-ISAF
  - Undertake planning for countering next year's likely Taliban offensive and for a projected five-year campaign to defeat the insurgency
  - Base the plan on creating a mosaic of security institutions that reach from the national down to the village level
    - In light of progress in building the ANSF, the time is right to do the detailed work of determining what Afghan capabilities will be needed to secure contested areas village by village, district by district, and province by province
    - Providing village-level security – a challenge never previously addressed and a gap that the Taliban has exploited through intimidation campaigns – should be achieved by enhanced police presence combined with unarmed and/or armed police auxiliaries that have the ability to call in police or ANA from nearby locations within a reasonable time
    - The absence of a village-level security strategy, which prompted Karzai to seek to mobilize informal militias earlier this year, is a need that can be addressed through state structures but in an “Afghan way”
    - The analysis undertaken to develop this multi-year counterinsurgency campaign should then inform CSTC-A plans for building, training, and equipping the ANSF and U.S. and NATO plans for shaping needed residual military capabilities (to mentor the ANSF, to provide key enablers such as air support and intelligence, etc.)

## ***Multi-year COIN plan (cont.)***

- **Needed actions (cont.):**

- Develop approaches to compensate for the “Achilles’s heel” of the NATO-ISAF Afghan Development Zones concept
  - The NATO-ISAF concept envisions creating sufficient security in key cities and towns to attract development activities by NGOs and private enterprise – that is, “if you build up security, they will come”
    - This is partly because NATO views its “military mission” not to include development activities run by NATO itself and because many NATO countries lack CERP-like monies
  - It is likely that, at a minimum, there will be a substantial lag in the arrival of NGO or private sector-driven development, as organizations and investors calculate whether security will in fact be enduring
  - Because achieving synchronized effects is crucial to winning popular confidence – development must quickly follow improved security – the United States should develop mechanisms to direct reconstruction and development into the Afghan Development Zones (through Army Corps of Engineers infrastructure projects or other U.S.-owned and -operated economic development instruments)
- Undertake an assessment of the optimal approaches to achieving U.S. strategic objectives in Afghanistan in a NATO-ISAF command structure
  - The assumption of control by NATO-ISAF will create a more complex and potentially less responsive command structure
  - It would be wise to send someone like LTG Kicklighter or LTG Barno (USA, ret.) to assess issues related to the pursuit of U.S. objectives in a NATO context

# ***Escalating development of ANSF***

- **Enlarge the vision for the role of the Afghan National Security Forces with the objective of enabling them to “fill the space” in contested areas and eventually to take ownership of security responsibilities for Afghanistan, with only some residual international mentoring and support**
- **Positive developments to build upon:**
  - The ANSF are maturing, and it is now appropriate to envision the next level of their development
  - The ANA program has been adjusted and synchronized to overcome the challenges that arose in the course of the initial acceleration of ANA development (e.g., embedded training team coverage, infrastructure development, equipment availability)
  - CSTC-A has programmed for the re-acceleration of ANA training and fielding to a level that not only can maintain the force structure as recruits complete their enlistment tours but also can expand the ANA toward the 50,000 and 70,000 milestones
  - CSTC-A has fielded a strong program to reform the Ministry of Interior police forces, one comparable to the successful Ministry of Defense reform and capacity-building program
  - CSTC-A has put into place a new, more robust police training and equipping program that is poised to start delivering and fielding major capability in early 2007
    - The training program takes cognizance of the twin needs to develop police appropriate to enforce the rule of law in a democratic system and to protect the population in a counter-insurgency environment

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## ***Escalating development of ANSF (cont.)***

- **Positive developments to build upon (cont.):**

- CFC-A and CJTF-76 have initiated a program of joint exercises with the leadership of the ANSF – a good step in starting the process of enabling the ANSF to assume security responsibilities over time
  - For Operation Mountain Lion, ANSF leaders were brought in to participate in a pre-operation table top exercise
  - For Operation Mountain Thrust, ANSF leaders jointly conducted the pre-operation exercise with Coalition officers
  - For Operation Mountain Fury, ANSF leaders took the lead in conducting the pre-operation exercise

- **Needed actions:**

- Announce the intent and shape the ANSF development program to expand Afghan security capabilities until all contested areas are secured against threats beyond occasional terrorist attacks
  - This means that the ANF program should not be bound by arbitrary ceilings of 62,000 police and 70,000 ANA troops, numbers developed in a lower-threat context
  - Instead, ANSF program targets should be determined by an analysis of the projected requirements to secure contested areas and adjusted as actual experience proves what is needed to achieve enduring security effects
  - When such security is achieved, the ANSF programs can then take “off ramps” and plateau police and ANA numbers at the needed level

## ***Escalating development of ANSF (cont.)***

- **Needed actions (cont.):**

- Provide strong support for efforts of CFC-A and CSTC-A to insist on effective reform of the police structure in the Ministry of Interior
  - Corrupt and criminal elements are making a major play to retain control or a foothold in the ministry despite the reform program
  - The reform process is the single best chance to set right a ministry that is essential to stabilizing Afghanistan through good governance, and this effort cannot succeed if senior ranks are infiltrated by corrupt elements
  - At an appropriate time, Minister Moqbil, who has been part of or acquiesced to this power play, should be replaced with a “Jalali-like” pro-reform figure
  - It is imperative that the group of 14 corrupt cronies of Fahim be purged at the end of the probationary period imposed by the international community
  - The United States should use its institution- and capacity-building program, as well as its training and equipping program, as quid pro quo leverage to make these needed changes
  - Washington should fully support CFC-A and CSTC-A in whatever “program brinksmanship” is needed to effect the reforms, even if this delays the program’s implementation
- Expand upon the initial ANA modernization program that will provide body armor, U.S.-made small arms, HUMVEES, air mobility, and other capabilities for a portion of the force
  - At a minimum, the ANA should receive a variety of weapons – mortars, recoilless rifles, etc. – needed to match the equivalent capabilities of the Taliban

## ***Escalating development of ANSF (cont.)***

- **Needed actions (cont.):**

- In addition, CSTC-A should be asked to propose capabilities that the ANSF should receive in order to overmatch and dominate the Taliban
- Establish a mechanism for European countries and Canada to fund ANSF development, modernization, and sustainment and impose a “success-strategy tax” on all countries participating in NATO-ISAF
  - Because the success of the ANSF is the vehicle that will allow NATO to complete its mission in Afghanistan and to draw down forces over time, all NATO members should play roles in paying for what it takes to succeed
- Create an Afghanistan/U.S./NATO combined intelligence fusion center and joint operations center at the soonest practicable time, thereby bringing the ANSF in as integral element in planning and executing operations and setting the stage for the eventual hand off of security responsibilities
  - Though it will take several years before the ANSF will be ready to assume full responsibilities, it is not too early to start working with ANSF leadership to prepare the ground work for such transfers
- Plan to subsidize the operations and sustainment of the ANSF, in partnership with other NATO countries, for as long as the threat requires capabilities above the level that the Afghan government can reasonably afford to pay
  - The escalating Taliban threat requires the postponement of the objective of self-sufficiency by the Afghan government in paying ANSF operating and sustainment costs

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## ***Escalating development of ANSF (cont.)***

- **Needed actions (cont.):**

- The Ministry of Finance has indicated that, if the Afghan government complies with the current schedule for achieving self-sufficiency, the ANA will need to be capped at 44,000 troops
- This would mean that U.S. and other NATO forces will need to be maintained at current levels indefinitely and that Afghanistan will not be able to take principal responsibility for its own security at any point in the foreseeable future
- Building the ANSF to the level required by the threat and subsidizing ANSF operations and sustainment is the preferable option in terms of creating “partnership capacity” that substitutes for U.S. and other NATO forces and the less costly option in comparison to fielding U.S. and other international forces

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# ***Building on effective COIN techniques***

- **While the past three years have seen progressive improvements in the counterinsurgency techniques of the Coalition, there are opportunities to undertake additional innovations**
- **Positive developments to build upon:**
  - Operations Mountain Lion, Thrust, and Fury underscored the powerful synergistic effects of integrated political-military-economic actions in terms of achieving enduring security gains
  - In areas where the population has enduring security, the Afghan people willingly provide intelligence on insurgent activities and cooperate to keep insurgents out
  - The establishment of Regional and Provincial Coordination Centers (RCCs and PCCs) that co-locate operators from Afghan and international security forces has improved situational awareness and responsiveness to security incidents
- **Needed actions:**
  - Complete the development of a “CORDs-like” parallel and integrated structure to support Afghan counterinsurgency efforts
    - The CORDS structure established a parallel U.S. organization to support each level of the Vietnamese civil and security administrative structure (national, regional, provincial, district) and enabled the United States to support Vietnamese area security and development programs
    - The U.S. support structure in Afghanistan has nearly evolved to that level, but gaps such as the lack of a PRT in every province should be closed

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## ***COIN techniques (cont.)***

- **Needed actions (cont.):**

- The completed structure should cover support and mentoring in the following ways:
  - National government – supported by international participation the Policy Action Group
  - Ministries of Defense and Interior – supported by CSTC-A capacity and mentoring programs
  - RCCs – supported by CFC-A or NATO-ISAF embeds
  - Provincial government – largely but not completely supported by PRTs or nearby FOBs
  - PCCs – supported by CFC-A or NATO-ISAF embeds
  - District administration – supported by PRT teams traveling among district centers
  - ANA and police units – supported by embedded training teams and police mentors
- This structure will enable the execution of the multi-year counterinsurgency campaign at the village and district levels and the spending of U.S. or other NATO country development resources at the provincial and district levels
- Establish innovative reconstruction and economic development “combat branches” that are an integral part of the military counterinsurgency campaign
  - CERP has been the most effective program by far in terms of delivering reconstruction and economic development effects as part of the counterinsurgency effort
  - National-level development programs, such as that of USAID, do not deliver “area effects,” have seldom been synchronized with military operations, and cannot easily be carried out in contested areas

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## ***COIN techniques (cont.)***

- **Needed actions (cont.):**

- Recent operations – such as Mountain Lion in eastern Afghanistan – showed that integrated and synchronized reconstruction (including roads, schools, dams, etc.) is a key element in efforts to develop enduring security
- The integration of combat engineering and Army Corps of Engineers activities in counterinsurgency operations should therefore be build upon
- U.S. forces that are part of NATO should be given funding and authorities to carry out “counterinsurgency infrastructure development,” starting with CFC-A’s proposed \$600 million program for the building of roads in eastern and southern Afghanistan that would connect provincial capitals to the ring road and district centers to provincial roads
- U.S. forces should also be given funds and authorities to create an “Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Economic Development Fund” – an enterprise fund that would be used to provide micro-credit through PRTs and to provide loans to establish Afghan firms or joint Afghan-foreign ventures in agriculture, food processing, building materials, or other sectors
  - A key benefit of such a security-directed economic development effort would be to cement relationships between local leaders and U.S. forces
  - If done in partnership with appropriate Afghan ministries, this economic development effort would enhance the Afghan government’s legitimacy
  - When undertaken in poppy-growing areas, this capability would deliver the first real alternative livelihoods to local people – and this in turn would enable other counternarcotics operations that could over time degrade the funding the Taliban receives from the drug trade

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## ***COIN techniques (cont.)***

- **Needed actions (cont.):**

- As economic opportunity grows, it will undercut the economic incentives for Afghans to cooperate with the Taliban by accepting money to be a “terrorist for a day”
- Implementing this concept will require no new forces but will demand that CFC-A or U.S. forces under NATO contract with civilian firms or individuals skilled in such economic development and embed such personnel in PRTs or with maneuver forces
- Work with Afghan leaders to develop dense human intelligence networks through tribes in the border areas with Pakistan
  - Minister Wardak and other Afghan leaders have long argued that this traditional mechanism can create a powerful intelligence capability, which could be connected to local police or to Provincial Coordination Centers, and neighboring states, particularly Pakistan, have used this approach to great effect as well
- Develop a strategy and plan to exploit the myriad rivalries and divisions within the Taliban leadership
  - U.S. intelligence analysts indicate that exploitable differences exist in terms of personal rivalries, regional divisions, factional competition, as well as disagreements on ideology, strategy, and tactics
  - DIA analysts should be tasked to do an “opportunities analysis” to feed into the development of a strategy to create dissension within or split the insurgency
  - The United States and the Afghan government should create an operational cell that utilizes the current reconciliation program – perhaps upgraded with new incentives – and that explores other political actions to undermine the insurgency and induce defections

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# ***Resolving the crisis in governance***

- **Enormous popular discontent is building against corrupt and ineffective governance, undermining Karzai's political standing, weakening the legitimacy of the new political order, and creating a vacuum of power in the south and other areas that the Taliban can exploit**
- **Positive developments to build upon:**
  - A consensus exists among key Afghan leaders and international officials on the nature of the problem
  - A number of actors – CFC-A, NATO-ISAF, UNAMA, the Afghan Human Rights Commission, and key Afghan leaders – have extensive data on the quality of governance across the country down to the district level
  - The Afghanistan Compact contains a provision requiring that the Afghan government create a joint Afghan-international committee to vet and recommend appointees to key positions in the government
  - The CSTC-A reform program for the Ministry of Interior provides enormous leverage to effect positive change in a ministry that is the principal interface between the Afghan government and the people
  - LTG Eikenberry has worked successfully with President Karzai to appoint better governors in Zabol, Uruzgan, and Helmand provinces, and the new appointees have preformed better and improved security conditions as a result

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## ***Crisis of governance (cont.)***

- **Positive developments to build upon (cont.):**

- Recent changes in senior personnel in the judicial sector – particularly the Supreme Court, the prosecutor's office, and the Ministry of Justice – have created a political setting in which ambitious rule of law programs are now feasible
- A successful rule of law pilot project in Wardak province represents an attractive and replicable model for the rest of the country

- **Needed actions:**

- Persuade President Karzai that the political success of Afghanistan requires a systematic effort to improve governance and that the United States will stand with him as this requires removal of figures associate with potential spoilers
- Undertake the following sequence of steps that will create a system to establish and monitor performance of governance down to the district level:
  - Persuade Karzai to implement the Afghanistan Compact requirement to form a committee charged with recommending personnel for senior positions and work with him to appoint reform-oriented Afghans to the committee
  - Work with the Policy Action Group system to create a process to solicit nominations for provincial and district roles from all levels of Afghan society (particularly through Provincial Councils) and to create a presidential personnel system controlled by reform-oriented Afghans
  - Undertake a province-by-province review of the quality and performance of key appointees and make changes as needed

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## ***Crisis of governance (cont.)***

- **Needed actions (cont.):**

- Establish the practice of consulting with provincial and local leaders before selecting nominees for governor and district administrator positions
  - Establish concentrated training programs for governors and district administrators to disseminate best governance practices (currently only short seminars are offered)
  - Before their appointment, send governor and district administrator nominees to their areas to identify handful of key needs
  - Arrange for a package of resources from ministries to address the identified needs upon deployment of the governor or district administrator (money is available but not spent in many ministries)
  - Develop a system among CFC-A, CSTC-A, NATO-ISAF, UNAMA, the Human Rights Commission, and the Afghan National Security Council staff to monitor performance of governors, administrators, and police chiefs (data exists but needs to be systematically pooled and cross checked)
  - Identify for Karzai – on a private basis – the failing or corrupt appointees and arrange for trade outs of such personnel over time as needed
- Mount prosecutions of selected bad actors – abusive police chiefs, spoilers, and officials involved in the drug trade – as an example to others
    - Identify several former governors and police chiefs who have used militias or other devices to undermine their reform-oriented successors – which has been a recent and troubling pattern – and develop the legal cases to prosecute them

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## ***Crisis of governance (cont.)***

- **Needed actions (cont.)**

- Review the performance of key potential spoilers – for example, former warlords who were given political roles under the warlord strategy – and determine whether further actions against them are necessary or desirable
  - Consider working with Karzai to develop the legal basis for prosecuting Dostam for his alleged role in the assault of a member of parliament from his region while at the same time reaching out to second-tier Uzbek leaders to assure them of their community's place in the political order
- Identify several senior or middle-level government officials involved in the drug trade and prosecute them
- Assume a de facto lead role in enabling the international community to mount a nationwide judicial reform program that takes advantage of key new appointees in the Supreme Court and other institutions
  - Fund immediately a \$500,000 proposal of the U.S. Mission rule of law working group to undertake a six-month nationwide assessment the needed actions in the judicial sector
  - Create a new CSTC-A element focused on the judicial sector and move the CFC-A's rule of law personnel into it as CFC-A is dissolved
  - Utilize CSTC-A's planning capability to develop with the Afghan government and the international community a comprehensive nationwide judicial sector plan
  - Utilize the successful rule of law pilot project in Wardak province as the model for the rest of the country
  - Market the nationwide plan to the international donor community and piece together funding for a five-year judicial sector program currently estimated to cost a total of \$500 million

# ***Building a record of success for 2009***

- **As noted in LTG Eikenberry's campaign assessment, it is essential to decide now what record of achievements the United States and the international community wants to enable the Afghan government to run on in the national election of 2009**
- **There are many positive developments already programmed, including completion of the ring road and associated spurs and the development of ANSF capabilities**
- **However, at a minimum, the following goals should be added and funded:**
  - Deliver on improved governance nationwide
  - Deliver provincial and district road networks (as proposed by CFC-A)
  - Deliver electrical power to 40 percent of the Afghan population (USAID concept best carried out by Army Corps of Engineers)
  - Develop and begin implementation of a nationwide water management program (initially funding the needed hydrological research and analysis and starting the refurbishing of key dams and previously existing infrastructure)
  - Field a nationwide comprehensive agriculture and rural development program (along the lines of former Deputy Secretary Mosley's proposals)
  - Make productive capital – micro-credit, enterprise funding, etc. – available nationwide

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# Resources

- **A key goal – and the intended effect of the proposals in this briefing – is to create the perception and reality of the “inevitability of success” of the new Afghanistan**
  - Winning the war in Afghanistan is eminently feasible, despite the enemy’s escalation in 2006, but requires an increase in the scale of financial resources and the urgency of program implementation
- **The first step should be to undertake the above-prescribed major asymmetrical counter-escalation**
  - A joint U.S-Afghanistan diplomatic initiative vis-à-vis Pakistan
  - An upgrade of ANSF programs sufficient to “fill the contested space” over a period of time
  - A new effort to reinforce security operations with counterinsurgency infrastructure building and economic development
  - A collaborative effort with the Afghan government to improve governance
  - An upgrade of programs to ensure a strong record of success by 2009
- **If the Coalition and NATO represent the “breaching force” and the ANSF and non-military programs are the “exploitation force,” it is vital that we scale and resource the exploitation forces to win decisively**

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 FM SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
 TO RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL  
 INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
 RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI  
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SUBJECT: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD MEETING WITH AFGHAN PRESIDENT HAMID KARZAI (U)

(C) SUMMARY: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD MET WITH AFGHAN PRESIDENT HAMID KARZAI IN WASHINGTON ON FEBRUARY 27, 2003. SECDEF MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS: (1) USG IS COMMITTED TO AFGHANISTAN. TRANSITION TO STABILITY OPERATIONS WILL BE MARKED BY THE DEPLOYMENT OF MULTI-NATIONAL PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRTS); (2) USG FOOTPRINT IN AFGHANISTAN IS ABOUT RIGHT; (3) FUTURE ISAF LEADERSHIP REMAINS AN IMPORTANT PRIORITY. CANADA, ITALY, SPAIN HAVE EXPRESSED AN INTEREST, AND A POSSIBLE NATO ROLE IS A POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT; (4) USG WILL NOT PAY SALARIES OF NON-ANA MILITIAS. PRESIDENT KARZAI MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS: (1) DEMOBILIZATION, DISARMAMENT, REINTEGRATION (DDR) REMAINS AN IMPORTANT PRIORITY FOR THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT; (2) DOMESTIC PRESSURE IS BUILDING FOR ANA REGIONAL TRAINING CENTERS; (3) USG SHOULD HELP PAY SALARIES FOR NON-ANA FORCES; (4) RECENT PERSONNEL REFORMS IN THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ARE A FIRST STEP IN CONTINUED

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Page 2 of 3

PAGE 03 RUEKJCS0620 C O N F I D E N T I A L  
STRUCTURAL AND PERSONNEL CHANGES TO PROFESSIONALIZE THE MINISTRY; (5)  
POSSIBLE WAR WITH IRAQ WILL NOT RESULT IN INCREASED TERRORIST  
ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN; TERRORISTS ARE ALREADY DOING THEIR BEST TO  
DESTABILIZE THE SITUATION. END SUMMARY.

1. (C) TRANSITION TO STABILITY OPERATIONS: SECDEF SAID THAT USG  
REMAINS COMMITTED TO AFGHANISTAN AND THAT REGIONAL STABILITY IN MOST  
OF THE COUNTRY WILL PERMIT TRANSITION TO INCREASED STABILITY  
OPERATIONS IN SELECT PROVINCES. SECDEF STATED THAT THIS DID NOT  
SUGGEST AN END TO COMBAT OPERATIONS OR THE CONCLUSION OF THE WAR ON  
TERRORISM IN AFGHANISTAN.

2. (C) FUTURE ISAF LEADERSHIP: SECDEF ADVISED KARZAI THAT CANADA,  
ITALY, AND SPAIN ARE INTERESTED IN ISAF LEADERSHIP ROLES. SECDEF  
EXPRESSED HIS SUPPORT FOR A FORMAL NATO ROLE IN ISAF. BOTH KARZAI  
AND SECDEF AGREED THAT NATO SUPPORT WOULD PROMOTE CONTINUITY OF  
LEADERSHIP AND RESOURCES AND FUTURE LEAD NATIONS SHOULD SERVE  
ONE-YEAR TERMS.

3. (C) DEMOBILIZATION, DISARMAMENT, REINTEGRATION (DDR): KARZAI WAS  
PLEASED WITH THE INITIAL RESULTS AND AMOUNTS PLEDGED AT THE RECENT  
TOKYO DDR CONFERENCE. KARZAI BELIEVES THAT INCREASING ANA OUTPUT BY  
ESTABLISHING REGIONAL TRAINING CENTERS MAY HELP TO FURTHER THE DDR

PROCESS.

4. (C) SALARIES FOR NON-ANA MILITIA: KARZAI SAID THAT 30,000 TROOPS  
LOYAL TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT ASSOCIATED WITH MOD FAHIM HAD NOT  
BEEN PAID FOR OVER A YEAR. TO REMEDY THE PROBLEM, ALL 100,000  
NON-ANA FORCES DISPERSED AROUND THE COUNTRY HAD TO BE CONSIDERED, AND  
THAT ALL WOULD HAVE TO BE PAID IF SOME WERE PAID. THE AFGHAN  
GOVERNMENT WAS HARD-PRESSED AND COULD NOT DO IT ALONE. HE ASKED USG  
SUPPORT IN PAYING THE MILITIA TO HELP PHASE THEM OUT AS PART OF A DDR  
PROCESS. FOREIGN MINISTER ABDULLAH SAID THAT THE REGIONAL FORCES  
WERE CONTRIBUTING TO STABILITY AND THAT THEY THEREFORE WARRANTED  
SUPPORT. SECDEF TOLD KARZAI THAT PAYING FOR NON-ANA MILITIAS WAS A  
"HARD SELL" FOR THE USG, GIVEN OUTSTANDING TRAINING AND FUNDING  
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE ANA AND OTHER SECURITY INSTITUTIONS.

5. (C) MINISTRY OF DEFENSE REFORMS: KARZAI SAID THAT HE REPLACED 15  
SENIOR OFFICIALS IN THE MOD/GENERAL STAFF WITH QUALIFIED PROFESSIONAL  
OFFICERS FROM DIFFERENT ETHNIC GROUPS. MOD REFORMS WOULD CONTINUE IN  
ORDER TO TRANSFORM THE MOD INTO A PROFESSIONAL AND NATIONALLY  
REPRESENTATIVE MINISTRY. HE EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR USG  
SUPPORT IN THIS EFFORT. SECDEF ASKED WHETHER OR NOT THE RUSSIANS  
WERE STILL TRYING TO PROVIDE DIRECT ASSISTANCE TO THE MOD. KARZAI

REPLIED THAT DEPUTY DEFENSE MINISTER BARIYALAI AND THE MINISTRY OF  
DEFENSE HAVE ASSURED HIM THAT RUSSIAN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WOULD BE  
COORDINATED THROUGH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT.

6. (C) EFFECTS OF POSSIBLE WAR WITH IRAQ: KARZAI SAID THAT RECENT  
PRESS REPORTS CITE AN INCREASE IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN AFGHANISTAN  
AND THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER ATTACKS LINKED TO A POSSIBLE OUTBREAK  
OF HOSTILITIES WITH IRAQ. UNLIKE THE REST OF HIS ASSOCIATES, HE  
PERSONALLY DISAGREED WITH THIS ASSESSMENT AND BELIEVED THE TALIBAN  
AND AL QAEDA REMNANTS WERE ALREADY DOING THEIR BEST TO DESTABILIZE  
THE SITUATION.

7. (C) STEADY COURSE IN AFGHANISTAN: SECDEF SAID THAT SOME CRITICS

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AROUND THE WORLD PREDICTED FAILURE IN AFGHANISTAN AND THAT VISIBLE  
SUCCESS ON THE PART OF THE U.S. AND OTHERS MADE THEM UNHAPPY. HE  
SAID THE PRESENT SIZE OF THE U.S. MILITARY FOOTPRINT IN AFGHANISTAN  
IS ABOUT RIGHT.

CLASSIFIED BY WILLIAM J LUTI, DUSD/NESA-SP  
REASON: 1.5 (D)  
DECLASSIFY ON 17 MAR 2013

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UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1100 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1100

INFO MEMO

April 3, 2003, 9:00 AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim 

SUBJECT: Report on Contributions to Afghanistan Reconstruction, Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and Iraq (U)

- (U) You asked me to provide you an update every two weeks on what countries have contributed to Afghan Reconstruction, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), and Iraq.

**Contributions for Afghan Reconstruction**

- ~~(C)~~ On March 17, 2003, the Afghan Government presented its 2003 budget at the Afghanistan High-Level Strategic Forum in Brussels, Belgium. I attended this conference with Under Secretary of State Alan Larson and Under Secretary of the Treasury John Taylor.
  - (U) International donors pledged an additional \$1.1 billion in assistance for Afghanistan in 2003. Of this amount, the U.S. pledged \$600 million.
  - (U) The Afghan budget has a \$181 million shortfall in 2003. In order to close this gap, President Karzai will send a letter to donors to request additional support. Secretaries Powell and Snow will subsequently send a joint letter to foreign donors, as will Under Secretaries Larson and Taylor.
  - ~~(C)~~ At the conference, I also held bilateral meetings with German, Norwegian and U.K. officials to request additional support for Afghan Reconstruction and the Afghan National Army (ANA). I am awaiting a response to my proposals.
- ~~(C)~~ On March 27, 2003, the British Government announced that it would lead a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Mazar-e-Sharif; provide a small team of officers, including  to the US-led PRT in Kandahar; provide personnel to U.S. PRT headquarter operations at Bagram airbase; and, provide support to other U.S. PRTs as resources allow. This is an extremely positive development. E012958 X1

Doc #3

X01180 /03

Classified By: Dov S. Zakheim  
Reasons: 1.5 (B)  
Declassify On: March 30, 2013

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DECLASSIFIED AUTHORITY  
E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. S. Res. & Int. Aff.

09-M-0373

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### **Contributions for the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT)**

- (U) Foreign allies are providing excellent support to the United States for the Global War on Terrorism. Last week, I sent you a memo which stated that foreign allies had provided over \$2.2 billion in logistical support to the United States for the GWOT since September 2001. The component commanders are continuing to solicit support for GWOT requirements from foreign nations. I expect that this total will continue to increase during the next quarter.
- ~~(S)~~ Several weeks ago, Korea and Thailand both deployed elements of engineering units to Bagram airbase. These units will construct new facilities and renovate existing ones, support the mechanical needs of U.S. forces, and provide other general engineering support, to include the repair and maintenance of runways. According to USCENCOM, their combined support will likely total more than \$50 million.

### **Contributions for Iraq**

- ~~(C)~~ I am working with Under Secretaries Larson and Taylor, Assistant Administrator of USAID Wendy Chamberlain, and Eliot Abrams to identify requirements for post-conflict reconstruction in Iraq, and to raise funds from the international community to meet those requirements.
- ~~(C)~~ On April 1, 2003, I hosted an international conference call with representatives from the UK, Australia, Spain and Japan. We discussed the best way to approach other foreign donors, how to engage the United Nations and other international organizations, and the timetable for our fundraising plan. The group agreed to have another conference call on April 8, 2003, to plot a way ahead on this initiative.
- (U) My Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Financial Management), and a member of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), met with representatives of Denmark, Jordan, and Italy to see how these nations could contribute to reconstruction activities in Iraq.

COORDINATION: Attached

Attachment:

As stated

Prepared By: Josh Boehm, 693-9817

Classified By: Dov S. Zakheim  
Reasons: 1.5 (B)  
Declassify On: March 30, 2013

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E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div. WHS

09-M-0373

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UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED  
FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

COORDINATION

OUSD(P)/SOLIC	Caryn Hollis	April 1, 2003
JCS J-5 (CASA)	Col (P) Randy Anderson	April 1, 2003
JCS J-5 (IMPC)	Col. J. Hayden	April 1, 2003

Classified By: Dov S. Zakheim  
Reasons: 1.5 (B)  
Declassify On: March 30, 2013

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FROM CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE

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E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
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09-M-0373

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7. He recommended we reduce the visibility of U.S. forces. In each of the 10 to 12 locations, he suggested they stay within a perimeter and not go into the mountains.
8. He recommended we develop a national army and national police to replace the warlords' forces. Then take the equipment from the warlords' forces and give it to the national army, and hire some recruits from the warlords' forces. They will then become political regional leaders, not warlords. They could be governors in the region, or they could go back into Kabul to another position. All that would be left would be their political authority, not their military forces.

He said Pakistan will take care of its borders.

He said Iran is interfering.

DHR:dh  
062503-1S

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EF-5133

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Pivarsky  
ISA

2003 JUN 16 PM 3:35

May 2, 2003 11:56 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
Gen. Myers

CC: Gen. Craddock

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

I want to talk to Gen. Myers and Gen. Franks (while he is in town) about the possibility of putting more Special Forces with the provinces in Afghanistan as a way to assert U.S. authority without a lot of troops. We ought to try to come up with a creative way of doing that.

We also should consider breaking up the ANA into somewhat smaller elements and doubling the number of provinces that they are in.

We also want to think about the possibility of accelerating the ANA. I talked to Karzai about it. He certainly wants to do it.

His idea is to have regional training centers in four or five places. I think that would likely contribute to the centrifugal force that already exists in the country from a regional and ethnic standpoint. Instead, I suggested he have regional recruiting and bring all recruits into Kabul, and train them there.

Please come up with a proposal as to how we could double the pace of the training in Afghanistan without lowering the quality. It might be that we could get some other countries to help, or we may have to step up ourselves, or both.

*Doc 4*

05-06-03 11:11 AM

DECLASSIFIED AUTHORITY  
E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

11/11/03 7:22:21

~~SECRET~~

SECDEF CONTROL# X01881 /03

09-M-0373

I am concerned that next year will be an election year in Afghanistan, and things aren't getting done fast enough. Roads are not getting built. Schools are not getting built. Too much of what is happening is being done through NGOs and AID in a way that doesn't benefit the central government. We have a big stake in Afghanistan's success.

We have to get metrics developed so we can track what is actually taking place in that country. There is not a sufficient sense of urgency on the part of anybody.

We have to get this fixed.

Thanks

DHR:dh  
050103-64

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

Snowflake

May 9, 2003 11:19 AM

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Jay Garner

If Zal does not become U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, I think Jay Garner would be the right man for Afghanistan. I have told Colin and Condi. They are thinking about it.

My concern is I don't think we have a lot of time for further delay. I am convinced we need to get some energy into our leadership in Afghanistan.

I believe he is the kind of person who could work well with Karzai. My hope is that we can make a decision on this soon, so that either Zal, Jay or someone else is nominated, goes through the confirmation process, gets out there and gets at it.

Very respectfully,

DHR:dh  
050903-17

*Afghanistan*

*Garner 03*

W00530 /03

snowflake

~~SECRET~~

June 30, 2003

OB  
7/8

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Musharraf and Afghanistan

Here is a memo I dictated after meeting with Musharraf. You might want to make sure Marin has seen it. I am not sure I agree with him, but there it is.

Thanks.

Attach.  
6/26/03 SecDef MFR re: 25 June 2003 Meeting w/Musharraf

DHR:dh  
063003-31

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED AUTHORITY  
E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div. WHIS

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SECDEF CONTROL# X03768 /03

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

09-M-0373

~~SECRET~~

6  
June 26, 2003

SUBJECT: 25 June 2003 Luncheon Meeting with President Musharraf at the Vice President's Residence

**Afghanistan.**

1. The central government is not extended outside of Kabul.
2. There is an ethnic imbalance—Pashtuns are underrepresented; the Panjiris are dominant. That won't work.
3. The threats are:
  - Al Qaeda are on the run. Keep them that way.
  - Taliban are dispersed and on the run, but they are local, unlike the Al Qaeda. We need to select out the top 50 Taliban; we need to find them and apprehend them. They are capable of regrouping.
  - Dissenting warlords, such as Hekmatyar could link up with the Taliban and cause real problems.
  - Smugglers.
4. What should we do? Recognize that the warlords are running a government within a government. The task we have is to win the people through reconstruction.
5. We should immediately place 2,000 to 2,500 troops in each of 10 to 12 population centers, along with helicopter gunships, some tanks and 4,000 to 5,000 troops in reserve. The Coalition should impose martial law, have an administrator and suppress the warlords.
6. Government functions must be extended to the regions. He recommended that they facilitate roads, water, etc. and have an engineering company and a medical unit along with the 2,500 troops in each of the 10 to 12 locations.

~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div. WHS

09-M-0373



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

~~SECRET~~ **NODIS**  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

JUL 24 2003

INFO MEMO

2003 JUL 25

USDP

I-03/010111

EF-6284

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, 695-4351)

*MC* 24 JUL 2003

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Cables (U)

- Attached next under is a summary of three informative cables on the following developments in Afghanistan (cables attached at Tab A):
  - Khalilzad-Karzai discussion on dealing with Kandahar Governor Shirzai.
  - Fahim's reaction to USG plans to accelerate progress in Afghanistan.
  - Interior Minister Jalali's rebuke to Ismail Khan for rejection of Herat PRT.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Mustafa Popal, ISA/NESA, 697-8088 x123

DUSD(SP/NESA) *Jully '04* Strmecki *copy provided (TDY)* PDASD/ISA *H/S*

Doc 5

Derived from: Multiple sources  
Declassify on: ~~XS~~

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~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED AUTHORITY  
E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

SECDEF CONTROL# **X02547 /03**

**SUMMARY OF THE 21 JUL 03 CABLE: SIE KHALILZAD DISCUSSES SITUATION IN KANDAHAR WITH PRESIDENT KARZAI**

- S/E Khalilzad discussed the situation in Kandahar with President Karzai, focusing mainly on the possibility of Shirzai's removal.
- Shirzai is an incompetent manager and seeks to increase his personal wealth. Shirzai is suspected to be involved in the drug trade and is also accused of extorting additional customs taxes to raise money for himself.
- Karzai is concerned that factional leaders, such as Shirzai, threaten the legitimacy of his government. The best option seems to be to remove Shirzai from Kandahar and replace him with a Pashtun not bound by strong local ties. Shirzai agreed in March 2003 to accept a reassignment, though Karzai has agreed not to move Shirzai without US agreement.
- Assuming that the US decides to remove Shirzai, the United States should work with Karzai to evaluate a suitable replacement for Shirzai.

**SUMMARY OF 19 JUL 03 CABLE: FAHIM'S TROUBLES**

- In a July 14 meeting with Presidential Envoy Khalilzad, Minister of Defense Fahim Khan complained of pressure from the United States and other international donors to reform only the MoD and not other ministries, and yet the MoD had yet to see the promised funds.
- However, he also feels pressure from former Mujaheddin like Ismail Khan, who believe that Fahim has sold them out. Fahim wonders if the United States is out to finish the Northern Alliance.

**SUMMARY OF 20 JUL 03 CABLE: JALALI TELLS ISMAIL KHAN: KABUL DECIDES, NOT YOU**

- In a recent conversation with Minister of Interior Jalali, Khan told Jalali that he was not in favor of a German PRT in Herat.
- Jalali's reported comeback was: Understand this: The decision to establish a PRT will be made in Kabul, not in Herat. If you disagree with this, then we will find someone to occupy your seat. Khan reportedly took the message on board.



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

OFFICE OF THE  
SEC  
200 AUG . 5 PM 4: 42

INFO MEMO

EF-6288

I-03/010024

USDPCopy provided  
LH 8/4/03

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, 695-4351)

*[Handwritten signature]*

04 AUG 2003

SUBJECT: Principals Approve Afghanistan Policy Guidelines (U)

- The Afghanistan Policy Guidelines (drafted by OSD) have now been approved at the Principals level throughout the USG.
- State concurred without comments; CIA asked for greater clarification of the terms "moderate and democratic"; CJCS asked for greater specificity on the "green-on-green" policy. All relevant comments were addressed in the approved version.
- The NSC is considering using an unclassified version of the Guidelines as part of a Presidential rollout of the new USG strategy for accelerating progress in Afghanistan.
- Doug Feith will confirm final language with Hadley for the rollout.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared by: Mustafa Popal, ISA/NESA, 697-8088 x123

DUSD(NESA) W. Kozlowski, PDASD(ISA) WF Strmecki (COPY PROVIDED) (TDY)

Classified by DUSD(NESA) William J. Luti  
Reason: 1.5 (d)  
Declassify on: 31 July 2013

DOC 6

X02714 / 03

SECDEF CONTROL#



DECLASSIFIED AUTHORITY  
E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Res Div. WDC

09-M-0373

## Principles for Afghanistan—Policy Guidelines

### *Promoting a Vision*

1. **Global significance.** Afghanistan was the first arena of the global war against terrorism. Having ousted the Taliban regime, the Coalition is now working to help the Afghans create a stable government and society that will prevent Afghanistan from serving as a base for terrorists. Success could create a model for the region and the Muslim world and an example to other terrorist states. Lack of success – a renewed civil war, a narco-state, or a failed state – would undermine Coalition efforts in the global war on terrorism and could stimulate an increase in Islamist militancy and terrorism.
2. **Coalition vision and goals.** The Coalition aims to promote an Afghan government that is:
  - Moderate and democratic, though understanding that Afghans will not simply copy U.S.-style institutions;
  - Representative of all responsible elements in Afghan society and formed through the political participation of the Afghan people;
  - Capable of effectively controlling and governing its territory;
  - Capable of implementing policies to stimulate economic development; and
  - Willing to contribute to a continuing partnership with the Coalition in the global war against terrorism.
3. **Duration of U.S. presence.** The Coalition will maintain security forces in Afghanistan for as long as necessary to accomplish our goals, and no longer.
4. **Principal Coalition efforts.** The Coalition will focus its programs on:
  - helping Afghans create a legitimate and popularly supported government;
  - assisting the Afghan government in providing security for its people; and
  - promoting reconstruction and economic growth.

5. **The right footprint.** Unlike the Soviets, the U.S., as a liberating power, will avoid having a presence that triggers a hostile response from the Afghan people. We will maintain a "footprint" appropriate to our objectives and designed to encourage the development of Afghan institutions to address the country's problems. We do not want to create over-dependence on the U.S. or others, though Afghanistan now needs various types of help from abroad.
6. **U.S. Role in the Coalition.** The U.S. leads the international Coalition and will seek to invigorate and expand the international community's assistance to Afghanistan.

*Completing the War on the Taliban and Al Qaeda*

7. **Military operations:** The Coalition will defeat and eliminate Taliban, al Qaeda, and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) forces seeking to destabilize Afghanistan.
8. **Opposing non-Taliban Islamists:** The Coalition will oppose radical Islamist individuals and groups that preach or practice violence or promote hatred. It opposes individuals or groups that cooperate or have common cause with the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and HIG.
9. **Stabilizing the south and east:** The Coalition will execute a political-military strategy for the south and east to prevent a Taliban resurgence and to build support for the Coalition and the central government.
10. **Defending the central government:** The Coalition will employ a range of political, military, and other tools to prevent the central government's collapse or overthrow, whether by armed rebellion or coup d'etat.
11. **Green-on-green violence:** The Coalition will avoid the threat or use of force in purely intra-Afghan conflict ("green-on-green") that does not (a) obstruct the prosecution of the war on terrorism or (b) threaten the success of the central government. The U.S. will strictly define conditions (a) and (b). Threat or use of U.S. force will be employed only after political strategies have been pursued.
12. **Enhancing security:** Through its military presence and assistance in building police and military services, the Coalition will enhance the security of the Afghan people against enemy forces and lawless domestic elements.

***Political Reconstruction***

13. **Hands-on political reconstruction:** The Coalition, while respectful of Afghan traditions and independence, will help create conditions for the political development of Afghanistan. The Coalition will:
- Promote moderation and will encourage and assist those Afghans (i.e., Karzai, Ghani, Jalali, Kazemi, Samar and others who share their vision) who support the development of a moderate, broad-based government consistent with the "Coalition vision and goals" set forth above (paragraph 2).
  - Support Afghan leaders, groups, and institutions seeking to establish a successful, stable, moderate state. It will work with Afghan moderates to encourage the development of moderate political alternatives in Afghanistan to counter radical Islamists, factional movements and ideologies, and warlords.
  - Promote adoption of an Afghan constitution and laws based on limited and representative government, the rule of law, free market principles, and universal human rights.
  - Encourage a system of governance that is based on merit.
  - Strengthen the sense of Afghan national identity, including by supporting national institutions and political processes, such as national elections.
  - Dissociate from illegitimate organizations and from individuals who played roles in the destruction of Afghanistan in the civil wars of the 1990s (i.e., factional leaders) and others who do not share the vision of a moderate, representative, and stable Afghanistan based on the rule of law (i.e., warlords).
  - Be sensitive to and respectful of Afghan cultural traditions.
14. **U.S. military coordination:** Coalition military personnel will coordinate and conduct liaison activities primarily with Afghan officials who have the full confidence and backing of the President, central government, and the people.

*Reconstruction of State Institutions*

15. **Streamlining the central government:** The Coalition will encourage and support allies in the Afghan government to streamline and professionalize the central government's cabinet and ministries.
16. **Center-provincial relations:** The Coalition will help the President conform center-regional relations to the system provided in the Constitution of 1964, the governing law under the Bonn Agreement. Although President Karzai and his cabinet will drive this shift, the Coalition has a strong interest in this process and will help Afghan moderates who share in its vision for a progressive Afghan state.
17. **Security-sector reforms:** A priority for the Coalition is to reform and rebuild security-sector institutions in order to make them effective, national (not factional) in character, professional, and capable of winning the trust of all groups in Afghan society. (See Annex A.)
18. **Demobilization of militias:** The Coalition will work with the President to forge an agreement by mid-2003 to demobilize non-ANA military forces as rapidly as possible. The first phase will place priority on removing the militias in Kabul, both to fulfill the Bonn Agreement and to prevent intimidation during the Constitutional Loya Jirga, national elections, and transfer of power.
19. **Provincial and district administrative capacity:** The Coalition will provide support to the Ministry of Interior to develop stronger administrative capacity to implement policies through provincial governments and down to district administrations and deliver services. The Coalition will encourage the organization of local councils to interact with provincial and district governments.
20. **Government revenues:** The Coalition will provide support to the Ministry of Finance, as well as the Ministry of Interior, to enable the central government to control customs revenues.

*Economic Reconstruction*

21. **Favor market economy:** The Coalition will use its assistance to promote the emergence of a free-market economic system that protects private property, provides for enforcement of contracts, and establishes a legal framework for capital markets, dispute resolution, and other key institutions.

22. **Preventing mafia or drug economy:** The Coalition will use its influence to prevent the emergence of a criminal economy, both by helping the Afghan government build its law enforcement capacity and create a thriving legal economy.
23. **Avoiding aid dependency:** The Coalition will use its aid to foster enterprise-driven growth and prevent aid dependency.
24. **Provincial Reconstruction Teams:** The United States and the Coalition will deploy, develop, and strengthen PRTs to enhance security, extend the reach of the central government, build provincial governing capacity, reinforce national development priorities, and facilitate reconstruction.
25. **Regional trade and transportation infrastructure:** The Coalition will support the rapid rebuilding of lines of communication to enable Afghanistan to become a crossroads for regional trade.

*Relations with Neighboring or Regional Powers*

26. **Enhancing regional cooperation:** The Coalition will work with allies in the Afghan government to increase trade and enhance economic cooperation with its neighbors.
27. **Preventing regional competition:** The Coalition will work with the Afghan government to prevent destabilizing competition driven by regional powers providing support to Afghan factions or attempting to dominate Afghan security institutions.

*Timelines and resources*

28. **Timeline:** The Coalition should set as its goal the completion of key reconstruction objectives by the end of 2007. Intermediate goals and metrics should be developed for each policy area.
29. **Strategy and resources:** Strategy and timelines should drive program budgets. Spending more now will save more money later by advancing U.S. goals and enabling the withdrawal of U.S. forces.

**Afghanistan Policy Guidelines  
Annex A**

**Ministry of Defense:** The Coalition will work with the President to change senior officials and officers in the MoD Headquarters, General Staff, and corps commands to end factional dominance by summer 2003.

**Afghan National Army:** The Coalition-trained Afghan National Army will become the only organized military force in Afghanistan, with the training of the Central Corps by June 2004 as the first priority.

- The ANA will be an effective, affordable, professional, and national institution under the control of the President as commander in chief and as provided by the Constitution.
- Selection of ANA officers and enlisted personnel will be merit-based and will draw from all ethnic and regional groups.
- The Coalition will accelerate the building of the ANA, provided that the quality of new units can be maintained.

**Ministry of Interior:** The United States will work with President Karzai and the Interior Minister to continue the transformation of the Ministry into a truly national institution.

- The United States will work with the lead nation in rebuilding the Afghan National Police, to accelerate the training of personnel, to extend training into the provinces, and to develop an effective highway patrol and a quick reaction force.
- The Coalition will assist the Interior Ministry to improve adherence to the rule of law and respect for human rights as a priority matter.
- The United States will ensure that a Coalition program is fielded to rapidly rebuild the Afghan National Border Police, particularly in sensitive border areas, and will be prepared to take a leading role if needed to achieve timely results.

**National Directorate for Security (NDS):** The United States will work with President Karzai to create an intelligence service built along the lines of intelligence services in democratic political systems.

EF-6486

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
POLICY

INFO MEMO

USDP *copy made 8/29/03 L.A.*

I-03/011296-ES

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: J.D. CROUCH II, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (697-7728)

AUG 28 2003

SUBJECT: German Police Training in Afghanistan

- You asked for a proposal to get State and Defense pushing the Germans to do a better, faster job on police training in Afghanistan.
- As part of our efforts to accelerate progress in Afghanistan, we are working with State to accelerate police training, including Germany's efforts.
- Out of the \$1 billion in additional US assistance for acceleration approved by the Principals Committee, the plan includes \$160 million for police training, including training to produce approximately 40,000 national police; 6,000 border police; and 2,600 highway patrol personnel.
- USD(C) Zakheim is working with Under Secretary of State Larson and Under Secretary of Treasury Taylor to execute a donor strategy for acceleration, as approved by the Deputies Committee.
- As part of this strategy, we will ask Germany to contribute an additional \$50 million to accelerate reconstruction, including police training. USD(C) Zakheim will call the German MOD State Secretary on this in the coming week.
- We will ask Germany to provide additional personnel to the police training effort and to expand police training into the provinces. To date, Germany has provided approximately \$27 million for police training focused only on training a Kabul force.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Prepared by: James Hursch, ISP/EUR, 697-2468, and Laura Cooper, SO/LIC/Stab Ops, 697-3317  
25 AUG 03  
Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Declassify on: X1

DECLASSIFIED AUTHORITY  
E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS



DOC 7  
X04609 / 03  
SECDEF CONTROL  
*A273*

09-M-0373

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- (C) Key steps to obtain German acceleration of police training:
  - The current plan is for President Bush to announce the new USG plan to accelerate progress in Afghanistan on 3 September.
  - State will demarche Germany and other key donors followed by phone calls at the Under Secretary level.
  - We will work with State and Treasury to draft a joint letter to Germany and other key donors from you, Secretary Powell, and Secretary Snow.
  - We will include talking points for President Bush to use with heads of state at the UN General Assembly in September, where he is scheduled to meet with German Chancellor Schroeder.
  - In early September, State Department Afghanistan Coordinator Ambassador Bill Taylor will travel to Berlin to press further for police training acceleration and coordinate implementation details.
  - We will provide Tom Ridge with talking points for his trip to Germany the week of 22 September, since he will be traveling at the invitation of Interior Minister Otto Schilly, who has responsibility for the training.
  - Should urging still be required in early October, you could discuss this with MOD Struck at the Informal NATO Defense Ministerial.
  - In addition, we will use all meetings with Germans at the USDP, ASD, and DASD level to push this point.
- (C) In order to challenge Germany to come up with as much funding as possible, we will avoid revealing the total amount of USG funds for accelerated police training on the table during initial discussions.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COORDINATION  
(this page is unclassified)

DASD (EUR/NATO)

Ian Brzezinski



OUSD(C)

David Norquist

David Norquist

DUSD (NESA)

Bill Luti

COL(P) Wiercsinski for

DASD (Stability Ops)

Joe Collins

Joe Collins

Director, European Policy

Jay Wilkins

JPH 8/22/03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Prepared by: James Hursch, ISP/EUR, 697-2468, and Laura Cooper, SO/LIC/Stab Ops, 697-3317  
25 AUG 03  
Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Declassify on: X1

DECLASSIFIED AUTHORITY  
E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

09-M-0373

A273  
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~~SECRET~~

September 15, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Zal Khalilzad

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Karzai's Strategy on Warlordism

President Karzai is moving along a path towards dealing with warlords.

It is critically important that we decide ourselves exactly what support we are willing to give him and what support we are not willing to give him. We do not want him making moves under the mistaken belief that we are going to back him up militarily. By the same token, to the extent he does make moves that make sense, it may very well be appropriate for us to be in a position to provide some assistance. Our body language before and during any actions he takes may very well be critical in achieving his goals without the use of any of our military forces.

The only way this can be done well in my opinion is if we get a joint plan between Karzai, Zal, and Marin Strmecki, on the political side, and our military people, and that I understand it and approve it, with the advice of Dick Myers.

Therefore, I have asked Dick Myers by copy of this memo to work with Doug Feith to see that such a plan is developed.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
091503.1S

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*Please respond by 1/3/03*

~~SECRET~~

SECDEF CONTROL#

X03181 /03

~~SECRET~~



UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF  
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD  
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

Copy to: *(Cone - 10/8)*  
USD(P)  
CJCS  
DEPSEC

SECDEF HAS SEEN

OCT 01 2002

OCT 9 2002

CCJ3-*(illegible)*

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary OF Defense

SUBJECT: Trends in Afghanistan

REF: SECDEF Memorandum, 3 Sept 02, Subject: Trends in Afghanistan.

*LARRY DI RITA*  
*10/8*

*E012958*  
*3.3(1)*

*E01298 3.3(1)*

- Efforts by Al Qaida (AQ)/ Taliban (TB) remnants to position themselves for insurgency operations against U.S. and Coalition Forces.

- Generally deteriorating security situation.

2. AQ and anti-Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) leaders are attempting to position themselves for insurgency operations; however, currently these efforts represent a limited threat to the ATA and/or Coalition:

- Efforts to develop an insurgency are manageable. The "fractious nature" of the various opposition groups will limit their ability to develop an insurgency; however, the Mujahideen coalesced against the Soviets in the 1980s under similar circumstances. Ultimately, the lack of sufficient external support will limit the success of any insurgency.
- Islamist leaders will attempt to use xenophobia and religion to generate support for their insurgency. However, there appears to be little support for a nation-wide grass roots resistance movement.
- The coalition will maintain credibility if it generally remains neutral in inter-ethnic conflicts and is seen to be supporting the Government of Afghanistan (GOA), assuming the GOA remains broadly accepted by Afghans.
- Actions by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO'S) and Information Operations (IO's) are creating good will and positive perceptions by Afghans, however their impact in key areas is limited by legitimate and perceived security concerns. Some humanitarian assistance efforts are delayed

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	<i>10/8</i>
SR MA CRADDOCK	<i>C 10/8</i>
MA BUCCI	<i>SAS 10/8</i>
EXECSEC WHITMORE	<i>10/7</i>

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E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
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Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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*X03261 102*

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based on misperceptions of the security situation and/or a reluctance to move into new areas.

3. Iran is building influence; however, this type of activity is not limited to Iran, nor should it necessarily be viewed as a destabilizing factor.

- Increased Iranian influence in the west will enhance narcotics interdiction efforts in Afghanistan.
- Russia, Pakistan and India are also conducting influence campaigns in their areas of influence.
- The US is perceived to have national rather than regional interests in Afghanistan, which will enhance perceptions of our position as an impartial party.

4. In terms of inter-factional violence and fighting between warlords, Afghanistan is more secure today than it has been since the late 1970s. However, episodes of criminal activity, absence of rule of law, and political instability are typical in a post civil war environment, and Afghanistan is no different.

- Despite sporadic ethnic clashes, there has been relative peace between ethnic groups and among factional leaders.
- The maintenance of relative calm after the bombings and assassination indicates that the situation is manageable.
- Continued stability hinges on the government's ability to maintain security and provide economic development.
- The successful fielding of a capable Afghan National Army (ANA) will enhance the GOA's ability to maintain security.
- The delivery of promised international aid will boost infrastructure development and economic recovery.

5. Efforts by Pakistan over the past several months, especially the recent raids in Karachi, have significantly impacted AQ ability to transfer funds, material support, and technical expertise to extremist elements.

- There are still individual **anti-ATA** elements who can and will commit violent acts.
- Disruption of AQ activity in Karachi will impact AQ and **anti-ATA** activities in Waziristan, and the ability to support operations into Afghanistan.

6. The security situation in Afghanistan, as defined by ethnic clashes, crime, narcotics trafficking and **anti-ATA** and coalition activities remains a concern. However, the CIA assessment overstates the immediate risks to stability and security, and understates the positive developments underway to bring stability to Afghanistan. Our ongoing efforts, supported by the practical delivery of development aid by the international

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community will both be required to sustain the initiative against anti-ATA forces.

*bm* *fr*  
Tommy R. Franks  
General, USA

~~SECRET~~

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Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

09-M-0373

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Working Paper

107 SEP 12 PM 5:12

November 7, 2001  
12:24 PM

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Discuss w/CENTCOM

I want to talk to Tommy Franks about the meeting I had with Tenet on the following issues:

- The complete coordination of the focus on the UBL meeting, specifically continuous coverage of Predator, Global Hawk or U-2, and continuous availability of air assets, whether tacair or AC-130.
- The question of the chain of command, and whether or not it ought to be lifted up or whether we need to make sure the rules of engagement are very clear.
- What kind of a ground control center he has that compares to the
- A good deal more thought perhaps should be given to what warheads ought to be on what weapons, because the Hellfire just isn't doing the job.
- The question of a single point of contact, so all the threads are coming through the same needle. My impression and Franks' impression is that they are not all coming through the same needle. Tenet's contention is that they are, and he is very happy with the situation, saying that never before in history has there been such close coordination. I need to know who the person is who can stick his finger in Fahin's face and say, "Go take Taloqan."

E012958 3.3(Q)

E012958

2

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Working Paper

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X02894 / 02

DEF CONTROL #

09-M-0374

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Working Paper

- Last, there is the issue of who is controlling, to the extent any American is, what the Northern Alliance is doing. This is important because if they go in and do things like they have done before-rape, pillage, maim, and blow up hospitals-somebody is going to get blamed, and it would be nice to not have finger pointing.

DHR/dh  
110701-1C

2

Working Paper

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

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09-M-0374



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

SECDEF HAS SEEN

NOV 30 2001

SP13  
11/27  
7/11/28  
Slight  
11/27/01  
11:30

INFO MEMO

EF-0348  
I-01/014389

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs  
(Mr. Peter W. Rodman, 695-4351)

2 '7 NOV 2001  
pmz

SUBJECT: Further Report on Afghan Talks in Bonn (U)

(U) Bill Luti, DASD/ISA for NESA, called me with a follow-on report on the formal opening session Tuesday in Bonn.

(C) He continues to be optimistic. All the parties, in their opening speeches, said exactly the right things:

- Northern Alliance Interior Minister Qanooni stressed that the NA had no intention of monopolizing power and supported a broad-based government of national unity. Rabbani's public statements at odds with this suggest that Rabbani -- not the NA's Bonn spokesmen -- is isolated.
- The Afghans agreed on a UN-proposed agenda for the Bonn negotiation:
  - an interim government consisting of a cabinet council and executive committee, to govern for six months, followed by:
  - a loya jirga to confirm a transitional government to govern for two years, followed by
  - a permanent governmental structure.
- The Afghans themselves added to the agenda a discussion of a security force.

loya jirga =  
supreme council  
with reps from  
all major groups;  
coalition govt.

COORDINATION at Tab A.

Classified by: ASD/ISA Peter W. Rodman  
Reason(s) 1.5(d)  
Declassify on 27 November 2011

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X02186 / 01

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E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
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09-M-0374

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Working Paper

December 20, 2001  
7:34 PM

TO: Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Ali

How do we get Ali to get his forces to move? It seems to me we have to get a full court press on it, or else we are going to have to use some of our own.

Any thoughts?

Thanks.

DHR/dh  
122001-1C

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Working Paper

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SECDEF CONTROL# X02438 /01

09-M-0374

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December 29, 2001 2:11 PM

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INFO  
01/02  
1555

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: CNA Lessons Learned

Attached is a memo on lessons learned at the mid-point, which you might want to read.

You also might want to give it to the folks doing the lessons learned effort for us, and then provide it to anyone else you think ought to have it.

Thanks.

Attach

11/26/01 John Keefe, Center for Naval Analysis, "First Cut at Lessons Learned"

DHR:dh  
122901-18

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SECDEF CONTROL# X02920 /02

09-M-0374

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11:53 AM

*Via Facsimile*

TO: Dick McGraw  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: March 4, 2004  
SUBJECT: **Afghanistan**

Thanks so much for your note and being out there and doing what you are doing. We all appreciate your willingness to step up to the plate.

I know it is tough. I wish that I were able to do more. Attached is a list of the things we have done here in the Department.

Please know that we are continuing to push the interagency process as hard as we can. Keep at it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
030404.01

*Attach: Rodman Info Memo to SD Re: DoD Support for Amb. Khalilzad*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

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UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

**OSD 75659-04**

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USDP

I-03/016549

C2/9  
2/10

## SecDef Afghanistan Update

### Warlord Demarche

- On February 5 Zal Khalilzad delivered the USG's demarche on the warlord strategy to President Karzai.
- Karzai said he:
  - would never assume that force would be available to back his actions; and
  - would always come to an agreement with us on moves with immediate or potential military risks.

Prepared by: Kurt Amend, ISA/NESA, 697-8088, ext 123

DUST/NESA

CC: ASD/ISA, PDASD/ISA

Classified by: Dr William J. Luti  
Reasons: 1.4 (b), (d)  
Declassify: February 9, 2014

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E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
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OSD 75415-04

09-M-0374

~~Secret~~

7:35 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM:  
DATE: February 18, 2004  
SUBJECT: Afghanistan

EF-8537  
I-04/002288

Take a look at this memo from Ryan Henry and tell me what you propose I should do with it.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
021804.04

Attach: SecDef Afghanistan Update 1/22/04 from R. Henry

Please respond by: 2/17

ALL DONE

~~Secret~~

When Accompanied By  
Attachment

OSD ~~76758-04~~  
75658-04

~~SECRET~~

- **Military Support**

- Agreed to provide Military Air Transportation on a non-reimbursable basis when travel is in support of the DoD mission in Afghanistan (gives Zal wide latitude to travel w/o charge throughout Afghanistan).
- Continue to station a 100-man USMC infantry company to provide security for the embassy compound and staff.
- Authorized the co-location of the Embassy and LTG Barno's command headquarters in Kabul to facilitate coordination and policy implementation.
  - Combined Force Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A)--functions as a planning cell for Zal, providing expertise on issues like the electoral process and Pakistan.
  - CFC-A also has supported discussions on Loya Jirga security issues, ANA movements, and security for the June elections.
- Created the OMC-A, which is helping coordinate security sector reconstruction, particularly the MOD and ANA.
- CENTCOM makes its radio stations in Bagram and Kandahar available for Zal's strategic communications efforts.

- **"Metrics" Support**

- We provide the staffing to support the Metrics, our mechanism for tracking progress. (Next month a USAID contractor will take over the role.)

- **Policy Support**

- We drafted the original "Accelerating Progress in Afghanistan" action plan that was the blueprint for the revised USG policy in Afghanistan.
- We developed the "Warlord Strategy." Zal delivered the USG "warlord" demarche to President Karzai 5 Feb.
- We developed the South/Southeast Strategy (together with CFC-A).

Memo prepared by Nat Troy, Jr., ISA-NESA 697-8088, x124.

DUSD/NESA H/S

PDASD/ISA H/S

Derived from: Multiple sources  
Reasons: X4  
Declassify: February 04, 2014

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March 8, 2004

TO: Doug Feith  
Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. John Abizaid

CC: Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghan Prisons

Let's get a timeline where we can get Afghanistan to provide the prisons necessary to house the GTMO detainees who are Afghans. One would think we ought to be able to get the right kind of an arrangement.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
030804-17

.....  
Please respond by 3/26/04

Afghanistan

8 MAR 04

OSD 10915-04

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EF-9028  
USDP *AD* 3/28/04  
March 26, 2004  
I-04/004119

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: *WJL* William J. Luti  
SUBJECT: **SecDef Afghanistan Update**

*Rtable*

- On March 24, Zal Khalilzad reported that the situation in Herat remains fragile.
  - Relations between Ismail Khan and the central government and UN have deteriorated.
  - Ismail is reportedly displeased with the presence of ANA troops and their embedded U.S. trainers.
  - Ismail does not trust the central government to arrest 17<sup>th</sup> Division Commander Zaher, whom he holds responsible for his son's death, and may move against Zaher supporters in neighboring Badghis province.
    - Ismail may also move against Badghis residents in Herat.
- Khalilzad will engage Ismail intensively until the situation normalizes and recommend that Karzai:
  - recall 17<sup>th</sup> Division Commander Zaher to Kabul;
  - dispatch a team to Herat to help Deputy Interior Minister Hilal and Chief of General Staff Bismillah Khan investigate the murder of Ismail's son; and
  - resist pressure to dismiss Ismail.

Prepared by: Nat Troy, Jr., ISA/NESA, 697-8088, ext124

cc: ASD/ISA, PDASD/ISA

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Dir. & Rec. Div. WHS

OSD 75931-04

~~FOUO~~  
~~SECRET // NOFORN~~  
ATTACHMENT

September 24, 2004

TO: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D. Rumsfeld*  
SUBJECT: Afghanistan: Counter Terrorism and Drug Interdiction

You said you wanted DoD to move promptly to expand the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan beyond counter-terrorism to interdicting drug labs. I agree that the drug trade is a dangerous source of funding for criminal and terrorist elements that can destabilize Afghanistan. However, there are severe limits on what the military can achieve if other critical elements of a counter-drug strategy are not in place. Because you urged DoD to do this even before other key related counter-narcotic efforts have been accomplished, I am concerned that we would run the risk of an unbalanced approach that in the end would not accomplish our goals.

Attached is a package of materials that sets out what I am told has been taking place, and what has not been taking place, in Afghanistan, since the overthrow of the Taliban regime in late 2001.

In this material, you will see evidence that the so-called "Lead Country" approach in Afghanistan is not working. The Germans are not getting the job done on police. The British are not getting the job done on counter-narcotics, with the exception of some Special Forces work. And, the Italians are not getting the job done on the civil justice system. Further, many if not most of the elements of the U.S. Government responsible for activities in Afghanistan are understaffed, and their goals are not being met.

As you know, weeks ago I directed US military forces in Afghanistan to take down drug labs they came across. I've since been told we should review and refine this order to ensure that the mission lines up properly with the relevant legal authorities. I am checking this out.

I want our people to be as aggressive as they are legally able to be when intelligence reveals reliable targets. The reasons I am reluctant to shift emphasis away from providing security broadly in Afghanistan – especially dealing with the terrorist threats from Al-Qaeda and the Taliban – to making a major effort against drug laboratories now are as follows:

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ATTACHMENT

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OSD 78074-04

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Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

09-M-0374

~~FOUO~~

- An effort to systematically interdict drug labs in Afghanistan, which I strongly favor if the legal authority can be sorted out, should be preceded, not followed, by the development and implementation of a broad strategy, including other key elements of a proper counter-narcotics strategy:
  - setting up prisons and a workable civil justice system, so that those arrested can be tried and held in jail; and
  - the development of adequate, trained, equipped and properly led Afghan security forces – in particular, police forces – so that the Afghan government can sustain the counter-drug effort initiated by the Coalition.
- Many of these labs are simple and small – they would fit in a few motel rooms. If taken down, many could be back up and operating again in a few days.
- There is also a need for an effective strategic communications effort, which has not been planned as yet, and an alternative crop program, which will succeed only if Afghanistan develops a substantial non-drug-related economy.
- Further, unlike in Iraq now, the training of Afghan police forces is separate from the DoD-led effort to train the other security forces. Afghan police training is being handled in large measure by the State Department and the Germans. The police forces are not being organized, trained, equipped, deployed and mentored in a way that will make them an effective force that the Afghans could use for a major counter-narcotics effort in the near future.

I believe the drug problem is serious. It could corrupt and undermine the constitutional government in Afghanistan. But to deal with the drug problem successfully, it will be necessary to get all key elements moving forward. There must be a comprehensive counter-narcotics plan incorporated within an Afghanistan strategy, one that provides for appropriate leadership for the police, the border patrol, and the civil justice system; an alternative crop program; and effective strategic communications – as well as customs collection, the demobilization of warlord militias and other key issues.

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~~FOUO~~

The choices we face are:

- The White House NSC staff organizes an effective USG effort to get the lead countries, those that assumed these responsibilities at the Bonn Conference, to do their jobs; or
- The USG decides the lead country approach is a failure and takes over the counter-narcotics responsibilities.

If all the Afghan security forces are to be properly organized, trained and equipped, a single USG department will have to be put in charge – as is the case in Iraq. At the moment, the USG is not properly arranged, and the “lead countries” are not doing what is necessary to achieve our security goals. The task before us is not to hit a few drug labs, only to have them reestablished in a few days, but to get organized so we can accomplish our strategic goals.

**Attach.**

9/15/04 Info Memo: Problems in Kabul Embassy Counter-narcotics Staffing  
9/3/04 Afghanistan's Police Program Brief  
Germany & DOS (INL) Police Programs for Afghanistan

DHR:dh  
091604-7.v2

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
POLICY

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

2004 OCT 13 AM 11: 53

I-04/013436 NATO  
USD(P) *AWO* 10/10/04  
ES-1011

INFO MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: Mira R. Ricardel *Jim Rand for 10-8-04* ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY (Acting)  
SUBJECT: Concept Paper on Merging ISAF and OEF into a Single Command (U)

- (C) We have prepared a concept paper (Tab A) that outlines the conditions under which DoD could consider merging ISAF and Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan under one command to help prepare you for the NATO Defense Ministerial in Romania on 13 – 14 October.

Attachment: a/s

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13-10-04 (014)

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Prepared by Col Dave Richards, ISP/NATO Policy, 692-4505

Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)  
Declassify on: 8 October 2014



OSD 78306-04

09-M-0374

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**Concept Paper on Merging ISAF and OEF into a Single Command (U)**


DUSD (NESA) (Bill Luti)

Bill Luti

Joint Staff J-5 (Skip Sharp)

LTG Skip Sharp

DASD (EUR and NATO) (Ian Brzezinski)



Director ISP/NATO Policy (Scott Schless)

Scott Schless

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Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)  
Declassify on: 8 October 2014

Prepared by Col Dave Richards, ISP/NATO Policy, 692-4505

# TAB A

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OSD Pol. Sec. G  
10/8/04

## Concept Paper: ISAF-OEF Merger in Afghanistan

### (U) Purpose

- This paper recommends SecDef propose at the NAC-D in Romania on 13-14 October that NATO Military Authorities be tasked explore how ISAF could be made more effective, including through integration with Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) in Afghanistan.

### (U) Background

- In December 2003 at NATO Ministerial meetings, SecDef and SecState said the U.S. supports, as an ultimate goal, the progressive merger of ISAF and OEF operations into a single, NATO-led multinational military operation in Afghanistan.
- Upcoming ISAF Headquarters (HQ) rotations are:
  - Turkey (ISAF VII) – February 2005 – August 2005.
  - Italy (ISAF VIII) – August 2005 – February 2006.
  - UK (ISAF IX) - February 2006 – February 2007.
- The 26 July SHAPE force generation conference failed to provide national contributions to begin stage two ISAF expansion into western Afghanistan. SHAPE will hold the next force generation conference in November.

### (C) Rationale for Merger

- The reasons to merge the ISAF and OEF missions include:
  - Accelerate the pace of Afghan reconstruction and the development of Afghan security forces.
  - Establish the conditions that will facilitate a reduction in U.S. force levels and an increase of force contributions by other nations.
  - Achieve unity of command and implement a single, integrated campaign plan.
    - Facilitate integration of security sector reform programs and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) activities.
    - Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the NATO mission and the overall international efforts in Afghanistan.

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Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Reasons: 1.4 (b) and (d)  
Declassify on: 7 October 2014

Prepared by Col Dave Richards, ISP/NATO, 692-4505

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**(C) Guiding Principles**

- A merged, NATO-led operation should support Afghan government policies and programs in Afghanistan.
  - Accepting existing ISAF weaknesses into a merged operation could result in one that is less effective than current OEF operations.
  - A merged NATO-led operation should not inhibit pursuit of, or lengthen the time required to achieve, USG goals and objectives in Afghanistan.
- NATO will need to adopt a strategy that supports Afghan government policies and programs on:
  - Counterinsurgency;
  - Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of militia;
  - Warlords;
  - Counter-narcotics; and
  - Development of Afghan Security Forces.
- Combat forces need to retain access to all areas of operation for counterinsurgency operations, and authority to conduct combat operations in coordination with the Government of Afghanistan.
- The pace of the integration should be driven by NATO and the Afghan government meeting key milestones rather than by an artificial timeline.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**(C) USG Policy Considerations for Merger**

- At a minimum, the following should be accomplished before proceeding with the merger:
  - Progress made by the Afghan government in extending political and military authority into regions.
  - Allied fulfillment of the required ISAF force contributions (e.g. NATO needs to implement stage two of ISAF expansion in the West).
  - Progress by ISAF contributors in mitigating national caveats that impede mission effectiveness.
  - Agreement on the command and control arrangements (U.S. general officer leads the operation) and robust rules of engagement, including for counterinsurgency operations.
    - U.S. general officer in lead will need to establish a common framework for PRTs along U.S. lines and have authority to direct PRT operations in cooperation with the PRT lead nations.
    - Some Allies may insist that combat and stability operations remain under separate commands. It is not clear if these Allies will support:
      - A merged command with two deputies that separate combat and stability operations, or
      - Conduct of some missions (like counternarcotics) by other nations within their geographic areas of responsibility.
- A new legal framework may be required to support a merged command (i.e. UNSCR and SOFA).

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~~(C)~~ Possible Way Ahead

- SecDef uses the Romanian NATO Defense Ministerial on 13-14 October, to propose that NATO Military Authorities (NMAs) be tasked to provide their advice on how we can improve the effectiveness of ISAF, including through an integration with OEF in Afghanistan.
  - NATO MODs, with the advice of NMAs can discuss options for integration more fully at their next meeting in February 2005.
- Prior to February 2005 NATO Defense Ministerial in Brussels:
  - Develop and execute an interagency political and diplomatic strategy to win Allied support for our Afghan strategy.
  - Assess the degree to which Allies will support an:
    - ISAF-OEF merger under U.S. command, and
    - Updated Operations Plan with the required rules of engagement.
- Defense Ministers task NMAs, if sufficient progress has been made, at the February 2005 NATO Defense Ministerial in Nice, to initiate further planning (i.e. develop CONOPS).
  - If the Afghan government supports and if Allies agree to the elements of our strategy, we could aim to achieve:
    - Initial operating capability (IOC) of merged command by August 2005 and
    - Full operating capability (FOC) as early as February 2006 consistent with the current ISAF HQ rotation timeline.

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~~Confidential~~

3:25 PM

TO: Doug Feith  
Marin Strymecki  
Zal Khalizad  
Gen. Dick Myers

CC: Gen. Abizaid  
Paul Wolfowitz

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

DATE: November 18, 2003

RE: **Letter from Dostum**

Attached is a letter from Dostum that is worrisome.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
111803.10

*Attach: Letter from Luti to USDP 11/7*

*Please respond by:* \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED AUTHORITY  
E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~Confidential~~

SECDEF CONTROL#

X04130 /03

09-M-0375

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5:23  
11/14/03  
C

FOR: THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

FROM: William J. Luti *WJL*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan – November 7 Letter from Dostum to SecDef

- The attached November 7 letter from Uzbek warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum to the SecDef (just received) makes a number of serious allegations about the situation in Afghanistan.
- In order to understand more thoroughly the facts that are alleged and the possible motivations for Dostum's letter, we are reviewing its contents with Zal Khalilzad who knows Dostum well and would have important insights to share.
- We will provide a draft response from the SecDef to Dostum on November 14, 2003.

Prepared by: Kurt E. Amend, ISA/NESA, 697-8088, ext 123

ASD/ISA *[Signature]*

PDASD/ISA *COPY PROVIDED*

Classified by: Dr William J. Luti  
Reasons: 1.4(b), (d)  
Declassify: 13 November 2013

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E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

2

09-M-0375

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USDP

I-03015976

EF - 7584

*copy  
prov. ded  
11/20/03*

TO: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Luti *WJL*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan – Letter from Abdul Rashid Dostum

- You asked for a response to be prepared to Dostam's letter of November 7.
- Marin Strmecki recommends that you do not respond to the letter for several reasons:
  - Warlords have often threatened and intimidated others by asserting that the United States supports them, even claiming that they could call in U.S. military strikes if others failed to comply with their demands.
  - Dostam will use a personal response to make an exaggerated claim of having a close relationship with you and the Department.
  - Zal Khalilzad believes a response from you could complicate ongoing negotiations to resolve the situation in Mazar.
  - You will meet with Dostam in early December and can make reference to the letter at that time if you wish.
- Further, DIA has reviewed the assertions in the letter and says that some facts are exaggerated and others are in error:
  - The Taliban and al-Qa'ida are not in "active control of most of" Helmand, Kandahar, Paktia, Paktika and Khost provinces. Rather, they have freedom of movement.
  - We are not aware of any \$3 million Ministry of Interior package for Kandahar. Dostum may be referring to the planned \$3 million USAID package for post-Sherzai Kandahar.

Classified by: Dr William J. Luti  
Reasons: 1.4 (b), (d)  
Declassify: 20 November 2013

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SECDEF CONTROL# X04878 /03

09-M-0375

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- In October, Minister of Interior Jalali purposely deployed 300 police to Mazar who were not from the area. It is possible that some are Pashtun, although we are not aware that any are former Taliban or committed atrocities under Taliban rule.
- If you wish to respond, a non-committal draft letter is attached

Prepared by: Marin Strmecki, 697-8088, ext 127

Classified by: Dr William J. Luti  
Reasons: 1.4 (b), (d)  
Declassify: 20 November 2013

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Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

Dear General Dostam:

Thank you for your letter of November 7. I have forwarded it to Ambassador Khalilzad, who will discuss the issues you raised.

Sincerely,



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

I-03/016549

INFO MEMO

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith *DJF for*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan – Military Options in Support of the Warlord Strategy

- On December 4 the Deputies reviewed a Strmecki-drafted briefing on the US warlord strategy and a Joint Staff briefing on military considerations regarding the warlord strategy.
- The discussion focused on a proposed USG message to Karzai (Tab A) which CJCS personally helped draft:
  - Zal Khalilzad argued against the clause: “however, at this time we do not envision the use of military force” (first bullet). He said it would have “a chilling effect” on Karzai’s implementation of the strategy.
  - Zal urged instead the following message:
    - The warlord strategy relies principally on political and economic tools.
    - The strategy aims to remove the major warlords through a series of tailored inducements and disincentives.
    - In certain circumstances agreed to in advance and after exhausting all other options, however, the United States might consider the use of force.
- Steve Hadley proposed:
  - Karzai has registered political successes that make it less likely that US military force will be needed; and
  - If Karzai fails to consult with the United States in advance and attempts to use force, the United States cannot guarantee military support.

Classified by: Paul Hulley, ISA/NESA  
Reasons: 1.4 (b), (d)  
Declassify: 4 December 2013



X04318 / 03  
DECLASSIFIED AUTHORITY  
E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
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Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

09-M-0375

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

- The Joint Staff has rewritten the message to President Karzai so that it meets Steve Hadley's intent (Tab B).
- I am working on a re-write of the Strmecki briefing that will preserve our key point:
  - Karzai should be told to proceed with the warlord strategy but we believe the political and economic tools suffice for the time being.
  - Karzai will have a sounder position in the country after the June elections (if elected) and he should not, before then, contemplate pushing the warlords in a way that is likely to provoke a military clash.
- The Principals will review the revised briefing on December 11.


COORDINATION:

Joint Chiefs/J-5

LTG Sharp

December 5, 2003

Prepared by: Kurt E. Amend, ISA/NESA, 697-8088, ext 123


DUSD (NESA)  12/5

2

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3

09-M-0375



## **Proposed USG Message to Karzai**

- ***We support you in executing a joint warlord strategy, however, at this time we do not envision the use of military force***
- ***We believe you can achieve your goals by political means but careful planning and coordination with us are critical***
- ***Build on political momentum from successful removal of Shirzai and MoD reforms***
- ***Use of all possible political and economic tools***
  - ***USG will work closely with you to develop a plan***
  - ***USG will provide an aid packages to reinforce changes***
  - ***USG will provide high-level and public political support for your decision***
- ***If you attempt to remove a warlord from power without USG forewarning and it meets armed resistance, the US cannot guarantee military support***
- ***The use of US military force would require a separate USG approval process***

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

PROPOSED USG MESSAGE TO KARZAI

Original Text	Revised Text
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• We support you in executing a joint warlord strategy, however, at this time we do not envision the use of military force</li><li>• We believe you can achieve your goals by political means, but careful planning and coordination with us are critical</li><li>• Build on political momentum from successful removal of Shirzai and MoD reforms</li><li>• Use of all possible political and economic tools<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• USG will work closely with you to develop a plan</li><li>• USG will provide aid packages to reinforce changes</li><li>• USG will provide high-level and public political support for your decision</li></ul></li><li>• If you attempt to remove a warlord from power without USG forewarning and it meets armed resistance, the USG cannot guarantee military support</li><li>• The use of US military force would require a separate USG approval process</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• We support you in executing a joint warlord strategy, <del>however, at this time we do not envision the use of military force</del></li><li>• We believe you can achieve your goals by political means, but careful planning and coordination with us are critical</li><li>• Build on political momentum from successful removal of Shirzai and MoD reforms</li><li>• Use of all possible political and economic tools<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• USG will work closely with you to develop a plan</li><li>• USG will provide aid packages to reinforce changes</li><li>• USG will provide high-level and public political support for your decision</li></ul></li><li>• <u>Because of your success and the economic and political tools at your disposal, we do not, at this time, envision the need for military force to execute your strategy</u></li><li>• The use of US military force would require a separate USG approval process</li><li>• If you attempt to remove a warlord from power without USG forewarning and it meets armed resistance, the USG cannot guarantee military support</li></ul>

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET~~

EF-7269  
I-03/014664

October 21, 2003

TO: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Dick Myers  
Doug Feith

FROM: [redacted]

SUBJECT: Afghanistan Governing Coalition

Attached is an October 17 memo from Zal Khalilzad with an update on his trip and some requests at the end. Let's discuss it at Round Table.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/17/03 Khalilzad memo to SecDef: "Re-establishing the governing coalition in Afghanistan"

DHR:dh  
102103-12

.....  
Please respond by 10/31/03

✓ 11/21  
11/20

Sir,  
Policy response attached.  
vr/abr Nosmyr

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E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

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DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

SECDEF CONTROL# X04810 /03

09-M-0375

~~Secret~~

To: Secretary Rumsfeld

From: Zal Khalilzad *ZK*

Subject: Re-establishing the governing coalition in Afghanistan

Date: October 17, 2003

I want to bring you up to date on my recent trip to Afghanistan. I arrived to find that Fahim and other Jihadi political figures and warlords were conspiring against Karzai. I have diffused the problem set in motion processes to take advantage of the crisis to push our agenda forward:

- Fahim convened meetings to create a united front against Karzai among Islamist leaders and warlords. This effort risked polarizing his cabinet into two camps, and endangering the ability of the government to function between now and June 04 elections.
- The Fahim front lacked cohesion from the outset - several individuals such as Dostam, Gailani, and Mojaddedi - shared little ideological ground with the Islamists. I met with many of the individuals who were part of the meeting and obtained commitments that they would not participate in coalitions against the government.
- Karzai and the moderates reasonably feared that his popularity would diminish if he is forced to remain allied with Fahim and other unpopular figures.
- I pressed both sides to come to an agreement that they would establish a governing coalition until the election. However, I insisted that the coalition agreement include an agenda of goals and programs. With my involvement, both sides came to an agreement on an agenda of twenty items, though the following seven were to be the priorities in the next few months:
  - Completion of a good constitution
  - Adoption of a code of conduct for high level officials
  - Improvement of the security of Kabul

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SECDEF CONTROL#

X03619 /03

1. Heavy weapons cantonment
  2. Removal of militias
  3. Arrest of violent organized criminals
  4. Changes in Kabul local governments
- Resolution of the crisis around Mazar-e-Sharif
    1. Ceasefire and disengagement
    2. Cantonment of heavy weapons
    3. Appointment of new governor
    4. Deployment of national police and army
  - Reform and streamlining of cabinet to reduce number of overlapping and inefficient ministries.

A small group composed of Vice President Khalili, Minister Farhang, and Minister Abdullah will negotiate the specifics (actions, timetables) on these items. I will have to keep their feet to the fire as implementation is not their strong suit.

The Afghans agreed that Brahimi and I would arbitrate and make judgments about performance under the agreement.

~~Secret~~

snowflake

~~SECRET~~

December <sup>19</sup>~~18~~, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Afghan Security Forces

I am not yet convinced we are doing everything possible to get Afghan security forces up to speed, so we can eventually get US and Coalition forces out by turning over responsibility for security to the Afghans.

Here is a note I received from our Policy shop in response to my request on the subject. Please let me know what you propose.

Thanks.

Attach.  
12/15/03 Policy memo re: Afghanistan Civil Defense Corps

DHR:dh  
121803-5

.....  
Please respond by 1/9/04

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E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~SECRET~~

SECDEF CONTROL# X04526 103

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DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

09-M-0375

EF-7266  
I-03/014660  
October 20<sup>22</sup>, 2003

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld   
SUBJECT: Afghan Army

I would like to see a proposal for accelerating the Afghan National Army. It should include the beginning of charts showing the number of Afghans providing for their own security—police, border guards, Afghan National Army, and any other security forces that exist. We ought to begin looking at the idea of a civil defense corps for Afghanistan.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
102003-39

.....  
Please respond by 11/14/03

  
12/18  
C/12/17  
Sir,  
Response attached.  
CDR Nosenko  
12/17

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Ch RDD, WHS  
Date: 17 December 2008  
IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

U21065 /03

22-10-03 15:09 IN

09-M-0375

~~SECRET - DRAFT - PRELIMINARY~~

✓  
12/18

2003 DEC 22 AM 7:25

I-03/014660

EF-7266

DEC 15 2003

USDP  
PDUSD/P HAS SEEN

FOR: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: William J. Luti *WJL*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan - Civil Defense Corps

- You asked our thoughts on creating a civil defense corps (on the Iraqi model) in Afghanistan. We floated this idea with Zal, who wrote you to support it.
- A civil defense corps could fit well into a "layered approach" to the security mission in Afghanistan:
  - **Local self-defense forces at the village or district level designed to fight enemy small units, inhibit enemy movement, and cooperate with heavier mobile forces.**
    - Currently, the Afghan government only has poorly trained and equipped police forces at the local level.
    - The U.S. military enlists local militias or militias that are affiliated with the Ministry of Defense, but these are largely mobile forces rather than local forces.
    - These militias are of uneven effectiveness, and their lawless behavior creates popular disaffection and negative association with the U.S.
  - **Mobile indigenous forces at the provincial or regional level designed to undertake sweep operations and static defense of key terrain and to respond to larger enemy formations.**
    - Currently, the ANA and some MoD forces represent the only mobile indigenous force. The ANA relies on U.S. mobility assets and embedded advisers.
  - **Highly mobile and lethal foreign forces at the regional or national level designed to destroy the enemy's larger units and centers of gravity.**

Classified by: Dr William J. Luti  
Reasons: 1.4 (b), (d)  
Declassify: 14 November 2013

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E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
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SECRET CONTROL# X04524 / 03 09-M-0375

~~SECRET - DRAFT - PRELIMINARY~~

- Currently, CJTF-180 provides the capability to perform this function.
- **Specialized and often clandestine units** designed to destroy enemy leadership and political infrastructure wherever it is based.
  - Any programs in this area are compartmented, but the greatest problem with respect to the Taliban is that its center of gravity – the command structures in Pakistan – cannot be effectively targeted.
- **Missing element:** The U.S. approach in Afghanistan is missing the key component of local self-defense forces capable of cooperating with the ANA and Coalition forces.
- **Civil Defense Corps:** The United States should propose to President Karzai that Afghanistan create, with U.S. assistance, a civil defense force that would provide lawful, local defense forces in the south and east.
  - President Karzai, Minister of Interior Jalali, and others recognize the need for such a force.
  - A concept for such a force could involve the following points:
    - Village, district, and provincial councils, which already exist in many areas, identify and recruit young men to form civil defense units, thereby ensuring close ties to the community and local vetting.
    - Afghan authorities and U.S. military arm, equip, and train the civil defense force units, which remain in their home areas.
    - Each civil defense force unit is tasked to report transit of any suspicious persons in its area of jurisdiction and to provide security for local roads, schools, and other sites.
    - Each civil defense force unit would also be tasked to operate with ANA or Coalition forces operating in its locality, supporting combat actions as necessary.
    - Communications and reporting is networked through the police or military chain of command, and information is integrated in an office jointly staffed by U.S. military and Afghan police and military.
  - To reinforce this concept, small amounts of reconstruction funding could be provided to villages and districts with effective civil defense force units.

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E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div. WHS

09-M-0375

~~SECRET - DRAFT - PRELIMINARY~~

- Marin Strmecki has received a concept paper from President Karzai's brother, who is also a close associate to Minister of Interior Jalali, that follows this general approach and that proposes pilot projects.
- If the United States proposes this idea to Karzai and Jalali, they are likely to respond positively.
- **Funding:** In the supplemental appropriations act, \$63 million in FMF funding is available and could be applied to this purpose.

Prepared by: Marin Strmecki, ISA/NESA, 697-8088 ext 127

DUSD (NESA) \_\_\_\_\_ PDASD/ISA \_\_\_\_\_

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E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
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Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

09-M-0375

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2003 NOV -6 09:23 MEMORANDUM

November 4, 2003

To: Secretary Rumsfeld  
 From: Zal Khalilzad  
 Subject: Civil Defense Forces in Afghanistan

I wanted to raise with you the idea of creating the equivalent in Afghanistan of the Civil Defense Force in Iraq.

The Action Plan for Afghanistan included the idea, and some funding, for the creation of an Interim Force in the Afghan National Army. It would be composed of about 5,000 individuals from current militias who meet ANA standards, who would be given brief initial training, and who would then be cycled through the Kabul training center as slots become available.

After seeing what has been achieved in Iraq, I believe that the better approach would be to create local self-defense forces in the south and east along the lines of Iraq's Civil Defense Force. Members of the Afghan Civil Defense Force should be nominated by village and district councils, which would ensure that this force will be rooted in the communities they will defend. The councils could be asked to consider fighters in current militias in their selection process, which would be a way to identify any individuals in the militias who could be productively used in this effort.

I believe we should adopt as our goal the mobilization of a Civil Defense Force numbering between 5,000 and 10,000 by June 2004. If we take this approach, perhaps you could announce this initiative when you visit Afghanistan later this year.

cc. Paul Wolfowitz  
 Doug Feith  
 Ge. Pace

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 Chief, Declass Br  
 Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECDEF CONTROL#

X03951 /03



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400  
INFO MEMO



I-01/012326

October 10, 2001 11:00AM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, 695-4351)

*pmc* 10 OCT 2001

SR MA TO SECDEF  
has been

SUBJECT: Linking the Air Campaign to Events on the Ground

At your PC SCVT today, you may want to continue your questioning about whether our political strategy in Afghanistan is meshed with our military campaign to help the Afghans liberate themselves from the dictatorship and help us track down bin Laden and his lieutenants.

- **Have we established formal mil-to-mil contacts** yet with all opposition commanders to determine their operational ground objectives? (I have their phone numbers if you need them). Do we have plans in place to apply air power to help them achieve those objectives? Wouldn't SOF forces, working side-by-side with the commanders, be better than CIA agents at designating targets and communicating directly with US air forces? Do we have plans in place to locate, target, and degrade those Taliban ground forces arrayed against the opposition? Can't we create kill boxes around enemy forward-line-of-troops and use SOF to laser-designate those targets?
- **Have we identified the critical military vulnerabilities of the Taliban?** They get oil for their tanks primarily down the road from Tourghundi (Tajik border) to Herat. Can we cut or mine that road? Their primary source of money is from the heroin trade. Have we targeted the huge heroin warehouses between Kabul and Kandahar? Their sole logistics route from Kandahar to Mazar is the road through Bamian (the Salang tunnel is already blocked). Are we helping the opposition (Gen Khalili - Hazaras) to cut that road at its most vulnerable point near Bamian?
- **With winter coming why don't we do something bold?** Why not assist General Dostam with a full press to take Mazar-e-Sharif and General Kahn to take Herat, fly the King (a Pashtun) into Mazar, establish a Provisional Government using the National Assembly process, and then fly massive food aid into Mazar? I'm told this would galvanize Pashtun support in the south and embolden them to help us root out bin Laden.
- **Do we have plans to re-supply** the opposition with ammunition and food either by US or third parties (not the Russians)?

Prepared by: DASD William J. Luti, 697-1336

Classified by DASD William J. Luti  
Reason: 1.5(a)  
Declassify on: 10 Oct 2011

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SECDEF CONTROL#

X01628 /01

~~SECRET~~  
Working Paper

October 17, 2001  
11:25 AM

TO: Gen. Myers

cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Steve Cambone

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Afghanistan

Does the fact that the Defense Department can't do anything on the ground in Afghanistan until CIA people go in first to prepare **the way** suggest that the Defense Department is lacking a capability we need?

Specifically, given the nature of our world, isn't it conceivable that the Department ought not to be in a position of near total dependence on CIA in situations such as this?

After you have reflected on this, please come back to me with a coordinated proposal as to what we might want to do about it, if anything.

**Thanks.**

DHR/dh  
101701-1C

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Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

Working Paper  
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REC'DEF CONTROL#

09-M-0375

~~SECRET~~  
Working Paper

2001 OCT -5 PM 1:53

October 22, 2001  
1:19 PM

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Discussions w/CENTCOM re: Sy Hersh Article

When I heard about Sy Hersh's piece in the *New Yorker*, I raised it with Tommy Franks. I asked him if it was true that the CENTCOM lawyer had inhibited him from hitting that target.

I reminded him that when he called me, I told him immediately to hit it if anyone wiggled and that I was going to call the President. But, in the meantime, he had my authority to hit it. I did not want to lose that target. I called the President. I called Tommy back within 4 ½ minutes and told him the President agreed.

When I read the Sy Hersh piece, I reminded Franks of our earlier discussion and asked him what had actually happened, and if his lawyer had, in fact, slowed him down in hitting that target. He said it was absolutely not true.

I have the feeling he may not have given me the full story.

On the morning of October 21, when I was in Taos, I asked Franks a series of questions about what actually takes place when this kind of thing occurs. He said that generally there is a Predator that locates a possible target. The Predator may or may not be armed with a Hellfire. There may or may not be CAP aircraft overhead.

When they see a target, he convenes a group, and they decide whether or not it is high collateral. Then they make a decision. If he would like to hit it, but it is high collateral, he calls me.

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Working Paper  
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09-M-0375

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Working Paper

I then asked him about 15 questions, as to precisely how long it took for each thing to happen.

I told him that I was concerned about it, and that I wanted him to know the following:

1. Getting Usama bin Laden, Omar and the senior Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership is enormously important.
2. I have a high tolerance level for possible error. That is to say, if he thinks he has a valid target, and he can't get me or he can't get Wolfowitz in time, he should hit it.
3. I added that there will not be any time where he cannot reach me or, if not me, Wolfowitz.
4. I expect him to be leaning far forward on this.

DHR/dh  
102201-3C

Working Paper

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E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

09-M-0375

~~SECRET~~  
~~NOFORN~~

TO: Gen. Richard Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
DATE: October 27, 2001  
RE: **Red Cross Building**

2002 JUL 24 PM 12: 00  
I have to go  
OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

With respect to the Red Cross building being hit again, I really do wonder why in the world we are sending in plane after plane after plane, with 2,000 lb. bombs to hit a bunch of sheet metal warehouses in downtown Kabul. Why aren't we out bombing the Dickens out of the folks in the Shamali plains and near Mazar-e Sharf?

DHR/azn  
102701.03.~

10:12 AM

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E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
Chief, Declass Br  
Dir. & Rec. Div, WHS

~~SECRET~~  
~~NOFORN~~ SECDEF CONTROL

X02165 /02

09-M-0375

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

INFO MEMO

2002 JUL 24 PM 12: 02

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*500  
7/3*

*7/11/13*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RMH/11/13*

SUBJECT: Strikes Against ICRC Warehouse

- ~~(S)~~ The overall facility was approved for strike prior to the start of hostilities. DOD did not know of the use of the facility by the ICRC prior to the 16 October strike.
- ~~(S)~~ Following the strike on the morning of 16 October, additional strikes planned for that day were cancelled and procedures were initiated to place the facility on the "No Strike" list.
- *These procedures failed and*  
~~(S)~~ In planning 25-26 Oct. strikes, CENTAF included the warehouse complex. Command review of the Air Tasking Order for 25-26 October failed to identify the error.
- ~~(S)~~ To prevent re-occurrence, CENTCOM has instituted manual and electronic review procedures. Further, DIA and CENTCOM J-5 have instituted a procedure to provide unclassified commercial imagery for NGO's to work directly with CENTCOM to identify their facilities in Afghanistan and derive GPS points to include in the No Strike list.
- The above is based upon initial fact finding by CENTCOM. Determination on the nature and extent of further investigation is ongoing at CENTCOM.

COORDINATION: None

*Whole packet*

Prepared By: L. E. Jacoby, RADM, J-2

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E.O. 12958 Dec 8, 2008  
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Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: ~~xt~~

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# JOINT STAFF ACTION PROCESSING FORM

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CLASSIFICATION ~~SECRET NOFORN~~ ACTION NUMBER J-2 WTC01 0560-01

TO DJS THRU ORIG SUSPENSE

SUBJECT Strikes Against International Cmmittee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Warehouse

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- Purpose. Promulgate memorandum directing USCENTCOM to forward the final investigation report on the October strikes against the ICRC warehouse. 1
- Discussion. SecDef has directed the Joint Staff to provide him a copy of the USCENTCOM final investigation report of the strikes against the ICRC Warehouse 16 Oct and 25-26 Oct. The memorandum at Tab directs the DCINC to forward the final investigation report to J-2 when it is available.
- Recommendation. Sign memorandum at Tab directing USCENTCOM to forward the final investigation report on strikes against the ICRC warehouse to the Joint Staff.

## ENDNOTE

<sup>1</sup> SJS WTC01 0560-01

COORDINATION					
NAME	AGENCY	DATE	NAME	AGENCY	DATE
Timothy C. McNeil	J-2	04 Dec			
AOI/DIV/EXT LCDR Dave Porcaro/J2/J2J/614-7810				Date Prepared: 04 DEC 01	
CLASSIFICATION		CLASSIFICATION/DECLASSIFICATION INSTRUCTIONS			
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October 7, 2001 10:39 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan

The President of Uzbekistan is very unhappy that the Russians knew, either before he did or simultaneously with him, precisely what the United States had requested of Uzbekistan. The President did not like it at all.

I do not know precisely who is talking to the Russians in real time, but you folks should know how unhelpful it is and see if we can't avoid recurrences.

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O 051645Z OCT 01

FM USDAO TASHKENT UZ

TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHAK/USDAO ANKARA TU IMMEDIATE

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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PASS ONLY TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD AND USD FOR POLICY FEITH

SUBJ: DRAFT REPORT OF DEFSEC MEETING WITH PRESIDENT  
KARIMOV

1. (S) SUMMARY: IN AN HOUR AND 15 MINUTE MEETING, OCTOBER 5, SECRETARY RUMSFELD AND PRESIDENT KARIMOV DISCUSSED U.S.-UZBEK COOPERATION AND THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM. DELIGHTED BY THE SECRETARY'S VISIT, KARIMOV REITERATED THAT THE GOU HAD AGREED TO GIVE THE USG FULL USE OF ITS AIRSPACE; YET CLOSER COOPERATION IN THE INTELLIGENCE AREA, INCLUDING SUPPORT FOR IMPORTANT COVERT OPERATIONS; AND PERMISSION TO USE ONE LARGE AIRFIELD TO BASE ASSETS AND FORCES FOR SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS. HE SAID THAT THE GOU DID NOT AGREE AT PRESENT TO U.S. AIRSTRIKES OR LAND OPERATIONS [REDACTED] FROM UZBEK TERRITORY. HE SAID TWICE THAT THE TIME WAS "NOT RIPE" FOR THESE THINGS. KARIMOV EXPRESSED WELL-REHEARSED FEARS ABOUT RUSSIA AND ISLAMIC EXTREMISM (RADIATING FROM PAKISTAN, AFGHANISTAN AND IRAN). HE STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WORK THAT U.S. AND GOU EXPERTS WERE DOING TO CONCLUDE A LEGAL BASIS FOR THE USG DEPLOYMENTS AND THE DEVELOPING LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP. HE STRESSED TOO THE IMPORTANCE OF USG "GUARANTEES" FOR UZBEKISTAN'S TERRITORY AND PEOPLE. SECRETARY RUMSFELD THANKED KARIMOV FOR THE SUPPORT UZBEKISTAN WAS GIVING THE CAMPAIGN AND NOTED AMERICAN INTEREST IN PURSUING A CLOSE, LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH TASHKENT. REGARDING THE ANTI-TERROR CAMPAIGN, SECRETARY RUMSFELD STRESSED USG DETERMINATION TO FOLLOW IT THROUGH TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. HE ALSO EXPRESSED OUR INTEREST IN YET CLOSER COOPERATION, ALLUDING TO [REDACTED]. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE USG WAS SEEKING HELP FROM MANY COUNTRIES IN PUTTING TOGETHER THE COALITION, OR MULTIPLE COALITIONS, AGAINST TERRORISM. SO WE WOULD NOT PUSH ANY PARTNER INTO COOPERATION WITH WHICH IT WAS NOT

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COMFORTABLE. KARIMOV WAS VERY COMFORTABLE THROUGHOUT THE MEETING AND IN THE (HIGHLY UNUSUAL) PRESS CONFERENCE THAT FOLLOWED, IN WHICH HE DESCRIBED THE ASSISTANCE THE GOU WAS RENDERING TO THE USG. SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S VISIT WAS A CLEAR SUCCESS IN DEMONSTRATING THE USG'S SERIOUSNESS ABOUT A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP AND PREPARING THE WAY FOR POSSIBLE DEEPER COOPERATION IN "ENDURING FREEDOM." END SUMMARY.

THE U.S. SIDE FOR THE MEETING INCLUDED, IN ADDITION TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD, THE AMBASSADOR, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY DR. DOUGLAS FEITH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS TORIE CLARKE, MAJOR GENERAL JAMES E. SANDSTROM, USAF SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, CENTRAL COMMAND, VICE-ADMIRAL EDMUND GIAMBASTIANI USN, SENIOR MILITARY ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY AND AN INTERPRETOR.

THE UZBEK SIDE HEADED BY PRESIDENT ISLOM KARIMOV, INCLUDED FOREIGN MINISTER KAMILOV, DEFENSE MINISTER GULAMOV AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DIRECTOR RAKHMANKULOV.

WHAT HAD BEEN AGREED - AND WHAT "NOT RIPE"  
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2. (S) PRESIDENT KARIMOV OPENED THE MEETING BY SAYING HOW DELIGHTED HE WAS TO RECEIVE SECRETARY RUMSFELD AND HOW THIS MEETING SIGNALLED THE VERY GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES. THE VISIT GAVE SECRETARY RUMSFELD AN OPPORTUNITY TO LEARN FIRST-HAND ABOUT THE SITUATION IN UZBEKISTAN AND THE REGION. HE WAS AWARE OF THE CONTACTS BETWEEN SECRETARY POWELL AND FOREIGN MINISTER KAMILOV, AND HE HIMSELF HAD BEEN IN CONTACT WITH PRESIDENT BUSH.

3. (S) KARIMOV SAID HE WOULD SUMMARIZE WHAT HE UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE BEEN AGREED BETWEEN US. THE GOU HAD OPENED ITS AIRSPACE FOR U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE. IT HAD AGREED TO [REDACTED] IT HAD OPENED ONE BASE FOR U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT AND PERSONNEL TO CARRY OUT SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS. WHAT UZBEKISTAN HAD NOT AGREED TO WAS ANY USE OF UZBEKISTAN'S TERRITORY BY U.S. TROOPS TO CONDUCT "LAND OPERATIONS." FOR THIS REASON, THE REQUEST THE UNITED STATES HAD MADE TO MOUNT [REDACTED] [REDACTED] COULD NOT BE ACCOMMODATED. FURTHERMORE, NO AIRSTRIKES COULD BE CARRIED OUT BY U.S. FORCES FROM UZBEKISTAN'S TERRITORY. AT THIS POINT, KARIMOV SAID TWICE QUITE EMPHATICALLY THAT THE LATTER QUESTIONS WERE "NOT RIPE" NOW FOR AGREEMENT.

4. (S) KARIMOV SAID THE GOU AND U.S. WERE AT WORK ON A LEGAL DOCUMENT THAT WOULD SET OUT THE TWO COUNTRIES' MUTUAL OBLIGATIONS AND WOULD CONTAIN A U.S. GUARANTEE OF THE SECURITY OF UZBEKISTAN'S TERRITORY AND PEOPLE. THE U.S. AND UZBEK LEGAL TEAMS WERE LOOKING AT TWO DOCUMENTS, ONE

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FOR THE SHORTER TERM AND ONE FOR THE LONGER TERM. WHY DID UZBEKISTAN NEED THE U.S. TO GUARANTEE ITS SECURITY? SECRETARY RUMSFELD SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT UZBEKISTAN'S POPULATION WAS 82 PERCENT MUSLIM, ALBEIT VERY SECULAR IN OUTLOOK. NEVERTHELESS, RADICAL ELEMENTS WERE PRESENT IN THE COUNTRY. THESE ELEMENTS HAD LINKS TO SAUDI ARABIA, PAKISTAN AND IRAN. THEY WOULD USE ANY OPPORTUNITY TO GENERATE SUPPORT. THE SPECIAL SERVICES OF THESE THREE COUNTRIES WERE ACTIVE IN UZBEKISTAN.

5. (\$) KARIMOV SAID THAT IT WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN UZBEKISTAN TO BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. HOWEVER, HE ASKED THAT WE ATTEMPT TO HOLD OUR DISCUSSIONS IN CONFIDENCE. THIS SUBJECT WAS ALREADY VERY MUCH ON THE MIND OF MOSCOW, FOR EXAMPLE, AND THE DETAILS ALL KNOWN.

KARIMOV'S FEARS: ISLAMIC EXTREMISM, RUSSIAN INTRIGUES  
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6. (\$) KARIMOV WORRIED THAT THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION WOULD NOT STAY FOCUSED ON AFGHANISTAN AND THE SECURITY PROBLEMS OF THE REGION. THE U.S. COULD GET WEARY OF THE INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS, AND LEAVE UZBEKISTAN FACING A WAVE OF EXTREMIST HOSTILITY. UZBEKISTAN HAD ALREADY BEEN THE VICTIM OF TERRORIST ATTACKS. THE FEBRUARY 1999 BOMBINGS IN TASHKENT HAD BEEN SUPPORTED BY ELEMENTS FROM PAKISTAN, IRAN, TURKEY, AND AFGHANISTAN. THE GOV KNEW THAT FOREIGN AGENTS HAD PROVIDED SUPPLIES AND MONEY. OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS, TERRORISTS HAD INFILTRATED UZBEKISTAN'S (SOUTHERN) SURKHANDARYO REGION AND THE MOUNTAINOUS AREAS OF THE TASHKENT REGION. SOME 5,000-6,000 TROOPS HAD BEEN DEPLOYED TO DEFEND TASHKENT ITSELF. TASHKENT WAS DEFENSELESS TO ANY KAMIKAZE ATTACK. THE GOVERNMENT CONSIDERED THE SITUATION TO BE UNDER FAIRLY GOOD CONTROL, DESPITE THESE DANGERS. THE POPULATION GENERALLY RESPECTED THE GOVERNMENT, BUT THE THREAT OF EXTREMISM COULD NOT BE IGNORED.

7. (\$) KARIMOV NOW MOVED ON TO DISCUSS RUSSIA'S ROLE IN THE CURRENT CRISIS. PUTIN HAD OFFERED HIS SUPPORT, BUT THIS MEANT LITTLE.

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] SO OFFERING THESE THINGS WAS EASY FOR RUSSIA. FINALLY, RUSSIA HAD OFFERED ITS SUPPORT FOR THE IDEA OF ITS CENTRAL ASIAN ALLIES GIVING THE U.S. ACCESS TO THEIR AIRFIELDS AND ENCOURAGED OTHER KINDS OF COOPERATION. THESE WERE JUST WORDS, AND IN FACT UZBEKISTAN CONTINUED TO FEEL PRESSURE FROM RUSSIA.] IN PARTICULAR, THERE WAS AN "INFORMATIONAL AGGRESSION" FROM THE RUSSIAN MEDIA. THE RUSSIAN MEDIA WAS ASKING WHY SECRETARY RUMSFELD WAS IN TASHKENT. THEY SHOWED U.S. PLANES IN UZBEKISTAN'S AIRFIELDS. U.S. INFANTRY WERE SAID TO BE IN TERMEZ (NEAR THE AFGHAN BORDER). THE REASON FOR THESE PRESS STORIES WAS CLEAR: RUSSIA WANTED UZBEKISTAN NOT TO DEAL WITH THE U.S. THEY WANTED UZBEKISTAN'S COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. TO GO

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THROUGH RUSSIA. BY COOPERATING WITH THE U.S. THEMSELVES, THEY HOPED TO GAIN CONCESSIONS ON CHECHNYA AND NMD. KARIMOV INSISTED THAT, IF UZBEKISTAN COOPERATED WITH THE U.S., IT HAD TO BE DIRECTLY, NOT THROUGH RUSSIA.

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PAKISTAN'S ROLE AND AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE

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9. (S) WITH RESPECT TO PAKISTAN, THE COOPERATION THE U.S. HAD WON FROM MUSHARRAF WAS VERY GOOD. IT WOULD BE CRUCIAL TO RESOLUTION OF THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. BUT THE U.S. SHOULD NOT EXPECT MUCH MORE FROM MUSHARRAF. HE COULD EASILY BE TOPPLED. THE ISI HAD NOT CEASED HELPING THE TALIBAN. THIS WAS THE MAIN REASON THE TALIBAN REMAINED SO DEFIANT. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LAST TEN YEARS SHOWED CLEARLY THAT IF PAKISTAN CUT OFF SUPPORT TO THE TALIBAN INCLUDING PREVENTING PAKISTANI EXTREMISTS FROM GOING TO FIGHT ALONGSIDE THE TALIBAN, THE TALIBAN WOULD LOSE POWER. GETTING PAKISTAN TO DO THIS WOULD BRING A BLOODLESS VICTORY TO THE U.S. EVERYTHING IN AFGHANISTAN WAS FOR SALE. PRESIDENT BUSH WAS RIGHT TO PUT THE EMPHASIS ON HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. THIS COULD BRING VICTORY BETTER PERHAPS THAN ARMED CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN. ALL THE WARLORDS' LOYALTY COULD BE BOUGHT. KANDAHAR AND THE PUSHTUNS GENERALLY WOULD ABANDON THE TALIBAN IF THEY RECEIVED MONEY. THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE COULD DO THE REST. THE U.S. SHOULD FOCUS ON TRYING TO CAPTURE AND USE SHEBEGHAN AIRFIELD, SOME FORTY KILOMETERS FROM MAZAR-I-SHARIF. BAGRAM AIRFIELD (NEAR KABUL) WAS TOO VULNERABLE.

10. (S) KARIMOV SAID HE WAS CONVINCED ONLY AFGHANS SHOULD FIGHT AFGHANS. IF THE U.S. SENT ITS OWN FORCES INTO AFGHANISTAN, THERE WAS A REAL DANGER THAT EXTREMISTS WOULD ALL CONSOLIDATE WITH NEW FORCE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. THE U.S. SHOULD NOT CREATE A SITUATION THAT WOULD UNITE ISLAMIC RADICALS AGAINST IT. ONCE OPERATIONS ACTUALLY BEGAN BY U.S. FORCES IN AFGHANISTAN, THE ARAB SUPPORTERS OF THE U.S. WOULD SHRINK AWAY. THE ROYAL FAMILIES OF SAUDI ARABIA, OMAN AND BAHRAIN WERE WEAK AND WOULD NOT STAY ON THE SIDE OF THE U.S. IN SUCH A SITUATION. THIS WAS BOTH HIS PERSONAL VIEW AND THE FORMAL POSITION OF UZBEKISTAN.

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11. (S) AFTER SAUDI ARABIA, UZBEKISTAN IS HOME TO THE HOLIEST SITES IN ISLAM, KARIMOV CLAIMED. MANY LEADING ISLAMIC SCHOLARS LIVED AND WERE BURIED HERE. IL-BUKHARI, FOR EXAMPLE, WAS SECOND ONLY TO MOHAMMED IN HIS IMPORTANCE TO ISLAM. FOR THIS REASON, ISLAMIC EXTREMISTS WANTED TO OVERTHROW KARIMOV AND INSTALL A RADICAL ISLAMIC REGIME. UZBEKISTAN CLEARLY SAW THE NECESSITY OF CONFRONTING THE TERRORISTS AND FULLY SUPPORTED THE UNITED STATES. ALTHOUGH UZBEKISTAN WAS APPROACHING ITS GOAL AT ITS OWN PACE, THE COUNTRY HAD CLEARLY MARKED THE U.S. AS ITS MODEL OF SOCIETY AND POLITY. THE PEOPLE OF UZBEKISTAN SHARED THIS ASPIRATION AND RAISED THEIR CHILDREN WITH THIS HOPE. LIKE THE U.S., UZBEKISTAN WAS DETERMINED TO TEAR TERRORISM UP BY THE ROOTS.

UZBEKISTAN'S ROLE IN THE ANTI-TERRORIST CAMPAIGN  
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12. (S) SECRETARY RUMSFELD THANKED KARIMOV FOR HIS REMARKS AND SAID OUR THOUGHTS ON THE ISSUES HAD MUCH IN COMMON. HE WAS GLAD TO MEET FM KAMILOV AND NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL CHAIRMAN RAKHMANKULOV. HE HAD MET DEFMIN GULAMOV IN BERLIN AND HAD WANTED TO VISIT BEFORE SEPTEMBER 11. HE HAD LONG REALIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF UZBEKISTAN. HE GAVE KARIMOV A LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH, SAYING HE WAS AWARE, OF COURSE, OF THE MANY CONTACTS IN RECENT DAYS BETWEEN SECRETARY POWELL AND FM KAMILOV AND OF THE CONVERSATION KARIMOV HAD HAD WITH PRESIDENT BUSH. WE THANKED THE GOU FOR ITS IMPORTANT COOPERATION IN THE [REDACTED] AS WELL AS FOR THE DECISION TO ALLOW THE U.S. TO MOUNT SEARCH AND RESCUE OPERATIONS FROM UZBEKISTAN. HE FULLY AGREED WE SHOULD DEAL DIRECTLY WITH EACH OTHER AND NOT THROUGH ANY OTHER COUNTRY. HE HAD COME TO TASHKENT, NOT TO MOSCOW. WE WERE LOOKING TO FORM A LONG-TERM CLOSER RELATIONSHIP WITH UZBEKISTAN. THE U.S. WAS NOT LOOKING FOR ANY QUID PRO QUO; WE NEVER DID THAT WITH THOSE COUNTRIES WHERE OUR RELATIONS WERE STRONG FOR THE LONG TERM. TERRORISM WAS A WORLDWIDE PHENOMENON AND NOT ONLY A QUESTION OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM. IT WAS NOT LIMITED TO THE AL-QA'IDA NETWORK. WE WERE SENSITIVE TO THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF UZBEKISTAN. WE KNEW THAT UZBEKISTAN FACED TERRORISTS WITH TIES TO AL-QA'IDA.

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13. (S) THE UNITED STATES HAS NO PLANS TO BASE LARGE FORCES IN UZBEKISTAN OR FOR THAT MATTER IN AFGHANISTAN, SECRETARY RUMSFELD SAID. WE WERE DEVELOPING RELATIONSHIPS ACROSS MANY COUNTRIES, BUILDING NOT JUST ONE COALITION BUT MANY IN ORDER TO FIGHT TERRORISM ON DIFFERENT FRONTS. SOME PARTNERSHIPS WOULD BE PUBLIC, OTHERS PRIVATE. THAT WAS THE CHOICE OF THE COUNTRIES INVOLVED. SOME FORTY TO FIFTY COUNTRIES WOULD JOIN TOGETHER WITH THE COMMON GOAL OF DESTROYING TERRORISM. AS ONE LEADER HE HAD MET RECENTLY HAD SAID, [THE PROLIFERATION OF WMD AND THE TERRORISTS' INTEREST IN ACQUIRING SUCH WEAPONS, COMBINED WITH THE REALITY THAT SOME STATES SUPPORTED AND SHELTERED]

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14. (S) SECRETARY RUMSFELD SAID HE RESPECTED THE PATH TOWARD ITS GOALS UZBEKISTAN HAD CHOSEN. THE U.S. HAD 250 YEARS TO GROW AND DEVELOP. WE UNDERSTOOD THAT UZBEKISTAN'S CHOSEN COURSE WAS NOT EASY. REGARDING THE PARTICULAR ISSUES AT HAND, WE'D LIKE TO CONTINUE TO EXPLORE WHETHER WE COULD REACH AGREEMENT. PRESIDENT KARIMOV HAD SAID THEY WERE "NOT RIPE" FOR DECISION. IF THAT WAS THE CASE, WE COULD ACCEPT THAT. WE COULD GO ON BY MAKING ADJUSTMENTS TO OUR PLANS.

15. (S) SECRETARY RUMSFELD SAID THAT THE GOU APPROACH TOWARD AFGHANISTAN WAS SOUND. THERE WERE MANY FACTIONS THERE. SOME WERE OPPOSED TO THE TALIBAN. SOME GROUPS IN AFGHANISTAN AND SOME ELEMENTS IN THE TALIBAN WERE OPPOSED TO AL-QA'IDA'S PRESENCE IN COUNTRY. AND SOME GROUPS HAD NO VIEWS ON AL-QA'IDA, BUT SIMPLY WANTED TO BE IN CHARGE. THE SECRETARY THEN COMMENTED THAT HE AGREED WITH MUCH OF WHAT KARIMOV HAD SAID. BUT ONE THING HE DID NOT ACCEPT WAS THE NOTION THAT ANYTHING IN AFGHANISTAN COULD BE BOUGHT. "AS WE SAY IN CHICAGO," SECRETARY RUMSFELD QUIPPED, ANYTHING IN AFGHANISTAN COULD BE RENTED, NOT BOUGHT. (KARIMOV LAUGHED.)

USG DETERMINATION  
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16. (S) SECRETARY RUMSFELD SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD PURSUE THE ANTI-TERRORISM CAMPAIGN WITH DETERMINATION AND AS LONG AS IT TOOK TO SUCCEED. WE WOULD PURSUE THE TERRORISTS NOT JUST IN AFGHANISTAN, BUT WHEREVER THEY WERE FOUND. AL-QA'IDA ALONE WAS ACTIVE [IN 50 OR 60 COUNTRIES] HE AFFIRMED THAT THE CAMPAIGN WAS NOT AGAINST THE AFGHAN PEOPLE OR MUSLIMS, BUT AGAINST TERRORISM, AND THAT THE USG WOULD DO ALL HUMANLY POSSIBLE TO MAKE THIS CLEAR. WE UNDERSTOOD AND RESPECTED THE FACT THAT UZBEKISTAN WAS A MUSLIM LAND. WE DEFENDED THE MUSLIM COUNTRY OF KUWAIT, FREEING IT OF SADDAM HUSSEIN'S TROOPS. WE HAD ALSO ACTIVE ON BEHALF OF THE MUSLIM PEOPLES OF BOSNIA AND KOSOVO. WE ALSO UNDERTOOK A HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION ON BEHALF OF SOMALIA. THE SECRETARY ALSO NOTED THAT WE WERE THE LARGEST SUPPLIER OF FOOD AID TO AFGHANISTAN SO FAR THIS YEAR: USD 170 MILLION. AND THAT WAS BEFORE THE PRESIDENT'S OCTOBER 4 ANNOUNCEMENT OF A HUGE HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM TO BEGIN IMMEDIATELY. THE SECRETARY NOTED OUR INTENTION TO HAVE THE U.S. MILITARY AIRDROP FOOD. HE SAID THAT HE WAS READY TO DISCUSS FURTHER ANY ISSUE WITH PRESIDENT KARIMOV.

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17. (S) KARIMOV SAID THAT HE WAS VERY IMPRESSED WITH SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S MEASURED APPROACH TO ALL QUESTIONS. KARIMOV REMARKED THAT HE HAD FOLLOWED THE SECRETARY'S CAREER FOR SOME TIME AND WAS DELIGHTED TO FINALLY MEET HIM. PRESIDENT KARIMOV SAID THAT THE SECRETARY'S LIFE EXPERIENCES ENABLED HIM TO EVALUATE THIS SITUATION NOT FROM A NARROW MILITARY ANGLE, BUT FROM A BROAD PERSPECTIVE. KARIMOV SAID THAT HE WOULD LIKE THE UZBEK-U.S. BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP TO BE CHARACTERIZED BY A "MEASURED, THOUGHTFUL APPROACH, MINDFUL OF THE CONSEQUENCES."

DEFEATING THE TALIBAN AND THE PROBLEM OF ISLAMIC EXTREMISM

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18. (S) KARIMOV SAID THAT THE TALIBAN WERE ABLE TO CONQUER 95 PERCENT OF AFGHANISTAN VERY QUICKLY. UZBEKISTAN HAD WATCHED THIS PROCESS VERY CLOSELY. HE URGED THE USG TO TAKE THE SAME TACK TO SOLVING THE TALIBAN PROBLEM. "GO RECRUIT SOME COMMANDERS," KARIMOV ADVISED SECRETARY RUMSFELD. KARIMOV THEN SAID THAT HE HAD MET THREE TIMES WITH FORMER ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS ROBIN RAPHEL. IN EACH MEETING, SHE HAD TRIED TO PERSUADE UZBEKISTAN TO DEVELOP FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE TALIBAN. BUT KARIMOV HAD TOLD HER THAT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE BECAUSE THEY WERE FANATICS. HE HAD ALSO TOLD HER THE HISTORY WOULD SHOW WHICH APPROACH TO THE TALIBAN WAS RIGHT.

19. (S) ACCORDING TO PRESIDENT KARIMOV, ISLAM WAS A COMPLEX RELIGION, WHICH SHOULD NOT BE USED TO JUSTIFY TERRORISM. HE SAID THAT THIS MIGHT SEEM PARADOXICAL, BUT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO SAVE TRADITIONAL ISLAM FROM RADICAL ELEMENTS. HE OBSERVED THAT ISLAM HAD MORE THAN ONE BILLION ADHERENTS AND WAS AN ATTRACTIVE RELIGION. BUT IT POSED A PROBLEM. AT THE MOSQUE, THE IMAM WOULD READ THE KORAN IN ARABIC. BUT THEN ALL OVER THE MUSLIM WORLD THE MEANING OF THAT KORANIC READING WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY EACH LISTENER. THIS LED TO MANY DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS, INCLUDING SOME EXTREME ONES. HE SAID THAT THE KORAN WAS TRANSLATED TWICE INTO UZBEK SINCE INDEPENDENCE. THE UZBEKS TRANSLATED IT A SECOND TIME BECAUSE THE ORIGINAL TRANSLATION WAS USED BY EXTREMISTS FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES. (KARIMOV DIGRESSED TO NOTE THAT THE READING OF THE KORAN IN ARABIC IS AN ART; WHILE HE DID NOT SPEAK ARABIC, WHEN LISTENING TO AN IMAM RECITE IT IN ARABIC HE FELT THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POWER OF THE READINGS.) HE CONCLUDED THAT THE KORAN'S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO MULTIPLE INTERPRETATIONS PRESENTED A REAL OPPORTUNITY TO EXTREMISTS, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE EXTREMISTS WERE WELL FINANCED.

20. (S) KARIMOV REPEATED THAT UZBEKISTAN WAS A CENTER OF ISLAM. ONE GREAT ISLAMIC THINKER FROM THIS AREA HAD FOUGHT RADICAL ISLAM IN THE TENTH CENTURY. KARIMOV'S TASK NOW WAS TO PAY HOMAGE TO THIS FIGURE. HE WAS A GREAT OPPONENT OF

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WHAT WE NOW CALLED WAHHABISM.

21. (S) SECRETARY RUMSFELD NOTED THAT HE TOO HAD MET ROBIN RAPHEL, AND HAD ALSO KNOWN HER HUSBAND, AMBASSADOR ARNOLD RAPHEL, WHO WAS ON THE PLANE OF THEN-PRESIDENT ZIA OF PAKISTAN WHEN IT EXPLODED IN THE LATE 1980'S. THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT HE DID NOT LIVE IN CENTRAL ASIA, BUT WAS STRUCK BY THE COMMENT THAT ISLAM HAD TO BE RESCUED FROM EXTREME ISLAMISTS. HE AGREED THAT YOUNG, IGNORANT PEOPLE MIGHT BE SUSCEPTIBLE TO FANATICISM. IN THE MAIN, HE STRESSED, IT MUST BE MUSLIMS WHO RESCUE ISLAM FROM THE EXTREMISTS. THE SULTAN OF OMAN HAD MADE THE SAME POINT TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD ON OCTOBER 4. THE SULTAN HAD READ THE MANUAL OF ONE OF THE HIJACKERS OF SEPTEMBER 11 THAT 'EXPLAINED' HOW TO KILL ONESELF AND OTHERS. KARIMOV INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT THE MANUAL ALSO CLAIMED THAT, BY DOING THIS THE HIJACKER WOULD GO TO HEAVEN. THE SULTAN HAD ALSO TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL FOR EGYPT, AS THE LEADING ARAB COUNTRY, TO TAKE THE LEAD IN THE FIGHT AGAINST EXTREMISM.

22. (S) KARIMOV SAID THAT HE HAD ESTABLISHED A YEAR AND-A-HALF AGO AN ISLAMIC UNIVERSITY. EXCELLENT YOUTH WERE STUDYING ISLAM THERE IN ITS TRUE, TRADITIONAL SPIRIT. THEY WILL HELP IN THE FIGHT AGAINST THE FANATICS. HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE A VERY GOOD THING IF AMBASSADOR HERBST VISITED THE UNIVERSITY AND PROVIDED A GRANT, SAY OF USD 300,000, IN SUPPORT. THAT WOULD MAKE QUITE AN IMPRESSION. KARIMOV REMARKED THAT THE SECRETARY'S TRIP TO EGYPT, SAUDI ARABIA AND OMAN WOULD PLAY A VERY IMPORTANT ROLE IN THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERROR. BY DEVELOPING THE NEEDED POLITICAL SUPPORT, THE TRIP MIGHT BE MORE USEFUL THAN MILITARY ACTION.

23. (S) SECRETARY RUMSFELD SAID THAT, AS A YOUNG CABINET MEMBER IN THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION, HE HAD ATTENDED EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT NASSER'S FUNERAL. DUE TO CROWDING IN THE STREETS OF CAIRO, WHICH MADE IT HARD FOR NASSER'S FUNERAL PROCESSION TO MOVE, THE SECRETARY HAD BEEN STUCK FOR HOURS IN A TENT WITH HUNDREDS OF PEOPLE REPRESENTING MANY COUNTRIES. THROUGHOUT THIS TIME, SOMEONE WAS READING FROM THE KORAN. THE SECRETARY WELL REMEMBERED THE IMPACT THIS READING HAD ON THE MANY MUSLIMS WITH HIM IN THE TENT. SO THE SECRETARY UNDERSTOOD WHAT KARIMOV WAS SAYING.

24. (S) SECRETARY RUMSFELD THANKED PRESIDENT KARIMOV FOR THE WARM WELCOME. THE SECRETARY REITERATED THE USG INTEREST IN A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP WITH THE GOU. KARIMOV REPEATED HIS OWN SATISFACTION WITH THE VISIT AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN DEVELOPING A RELATIONSHIP OF MUTUAL TRUST.

25. (S) COMMENT: KARIMOV LOOKED RELAXED THROUGHOUT THE

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MEETING AND THE PRESS CONFERENCE THAT FOLLOWED. THIS IS STRIKING BECAUSE OVER THE PAST TWO-PLUS WEEKS -- AS WE SOUGHT TO DEVELOP THIS NEW LEVEL OF COOPERATION -- KARIMOV AND ALL OF HIS ADVISERS HAVE BEEN MORE OR LESS GRIM FACED. KARIMOV'S RELAXED MOOD SUGGESTS THAT HE IS GROWING MORE COMFORTABLE WITH HIS NEW COURSE. SO TOO WAS HIS SURPRISING DISCUSSION IN THE POST MEETING PRESS CONFERENCE, OF THE MAIN POINTS OF AGREEMENT ON GOU SUPPORT FOR "ENDURING FREEDOM." THE MERE FACT OF SECRETARY RUMSFELD'S VISIT AND THE QUALITY OF THE CONVERSATION CERTAINLY HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH KARIMOV'S NEW Demeanor.

~~CLASSIFIED BY: AMB JOHN E. HERBST.~~

~~DECL: (U) X1.~~

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*Doc 9/26/02*  
September 20, 2001 3:48 PM

TO: Jim Haynes  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Legal Gaps in War on Terrorism

My friend Jack Marsh gave me this memo on legal gaps in the war on terrorism.

Please look at it and, if you think it merits it, send it over to the Attorney General and the White House Counsel, Al Gonzalez.

If it should be put over my signature, please draft the memo and I will sign it. If you think it would be more appropriate coming from the General Counsel, then will you please sign it.

I will send a thank you note to Jack Marsh, and if you need more detail, he and his associate are available.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/20/01 Marsh memo to SecDef

DHR:dh  
092001-13

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Reviewed Ch RDD, WHS  
Date: JAN 9, 2009  
IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

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*26 Sep 01*



**JOHN O. MARSH, JR.**

ATTORNEY AT LAW

560 NORTH LOUDOUN STREET  
WINCHESTER, VIRGINIA 22601

Telephone: (540) 678-1220  
Facsimile: (540) 678-8849

*9/20*

**TELECOPY PAGE**

DATE: 20 Sep '01 TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

TO: Hon. Dax Rumsfeld

OFFICE NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_ TELECOPY NUMBER \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: John O. Marsh, Jr.

PHONE NUMBER: 540-678-1220 FAX: 540-678-8849

NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING COVER PAGE): \_\_\_\_\_

MESSAGE: Memo AS per your Request

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Reviewed Ch RDD, WHS  
Date: JAN. 9, 2009  
IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

September 20, 2001

Don:

The attached memo is in response to the discussion yesterday.

I have deliberately left my name off the memo.

Marty Hoffman, I am sure can be of great help to you on the issues raised.

Assistance in preparation of this memo came in large measure from Lee Zeichner, Attorney, who is widely recognized for his legal and technical experience in the National Security field. There was also input from Steve Mitchell, Attorney, formerly Department of Justice, Computer Crime Prosecutor.

Don - please detach this  
page from the memo.  
Great seeing you.



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IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

09-M-0607

MEMORANDUM

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Ch RDD, WHS  
Date: JAN 9, 2009  
IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

To: The Honorable Donald H. Rumsfeld

Date: September 20, 2001

Re: Legal Gaps in War on Terrorism: Technology and Infrastructure

---

As we discussed yesterday, I include below a partial summary of gaps in legislative and regulatory programs that could impede our ability to conduct a war on terrorism. Many of these gaps center on the nation's ability to prepare for and recover from attacks on critical infrastructures. Presidential Decision Directives 62 (WMD, Chemical, Biological) and PDD-63 (protection of information infrastructure) were simultaneously approved in May 1998, but never fully funded or implemented by the Congress. As a result, several consistent problems exist:

1. There is a new global information infrastructure, the Internet, which is being exploited by terrorist groups for communication. It is estimated that 90% of internet traffic is in the private sector and only 10% in government. It is hard to monitor and surveil, while difficulties are compounded on the domestic scene for police and intelligence agencies, in part due to laws that have not kept pace with technology.
  2. Where critical infrastructures are owned and operated by industry, or at the state and local level, the Federal government may lack clear authority to direct appropriate actions and developments – including preparedness, response, and reconstitution. This may be especially true for the Department of Defense.
  3. The law has failed to keep pace with technology. Activation of certain national security emergency preparedness programs and authorities has already lead to government and industry confusion – which we cannot afford at this time.
  4. Finally, many the “cyber” programs for national security emergencies have not been developed or overhauled for Homeland Defense and critical infrastructure needs.
- Defense Production Act of 1950 (“DPA”) & Executive Order 12919

The DPA provides the Administration with an important tool to prioritize and allocate preferential delivery of goods and services needed for the national defense. Executive

Order 12919, passed by President Clinton in 1994, splits responsibility for implementation between DoD, FEMA, and the Department of Energy. Congress has never overhauled the DPA for particular Homeland Defense needs and contingencies. As a result, both Congress and the Administration disagree over whether the authority may be used for a complete range of critical infrastructure needs – many of which are outside of the Defense Department’s traditional areas of jurisdiction (e.g., network and critical infrastructure services, which are owned principally by industry and administered by civilian agencies). If we do not clarify and facilitate its application, the nation will lack an essential preparedness and recovery tool for this war on terrorism.

Senator Bennett has taken the lead on this issue.

- Communications Act of 1934

The Communications Act of 1934 is the principal delegation of authority to restore telecommunications services after an attack. However, neither Congress nor the FCC has clearly applied this law to Internet services and technologies. Fear of government regulation has prevented this application. As a result, the President lacks clear authority to coordinate recovery and restoration of the Internet.

- Example: The National Communications System (DISA) does not have clear-cut jurisdiction to manage restoration for portions of the Internet, including private networks and cable-delivered Internet services.
- Gap: Many of the President’s emergency programs for restoring critical services in the aftermath of an attack are based on the DPA or the Communications Act of 1934. Since neither has been carefully overhauled, the nation lacks clear-cut and tested processes for critical infrastructure response and restoration.

- Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act (CALEA)

The nation’s ability to require industry cooperation for electronic surveillance is bounded in several authorities, including the Communications Assistance to Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA). Pursuant to these laws, providers of telecommunications services are required to assist law enforcement in executing electronic surveillance orders. CALEA directs the telecom industry to design and deploy networks to support law enforcement assistance and capability requirements. Neither Congress nor the Administration has overhauled the law for Internet services delivery – which is a significant tool for terrorists.

- Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”): The ECPA restricts government and certain industry behavior in monitoring transmissions in storage and in transit. This is the principal privacy statute for information and network security. Congress has not overhauled this legislation for technological developments or for Homeland Defense

needs. In addition, the law is poorly written and restricts government administrators from monitoring traffic on its networks.

- **Antitrust laws (Sherman and Clayton Acts)**

Industry continues to worry that cyber-security cooperation may lead to prosecution under the nation's antitrust laws (Sherman and Clayton Acts). The Department of Justice has issued Administrative guidance, but Congress needs to provide clear protection. This will afford a foundation for industry to devise better security cooperation mechanisms and programs.

- **Quarantine Laws – A province of the Governors of the States**

State and local jurisdiction governs the nation's quarantine programs absent an interstate connection. New regulations are aimed at coordinating a Federal nexus. These regulations are newly issued and Congress might need to re-examine a more pronounced Federal role.

- **Government Information Security & National Security Systems**

Congress passed the Government Information Security Reform Act ("GISRA") last year, and split jurisdiction for managing government systems between DoD and OMB. DoD has jurisdiction for national security systems, which include classified information technology and five unclassified categories. These five unclassified categories have not been examined carefully for over ten years. Many of the government's unclassified systems, if breached, would have significant national security ramifications. The Administration and Congress should review this area carefully, and re-assess whether the Defense Department authority should be expanded over additional unclassified systems and networks.

- **Indemnification for production of vaccines has been a show stopper.**

The Defense Department Joint Vaccine Accelerated Program (JVAP) was held up for nearly a year (due to bureaucratic wrangling over indemnification) after a successful bidder was selected. Indemnification was included in the RFP. The personal intervention of the Dep. Sec. was necessary to get the issue moving.

- **Presidential Decision Directives (PDD's) and Executive Orders (EO's)**

Executive orders of the President when they lack statutory authority are not viewed favorably on the Hill, and, therefore, suffer in the Appropriations process. Both PDD 62 (Weapons of Mass Destruction) and PDD 63 (Critical Information Infrastructure protection) were initially implemented using the Executive Order approach.

- Presentation To The American Public

It is important in the presentation of these issues by the Administration to the public that they always are being framed in the context of protecting individual rights and liberties. Changes in laws are necessary to effectively safeguard the Constitutional guarantees of our Republic. This is a vital and achievable goal.

- Process Recommendation

Much has been done to identify potential gaps and relevant policy levers by a number of Congressional and Presidential Commissions addressed to terrorist-related issues, including, for example, the Bremer Commission, the PCCIP Commission, the Rudman Commission, the Governor Gilmore Panel, and others. These efforts examined terrorism-related issues from slightly different perspectives, with some concentrating on the roles and responsibilities of government (and, within it, the intelligence, law enforcement or defense communities), and with some more attuned to potential private sector contributions. I thus recommend, as a process matter, an immediate effort to bring together key participants and staff from these Commissions to conduct a comprehensive collection, comparison and re-evaluation of these ideas in light of recent events. This could be accomplished quickly.

**CORRESPONDENCE CONTROL WORKSHEET**

*JR*  
*08/2002*

DOR 8/ 8/2002

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: AUG 25 2010

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Working Paper

October 2, 2001  
11:31 AM

SUBJECT: Thoughts on the "Campaign" Against Terrorism

We may need two or three versions of "Talking Points" if we are to get the President's message across effectively: (1) Press, (2) Congressional, and (3) Allies – classified.

The U.S. and our coalition partners are creating the conditions for sustained anti-terrorist and humanitarian relief operations, across a broad front. In Afghanistan, this requires initially dealing with the threat from air defenses and aircraft.

Sustained operations will include:

- Developing working liaisons with groups on the ground to strengthen our intelligence information.
- Use of direct action to acquire intel and capture terrorists.
- Use of military capabilities to deal with terrorists and those that harbor them.
- Taking steps to assist Afghans who suffer from Taliban oppression.
- Engaging in substantial humanitarian relief and assisting the Afghan people.
- Working with Muslims worldwide to demonstrate the truth that the problem is terrorism—not a religion or a group of people. The goal is to change the image of suicide bombers from martyrs to murderers of people of all ages and all faiths.
- The U.S. and our partners are dealing with Afghanistan as a part of the much broader problem of terrorist networks and nations that harbor terrorists across the globe.

NOTE: There should be no discussion of "pauses." There will be no pauses. The President's campaign will continue across a broad front, using the full resources of the U.S. Government and of coalition partners worldwide.

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Donald Rumsfeld

Working Paper


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Working Paper

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: AUG 25 2010

October 17, 2001  
11:25 AM

TO: Gen. Myers  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
Steve Cambone  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Afghanistan



CIA  
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OSD 1.4(a),  
(c), (d)

Thanks.

DHR/dh  
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NSC 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

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
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
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
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
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DOS 1.4 (a), (d)

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CIA 1.4(c)

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
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
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
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
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
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
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C 20504

2695

April 14, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. LEWIS LIBBY  
National Security Advisor to  
the Vice President

MR. KARL HOFMANN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. JEFFREY KUPFER  
Executive Secretary  
Department of the Treasury

COL JAMES A. WHITMORE  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MR. JAMES A. MCATAMNEY  
Counsel for National Security  
Affairs  
Department of Justice

MR. ANDREW H. CARD  
Chief of Staff to the  
President

MR. ALBERTO R. GONZALES  
Counsel to the President

MR. JOHN G. EDWARDS  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

COL EDWARD W. SNEAD, USA  
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for NSC Meetings on  
Regional Issues (S)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the NSC  
Meetings on Regional Issues on March 10 and 12, 2003. Please  
pass to Principals and Deputies only. (S)

*Gregory L. Schulte*  
Gregory L. Schulte  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

~~SECRET~~

~~Classified by: Gregory L. Schulte~~

~~Reason: 1.5(a)(b)(d)~~

~~Declassify on: 4/11/12~~

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
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Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: AUG 25 2010

NSC 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)  
DoS 1.4(d)

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Date: AUG 25 2010


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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: AUG 25 2010

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(S), 1.4(c)  
CIA 1.4(c)

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CIA 1.4(c)  
OSD 1.4(b), (d)

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**Date: AUG 25 2010**

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Date:

AUG 25 2010 09-M-1808



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 THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
 WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



SEP 30 2007 OCT -1 AM '07

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Strategic Thoughts

OFFICE OF THE  
 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

0000

The U.S. strategic theme should be aiding local peoples to rid themselves of terrorists and to free themselves of regimes that support terrorism. U.S. Special Operations Forces and intelligence personnel should make allies of Afghanis, Iraqis, Lebanese, Sudanese and others who would use U.S. equipment, training, financial, military and humanitarian support to root out and attack the common enemies.

Some air strikes against Al-Qaida and Taliban targets are planned to begin soon. But, especially in the war's initial period, I think U.S. military action should stress:

- indirect (through local, non-U.S. forces) action, in coordination with and in support of opposition groups;
- direct use of U.S. forces initially primarily to deliver logistics, intelligence and other support to opposition groups and humanitarian supplies to NGOs and refugees; and subsequently
- on-the-ground action against the terrorists as individuals--leaders and others--

rather than focusing too heavily on:

- direct,
- aerial attacks on
- things and people.

The U.S. should exercise care and restraint regarding initial air strikes until intelligence develops to permit impressive (worthwhile) strikes against Al-Qaida and other targets, strikes that in some instances can be coordinated to provide effective support to the opposition. We should avoid as much as possible creating images of Americans killing Moslems until we have set the political stage that the people we are going after are the enemies of Moslems themselves.

Public expectations still are shaped by conventional thinking rooted in recent history. It is therefore widely assumed that U.S. will strike soon and exclusively at Al-Qaida in Afghanistan.

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 MAY 7, 2009  
 CHIEF ROOWITS

Classified by: USDP, D.J.FEITH  
 REASON: 1.5(d)  
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It would instead be surprising and impressive if we built our forces up patiently, took some early action outside of Afghanistan, perhaps in multiple locations, and began not exclusively or primarily with military strikes but with equip-and-train activities with local opposition forces coupled with humanitarian aid and intense information operations.

We could thereby:

- Garner actionable intelligence on lucrative targets, which we do not now have.
- Reduce emphasis on images of U.S. killing Moslems from the air.
- Signal that we intend to fight smart, rather than simply use direct force.
- Signal that our goal is not merely to damage terrorist-supporting regimes but to threaten their regimes by becoming partners with their opponents.
- Capitalize on our strong suit, which is not finding a few hundred terrorists in the caves of Afghanistan, but is the vastness of our military and humanitarian resources, which can strengthen enormously the opposition forces in terrorist-supporting States.

A key war aim would be to persuade or compel States to stop supporting terrorism. The regimes of such States should see that it will be fatal to host terrorists who attack the U.S. as was done on September 11. If the war does not significantly change the world's political map, the U.S. will not achieve its aim. There is value in being clear on the order of magnitude of the necessary change. The USG should envision a goal along these lines:

- New regimes in Afghanistan and another key State (or two) that supports terrorism (to strengthen political and military efforts to change policies elsewhere). 1.5.d
- Syria out of Lebanon.
- Dismantlement or destruction of WMD capabilities in [redacted] 1.5d
- End of [redacted] support for terrorism. 1.5d
- End of many other countries' support or tolerance of terrorism.

cc:  
Vice President  
Mr. Powell  
Mr. Tenet  
Ms. Rice

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IAW EO 12958  
MAY 7, 2009  
CHIEF, ROD WHS



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

JUN 14 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Support for Regime Change in Iraq

On 12 June, I provided you with a trip report on my travels to Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar. The purpose of this memo is to elaborate and provide texture regarding my discussions with King Shayhk Hamad of Bahrain on 10 June.

[REDACTED]

I  
114(d)

DOS 114(b)(d)

OSD 1.4 (b)

NATURE OF THE IRAQI REGIME. I told the King that in the event of regime change it should result with Iraq one country, free of weapons of mass destruction, with a broadly based government that does not threaten its neighbors.

[REDACTED]

14 June 02

DOS 114(b),(d)

OSD 1.4 ( b )

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DOS 114(b),(d)

CC:  
Vice President Cheney

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

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May 20, 2002 2:10 PM

2002 OCT 23 PM 2: 54

TO: Doug Feith  
Jim Haynes

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Detainees

I just read your memo of May 11 on detainees in Guantanamo Bay.

I don't think I agree with your second bullet point that we should decide not to prosecute before we give detainees to other countries. Why not let other countries prosecute detainees? Why not let other countries do some of the interrogation, as long as we get the take and we get access to them in the future? They may be able to do a better job of interrogating than we do.

Furthermore, we don't need to prosecute everybody. Why not let some other countries do some of it?

Attach.

05/11/02 USD(P)/GC memo to SecDef, Detainees

DHR:dh  
052002-30

.....  
Please respond by 06/21/02

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WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

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INFO MEMO

MAY 20 2002

I-02/005287-USDP

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) *WJF 5/11/02*  
William J. Haynes II, General Counsel *WJF 5/11/02*

SUBJECT: Russian detainees at Guantanamo Bay (~~SECRET~~)

- (~~SECRET~~) The Russians have not yet asked us to hand over these three detainees. Also, we have not yet finished our intelligence and criminal investigations of these detainees. It is therefore premature to transfer them.
- (~~SECRET~~) As soon as we finish our own intelligence and criminal investigations, and assuming we decide not to prosecute these detainees, we will promptly ask the Russians to take them under terms consistent with our transfer policy.
- (~~SECRET~~) The Russian detainees may be of US criminal investigative value because all three were present at the Mazar-e-Sharif prison uprising and may be material witnesses to the Spann murder.
- (~~SECRET~~) During the Russian visit to Guantanamo Bay (March 17-22), the Russian and US interrogation teams jointly concluded that the detainees should remain at Guantanamo Bay while the Russians investigate further and the United States finishes its intelligence interrogations and criminal investigations.
- (~~SECRET~~) Thereafter, Russian authorities opened criminal investigations of these detainees and have sent to the Department of Justice on April 19 an official request for interrogation assistance (Tab A).
- (~~SECRET~~) The Russian request invokes the US-Russia Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty of 1999. Acting on that basis could be inconsistent with our interrogation and investigation procedures (e.g., with respect to rights warnings). We will ensure that our cooperation with the Russians does not undermine our own objectives.
- (~~SECRET~~) The Russians asked the US Embassy for points of contact for transfer discussions, but have not yet initiated a formal transfer request.

COORDINATION: None

Attachment: As stated

Prepared by: Michael Mobbs (PAG), Detainee Policy Group, 614-2912

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Reason: 1.5  
Declassify on: 6 May 2012



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700 OCT 23 PM 2:41

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TO: Gen. Myers  
Steve Cambone  
Rich Haver

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: NSPD-5

Attached is a copy of David Addington's response to the DCI on NSPD-5, which I think you will find interesting.

Attach.

05/07/02 Addington memo to DCI, "Comments on NSPD-5 External Panel Recommendations"

DHR:dh  
052002-28

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

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WASHINGTON

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MAY 20 2002

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May 7, 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

FROM:  David S. Addington, Counsel to the Vice President

SUBJECT: Comments on NSPD-5 External Panel Recommendations

This is in response to your memorandum of April 4, 2002 to the Vice President and the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and Defense, and the Attorney General seeking written views on the findings and recommendations of the External Panel under National Security Presidential Directive 5 on "Intelligence."

To preserve appropriate confidentiality with the President on many important matters, the Vice President often reserves his advice on such matters for the President. This is one of those matters.

To the extent that it may be useful to you, the following are my views on the External Panel recommendations that you forwarded:

1. Disagree with Implication of Lack of Unity in Chain of Command over Intelligence Agencies. The Panel document's description of CIA as the only independent agency in the U.S. Intelligence Community while "all other elements have dual reporting requirements" (p. ix) gives the incorrect impression that the important organizational principle of unity in the chain of command does not currently apply to U.S. intelligence agencies. Each element of the Intelligence Community is under the command or supervision of a single officer of the Government.

a. The DCI alone is in charge of the CIA and the ODCI, which is part of the CIA for administrative purposes. (50 U.S.C. §§403-1, 403-3(d), and 403(e)(4)).

b. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) alone has authority, direction and control over the DIA, NSA, NIMA, NRO, the "other offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized national intelligence through reconnaissance programs," and the intelligence elements the four military services in the Department (10 U.S.C. §113(b)).

~~Office of the Vice President-controlled Document  
Classified by Signer for Section 1.5 (b,c,d)  
Declassify on: X Derived from DCI COL 21-96~~

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Date: AUG 24 2010

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c. The Secretary of State alone supervises the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research (22 U.S.C. §2651a(a)(1)); the Secretary of the Treasury alone supervises the intelligence elements of the Department of the Treasury (31 U.S.C. §§301 and 321); the Attorney General alone supervises the intelligence elements of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice (28 U.S.C. §§509 and 531); and the Secretary of Energy alone supervises the intelligence elements of the Department of Energy (42 U.S.C. §7131).

2. Disagree With Conclusion that DCI is Severely Restricted in Doing His Job by Lack of Authority. The Panel document states that the DCI's "authority over the nation's intelligence agencies, except for the CIA remains severely limited, restricting his ability to organize, task, collect and analyze intelligence" (p. ix). First, the incumbent DCI has done an excellent job, and within current authority. Second, the Panel document leaves the misimpression that the DCI lacks authority needed to do his job. The DCI has substantial authority tailored precisely to ensure that he can do his job, but without injury to the important principle of unity of command over the intelligence agencies. The DCI has significant authority by law and executive order to prepare the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget; to establish national intelligence collection requirements, priorities and tasking; to protect intelligence sources and methods; to approve (with OMB and affected department heads) reprogrammings and transfers of NFIP funds; to have access to all intelligence as approved by the President; to coordinate relationships between U.S. intelligence agencies and foreign government intelligence or security services; and to perform other duties as assigned by the President. (50 U.S.C. §403-3(c) and 403-4)

3. Nonconcur on the National Intelligence Reorganization Recommendations. I recommend against removing hire-and-fire authority over the heads of NSA, NIMA and NRO from the SECDEF and giving it to the DCI; against appropriation of funds to the DCI instead of the SECDEF for NSA, NIMA, and NRO; and against creation of a "streamlined national intelligence enterprise" that incorporates under the DCI's authority the CIA, NSA, NIMA, NRO and other special programs (pp. x and xi). The existing organizational arrangements ensure that NSA, NIMA, and NRO are responsive to Presidential and departmental-level needs for intelligence and to the needs of combatant commanders. Transferring from the Secretary of Defense to the DCI control of NSA, NIMA, and NRO is highly likely to reduce the priority given to intelligence support for the combatant commanders by these three combat support agencies -- an unwise move at any time, but a particularly unwise move when the United States is at war against terrorists of global reach. Also, the decision of the Congress and the President in 1947 to create a "Central" intelligence agency that pulls together and analyzes all intelligence, but not to create a single "National" intelligence agency that takes over all Government intelligence functions, remains a wise decision. It ensures that national-level decision makers have the national intelligence they need and departmental-level decisionmakers have the tailored intelligence they need, but without creating a single all-encompassing intelligence organization that, if misused, could infringe upon the freedoms of the American people.

4. Nonconcur on National Technical Programs Reduction or Phase-Out. In the second bullet under the heading "Maintaining the Technological Edge" (p. xiv) the Panel document states that the President "may wish to consider" terminating or modifying specified technical collection programs, including several that currently are considered keys to meeting the long-term collection needs of the future. Termination or modification of these programs should occur only if a careful and

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detailed examination of the programs by the DCI and the head of the relevant department determines that such action is clearly warranted and only after a final decision by the President of the United States to approve termination or modification.

5. Concur. With One Change, in Organizational Recommendation to Create Collection Management Center. I concur in the Panel recommendation to establish under the DCI a Collection Management Center (CMC) to strengthen the execution of the DCI's existing authorities for establishment of requirements and collection priorities and collection tasking. However, in addition to having the CMC be "composed of staff officers from the collection agencies and the military services" (p. xii) as the Panel recommends, I would recommend that it also include staff officers from the senior government officials and military commanders who are the principal consumers of intelligence. Including consumer representatives in the CMC will help ensure that the DCI's requirements, collection priorities, and collection tasking provide the intelligence that decisionmakers need.

6. DCI Review of Remainder of Recommendations. The Panel document contains a substantial number of further recommendations, many of which should, if implemented, substantially strengthen U.S. intelligence capabilities. The recommendations under the headings "Expand and Diversify Human Source Intelligence" and "Integrate National Intelligence and Law Enforcement" appear to hold particular promise. Further review of the External Panel recommendations by the DCI and the heads of departments and agencies in the Intelligence Community is merited before the President makes a final decision on which of the External Panel's recommendations to implement. Also, given the breadth and cost of the recommendations potentially to be implemented, the President will need to be able to set priorities among the recommendations to be implemented.

7. Presidential Action Recommended. Based on the discussion above, I recommend that the President issue a memorandum in the following form to the DCI:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NSPD-5 External Panel Recommendations

Thank you for your submission of the recommendations of the External Panel in response to National Security Presidential Directive 5 (NSPD-5) on "Intelligence." Please express my appreciation to the individuals who served on the External Panel for a job well done.

The Administration will not pursue the Panel recommendations to (a) grant to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) hire-and-fire authority over the heads of the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO); (b) secure appropriation of the funds for NSA, NIMA, and NRO to the DCI; and (c) establish a "streamlined national intelligence enterprise" that incorporates under the authority of the DCI the CIA, NSA, NIMA, NRO and other special programs.

Please consider in detail the remaining Panel recommendations and submit to me through the National Security Council within 90 days of the date of this memorandum (a) your determination of which of the remaining Panel recommendations should be implemented; (b) your views on the relative priorities among the recommendations that you determine should be implemented, taking into account the value of each recommendation to the security of the United States, its value to the advancement of U.S. interests abroad, and its cost; and (c) a draft document by which I could direct implementation of such determination and views. Please consult as appropriate the heads of departments and agencies with elements in the Intelligence Community in carrying out this task.

~~SECRET~~

June 24, 2002 5:03 PM

*Handwritten:* Done 6/26

062402-57

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Telcon Memos

Have I been getting these telcons that Condi says I have been getting? I don't recall ever receiving one. Please let me know.

She claims in her memo to me that I am getting them on a regular basis. Please find out how many I have received. Then I want to send her a memo telling her I have received two, my understanding is that she has had dozens of calls with Ivanov and there is no way that is going to work.

Every time I have had a meeting with Ivanov, we have sent out cables and memcons.

Thanks.

Attach.  
06/20/02 Rice ltr to SecDef re: Ivanov

DHR:dh  
062402-57

.....  
Please respond by 07/12/02

*Handwritten:* Sir, Attached are the memcons we have received. Sec Def has seen all of these. If there are others we do not know about them.

*Handwritten:* Col B  
6/25

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

June 20, 2002

*Go/21*

**JUN 24 2002**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: CONDOLEEZZA RICE *CR*

SUBJECT: Ivanov

Thank you for your note regarding Sergei Ivanov. I have attached a copy of the memorandum of our most recent conversation. I believe that these are made available to you on a regular basis.



I do not deal with him on "defense" issues, but Georgia is actually broader than that. If we keep each other informed of our contacts, I am sure there will be no problem.

*DOS*  
*1.4(b)(d)*

Thanks.

Attachment

Tab A Rice-Ivanov Memorandum of Telephone Conversation

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**Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS**  
**Date: AUG 25 2010**

*40KPA 02*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Telcon with Defense Minister of Russia (U)

PARTICIPANTS: National Security Adviser  
Defense Minister Ivanov

Notetakers: Leslie Radcliff, Alex Joves and  
Bob Riley

DATE, TIME June 19, 2002, 6:53-7:16 a.m. EDT  
AND PLACE: Suite

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: AUG 25 2010

National Security Advisor: Hello. (U)


Defense Minister Ivanov: Hello, Condi. How are you? (U)

National Security Advisor: I'm just fine, thank you. How are  
you? (U)

Defense Minister Ivanov: I'm just fine, thank you. You wanted  
to call me last week, but I was in Central Asia. (S)


National Security Advisor: That was my understanding. I  
thought it would be better to call when you got back to Moscow.  
(S)

Defense Minister Ivanov: Yes, because I could talk on the open  
line only. (S)



DOS 1.4 (b),(d)

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


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
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
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
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
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
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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: AUG 25 2010

09-M-1911



Defense Minister Ivanov: Okay, Condi. (U)

National Security Advisor: Good to talk to you. Take care.  
(U)

Defense Minister Ivanov: Good-bye. (U)

-- End of Conversation --

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: AUG 25 2010

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*COPY*

June 17, 2002 8:59 AM

TO: Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Ivanov

**DECLASSIFIED IN FULL**  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: **AUG 25 2010**

I have met with MoD Sergei Ivanov and talked with him on the phone many times during this administration. During several of those conversations, I am convinced that he looked me in the eye and didn't tell the truth. On two of those occasions, it involved conversations he had with you.

The most recent was when he told me that he had provided you all of the details of Russia's plans to go into the Pankisi Gorge in a joint operation with Georgia. You told me he had not given you the details. I am sure there is not a language problem.

The reason for this memo is that I am concerned that this is a clever fellow, and that, at some point in the months ahead, he is going to find a seam between Rice and Rumsfeld. The fact that he is dealing with both of us on a regular basis concerns me. There is a risk that Russia will do something, for example, in Georgia and then try to justify it based on his conversations with the two of us, saying he had the impression that Russia had a green light to do it. I may be overly sensitive to the risk, but I do think it is a risk. I think it is time for us to fashion some clearer understanding of who is doing what with Ivanov. If you feel you want to keep talking to him, rather than to your counterpart, please tell me why and what the subjects will be, so I can avoid those subjects. That way, possibly we can avoid a problem. It is better to be safe than sorry.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
061702-9

*Do we  
get him?*

*- Rice Response Attached*

~~SECRET~~

09-M-1911

*VR  
ED 6/21*

~~SECRET~~

2002 AUG 13 AM 7:42

July 22, 2002 3:53 PM

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

TO: Adm. Jacoby

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Al Qaeda

What are your thoughts on this memo from Paul Wolfowitz?

Thanks.

Attach.  
07/19/02 DepSecDef memo to SecDef re: Al Qaeda

DHR:dh  
072202-31

.....  
Please respond by 08/09/02

JUN 30 2010  
DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

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*DRM-1912*

SECDEF CONTROL# X02606 /02

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SECDEF HAS SEEN

2002 AUG 13 AM 7:36

JUL 22 2002

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: July 19, 2002

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*

*7/19*

SUBJECT: Al Qaeda Ops Sec

OSD 1.4 (c)

CIA 1.4 (c)

Don,

When pressed on why they believe Osama bin Laden is still alive the main explanation offered by the intelligence community is that his death would be too important a fact for them to be able to keep it secret.

However, the fact that he is alive would be an equally important "secret." If, as the intelligence community believes, they would have to communicate with one another about bin Laden's death, they would also have to communicate with one another about his survival.

The only conclusion that can actually be drawn is that they must be able to communicate quite effectively on important subjects without our detecting anything.

The bottom line is that Al Qaeda is able to communicate within its organization

I fear we are so mesmerized that we find it impossible to adequately account for the fact that the terrorists know that we do this. We are a bit like the drunk looking for our keys under the lamppost because that is the only place where there is light.

The most disturbing conclusion from all of this is that we are susceptible to deliberate manipulation by the terrorists,

JUN 30 2010

~~SECRET~~

SECDEF CONTROL#

X02605 /02

~~SECRET~~

September 9, 2002 9:47 AM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: WMD

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 06 2011

Please take a look at this material as to what we don't know about WMD. It is big.

Thanks.

Attach.

09/05/02 I-2 memo to SecDef, "Status of Iraqi WMD Programs"

DHR:dh  
090902-26

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

09-M-1913

X01695 /03


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THE JOINT STAFF

09/5

Director for Intelligence (J-2)  
Washington, D.C. 20318-2000

9/5/02

SECDEF HAS SEEN

SEP 09 2002

(P)

TO: CJCS VCJCS ACJCS DJS

SUBJECT: Status of Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Programs

Sir, a couple of weeks ago SECDEF asked me what we don't know (in a percentage) about the Iraqi WMD program. We've struggled to estimate the unknowns, and the attached briefing sums up our best J2 sense. We range from 0% to about 75% knowledge on various aspects of their program. I'd be happy to discuss further if you wish.

✓  
*Glen D. Shaffer*


GLEN D. SHAFFER  
Major General, USAF  
Director for Intelligence, J2

cc:  
DR/DIA  
SECDEF/MA  
DEPSECDEF/MA  
ASD/C3I  
J3  
J5  
DDI

~~Derived from: Multiple Sources  
Declassify on: X1  
Date of Source: 16 August 2002~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN//X1~~



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
DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 06 2011

# ***IRAQ: STATUS OF WMD PROGRAMS***

**The overall classification of this briefing is:**

71432001  
5 Sep 02

~~SECRET//NOFORN//X1~~



DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 06 2011


## ***IRAQ: STATUS OF WMD PROGRAMS***

- **We assess Iraq is making significant progress in WMD programs**
- **Our assessments rely heavily on analytic assumptions and judgment rather than hard evidence**
- **The evidentiary base is particularly sparse for Iraqi nuclear programs**
- **Concerted Iraqi CCD&D have effectively negated our view into large parts of their WMD program**

***We don't know with any precision how much we don't know***

71432002  
5 Sep 02


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## ***IRAQ: NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM***

- **We know Iraq has the knowledge needed to build a nuclear weapon without external expertise.**
- **We are certain many of the processes required to produce a weapon are in place**
  - **We think they possess a viable weapon design**
  - **We do not know the status of enrichment capabilities**
    - **We think a centrifuge enrichment program is under development but not yet operational**
- **We do not know if they have purchased, or attempted to purchase, a nuclear weapon**
- **We do not know with confidence the location of any nuclear weapon-related facilities**

***Our knowledge of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program is based largely – perhaps 90% -- on analysis of imprecise intelligence***




## **IRAQ: BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM**

- **We know Iraq has the knowledge needed to build biological weapons without external expertise**
- **We are certain all of the processes required to produce biological weapons are in place**
  - **We know they have produced anthrax, ricin toxin, botulinum toxin and gas gangrene**
- **We cannot confirm the identity of any Iraqi facilities that produce, test, fill, or store biological weapons**
  - **A large number of suspect facilities have been identified that could support R&D/production**
  - **We believe Iraq has 7 mobile BW agent production plants but cannot locate them**

***Our knowledge of what biological weapons the Iraqis are able to produce is nearly complete...our knowledge of how and where they are produced is probably up to 90% incomplete***

71432003  
5 Sep 02

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
## ***IRAQ: CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM***

- **We know Iraq has the knowledge needed to build chemical weapons without external expertise**
- **We do not know if all the processes required to produce a weapon are in place**
  - **Demonstrated capability to produce mustard & nerve agents**
  - **Lack the precursors for sustained nerve agent production**
- **We can confirm the identity of facilities producing feedstock chemicals suitable for CW precursors**
- **We cannot confirm the identity of any Iraqi sites that produce final chemical agent**

***Our overall knowledge of the Iraqi CW program is primarily limited to infrastructure & doctrine. The specific agent and facility knowledge is 60-70 percent incomplete.***

71432004  
5 Sep 02


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## ***IRAQ: BALLISTIC MISSILE PROGRAMS***

- **We know Iraq has the knowledge needed to build ballistic missiles without external expertise**
- **We are certain many of the processes required to produce ballistic missiles are in place**
  - **We know they can produce short range ballistic missiles (Al Samoud and Ababil-100)**
  - **We doubt all processes are in place to produce longer range missiles**
- **We can confirm the identity of most facilities that contribute to ballistic missile production or RDT&E**
- **We have good information on general storage at production/assembly sites, but little missile-specific data**

***Our knowledge of the Iraqi ballistic missile program is about half complete for the production process but significantly lacking – less than 25 percent – for staging and storage sites***



71432007  
5 Sep 02

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Authority: EO 13526  
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Date: JAN 0 6 2011

(b), (c)

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71432006  
5 Sep 02

JS 1.4 (a), (b), (c)  
NSA 1.4 (a), (c), (e), (g)

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JAN 05 2011

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09-M-1913

~~SECRET~~

May 6, 2002 9:54 AM

05/06/02 09:54:57

MAIL ROOM

TO: Gen. Franks  
CC: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraq

Attached is a paper on Iraq. It sure calls for good preparation with respect to WMD.

Regards.

*CIA 5 U.S.C. (b)(3), 50 U.S.C. Section 403(g)*

[Redacted]

DHR:dh  
050602-13

.....  
Please respond by 05/24/02

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 15 2010

**FAXED**  
*6 May 02*

[Redacted]  
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SECDEF CONTROL

*09M-1914*

*X03513 /02*



SECRET [REDACTED]

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Prepared NES c

**Intelligence Community Brief**

**[REDACTED] Iraq: Unusual Logistical Activities In Preparation for an Anticipated US-Led Campaign**

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

MAY 06 2002

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 1 2010

**Key Points**

[REDACTED] Recent activities detected at several ammunition storage depots in Iraq raise the possibility that Iraq, in preparing for an anticipated US-led military campaign to topple the regime, may be moving SCUD missiles or chemical and biological weapons (CBW) either to protect them or to prepare them for future use. The analysts who hold this view, a minority within the Intelligence Community, note that:

- Apparent transshipment activities have occurred at sites confirmed or suspected to have been associated with Iraqi SCUD missiles or CBW materials.
- The presence of a decontamination vehicle at one site and possibly another at an additional site is inconsistent with the movement of conventional munitions. The presence of decontamination/washdown trenches at one of these sites also is inconsistent with movement of conventional munitions.

[REDACTED] Most analysts argue that these transshipment activities probably are the movement of conventional munitions from central storage sites to bolster defenses. They point out that detected activities are consistent with the movement of conventional munitions noted elsewhere in Iraq and emphasize that the overt character of detected activities and the relative absence of security associated with them are inconsistent with movement of SCUD or CBW materials.

CIA 5 U.S.C. (b)(3), 50 U.S.C. Section 403(a)

(U) This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Conventional Military Issues. It was coordinated with CIA, DIA, NIMA, NSA, State/INR, NAIC, and USCENCOM. Inquiries may be directed to the NIO on [REDACTED]



ICB 2002-08  
2 May 2002

SECRET [REDACTED]

0006

09-M-1913

**Anticipating US Military Action**

Since mid-September 2001, Iraqi forces have been preparing for a US-led military campaign to topple Saddam's regime. These activities are the most extensive since the Gulf War and include:

- Preparing an extensive network of trenches throughout the country to defend strategic areas—one of the largest trenches is 7 kilometers long and is located east of Mosul in northern Iraq.
- Establishing dispersal areas and sites to support the relocation of equipment and personnel.
- Augmenting radar coverage of western airspace and deploying additional anti-aircraft artillery to the Air Defense Sector Operations Center for the western sector.
- Launching a large campaign to repair heavy equipment transporters. The size of this campaign is unprecedented. Iraqi forces recently have moved about 250 trailers to repair facilities. Iraq repaired about 10 trailers in 1995 and approximately 20 in 2000.
- Modifying new trucks diverted from the "oil-for-food" program to carry air defense artillery.
- Increasing the tempo of flight training.
- Stepping up preparations to contain civil unrest.

[REDACTED]

Since mid-March 2002, Iraq has engaged in

apparent transshipment activities at seven ammunition storage facilities in central and western Iraq. These facilities have confirmed or suspected historical links to Iraq's SCUD missiles or chemical and biological weapons (see map). We do not know whether the Iraqis have moved materials into or out of the facilities or what they have moved.


- [REDACTED] which revealed logistical operations at five strategic ammunition facilities (Ar Rutbah, H-3 Airfield Depot, Al Hadithah, Qubaysah, and An Najaf). Approximately 60 newly acquired stakebed cargo trucks were involved. These trucks are subordinate to the General Headquarters.
- The magnitude of the activity at Ar Rutbah and H-3 is especially noteworthy because these facilities in western Iraq are usually dormant.
- We have detected stakebed truck activity in conjunction with the presence of a confirmed and a possible decontamination vehicle at Al Musayyib Barracks and Habbaniyah Depot, respectively. We also have detected decontamination/washdown trenches near the entrance to a bunker area at Musayyib.

**What We Know About These Facilities**

[REDACTED]  
The logistical activity that concerns us has [REDACTED] at the following munition storage facilities. In italics we highlight the Intelligence Community's judgments regarding each facility's past association with either SCUD missiles or chemical and biological weapons.

CIA 5 U.S.C. (b)(3),  
50 U.S.C. Section 403(g)

(S//REL) Iraq: Ammunition Depots With Unusual Logistical Activity, April 2002



DI Cartography Center/MPG 750790AI (R00667) 4-02

CIA S. U.S.C. (b)(3),  
50 U.S.C. Section 403(g)

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 1 2010

OSD 1.4 (C)

[REDACTED]  
**H3 Airfield Depot: Confirmed Association.** Following the Gulf War, Iraq admitted to UNSCOM that it had stored R-400 bombs filled with a chemical nerve agent.

[REDACTED] **Qubaysah Depot: Confirmed Association.** SCUD missiles were staged from this facility at the outset of the Gulf War. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In addition, following the Gulf War Iraq admitted to UNSCOM that it had stored CW-filled SCUD warheads and bombs and unfilled CW rockets at this facility.

[REDACTED]  
**Al Hadithah Depot: Confirmed Association.** Iraq admitted storing CW rocket warheads at this depot before and during the Gulf War. It claimed that these rockets were unfilled.

OSD 1.4 (C)

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] **An Najaf Depot: Suspected Association.** The Intelligence Community suspects that this facility once stored chemical and/or biological agents and SCUD missiles. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We judged that this unusual deployment was related to the presence of proscribed materials. In 1996, we detected the presence of a Samarra-type decontamination vehicle; we regarded the presence of this vehicle as suggestive of chemical and/or biological agent storage.

- In the 1980s we confirmed [REDACTED] that a Samarra-type vehicle was associated with movement of Iraq's chemical weapons. We believe this type of vehicle also would be associated with the movement of Iraq's biological weapons.
- Moreover, the drive-in bunkers at An Najaf are similar to those at Qubaysah where Iraq stored SCUD missiles.

[REDACTED]  
**Al Musayyib Barracks: Suspected Association.** A separately secured ammunition storage area at Al Musayyib Barracks may house chemical and/or biological munitions. A Samarra-type decontamination vehicle has been present in this storage area since at least December 2001. Convoys of stakebed cargo trucks were noted on several occasions in March and April 2002. In addition, decontamination/washdown trenches have been present near the separately secured storage area since at least 1998.

- In 1997, Iraqi officials impeded an UNSCOM inspection of the barracks, one of several military installations Baghdad declared "sensitive" during a contentious UNSCOM inspection in September 1997. This Iraqi obstruction raised our suspicion that the facility might have stored proscribed materials.

[REDACTED]  
**Habbaniyah Depot: Suspected Association.** Before the Gulf War, the Intelligence Community considered the Habbaniyah Depot a

CIA 5 U.S.C. (b)(3),  
50 U.S.C. Section 403(g)

suspect BW storage site because of the presence of an unusual refrigerated storage bunker. UNSCOM inspected the Habbaniyah Depot after the war and found no evidence that it held CW or BW munitions. Analysis of Iraq's refrigerated 12-frame bunkers indicated that Iraq apparently used these bunkers to store high explosives.

- On 9 April 2002, we detected a tanker truck parked near a stakebed cargo truck involved in transshipment activities at Habbaniyah. We assess this tanker could be a decontamination vehicle. A decontamination vehicle suggests the presence of chemical or biological materials, because such a vehicle is not appropriate to handle conventional ammunition.
- In addition, Habbaniyah Depot is close to the Al Taqaddum Airbase, which is one of Iraq's major airfields. Al Taqaddum was a confirmed CW storage site; CW aerial bombs were placed in revetments during the Gulf War. Recent transshipment activity and the proximity of the airfield indicate that the Iraqis might be storing CW munitions at Habbaniyah.

**Explaining What We Have Detected**

(U) There are two principal explanations for the activities we have detected.

**Movement of conventional ammunition.** In the view of most IC analysts, these transshipment activities probably are the movement of conventional munitions from central storage sites to bolster defenses. Analysts holding this view generally do not see the activities as anomalous but consistent with Iraqi logistic doctrine and with ammunition movements detected elsewhere in Iraq. They note that:

- The use of GHQ-level trucks—suggested by some as an unusual signature—to move ammunition from central storage areas to forward transfer points is consistent with Iraqi supply doctrine.
- There have been multiple transfers of ammunition from depots to the Iraqi Army.
- Divisions and brigades in the Iraqi Army and Republican Guard have made preparations to receive additional ammunition. Moreover, [REDACTED] there has been some transfer of items (most likely ammunition) from operational-level storage facilities to tactical locations.

They also emphasize that:

- We have not seen evidence of the significant security procedures we would expect to see if the Iraqis were moving SCUD components or CBW.
- The detected activities—involving scores of stakebed trucks at several facilities—have been far too overt to be related to movement of missiles or CBW based on what we know about Iraq's past practices in handling these sensitive items.

**Moving components of Iraq's residual SCUD force and/or CBW-related materials.** An alternative, but not widely held, view is that Iraq is moving SCUD components and/or CBW-related materials (e.g., filled or unfilled weapons, CB agents) either to protect them from future strikes or inspections or to position them for use against Israel or US forces based in the region. Analysts holding this view note that:

**Is Saddam Engaged in Deception?**

[REDACTED] We have considered whether Saddam might deliberately be creating a number of apparently missile- or CBW-related signatures to divert US and coalition attention from activities elsewhere.

- So far we have not detected anomalies to indicate such deception.
- Analysts judge that deception is unlikely because of the timing; Iraq's activities to date have had the impact of increasing the Community's overall focus against Iraq's missiles and CBW. This focus has increased the risk to Iraq that movement of proscribed weapons and materials could be detected.

[REDACTED]  
Alternatively, Iraq could be employing known CBW signatures to elicit false accusations from the United States.

- In our judgment, Iraq probably regards this ploy as too reckless. The gambit could go awry and trigger US-led military strikes.

- Activities have been occurring at facilities with a confirmed or suspected association with missiles (Qubaysah, Ar Rutbah, and An Najaf) or CBW (H3, Qubayasah, Al Hadithah, An Najaf, Al Musayyib, and Habbaniyah).
- The scope of the activities detected at H-3 and Ar Rutbah is especially unusual, because these facilities usually are dormant.
- The presence of a decontamination vehicle at Musayyib and possibly one at Habbaniyah, and the location of decontamina-

tion/washdown trenches at Musayyib are anomalies probably explained as associated with the movement of CBW-related materials.

[REDACTED]  
These analysts also suggest that Iraq has suspended normal security practices in moving proscribed systems and materials so as not to attract the attention of US intelligence.

CIA 5 U.S.C. (b)(3),  
50 U.S.C. Section 403(g)

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 13 2010

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~~NOFORN~~

~~UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
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February 25, 2002 12:13 PM

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Dov Zakheim

F

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 06 2010

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Sense of Urgency

Attached is a memo from Dov that responded to my memo on "a sense of urgency." There are some interesting ideas in here.

I assume since Dov sent it that they were implemented to the extent reasonable in the '03 budget bill.

I also assume, Steve, that you will see that they find their way into the Defense Planning Guidance.

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/31/01 UDS(C) info memo to SecDef: "A Sense of Urgency"

DHR:db  
022502-28

.....  
Please respond by 03/29/02

R-1

~~NOFORN~~  
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X04886 / 03

~~UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
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09-17-1915

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

SECDEF HAS SEEN <sup>11/2</sup>

FEB 25 2002

INFO MEMO

October 31, 2001; 5:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Dov S. Zakheim <sup>11/2</sup>

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 06 2010

SUBJECT: A Sense of Urgency

- You asked what we would like to have accomplished prior to the United States experiencing a nuclear, chemical or biological event of significant proportion, should such an event happen.
- For communications we need redundant, survivable web based technology to securely share critical information between current and alternative operations sites as well as other federal agencies. Protecting information systems and infrastructure will be critical in any such incident.
- Providing units to respond to a serious incident in a timely manner will be critical. Much of our current capability is based on affordability. We should study the homeland security requirements in more detail and fully fund the programs necessary to meet those requirements. Examples of current capabilities and some programs that should be expanded include:
  - Priority cell phone use for four cities. This capability needs to be available nationwide and requires supplemental funding.
  - Additional National Guard teams dedicated to respond to incidents at military activities. The 32 National Guard Civil Support Teams currently assist civilian authorities to prepare for and react to chemical or biological events.
  - A Joint Forces Command Joint Task Force for Civil Support to enhance joint planning has been established and should be adequately funded.
  - A Marine Corps Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF), a 375-member unit that can assist in consequence management.
  - A 180-member Army Technical Escort Unit to dismantle and dispose of chemical and biological weapons.
- PA&E has outlined a source of planning activities (~~attached~~) that could be used to develop investment plans for the items listed below.
  - Increased vaccine production capabilities.

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

X04885 /03

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 06 2010

- Storage of masks and suits to be made available for the portion of the general population considered at risk.
  - Provision of critical detection suites for early warning of chemical or biological attack that could be moved to an area at risk. This action alone would require an investment of many billions, but would dramatically reduce casualties in a biological attack. For example, detection suites for DoD's 530 installations worldwide will cost over \$5 billion.
  - Maintaining a stockpile of vaccines, antibiotics, and other drugs.
  - Investing in critical infrastructure protection (CIP) improvements to reduce vulnerability to physical and nuclear, chemical and biological (NBC) attacks (e.g., telecommunications network, naval shipyards, electrical power system, and dams etc.).
- I also attach a possible scenario for biological attack, through the use of continental currency.

**COORDINATION:** Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation.

**Attachment:**  
**As stated**

**Prepared By:** Barry D. Watts, 695-0971 and Wayne Schroeder, 693-8083

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

~~Secret/NoFor~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 06 2010



OSD 1.4 (e), (g)  
DHS 1.4 (g)

~~Secret/NoFor~~

~~Secret/NoFor~~



OSD 1.4 (e), (g)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: DEC 06 2010

~~Secret/NoFor~~

~~SECRET~~

January 14, 2002 9:20 AM

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 13 2010

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Trip Report

Mr. President,

I found that I never sent you a trip report for my December trip. My apologies for the delay. Here it is.

Respectfully,

Attach.

12/19/01 SecDef Trip to Caucasus, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and NATO (Dec. 15-19)

DHR:dh  
011402-19

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UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

SECDEF CONTROL

X00146 /02

09-M-1910



~~SECRET~~  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON DC 20301-1000

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 13 2010

JAN 14 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: SecDef Trip to Caucasus, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan and NATO  
(December 15-19)

Some observations on my visit (1) to the three Caucasus countries of Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia; (2) to see U.S. troops and key leaders in Uzbekistan and Afghanistan; and (3) my meetings at the NATO defense ministerial in Brussels.

**I. Visit to Caucasus, Uzbekistan & Afghanistan**

We emphasized U.S. support for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the South Caucasus states; and the need to address regional security threats, such as terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The countries of this oil rich, strategically important region seek U.S. security assistance and, in some cases, security guarantees. OSD 1.4 (b), (d) OOS 1.4 (b), (d)

- **Azerbaijan.** President Aliyev looked remarkably well despite reports of grave illness.

[REDACTED]

- **Armenia.** Armenian-Azeri relations remain tense.

[REDACTED]

- **Georgia.**

[REDACTED]

We have a plan to provide counter-insurgency training soon, but need to find funding.

- **Uzbekistan.** [REDACTED] I visited U.S. forces at Karshi-Khanabad airfield. They had just returned from combat operations in Afghanistan, including the team who had participated in a successful horse cavalry

~~CLASSIFIED BY: Secretary Rumsfeld~~  
~~REASON: 1.5(c)~~  
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 14 Jan 2012~~



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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 13 2010

charge near Mazar-e-Sharif. Morale is high. U.S. troops are determined and proud. It was a delight to be with them.

- **Afghanistan.** I met with Prime Minister Karzai and Defense Minister Khan at Bagram Airbase and delivered a clear message that we wanted the Taliban punished and Al Qaeda destroyed. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I visited U.S. troops at Bagram, including special operators hunting Osama Bin Laden. They are doing a great job under difficult circumstances.

POS 1.4 (b), (d)

## II. NATO Defense Ministerial, Brussels

Key areas of discussion included:

- **The War on Terrorism.** Support for the campaign against terrorism remains strong, but not uniform. Success in Afghanistan has impressed the Allies. Several are anxious to be seen as active participants through an international security presence in Kabul. However, they are unsure how to proceed. They expect the U.S. to rescue this security force should a crisis arise.
- **Bosnia.** I emphasized that NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia has been a success. The time has come to restructure and reduce that force. I emphasized that SFOR troop levels could be reduced by at least 6,000 (there are currently 18,000, including 3100 U.S.) by next fall.
- **Missile Defense and the ABM Treaty.** Your notice of withdrawal from the ABM Treaty was a non-event. That in itself is a major success.

### Meetings with Russian MOD Sergei Ivanov

I held two evening meetings with Ivanov:

- **Strategic Framework.** We set out a notional agenda For DoD-Russia meetings to be held in January in D.C. Ivanov may visit Washington in May.
- **Counter-proliferation.** We discussed further cooperation on biological defenses. [REDACTED]


POS 1.4 (b), (d)

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Date: JUL 13 2010



**Bilaterals with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine**

- [REDACTED]
- **Kyrgyzstan.** Its parliament voted to support combat operations, and allow U.S. aircraft to base at Kyrgyz airfields. [REDACTED]
- **Ukraine.** [REDACTED] Ukraine is strategically important and deserves our continued engagement, particularly in the defense area.

cc: The Vice President  
The Secretary of State  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The National Security Advisor

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
DOS 1.4 (b), (d)

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April 9, 2003 6:36 PM

TO: Gen. Franks  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Priorities

*D.R.*

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 14 2010

Here is what I believe to be a final draft of the key task priorities.

We have gotten the suggestions from CENTCOM and CIA, as well as from the folks here.

Unless we hear to the contrary, we are going to assume that these will be how we will focus our assets in the period immediately ahead.

Thanks so much.

Attach.  
4/9/03 Iraq—Key Task Priorities

DHR:dh  
040903-12

.....

Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

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SECDEF CONTROL X01250 /03

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DRAFT

April 9, 2003  
5:44 PM

Iraq—Key Task Priorities

NOTE: THIS IS A LIST OF KEY TASKS—IN PRIORITY ORDER.

WHAT IT IS NOT:

IT IS NOT A WAR PLAN.

IT IS NOT A HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PLAN.

IT IS NOT A STABILIZATION PLAN.

IT IS NOT A RECONSTRUCTION PLAN.

SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISHING MANY OF TASKS LISTED ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES MAY WELL HELP TO WIN THE WAR AND/OR HELP IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, STABILIZATION AND/OR RECONSTRUCTION. BUT THAT IS NOT THE PURPOSE OF THIS MEMO.

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USE OF U.S. AND COALITION CAPABILITIES FOR THESE PURPOSES SHOULD BE BALANCED AGAINST THE TASK OF WINNING THE WAR AND STABILIZING THE COUNTRY.

DRAFT  
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DRAFT


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Date: JUL 14 2010

Periods for US Activities in Iraq

Period 1—Period before cessation of hostilities—the US will have the “maximum” freedom of action

Period 2—After Period 1, and before an international coalition, the UN or the Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA) will have a major role, the US will have “medium” freedom of action

Period 3—After Period 2, when an international coalition and/or the IIA assumes significant influence



DRAFT  
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JS 1.4 (a)


OSD 1.4 (c)

JS  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(5)

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DRAFT

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 14 2010

Key tasks (in priority order):



JS 1.4 ( a )

OSD 1.4 ( C )


JS  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)( 5 )

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Date: JUL 14 2010



DHR:dh  
Iraq: Priorities

JS 1.4 (a)

JS  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(5)

DRAFT  
~~SECRET~~

OSD 1.4 (b), (c), (d)

~~SECRET~~

May 16, 2003 7:12 AM

TO: Amb. Bremer  
Gen. Myers  
Gen. Pace  
Gen. Franks  
LTG Abizaid

CC: LTG Craddock

FROM: *DSD*  
Donald Rumsfeld *TR*

SUBJECT: Priorities

I asked several people to redo the priority list we issued in early April. I know John Abizaid is working on it. I did, however, want to send along Steve Cambone's contribution. I think it is a pretty good construct.

Why don't you folks look at it, and let's see if we can coordinate with John Craddock and develop an agreed-upon set of priorities. There is no question but that the ones from April 9 are out of date.

Thanks.

Attach.

5/15/03 Cambone memo to SecDef re: "Iraq—Priorities"

DHR:dh  
051603-2

.....

Please respond by 5/30/03

*09M-1918*

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 15 2010

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SECDEF HAS SEEN

MAY 16 2003

15 May 2003, 1600

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: STEVE CAMBONE *SC*


SUBJECT: IRAQ—PRIORITIES (U)

(U) You asked for my view on updating your April 9 paper on priorities (attached).

(U) In setting priorities for the Iraq joint task force's (CJTF-7's) and, by extension, the Coalition Provisional Authority's effort in Iraq, I believe it is helpful to identify the main areas of work on which we want them to concentrate and then, within each area of work, priorities that they should follow in the allocation of resources over time. Resources include personnel, intelligence, logistics support, funding, etc.

(S) Below is an outline of areas of work, with priorities and their time frames for completion. The clock would start from the time this guidance is issued. I assumed existing guidance on "de-Baathification," etc.

I. Military Operations:



JS 1.4 (a)

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
*JS*  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(5)

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 15 2010

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II.



JS 1.4 (a)


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JS  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(5)

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Date: JUL 15 2010

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Attachment

IS 1.4 (a)

OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

JS  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(5)

**DRAFT  
SECRET**

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DRAFT

April 9, 2003  
5:44 PM

Iraq—Key Task Priorities

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USE OF U.S. AND COALITION CAPABILITIES FOR THESE PURPOSES SHOULD BE BALANCED AGAINST THE TASK OF WINNING THE WAR AND STABILIZING THE COUNTRY.

DRAFT  
~~SECRET~~

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Period 3—After Period 2, when an international coalition and/or the IIA assumes significant influence




JS 1.4 (a)

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5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(5)

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Date: JUL 15 2010



OSD 1.4 ( b ), ( d )

**DRAFT**  
**SECRET**

JS 1.4 ( c )

JS  
5 U.S.C. § 552 ( b ) ( 5 )

~~SECRET~~

*Approved  
10/25/03*

October 22, 2001 1:16 PM

FORM 128-5 (11-80)

DEFENSE

*File Notes  
Refer to SF 1022012C*

TO: VADM Giambastiani  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Memo on Phonecon w/CENTCOM

Here is a memo I have dictated. Would you please use your notes to edit it, elaborate, enlarge it and put in the correct dates.

I think it is important that we have this information down. I have a sixth sense that I didn't get the full story and that there may be other versions.

Thanks.

*Complete  
VADM had copy  
Submitted memo to  
DoD war efforts. I would like*

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 28 2010

DHR: dh  
102201-24

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SECDEF CONTROL # X02502 /02

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 22 2010

~~SECRET~~  
Working Paper

NOV 22 5 PM 4: 53

October 22, 2001  
1:19 PM

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Discussions w/CENTCOM re: Sy Hersh Article

When I heard about Sy Hersh's piece in the New Yorker. I raised it with Tommy Franks. I asked him if it was true that the CENTCOM lawyer had inhibited him from hitting that target.

I reminded him that when he called me, I told him immediately to hit it if anyone wiggled and that I was going to call the President. But, in the meantime, he had my authority to hit it. I did not want to lose that target. I called the President. I called Tommy back within 4 ½ minutes and told him the President agreed.

When I read the Sy Hersh piece, I reminded Franks of our earlier discussion and asked him what had actually happened, and if his lawyer had, in fact, slowed him down in hitting that target. He said it was absolutely not true.

I have the feeling he may not have given me the full story.

On the morning of October 21, when I was in Taos, I asked Franks a series of questions about what actually takes place when this kind of thing occurs. He said



CENTCOM 1.4 (a)(c)

When they see a target, he convenes a group, and they decide whether or not it is high collateral. Then they make a decision. If he would like to hit it, but it is high collateral, he calls me.

Working Paper  
~~SECRET~~

X02501 /02  
DEF CONTROL

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Working Paper

I then asked him about 15 questions, as to precisely how long it took for each thing to happen.

I told him that I was concerned about it, and that I wanted him to know the following:

1. Getting Usama bin Laden, Omar and the senior Taliban and Al Qaeda leadership is enormously important.
2. I have a high tolerance level for possible error. That is to say, if he thinks he has a valid target, and he can't get me or he can't get Wolfowitz in time, he should hit it.
3. I added that there will not be any time where he cannot reach me or, if not me, Wolfowitz.
4. I expect him to be leaning far forward on this.

DHR/dh  
102201-3C

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 12 2010

Working Paper  
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**SECRET**

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF 24 JAN 2010  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

**DECLASSIFIED IN PART**  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 22 2010

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJC *RBMyers*

SUBJECT: Statistics Regarding Afghanistan (U)

- (S) In response to your recent request (TAB) for the total number of sorties flown, the amount of ordnance dropped, the number of countries and their contributions to the coalition, the number of bases we used, and the number of people involved in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), the following data (accurate as of 14 January 2002) is provided:
- (S) The total number of sorties flown since 7 October 2001 is 21,100.
  - (S) USN, 5,626; USMC, 3,062; USAF, 9,669; Special Operations Forces, 1,303; Coalition Forces, 1,440.
- (S) During CY 2000 USCENTCOM conducted 742 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) sorties. During OEF and as of 11 January 2002, USCENTCOM conducted 826 ISR sorties in support of OEF alone.
- (S) The total number of bombs dropped since 7 October 2001 is 18,725. This includes 10,775 precision-guided munitions and 7,950 free-fall weapons.
- (S) The total number of Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) employed since 7 October 2001 is 82. This number reflects the amount of TLAM's launched across seven salvos between 7-25 October 2001. [REDACTED] JS 1.4(d)  
TLAM's) fired six TLAMs.
- (S) A total of 46/50 suspected weapons of mass destruction (WMD) sites have been exploited within Afghanistan since 7 October 2001.
- (S) There are 15 countries that have contributed forces and/or equipment to OEF. These include Australia, Belgium, [REDACTED] Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, [REDACTED] Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Singapore, Turkey and the United Kingdom.

OSD 1.4 ( b )

~~Classified By: LtGen G. S. Newbold, DJ-3  
Reason: [REDACTED]  
Declassify On: 14 January 2013~~

Doc 2

09-M-2191

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X02136 /02

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 22 2010

- (S) The following table details the contributions made by those 15 countries:

OSD 1.4 (b)

JS 1.4 (a),(b)

Australia	
Belgium	
Canada	
Denmark	
France	
Germany	
Italy	
Netherlands	
New Zealand	
Norway	
Singapore	
Turkey	
United Kingdom	

JS 1.4 (a),(b)



- (S) US forces operate from 27 different bases in the region.
  - (S) Mazar-e-Sharif, Bagram, Kabul, Qandahar, Karshi-Khanabad, Jacobabad, Shamsi, Islamabad, Manas, Masirah, Thumrait, Seeb, Al Udeid, Ah Sayliyah, Doha, Falcon 78, Al Jaber, Ali Al Salem, Camp Doha, Commando Camp, Al

2  
**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

Daft-a, Fujarah, Minhad, Jebel Ali, Manama, Shaik Isa, and Prince Sultan Air Base.

- (S) The total number of US military personnel involved in OEF is 57,447.
  - (S) USA, 10,198; USAF, 17,206; USN, 21,949; USMC, 5042; Coast Guard, 9; Special Operations Forces, 3,043.
  - (S) Currently there are 24,328 Army Reservists mobilized in support of OEF and Operation NOBLE EAGLE. Fifty percent of these personnel are being utilized in a force protection role and nearly 25 percent are being used in a war-fighter support role. The remaining 25 percent are being utilized to support command, control, communications, intelligence and training/mobilization functions.
- (S) The total number of coalition forces involved in OEF is 13,109.
- (S) Delivered over 2.4 million humanitarian daily rations, 3.4 million pounds of heat and 328,000 blankets.

COORDINATION: NONE

Prepared By: G. S. Newbold, Lt Gen, USMC, DJ-3,697-3702

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: **NOV 22 2010**

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TAB

EO: January 9, 2002 6:03 PM

2002 JUL 24 AM 10: 10

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110  
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1010  
15

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld DA  
SUBJECT: Statistics

Please have someone pull together some data and statistics on what took place in Afghanistan from October 7, 2001, until today, January 9, 2002, in terms of number of flights, amount of ordnance, number of countries who cooperated in the coalition, number of bases we used, number of sorties, number of people involved, etc.—anything that is statistically interesting.

I need to start capturing some of that.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
010902-32

.....  
Please respond by 01/16/02

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 22 2010

Tab

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X02134 / 02

SECDEF CONTROL #

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May 9, 2003 8:22 AM

*No  
Some  
check*

*ADVANCE  
COPY SENT*

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: OIF Forces Slide

In the future when this comes in, is there some way they can show us what the peak was in each of these countries in each of these boxes, in other words, what our high mark was?

It would be really nice if I could see for each of the boxes what it was pre-Iraqi buildup, the high point in the buildup, the current numbers and then what is happening.

Thanks.

Attach.  
OIF Forces

DHR:dh  
050903-16

.....  
Please respond by 5/16/03

MAY 19 2003

*Response Attached.*

*C 5/19*


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Date: NOV 22 2010

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REC'D CONTROL# X03430-103  
Doc 3 09-M-2191

# OIF Forces – 1 January 2003



\* JTF-20 reporting began 10 MAR 03


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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 22 2010

C/S

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# OIF Forces – Peak (19 Apr 2003)



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 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
 Date: NOV 2 2 2010


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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 22 2010

# OIF Forces – Current (9 May 2003)



C/S



**SECRET**

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1006-03  
19 June 2003

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *[Signature]*

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 22 2010

SUBJECT: Patrols in Baghdad (U)

- (U) In response to your inquiry the following information is provided.
- (S) While the number of foot patrols varies from day to day, a USCENTCOM summary illustrates current security efforts in Baghdad. On 12 June, CJTF-7 units conducted 287 dismounted patrols involving 3,000 soldiers. During each 24-hour period, 700 to 900 dismounted personnel are actively patrolling at any given time, normally organized into 7 to 9-man elements. An increasing number of patrols are conducted with personnel from the Iraqi police force. More than 3,000 additional US personnel, conducting mounted patrols and manning security checkpoints, also contribute to the security effort.
- (S) The largest concentration of combat units in Iraq is found within the greater Baghdad area. There are 28 combat battalions and 13 military police companies operating within the city. These battalions, and their associated brigade and division headquarters, consist of approximately 28,700 soldiers. More than 7,000 soldiers are committed each day to provide security for weapons of mass destruction sites, mass grave sites, Iraqi infrastructure and cultural facilities and as convoy escorts to ensure delivery of humanitarian assistance supplies.
- (U) During mission planning, commanders allocate available forces to achieve a mix of mounted and dismounted patrols and both fixed and mobile checkpoints. Dismounted operations provide for great interaction with the populace, but are slow and cover relatively small areas. Mounted patrols cover larger areas, often achieve tactical surprise through speed and mobility, but are much less effective in interacting with the populace. Checkpoints are effective for controlling crowds, facilitating searches for contraband and weapons and provide an excellent means to interact with the populace.

~~Classified By: N.A. Schwartz, Lt Gen, USAF, DJ-3  
Reason: 5 (c)  
Declassify on: X1~~

**SECRET**

RECDEF CONTROL# X03424 / 03  
Doc 4 09-M-2191

- **(S)** Commanders in Baghdad commit a higher percentage of available combat power to security and stability operations than anywhere else in Iraq. Lieutenant General McKiernan and his subordinate commanders are operating aggressively to bring security and stability to the city. Recent reports, including an informal assessment from Ambassador Bremer, indicate the security environment in Baghdad is improved. I am confident steady progress will continue, particularly as Iraqi police forces increase in size and effectiveness.

**COORDINATION:**

**Attachments:**  
As stated

**Prepared By:** N. A. Schwartz, Lt Gen, USAF; Director, J-3; 697-3702

**DECLASSIFIED IN FULL**  
**Authority: EO 13526**  
**Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS**  
**Date: NOV 22 2010**

483

TAB

July 14, 2003

U/16  
J3

TO: Gen. Pace  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Train for Counter-Insurgency

You were there when Henry Hyde said that he heard the suggestion that we train and equip counter-insurgent people to deal with Iraq. Do you have any thoughts on that?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
071003-37

.....  
Please respond by 7/25/03

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: NOV 22 2010

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Tab

Doc 5

09M-2191



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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: **NOV 22 2010**

**CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

273 APR 11 11 12: 37

INFO MEMO

CM-1138-03  
8 August 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

SUBJECT: Train for Counterinsurgency (U)

- ~~(S)~~ In response to your question regarding training for counterinsurgency, the following is provided. My thoughts are divided into two primary areas: (1) training and equipping Iraqi counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism (CT) personnel to deal with the situation in Iraq, and (2) the need for DOD funding authority to train and equip foreign nation state militaries, indigenous groups or individuals in support of war on terrorism efforts.
- (U) Training and Equipping COIN/CT Personnel for Iraq
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ The US government has several on-going programs to develop Iraqi security capabilities that will make key contributions to overall COIN efforts. In addition to State and CIA efforts, the Coalition Provisional Authority and USCENTCOM are engaged in cooperative initiatives to form an Iraqi Civil Defense Force (ICDF) to perform joint patrolling, fixed site security, convoy security, route security and natural disaster assistance; and the New Iraqi Army (NIA) as an interim military capability for territorial defense (including border security), stability operations and public order tasks in support of CJTF-7.
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ Complementary to these on-going efforts, DOD could develop an additional, specifically oriented, Iraqi military COIN capability by training Iraqi military units that can perform specialized COIN functions that fall between the localized, defensively focused paramilitary ICDF and the heavier, conventional NIA.
  - ~~(S//NF)~~ Specialized Iraqi military COIN units could be specifically oriented to assist US units by performing intelligence collection, reconnaissance, surveillance, waterborne patrolling, raids and ambushes, quick reaction, border incursion interdiction and the infiltration and disruption of clandestine enemy networks. Successful integration of these Iraqi forces into the overall security and stability operations plan for Iraq could potentially free up US military forces for other missions.

~~NOT RELEASABLE TO  
FOREIGN NATIONALS~~

~~Classified By: Lt Gen N.A. Schwartz, USAF, DJ-3  
Reason: 1.5(a)  
Declassify On: X4~~

**SECRET//NOFORN**

SECDEF CONTROL#


X02754 /03

Doc 6 09-M-2191

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

- (~~S//NF~~) In addition to our main COIN efforts, DOD could train small groups of thoroughly vetted Iraqi personnel in selected aspects of counterterrorism (CT) if deemed advantageous to USG objectives. However, we must keep in mind that the personnel selection, training, skills and experience levels associated with effective CT units are by necessity high and would require a long-term investment with no immediate short-term payoff.
- (~~S//NF~~) Raising these forces will present challenges. Vetting of Iraqi personnel for political reliability and security will be a major concern. The different interest groups in the region could attempt to penetrate/infiltrate the effort and use these forces as potential sources of intelligence, weapons, equipment, and training to strengthen their toehold inside Iraq. They will also target "collaborators" with a vengeance. Lastly, the conduct of these forces with regard to human rights will continually be under the media "microscope."

CENTCOM 1.4(A)



(U) COORDINATION: TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lt Gen N.A. Schwartz, USAF; Director, J-3; 703 697-3702

*Mr Secretary,  
If you approve, we  
could get CENTCOM's view  
of Iraqi training for CT  
and what such a plan  
might look like.  
V. Dick*

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

*In case  
D. R. J.*

CLASSIFIED  
ZTR 111 11 11:49

*To D. L. A - ✓ 8/11  
OK - D. R. J.*

SecDef 8/19  
- Agree w/ CJCS hand-  
written note - ask  
CENTCOM what they think  
- This type of training  
will likely entail using  
our SOF - not conventional  
forces

*e*

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this document becomes

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CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

2002 APR 22 PM 3:16

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
19 April 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 4/19*

SUBJECT: Training Afghan Army (U)

- (U) In response to your question (TAB A) concerning the use of Army or Marines to train the Afghan National Army (ANA) in place of special forces (SF), which are in short supply, the following is provided.
- (S) Per USCENTCOM concept of operations, the unit executing training should be capable of and experienced in the conduct of the training of indigenous forces in an austere and potentially hostile environment. Training forces should possess intercultural relations skills, be trained to work through interpreters and function without robust overhead, command and control or support. Unit must be able to send and receive its own communications.
- (U) According to USCENTCOM, options to train the ANA included SF, Army infantry, Army Reserve training organizations and coalition forces. In consideration of the above criteria, SF is the logical choice for the following specific reasons:
  - (U) Training of foreign forces is a primary mission for SF. They have the Programs of Instruction specifically designed for this mission. Foreign Internal Defense is the responsibility of SF as outlined in title 10.
  - (U) While Marines/Army Infantry can do the light infantry mission, they are not experts at training other forces to do the mission. Additionally, they may require linguistic assistance, whereas, SF have internal capability.
  - (U) SF have recent experience building an Army in Africa.
  - (U) Afghan forces already know/trust SF.

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~~Classified by: LTG G. W. Casey, USA; D-J5  
Reason: (S) (U)  
Declassify on: 19 April 2012~~

**SECRET** SECDEF CONTROL#

X01244 /02

*Doc 8 24M-2191*

# ~~SECRET~~

- (S) Under current operating conditions, although SF are low-density forces, there are enough SF available to support the training of the ANA and current assigned missions.
- (U) Army and Marine forces could potentially conduct the mission, but would likely require greater numbers and time to conduct the training, increasing overall costs.
- (S) The impact of using SF will be mitigated as ANA trainers relieve US trainers ("train-the-trainer" concept). This should occur following the third cycle. Additionally, USCENTCOM may shift to contractors for training as well, which could alleviate the burden on US forces, whose unique capabilities are needed elsewhere in the Global War on Terrorism.

COORDINATION: (U) TAB B

Attachments:  
As stated

Prepared By: Lieutenant General G. W. Casey, Jr., USA; Director, J-5; 695-5618

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: NOV 22 2010

snowflake

\* 226

April 1, 2002 6:47 PM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Training Afghanistan Army

Have we **thought** of using Marines to train the soldiers and border patrol in Afghanistan instead of Special Forces? Why should Special Forces do it? They are in short supply, and Marines and **Army** people are not.

Thanks.

DHR:dm  
040162-52

.....  
Please respond by 04/19/02

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: NOV 22 2010

Tab A

UO7102-02

TAB B

COORDINATION PAGE

USA	Colonel Loving	April 11, 2002
USMC	Colonel Kelley	April 11, 2002
USCENTCOM	Colonel Wilson	April 5, 2002
USSOCCOM	Colonel Chadwick	April 11, 2002

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
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Date: NOV 22 2010

Tab B



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WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

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Date: JUL 1 8 2010

JUN 16 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY COLIN POWELL

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *D*

SUBJECT: Information from Baghdad

You asked how the interagency is being kept abreast of events in Baghdad. Attached is a summary of the main mechanisms by which the interagency is informed on Iraqi matters.

Attachment

cc: Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
Chief of Staff Andrew Card

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
~~UNCLASSIFIED WHEN ATTACHMENT IS DECLASSIFIED~~

X01964 /03

DOC. 10

09-11-2008

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OSD Policy  
11 Jun 03

**Information from on Coalition Provisional Authority Activities in Iraq**

- Daily Coalition Provisional Authority update paper, broadly circulated to State, USAID, Treasury, OSD, Joint Staff and NSC staff.
- Twice-weekly meetings of the Executive Steering Group (ESG) chaired by Frank Miller (with SVTC participation by the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad).
- Twice-weekly special meeting of the Deputies Committee (usual attendees: Feith, Grossman, Hadley, Taylor, McLaughlin, Sharp, F. Miller and Cleveland).
- Communications (by phone, email) between departments and agencies in Washington and their respective representatives at the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad.
- Iraq Status Brief, two editions produced so far, updated weekly and distributed to attendees at Thursday Deputies meetings and to NSC Principals.
- Morning calls among the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor.
- Memos from Ambassador Bremer circulated to Principals by the Secretary of Defense and to Deputies at DC meetings.

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~~SECRET~~



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
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WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



JUL 01 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Supporting the Iraqi Opposition (U)

(S) Organizing the Iraqi Opposition to assist with regime change is needed for two reasons: to ensure legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of other regional players, and to make sure the wrong people don't fill the vacuum created by the end of the Saddam regime.

(S) Regional leaders have argued that it is important for Iraqis to be seen participating in the liberation of their country. Regime change in Iraq should not be simply the result of an American "invasion." This could be an important factor in obtaining regional support.

(S) Even more important, however, is the need to ensure that the post-Saddam vacuum is filled quickly by the right people. An attempt to run Iraqi affairs by ourselves *without* a pre-cooked umbrella group of Iraqi Opposition leaders could backfire seriously. A historical example may be instructive:

- (U) In 1943-44, FDR and Churchill had plans for an Allied Military Government for postwar France (i.e., an occupation government for France as well as Germany). They considered deGaulle a phony. Only when deGaulle was greeted by millions of cheering Frenchmen in June 1944 did they conclude that he indeed represented free France.
- (U) Had FDR and Churchill actually imposed an occupation government, the Communist-dominated resistance would have been the only significant political force on the ground in the country. The Gaullists would have been neutered, and the Communists would have ruled the countryside.

~~Classified by DASD William J. Luti  
Reason: 1.5 (a) (d)  
Declassify on: 17 June 2012~~

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

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~~SECRET~~

- (U) DeGaulle, in power from 1944-46, was able to expand his own political movement and effectively neutralize the Communists.

(S) In Iraq, there are many undesirable opposition elements—a Communist faction, Sunni fundamentalists, and radical Sh'ia—all with presumably some support around the country and in some institutions. Organizing the democratic opposition groups that we favor into a real political-military force is essential to preempt these groups, avoid a political vacuum, and avoid a chaotic post-Saddam free-for-all.

(S) An international presence, or interim international "commission", would not be an adequate substitute for helping friendly indigenous forces establish their political and military authority quickly on the ground.

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~~Classified by DASD William J. Luti  
Reason: 1.5(a)(1)  
Declassify on: 17 June 2012~~

~~SECRET~~

09-M-2208



~~SECRET~~  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



AUG 12 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (CONDOLEEZZA RICE)

Subject: Military Assistance Under the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA)

At the May 1<sup>st</sup> Principals' Committee meeting on Iraq we deferred discussion of my April 8, 2002, memorandum to you on making full use of the ILA, pending other Presidential decisions. It is time to take this up. A U.S.- trained opposition force can play an important role in attaining our Country's goals in Iraq. How we form, train, and equip such a force is a matter we should discuss. I suggest we do so at an early Principals' Committee meeting.

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Date: JUL 18 2010

~~Classified by: DASD William J. Luti  
Reason: 1.5(a)  
Declassify on: 29 July 2012~~

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

APR 1 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Iraqi Interim Authority

It is crucial to our war effort to convince the Iraqi people that:

1. There will be no cease fire.
2. We are intent on changing the regime – there will be no deal that leaves Baathists in power, and
3. The new regime is going to be a free Iraqi government, not a US military government.

In particular, Generals Franks and Abizaid want to organize a highly-visible event *soon* to make these points.

We have developed a mechanism to do this – the Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA). On Sunday, I distributed to the Principals a plan to implement the IIA concept.

We have got to get moving on this. We can't afford to have a protracted interagency debate. This is now a matter of operational importance – it is not too much to say that time can cost lives.

Publicly beginning the process of creating an IIA would be a major boost to our psychological operations, and could be the "tipping point" that energizes Iraqis to throw off the Saddam regime.

The implementation plan we distributed may not be perfect, but we've talked with Generals Franks and Abizaid, and others, and I'm convinced the plan is a reasonable one. Outside the National Military Command Center here in the Pentagon hangs a sign that quotes George Patton: "A good plan executed now is better than a perfect plan next week." I'm sure the interagency process could, over time, come up with a lot of good ideas, but we need a good idea cut-off date.

Unless there is a fundamental objection to what we have proposed, I intend to direct General Franks to coordinate an announcement in Iraq of the formation of an organizing committee to begin implementation of the IIA. This would be the centerpiece of the major public event he described to you at the NSC meeting on Tuesday.

~~Classified by: Donald Rumsfeld, USD(P)  
Reason: (S)  
Declassify on: X6~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

X01171 /03 Doc.8  
DEF CONTROL#  
09-M-2208

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

cc: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Colin Powell  
The Honorable George Tenet  
The Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.  
The Honorable Condoleezza Rice

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Date: JUL 18 2010

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09-M-2208



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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FOR POLICY

C6/16

11 June 2003

NOTE FOR: SD

FROM: Douglas J. Feith *DJF*

JUN 18 2003

*4/12  
1/2003*

You may want to send the attached.

cc: DSD  
VCICS

*cc to  
V.P.  
of the Tenet*

*Power  
by hand  
for ES Merritt  
-96  
06/16/03*

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Date: JUL 18 2010



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Date:

JUL 18 2010

JUN 19 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR JERRY BREMER

FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Response to your "should we pay the ex-military" proposal

I agree with the need to address the unemployment situation among Iraq's ex-military personnel. The longer we wait to address this problem the more susceptible they will become for recruitment by organized crime and/or Baathist elements.

I believe your first option – "paying them on a continuing basis an amount less than what they would have received had they retired" – is preferable to the other options. Payments distributed in this manner reduce the incentives for former military personnel to engage in anti-coalition activities.

This option should buy us time for former military personnel to reintegrate into Iraqi society. However, the preferred option is to hire them to do real work that is needed in Iraq—police, border guards, oil industry protection, trash removal, construction, etc.



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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 18 2010

SC [signature]

15 June 2003

CPA Memo

To: SecDef  
From: Ambassador Bremer  
Subject: Should we pay the ex-military?

We have been studying the problems that the disbanded Iraqi armed forces pose to force protection, general security, and law and order. When we dissolved the MOD and the old armed forces, we dismissed their employees. That has left some 230,000 officers and NCOs unemployed. At the time of dissolution, we decided to continue to pay pensions to widows and disabled and also to officers who had retired prior to April 16, 2003, and, consistent with the basic de-Baathification edict, we made clear we would not pay anything to those in the top four party ranks, who turn out to number about 9000. That still leaves tens of thousands, some of whom have been demonstrating in cities around Iraq protesting their not having been paid. This discontent among a respected group with training in weapons and with networks of contacts and loyalties presents a significant threat.

Virtually all above the rank of LTC, and about half those below, would have been eligible to retire under the regime's laws. The issue is how, if at all, they should be paid. There are essentially three options: (1) pay on a continuing basis an amount not too much short of what they would have received had they retired; (2) make a single termination payment; and (3) defer the issue until there is an Iraqi body that can at least share in the decision.

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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date:

JUL 18 2010

The military commanders here strongly favor the first course, because they believe it would forestall an increasingly vocal and violent opposition from the former military that threatens to become a grave danger to both our troops and our mission but could be reclaimed by such payments. Paying the necessary amounts would, however, mean a big disparity between what the military and civil service retirees get, with heavy pressures for very expensive equalization of benefits. The second option is what the dissolution order contemplated, but one-time payments would be far less likely to calm military protests . The third option forces the Iraqis to share in a hard decision, with long-term implications, but it leaves the issue a continuing source of controversy with an increasingly impatient group of officers which will pose a further risk to our troops here— and may accelerate the debate over how the IIA will participate in decisions that affect security.

I would welcome your guidance during our call Monday afternoon, since I intend to raise the issue at this Thursday's Political Committee meeting. I will seek to get their sense of how a decision for any of the three options would be received by the general public and affect the attitudes of former military and how the emerging political leadership would view a decision to defer the issue until the IIA can participate.



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Date: JUL 18 2010

JUN 21 2003

**MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR L. PAUL BREMER**

**SUBJECT: Forming the Interim Administration**

- Your effort to broaden the Coalition Provisional Authority's acquaintance with potential leaders throughout Iraq gives me confidence that a Political Council and Constitutional Conference can quickly be in place. The sooner the better, in my view, to put an Iraqi face on governance tasks and on the process that Baathists are attacking. Early creation of an Interim Administration (IA) should help refute Baathists' claims of popular support.
- I think we should look for ways to involve Iraqis more in the selection of members -- while ensuring that qualified, representative leaders are selected, and without slowing the process. Without some additional element of Iraqi participation in the selection, there is risk that selectees will be tainted as creatures of the U.S.
- One course might be to convene regional assemblies to select nominees. If we invite the attendees to the regional assemblies, we can be reasonably confident they will select acceptable nominees.
- I am open to other ideas on forming the IA quickly with members whom the Iraqis see as reflecting their own preference.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECDEF CONTROL# X02077 103

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09-M-2208

09-M-2208

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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
3000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000  
OSD Policy 20 Jun 03 9:00 AM  
2003 JUN 23 AM 11:14 ACTION MEMO

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_  
FROM: Douglas J. Feith /s/ 6/21/03  
SUBJECT: Forming the Iraqi Interim Administration

- Ambassador Bremer has provided a road map for the Iraqi political process (Tab A).
- We agree with him that it would be helpful to have in place -- soon-- an Iraqi political body representing the post-Saddam transition to the world and to Iraqis. The two bodies of the Interim Administration, the Political Council and the Constitutional Conference, will fill this role and will also move Iraq toward self-government.
- The speed of this process is important, to put an Iraqi face on the governance tasks and on the process and institutions which Baathists are attacking.
  - We support Ambassador Bremer's ambitious timeline (mid-July for the Political Council, end of July for the Constitutional Conference).
- Ambassador Bremer plans to appoint the members of the Political Council and the Constitutional Conference.
- One recommendation you may want to make to him, on the other hand, is that the Interim Administration may enjoy greater legitimacy among Iraqis if they see some public role for themselves in the selection process.
  - Some Iraqi politicians have criticized the Coalition for not permitting Iraqis to select their leaders.
- One way to involve Iraqis while maintaining Coalition control would be for the Coalition to invite local notables to regional meetings which would select nominees for a proportion of the Political Council seats.
  - Ambassador Bremer would then confirm the nominees.
  - Such a process would demonstrate our trust in the judgment of Iraqis.

~~Classified by DUSD(SP-NESA) William J. Lutz  
Reason: 1.5 (d)  
Declassify on: 16 Jun 2013~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECDEF CONTROL X02077 103

09-17-2208

DOC. 13

~~SECRET~~  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RECOMMENDATION: that you sign the memorandum outlining this approach to Ambassador Bremer at Tab B.

COORDINATION: None  
Attachments: as stated.

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

Drafted by: C. Straub [REDACTED]

DUSD(SP-NESA) WA 20 JUN 2003

ASD/ISA PMC

PDASD/ISA \_\_\_\_\_

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

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# POLITICAL PROCESS

Page determined to be Unclassified  
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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 18 2010

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# PRINCIPLES

- Iraq will hold elections to choose its own government as soon as a new Constitution is written and approved by the Iraqi people.
- Until then, Iraq will be governed by the Coalition with the assistance of an interim administration of Iraqis. This interim body will have real responsibilities and will make decisions that will shape Iraq's future.

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 18 2010

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# INTERIM ADMINISTRATION

- CPA is working with Iraqis to identify a set of individuals who could represent Iraq's diverse population in an interim administration.
- We have launched a National Dialogue. In the next month, members of the CPA will travel to every governorate in Iraq to consult with Iraqis about the political process.
- Iraqi participation will come in two distinct processes:
  - Political Council to participate in the immediate tasks of government. This Council will be formed by mid-July. <sup>25-30</sup> <sub>people.</sub>
  - Constitutional Conference to shape the country's future governing structure.

UNCLASSIFIED

Page determined to be Unclassified  
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Date: JUL 18 2010

# **POLITICAL COUNCIL**

- **Face of the Iraqi people; body with responsibilities that increase over time.**
- **25 to 30 Members to be selected by CPA following nationwide consultations;**
- **Council will nominate Iraqi Interim ministers – working with, not under, Coalition Advisers;**
- **Council will decide own organization, e.g. elected chairman, or collective presidency with rotating chairman. Council may create nominate the members of special commissions in areas such as Judicial Reform, Elections, DeBaathification, Educational Reform, Human Rights, Property Claims, or economic matters;**
- **No Council member may serve as a minister, but members may serve on special commissions or staff them with own members or other Iraqis.**

UNCLASSIFIED

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 18 2010

# CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE

- Approving a constitution is the first step towards an electoral process; *100-200 people*
- CPA will convene a Constitutional Conference of members selected by CPA following nationwide consultations. Size/composition depends on the outcome of nationwide consultations;
- Will be for Conference to decide how it wishes to proceed, but one immediate issue will be to decide what form of government the people of Iraq want – constitutional monarchy, parliamentary or presidential system. This could be decided either through an initial vote of the convention, or by a national referendum;
- After initial debate, expect that conference would select one or more drafting committees. Conference would adjourn during drafting, reconvene to debate draft. Important that there be substantial media coverage, permitting an informed public debate of the issues.
- When ratified, new constitution would be submitted to a national referendum.

UNCLASSIFIED

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 18 2010

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UNCLASSIFIED

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 18 2010

# TIMING

- Once a new Constitution is in place, Iraq will hold free elections to choose its own leaders;
- How long this process takes is up to the Iraqi people. The constitution must be both written by them and accepted by them;
- Once the constitution has been approved, Iraq can begin preparations for elections for a democratic government.

UNCLASSIFIED

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 18 2010

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass. Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

TO: Doug Feith  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
DATE: July 25, 2003

RE:

We've got to have a plan if and when we catch or kill Saddam Hussein. We might as well think it through beforehand and know precisely what is going to be done in terms of the body, publicity, what we do if he's alive, what we do if he's dead. It seems to me the time to think about that is now rather than later. Maybe I'm just too hopeful.

Thanks.

DHR/azn  
072503.02azn.S

Please reply by: 8/5/03

~~SECRET~~

SECDEF CONTROL#

X04041 103

09M-2208

Doc. 14

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

~~SECRET~~

SDS  
-15



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**  
#-01/012486

INFO MEMO

October 13, 2001, 1:45p.m.

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Y 10/16  
10/14/01

SUBJECT: De-conflicting Humanitarian Assistance and Military Operations (U)

- (U) This paper responds to your request to know how we are de-conflicting civil humanitarian assistance and military operations in Afghanistan.
- (U) CENTCOM, State Department, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) are represented at a large civil center in Islamabad. UN, USAID, and other State Department representatives are also with CENTCOM in Tampa.
- (S) Flow of tactically-relevant data will go from Islamabad to Tampa, with policy issues addressed in Washington, either through the interagency process or the (Under Secretary for Global Affairs) Dobriansky Committee at State. CENTCOM participates in interagency humanitarian teleconferences.
- (S) USAID and State had significant input at CENTCOM in planning airdrops.
- (S) UN and major NGOs have recently visited Pentagon. OSD-Joint Staff coordination on these issues is constant and excellent.
- (S) CENTCOM efforts are led by an Army Civil Affairs general officer. Command is building a Humanitarian Affairs Task Force to help the combatant commander.

COORDINATION: TAB A.

Prepared by: Joseph J. Collins, DASD PWHA. [REDACTED]

copy to:  
ASD ISA  
ASD SO/LIC

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Joseph Collins  
Reason: [REDACTED]  
Declassify on: 13 OCT 2011

→ SD 10/14/01  
My Deputy Assistant Secretary, Joe Collins, says he has not been able to find any basis for any complaints that the food aid is stopped because of inadequate deconfliction procedures.

Doug Feith

Doc. 15

SECDEF CONTROL# X01679 /01  
09-M-2208  
09M-2208



DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

~~SECRET~~

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY  
BAGHDAD

019 007 000 000 7:20

19 October 2003

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Paul Bremer <signed>  
SUBJECT: Muqtada al-Sadr

Mr. Secretary:


Following up on our conversation yesterday, I thought you should see Mike Gfoeller's most recent analysis of the threat Muqtada al Sadr poses to the coalition in his area of operation (the Shia heartland).

"Stability is the sine qua non of our success in this region. The challenge posed by Muqtada al-Sadr now dominates the political and security situation in our region's Shi'ite provinces and directly threatens the success of our mission. As both the GCs and I have reported in detail, Sadr's baleful and destructive influence is now felt in all five provinces of the Shi'ite Heartland, from al-Wasit to Najaf. His actions in Karbala, which have sparked a crisis costing the lives of three American military personnel and several Iraqi police, very nearly took that city from our grasp, at least for a short while. It is no exaggeration to say that his growing influence threatens to undo all the progress we have made here since May.

Permit me to restate my strongly held view that Sadr and his twelve senior aides, listed in the warrants referring to the death of Ayatollah al-Khoie, should be arrested for murder. Until Sadr and his henchmen are behind bars, we will know no peace in the Shi'ite Heartland. It is abundantly clear from his actions and statements that his ultimate purpose is to achieve supreme power in Iraq in a manner similar to that employed by al-Khomeini in Iran 24 years ago. Like Khomeini, Sadr believes in the doctrine of "wilayat al-Faqih," or the rule of Islamic religious scholars. The longer we leave him unpunished, the greater his prestige grows in the eyes of the fanatical minority already devoted to his cause, and the greater is the intimidation and fear felt by the vast majority of Shi'a who hold him in disdain.

Moreover, our own prestige in the region will continue to decline so long as the Shi'ite majority believe that we are afraid to punish Sadr for his crimes. The primary motivating idea of Shi'ite Islam is a profound demand for justice, a demand that the Shi'ite faithful believe is often ignored in this world. Unless justice is seen to be done with regard to Sadr, we will never be able to establish true stability in this region of Iraq."

CC: Secretary Powell  
Dr. Rice  
General Abizaid



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SECRET CONTROL # X03625-103 Doc. 16  
09M-2208

~~SECRET~~

EF-7244  
I-03/014581

October 20, 2003

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Saddam Hussein

The attached memo is addressed only to CPA; it is not also addressed to CENTCOM. If we capture Saddam Hussein, CENTCOM is just as important as Bremer.

Please have someone think through all the people who should receive it, correct the memo and send it back to me for signature.

Thanks.

Attach.  
9/29/03 SecDef memo to USD(P) re: Saddam Hussein [092903-21]  
10/15/03 Luti memo to SecDef re: Immediate Considerations

DHR:dh  
102003-28

.....  
Please respond by 10/24/03

Sir,  
Revised memos attached.  
vr/CDR Nosemy  
10-22

*10/22*  
*20 OCT 03*

*Here  
Abi-  
Clear*

U17991 /03

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21-10-03 12:37 IN

~~UPON REMOVAL OF THIS DOCUMENT FROM THE SYSTEM IT IS TO BE RECLASSIFIED~~

Doc. 17

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY  
BAGHDAD

10 November 2003

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld  
FROM: Paul Bremer  
SUBJECT: Strategy for Iraq's Political Transition

OSD 1.4 ( d )

Based on my meeting with the Governing Council's presidential group of nine last Thursday, and on subsequent conversations with [redacted] and other GC members, I have concluded that the time has come to readjust our planned program for Iraq's political transition. Although 20 of 24 GC members support our proposal to choose delegates to a constitutional convention through the use of indirect "local elections," it is now clear that they are unwilling to force that option on the religious Shi'a members of the Council. My discussions with these Shi'a members persuade me that it would be a mistake to encourage such a move.

At the Thursday meeting, Talabani talked about generating a consensus in advance on basic principles for eventual inclusion in the permanent constitution. In discussions with him and others, we have been working to synthesize this notion into an overall political plan that is compatible with our objectives. What has evolved is an alternative way forward that would include the drafting of a transitional constitution or "basic law" by the GC (in coordination with CPA), the conduct of direct elections to fill the legislative and/or executive bodies created by that transitional constitution in late summer or early fall of 2004, and the recognition of a fully-sovereign Iraqi Transitional Government shortly thereafter. The transitional constitution would be unamendable, and would include a sunset provision and a clear timetable for the drafting of a permanent constitution.

In accordance with the provisions of the transitional constitution, the new government would initiate a process for the drafting of a permanent constitution by a separate body to be directly elected by the Iraqi people. This would be followed by popular ratification, national elections, and the first Iraqi government under its permanent constitution.

This alternative would meet many of the concerns about the political timetable raised by members of the GC over the past few months, and would be consistent with our own interests as well. [redacted]

[redacted] It would meet the requirement

OSD 1.4 ( d )

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SECDEF CONTROL

X03982 / 103

Doc. 18  
09-M-2208

Mm0000

of the religious Shi'a that Iraq's permanent constitution be drafted by a directly-elected body. Finally, 

While ideally we would wait until a permanent constitutional process were complete before ending the occupation, this proposal is the best alternative course of action available to us. The transitional constitution option would ensure an honorable end to the occupation under the desired timeframe. We would recognize a fully sovereign Iraqi government only after establishing a transitional constitution respecting democracy and human rights, and after holding the first free and fair elections in Iraq's history. While there is a risk involved with holding national elections this early, we could mitigate the dangers by making certain that the transitional constitution protects individual liberties, establishes the separation of powers, and presents a clear timetable for the drafting and adoption of a permanent constitution. During this period we would use the time to identify and nurture potential national leaders.

In parallel to this process, we would need to negotiate a series of bilateral agreements with the GC. These would grant authority to the Coalition to continue to station forces in Iraq to conduct stabilization operations, and would govern the management and expenditure of U.S. taxpayer funds for Iraqi reconstruction. We would try to include these agreements in the transitional constitution.

Once the transitional constitution is complete, we would also consider returning to the United Nations Security Council to obtain a third UNSCR. This resolution could endorse the transitional plan, and could make explicit reference to the timelines specified in the transitional constitution for establishing a process by which Iraq would write and ratify a permanent constitution.

We must move rapidly if we are to secure this compromise before Talabani travels later this month and well before the 15 December UNSCR deadline. I would like your guidance as soon as possible.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

CC: Secretary Powell  
Dr. Rice

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 10, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid  
Jerry Bremer

CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith  
LTG J. Keith Kellog (Ret.)  
LTG John Craddock

*Ruban Jeffery*

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date:

JUL 18 2010

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Security Elements

The U.S. is going to put a great deal of money and stake a lot on being successful in developing the Iraqi security elements—army, border patrol, civil defense corps, site protection and police.

Therefore, I need to have a single individual we can go to who will keep track, on a continuing basis, of what is taking place with respect to each of those activities in Iraq. A reporting mechanism will need to be designed so we can monitor regularly and so we are assured if anything is starting to go off track or lag.

The kinds of things we will need to track on at least a weekly basis include:

- How we are doing in assuring appropriate leadership for each of these organizations—leadership is key.
- Fashioning an end game for each of these organizations and understanding how we will avoid creating local militias.
- Aggregate data to show what is working and not working.
- Knowing the rhythm for each of the elements in terms of their training cycles. For example, with the police, some go out with 8 weeks training and some with 4 weeks. Those with 4 weeks' training will be brought back in to get the additional 4 weeks at some point. We need to know the phasing.
- We will need to monitor and assess training procedures and the numbers of trainees, to assure our efforts are adjusted among the four security services to fit the evolving security situation on the ground.

*Doc. 19*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

X04019 / 03

CLASSIFIED CONTROL

*09-M-2208*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- We need clarity as to the types of assignments each of the four organizations will undertake.
- The names each element will be called and how ought we to talk about them. Do we want to use "national guard" for example, instead of "civil defense"?
- How well are we managing the vetting process? Can it be improved?
- Are we developing appropriate counterintelligence capabilities to alert us when vetting failed.
- Who is responsible for each activity? How well are they performing?
- What is the chain of command for each element and how might they evolve over time?
- How are costs being managed?
- Are we meeting our targets?
- Other.

How do you recommend we approach this? Possibly the new COO of the CPA, General Kellogg, can work with General Sanchez to make a recommendation.

DHR:dh  
110703.6S

Please respond by 11/21/03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

November 10, 2003

TO: Gen. John Abizaid  
CC: Gen. Dick Myers  
LTG John Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: SOF

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

I am concerned about the low number of SOF we have in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Please do a review and let me see why you believe we have the right number,  
given that the problems are growing, not declining.

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
110703-15

.....  
Please respond by 11/21/03

X04002 / 03

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Doc. 20

DFM-2208

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

MEMO TO: GEN Schoomaker      DATE: November 12, 2003  
          Gen Hagee  
          GEN Abizaid  
          Doug Feith

FROM:     Secretary Rumsfeld *D.A.*

CC:       Paul Wolfowitz  
          General Myers

SUBJECT:  Equipping Iraqi Security Forces

As we accelerate the buildup of Iraqi security forces, we need to do a better job of equipping them. At present, they are being issued uniforms from the former regime, which are unpopular with the forces and with the populace. At the same time, the forces lack cold weather/rain gear, sturdy boots, body armor/flak vests/helmets, communications gear, night vision aids, trucks, and machine guns.

CENTCOM should compile a complete list of uniform and equipment requirements to ensure a satisfactory equipping level for Iraqi security forces.

The Army and Marine Corps should survey their surplus stocks and identify useable items that could be provided to Iraqi security forces.

USDP and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency should identify any excess defense articles that could be used by Iraqi security forces.

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DRAFT WORKING PAPERS

Doc. 21

X04090 /03  
-ECDEF CONTROL# 09-M-2208

09M-2208

**SECRET**

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

**MEMO TO: Secretary of Defense**

**November 28, 2003**

**FROM: Paul Wolfowitz**

**SUBJECT: CERP Funds**

Don,

We had a group in here Thanksgiving morning to get the attached instruction out to Bremer and Abizaid to try to get the CERP funding onto a stable path, to ensure that when we transition to having some portion of CERP provided by appropriated funds this is not another disruption in the flow of funds to commanders. I also wanted to nail down Jerry's commitment to me on the telephone on Wednesday that he would provide \$100 million from seized assets for CERP, before Bremer's meeting with the military commanders today.

As you may recall, we were successful in getting Congress to add \$180 million in authority in the '04 Supplemental to permit us to fund CERP with appropriated funds. However, various restrictions like the Berry Amendment will apply to how we use that money. Hence, the transition process from use of seized assets, which have no such restrictions, could be complicated. We want to make sure that the complications don't end up leaving the commanders out of "ammunition."

The \$180 million authority can be used in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Afghanistan doesn't yet have a CERP program, and I think it's unlikely that they could make use of much more than \$20-40 million in this fiscal year. John Abizaid agrees, and he is comfortable with the initial allocation of \$140 million to Iraq. We will decide on the split of the remaining \$40 million based on Abizaid's recommendation.

The message also asks commanders to identify their real needs for CERP. We need to develop a long-range plan for CERP that is based on a realistic needs assessment rather than assumed resource constraints. While resources are always constrained, this is one account that should not be underfunded.

John Abizaid personally told Pete Pace that he was extremely grateful that this work was being done, particularly on Thanksgiving Day.

Doc. 22

*Paul W.* X04371 #03  
-ECDEF CONTROLS-

**SECRET**

DA-M-2208

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
CABLES DIVISION**

**FAX TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET**

Telephone: Comm: [REDACTED] DSN: [REDACTED]  
Facsimile: [REDACTED]

**To: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DONALD RUMSFELD**

**Fax Number: [REDACTED]  
From: LTC COX**

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

**Subject: Principles of Iraq**

**Number of Pages Including Cover: 5**

**Remarks:**

**CLASSIFICATION: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~**

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

Doc. 23

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECDEF CONTROL# X01552 /03

09-M-2208

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
 Authority: EO 13526  
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
 Date: JUL 18 2010

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DRAFT/WORKING PAPERS

# Chronology



Al Qaeda strikes WTC & Pentagon	CJCS issues WARNO to COCOM to Cbt Terrorism	JS Coord Cell activated	SecDef issues "Strat Guidance for Campaign against Terrorism	OEF Initiated against Taliban and al Qaeda	NSC issues NSPD US Strategic goals & obj in Iraq		
11 Sep 01	19 Sep 01	20 Sep 01	3 Oct 01	7 Oct 01	16 Feb 02		
Exercise PROMINENT HAMMER I	Camp David Briefs UK & Australia Planning Conference	CJCS issues PLANORD for possible ops against Iraq	JS J5 Interagency (IA) Pol-Mil Cell created	IDF briefs US- Iraq War implications (US begins planning to keep Israel out of war)	Exec Steering Group (ESG) Initial Meeting	CDRUSCENTCOM discussion on assembling UK forces in Turkey	
12-13 Mar 02	11 May 02	28 Jun 02	9 Jul 02	10 Jul 02	30 Jul 02	12 Aug 02	13 Aug 02
CJCS briefs Iraq Pol-Mil Strat Plan: Northern Front considered critical	Prep for SecDef KSA visit: OSW, overflight, CAOC, intel	POTUS approves Iraq goals, objectives and strategy	POTUS UN speech	CJCS issues PLANORD for training FIF	POTUS issues NSS	PROMINENT HAMMER II	
22 Aug 02	27 Aug 02	29 Aug 02	11 Sep 02	12 Sep 02	17 Sep 02	25-26 Sep 02	

8/1/2003

1

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Doc. 1

09-M-2208

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DRAFT/WORKING PAPERS

# Chronology



<b>CENTCOM War Game</b>	<b>CJCS issues PLANORD for Northern Front Operations</b>	<b>CJCS meets with Saudi Defense officials</b>	<b>POTUS Post-Strat brief: DoD designated lead agency</b>	<b>CJCS issues NMSP for War on Terrorism</b>	<b>1003V published</b>
4-5 Oct 02	7 Oct 02	27-28 Oct 02	28 Oct 02	29 Oct 02	31 Oct 02

<b>UNSCR 1441</b>	<b>DoS sends cables to 52 countries</b>	<b>CDRUSCENTCOM P4 to SecDef outlining six major task for success</b>	<b>UNMOVIC enters Iraq</b>	<b>USCENTCOM INTERNAL LOOK</b>	<b>"Grey Beard" planning &amp; insights project</b>	<b>IA Contingency Exercise</b>	<b>Coalition Working Group (CWG) established</b>
8 Nov 02	15 Nov 02	24 Nov 02	27 Nov 02	8 Dec 02	11 Dec 02	13-14 Dec 02	17 Dec 02 19 Dec 02

<b>PLANORD MOD 06 released for PW planning Org (TF 4)</b>	<b>PH IV EXORD released: USJFCOM form TF 4</b>	<b>US AMB to KSA presents updated 1003V requests to Saudi's</b>	<b>CJCS Issues PLANORD for COCOM &amp; Service potential risks</b>	<b>CJCS trip to Turkey</b>	<b>NSPD 24 published establishing ORHA</b>	<b>Exercise PREDOMINANT CHALLENGE</b>
19 Dec 02	10 Jan 03	11 Jan 03	16 Jan 03	19-20 Jan 03	20 Jan 03	27-28 Jan 03

8/1/2003

~~SECRET//NOFORN(SNF)~~

# Chronology

FIF Training begins in Hungary	SecState UN presentation	Saudi's agree in principle to PSAB requests	OIF brief to Key Israeli Leaders	EUCOM (CENTCOM controlled) info sharing in Tel Aviv begins	Pakistanis capture #3 al Qaeda (KSM) FIF deployed CENTCOM AOR	POTUS issues 48 hour ultimatum		
1 Feb 03	5 Feb 03	12 Feb 03	14-15 Feb 03	16 Feb 03	1 Mar 03	17 Mar 03		
ELABORATE CROSSBOW I Seminar	Operation IRAQI FREEDOM begins w/ strike against Hussein	CJCS/SecDef policy message to keep Israel out of war Ground war begins	Exercise ELABORATE CROSSBOW	FIF training suspended (76 grads)	US units enter Baghdad suburbs	US planes land at Baghdad airport	Major Cbt Opns concluded	
18-20 Mar 03	19 Mar 03	20 Mar 03	25-26 Mar 03	31 Mar 03	5 Apr 03	6 Apr 03	15 Apr 03	
<b>Major combat operations</b>								
POTUS declares major combat opns over – stability & security phase	L. Paul Bremer appointed special envoy	Exercise ELABORATE CROSSBOW II	Terrorist attack 3 western compounds in KSA	"Mayor of Baghdad" asked to step down	L. Paul Bremer arrives in Baghdad	UNSCR 1483 passed lifting sanctions		
1 May 03	7 May 03	7-8 May 03	12 May 03	12 May 03	13 May 02	22 May 03		

8/1/2003



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~SECRET~~  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400  
INFO MEMO

OCT 12 2001 *ML*



I-01/012479

October 12, 2001 6:36 PM

*y 14/1700*

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

*OSD*  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, [redacted]) *JWR*

SUBJECT: (S) Why Time is of the Essence in the Afghan Campaign

- **Momentum.** Exploiting the tide of battle is critical for the United Front. Our air campaign has been overwhelming. It has shocked the Taliban. If we hold back on hitting their front-line ground troops, it may break our momentum and discourage anti-Talib defections. Survival of their front-line forces would "prove" that "God is with them."
- **Weather.** Bad winter weather will slow down our air campaign and the United Front's ground campaign. If not defeated soon, Taliban/al-Qaida forces could survive for months, and boost their fighting spirit. If they survive into the winter, it could be a protracted fight.
- **Take Kabul soon.** Reinforce success by heavy air strikes on Taliban/al-Qaida front line ground forces around Kabul (and other cities). US can act as an honest broker with United Front commanders to ensure Pashtuns share in taking Kabul.
- **Arrival of International Radicals.** Defeat Taliban/al-Qaida forces in the next few weeks before international extremist jihadis from Indonesia, Morocco, Algeria, the Philippines, and elsewhere arrive to reinforce them. If the Taliban and their hero bin Laden are defeated soon, the enthusiasm of the jihadis will be broken.
- **Arm and Advise.** Ammunition is running out and opposition commanders need US military advice and coordination soon to capitalize on the shock of the air campaign.

*OSD*  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

Prepared by: William J. Luti, [redacted]

DASD *WJLuti 10/12*

~~Classified by DASD William J. Luti  
Reason: 1 (S)  
Declassify on: 12 Oct 2011~~



CDREF-CONTROL# X01637 /01

*Doc 2 09-M-2208*

Coordination Page

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

Mr. Douglas J. Feith

ADJ 10/12/01  
CF

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA)

Mr. Peter W. Flory

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 18 2010

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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

~~SECRET~~  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2400



7:07 APR 11 AM 9:14

INFO MEMO

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

I-02/005168

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, [redacted])

OSD [signature] 08 APR 2002

SUBJECT: Afghan Army

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

- Attached next under is the one-page point paper you requested on the Afghan Army.

COORDINATION: Tab A

Attachments:  
As stated

DONE

Prepared by: Mustafa Popal, ISA NESAs, [redacted]

DASD [signature] 05 APR 2002

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

~~Classified by: DASD NESAs William J. Luti  
Reason: [redacted]  
Declassify on: 5 April 2012~~

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SERIALIZED FOR DISSEMINATION~~



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09-M-2208

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Date/Time: 8 April 02/1 100

### POINT PAPER ON AFGHAN ARMY

#### How we plan to work building and developing the Afghan Army

- Implement SecDef-approved (Quick Start) CENTCOM training plan. Training to begin in May. Multi-ethnic cadre to be provided by Afghan Interim Administration (AIA) and trained by Special Forces A Teams.
- Support assets (logistics/equipment/supplies/funds) will be solicited from other nations and coordinated through CENTCOM.

#### Who else is going to help?

- AIA endorsed CENTCOM plan in Geneva (Apr 2-3). EU will likely focus efforts on training 12k border control forces. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CENTCOM will compile/deconflict international offers; Afghan government will make final decision.

OSD 1.4 (d)

#### What is it going to cost?

- Estimated total cost for 18 months (end of FY03): \$76 million (\$20 million for training/equipment and \$56 million for garrison/sustainment).
- Salaries not included in estimate. Will depend on overall force size (AIA est. 66-70k men). State working with UN to establish Trust Fund for Afghan military and has requested \$20M/FY02 for salaries. *Emergency & Extraord. Superd. Fd*
- DoD funds (CIF, EEE, Drawdown) to cover \$4 million costs for first training cycle. Follow-on costs to come from Supplemental (FMF/IMET), future DOS appropriations, and donor contributions.

*Afghan Interim Auth.*

*CINC Initiative Fund*

#### What the schedule is

- Duration: 18 months with six 12-week training cycles. First training cycle to commence in May 2002. Afghan trainers will conduct training under CENTCOM supervision in third cycle (Nov 02-Jan 03).
- Total trained over 18 months: 12,600 (16 light infantry battalions/1600 men each and 10 border battalions/300 men each).

#### How we are organized

- ISA NESAs will have lead on Afghan army matters and will coordinate efforts with SO/LIC Stability Operations.

*Sec Collin's organization*

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 Reason: 1.3  
 Declassify on: 5 Apr 2012

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 Date:

JUL 18 2010

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EF/LSO

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

May 17, 2002 7:40 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Opposition

*NESA  
for 5/20*

I think an info memo to the senior people in the NSC on the subject of Rodman's memo here might be useful. Why don't we get one fashioned.

Thanks.

Attach.  
05/09/02 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: Support for Iraqi Opposition

DHR:dh  
051702-5

.....  
Please respond by 5/21/02

*USDP*

*ISA has 1*

*5/17/02*

*5/18/02*

*→ PWR*

*This shd go out on Monday 5/20.*

*Glad that JD liked your memo. Do it as a memo from JD to Principals (VP, Powell, Rice, Tenet) DJP*

05-17-02 16:07 IN

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5/9



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

EF 1536

INFO MEMO

I-02/007190

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, [REDACTED])

09 MAY 2002

SUBJECT: Support for Iraqi Opposition (U)

(U) Organizing the Iraqi Opposition to assist with regime change is needed for two basic reasons:

- legitimacy, particularly in the region, and
- making sure the wrong people don't fill the vacuum.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WWS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

Legitimacy

OSD 1.4 (d)

(f) Regional leaders seem to be of the view that Iraqis need to be seen as participating in the liberation of their country. It should not be seen as just an "American invasion." [REDACTED]

- This is likely to be an important factor in obtaining regional support.

Filling the Vacuum

(f) Even more important may be the need to ensure that the post-Saddam vacuum is filled quickly by the right people.

A historical analogy is instructive:

- In 1943-44, FDR and Churchill had plans for an Allied Military Government for postwar France (i.e., an occupation government for France as well as Germany). They considered deGaulle a phoney. Only when deGaulle was greeted by millions of cheering Frenchmen in June 1944 did they conclude that he indeed represented free France.

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CLASSIFIED BY ASD/ISA/PETER W. RODMAN  
Reason(s) 1.4  
DECLASSIFY ON 9 May 2012



05-09-02 11:02 IN  
09-M-2208

~~SECRET~~

- Had FDR and Churchill stuck to their plan, the Communists would have been the only significant political force in the country. The Gaullists would have been neutered, and the Communist-dominated resistance would have ruled the countryside.
- DeGaulle, in power from 1944-47, was able to build up his own political movement and effectively neutralize the Communists.

(S) In Iraq, there are many undesirable opposition elements – a Communist faction, Sunni fundamentalists, and radical Shia – all with presumably some support around the country and in some institutions. Organizing the groups we favor is essential to preempt these groups, avoid a vacuum, and avoid a chaotic post-Saddam free-for-all.

(U) An international presence or interim international “commission” would not be an adequate substitute for helping friendly indigenous forces establish their political authority quickly on the ground.

COORDINATION: TAB A

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

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COORDINATION

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Mr. Douglas J. Feith

*LJF* 5/13/02

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 18 2010

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

~~SECRET~~

EF/LSO

May 17, 2002 7:40 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Opposition

SECDEF HAS STR

JUL 18 2010

*(Handwritten signature/initials in a circle)*

*copy sent to [unclear] [unclear]*  
*He/O*

I think an info memo to the senior people in the NSC on the subject of Rodman's memo here might be useful. Why don't we get one fashioned. 6/25

Thanks.

*Response attached. Feith has approved*

Attach.  
05/09/02 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: Support for Iraqi Opposition

*DLR*  
Larry Di Rita  
4/24

DHR:dh  
051702-5

.....  
Please respond by 5/21/02

*USDP*  
*ISA must*

*5/27/02*

*5/19/02*

*pho*  
*This shd go out*  
*on Monday 5/20.*  
*Glad that JD*  
*liked your memo.*  
*Do it w/ a memo*  
*from JD to principals*  
*(NP, Powell, Rice, Feist) DJF*

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**Date: JUL 18 2010**

**TAB B**

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ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

EF 1536

BCH  
5/9

INFO MEMO

I-02/007190

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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(Peter W. Rodman, [REDACTED])

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~~CLASSIFIED BY ASD/ISA PETER W. RODMAN  
Reason(s) 1.5(d)  
DECLASSIFIED ON 9 May 2012~~

~~SECRET~~



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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHC  
Date: JUL 18 2010

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COORDINATION: TAB A

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

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09-M-2208

COORDINATION

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Mr. Douglas J. Feith

LJF stisler

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 18 2010

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

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EF/650

May 17, 2002 7:40 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Opposition

*NEESA  
for 5/20*

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DHR:dh  
051702-5

.....  
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*USDP*

*ISA has 1*

*5/17/02*

*5/19/02*

*→ PWR*

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from JD to Principals  
(VP, Powell, Rice, Tenet) DJP*

05-17-02 16:07 AM

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Date: JUL 18 2010

**TAB C**

Coordination Page

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

Mr. Douglas J. Feith

6/24/02

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA)

Mr. Peter C. W. Flory

CS

**Page determined to be Unclassified**  
**Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS**  
**IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5**  
**Date: JUL 18 2010**



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



AUG 12 2002

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subj: Planning Guidance for Iraqi Opposition Training

Please provide me a plan to recruit, train, and equip Iraqi armed opposition elements to enable them to be prepared to participate in operations aimed at replacing the Saddam Hussein regime. The training should enable the opposition to be militarily useful and a constructive force in post-Saddam Iraq. Because time is of the essence, the opposition should be trained directly by U.S. military personnel or contract services.

The planning process should present at least two options for an objective Iraqi opposition force: one comprising combat maneuver elements as well as combat support and civil affairs, and a second consisting of combat support and civil affairs only. The plan should:

- Recommend a force provider to recruit, train, and equip the opposition elements, which would then be placed under the operational control of commander, U.S. Central Command.
- Determine the number of opposition personnel to be trained, the skills and levels of competency to be trained, and the date by which training will be complete.
- Determine the equipment to be issued to the opposition.
- Recommend training locations.
- Plan for levying opposition groups for Iraqi volunteers and for assessing and vetting those who volunteer. Volunteers credibly accused of war crimes, humanitarian offenses, or anti-American statements should be barred from training.

I would like to be briefed on this plan by 23 August 2002.

~~Classified by William J. Luti, DASD/NESA  
Reason: 1.5(a)  
Declassify on: 17 July 2012~~

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SECDEF CONTROL#

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**SECRET**  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301-2000

AUG 12 PM 2:56 ACTION MEMO

AUG 13 2002

I-02/011081

POLICY  
FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action

FROM: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy  
(Douglas J. Feith, [redacted])

*8/8/12*

*OSD*

SUBJECT: Training and Employment of the Iraqi Opposition

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

- (S) Attached for your signature is a memo which will put into action the opposition training program we briefed to you on Saturday, July 27<sup>th</sup>.
  - The memo (Tab A) requests a plan from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and incorporates your desire to have an option for an opposition force with combat capability. General Pace has already verbally alerted CENTCOM. Your earlier corrections have been made.
  - The second memo (Tab B) asks the National Security Advisor to place full use of the Iraq Liberation Act on the agenda of the next Principals' meeting on Iraq.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign both memos.

COORDINATION: None

Attachments:  
As stated

*OSD*

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

Prepared by: Chris Straub, [redacted]

DASD *WJL*

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

Classified by: DASD William J. Luti  
Reason: 1.4(f)  
Declassify on: 29 July 2012

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RST  
di



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400  
INFO MEMO



INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WNS  
Date: JUL 18 2010  
USDP 8/17/02  
1-02/011745

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, [redacted])

15 AUG 2002  
OSD  
8/17/02

SUBJECT: Who Will Govern Iraq? (U) 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2) → SD / OSD

(§) The State Department has proposed a Transitional Civil Authority (TCA), led by the United States, to govern Iraq once Saddam is gone. The premise is that (1) the Iraqi opposition is too divided to fill the vacuum on its own, and (2) the U.S. will want to control what happens with Iraqi WMD, oil, etc.

Worth reading, though I don't think that Peter's recommendations are necessarily inconsistent with creating a US-led Transitional Civil Authority.

(§) My concern is that this occupation government may unintentionally prolong the vacuum in Iraq and enable the wrong people to fill it.

Historical Analogies

(§) Historical analogies have been invoked, especially a comparison with recent experience in Afghanistan and the model of occupied Germany and Japan after WWII.

(§) In Afghanistan, the Bonn process succeeded in working out a rough accord among the competing groups, making possible an Interim Authority. Iraq clearly differs from Afghanistan, in that:

- Afghans on the ground (i.e., the Northern Alliance) played a greater role in their country's liberation than is likely in Iraq.
- Iraqi opposition groups have much further to go before they would be capable of a provisional government.

(§) This is what leads some in the USG to study the allied occupation of Germany and Japan after WWII. The theory is that only we can fill the vacuum. But this analogy, too, is flawed:

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CLASSIFIED BY ASD/ISA PETER W. RODMAN  
Reason(s) 1.5(d)  
DECLASSIFY ON 12 August 2008



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- We will have nowhere near the total control in Iraq that we had in Germany and Japan.
- There is already a lively Iraqi opposition, which, despite its current disunity, will be essential for adding legitimacy to a U.S. military action.

(S) A more interesting analogy is with postwar France:

- FDR and Churchill planned an Allied Military Government for France, the same as for Germany. They did not take deGaulle seriously; only after millions turned out to greet him on his return after D-Day did they conclude that he represented Free France as he claimed.
- Had an occupation government been imposed on France, the Communists – who dominated the Resistance – would have taken over the countryside while the allies sat in Paris imagining that they were running the country. Meanwhile, the occupation government would have neutered the Gaullists.
- As it happened, deGaulle in power (1944-46) built up his own movement as a counterweight to the Communists and neutralized them.

### The Iraq Case

(S) While Iraq has no deGaulle, the French experience seems to me more instructive than that of Germany and Japan:

- There are bad guys all over Iraq – radical Shia, Communists, Wahhabis, al-Qaeda – who will strive to fill the political vacuum.
- An occupation government will only delay the process of unifying the moderate forces.
- The best hope for filling the vacuum is to prepare Iraqis to do it.

(S) Thus, I see Afghanistan as the model to be emulated, even if the Iraqis are not yet ready for their Bonn process. **We should accelerate the process of unifying the opposition** – more or less the six organizations that were represented in Washington on 9-10 August – into a coherent political force:

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

- First, they should agree on a common program.
- Using our considerable leverage, we should then press them to form an umbrella group, with the aim of setting up a Provisional Government in the near term.
- The sooner they work out their mutual relations and allocate power among themselves, the better.
- The U.S. has enough leverage to reach firm understandings with this umbrella group or Provisional Government on issues that concern us (e.g., oil; WMD; relations with Turkey, Kuwait, Jordan; Kurdish autonomy).

Prepared by: ASD/ISA Peter W. Rodman, [REDACTED]

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

April 1, 2003 11:32 AM

2003 JUL 30 AM 8:32

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Interim Authority

*ADVANCE COPY SENT*

Please prepare a memo from me to the President on the Iraqi Interim Authority, explaining what we want to do. Please find out from Paul what Gen. Franks told the President in the NSC, then let's get it done and move it.

Thanks.

Attach.  
3/31/03 Policy paper: "Talking Points on the Iraqi Interim Authority"

DHR:dh  
040103-12

.....

Please respond by 4/4/03

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Authority: EO 13526  
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Date: JUL 18 2010

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UPON REQUEST THIS DOCUMENT WILL BE RECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Aut 8/27  
Submit  
per 2/17

OSD Policy  
31 Mar 03

### Talking Points on the Iraqi Interim Authority

- I have been planning to talk to you about a set of issues on postwar Iraq:
  - Governance – how to ensure an Iraqi government in line with your vision.
  - US military footprint in postwar Iraq.
  - Exploiting our post-victory strategic leverage (Iran, Syria, Libya, etc.)
  - Organizing the Coalition Provisional Authority to administer Iraq.
- The first item – governance – is not only a postwar concern. It may be essential to winning the war. General Franks thinks it essential now to put an Iraqi “face” on our operations.
- DoD has put forward an idea for doing this – it involves beginning now to initiate the multi-step formation of the Iraqi Interim Authority.
- Our proposal starts with people we know, and who we know support your vision of a democratic Iraq. These are necessarily Kurds and expatriates.
  - We would quickly include those who have lived under Saddam’s control.
- Postponing this runs a serious risk of leaving a vacuum that will be filled by others who are already organizing.
  - It is better for others to react to our ideas, than for us to have to react to those of others.
  - Iran and Syria are organizing their clients in Iraq. Saudi Islamists will pour money in.
  - Relying only on local leaders will still leave a vacuum at the national level, and makes us dependent on leaders whom we don’t know well.
- Therefore, we should move immediately to announce a process for creating the Iraqi Interim Authority. Leadership of the Free Iraqis could form a core group of an Organizing Committee.
  - This is the best way to support moderate Iraqis who <sup>Support</sup> your vision for Iraq.
  - We have prepared a detailed proposal to accomplish this. We should move quickly to implement it.
  - It is better for others to react to our initiatives than to be reacting to the (unfriendly) initiatives of others.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JUN 9 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Why We Need an IA Sooner Rather Than Later (U)

(U) I agree with you on the need to move quickly to create a leadership council for the Interim Administration. My thoughts on this include the following:

- **(C) Perception:** It will put an Iraqi face on what is now a Coalition military presence. Overnight, the perception (internationally and internally) will shift from occupation to a shared Coalition/Iraqi enterprise.
- **(C) Positive News:** The very fact of our refereeing a cohesive interim structure out of Iraq's ethnic/political diversity will be an important achievement. Delays/frustrations in restoring public utilities will be seen in perspective. Overnight, much of the attention will shift to the political plane.
- **(C) Arab Support:** Arab leaders told me on my recent trip that they would like to see an IIA soon. It would put an Iraqi face on what is happening and give them Iraqis to work with.
- **(C) Iraqi Impatience:** Indications are that Iraqi political/ethnic groups are restless. Standing still may lead to unraveling. Progress toward an IIA may be essential to retard centrifugal forces.
- **(C) Countering the Bad Guys:** Regime remnants are coalescing to some degree and stepping up sabotage. Their dream is a guerrilla insurgency. But guerrilla insurgencies depend on popular support. Progress toward an IIA will help neutralize if not dry up that popular support.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources.  
DECLASSIFY ON: X1



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POLICY

~~SECRET NOFORN~~  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2000

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010  
INFO MEMO

2003 JAN 08 09:21  
DEFENSE

January 8, 2003 7:15:18 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

FROM: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Douglas J. Feith)

DJF by L#  
JAN -9 2003

SUBJECT: Establishing the DoD Postwar Planning Office

- Steve Hadley and I think that the best way to ensure interagency cooperation on the DoD postwar planning office might be to have an NSPD directing the other agencies to provide detailees.
- We have provided the attached draft NSPD to the NSC staff, where it is now being worked.

Prepared by: DUSD(SP-NESA) William J. Luti, [REDACTED]

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

~~CLASSIFIED BY: D.J. FEITH, USDP  
REASON: 1.5  
DECLASSIFY ON: 05/01/13~~

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REC'D CONTROL

X00121 /03



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OSD Policy  
7 Jan 03

### **Draft NSPD on Post-war Planning Office**

If U.S. armed forces occupy Iraq, we will become responsible, in the immediate aftermath of the occupation, for the governance of the country and the welfare of its population. The immediate responsibility will fall on U.S. Central Command – overall success, however, will require a national effort.

To support this effort, the Department of Defense will establish a Post-war Planning Office. The planning office will be responsible for conducting execution-level planning across the spectrum of issues that the USG would face with respect to the post-war governance of Iraq, including:

- Maintaining the internal security and territorial integrity of Iraq.
- Assisting with humanitarian relief.
- Dismantling weapons of mass destruction.
- Defeating and exploiting terrorist networks.
- Protecting energy supplies and infrastructure.
- Facilitating the country's economic reconstruction.
- Reshaping the Iraqi military by establishing non-aggressive, civilian controlled armed forces.
- Supporting the transition to Iraqi-led authority over time.

The office will draw on the interagency work that has already been accomplished in this regard, and will maintain close liaison with the groups already active. It will receive policy guidance from the Executive Steering Group, the Deputies Committee and the Principals Committee.

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

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OSD Policy  
7 Jan 03

The office will build links to the Free Iraqi opposition, the specialized UN agencies and non-governmental organizations that can play a role in meeting the needs of the Iraqi people, and to counterpart planning offices in the governments of coalition countries. Under the policy guidance of the ESG, DC and PC, it will invite representatives of the governments of coalition countries to participate in its efforts.

In the event of a U.S. occupation of Iraq, the planning office would deploy to Iraq to form the nucleus of the administrative apparatus that would assist the authorities installed by the USG to exercise power in Iraq.

To make full use of all the planning that has occurred and is continuing to be done within the USG and to draw on expertise located throughout the government for any additional planning efforts, the planning office will require the full-time services of detailees from across the interagency.

The following departments and agencies should respond immediately to requests by the Department of Defense to supply one or more detailees to work full time with the planning cell:

- State (including AID)
- Treasury and Commerce
- Energy
- CIA (and other intelligence agencies)
- Agriculture

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

09-M-2208

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

OSD Policy  
7 Jan 03

- Education
- Justice
- OMB

The detailees will provide substantive expertise and should be sufficiently senior (SES level – senior O-6 to O-7 in case of military) to coordinate issues throughout their agencies when required.

This effort is of the highest priority and time-sensitivity, and will require the whole-hearted support of your department or agency.

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 18 2010

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09-M-2208



~~CONFIDENTIAL//SI~~  
**THE JOINT STAFF**

Director for Intelligence (J-2)  
Washington, D.C. 20318-2000



APR 8 2003  
**SECDEF HAS SEEN**  
APR 10 2003

~~CONFIDENTIAL//SI~~

C 419

TO: CJCS VCJCS ACJCS DJS

SUBJECT: (S) The Importance of the Tribes in Post-Saddam Iraq

- Expect to play the role of intermediaries between tribesmen and politicians
- Leaders are either educated and sophisticate or poorly educated and have little understanding of events outside their boundaries
- Tend to look at issues from the perspective of their self-interest rather than taking a broader focus

Normally do not commit to a position until convinced it provides the best course of action  
Value consensus among the tribal leadership

1. (S) This desk note provides information related to the upcoming Iraqi opposition meeting inside Iraq and the question of the role of Iraq's tribes in future government.

2. (S) Tribal identification is a critical element of many Iraqis' identity:

- 97% of the tribes are settled, not Bedouin
- 75% of Iraqis identify with their tribe
- Iraq has approximately 25 major tribal confederations, 150 major Arab tribes and 50 major Kurdish tribes
- Some of tribal confederations have 500,000 to 1 million members
- Most Arab tribes have Sunni and Shia wings.

3. (S) How others view tribes:

- The Baath Party was initially hostile to tribalism—seeing it as backwards and a form of feudalism
- Saddam encouraged a tribal resurgence in Iraq, using patronage to buy influence with mixed results
- Political parties see tribalism as a threat because tribal leaders have considerable influence over their tribesmen

4. (S) Tribes:

- Have been a destabilizing force at various times in modern Iraqi history
- Led uprisings against the British occupation in the 1920's and agitated for independence in the 1930s

5. (S) **ASSESSMENT:** The tribes are a political force and tribalism is a reality in contemporary Iraq. If not properly considered, the tribes will confound a transitional administration. Since tribal self-interest transcends regimes, tribal leaders—even those once closely aligned with Saddam's regime—have a strong incentive to work with a post-Saddam government. We believe their inclusion in the political process—even if it requires a separate forum—is essential given their ability to undermine the transformation.

6. (U) Prepared by: SIO, Iraq Intelligence Task Force, [REDACTED]

*To Larry*  
*Handwritten signature*  
GLEN D. SHAFER  
Major General, USAF  
Director for Intelligence, J2

cc:  
J3  
J5  
SECDEF/MA  
DEPSECDEF/MA  
USD/P  
USD/I  
ASD/C3I  
DR/DIA  
DDI

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (2)

X01252 /03

**SECDEF CONTROL**

Classified by [REDACTED] Source  
Res. [REDACTED] Declass on: [REDACTED]

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 13 2010

~~CONFIDENTIAL//SI~~

Doc #1

M-M-2209

TAB

April 2, 2003 7:39 AM

TO: Gen. Pace

CC: Gen. Myers

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Estimated Iraqi Strength in Numbers of People

On the Hill yesterday, Gen. Myers and I didn't know the answers to questions Senator Levin asked about how many overall did we estimate (in terms of numbers of people) were in the following:

1. Iraq's regular army.
2. Republican Guard.
3. Special Republican Guard.
4. Fedayeen Saddam.
5. Any other elements in Iraq.

Page determined to be Unclassified  
 Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
 IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
 Date: JUL 13 2010

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
040203-2



Please respond by 4/9/03

03 APR 5 3:19



*osc 2*

09-M-2209  
Tab

40519303

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

COORDINATION: (U) NONE

Attachment:

As stated

Copy to:

General Pace

Prepared By: Maj Gen Glen D. Shaffer, USA; Director, J-2; [REDACTED]

OSD

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 13 2010

2

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~SECRET~~

June 2, 2003 10:46 AM

TO: LTG Craddock  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Iran

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 22 2010

Please tell [redacted] briefer I would like to see a paper that assesses the Iranian strategy. It is clear they have a strategy.

CIA EO 13526 1.4(c)<25Yrs

What is the size of their effort—how deep does it go?

When will they start killing uncooperative Iraqis?

When will they start killing Americans?

Thanks.

DHR:dh  
060203-1S

.....  
*Please respond by* \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~

REC'D CONTROL# X03457-103

Doc # 3 09M-2210

snowflake

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 22 2010

**SECRET**

9:15 AM  
APRIL 17, 2002

TO: Doug Feith  
cc: Paul Wolfowitz  
Gen. Dick Myers  
Gen. Pete Pace  
Doug Feith

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: **AFGHANISTAN**

I may be impatient. In fact I know I'm a bit impatient. But the fact that Iran and Russia have plans for Afghanistan and we don't concerns me. I keep getting an answer that "the Deputies are working on it." Well I can't believe that it takes that many months to figure it out.

If this were something DoD could do alone, we could get it done. Apparently it is not something that requires an interagency process. Once it goes into the interagency process, it sinks out of sight.

What do you propose we do? How do we get control of the levers so that we can influence what's going on? How do we decide what ought to happen, and then get all the military, diplomatic, humanitarian threats coming through the needle-head?

*CIA* EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs

What do we do about finding out what

What do we do about improving our influence in the South

We are never going to get the U.S. military out of Afghanistan unless we take care to see that there is something going on that will provide the stability that will be necessary for us to leave.

Help!

DIIR/azn  
041502 09s

**SECRET**

X04942 103

SECDEF CONTROL #

*Doc # 5*

*09-11-22 10*

snowflake

**SECRET**CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO  DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR  RELEASE OF  
THIS DOCUMENT : 31-Aug-2010 

October 3, 2002 10:59 AM

TO: Honorable George Tenet  
 CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
 FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*  
 SUBJECT: Evaluating Intelligence on Iraq

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 Authority: EO 13526  
 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
 Date: SEP 22 2010

It is possible that we will end up in Iraq and will have the rare opportunity to see precisely what was actually happening inside the Iraqi leadership and on the ground over the past decade, and in particular during the current crisis. It would be enormously helpful if we developed benchmarks today, before we go in, as to what the U.S. intelligence community assesses the situation to be in Iraq and why.

We could select specific categories, and indicate what the intelligence community assessments are, what they are based on and why. Then, with the advantage of having direct access to Iraqi territory, people and records, we could see exactly what the situation was. We could compare our benchmarks against what we find, and determine why the community assessments were different from the actual facts in the areas where that proves to be the case.

We know something about their denial and deception capabilities, their work underground, dual-use technologies, etc. What about Iraq don't we know? How important are these unknowns? What surprises have Iraqis been preparing, and will they have an important role in a conflict?

Learning precisely what the differences are between our assessments and the full truth, and second, attempting to learn precisely why our assessments were different, if they were different, could conceivably enable us to make major strides in training intelligence analysts, in developing new techniques and in coping with

~~Classified by: SecDef Rumsfeld  
 Reason(s): 1.5(a), (c), (d)  
 Declassify on: X~~

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SECDEF CONTROL

Doc # 4  
X03246 / 02

R-3

09M-2210

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 22 2010

the proliferation of denial and deception techniques. Also, it might help us do a better job of making assessments with respect to the "known unknowns" and the "unknown unknowns," as well as the "known knowns."

If we do it right, it could serve as a fact-based model and an opportunity to make significant improvements in how we do our intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance work.

Any thoughts? We could make this one of the first tasks we ask the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to address with your staff, presuming Congress acts.

DHR/dh  
091202-3S

*Geoff - I had  
planned a visit with you at  
lunch tomorrow, but apparently you had  
to cancel. -  
Give me a call after you think about it -  
Thanks -  
Don*

~~SECRET~~



**SECRET**

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-8999

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 19 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


CM-821-03  
8 March 2003

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMyers/B*

SUBJECT: Chemical/Biological (CB) Preparedness (U)

- (S) In response to your request (TAB A), the following information is provided. US forces are trained and equipped to respond to a wide range of CB situations. I feel confident in the majority of the capabilities relied upon to overcome this scenario (TAB B).



*OSD 1.4 (g,h)  
Army 1.4 (g,h)*

*OSD 1.4 (g)  
Army 1.4 (g)*

*JS 1.4 (a)*

~~Classified By: James E. Cartwright, Lt Gen, USMC, Director, J-8  
Reason: 1.5(a) and (g)  
Declassify On: 20 February 2013~~

*Doc 1*


*09-M-2212*

**SECRET**

SECDEF CONTROL# X00795 /03

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 19 2010

~~SECRET~~



OSD 1.4 (a), (3), (h) 2  
Army 1.4 (a), (g), (h) ~~SECRET~~

SECRET (a)

~~SECRET~~



COORDINATION: NONE

Attachments:  
as stated

OSD 1.4 (a), (3)  
Army 1.4 (a), (9)  
JS 1.4 (a)

Prepared By: LtGen James E. Cartwright, USMC; Director, J-8; 697-8853

~~SECRET~~

# TAB A

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 19 2010

~~SECRET~~

February 13, 2003 1:04 PM

TO: Gen. Myers

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
William Winkenwerder  
Lisa Bradson

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DA*

SUBJECT: Preparedness

How prepared are we if Saddam Hussein were to initiate a pre-emptive chem/bio attack on our forces in Kuwait tomorrow?

Thanks.

Attach.  
02/10/03 CJCS memo to SecDef [X00434/03]

DHR/dh  
021303-1S

.....  
Please respond by 02/17/03

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 19 2010

~~SECRET~~

SECDEF CONTROL

Tab A  
X00794 /03

# TAB B

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 19 2010

JS 1.4 (a)

~~SECRET~~

Army 1.4 (a), (g)

TAB B

OSD 1.4 (a), (g) US FORCES CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL (CB) DEFENSE PREPAREDNESS ASSESSMENT (U)

1. (S) General. US forces are trained and equipped to respond to a variety of known threats through an integrated and tiered package of capabilities that includes: threat awareness, early warning, operational plans, medical pre-treatments, detection and identification systems, personal protective equipment, tactical maneuver, decontamination equipment and supplies and medical response. Taken together, US forces can operate effectively in a limited chemical warfare environment

2. (S) Threat. Iraq is assessed to possess the capability to employ CB warfare agents against US forces at permanent and operationally-fixed sites using theater ballistic missiles, bombing or spraying from tactical aircraft or covert dissemination methods. Additionally, those same agents may be employed against tactical maneuver forces by conventional artillery and artillery rocket systems.

3. (S) Early Warning.

Classified By: James E. Cartwright, Lt Gen, USMC: Director, J-8  
Reason: ~~1.5(2)(A)~~  
Declassify On: 20 February 2013

OSD 1.4 (g)  
Army 1.4 (g)  
JS 1.4 (a)


~~SECRET~~

Tab B

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5. (S) Medical Pre-treatments. All US Service members deploying to Kuwait who are not medically or administratively exempted are being vaccinated against anthrax and smallpox. As of 26 February 2003, over 440,000 personnel deployed to or expected to deploy to higher threat areas such as Kuwait have received at least one immunization for anthrax; over 280,000 (63 percent) have received three or more anthrax immunizations; and over 240,000 have received smallpox vaccinations. At the current vaccination rates, over 440,000 personnel will have received three or more anthrax vaccinations and smallpox vaccinations by early April 2003.



B-2

Tab B


JS L4 (a)

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
7. (S) Personal Protective Equipment. US forces have the capability to shield individuals against exposure to toxic CB warfare agents using currently fielded individual protective equipment. All military Service members and essential DOD civilians in theater have this individual protection capability, which has been significantly improved since the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The key elements are the Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology suit and various protective masks and filters. These key elements are plentiful, correct, strategically placed and are in production in order to provide a large reserve for the present and the future.

8. (S) Command and Control. US forces have the capability to relay early warning and post-attack reports for suspected or confirmed CB warfare events using current command, control, communications, computers and intelligence networks and procedures.



9. (S) Collective Protection. Many combat vehicles, such as the M1 Abrams tank, the M2/3 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, Marine Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), Paladin and MLRS Artillery and military ambulances have protective overpressure or collective protection systems.

10. (S) Protection of Food and Water. Increased force protection and medical surveillance efforts, combined with pre-planned logistics plans to replenish food and water and medical treatment capabilities, have greatly reduced the risk of covert or overt CB contamination of food and water sources. Sealed food sources, such as Meals Ready to Eat, ensure the US force subsistence security posture.



11. (S) Medical Response. A sophisticated, tiered casualty treatment capability is in place for CB warfare patients. US forces have the capability to provide post-exposure treatment against chemical nerve agents using individual or "buddy" administered atropine and pralidoxime chloride. Following self aid and buddy care, decontaminated casualties receive increasing levels of care as they are moved from field

**SECRET**

JS 1.4 (a)

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hospitals to fully capable field hospitals and hospital ships. [REDACTED]

12. (S) Decontamination (Personal and Organizational). US forces have the capability to immediately protect personnel and sustain combat operations at unit level through decontamination by removing or neutralizing chemical warfare agents from skin, personal equipment and critical equipment surfaces. Principal methods include M291/M295 Decontamination Kits for personnel and personal items and M11/M13 hand-held spraying devices for vehicles, crew-served weapons, etc. [REDACTED]

13. (S) Funding. The Senior Readiness Oversight Council has directed expenditure of more than \$200M immediately on many of these items to improve US posture. OSD Comptroller is working to source these capabilities.

OSD 1.4 (g)

Army 1.4 (g)

JS 1.4 (a)

~~SECRET~~

OSD 1.4 (C)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

CIA 1.4 (C)



- Adequate Physical Space at GTMO: We need to turn GTMO into a long term interrogation facility. Your recent briefing with General Hill was the first step in getting the right buildings constructed. You had some questions about comparative costs that are being worked.
- Public and Private Diplomacy: We have been working well with DoD/PA. We are building a good relationship with State Department on this issue. Ambassador Pierre Prosper has done a good job of fending off European pressure, and SO/LIC has been able to get the intelligence community to declassify materials and facts so that he can more effectively make the case.
- Innovation: We do not pretend to have all the answers to the GTMO challenge, though we are working hard at it. When other agencies have proposed good ideas, DoD has grabbed on and implemented.



- We continue to solicit ideas from other agencies and from the Hill. For instance, SO/LIC and the Joint Staff regularly meet with House and Senate Intelligence Committee staffers to collaborate on these matters.

NEXT STEPS: We are preparing a more detailed briefing for you. After we have gone over it with you, we should brief NSC Staff.

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OSD 1.4 (C)

CIA 1.4 (C)

Derived From: Multiple Sources

~~Declassify On: XT~~

DECLASSIFIED In Part JUL 12 2010  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

09-M-2214

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

OCT 15 PM 3:12

INFO MEMO

USD(P): *[Signature]* 10/14/02

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
FROM: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
Marshall Billingslea, PDASD (Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict)  
SUBJECT: Detainees at GTMO

*[Signature]* 10/11/02

- Since taking the job in SO/LIC in August, I have been working to fix a number of problems that we have at GTMO. Here is the state-of-play:
- Transfers/Releases: SO/LIC has instituted a process to determine which detainees should be transferred or released to other nations.
  - The process we put in place in September is now yielding results. This week the Deputy approved release to Afghanistan of 3 detainees, and 1 to Pakistan. I have made clear to our folks that those 4 need to be on a plane heading out of GTMO no later than the 26<sup>th</sup>.
  - There are three more detainees to be considered in the near term. Two may be transferable, but one - [REDACTED] - probably should not be released.
  - I do not expect a huge volume of release recommendations. We did the easy cases first. Most of the rest of the detainees are anti-American and violent.
  - Contrary to rumors circulating among NSC Staff, I do not think there are "200" detainees that can be immediately released. This population has been through several screens in Afghanistan before they arrived at GTMO. Fewer than 1 in 10 captured people have been sent to GTMO.
- Who Runs GTMO?: When I started looking at the detainee issue, it became clear that we needed to work on the process. Two separate JTF's (170 and 160) were in constant conflict with one another.
  - We solved that problem by rolling the two JTF's into a single command. That went into effect this Wednesday.
- Who is Conducting Interrogations, and How? [REDACTED]

OSD 1.4 (C)  
CIA 1.4 (C)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

OSD 1.4 (C)

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
~~Declassify On: X1~~

SECDEF CONTROL# X03426 /02

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\*\*\*\*\* This Message Has Been Altered \*\*\*\*\*

Page 1 of 6

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O O 190848Z SEP 03  
FM HQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTH BAGHDAD  
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC  
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC  
INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE

SEP 03 11:00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

QQQQ  
SUBJ: PATH TO SOVEREIGNTY  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~///DB

MSGID/GENADMIN/HQ CPA/0130//  
SUBJ/PATH TO SOVEREIGNTY//  
GENTEXT/REMARKS/XXXX  
PROG: 17 SEPTEMBER 2003  
APPROVER: PBREMER  
DRAFTER: RMARTINEZ  
CLEAR: SCARPENTER  
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DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 30 2010

FROM: CPA HQ  
TO: SECDEF WASHDC  
SECSTATE WASHDC  
NSC WASHDC  
INFO: IRAQ COLLECTIVE  
BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ CPA HQ 130

~~E.O. 12958: DECLASS: 9/16/08.~~  
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PTER, IZ  
SUBJECT: PATH TO SOVEREIGNTY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (S) (B)

FROM AMBASSADOR BREMER TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD  
1. SUMMARY: THE PATH TO IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY SHOULD RUN THROUGH THE

PAGE 03 RUEOMFD1976 ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS. ANY PROPOSAL TO RESTORE IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY  
BY VESTING IT IN THE GOVERNING COUNCIL (GC) OR IN A "ALTERNATE  
PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT" WOULD ENTAIL A NUMBER OF SERIOUS

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\*\*\* ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ \*\*\*

Doc 2

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SECDEF CONTROL X03209 /03  
09-M-2215

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

\*\*\* C O N F I D E N T I A L \*\*\*  
\*\*\*\*\* This Message Has Been Altered \*\*\*\*\*

Page 2 of 6

DISADVANTAGES. END SUMMARY.

2. ONE MAJOR PROBLEM WOULD BE THE LACK OF ANY FORMAL CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE TO SPECIFY THE POWERS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. RESTORING IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY WITHOUT A NEW CONSTITUTION WOULD ESSENTIALLY GRANT THE GC UNLIMITED AUTHORITY. THERE WOULD BE NO GUARANTEE OF CHECKS AND BALANCES, OR OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS. POLITICALLY, IT WOULD BE NEAR-IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE COALITION TO INTERVENE TO AFFECT ITS DESIRED END-STATE ONCE SOVEREIGNTY WERE RESTORED TO IRAQ.

3. ANOTHER PROBLEM IS THE LACK OF A FORMAL, AGREED-UPON DEFINITION OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE MANY LOCAL COUNCILS WHICH HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED IN GOVERNORATES AND CITIES ACROSS IRAQ. CURRENTLY, THE COALITION PRESENCE HAS ALLOWED REAL POLITICAL POWER TO DEVOLVE TO THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES. LOCAL IRAQI COUNCILS HAVE BEEN FORMED IN EACH OF THE 18 GOVERNORATES, WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF LOCAL COALITION COMMANDERS. THE GC IS ON RECORD AS STRONGLY OPPOSING THE MAKEUP OF THESE LOCAL COUNCILS. IN THEIR VIEW, LOCAL GOVERNORS SHOULD BE APPOINTED BY AND RESPONSIBLE TO THE GC. CEDING FULL POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN IRAQ TO THE GC WOULD THEREFORE SEVERELY UPSET THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE PROVINCES. RECENT CONSULTATIONS WITH IRAQ'S GOVERNORS CONFIRM THAT THE PROVINCES WOULD MOST LIKELY ACTIVELY DISOBEY THE GC.

1. (S) SUMMARY: THE PATH TO IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY SHOULD RUN THROUGH THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS. ANY PROPOSAL TO RESTORE IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY BY VESTING IT IN THE GOVERNING COUNCIL (GC) OR IN AN "ALTERNATE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT" WOULD ENTAIL A NUMBER OF SERIOUS DISADVANTAGES. END SUMMARY.

2. (S) I WANT TO REVIEW WITH YOU MY CONCERNS ABOUT THE ARGUMENTS FOR "EARLY SOVEREIGNTY." ONE MAJOR PROBLEM WOULD BE THE LACK OF ANY FORMAL CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE TO SPECIFY THE POWERS OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT. RESTORING IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY WITHOUT A NEW CONSTITUTION WOULD ESSENTIALLY GRANT THE GOVERNING COUNCIL (GC) OR SOME OTHER NON-ELECTED BODY AUTHORITY UNCONSTRAINED BY ANY CONSTITUTION. THERE WOULD BE NO GUARANTEE OF CHECKS AND BALANCES, OR OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS. POLITICALLY, IT WOULD BE NEAR-IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE COALITION TO INTERVENE TO AFFECT ITS DESIRED END-STATE IF SOVEREIGNTY WERE RESTORED TO IRAQ BEFORE THESE PRECONDITIONS WERE ESTABLISHED.

3. (S) ANOTHER CONCERN IS THAT THE BALANCE OF POWER IN IRAQI NATIONAL POLITICS DOES NOT CURRENTLY FAVOR U.S. INTERESTS, OR THE INTERESTS OF A LIBERAL, NATIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC IRAQI POLITICAL ORDER. CURRENTLY, THE COALITION POSSESSES A GREAT DEAL OF LEVERAGE IN IRAQI POLITICS. WE ARE ABLE TO INFLUENCE THE DISCUSSIONS AND DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES, ENSURING THAT SEPARATIST KURDS, PRO-BA'ATHIST ELEMENTS OF THE GC, AND EXTREME ISLAMISTS FROM GETTING THEIR WAY. WHETHER THEY ADMIT IT OR NOT, OUR PRO-DEMOCRATIC FRIENDS IN IRAQI POLITICS ARE CURRENTLY NOT STRONG ENOUGH TO OVERCOME THESE EXTREMIST ELEMENTS WITHOUT OUR HELP. THE DANGER OF HANDING OVER

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POLITICAL AUTHORITY TOO EARLY IS THAT WE WILL FORFEIT OUR PLACE AT THE BARGAINING TABLE. COMPROMISES WILL BE MADE AMONG THE IRAQIS THAT WILL NEGATIVELY IMPACT OUR INTERESTS. CONSIDER THE FOLLOWING:

- THE COMMITTEE OF 65 FROM THE LONDON CONFERENCE, CHOSEN ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY BY THE CURRENT LEADERS OF THE GC (CHALABI, HAKIM, ALAWI, BARZANI, TALABANI) WAS DISPROPORTIONATELY DOMINATED BY SCIRI-BACKED ISLAMISTS.
- THE GC RECENTLY APPOINTED AYAD ALAWI AS CHAIRMAN OF ITS SECURITY COMMITTEE, AND NURI BADRAN AS MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR. BOTH HAVE STRONG BA'ATH PARTY CONNECTIONS, AND HAVE RECENTLY FLOATED PLANS TO REHIRE FORMER MEMBERS OF THE REPUBLICAN GUARD.
- THE CONSTITUTIONAL PREPARATORY COMMITTEE HAS APPARENTLY ENDORSED AN ELECTION SCHEME WHICH, IN ORDER TO PLACATE THE KURDS, REQUIRES THAT IRAQIS CAST VOTES IN THEIR PLACES OF ORIGIN AS OF 1957.



OSD 1.4 (d)

5. AN ADDITIONAL PROBLEM IS THAT, WERE SOVEREIGNTY RESTORED TO IRAQ IMMEDIATELY, THERE WOULD BE NO GUARANTEE THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD WANT U.S. TROOPS TO REMAIN WELCOME FOR ANY NECESSARY PERIOD OF TIME. FROM THE IRAQI POINT OF VIEW, THE "OCCUPATION" OF THEIR COUNTRY IS NOT A RESULT OF THE LANGUAGE OF UNSCR 1483, OR THE GC'S LACK OF SOVEREIGN POWER. THE PERCEPTION OF "OCCUPATION" STEMS, RATHER, FROM THE FACT THAT THERE ARE 150,000 COALITION TROOPS ACROSS THE COUNTRY AND THAT THEY HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO TELL IRAQIS WHAT TO DO. GIVING THE GC NOMINAL SOVEREIGNTY WILL NOT ALLEVIATE THE DISCOMFORT IRAQIS FEEL UNDER COALITION AUTHORITY. ONCE THE GC IS GRANTED SOVEREIGN POWER INCLUDING, PRESUMABLY, THE POWER TO REQUIRE THAT COALITION TROOPS LEAVE IRAQ, POLITICAL PRESSURE WILL BUILD INSIDE THE COUNTRY FOR THE GC TO DO JUST THAT. SCIRI AND OTHER ISLAMISTS HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO CALL FOR US TO LEAVE - PROBABLY CONFIDENT IN THE FACT THAT, SINCE WE RETAIN AUTHORITY AS THE "OCCUPYING POWER," WE CAN SAFELY IGNORE THEM. IF THE GC IS GIVEN SOVEREIGNTY, THE ISLAMISTS WILL BE UNDER TREMENDOUS PRESSURE TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON THEIR RHETORIC.

6. FURTHERMORE, RESTORING IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY WOULD GIVE UP ANY GUARANTEE WE NOW HAVE THAT A CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS WILL TAKE PLACE AND BE CARRIED THROUGH TO COMPLETION. RESTORING IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY IMMEDIATELY WOULD CEDE ANY INFLUENCE THE COALITION MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE IN BUILDING A CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS THAT PRESERVES IRAQ'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, ENSURES DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURES, AND GUARANTEES RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. IRAQ'S HISTORY OF WORKING UNDER "INTERIM"

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CONSTITUTIONS THAT LAST FAR LONGER THAN ORIGINALLY INTENDED IS NOT HEARTENING. IF THE COALITION RELINQUISHES ITS AUTHORITY BEFORE AN IRAQI CONSTITUTION IS WRITTEN AND RATIFIED, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO INTERVENE IF POWERFUL CONSTITUENCIES - A POWER-HUNGRY GC, FOR EXAMPLE, OR INDEPENDENCE-MINDED KURDS - LATER DECIDE THAT COMPLETING SUCH A PROCESS IS NO LONGER IN THEIR INTEREST.

7. FINALLY, ANOTHER DISADVANTAGE OF RESTORING SOVEREIGNTY TO IRAQ BEFORE A CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN WRITTEN FOR U.S. POLICY IN IRAQ AND RATIFIED IS THAT IT WOULD SIGNAL YET ANOTHER FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE OF COURSE. ALREADY, THE SWITCH FROM "ORHA" TO "CPA" AND THE RETURN TO THE UN FOR A SECOND RESOLUTION HAVE SIGNALLED WEAKNESS TO IRAQIS AND THE ARAB WORLD. PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY POWELL HAVE NOW BEEN ABSOLUTELY CLEAR AND ON THE RECORD CONCERNING IRAQ'S PATH TO SOVEREIGNTY. A SUDDEN CHANGE IN THIS POSITION WOULD SUGGEST THAT WE ARE ON THE RUN, LACKING CONFIDENCE AND RESOLUTION IN OUR CURRENT COURSE OF ACTION.

4. AN ADDITIONAL PROBLEM IS THAT, WERE SOVEREIGNTY RESTORED TO IRAQ IMMEDIATELY, THERE WOULD BE NO GUARANTEE THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD WANT U.S. TROOPS TO REMAIN FOR ANY NECESSARY PERIOD OF TIME. FROM THE IRAQI POINT OF VIEW, THE "OCCUPATION" OF THEIR COUNTRY IS NOT A RESULT OF THE LANGUAGE OF UNSCR 1483, OR THE GC'S LACK OF SOVEREIGN POWER. THE PERCEPTION OF "OCCUPATION" STEMS, RATHER, FROM THE FACT THAT THERE ARE 150,000 COALITION TROOPS ACROSS THE COUNTRY AND THAT THEY HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO TELL IRAQIS WHAT TO DO. GIVING THE GC NOMINAL SOVEREIGNTY WILL NOT ALLEVIATE THE DISCOMFORT IRAQIS FEEL UNDER COALITION AUTHORITY. ONCE THE GC IS GRANTED SOVEREIGN POWER INCLUDING, PRESUMABLY, THE POWER TO REQUIRE THAT COALITION TROOPS LEAVE IRAQ, POLITICAL PRESSURE WILL BUILD INSIDE THE COUNTRY FOR THE GC TO DO JUST THAT. SCIRI AND OTHER ISLAMISTS HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO CALL FOR US TO LEAVE - PROBABLY CONFIDENT IN THE FACT THAT, SINCE WE RETAIN AUTHORITY AS THE "OCCUPYING POWER," WE CAN SAFELY IGNORE THEM. IF THE GC IS GIVEN SOVEREIGNTY, THE ISLAMISTS WILL BE UNDER TREMENDOUS PRESSURE TO FOLLOW THROUGH ON THEIR RHETORIC. WHILE WE OF COURSE WANT TO KEEP THE OCCUPATION SHORT, WE WOULD BE DERELICT TO OUR INTEREST IN A STABLE IRAQ TO LEAVE BEFORE A RESPONSIBLE IRAQI GOVERNMENT CAPABLE OF PROVIDING FOR THE COUNTRY'S SECURITY IS ESTABLISHED.

8. OVERALL, MOST MEMBERS OF THE GC HAVE COME TO UNDERSTAND THAT SOVEREIGNTY IS DIVISIBLE AND THAT IT CAN ACCRETE. AS WE HAVE SAID, THE GC WAS THE FIRST STEP IN THIS PROCESS, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MINISTERS WAS THE SECOND. SEATING AN IRAQI BEHIND THE PLACARD AT THE UN WILL MOVE FURTHER IN THIS DIRECTION. THE FACT IS THAT A PIECE OF PAPER WILL NOT AFFORD LEGITIMACY (OR SOVEREIGNTY) - OTHERWISE WE COULD HAVE SOLVED THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT YEARS AGO AT THE UN. ONLY THE ACTIONS OF THE GC AND ITS CABINET CAN DO THAT. ONLY WHEN AVERAGE IRAQIS SEE THE GC AND ITS MINISTERS ADDRESSING THEIR CONCERNS WILL THEY GIVE BOTH INSTITUTIONS LEGITIMACY. ULTIMATELY, THIS LEGITIMACY MAY TRANSLATE INTO FULL SOVEREIGNTY IN LEGAL TERMS. SIMPLY ASSIGNING SOVEREIGNTY NOW, HOWEVER, WILL RISK GREATER POLITICAL DESTABILIZATION IN IRAQ AS MANY WHO REMAIN OUTSIDE THE UNREPRESENTATIVE GC WILL FEEL AS THOUGH THEY HAVE BEEN BETRAYED BY THE COALITION.

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5. (E) FURTHERMORE, RESTORING IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY WOULD GIVE UP ANY GUARANTEE WE NOW HAVE THAT A CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS WILL TAKE PLACE AND BE CARRIED THROUGH TO COMPLETION. RESTORING IRAQ'S SOVEREIGNTY IMMEDIATELY WOULD CEDE ANY INFLUENCE THE COALITION MIGHT OTHERWISE HAVE IN BUILDING A CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS THAT PRESERVES IRAQ'S TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, ENSURES DEMOCRATIC STRUCTURES, AND GUARANTEES RELIGIOUS FREEDOM. IRAQ'S HISTORY OF WORKING UNDER "INTERIM" CONSTITUTIONS THAT LAST FAR LONGER THAN ORIGINALLY INTENDED IS NOT HEARTENING. THE LATEST "INTERIM" CONSTITUTION WAS PUT IN PLACE BY SADDAM IN 1970. IF THE COALITION RELINQUISHES ITS AUTHORITY BEFORE AN IRAQI CONSTITUTION IS WRITTEN AND RATIFIED, IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO INTERVENE IF POWERFUL CONSTITUENCIES - A POWER-HUNGRY GC, FOR EXAMPLE, OR INDEPENDENCE-MINDED KURDS - LATER DECIDE THAT COMPLETING SUCH A PROCESS IS NO LONGER IN THEIR INTEREST.

6. (E) ANOTHER PROBLEM IS THE LACK OF A FORMAL, AGREED-UPON DEFINITION OF THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE MANY LOCAL COUNCILS WHICH WE HAVE ESTABLISHED IN GOVERNORATES AND CITIES ACROSS IRAQ. CURRENTLY, THE COALITION PRESENCE HAS ALLOWED REAL POLITICAL POWER TO DEVOLVE TO THE LOCAL AUTHORITIES. LOCAL IRAQI COUNCILS HAVE BEEN FORMED IN EACH OF THE 18 GOVERNORATES, WORKING UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF LOCAL COALITION COMMANDERS. THE GC IS ON RECORD AS STRONGLY OPPOSING THE MAKEUP OF THESE LOCAL COUNCILS. IN THEIR VIEW, LOCAL GOVERNORS SHOULD BE APPOINTED BY AND RESPONSIBLE TO THE GC. CEDING FULL POLITICAL  
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AUTHORITY IN IRAQ TO THE GC WOULD THEREFORE SEVERELY UPSET THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE PROVINCES. AND, IT WOULD WORK AGAINST OUR BROADER OBJECTIVE OF DEVOLVING POWER AWAY FROM BAGHDAD AS A CHECK ON FUTURE TYRANNY. RECENT CONSULTATIONS WITH IRAQ'S GOVERNORS CONFIRM THAT THE PROVINCES WOULD MOST LIKELY ACTIVELY DISOBEY THE GC.

7. (E) FINALLY, ANOTHER DISADVANTAGE OF RESTORING SOVEREIGNTY TO IRAQ BEFORE A CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN WRITTEN FOR U.S. POLICY IN IRAQ AND RATIFIED IS THAT IT WOULD SIGNAL YET ANOTHER FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE OF COURSE. ALREADY, THE SWITCH FROM "ORHA" TO "CPA" AND THE RETURN TO THE UN FOR A SECOND RESOLUTION HAVE SIGNALLED WEAKNESS TO IRAQIS AND THE ARAB WORLD. PRESIDENT BUSH AND SECRETARY POWELL HAVE NOW BEEN ABSOLUTELY CLEAR AND ON THE RECORD CONCERNING IRAQ'S PATH TO SOVEREIGNTY. A SUDDEN CHANGE IN THIS POSITION WOULD SUGGEST THAT WE ARE ON THE RUN, LACKING CONFIDENCE AND RESOLUTION IN OUR CURRENT COURSE OF ACTION.

8. (E) OVERALL, MOST MEMBERS OF THE GC HAVE COME TO UNDERSTAND THAT SOVEREIGNTY IS DIVISIBLE AND THAT IT CAN ACCRETE. AS WE HAVE SAID, THE GC WAS THE FIRST STEP IN THIS PROCESS, AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MINISTERS WAS THE SECOND. SEATING AN IRAQI BEHIND THE PLACARD AT THE UN WILL MOVE FURTHER IN THIS DIRECTION. THE FACT IS THAT A PIECE OF PAPER WILL NOT AFFORD LEGITIMACY (OR SOVEREIGNTY) - OTHERWISE WE COULD HAVE SOLVED THE ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT YEARS AGO AT THE UN. ONLY THE ACTIONS OF THE GC AND ITS CABINET WITH PATIENT, STEADY, AND WHERE NECESSARY, FIRM COALITION GUIDANCE, CAN

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DO THAT. ONLY WHEN AVERAGE IRAQIS SEE THE GC AND ITS MINISTERS ADDRESSING THEIR CONCERNS WILL THEY GIVE BOTH INSTITUTIONS LEGITIMACY. ULTIMATELY, THIS LEGITIMACY MAY TRANSLATE INTO FULL SOVEREIGNTY IN LEGAL TERMS. SIMPLY ASSIGNING SOVEREIGNTY NOW, HOWEVER, WILL RISK GREATER POLITICAL DESTABILIZATION IN IRAQ AS MANY WHO REMAIN OUTSIDE THE UNREPRESENTATIVE GC WILL FEEL AS THOUGH THEY HAVE BEEN BETRAYED BY THE COALITION.

9. IN SHORT, IT IS ABUNDANTLY CLEAR THAT WE MUST RETAIN OUR LEVERAGE AND AUTHORITY UNTIL WE HAVE IN PLACE A RESPECTABLE POLITICAL ORDER WHICH MAXIMIZES THE CHANCES OF OUR ACHIEVING THE PRESIDENT'S VISION OF A STABLE, DEMOCRATIC IRAQ.

BREMER

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ACTION

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INFO CHAIRS(\*) CHAIRS TESTBED(\*) CHAIRS DA(\*)  
SECDEF-C(1) SECDEF-C(\*) USDAT:STS(\*) ASD:PA-SMTP(\*)  
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+JCP EMAIL CUSTOMER//CHAIRS//  
+USDP:ESC

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SECDEF HAS SEEN

JUN - 3 2003

2 June 2003

U D.Y

TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Paul Bremer

SUBJECT: Meeting with Iraqi Political Leaders

I held my second meeting with the Leadership Council Sunday night. I began by stressing the commitment of President Bush and Prime Minister Blair to the economic and political reconstruction of Iraq. The coalition shares with Iraqis a vision of Iraq that is democratic, free, and prosperous. I then laid out our vision for establishing an interim administration (IA) in the next five to six weeks. Stressing my desire to consult broadly with all Iraqis to reach this goal, I reiterated the coalition's commitment to an IA that was representative of all strands of Iraqi society. I then outlined our concept of the IA by specifying it would have two main bodies: the Political Council and the Constitutional Convention. I said we would welcome their advice and views on these plans.

The Political Council

The Political Council (25-30 Iraqis) would be the "public face" of the IA and Iraq's main interlocutor with the coalition and the world at large. Membership on the Political Council would be personal, meaning that an individual, while perhaps affiliated to a party, could not endorse another person to take his seat on the council in his absence. Being a member of the Political Council would be a paid full-time commitment, one that the coalition hoped would be assumed by the most senior representatives of Iraqi political parties and the country's most-respected figures. All members of the Political Council would be permitted to stand for office in Iraq's first election. Consultation between Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the

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council would be close. I noted that I would plan to meet with the council often, perhaps weekly.

The Political Council would have two major responsibilities. First, this body would play a role in getting the government ministries back up and running. The council would nominate to the CPA a candidate to be a Chief Advisor to each ministry. (A person could not simultaneously be a Chief Advisor and sit on the council.) This Chief Advisor would have increasing responsibilities within the ministry, working with the CPA Senior Advisor, having full access to all the ministry's staff and files, and being party to all ministry decision-making. The Chief Advisor would be available to brief the Political Council as it wished on the progress of the ministry. When both the Political Council and the CPA determined that a ministry was ready to assume greater responsibility, the CPA would ask the IA to nominate a candidate for the position of Interim Minister.

The Political Council would also be responsible for addressing long-term issues that will ultimately determine the shape of Iraqi society. Education, economics, de-ba'athification, and electoral laws were just some of the topics about which Iraqis will want to develop recommendations and strategies. I suggested that the Political Council might set up committees on these issues to serve as the focal point for a broad dialogue with Iraqi people on such subjects. The CPA would welcome advice on these issues.

#### The Constitutional Convention

Turning to the second body in the IA, I stated that in my private consultations with Iraqis, including the groups present, I had found unanimous agreement that a new constitution must precede a national election. A Constitutional Convention, therefore, was essential. The selection of this group must be done carefully through a nationwide process to ensure a representative body. Although I stressed that I was open to ideas about how the Constitutional Convention might function and on its size,

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I expected that, after convening, the convention would establish a 12-15 person drafting committee. Once the committee completed its work, the constitution would be submitted back to the Convention for approval and then to the Iraqi people for their endorsement in a referendum. I stated that the timeline for completion of the constitution was for the Iraqi people to determine.

I concluded my opening comments by stressing the coalition's desire to move ahead. The next step was broadening the consultative process to ensure that both bodies of the IA would ultimately be more representative. I underscored how the creation of the IA would be "an agreed process" between the CPA and Iraqis. I did, however, note that legally, I would be the one to appoint the body. I reminded each of the leaders that we had asked them to bring to this meeting the names of people to add into the consultative process. We hoped they would give us these suggestions now. We also sought their recommendations on people who could play an important role in the Constitutional Convention and on the Iraqi De-Ba'athification Council announced last week. I stated that we expected to accelerate the pace and breadth of our consultations and would meet again on Friday in an expanded forum that included additional Iraqis.

The British Envoy then made clear that his government agreed entirely with the approach outlined and, like us, stood ready to receive the advice and views of the Iraqis present.

#### Reaction of the Leadership Council

The Iraqis asked several points of clarification after our presentations. These queries related to: the selection of people for the Constitutional Convention (we noted that we believed the convention should be broadly representative and that we would welcome their views on how best to achieve this), the role of a possible national conference (we said we held open the possibility of convening one sometime later in the process if it seemed useful), and the authorities of the Political Council. In

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response to a question about qualifications for membership on that council, I noted that members would have to endorse our broad vision for Iraq as captured in the Nasiriyah declaration of principles. No one present offered explicit criticism of our plans while at the table.

During informal discussions with attendees at a reception after the meeting, it was apparent that the Iraqis differed in their reception to CPA plans. The INC itself gave contradictory signals, saying to some CPA representatives they were pleased with our approach and telling others they were unhappy with the indirect Iraqi role in governing. The INA, by contrast, thought the approach was sound. The PUK and KDP seemed generally on board, but clearly wished to consider further the implications of the proposal for their own situation. SCIRI, which had been antagonistic to the ideas before, seemed to take a pragmatic approach, asking clarifying questions, but avoiding antagonism. The Dawa Party cautioned that the Group of Seven was not representative and the US should not project the impression that it was treating them as any kind of collective leadership. The NDP was focused on the need to start the Constitutional Convention process as soon as possible.

#### Next Steps

We will move out smartly this week. Our goal is to subsume the G-7 into a broader and more representative "consultative committee." We will quickly identify another six to ten people to invite to our consultative meeting Friday night (which will include the original G-7 as well). We will present our ideas again to them and seek ways to broaden our reach even further. I plan to set a rapid pace over the next month, meeting with our expanding circle of Iraqis in formal sessions at least weekly while our folks actively canvass the country for fresh candidates – for the Political Council, its likely specialized committees, and the Constitutional Convention.

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WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ACTION MEMO

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DepSec Action \_\_\_\_\_

Larry Di Rita  
4/19

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman [redacted])

11 APR 2002

OSD

SUBJECT: Acquiescence If Not Support 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

In our meetings with you Saturday (6 April), we mentioned that some countries are shifting away from their presumed opposition to any U.S. action against Iraq, or that their opposition was exaggerated in the first place.

A collection of interesting statements and reports is at Tab A. You may wish to sign the attached cover memo which would transmit it also to the Vice President, SecState, and Dr. Rice.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the cover memo at Tab A.

COORDINATION: Tab B

Attachments:  
As Stated

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	4/17
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	2/4/22
MA BUCCI	5/31/19
EXECSEC WHITMORE	1/10/16

Prepared by: ASD/ISA Rodman, [redacted]

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When with attachment.

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Coordination Page

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

Mr. Douglas J. Feith

*[Handwritten signature]*  
4/15/02

**Page determined to be Unclassified**  
**Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS**  
**IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5**  
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June 3, 2003

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)  
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.  
Honorable George Tenet  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: CPA Meeting w/Iraqi Political Leaders

Attached for your information is a report from Paul Bremer on his meeting with some Iraqi political leaders.

Regards,

Attach.

6/2/03 Bremer memo to SecDef, "Meeting with Iraqi Political Leaders"

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JUN - 3 2003

2 June 2003

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TO: Secretary Rumsfeld  
  
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The British Envoy then made clear that his government agreed entirely with the approach outlined and, like us, stood ready to receive the advice and views of the Iraqis present.

#### Reaction of the Leadership Council

The Iraqis asked several points of clarification after our presentations. These queries related to: the selection of people for the Constitutional Convention (we noted that we believed the convention should be broadly representative and that we would welcome their views on how best to achieve this), the role of a possible national conference (we said we held open the possibility of convening one sometime later in the process if it seemed useful), and the authorities of the Political Council. In

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JUL 30 2010

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response to a question about qualifications for membership on that council, I noted that members would have to endorse our broad vision for Iraq as captured in the Nasiriyah declaration of principles. No one present offered explicit criticism of our plans while at the table.

During informal discussions with attendees at a reception after the meeting, it was apparent that the Iraqis differed in their reception to CPA plans. The INC itself gave contradictory signals, saying to some CPA representatives they were pleased with our approach and telling others they were unhappy with the indirect Iraqi role in governing. The INA, by contrast, thought the approach was sound. The PUK and KDP seemed generally on board, but clearly wished to consider further the implications of the proposal for their own situation. SCIRI, which had been antagonistic to the ideas before, seemed to take a pragmatic approach, asking clarifying questions, but avoiding antagonism. The Dawa Party cautioned that the Group of Seven was not representative and the US should not project the impression that it was treating them as any kind of collective leadership. The NDP was focused on the need to start the Constitutional Convention process as soon as possible.

#### Next Steps

We will move out smartly this week. Our goal is to subsume the G-7 into a broader and more representative "consultative committee." We will quickly identify another six to ten people to invite to our consultative meeting Friday night (which will include the original G-7 as well). We will present our ideas again to them and seek ways to broaden our reach even further. I plan to set a rapid pace over the next month, meeting with our expanding circle of Iraqis in formal sessions at least weekly while our folks actively canvass the country for fresh candidates – for the Political Council, its likely specialized committees, and the Constitutional Convention.

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



APR 23 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR: VICE PRESIDENT  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Acquiescence If Not Support

Many countries in the Middle East as well as among our European allies are presumed to be opposed to any U.S. action against Iraq. Yet there are also indicators that this opposition is not as strong as assumed, or is not the case at all, or is shifting.

A compilation of such straws in the wind is attached for your information.

Some of them, of course, are quite sensitive and should be protected.

Attachment  
As stated

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
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APR 11 2002

Attitudes towards U.S. Action on Iraq

Here are examples of interesting indicators of attitudes to a hypothetical U.S. action against Iraq.




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


Italy

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(U) In a recent interview, Italian Minister of Defense Antonio Martino was asked about future moves against Iraq. "If, as I believe possible, the United States presents a convincing case that Iraq is engaged in the production of weapons of mass destruction, and that it has the capability of projecting these weapons," Martino responded, "then we can convince a majority of Parliament to support the operation. Even the most reluctant Italian would understand." Martino predicted also that Germany and Spain would follow suit. (Michael Barone, "Europeans for the U.S.," *U.S. News and World Report*, April 8, 2002, p.27)



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Mr President

December 20 2003

With the prospect of returning sovereignty to the Iraqis in six months, and knowing that we will meet Monday morning, I thought it useful to give you my analysis of the current situation and the implications of that assessment for our priorities in the immediate months ahead.

We have already achieved a great deal. Our success depends on our ability to demonstrate convincingly our intention to stay the course until we have stabilized Iraq and given it the opportunity to repair its economic and political infrastructure.

#### Security analysis

It is too early to assess the overall effects of Saddam's arrest. Hopefully it will lead many opponents to accept the inevitability of our vision for Iraq. We are pulling out all stops to encourage this trend. And it should start Iraq on the long path of coming to terms with its past.

In the short run, however, we should expect an upturn in violence from our enemies. They will want to show their continued relevance. And international terrorists in Iraq are unlikely to be deterred by the arrest. They could decide that the removal of a secular dictator offers them opportunities to extol their radical Islamism. There are signs of increased activity by these killers.

Since September the enemy has shown signs of regrouping and becoming more sophisticated. He has been adopting his tactics, using more standoff weapons. His strategy is to break the will of those cooperating with the Coalition, whether Iraqis, NGOs or other Coalition countries.

But our opponents lack political support among the population which is glad to see Saddam and his cronies gone. They are a small minority. Their only hope is to encourage the fear that they will outlast us and come back to power. Saddam's capture will help dispel this myth.

Iraqis are ambivalent in their attitude toward our forces. On the one hand, as proud nationalists, they resent being occupied. On the other hand, Iraqis have a keen appreciation of the risks of our premature departure. For example, 86% of Iraqis in the north recently told pollsters that they want Coalition forces to stay for at least a year after an elected government comes to power. According to the most recent poll, in the past three months support for continued coalition military presence has almost doubled in Baghdad and Basra and 73% of Iraqis would feel "less safe" if our forces left immediately.

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**In sum, our success depends on our political will and our ability to demonstrate convincingly that we will stay until we succeed.**

**Security Priorities the next 9ix months**

- 1. Our top priority is to restore Iraq's ability to provide for its own defense. It is their country and they should ultimately be responsible for its security.**

**We will do this by accelerating the establishment of the Civil Defense Force and by training a professional police and army. Polls show that the Iraqi people have confidence in these forces. We will develop the Iraqi National Security structure. We will establish a Ministry of Defense, and appoint a Minister by April 1. And we will create a new Iraqi intelligence service.**

**Giving the Iraqis more prominence in the security field is already paying dividends. In recent weeks all divisions report a marked increase in HUMINT. We should see an up-tick in this kind of reporting in the wake of Saddam's arrest.**

**But we need to remember that the quality of Iraqi forces varies. It will be some time before they will be capable of providing real security. In our public comments about the role of these forces, we need to avoid the impression that we are pushing them forward to justify a drawdown of Coalition forces.**

- 2. We will negotiate a security agreement providing for continued American and Coalition military forces here after we turnover sovereignty.**

**Security will be our responsibility for a long time to come. This will conflict with our desire not to be seen as "occupiers". Ending the formal state of "occupation" in June will help, but our continued troop presence will still look to many Iraqis like an "occupation." The more Iraqi faces we can put on the front line the better.**

**Negotiating this agreement will be difficult because it will run counter to marked nationalistic Iraqi emotions. We can ease the process by couching our requests by portraying them as necessary for Iraq's security and by making Iraq effectively a member of the post June 30 "coalition".**

**Our security posture must be determined by the situation on the ground. If we should come to need more or different kinds of troops to win, that is what we should have. The same goes for our operational plans. Pulling out of selected cities makes sense only if it contributes to better security, not just for our forces but for Iraq.**

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### Political developments analysis

We are entering an unprecedented period in Iraq's 8,000 year history. In the next six months, we must mid-wife a Law on Administration, (effectively an interim constitution), and a Transitional Legislature and put in place the process leading to Iraq's first free full elections in 2005. It will not be easy and success is by no means guaranteed.

The overriding characteristic of Iraqi politics today is distrust. Each community has its own particular nightmare.

- Shias have been denied proportionate power for hundreds of years. Their nightmare is that, with the prize at last in sight, it will be snatched away.
- Sunnis, having denied others power for centuries, now fear that it is payback time and that democracy's central pledge, majority rule, means the minority will be crushed. Their nightmare is that the Shia will do to them what they have long done to the Shia.
- The most popular Kurdish saying is that "only the mountains are our friends." They have too often been betrayed over the centuries to trust anyone but themselves—and even there... Their nightmare is that Iraq will fall apart and they will be left on their own.

Iraq's political infrastructure is weak. Polls consistently, and unsurprisingly, show disdain for politicians and political parties. There is no obvious national leader on the horizon. Iraq's exiles generally lack support and credibility; most internals lack broad political agendas and experience. Very few of either variety have begun building political support beyond their ethnic or sectarian bases. Two thirds of Iraqis cannot name even a single leader they trust.

There are, however, some positive factors in our favor.

1. The political instincts of most Iraqis are supportive of the American vision for Iraq.

- \* Polls show that there is strong support for American values among urban dwellers (freedom of speech, religion, assembly).
- \* The overwhelming majority of the population wants the country run on basis of free and fair elections and wants nationality and religious groups to share power.
- \* More than 70% favor equal rights for women.

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Date: JUL 30 2010

~~NO DIS~~**2. The most popular political model is multiparty democracy.**

- \*Overall only 10% of the population favors Iranian-style theocracy.
- \*Shias appear to be more moderate and, except for residents of the holy city of Najaf, they do not favor theocratic govt.

**3. Despite their differences, Iraqis have a sense of "nation". They have a deep and broad love of their history, culture and land. They have a strong distaste for foreign intervention as shown by their reaction to the Turkish troop offer and by their dislike of being "occupied." Even in the Shia heartland, Iranian machinations are not generally welcomed.**

**4. The common nightmare of Saddam's repression may lessen mutual distrust. Shia and Sunni, Kurd, Christian and Turkomen—those who lived here—all fear a return to brutality.**

**5. Finally, the Iraqis are clear-eyed about their own bitter divisions. They know that they don't trust each other. This explains the apparent paradox when polls show that, while Iraqis don't like being occupied, they also don't want our troops to leave until Iraq is stable. Most Iraqis recognize that if the Coalition leaves too soon, they may face civil war or foreign intervention.**

**Political Priorities for the next six months**

- 1. We will work with the Governing Council, Shias, Sunnis and Kurds to implement the November 15 agreement and gain acceptance to our broader political vision for Iraq.**

**The key will be to convince all communities that the process is not zero-sum and that each of their interests is best served by successful implementation of that agreement. We will work closely with the Governing Council to write a Law on Administration which enshrines the protection of fundamental rights. We will work to bring into being a representative Transitional Government by the end of June. We will use our revitalized TV stations to encourage broad public discussion of Iraq's future.**

- 2. We will pursue a robust engagement policy with the Sunnis.**

**Using our new Office of Provincial Outreach, we will devote time, people and money to the dialogue. We will use the opportunity afforded by Saddam's capture to show them they have a future in the new Iraq. We will continue to encourage the Iraqis to pursue a moderate deBaathification process which offers the prospect of returning most party members to normal life.**

- 3. We will develop the country's adherence to the rule of law.**

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**We will set in place institutions of justice, including an Office of Public Integrity, Inspector Generals in all ministries, and a system of broad financial disclosure for all top officials.**

- 4. We will begin the reform of the civil service to ensure that Iraq has a capable and honest government.**

**Working with the British, we will design a reform program which includes training in modern financial accounting procedures for all ministries.**

#### **Economic analysis**

**There is good news on the economic front, notwithstanding the return in recent weeks of long gas lines. The restoration of essential services is gaining momentum. Power generation is back near pre-war levels. With determination (and by God's grace) it will match estimated demand by the summer. Hospitals and schools are open. Potable water and pharmaceutical supplies are more widely available than before.**

**In every major city polled, despite their continued concern about security, urban dwellers cite a dramatic improvement in their neighborhood over past three months. They consider life today better than a year ago and express hope for the future.**

**\* Since liberation, we have raised teachers' salaries 12 to 25 times over pre-war levels. Doctors' pay is up eightfold; university professors 12 times. Pensions for civil servants are up tenfold. Police salaries have quadrupled.**

**\* In the past six months, we have completed over seventeen thousand reconstruction projects across the country. This includes everything from repairing schools and hospitals to rebuilding roads and bridges.**

**This pump priming has engendered thousands of new businesses all over the country, providing employment and stimulating secondary economic activity. Judging from the stable exchange rate of the New Iraq Dinar, inflation appears to be low. The NID's introduction across the country has proceeded smoothly to date with over 87% of the new bills in circulation.**

**Nonetheless unemployment is still high, though probably not the 50% frequently cited. Our internal estimates place it at 20-30%. So creating jobs fast is our single most important challenge.**

#### **Economic Priorities for the Next Six Months**

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Date: JUL 30 2010

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1. **Our immediate priority is to create local jobs and improve lives through reconstruction projects.**

Between now and July 1, we will put almost \$500 million to job creation through a variety of channels. This is more than double our rate of spending on such programs the past six months. Our hope is that as these funds are depleted, large projects funded by the supplemental will kick in and accelerate economic momentum.

2. **We will prioritize and accelerate those projects funded by the supplemental which can produce jobs and/or visible economic benefit to the largest number of people the most quickly. Electricity generation tops the list.**

3. **Job creation in turn depends on getting credit out into the economy.**

The state owned banks have proven unable to do this, although 83% of their branches around the country are currently open. We have established several mini and micro loan programs which are being expanded. Within a month, we expect to award licenses for several foreign banks to operate in Iraq. But it will be a half year before they start to make loans.

4. **We will try to persuade the Minister of Oil to take the first steps to reform Iraq's oil industry. We will encourage him to reestablish the Iraqi National Oil Company and to establish the framework of an oil trust to ensure that each Iraqi citizen sees immediate benefits from the country's oil reserves.**

5. **We have set Iraq on the path to a responsible fiscal policy by producing balanced budgets for 2003 and 2004. It will be important to continue responsible budgeting as revenues increase in the coming years. We will accelerate the preparation of the 2005 budget, with initial budget calls to ministries in April.**

Despite the urging of the International Monetary Fund, there are three major economic decisions which we will postpone.

1. **Because we will prioritize job creation, we will not press to close down state owned enterprises. While these are value-destroying organizations, their reform will necessarily entail restructuring their employment base and a stronger domestic consensus than now exists. Where a particular Minister calculates that he can privatize an SOE, we will encourage him to do so.**
2. **We will postpone action on liberalizing energy prices. Here, too, the economic and commercial arguments in favor of reform are strong.**

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But these are outweighed by the political consequences of such a major reform at a time of insecurity and political debate.

3. We will keep open the possibility of taking the first step to reform Iraq's food ration system. Since some 60-70% of the population depends on this monthly "food basket", changing the system, though economically compelling, will go forward only if the Iraqi authorities are decisively in favor and test programs demonstrate popular support.

#### Organizational Priorities

Finally a word on organization.

1. We will work over the next six months to ensure that the CPA makes an orderly transition into an American Embassy when sovereignty is transferred.
2. And we will take steps to transition the Program Management Office into an appropriate structure to oversee the management of projects funded under the supplemental in a way which allows the US government to retain significant leverage for the US after the return to sovereignty.

Best wishes for Christmas and a Happy New Year.

Jerry

~~NODIS~~

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June 14 2003

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

JUN 16 2003

**MEMO TO: President Bush**

**THRU: Secretary Rumsfeld**

**FROM: Paul Bremer**

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 30 2010

**Mr. President**

**Concluding my first month here, I wanted to give you my assessment, which I forward to you through the Secretary of Defense.**

**Security has improved in most of the country. Through aggressive patrolling by our army and the recall of thousands of police, we have made the citizens of Baghdad feel safer. Basic services are now mostly at pre-war levels. Economic activity is vibrant—complete with traffic jams. Much more is to be done. But we have turned the corner in Baghdad.**

**However, I still have two security concerns. As you know, we face virulent opposition in the triangle north and west of the capital. To date, this appears to be the work of small groups of**

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Date: JUL 30 2010

**Baathists, Fedayeen Saddam and Wahabbis, so far operating without apparent central command and control. But our raid on the camp west of Baghdad Wednesday showed that heavily-armed foreigners and perhaps terrorists may be installing themselves here. With continued robust military countermoves, we can impose our will in these areas, but it will take time and will cost lives.**




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**Finally, a word on the economy. With unemployment over 50%, creating jobs is our top priority. We are using Iraq's money for several stimulative programs, focused on the construction industry which most quickly can create jobs. But we are also transitioning to broader economic reforms to address the serious distortions imposed on the economy by 30 years of rigid socialism. We will need to make early decisions, with Iraqi advice, on questions like the future of the hundreds of state owned enterprises, the amount of permitted foreign investment, how best to protect oil revenues through a trust fund, and what to do about the currency.**

**We should not underestimate the difficulty of moving forward on the economy. Thirty years of misallocated capital, underinvestment in infrastructure and hidden and direct subsidies have grossly distorted economic activity. But I am optimistic that we are on the right path in all**

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**these areas and that with the right mix of speed,  
energy and patience we can succeed.**

**Jerry**

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August 15, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Iraq



Mr. President—

I understand you had some questions yesterday about the security situation in Iraq.

With regard to the cleric Sadr, I have attached Jerry Bremer's response, which I think is very good.

I will get back to you in the next few days with answers to your other questions.

Respectfully,

Attach.

8/15/03 CPA memo to SecDef re: Muqtada al-Sadr

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
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
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


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Date: JUL 30 2010

September 15, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Colin Powell (by hand)  
Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
Honorable George Tenet

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Police Training for Iraqis

Attached is a good report from Jerry Bremer on progress being made.

Respectfully,

Attach.  
9/14/03 CPA memo re: Police Training

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date:

JUL 30 2010

**CONFIDENTIAL**

December 28, 2003

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: Assistance to Iran

Mr. President—

Shortly after the earthquake in Iran, the Department of Defense proposed that we offer humanitarian assistance to the Iranian people. As you know, we are now in the process of assisting with some C-17 and C-130 loads of disaster relief, medical assistance and the like.

It strikes me that you might want to consider a truly massive US Government effort on behalf of the Iranian people.

The US is frequently criticized for only being able to wage war, but not having much interest in helping people. We are portrayed as anti-Muslim and only interested in oil. Here is an opportunity for us to prove to the contrary, that we are not anti-Muslim and that we can do much more than wage war.

You could lead the US in a major effort to help the Iranian people. Possibly get a senior person like George Shultz to lead it; ask the American people to participate; and ask schoolchildren to each give a dollar to buy books and to help build back schools for those Iranian children whose schools were destroyed.

Our goal could be to do more than any other country on the face of the earth. This is the right season. There will be a positive response by the American people. It is an activity that could have a follow up over a period of months.

If we put a good, strong American imprint on all of the assistance, it could be the thing that might spark the Iranian people to recognize that we do have an interest in them as human beings, their futures and their success.

If you would like to discuss this, I am available. I think it could be of enormous help to the Iranian people and a major success for the US.

Very respectfully,

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122703-41 (to computer)

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

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Date: JUL 30 2010

MAR 14 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Increasing Iraqi Warfighting Capabilities

- I am concerned that the Oil For Food program is inadvertently letting Iraq increase its warfighting capabilities.
- Our efforts to streamline the sanctions process through the Goods Review List has focused on WMD.
- WMD is an essential issue, but my concerns extend to key enablers of conventional warfighting capabilities as well.
- Heavy Equipment Transporters (HETs) are an example. State staff has been helpful in offering to reopen the Goods Review List to include HETs as a restricted item.
  - However, the issue is military mobility, not just HETs.
    - Five-ton trucks can free-up HETs that are currently being used to haul supplies;
    - Hydraulics from dump trucks can be adapted to support SCUD Tactical Erector-Launchers (TEs);
    - With certain types of lining, tanker trucks can carry chemical and biological weapons.
- I understand there is a March 21 meeting with the Russians to reach closure on the Goods Review List.
- I think the Goods Review List needs to restrict more than just HETs.

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- We should be looking at everything, in addition to WMD, that Baghdad could divert to key military purposes. Mobility and communications come to mind but there could be other areas.
- My inclination is to continue with the Goods Review List process but substantially revise it to restrict a broader range of warfighting capabilities.
- I ask that the Deputies Committee take up this issue at its March 11 meeting. A draft options paper for this meeting is attached.



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Chief, Records & DeClass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 30 2010

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MAR 08 2002

## Iraq Sanctions Goods Review List Options for Deputies

**Objective:** Approve DoD's request that the Goods Review List be reopened for more detailed review of conventional warfighting capabilities.

**Background:** Since 1991 the UN has had sanctions on Iraq. The Oil For Food (OFF) program was designed in 1995 to permit Iraqi oil profits to pay for humanitarian relief for its civilian population, among other things. Under this program proposed contracts for shipments to Iraq are reviewed by UN Sanctions Committee member states – same as the Security Council (to include Perm 5 plus rotating 10 members – which currently includes Syria).

Since 1999, there have been several lists of “pre-approved” items covering areas like agriculture, medicine and water/sanitation. Items on these lists are processed by the UN Secretariat staff without further review by Sanctions Committee members. The pre-approved lists were agreed to by Sanctions Committee members with a view to limiting the volume of contract reviews. Items not on the pre-approved lists can only be approved by unanimous vote of the Sanctions Committee.

Historically, the U.S. and the UK are the only countries that do thorough technical reviews and lodge objections to shipments. In conducting its reviews, the U.S. has applied informal criteria based on Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Nuclear Suppliers Group and Wassenaar dual-use commodities lists.

**The Goods Review List:** In November 2001, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1382 to significantly expand the number of items that can be shipped to Iraq without review. The Goods Review List (GRL) is designed to be a vehicle for increasing the number of items that can be shipped without Sanctions Committee review. It would do this by reversing the current system of reviewing everything (except what is on the pre-approval lists) by creating a limited list of items that must be reviewed. The GRL would codify the current, limited practice of primarily focusing on only items that would contribute to WMD and missile programs. While the GRL does not completely ignore conventional capabilities, prudence suggests a thorough review from a warfighting perspective.

Under resolution 1382, the Council “decid[ed] that it will adopt the List and procedures subject to any refinements to them agreed by the Council in light of further consultations, for implementation beginning on 30 May 2002.” (emphasis added) The List has five sections; chemical, biological, nuclear, missile and conventional. The conventional section generally mirrors the Wassenaar list.

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: X1

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 30 2010

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**Issue for Decision:** The key issue for Deputies consideration is whether the List is robust enough for the full range of Iraqi warfighting capabilities that we now care about in a post-9/11 and post State-of-the-Union environment.

**Options:**

**1. Suspend the Goods Review List process.** Action: inform the Security Council of U.S. intent to withdraw from the Goods Review List process. State to advise what action may be necessary by the Council to suspend the self-executing nature of the List under Resolution 1382.

Pro: maintain status quo with respect to transparency into nearly all Oil-For-Food shipments to Iraq; maintain de facto U.S. veto over any shipment.

Con: significant political cost among allies - allied governments driven by commercial pressure; undermine U.S. leadership role at UN; reinforce international view of this Administration as unilateralist; continues significant resource burden to U.S. agencies associated with reviewing large volume of shipment requests.

**2. Amend the Goods Review List to include all significant conventional warfighting enablers – not just HETs.** Action: Joint Staff and OSD to complete pending conventional warfighting review of the Goods Review List; State to develop strategy for expanding 21 March meeting with Russians and notification to the Security Council regarding possible major revisions to the List.

Pro: achieves State/UN/allied/Russian goal of streamlining Oil-For-Food processing – permits legitimate commercial ventures to move forward faster; achieves DoD/State goal of limiting Iraqi warfighting capabilities across the full spectrum of goods/technologies – not just WMD; lessens resource burden on U.S. agencies. This option could be presented as a responsible U.S. move in light of September 11, short of dashing the entire Goods Review List process.

Con: some political cost among allies.

**3. Amend the Goods Review List to add only HETs.** Action: State to follow-through on pending discussions regarding inclusion of HETs only in current version of the List.

Pro: satisfies current concerns about HETs; limits political fallout among allies.

Con: ignores larger conventional warfighting issues; exacts some political cost without achieving meaningful limitation on Iraqi capabilities in the long run.

Derived From Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: X1

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snowflake

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~~CLOSE HOLD~~

May 8, 2002 7:23 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Gardez

Attached is a piece of paper on the subject of Gardez that we discussed. I have not edited it, but it kind of lays out the logic of the matter we discussed on the phone concerning Gardez.

Regards,

Attach.  
05/06/02 "U.S. Role in the Gardez Situation"

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
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Date: JUN 30 2010

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


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
OSD 1.4 (D) 2  
OSD 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (5)

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Date:

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DOS 1.4(d)

DOS 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)

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Date: JUL 30 2010

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February 4, 2002 7:37 AM

TO: Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable George Tenet  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Paper on Iran

FYI.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: *JUL 30 2010*

Attach.  
Undated paper: Iranian Influence in Afghanistan

DHR:dh  
020402-7

X00404 /02

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 30 2010


**Iranian Influence in Afghanistan  
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**ISSUE:** Actions to Diminish Iranian Influence in Afghanistan (U)

**BACKGROUND:**

DOS 1.4 (b), (c), (d)

OSD 1.4 (c), (d)



- (U) On 21 January, Iran's Foreign Minister Kharrazi attended the Afghanistan reconstruction conference in Tokyo and pledged \$600 million over five years in aid to Afghanistan with \$120 million over the next year.



**STATUS:**

DOS 1.4 (c), (d)

OSD 1.4 (c), (d)



DOS 1.4 (b), (d)

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OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

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
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NO. 297 P. 4

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OSD 1.4 (d)

OSD 1.4 (d)



Prepared by: [redacted] CC-POLAD, [redacted]

OSD 1.4 (c), (d)

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2), (6)

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**Date: JUL 30 2010**

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TIME OF RECEIPT:  
2003 DEC 20 AM 9:47

2003 DEC 20 AM 9:

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PRECEDENCE

CLASSIFICATION:

RELEASER: SOP

IMMEDIATE

DATE/TIME:

MESSAGE #: 3324

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FROM: Amb Bremer (thru WHSR) PHONE: \_\_\_\_\_ ROOM: \_\_\_\_\_

SUBJECT: \_\_\_\_\_ PAGES: 8

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

LOCATION	DELIVER TO	ROOM	PHONE
	SEC POWELL		
	SEC RUMFELD		

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
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Date: JUL 30 2010

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY

BAGHDAD



INFO MEMO

September 14, 2003

FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld  
From: Ambassador Bremer <signed>  
Subject: Police Training and the Jordan Option

Clay McManaway is just back from Jordan. We have a real breakthrough on police training. While details need to be worked out, I wanted to give you a quick word on our plan.

The option of training Iraqi police in Jordan is viable and attractive. We will start within three weeks to train as trainers fifty to one hundred select Iraqi policemen. This will be done at established Jordanian police training centers by Jordanian instructors. Within three months, we will begin training fifteen hundred recruits at a logistical center currently under construction that we will convert for this purpose. The recruits will be trained by professional trainers from the US, the UK, and other members of the Coalition and international community.

The converted logistical center can be expanded to train the full Iraqi police force requirement of another thirty five thousand policemen, and beyond if that proves desirable. This can be done on a schedule to meet any build up of recruits and trainers that we are likely to achieve.

This development removes the issue of facilities as a constraining factor on our pace in training recruits for the new Iraqi police force. We will continue to search for suitable locations for training in Iraq while preparing the facility in Jordan. If we find a location

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Callis  
9/15

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in Iraq, we can decide to complement the training center in Jordan with one of equal or greater size. If we have not found a place in Iraq within a month, we can and should exercise the option of continuing to expand the facility in Jordan to a capacity of at least three thousand recruit trainees plus trainers and support staff.

With the focus now on how quickly we can recruit and how quickly we can build up a cadre of professional trainers, we can consider accelerating training further to reach the level of a trained Iraqi police force of seventy five thousand in less than eighteen months.

We have already asked the State Department to start identifying police trainers using the existing contract they have with DynCorp. We have funds for this entire project in the supplemental.

We will forward a full plan for the buildup by week's end.

Cc: SecState  
C. Rice

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LF685 - 12



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2900 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2900

F HAS SEEN

ACTION MEMO

MAR 14 2002

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
POLICY

02/003738

MAR 08 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: J.D. Touch II, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy *3/7/02*

SUBJECT: Heavy Equipment Transporters (HETs) to Iraq - Way Forward

- We prepared talking points for you to call Secretary Powell and NSA Rice on the need to re-look the way the UN clears shipments of goods to Iraq.
- You asked that we convert the talking points into a memo from you to the Vice President, Powell and Rice ~~(S)~~.
- Draft memo, per your request, is at Tab A. It highlights the concern that the past focus on WMD (important) may not have stopped Iraq from exploiting the Oil-For-Food program to increase conventional military capabilities (equally important).
- Draft memo at Tab B requests that this issue be put on the next Deputies Committee meeting agenda. If you wish to pursue this matter, we need to force the issue promptly.
- Meeting with Russians scheduled for March 21, supposedly to "finalize" the Goods Review List (contents of this list are what drives the HET issue).
- Under a UN Security Council Resolution passed November 29, 2001, the Goods Review List will go into effect on May 30, 2002. The U.S. will need to take affirmative steps before then to revise or block adoption of the List.

RECOMMENDATION: approve memo to Vice President, Secretary Powell and NSA Rice.

COORDINATION: USD(P) at Tab C.

Prepared by:

SPL ASSISTANT DI RITA	3/10
SR MA GIAMBASTIANI	3/11
MA BUCCI	3/11
EXECSEC WHITMORE	3/10

~~SECRET~~

Derived From: Multiple Sources  
Declassify On: X1

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2,6)



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Date: JUL 30 2010

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*Letter to CIA*

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 30 2010

1000

3/15/02  
4/3/02

3/15/02

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY  
FROM: Douglas J. Feith *AD 3/15/02*  
SUBJECT: HETS

Attached are talking points on HETS for your  
morning conference call with Dr. Rice and Secretary  
Powell *or for another occasion when you can talk with them.*


*NO - Draft a memo for me  
to VP - C.P. CR*

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OSD 1.4 (b) (c) (d)  
DoS 1.4 (d)  
DoS U.S.C. § 552 (b) (5)

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Date: JUL 30 2010

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June 2, 2003 10:48 AM

TO: Gen. Myers  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld TA  
SUBJECT: Iran

Attached is a memo I have asked our intel people to provide the answers to.

[REDACTED]

Thanks.

DOS 1.4(d)

Attach.  
6/2/03 SecDef memo to SMA re: Iran [060203-1S]

DHR:dh  
060203-26

.....  
Please respond by 6/20/03

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
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Date: JUL 20 2010

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MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld      DATE: June 14, 2003  
FROM: Paul Wolfowitz *PW*  
SUBJECT: Meeting with [REDACTED]      DOS 1.4(d)

OFFICE OF THE  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2003 JUN 21 PM 6:40

- I met with [REDACTED] Zalmay Khalilzad from the NSC and State Department DAS Philo Dibble also attended.
- DOS 1.4(d)* • [REDACTED] thanked the United States for Iraq's liberation; [REDACTED] he went to Walter Reed Medical Center to thank wounded U.S. servicemen.
- [REDACTED] had several observations and ideas about which I think you should be aware:



*OSD 1.4(d)*

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
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*-09-m-2296*

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


- Enhanced intelligence exploitation would improve the security situation.
  - The extent of Saddam's network is amazing—he was even recruiting U.S. citizens, [REDACTED]

OSD 1.4 ( b ), ( d )

- We lack personnel and resources in our interrogation capability.

OSD 1.4 ( d )



- We need better communication with our Iraqi allies:
  - Ex-Ba'athists like the former warden of Abu Gharayb prison have better access to OCPA than do non-Ba'athist petitioners.

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OSD 1.4 (C)  
DOS 1.4 (d)  
CIA 1.4 (c)

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] urged a more transparent political process.
  - He said the U.S. has advocated a military government, an Iraqi Interim Authority, a provisional government (promised by Zal Khalilzad), and now an appointed interim administration.
  - [REDACTED] said that a greater G-7 Leadership Council role in appointing delegates or organizing provincial conferences would mirror Bremer's appointments, but further the interim administration's legitimacy.
  - [REDACTED] recommended more careful outreach to the Shi'a:
    - We need to consult Grand Ayatollah Sistani frequently. He is Iraq's top religious leader and, even if he does not want himself (or any other religious figure) to be involved in politics, we need his support for the constitutional process.
    - Our objective should be a liberal democratic constitution, but we need to have serious Islamists sign onto it for its legitimacy and success.
- I pressed [REDACTED] that he should be more vocal himself in countering misperceptions of U.S. intentions.
  - I suggested that he write an opinion editorial for the Washington Post or other major outlet.
- I queried whether it might not be best for Iraqis to first demonstrate their capacity to debate constitutional issues, as was done in Romania, before assuming authority which they are not yet ready for.

DOS 1.4 (d)

DOS 1.4 (d)

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- In response to my question, [REDACTED] thought it would be feasible to organize local assemblies in three or four provinces to demonstrate the feasibility of such a debate on a national scale.

pos 1.4 (d)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**RSS - SecDef CablesESO**

**From:** Norwood, Scott [norwoods@orha.centcom.smil.mil]  
**Sent:** Sunday, June 15, 2003 3:15 PM  
**To:** Norwood, Scott; Nagelmann, Sarah, , OUSDP; cableseso@osd.pentagon.smil.mil  
**Cc:** Nagelmann, Sarah, CIV, OSD  
**Subject:** Memo to SD

Pls confirm receipt and fwd to Larry DiRita. SecDef should have opportunity to read before morning phone call if practical  
thx  
Vr jsn

*Trag*

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6/15/2003

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11/5/01  
11/11/01  
11/11/01  
Revised by [unclear] presented @ [unclear] 11/11

October 30, 2001 2:51 PM

103001-50

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Strategy

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 20 2010

Here are some edits to the "U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan." It is a pretty good paper. Please take a look at the additions and changes. Mark them in bold type, do your own edit, and then I want to send it to some folks.

Here is a draft memo to send it with to the Vice President with copies to Colin Powell, Condi Rice and George Tenet:

*Attached is a revision of the paper entitled "U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan." It seems to me that it is useful to update this from time to time.*

Thanks.

Attach.  
10/16/01 memo, "U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan"

DHR:dh  
103001-50

.....  
Please respond by \_\_\_\_\_

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Date: JUL 20 2010

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DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION

Approved at  
NSC meeting  
10/16/01

October 16, 2001  
7:43 AM

**SUBJECT: U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan**

All elements of U.S. strategy must be integrated-military, diplomatic, covert, humanitarian, financial, etc..

1. U.S. Goals re: Al-Qaida

- Eliminate Al-Qaida leadership and forces.
- Deal with Al-Qaida in a manner that clearly signals the rest of the world that terrorists and terrorism will be punished *and stopped.*
- Collect intelligence for the worldwide campaign against terrorism.

2. Goals re: Taliban

- Terminate the rule of the Taliban and their leadership.
- End the use of Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorism.
- Do so in a manner that signals the world that harboring terrorism will be punished severely.
- *Collect intelligence to help in the worldwide campaign against terrorism*
- Take steps to contribute to a more stable post-Taliban Afghanistan.

Note: The U.S. should be involved in the diplomatic effort, but it is not ~~within~~ *in* U.S. power to assure a specific outcome. U.S. preference for a specific outcome ought not paralyze U.S. efforts to oust Al-Qaida and the Taliban. The U.S. should not commit to any post-Taliban military involvement, since the U.S. will be heavily engaged in the anti-terrorism effort worldwide. *The US needs to be involved in this effort to ensure that our coalition partners are not distracted*

3. Execution

- Al-Qaida's and the Taliban's main assets are people. They must be destroyed.

DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION  
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DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION

- Use any and all Afghan tribes and factions to eliminate Al-Qaida and Taliban personnel and military capabilities.
- DoD and CIA <sup>work</sup> coordinate closely in getting all factions engaged in eliminating Al-Qaida and Taliban; by the use of incentives and disincentives-money, food, military equipment, supplies, air strikes, etc.

4. Operations

OSD 1.4 (b)

- ~~Urgently~~ <sup>We need - many more</sup> Insert additional CIA teams and Special Forces in country operational detachments (A teams), by any means, both in the North and the South. ~~Add~~ <sup>add</sup> third country special forces if appropriate (UK, ~~██████████~~ <sup>██████████</sup> Australia, New Zealand, etc.) <sup>Still in interest of top of page</sup>
- CIA and DoD teams on the ground are critical for success-U.S. influence, targeting, logistics and humanitarian efforts.
- Ground liaison teams should urge Afghan ground forces:
  - In the North, in this order, to:
    - Establish a land bridge to Uzbekistan by attacking and occupying land and major cities.
    - Eliminate Al-Qaida, Taliban and Arab forces to the north and northeast.
    - Move toward Kabul and, to the extent possible, threaten <sup>or occupy</sup> surround Kabul, while making pronouncements about a shared government with other key elements.
    - Sever Taliban lines of command, northwest and northeast of Kabul.
  - In the South and West to:
    - Move against Al-Qaida and Taliban forces and strongholds throughout the country.
- U.S. military and coalition forces will:

The US should prepare for a major coalition ground effort to take Kabul, but with the goal of bringing the Taliban into a coalition with the US.

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- Closely coordinate with forces on the ground to achieve the military goals.
- CINCENT will use all capabilities to encourage ground forces to achieve U.S. goals:
  - Attack from the air enemy capabilities, to facilitate success of Afghan forces on the ground.
  - Provide money, equipment, food, etc.
  - Provide equipment.
  - Provide food.

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Date: JUL 20 2010

5. Other

- Establish secure air and land supply routes in the North and South, so aid can be focused on opposition forces, rather than in Taliban-occupied areas.
- Build humanitarian supply routes and centers to help the US oppose the Taliban.

6. Kabul

Providing additional conventional support to Northern Alliance forces north of Kabul (the vicinity of Panshir and the Shomali plains) may set conditions for Northern Alliance to eliminate Taliban resistance in Kabul and take the city.

- The USG should not agonize over post-Taliban arrangements to the point that it delays success over Al Qaida and the Taliban. The sooner the Taliban is pushed out of Kabul, Herat, Mazar-e-Sharif, and other key cities, the better. However, without slowing down the Northern Alliance's advance, the USG should begin discussing international arrangements for the administration of Kabul to relieve Pashtun fear of domination by Northern Alliance (Tajik-Uzbek) tribes.
- Engaging U.N. diplomacy too early beyond intent and general outline could interfere with U.S. military operations and inhibit coalition freedom of action. Diplomacy can be most useful:

1) Occupy Mazarsharif and Herat, and  
2) Occupy Kabul.  
3) Occupy Herat.

Final major effort in 1) Occupy Mazarsharif and Herat, and  
2) Occupy Kabul.  
3) Occupy Herat.

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- 1) bilaterally, particularly with Pakistan, but also with Iran and Russia, to reinforce our messages to the Northern Alliance and to Southern Pashtuns (see below);
  - 2) to enlist commitments from key allies and Muslim countries for a follow-on peacekeeping force for Kabul.
- An international group could be UN-based or an ad hoc collection of volunteer states (such as Turkey, [REDACTED] and Egypt, along with other NATO allies), but not the U.S. The U.S. will have a ~~major~~ deal of work to do in the rest of the world. *mil/boy* *not boy*

OSD 1.4 ( b )

7. The South

It is critical that CIA and DoD speed up the process of establishing on-the-ground contacts in the South as well as the North. Pakistan could be key in this regard, particularly if the U.S. emphasizes to them that this is the key to balancing gains by the Northern Alliance. The U.S. should explore the value of ties with King Zahir Shah. He may have some influence with Pashtuns, particularly if he is seen to have the confidence of the U.S. The U.S. should be wary of associating closely with the still hated Russians or the Iranians, given Pashtun fear of domination by Iranian-backed Shia.

8. Message to Southern Tribes

The message to Southern tribes should emphasize the importance of joining the U.S. if they wish to balance the Northern Alliance:

- The U.S. is prepared to give them the same support it is giving Northern groups if they will join with the US.
- U.S. actions in the North demonstrate that the U.S. is able and willing to support its friends.
- The U.S. is committed to preserving Kabul as a capital for all Afghans, not one dominated by the Northern Alliance.

9. Message for the Northern Alliance

- The U.S. goal is to help Afghans drive out the foreign terrorists, defeat the Taliban and help Afghans regain control over their land and people.

4

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- The U.S. will provide support to accomplish those goals: coordinated air strikes with ground movement, ammunition, supplies and food.
- Long-term, the U.S. and its allies are prepared to provide economic support for reconstruction within an all-Afghan political framework.
- It is crucial that their forces conduct themselves humanely and professionally toward the civilian population. Atrocities will damage their cause. U.S. support depends on their dealing severely with breaches of professional conduct.
- The U.S. must also ally with anti-Taliban forces in the South. This means the future of Kabul should be decided by a political process, and not by military action alone. The U.S. expects them to declare, as soon possible, that their goal is not to establish dominion over the entire country, but to get a political process started that will reflect the interests of all the Afghan peoples.
- The U.S. envisions some kind of international security arrangement for Kabul and the surrounding area in which a political process could take place. The U.S. envisions a highly capable peacekeeping force drawn from allies in Europe, the Muslim world and elsewhere to help to secure Kabul until stability is achieved.
- The U.S. will consult on its plans for moving on Kabul. It may be wise to encourage the Taliban to surrender the city without the Northern Alliance forces having to invest and occupy it by force, possibly by surrounding the city and introducing a capable peacekeeping force.

Timing

The President has properly prepared the American public for a long campaign. However, it would be helpful to achieve some decisive results relatively early:

- An early defeat of Taliban/Al Qaida will make it more difficult for them to conduct additional terrorist operations.
- Making an example of the Taliban increases U.S. leverage on other state supporters of terrorism.

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Date: JUL 20 2010

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DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION

- There will undoubtedly be intense diplomatic activity once winter slows down military operations. That diplomacy must operate against a background of U.S. success or it will inhibit U.S. actions.
- Success will build U.S. public confidence for action in other theaters.
- Success will maintain the support of key coalition members; protracted fighting may achieve the opposite.
- However, early successes may not be possible, and expectations should be kept to realistic levels.



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Date: JUL 16 2010

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

INFO MEMO

CM-1094-03  
22 July 2003


FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS

*RBMY/27*

SUBJECT: Police (U)

- (S) In response to your request, in a briefing to President Bush and Prime Minister Blair the first week in July, Ambassador Bremer indicated that approximately 7,000 international police officers are required to maintain order, investigate crimes and train the future Iraqi police force.
- (S) In April, the Department of State (DOS) solicited 40 countries for support to the international police force. Twenty-one nations responded positively,



- (S) DOS International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau is ready to provide up to 1,000 US police advisors through a contract with DynCorp, once a determination is made regarding administration of the civil police program. Contributors to the DynCorp force include active, retired and recently separated law enforcement officers with at least 10 years experience.

JS 1.4 (A)

~~Classified By: LTG W. Sharp, USA, Director, J-5  
Reason: (S) (d)  
Declassify On: 11 July 2012~~

OSD 1.4 (b, d)

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*Doc 1*

*X03771-03*


09-M-2217

*09M2217*

(LSCI)

- (P) DOS and the Department of Justice are prepared to work together to implement a police sector training program once venue and administration determinations are finalized.

BS



- (P) Ways to increase the number of international police contributions include:
  - (S) Use of individual, targeted diplomatic approaches to re-engage countries that did not respond to the April DOS cable.
  - (S) Use of high-level, personal approaches to gain commitment from countries that responded positively, but did not make a specific offer.
  - (S) Offers of financial incentives to selected countries that have police available, but cannot afford to deploy them out of their country.
  - (S) Expansion of diplomatic approaches beyond the original 40 countries.

COORDINATION: TAB B

JS 1.4 (d) DOS 1.4 (d)

Attachments:  
As stated


OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

Prepared By: LTG Walter Sharp, USA; Director, J-5; [REDACTED]

OSD

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 16 2010



OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN  
OF THE  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Note from EA

13 November 2002

TO: CJCS *Milg*

General Myers,

Mr. Rodman requested a quick review of the attached proposed SECDEF memo for the President on the "Next steps on Iraq." J-5 has provided the following comments. DJS and VCJCS have reviewed with no additional remarks.

Recommend you sign and forward.

VR,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be the initials "JD" or similar.



Doc 2 09-M-2217

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 16 2010

MEMO FOR: THE PRESIDENT

CC: The Vice President  
SecState Powell  
Andrew Card  
Dr. Rice

From: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Next Steps on Iraq

The inspections timeline set up by UNSCR 1441 has important implications for U.S. military planning. Here are my initial thoughts.

Your Rose Garden remarks effectively posed the stark choice that Saddam faces: either to continue the game of cheat and retreat, or to disarm completely. The task is to test -- sooner rather than later -- which choice he has made. We are working on the assignment of seeking ways to determine what his choice will be.

When will we know this? It could be early, if he makes some early blunder. It could be 30 days from now, if the declaration of his WMD holdings as required by the UNSCR is blatantly false. Or it could be many months away, after the inspectors have begun their work. And even if Saddam commits what we

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~~CLASSIFIED BY ASE/ISA PETER W. RODMAN  
Reason(s) 1.5(d)  
DECLASSIFY ON 9 November 2012~~

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Date: JUL 16 2010

consider another material breach, we do not know whether other Security Council members will agree.

Militarily, we need to continue our preparations—not only to keep up the military pressure that reinforces U.S./U.N. diplomacy, but to be ready to move relatively quickly should Saddam do something that leads you to decide to act.

- If we were to execute our full military planning, with which you are familiar, it should have us ready by February.
  
- Between now and then, we will work to be prepared for more rapid military action that, on short notice can:
  - protect the Kurds and seize the oil fields in northern Iraq (this requires much more cooperation from Turkey);
  - seize the port of Basra and the southern oil fields;
  - neutralize the SCUD threat against Israel in the west;
  - prepare the ground for a possible provisional advisory council of Iraqi oppositionists;
  - create a shock effect which, with a great deal of good fortune, could hasten the crumbling of the regime. This would be designed to give us some modest hope that his WMD would not be used.

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- I have directed our planners to be prepared to put boots on the ground early, and to develop, refine and be ready to execute a substantial information campaign immediately.

The new UNSCR also provides an opportunity to accelerate our coalition-building. There are a number of countries prepared to join with us in military planning, in the name of reinforcing the diplomacy. Being in on such planning may induce them later to join a "coalition of the willing," even if the Security Council should fail to agree on a second resolution.

- We should therefore begin a full-court press now on allies and friends to join us, in the name of reinforcing the UNSCR.
  - Some might join us in military planning; others in logistical support roles.
  - Some may be willing to backfill (in Europe, or even in the U.S.) to perform such missions as force protection that could reduce the burden on U.S. National Guard and reserves.
  - Some may be prepared to provide assistance tied to the broader global war on terrorism, but which will help us across the spectrum of activities, including any potential action in Iraq.


OSD 1.4 ( b ),(d) ~~SECRET~~

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JS 1.4 (a), (d)


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OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

- The new UNSCR should be of enormous help in persuading the Turks. So will the Prague NATO Summit. We expect the Summit to issue an allied statement on Iraq, reinforcing our message on what the UNSCR requires of Saddam.



JS 1.4 (d)

OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

Prepared by: ASD/ISA Peter W. Rodman, 

OSD  
§ U.S.C. § 552 (b)(Z)

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 16 2010

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

NOV 13 PM 12:57

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

INFO MEMO

CR-608-02

13 November 2002

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: General Richard B. Myers, CJCS *RBMY 11/13*

JS 1.4 (a), (d)

SUBJECT: Next Steps on Iraq (U)

- (U) In response to your request for input on the draft Memorandum for the President on Next Steps on Iraq (TAB), the following is provided:
- (U) Page 2, 1st bullet recommend inserting: "If we were to execute our full military planning, with which you are familiar, it should have us ready by *late (RM)* February; however this requires a decision to be made 45 days prior to the desired date in order to position key assets. (Justification: Pre-positioning [redacted])
- (U) Talking Points on Turkey (last page), Section II, Specific Points, 1st bullet recommend changing: "We need your permission for US coordination cells at sites you approve to help prepare the Northern Front." (Justification: "US coordination cells" are a more acceptable term than "site survey" and also allow an expanded range of actions to coordinate between the US and Turkey.)
- (U) Talking Points with President Sezar (last page) add a bullet: "We need your support for coalition operations so that potential coalition partners, [redacted] can begin their integrated planning and preparations." (Justification: Operational planning currently has [redacted] participation in the North. GOT has neither approved nor denied participation by coalition partners. A determination on this issue is needed.)

JS 1.4 (A)

Attachment:  
As Stated

Prepared By: LTG Casey, J5, [redacted]

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

SECDEF CONTROL# X03850 /02


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Derived from: OSD Memorandum  
Reason: 1.5 (4)  
Declassify on: 9 November 2012

## Talking Points on Turkey

### I. Major Points

- Now that the UN Security Council resolution has passed, gaining an international consensus to disarm Saddam will be a lot easier.
- The inspection regime won't work unless we keep the military pressure up – after all, it was only diplomatic and military pressure that brought us this far.
- It is essential that we begin planning for a Northern Front in case we have to use force to disarm Saddam.
- If we go to war, the quicker the conflict is resolved, the better for all of us – economically as well as politically.



JS 1.4 (a)

OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

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ADM

TIME OF TRANSMISSION:

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
TIME OF RECEIPT:

**WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM**

2003 MAR -4 PM 2:03

PRECEDENCE

CLASSIFICATION:

RELEASER: ASB

IMMEDIATE

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DATE/TIME: 04 1403

MESSAGE #: 638

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 SUBJECT: PAPERS FOR PC ON 4 MAR PAGES: COVER + 12

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12 DOD	COL. JAMES A. WHITMORE-EXEC SEC		
F JCS	COL. EDWARD SNEAD-SECRETARY		
3 CIA	MR. JOHN EDWARDS-EXEC SEC		
15 JUSTICE	MR. JAMES MCATAMNEY COUNSEL FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS		
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SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Revision of 1991 M.I. Brief

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: AUG 25 2010

09-M-2459

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APR 21 2003

FOR: CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

Cc: Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)  
Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)  
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Detention Facilities in Iraq

- I suspect that, during the course of combat operations and in the aftermath, we will gain control over a number of personnel who are not Prisoners of War, but instead are unlawful enemy combatants.
- We need to develop a plan, working with the developing civil authorities in Iraq, to deal with the various types of detainees we will have: Iraqis, non-Iraqis, EPWs, unlawful enemy combatants, those awaiting trials for war crimes, etc. (Ultimately, we will need a memorandum of understanding with the new government of Iraq).
- Our goal should be that only in exceptional circumstances would a detainee be transferred out of Iraq.
- Please take a look at this issue, and have your folks get with Under Secretary Steve Cambone and Under Secretary Doug Feith to sketch out a plan. I want to see a first draft of the plan by April 30.

383.6

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Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

21 Apr 03

Classified by: SecDef Rumsfeld  
Reason: 1.5(-)  
Declassify on: 21 Apr 2013

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APR 21 2003

DECLASSIFIED In Part JUL 7 2010  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

FOR: The Honorable Colin Powell

Cc: The Honorable John Ashcroft  
The Honorable George Tenet  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice  
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
Commander, U.S. Central Command

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



OSD 1.4 (C)

SUBJECT: Making Afghans Responsible for Holding "Low-Level" Enemy  
Combatants in the Afghan System



- We currently find ourselves in the predicament of having to serve as Afghanistan's "Bureau of Prisons." We cannot release these people, since they will simply continue to fight against the U.S. and Karzai government. But there is no reason for the United States to be the one to hold all of them.
- I think the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan needs to approach President Karzai to secure his agreement to establish a detention facility in Afghanistan, under Afghan control, to hold low-level enemy combatants.
- Part of that effort also needs to be a plan for the Afghan government to rehabilitate, and reintegrate adolescent fighters back into society.
- Once Ambassador Finn has secured Karzai's agreement to be ready to take back the low-level fighters by a date certain, and his pledge not to release them (unless the USG concurs first), I think US AID and the Department of State should pull together a plan to help the Afghans establish the necessary facility. General Franks will consult with US AID and Department of State representatives as this program develops.

Classified by: SecDef Rumsfeld  
Reason: 1.5(a)  
Declassify on: 21 Apr 2013 ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

REF CONTROL#

X01358 /03

R-4

09.M-2462



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

NOTE: SENT TO  
POTUS AND  
PRINCIPALS  
ON 1 APRIL PM.

APR 1 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

DECLASSIFIED JUL 2010  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Iraqi Interim Authority

It is crucial to our war effort to convince the Iraqi people that:

1. There will be no cease fire.
2. We are intent on changing the regime – there will be no deal that leaves Baathists in power, and
3. The new regime is going to be a free Iraqi government, not a US military government.

In particular, Generals Franks and Abizaid want to organize a highly-visible event *soon* to make these points.

We have developed a mechanism to do this – the Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA). On Sunday, I distributed to the Principals a plan to implement the IIA concept.

We have got to get moving on this. We can't afford to have a protracted interagency debate. This is now a matter of operational importance – it is not too much to say that time can cost lives.

Publicly beginning the process of creating an IIA would be a major boost to our psychological operations, and could be the "tipping point" that energizes Iraqis to throw off the Saddam regime.

The implementation plan we distributed may not be perfect, but we've talked with Generals Franks and Abizaid, and others, and I'm convinced the plan is a reasonable one. Outside the National Military Command Center here in the Pentagon hangs a sign that quotes George Patton: "A good plan executed now is better than a perfect plan next week." I'm sure the interagency process could, over time, come up with a lot of good ideas, but we need a good idea cut-off date.

Unless there is a fundamental objection to what we have proposed, I intend to direct General Franks to coordinate an announcement in Iraq of the formation of an organizing committee to begin implementation of the IIA. This would be the centerpiece of the major public event he described to you at the NSC meeting on Tuesday.

Classified by: Douglas Feith, USD(P)  
Reason: 1.5(b)  
Declassify on: X6

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X01171 /03

DEF CONTROL



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

*Couriered to  
White House*

*14 Oct 02  
7:25 pm*

14 October 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: UN Inspections of Iraq

When the US started down the inspection route at the UN, the purpose was not to get entangled in a cat and mouse game with Saddam Hussein, but to see whether the Security Council would support an inspection regime that could bring about disarmament. For that to be achievable, the regime would have to allow the UN to get clarity rather quickly on whether the Iraqi leadership has had a change of heart and is actually willing to give up the weapons that it has sacrificed so much to create.

An inspection regime that is not capable of achieving clarity at all, or can't possibly produce it in less than a year or so, is Iraq's best hope of inflicting a strategic defeat on the US.

It is useful to recall that the purpose of entering into UN negotiations was to test the UN's seriousness regarding Iraqi WMD, not to indulge a fantasy that we could design an inspection regime that will allow us to score a quick checkmate against Saddam Hussein against his will. The excruciating process of negotiating inspection modalities tends to obscure certain key points:

- The UNMOVIC inspectors cannot be expected to outmaneuver Iraq's highly experienced denial-and-deception experts to prove either (1) that Iraq possesses WMD or (2) that Iraq is patently and unreasonably blocking the inspections.
- Iraq won't commit flagrant obstruction unless UNMOVIC can catch Saddam Hussein, as it were, with his pants down. The long history of weapons inspections in Iraq tells us that this is highly unlikely, especially in the first year or so.
- Several former inspectors warn that, even under UNSCOM (the post Desert-Storm inspection regime), the inspectors were only once able -- with extraordinary luck, wit and aggressiveness -- to come close to pulling off a real surprise inspection.
- Iraq has had more than half a decade to improve its denial-and-deception techniques. And UNMOVIC today is a notably weaker organization, staffed entirely by UN employees.
- Even with the stronger provisions the US is trying now to add to the UNSC resolution, UNMOVIC can by no means be counted on to prove that Iraq is lying or to force Iraq into a clear-cut obstruction.

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- To me it seems unrealistic to think UNMOVIC could prove either proposition in less than 12 months and there is a danger, after five or six inspections that prove to be "dry holes," that the US would be pressed hard (including perhaps by Hans Blix) to accept Iraqi declarations at face value. In other words, months of failing to "catch" Saddam Hussein is likely to change the subject on the world stage away from Iraq's credibility and onto the embarrassing failure of the US to make the case that Iraq has WMD.
- The only reasonable goal of any inspection regime is to monitor the disarmament of a government that is cooperating in good faith. No matter how muscular, inspections cannot disarm a large country like Iraq where the government is skilled at hiding and cheating and is determined to do so.

The only chance of achieving clarity within weeks, or months, rather than years, is:

- Optimistically, if Saddam Hussein confesses so freely in a new declaration that the UN can conclude that he has had a real change of heart; or,
- If the Iraqis either declare that they have nothing, or declare so little that the UN can conclude that they are lying blatantly and therefore decide that inspections would be pointless. It is important to note that Blix has already said that he does not now have the information to conclude that the Iraqis would be lying even if they declare that they have nothing.

Any other Iraqi action exposes the US to risks of long delays. In the worst case, the officials of UNMOVIC - eager to avoid a war - could declare Iraq in compliance when it is not, simply because they have been unsuccessful.

As months go by, dangers will grow:

- 1) That the clarity of purpose that you have shown the American people and the world could become blurred.
- 2) That some new crisis in Korea or between India and Pakistan or between Palestinians and Israelis could get out of control and make action more difficult.
- 3) Our growing international coalition could unravel if people in the region begin to conclude that once again Saddam will slip away and that the US is not a country on whom to stake one's future. Or,
- 4) That Saddam could covertly disperse some of his WMD capabilities or his UAVs with terrorist groups or Iraqi sleeper cells.

In addition, Saddam's preparations to use weapons of mass destruction can be expected to advance daily. His preparations to draw Israel into a conflict would likely move forward with time. US military effectiveness will peak at a certain point and then decline. It is difficult to try

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to maintain a large force in fighting trim while waiting for UN inspectors to find something. At some point it will make sense to stand down.

As noted, our negotiations aim to give the UNSC the opportunity to establish its relevance, its seriousness of purpose. If the UNSC is unwilling to endorse an inspection mandate meeting minimum necessary standards, then the UN has not risen to the challenge. It may well be better if the US inspection initiative ended as a noble if unrealized effort to get the UN to meet its responsibilities than if it ends with UNMOVIC inspectors having spent months in fruitless searches in Iraq, seeming to confirm Iraq's contention that it has no WMD.

Given the well-known history of UN inspections of Iraq, the US must be careful not to agree to a new inspection regime that fails to take account of the past inspection regime's failures and Iraq's having "gone to school on us" on this subject for over a decade.

The world should be reminded that the US made a large concession when we did not insist on reviving UNSCOM. So if we position it right, we should be seen clearly within the bounds of reasonableness to require the following measures to bolster the currently weak UNMOVIC regime:

- First and foremost: That a false declaration is by itself a "material breach." If Iraq makes a patently false declaration, the UN should not proceed with inspections, for it would be clear then that there is lacking the good faith and cooperative attitude necessary to make inspections work.
- That we be able to take Iraqi sources out of the country with their families, to be interviewed in secure conditions free of intimidation.
- That individual P-5 members can:
  - 1) Designate sites to be inspected and individuals to be interviewed.
  - 2) Appoint our nationals as members of any inspection team. This is essential not only to try to keep the Iraqis honest but to keep Blix on the right track.
  - 3) Specify the conditions under which inspections and interviews would be carried out.
- That Iraq be prohibited from threatening or attacking the aircraft of UN member states engaged in air operations over the entire country of Iraq.

It is important that these provisions be in any UNSC resolution that we offer or support. It will take maximum efforts to get the French and the Russians to go along. But, in any case, you should be in a stronger position to act if the French have vetoed your reasonable effort to resolve this issue peacefully than if Hans Blix and a weak UNMOVIC have had twelve months or so to muddy the issue.

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

09-M-2465 18

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

If it comes to US unilateralism vs. French unilateralism -- and that's what it would be on their part if the French veto -- the American people will likely be with you over France. What we need to try to avoid is to be in a state of inspection limbo a year or so from now.

Weeks ago, you set guidelines that deserve mention:

- The US will not allow itself to get sucked into a "quagmire of negotiations," or a "mud pit of diplomacy."
- The US goal at the UN is *not* to get merely the best resolution possible, but to achieve a resolution that actually meets the standards appropriate to the threat and to the goal of achieving disarmament.
- In my view it is far better to have tried but failed to get an acceptable resolution than to agree to an inadequate resolution that will trap us in an endless inspection game with Saddam Hussein and Hans Blix.

What we aim to accomplish regarding Iraq, the WMD nexus to state sponsors of terrorism and the broader war on terrorism hinges on our insisting that the UNSC resolution meet a minimum -- albeit high -- standard.

Very Respectfully,



DECLASSIFIED JUL 7 2010  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

APR 21 2003

FOR: The Honorable Colin Powell

Cc: The Honorable John Ashcroft  
The Honorable George Tenet  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld



SUBJECT: Negotiating Transfer Agreements With Foreign Nations

- We need to make a real push to secure agreements with key foreign governments so that we can transfer enemy combatants out of Guantanamo Bay back to them for further detention and/or prosecution.
- The current approach of adding the negotiation of transfer agreements to the list of many other things expected of a U.S. ambassador in-country is not working. After more than a year, we do not yet have a single agreement signed, even though [REDACTED] have expressed a high level of interest. DOS 1.4(b),(d)
- As was the case with Article 98 Agreements, we need a full time ambassador or envoy to negotiate these transfer agreements. While I am prepared to put forward such a person, I think the Department of State should have the lead for securing these agreements.
- Regardless of who is in the lead, we need someone named and working this issue full-time. We should get someone named next week.

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Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

~~Classified by: SecDef Rumsfeld  
Reason: 1.5(a)  
Declassify on: 21 Apr 2013~~

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

SECDEF CONTROL#

X01357 /03

09.M.2466

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

APR 21 2003

FOR: CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Low-Level Enemy Combatants

OSD 1.4 ( C )

- We need to stop populating Guantanamo Bay (GTMO) with low-level enemy combatants. GTMO needs to serve as an [redacted] [redacted] not a prison for Afghanistan.

- Therefore, effective June 16, the January 7, 2002 Screening Criteria are amended to authorize you to transfer to Guantanamo only those detainees who meet the stated criteria and are of [redacted] value.

OSD 1.4 ( C )

- As of June 16, you are directed to continue to detain in Afghanistan screened enemy combatants who pose a threat to U.S. forces but are of [redacted] value.

OSD 1.4 ( C )

- I am also asking Secretary Powell to have Ambassador Finn approach President Karzai on the need for the Afghan government to [redacted] where [redacted] can be kept. I want General Franks to have the same discussion with Karzai, and to consult with the Ambassador and Department of State representatives as the program is developed.

OSD 1.4 ( a ), ( c )

- Please work together to sketch out a plan to help the Afghans set up an adequate facility. By April 30, please tell me what is needed, and I will help get you the resources.

DECLASSIFIED *Fn Part* JUL 9 2010  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

~~Classified by: SecDef Rumsfeld  
Reason: 1.5(a)  
Declassify on: 21 Apr 2013~~

DEF CONTROL #

X01365 /03

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09. M. 2467

383.6

21 Apr 03

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: AUG 18 2010

02/06/0312:02 PM

DOS 1.4 (d)  
DOS 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(5)

OSD 1.4 (a,b,d)

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2,6)



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DECLASSIFIED IN PART

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: AUG 18 2010



OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2), (6)

DOS 1.4 (b), (d)

09-M-2468


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Date: AUG 18 2010

DOS 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(5)

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DOS 1.4 (d)



OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2), (6)

OSD 1.4 (a), (b), (d)


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Date: AUG 18 2010




DO5 1.4 (P) 500

OSD 1.4 (P), (D)

CEB

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (2), (6)



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Authority: EO 13526  
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Date: AUG 18 2010

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FACT SHEET  
US PRESENCE IN ICELAND

CURRENT PRESENCE

PEOPLE (Including Civilians & Dependents): 3895

U.S. Military: 1856 (USN approx. 1040; USAF approx 816)  
DoD Civilians: 99  
Dependents: 1940

ASSETS

- F-15 aircraft (4-6) & Tanker (KC-10/KC-135)
- HH-60 SAR Helos (5) & Tanker (HC-130)
- P3 Aircraft (4)
- Integrated Underwater Surveillance System
- Iceland Air Defense System (4 radar sites, 1 control center)
- Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station
- Marine Corps Security Force (50)

AIRFIELD COSTS (approximate)


U.S. pays 100% of \$30.8M/yr

*Includes runway maintenance, radar contract, utilities, crash and rescue response ...*

AIRFIELD USE (%s approximate)

30% military flights

70% commercial aircraft



005 114 (d)

OSD 1.4 (a)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

~~SECRET~~

November 2, 2002 5:51 PM

TO: President George W. Bush  
CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable Andrew H. Card, Jr.  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Achieving an Acceptable UN Security Council Resolution—At  
What Point Is the Price Too High?

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 13 2010

As we approach the end game at the UN, it is useful to remind ourselves that the purpose of any resolution is to confront Saddam with a clear choice: either he

- decides to continue to defy the UN and to maintain his WMD programs, or
- he cooperates fully with a disarmament regime as the only way to stay in power.

Therefore, the U.S. goal in negotiating a resolution should be to provide the earliest possible test of which choice Saddam decides to make.

We already have made concessions. Before we began work on a resolution, we accepted:

- UNMOVIC, despite its serious flaws relative to UNSCOM, and
- Blix as head of UNMOVIC, despite his past record.

Then, in negotiating a resolution, we have made additional concessions. Specifically, we have given up:

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~~SECRET~~

1. The right to have U.S. representatives on the inspection teams, as well as competence as the "criterion" for selecting team members.
2. The right to designate specific sites to be inspected and specific individuals to be interviewed.
3. The right to specify that interviews be conducted outside of Iraq.
4. The requirement that Iraq "immediately cease" firing on coalition aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones.
5. The right to multiple inspectors' "operating bases" inside Iraq, as opposed to merely "offices."
6. The "all necessary means" clause, i.e., the explicit recognition that member states would be authorized to use force if the Iraqis violated the terms of the resolution.
7. And, we have accepted that the Council would have to meet to consider possible Iraqi violations.

005 114 (2)

France's objectives are exactly the opposite of ours. [REDACTED]

It would be both commercially and politically disadvantageous for France to be seen as having opposed America's successful removal of Saddam Hussein from power if that were to occur. Thus, the perfect outcome for France is a UN resolution that ties U.S. hands and puts France in the driver's seat. The question is at what point will we be paying too much to gain French support for a UN Resolution.

This week we face the prospect of further concessions to gain French support. Among the concessions now being considered are:

- Iraq might not be required explicitly to state its acceptance of the new resolution.
- The amended resolution could be seen to some extent as "wiping the slate clean" of Iraq's past material breaches of UN resolutions.

OP 9

OP 1

OP 10

OP 4

2

OP 12

SECRET

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- The U.S. might not have the right to recommend that interviews of Iraqis be held outside Iraq.
- Even a patently false declaration by Iraq might not result in another Security Council meeting.
- The warning to Iraq of "serious consequences" if it continues to violate UN Resolutions could be watered down by being put "in the context of" a second Security Council meeting.

I would be concerned if we were to yield on any of the first four items listed above. If there are to be additional concessions, we should consider, at the same time, taking back some of the earlier concessions. In particular, we could consider reinserting provisions that would serve our original purpose of testing early Saddam's actual willingness to disarm, such as the first four numbered items listed on the second page of this memo.

In my view, the French won't veto. Even if they were to veto, the U.S. would probably be better off with a French veto than with an unacceptable inspection regime. The French probably understand that as well, which is why they are unlikely to veto. If the French do veto, we can make this a case of France obstructing the enforcement of sixteen previous UN resolutions, rather than a case of the U.S. versus the UN, and highlight France's long record of close dealings with the Baghdad regime.

Respectfully,

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL SENSITIVE~~



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

MEMORANDUM FOR DR CONDOLEEZZA RICE

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Secretary of State Colin Powell

SUBJ: Proposed UN Security Council Resolution (draft of 1400, 21 Sep)

**General Observations:**

- We should not separate the “humanitarian” issues (tyranny, terrorism, threats to neighbors) from the WMD issues.
  - Separating the two sets of issues ignores the key *strategic* insight of the President’s UNGA speech – it is precisely because of the nature of the regime that inspections can’t answer the WMD problem.
  - The regime’s hostile and oppressive nature isn’t a side issue – it is the reason that President Bush has concluded that only regime change can adequately resolve the Iraqi WMD threat.
- As a *tactical* matter, including the humanitarian issues in the resolution that deals with WMD will make it harder for some European countries to oppose it.
  - If, on the other hand, two resolutions are presented, these countries may think that a vote for the “humanitarian” resolution will buy them a pass on the “WMD” resolution.
  - So they could play to humanitarian sentiment domestically without voting for a resolution that could lead to the use of force.
- If there's to be an inspection regime, it's crucial that key decisions be within US control. So we should add (in OP5, fifth line, after "Iraq:") the statement: "All decisions by UNMOVIC and all decisions by IAEA regarding Iraq shall be subject to the supervision and direction of the member states now enforcing the no-fly/no-drive zones established to uphold Security Council resolutions, subject only to the final authority of the Security Council."

Classified by: ~~DASD (NSA)~~, William J. Luti  
Reason: 1.5, 1.6, and d.  
Declassify on: 21 Sep 2012

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DECLASSIFIED JUL 7 2010  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

~~CONFIDENTIAL SENSITIVE~~

09-M-2472

- These decisions could lead to war. They cannot be left in the hands of UN officials -- the bureaucratic leadership of UNMOVIC and IAEA. That would put us on the road to failure.
- Hans Blix is especially ill-suited to the task, but the issue is not personal. No UN official, no matter how good, should control decisions of such momentous importance -- peace and war -- for the US.
- Hans Blix's record as head of the IAEA was not good.
- In the 1980s, Blix led an IAEA that -- operating in a "cooperative" mode -- discovered none of the facilities that, by the time of the Gulf War, had brought Iraq to within a year or so of producing a nuclear weapon.
- Even after the Gulf War, Blix's IAEA was on the verge of giving Iraq a clean bill of health when the defection of Hussein Kamal in 1995 brought to light hidden nuclear developments.
- We need to do additional work on ideas to ensure that an inspection regime is not unduly hampered by the deficiencies in the current UNMOVIC inspectorate apparatus.

**Specific Comments:**

- Preambular paragraph 3 (PP3) could be clarified to make clear that the "use of force" provision applies to UN Security Council resolution 687 and subsequent resolutions dealing with Iraq.
- PP7 should be replaced by the corresponding language of the 19 September draft. The earlier draft stated that Iraq "has ... continued to aid and harbor terrorist groups..." There is no reason to omit that statement from the resolution.
- PP11 should be deleted -- its inclusion is an example of negotiating with ourselves even before we begin negotiating with others.
- In Operative Paragraph 2 (OP2), at the end of line 9, add after "facilities": "and the names of all personnel associated with those activities."
- The provisions of OP4 calling for a meeting between UNMOVIC/IAEA and the government of Iraq should be deleted -- this could imply that there are matters to be negotiated between the UN and Iraq.
- OP5 should state that the inspectors have the right at their sole discretion to destroy prohibited items. (The underlined phrase appeared in the 19 September draft.)

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Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

- As written, OP5 calls on the inspectors to “reestablish baseline information.” This should be deleted – it implies that we are embarking on a long drawn-out process.
- OP5 and OP6 refer to Security Council-approved forces that are to provide security for the inspectors. This implies, for example, that the use of U.S. and UK forces for this purpose would require a new Security Council resolution. These paragraphs should be amended to refer to the “forces now enforcing the no-fly/no-drive zones established to uphold Security Council resolutions.”
  - This would not only obviate the need for a new UN Security Council resolution, but would also provide a UN Security Council mandate for Operations Northern and Southern Watch.
- OP9 should be deleted – it could imply that *only* the directors of UNMOVIC and IAEA can make judgments about Iraqi compliance.
  - In any case, this level of detail about procedure is not necessary in what should be view as a “constitutional” document.

*Donald R. ...*

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Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

7

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

18 Dec 02

### Proposed U.S. Approach to Dealing with the Iraq WMD Declaration

- Claiming that the Iraqi declaration is false is a momentous step.
  - We have argued that effective inspections require Iraqi cooperation.
  - By claiming that the declaration is false, we are in effect saying that inspections cannot serve their purpose.
- The credibility of the USG depends on how we *talk* about, and *react* to, the Iraqi WMD declaration.
- We should be ready to use strong language – such as accusing Iraq of a “material breach” of UN Security Council resolution 1441 – as soon as we are ready to take decisive action, *but not sooner*.
  - Making strong statements and not following them up with action could damage our credibility and make it more difficult to obtain cooperation from other countries.
  - We should avoid conditioning the world to the idea that Iraq can commit a material breach of a UN resolution without major consequences ensuing.
- Therefore, until we are ready to take action, we should avoid strong language.
- Instead, we should say that we won’t reach a definitive judgment until we have completed a detailed analysis, which will take weeks. During that period, we can:
  - Get our own case concerning the falsity of the declaration in order (and it isn’t yet), and prepare to make it public.
  - Consult with other countries that may have intelligence and insight into Iraqi WMD programs.
    - This would include countries whose companies may have supplied relevant equipment and materials to Iraq.
    - The process of consultation and engagement would give us the opportunity to build international consensus and support.
  - Continue flowing forces to the region.
  - Pressure Iraq.

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, DoD Ofc of Security Review

JUN 04 2013

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

09-M-2473

**SECRET NOFORN**

18 Dec 02

- This would demonstrate reserve, deliberation and a willingness to consult with other countries.
- This would put us on our own time line, not that of UNMOVIC.
- When and if we are ready to reach a definitive judgment that the declaration is false, we could return to the UN and challenge it to respond to the situation.
  - If Iraq had not blatantly blocked the inspectors by that time, we could present intelligence evidence concerning Iraq's denial and deception program to demonstrate further its failure to cooperate.
- Whether or not we can obtain a second UN resolution, we could make one last effort to avert war by offering Saddam and his inner circle asylum if they surrender power and leave Iraq within \_\_ days.
  - This would require diplomatic activity now to identify a country willing to provide such asylum.

DECLASSIFIED JUN 04 2013  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, DoD Ofc of Security Review

26 DEC 02  
3:00 PM  
DSD has seen.

~~SECRET~~

TO: Vice President Richard Cheney  
Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable George Tenet  
Honorable Spencer Abraham  
Dr. Condoleezza Rice

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 13 2010

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Remaining Firm on North Korea

It is clear from North Korea's actions over the weekend that Kim Jong Il is taking a series of steps designed to blackmail us into negotiations with him. Our best response to this strategy is to remain calm and firm. We should continue to deny Kim Jong Il the kind of attention he craves and has become accustomed to receiving in response to provocative behavior. We need to train Kim Jong Il to understand that blackmail tactics that worked with the previous administration will no longer work.

We should strongly encourage the IAEA to respond forthrightly to North Korea's latest violation of its Safeguards Agreement. The IAEA should call a spade a spade, and take the necessary steps to refer the violation to the United Nations Security Council and General Assembly in keeping with its charter. Putting this matter before the Security

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09-M-2474

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Council--or even threatening to--will confront the Chinese and Russians with the

seriousness of this issue. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] There is no reason for us to shy away from UN

consideration; on the contrary.

### OSD 1.4 ( d )

The argument that some members of the previous administration are making--that North Korea is resorting to provocations because we refuse to negotiate--has it backwards. Getting us to the table is the trophy that Pyongyang seeks; for us to grant it in response to the latest nuclear provocations would only reinforce Pyongyang's weak hand and prove that bad behavior pays. As the Agreed Framework shows, such a negotiation produces bad agreements.

At the same time, we need to move quickly to flesh out the "tailored containment" policy the President approved at the NSC meeting on November 13. Partly because we have not yet defined the elements of this approach, we are, for the moment, ceding the initiative to the North Koreans. We need to clarify our basic principles and strategy. Our approach should focus on pressures we can bring to bear. Examples of such pressures are:

- a UNSC resolution prohibiting North Korean missile exports (which would strengthen our hand in the next "Yemeni SCUD" case);
- cutting off funds North Korea receives from abroad, such from as the Chosen Soren in Japan;

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- pressing China and Russia to ratchet up diplomatic pressure and constrict economic aid and development projects.

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 13 2010

The North Koreans are not going to allow us to ignore them, but we need not react on their terms. We need to remain firm that we will only talk once they verifiably dismantle their entire nuclear weapons program. Any hints that we are preparing to go to the negotiating table now would be a victory for North Korea, validating its blackmail tactics and putting us at a distinct disadvantage.

Iraq should not distract us from this necessity. The opposite is true: yielding to blackmail by North Korea would undercut, globally, the credibility of our determination to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

I recommend the Principals discuss the way ahead at the PC meeting this Friday. Until that time, we should take no actions that encourage Pyongyang to believe its tactics are succeeding.

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SECDEF: NOT KNOWING THE TOPIC (OTHER THAN "DIPLOMACY")  
I DIVINED THIS PAPER FROM THIN AIR... BILLUT

~~SECRET~~

26 January 2013  
OSD/Policy/SP-NESA

**SECDEF HAS SEEN**

JAN 27 2003

**Read Ahead for Principles Meeting on "Diplomacy re Iraq"**

**Purpose of the PC Meeting:** No paper for the meeting but we believe you discuss:

- the diplomatic way ahead for handling the UNMOVIC inspections;
- while we make the case for disarming Iraq with a coalition of the willing (with or without a second resolution).

**The plan (as we understand it):**

- **27 January: Blix makes his informal report to a closed session of the Council.**

- Anticipate his usual: "...on the one hand Iraq is cooperating, on the other hand they are not."

- **27 January: Negreonte responds in closed session by asking a series of questions (his remarks later made public):**

- **Goal:** tee up USG position – Iraq has failed both tests in 1441: full declaration and active cooperation.
  - Where is the evidence to account for 26,000 liters of anthrax?
  - Where is the evidence to account for 38,000 liters of botulinum?
  - And so on....ending with: *will the UN live up to its obligation to enforce its own resolutions?*

- **29 January: Negreonte again responds in closed session with a more "pointed" set of questions:**

- Questions with technical detail (in draft by Bob Joseph and being declassified by CIA).

- **31 January: Blair meets with the President.**

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Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

~~Classified by: DUSD (SP-NESA) William J. Luti  
Reason: 1.5(f)(1)  
Declassify on 27 January 2013~~

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09-M-2476

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- *3 February: Secretary Powell in open session in the Security Council (Foreign Ministers present):*
  - Makes "The Case."
  - Uses declassified information on:
    - WMD programs, and
    - denial and deception tactics.
  
- *Month of February:*
  - Inspections continue.
  - Build coalition. – continue making the case.
    - High-level briefing teams travel (to be decided by PC)?
  - Continue positioning forces.

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Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

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Reason: 1.5 (C)  
Declassify on 27 January 2013

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09-M-2476

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28 OSD Policy  
27 January 2003  
1:30 PM

Read Ahead for Principal's Committee Meeting  
Future of Iraq Brief II

- Principals will discuss 40 slide Future of Iraq II brief which you have seen.
- Some decisions have already been made on the first phase of reconstruction:
  - The President has signed an NSPD directing the establishment of a Postwar Planning Office in DOD.
    - Builds on interagency work already done.
    - This office is now working--needs support from various USG agencies.
- The "Future of Iraq II" brief should marry these decisions to postwar planning for decisions on:
  - Civil Administrator.
    - Would provide unity of effort between civil and military reconstruction.
  - Iraqi Consultative Council.
    - Puts an Iraqi "face" on governance at an early stage.
  - New Iraqi Army.
    - Defensive, not offensive -- allied with U.S.
  - New Iraqi government whose policies are aligned with U.S. on:
    - Terrorism.
    - WMD.
    - Other key regional issues.

DECLASSIFIED JUN 04 2010  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, DoD Ofc of Security Review

Classified by DUSD William J. Luti  
Reason: 1.5 (a)(b)  
Declassify on 21 January 2013

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09-M-2477

~~SECRET~~

THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



FEB 3 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: A Second UN Security Council Resolution on Iraq? (U)

I wanted you to have my thoughts on this subject in connection with the important UN Security Council session this week.

The bottom line is that I suspect it may not be realistic to expect a second UN Security Council resolution on Iraq to call for the use of "all necessary means" to enforce existing resolutions. That would be the most helpful resolution to get -- but today it seems unlikely, unless something dramatic occurs.

U1

Therefore, we should probably not try for that kind of resolution, unless we have the votes assured.

- A failed attempt would be a diplomatic defeat.
- Further, we should avoid implying that we feel we might need such UN authorization as a legal matter. We don't; we have ample preexisting authority under previous resolutions and the right of self-defense.

A more realistic strategy might be to aim deliberately at a **more limited resolution**. For example:

- a resolution limited to an expression of regret that Iraq has not cooperated, drawing as much as possible on Blix and El-Baradei's own words; and
- leaving open what should be done about it.

There might be a number of advantages to such an approach:

- Below the probably unattainable threshold of "all necessary means," the main benefit of any second resolution would be political and diplomatic, not something required as a legal precondition for the use of force. (Even the phrase "further material breach," although helpful politically, would not be required because 1441 "decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations").

3Feb03

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
DECLASSIFIED JUL 8 2010  
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- Aiming at a limited resolution could probably also deprive the French and others of most of their leverage. The more we seek in a resolution, the more they may think they can extract concessions from us in return (e.g., additional months of inspections, etc.).
- Ultimately, a limited resolution implies the failure of the UN to stand up squarely to the challenge which UNSCR 1441 recognized as a threat to peace and security.
- Thus, paradoxically, a more relaxed attitude toward a second resolution would point even more ominously (from Saddam's point of view) to the inevitability of U.S.-led coalition action.

If a new resolution is sought, though, there are other possible provisions that we might want to consider including:

- As part of such a resolution, or as a separate initiative, the U.S. could propose that Saddam and other very senior designated Iraqi leaders be offered asylum and possibly given immunity from prosecution by their host country if they surrender power, leave Iraq with their families, account for assets outside Iraq, and agree to other conditions of exile.
- A resolution could also usefully lift UN economic sanctions on any portions of Iraqi territory not under Saddam's control (thus facilitating recovery efforts in liberated territory).

Cc: The Vice President  
Secretary of State Powell  
DCI Tenet  
White House Chief of Staff  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs



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0950

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, DC 20504

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: AUG 26 2010

Summary of Conclusions for  
Meeting of the NSC Principals Committee

DATE: February 3, 2003  
LOCATION: White House Situation Room  
TIME: 8:55 - 9:55 a.m.

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions of the PC Meeting on Regional  
Issues (S)

PARTICIPANTS:

Chair  
Condoleezza Rice

WH Counsel  
Alberto Gonzales

State  
Secretary Colin Powell  
William Burns

CIA  
George Tenet  
John McLaughlin

Defense  
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld  
Douglas Feith

JCS  
General Richard Myers  
VADM James Metzger

Chief of Staff  
Andrew Card

White House  
Steve Hadley

OVP  
The Vice President  
Lewis Libby  
Eric Edelman

NSC  
Robert Joseph

Summary of Conclusions

It was agreed that:

- Principals discussed the presentation to be made by Secretary Powell before the Security Council on February 5, 2003. The presentation will have several modules, including:

NSS DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW [EO 13526]  
DECLASSIFY IN FULL  
by Mary Ronan on 8/11/2010

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Reason: 1.5(b)(c)(d)  
Declassify on: 02/03/13~~

09. M. 2479 R5

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2

- Active Iraqi deception efforts to deceive the inspectors that, in conjunction with Iraq's false declaration in December 2002, constitute a further material breach under UNSC 1441;
- Evidence on Iraq's biological, chemical, nuclear, and illegal delivery system programs; and
- Terrorism (including the intersection with WMD) and human rights.

The presentation will demonstrate how Iraq has failed the test of cooperation explicit in 1441, and how Iraqi behavior contrasts with that of countries such as South Africa that have cooperated in disarmament in the past. (Action: State)  
(S)

 DOD will provide comments on the proposed talking points by the afternoon of February 3, 2003. For the purposes of the phone call, the Kurdish re-supply issue will be raised but will not constitute a make or break issue at this time. (Action: OVP/DOD) (S)

OSD 1.4 (d)

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WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM  
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(10)  
1727  
6 Feb 03  
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**WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM**

PRECEDENCE

CLASSIFICATION:

RELEASER: Asst

IMMEDIATE

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DATE/TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

MESSAGE #: 0370

FROM: <u>NSC</u>	PH: <u>456-9425</u>	ROOM: <u>379</u>
SUBJECT: <u>SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS FOR PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON REGIONAL ISSUES.</u>	PAGES: <u>4</u>	

PLEASE DELIVER TO:

LOCATION	DELIVER TO	ROOM	PHONE
4 DOS	Exec Sec		
12 DOD	Exec Sec		
3 CIA	Exec Sec		
5 JCS	Secretary, Joint Staff		

SECDEF	/
SPLASST	/
EXECSEC	/
DEPSECDEF	/
C&D	/
OCD	/
USDP	/
GC	/
RB	X
CABLECH	
FILE	

SPECIAL DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

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Date: AUG 25 2010

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0950

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20504

February 6, 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. KARL HOFMANN  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

MR. LEWIS LIBBY  
National Security Advisor to  
the Vice President

COL JAMES A. WHITMORE  
Executive Secretary  
Department of Defense

MR. ALBERTO R. GONZALES  
Counsel to the President


MR. ANDREW H. CARD  
Chief of Staff to the  
President

MR. JOHN G. EDWARDS  
Executive Secretary  
Central Intelligence Agency

COL EDWARD W. SNEAD, USA  
Secretary, Joint Staff

SUBJECT: Summary of Conclusions for Principals Committee  
Meeting on Regional Issues (S)

Attached at Tab A is the summary of conclusions for the  
Principals Committee meeting on Regional Issues on  
February 3, 2003. Please pass the attached to Principals (to  
include plus one, if applicable). (S)

  
Gregory L. Schulte  
Executive Secretary

Attachment  
Tab A Summary of Conclusions

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: AUG 25 2010

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Reason: 1.5(b)(c)(d)  
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09-M-2482

09-M-2482

PC Meeting on Iraq  
6 February, 2003, Thursday

(Rice, Powell, Rumsfeld, Gen Myers, Feith, Crouch, Jeff Jones, Anna Perez,  
Tucker Eskew, Chris Straub, Hadley, Edelman)

STRATEGIC INFORMATION

[ Tucker Eskew briefed about Coalition Information Centers for Iraq.  
(see attached)]

[Anna Perez briefed on "Interagency Communications Coordination".  
(see attached)]

Rumsfeld: Communications framework document should be approved by Policy people, not PA people. Torie needs to get this approved by Doug Feith. I'll get this done.

Eskew: We plan to inoculate further against Iraqi co-location of military and civilian assets.

Armitage briefed this and we plan to have DoD hit this point again soon. We will hit it several times.

Eskew: CICs are approved?

Rice: Yes

Rumsfeld: Good idea.

Rice: Principals should get the communication framework done for approval.

[Jeff Jones briefed "Iraq Information Strategy – The Rest of the Story"  
(see attached)]

Today's ATO included leaflet drops for Baghdad vicinity.

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Date: JUL 27 2010

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Rumsfeld: Can't be. We're not flying over Baghdad.

Gen Myers: We'll get the facts on this.

## UPDATE ON FREE IRAQI FORCES

[Chris Straub briefed "Free Iraqi Force Status"]

Rice expressed concerns about Iran's role in FIF – shouldn't be excessive.

Powell: Are there any FIF units or are they just spread out among US units?

Straub: The latter.

## ICELAND

[JD Crouch briefed what we have in Iceland and what we plan to take out.]

Crouch: How do we get Icelanders to take seriously that we're going to remove assets and people and start negotiating?

Rumsfeld: This is the leading edge of an effort that will reach other US forces in Europe. Others in NATO are not interested in backfill because the mission makes no sense.

We're willing to keep people there until after their elections.

Powell: Iceland has been a good ally. In their politics and mentality, they have a political need for something that looks like a defense capability. We want to keep Iceland in the right place. Can't we keep planes there with some rotational scheme?

Danger is they could pull the 1951 treaty-abrogate. Wouldn't be in their interest or ours.

PM pushed President Bush on this at Prague.

Rumsfeld: We'll go from 3,800 to 1,200 US people there. Our presence is a part of their GNP – not insignificant. If we don't straighten this out in Iceland how can we reconfigure ourselves in Europe as the President wants us to do?

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Date: JUL 27 2010

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Rice: Can we do rotation of some kind? Can Iceland pay more and we keep some US presence there for a time? Will things get better if we wait a while?

Powell: We can rotate F-15s through. That has merit. I thought EUCOM was looking at this seriously.

Crouch: Gen Ralston asked for backfill from allies. No interest. If by rotation, you mean aircraft there for a few days at a time on occasion for exercises, that's possible.

Powell: The problem is the March 1 EXORD sword of damocles. Let's find a way to phase things in.

Rumsfeld: What they really want is SAR for fishing boats and GNP.

Rice: By June 1 there should be a plan for implementation.

Crouch: What we need is to get into negotiations. We can tell them we'll wait till.

Rice: Look at definition of "defense capability" for Iceland.

Rumsfeld: We've got to end some of these projects. They're taking too long and we're all very busy.

~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

09-M-2483

~~TOP SECRET~~

CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20318-9999

CH-755-03

6 February 2003



MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: POTUS Meeting, 5 Feb 2003 - 0920-0950 (U)

1. (U) This memorandum summarizes discussion at a White House meeting with President Bush on Wednesday, 5 February 2003, 0920-0950. Attendees at the meeting included: the President, the Vice President, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard Myers.

2. (U) The following issues were discussed:

- (U) **Belgium:**
  - SecDef mentioned that Belgium is coming around on support for NATO defense measures in case of conflict in Iraq but they have not said so publicly yet.
- (U) **Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC):**
  - The President asked about the article (Washington Times, 5 Feb) that said that the CAOC was not functioning well. Chairman, JCS explained that the report was an internal Air Force look at the operation of the CAOC and that all the recommendations from the report have been implemented. *Purple Section for BOS*
- (U) **Iraq Timeline:**
  - The President said we were absolutely going to send teams to Congress and world capitals to make the case. Condi said we have a plan to do it.
  - The President said he agreed with the SecDef paper on a second UN resolution strategy. He said we need to get something, but we probably won't get a full war resolution. POTUS said he would ask for a resolution, probably on 6 February. POTUS went on to say that his speech on 6 February would not be the major one, but to simply state that this is the United Nation's chance to do it right and if the UN doesn't act, we will be prepared to act.
  - SecDef said there is a possibility that Saddam Hussein will offer to disarm at the last minute and that people must know that disarmament means no more Saddam. The President agreed.
  - SecDef said we need to start announcing the coalition we have with us. POTUS said the momentum is building and that a UN resolution will help.
  - SecDef discussed U2 flights over Iraq. POTUS agreed we should do it. Condi mentioned that Senator Levin thought we should go to the UN for a U2 resolution. POTUS said we don't need a UN resolution and asked Condi to talk to Blix and say that we will fly the U2 and that the US will take responsibility if Iraq fires upon it.

Classified by: Gen Richard B. Myers, CJCS  
Revised: 1/8/04  
Declassify on: OADR

Downgraded to Secret  
Date: 2/12/2010  
DOD Office of Security Review

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- SecDef said that it looks like we would send the 4<sup>th</sup> ID to Kuwait because we won't get a decision from Turkey in time but that General Franks could use Marines or perhaps parts of the 101<sup>st</sup> Infantry Division as a force in Northern Iraq.

NSC 1.4(b),(d)

- SecDef explained the date when the TPFDD would start, but said that we will most likely not flow all of the forces to the region, probably taking one of the off ramps previously briefed to the President.
- VPOTUS said that a decision to use force in Iraq could be earlier than anticipated if Saddam makes a move.
- POTUS agreed with the ultimatum strategy as outlined in the time line paper.

JS 1.4 (a)

- Regarding the time line, SecDef said we would keep working and tweaking the time line.

- ~~(S)~~ **Readiness for Iraq:**

- POTUS made it clear that he wanted to be in the best military posture so if a decision to attack were made, we could complete the mission as quickly as possible. He said he needed to know right away if any problems come up that will keep us from having the best military posture.

- ~~(S)~~ **A.Q. Khan:**

- POTUS said we would deal with this issue after Iraq and we will enlarge the issue to show the problem to the world. He went on to say that we would need to ensure Pakistan is protected.

- ~~(S)~~ **Taiwan:**

JS 1.4 (a)

[REDACTED]

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*VR Dick*  
 RICHARD B. MYERS  
 Chairman  
 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

~~SECRET~~

TO: NSC Meeting-goers  
FROM: [REDACTED]  
DATE: 12 Feb 2003; 7:55 AM  
RE: Agenda for Today's NSC Meeting

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: AUG 25 2010

OSD 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

According to Rice's EA, POTUS plans to "go around the table," asking Principals if there is any issue they would like to discuss.

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by Mary Ronan on 8/11/2010

Doc 3

R3  
09-M-2486

~~SECRET~~

February 24, 2003 10:25 AM

TO: Vice President Richard B. Cheney

CC: Honorable Colin Powell  
Honorable George Tenet  
Honorable Condoleezza Rice

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Handwritten Signature]*

SUBJECT: Libya

OSD 1.4 (b), (d)



CIA 1.4(c)

My uninformed view is that we should consider the following:

- Contact  and tell him that two weeks is too long – we need his answers in 48 hours. *CIA 1.4(c)*
- Tell him we have reason to believe Libya is involved with Iraq in the development of weapons of mass destruction.
- In the period ahead, we will know precisely the extent to which Libya is involved in Iraq's WMD programs.
- Finally, it would be in Libya's overwhelming best interest to tell us precisely what they know in the next two days, and that what they tell us proves to be correct and complete.

Additionally, I understand there have been extensive negotiations with Libya about a Pan Am Flight #103 settlement and that those negotiations were surfaced in the interagency last week. There is reportedly pressure from the British and the families for the U.S. to agree to a settlement. The potential consequences of such a settlement for our entire counter-terrorism policy are enormous. These issues should be brought to the Principals, and merit a session with the President before final decisions are reached.

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09-11-2487

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DRAFT

OSD Policy  
7 Jan 04  
12:15 PM

### Apprehension of Moqtada al Sadr

- Although Sadr appears to have stepped back from such tactics as the seizure of mosques and parading his security forces, he continues to attempt to arouse Shi'a opposition to the Coalition.
  - In addition, there is an Iraqi warrant against him for questioning in the al-Khoie murder case.
- Sadr's number of followers appears to be diminishing. He may be marginalizing himself by challenging more senior Shi'a clerics and by his rancor and extreme rhetoric.
- In light of Sadr's weakness, it is appropriate to reexamine the question of arresting him. There are two viewpoints:
- **Arrest him now:**
  - Sadr's rhetoric may cause attacks on Coalition and Iraqi forces, and creates difficulties for the Baghdad council and for our efforts to win over Sadr City.

---

- Sadr's arrest would strengthen the mainstream Shi'a leadership with whom we have constructive relations.
- Sadr's arrest would reassure Sunnis that the Coalition does not favor the Shi'a.
- Sadr's arrest would reinforce the fledgling Iraqi justice system and the rule of law.
- He is weaker now than when we earlier considered the arrest.
- **Don't arrest him now:**
  - The arrest could entail casualties.
  - Sadr will probably weaken further. Arresting him now could reverse his decline by putting him in the spotlight as a victim of the occupation.

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DRAFT

DECLASSIFIED IAW EO12958  
July 07, 2009  
CIL WHS R & D Div

09.M.2544 /

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
DRAFT

OSD Policy  
7 Jan 04  
12:15 PM

- Sadr City and parts of southern cities could respond violently. Possibilities range from riots to attacks on Coalition forces.
- Despite earlier assurances of silence, Shi'a leaders such as Grand Ayatollah Sistani could publicly condemn the arrest.

**CPA and CENTCOM positions:**

Ambassador Bremer supports an arrest now but believes his arrest could spark violence in southern provinces and in Sadr City (see attached summary of Bremer memo).

General Abizaid remains concerned about potential Shi'a unrest and the possible diversion of TF-121 intel assets from higher priority tasks (see attached Joint Staff Talking Paper).

**RECOMMENDATION:**

**Arrest him now:**

- ~~First, he's never been in a weaker political and military position than he is now.~~
- Second, an Iraqi court has issued a warrant for his arrest in connection with the al-Khoie murder.
- Third, his arrest would demonstrate that the rule of law applies to Shi'a as well as Sunni.
- CIA says the arrest is more likely to provoke a reaction if Sadr is wounded or killed, so extra care should be taken.
- Iraqis should make the arrest.
- Advance work with Sistani should continue.

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July 07, 2009  
CII, WHIS R & D Div

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09-M-2544

## Bremer Memo on the Arrest of al-Sadr

### Key points are:

- "He should be arrested for suspected involvement in the murder of Ayatollah al-Khoie in April, 2003."
- "While MAS' position in the general public has weakened since then, he and his followers, in Najaf, Kerbala, Baghdad and Kirkuk, have become increasingly bold in their defiance of good order."
- "CJTF-7 is best placed to update you on their operational plan and provide detailed risk assessment. You will hear from them, I believe, that they have no confidence that the Iraqi police alone can carry out the operation. I concur with this assessment. We must therefore assume that the operation will be largely conducted by U.S. forces."
- "They have one operational alternative which they believe might allow his capture without injuring or killing him, but it would take place in the city and could involve collateral damage".
- Bremer adds that the Governing Council and the Shi'a religious hierarchy support arresting Sadr to uphold the principle of equality before the law. "However, this support is tacit in the case of the Hawza and we should not expect to have overt public support for the arrest following his arrest. Sistani himself might see advantage in condemning it."
- "Recent reports that MAS' activities continue to subvert rule of law, contributing to an increased level of tension between the Sunni and Shi'a communities support arresting him".
- CPA and CJTF-7 believe post-arrest violence in southern provinces and Sadr City "is likely to be short-lived and can be contained."

DECLASSIFIED LAW EOI2958  
July 07, 2009  
CI, WIIS R & D Div



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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

APR 12 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR AMBASSADOR L. PAUL BREMER

SUBJECT: Sunni Outreach

I have listed a range of actions which might increase Sunni support for our efforts. You are probably already doing many of them. Please let me know which of these you are not yet doing, as well as the actions listed which you believe unsuitable.

Some of these initiatives may require the combined effort of several agencies and commands. If you think an inter-agency decision is required to achieve that combined effort, please let me know.

I see two principal objectives: Change the mindset of disenfranchisement and hopelessness; demonstrate the primacy of the rule of law.

- De-Baathification: either ensure the Governing Council executes the program properly and promptly acts on waiver requests, or return the authority to CPA. Energize the Reconciliation Process.
- Tribes:
  - have CPA governance specialists and Special Forces teams visit tribes regularly to build relationships.
  - Enlist the help of Sunni tribal leaders in recruiting personnel for Iraqi security forces.
  - Where appropriate, contract with tribes to secure essential services.
- Sunni clerics: target small USAID projects on the communities near moderate Sunni mosques.
- Property settlement: ensure an equitable process and publicize results.
- Essential services: focus on restoration in Sunni communities that demonstrate Iraqi rule of law. Work to develop and publicize a “model city.”

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July 07, 2009  
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OSD 76076-04


09-M-2544

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- Employment: target labor-intensive projects on Sunni areas.
  - Increase funding and resources to the Office of Provincial Outreach (OPO).
  - Look for opportunities (OPO or USAID) to create business opportunities for Sunnis.
- Justice: prosecute attacks on Coalition forces.
- Strategic communications: stress Iraqi nationality over ethnicity, tribal, and religious affiliations.
  - highlight aspects of the Transitional Administrative Law that favor federalism and protect minorities.
  - Profile prominent Sunnis, including those who will play leading roles in the Ministry of Defense and Iraqi Armed Forces.
  - Highlight Sunni businessmen who win contracts or subcontracts.
  - Utilize a high ranking Sunni Arab interlocutor from another country (e.g., UAE or Qatar) to meet with the Sunni leadership in the 'Triangle' to develop an Arab way ahead, a Sunni way ahead

- 
- Militias: Eliminate militias or integrate them into the Iraqi security forces.
  - Surge and Coordinate intelligence assets, forces (coalition and Iraqi), Information Operations and rewards programs to identify and reward (money, projects, etc) pro-coalition individuals and communities.
  - Ensure 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division and other commands operating in Sunni-dominant areas have the funds and authorities they need to quickly engage Sunni tribes, clerics, and communities.

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OSD Policy  
29 Mar 04, 0655

Read Ahead – 29 March 2004

### Sunni Strategy

- There is an agenda item on Sunni strategy.
  - State paper is attached. (OSD Policy provided yellow highlighting and notes in blue.)
- The paper contains many “good government” suggestions which are unexceptionable.
  - For example, we should adopt and enforce entry-control measures which would give us a better handle on foreigners in Iraq.
  - However, those most involved in the “Sunni strategy” issue sometimes forget that we can’t afford to court the Sunnis in ways that would alienate the Shi’a or Kurds.
  - Depending on what is proposed, you may find it necessary at some point to remind the meeting that we can’t be seen as aiming at re-establishing the *ancient régime* by giving Sunnis a favored status.

### Talking Points

- Basic principle should be that all “Sunni outreach” efforts be couched in terms of increasing the involvement of *all* Iraqis in the public life of the country, the economy, etc.
- Some proposed measures would risk alienating the Shi’a and Kurds, or undercutting basic policies designed to promote democratization of Iraq.
- For example, we shouldn’t consider “recalling” old Regular Army units. This could raise doubts about our commitment to the new Iraqi security forces we are establishing, especially the Iraqi Armed Forces and ICDC. ?
- Similarly, we shouldn’t recast our entire de-Ba’athification policy, by dropping the notion that high-level Ba’ath party membership disqualifies one for public office.

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July 07, 2009  
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From USSW-COM  
GTRM 1200 VA of the United  
July 27, 2004 @ 12.47 PM

Detainee Intelligence Value Summary , 25 July 2004

ISN  
00005

NARRATIVE

(S//NF) AL MATRAFI, ABDALLAH AIZA - US9SA-000005DP: NGO Ties - Al-Wafa. The detainee is a Saudi Arabian citizen who headed the Saudi Arabia based Al-Wafa Humanitarian Organization (Wafa al Igatha al Islamia.) In the 1990's this organization was active in the Balkans, Central Asia, the Middle East, Europe and the United States. Detainee had close dealings with UBL to coordinate the establishment of Al-Wafa offices in AF. [REDACTED]

00006

(S//NF) NOORI, MULLAH NORULLAH - US9AF-000006DP: Taliban Governor. After the Taliban came into power in 1999, the detainee was employed as a bodyguard for Governor Mohammed of Balkh, who he replaced later as governor. [REDACTED]

00017

(S//NF) KHAN, MUHAMMED IJAZ - US9PK-000017DP: Taliban foreign fighter. Detainee admits to being a Taliban foreign fighter. Detainee has demonstrated a commitment to jihad, and has expressed during interrogation a continued commitment to jihad. [REDACTED]

00029

(S//NF) AL ANSI, MUHAMMAD AHMAD ABDALLAH - US9YM-000029DP: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and fought with the Taliban near the northern front line around 15 May 2001. [REDACTED]

00035

(S//NF) QADER IDRIS, IDRIS AHMED ABDO - US9YM-000035DP: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The detainee is associated to Al-Qaida and the Taliban. The detainee was an Al-Qaida recruit who traveled to AF for Jihad. The detainee was recruited by an individual from a mosque in Yemen affiliated with the Salafist movement.

00063

(S//NF) AL QAHTANI, MUHAMMAD MANI AHMED AL SHAL LAN - US9SA-000063DP: 9/11 Attack - 20<sup>th</sup> Hijacker / [REDACTED]

Detainee has corroborated reporting from detained senior Al-Qaida members that he was the "20<sup>th</sup> Hijacker" for the mission on 9/11. In January of 2001, the Detainee trained at the Al-Farouq [REDACTED] basic training camp, then received advanced training at Abu Obeida [REDACTED] training camp. Detainee was hand picked by UBL and was further screened by Khalid Shaykh Muhammed for a role in the 9/11 mission. United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001, only had four hijackers aboard. Considerable circumstantial evidence points to this detainee as the fifth hijacker intended for that flight.

00101

(S//NF) IRFAN, MOHAMMED - US9PK-000101DP: [REDACTED]

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Chief, DoD Ofc of Security Review

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OSD 1.4 (b, c, d)

OSD 1.4 (b, c, d)  
OSD 1.4 (c)  
OSD 1.4 (c)  
OSD 1.4 (c)

12-1  
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**SECRET//NOFORN**

00123 (S//NF) HASSAN, MUHAMMAD HUSSEIN ALI - US9MO-000123DP: [REDACTED]

3

00150 (S//NF) BOUJAADIA, SAID - US9MO-000150DP: Al-Wafa member. Arrested while trying to cross from AF into PK without identification documents. This detainee is the brother-in-law of ISN 160, Zohair al Ha'ili (aka Zohair al Thubaiti) whom open press has linked to a planned attack on U.S. warships in the Strait of Gibraltar. ISN 160 worked for Al-Wafa and got the detainee a job with the organization. The detainee worked for Al-Wafa for three months after entering AF in July of 2001 with his family.

00155 (S//NF) AL-HUBAYSHI, KHALID SULAYMANJAYDH - US9SA-000155DP: Al-Qaida Trained. The detainee has an extensive history as a jihadist including time spent training in the Philippines in 1996 and 1997 at Al-Qaida run Camp Vietnam, with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Khalden training camp in Khowst in 1997 [REDACTED]

OSD 1.4 (b)(7)(D)

00164 (S//NF) ACHAB KANOUNI, IMAD - US9FR-000164DP: [REDACTED]

Detainee was captured with two French Al-Qaida members.

00177 (S//NF) AL JUTAYLI, FAHD SALIH SULAYMAN - US9SA-000177DP: Al-Farouq Training Camp. Detainee is an admitted jihadist who traveled to AF in 2001 and participated in training at the Al-Farouq training camp under at-large Al-Qaida member Hamza Al-Muhajir. [REDACTED]

12

00181 (S//NF) AL SHIMRI, MAJI AFAS RADHI - US9SA-000181DP: [REDACTED]

13

OSD 1.4 (b)(7)(D) 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

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00195 ~~(S//NF)~~ AL SHUMRANI, MOHAMMAD AL RAHMAN - US9SA-000195DP: Al-Qaida and Taliban. Detainee fought with the Taliban and received training at an Al-Qaida controlled training camp.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Detainee's name is contained on multiple suspected Al-Qaida database files.

00199 ~~(S//NF)~~ AL-UMARI, JABD-AL-RAHMAN, MA'ATH THAFIR - US9SA-000199DP: Al-Qaida. Detainee had prior knowledge of the 9/11 attacks and of a planned attack on the U.S. in February 2002. He has provided eye-witness accounts of UBL conversations and has a wealth of knowledge about Al-Qaida organization and tactics.

[REDACTED] Detainee served in the Saudi Arabian Army from 1991 to 2000. Fought with Taliban in AF for eleven months, ending in the Tora Bora region.

00200 ~~(S//NF)~~ QAHTANI, SAID MUHAMMAD HUSYAN - US9SA-000200DP: Taliban, Al-Qaida Associate. The detainee is a member of the Taliban

[REDACTED] The detainee's name was also on lists found in raids from safe houses that are linked to Al-Qaida

00201 (S//NF) TOURSON, AHMAD - US9CH-000201DP: Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) Jihadist. Detainee is an admitted member of the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)

[REDACTED] which have extensive ties to terrorism and Al-Qaida.

00230 ~~(S//NF)~~ AL JAD AN, HUMUD DAKHIL HUMUD SA ID - US9SA-000230DP: Chechen and Taliban Jihadist. Detainee is a veteran of both the Chechen jihad as well as the Taliban.

[REDACTED] He arrived at Camp Al-Farouq in 2000 already trained on explosives and bomb-making with electronic timers and detonators. He trained on heavy weapons at Saber camp. He has been identified as a commander [REDACTED] at Tora Bora. Detainee's name was associated with Al Qaida Mujahidin and the contents of their "trust" accounts on computer media recovered [REDACTED] in Al-Qaida safe houses [REDACTED]

00239 ~~(S//NF)~~ AMI, SHAKIR ABDURAHIM MOHAMED - US9SA-000239DP: Advisor to UBL. Detainee served as an advisor to UBL, was a fighter at Tora Bora, and was involved in the funding of the United Kingdom's Al-Qaida network.

[REDACTED] He has lived in the United States. [REDACTED] He was a

translator for the Saudi military, his primary languages are Arabic and English.

00252 ~~(S//NF)~~ BASARDAH, YASIM MUHAMMED - US9YM-000252DP: Al-Farouq Training Camp. Detainee attended the Islamic Studies Institute in Kandahar, AF. In early September, 2001 the detainee attended Al-Farouq training camp;

[REDACTED]

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6

7

2

5

20

OSD 1.4 (C)

OSD 1.4 (b, c, d)

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

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OSD 1.4 (b, c, d)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

00261 ~~(S//NF)~~ AL DOSARI, JUMA MOHAMMED ABDUL LATIF - US9BA-000261DP: Al-Qaida Operatives in the US. Detainee may have recruited candidates for Al-Qaida as the Imam of the Bloomington, Indiana Mosque (October 2000 to June 2001). Information provided by the detainee enabled the FBI to uncover an Al-Qaida cell operating in upstate New York in late 2001.

00270 ~~(S//NF)~~ ZEMMORI, MOSA ZI - US9MO-000270DP: Member of Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group (GICM). Reported to be a member of the Theological Commission of the Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group (GICM). Detainee attended the Derunta training camp [REDACTED]

00306 ~~(S//NF)~~ ZAEFF, ABDUL SALAM - US9AF-000306DP: Taliban Ambassador. Detainee was the Taliban Ambassador to Pakistan's Foreign Ministry Office and held several positions in the Taliban government (Deputy Minister, Natural Resources and President of Transportation). He has extensive knowledge of the former Taliban members and the regime, AF Infrastructure, Pakistan's Foreign Ministry, the ISID and even its terrorist organizations. Detainee admits to ten years of formal education; his madrassa training in Islamic Studies adds another four years of education.

00324 ~~(S//NF)~~ AL SABRI, MASHUR ABDALLAH MUQBIL AHMED - US9YM-000324DP: Associated to Terrorists. Detainee lived with Al-Qaida operatives: Hassan al Khamiri (suicide bomber for USS Cole) [REDACTED]

He assisted the Taliban against the Northern Alliance at Bagram. [REDACTED]

00329 ~~(S//NF)~~ FARAJ, ABD AL HADI OMAR MAHMOUD - US9SY-000329DP: Al-Qaida ties. Detainee is linked to Sheik Issa Al Misri, an AF based Syrian Al-Qaida facilitator. Sheik Issa Al Misri is known to conduct interviews of Al-Qaida candidates, to include special operatives and suicide bombers, and directly reported to UBL. [REDACTED]

Detainee's name was on Al-Qaida training documents [REDACTED]

00330 ~~(S//NF)~~ MOUHAMMAD, MAASOUM ABDAH - US9SY-000330DP: Al-Qaida member. [REDACTED]

00334 ~~(S//NF)~~ AL MARI, JARALAH - US9QA-000334DP: Jihadist. Detainee is a 28-year-old who was invited to participate in the Jihad while visiting Mecca. May be able to provide general information on recruiting techniques used by the Taliban and on terrorist training camps and housing facilities. Detainee arrived in Afghanistan after 9/11. He was sent to Al-Farouq (near Kandahar) for training. He and others were sent to a safe house for interim shelter. The group moved through various mountain hideouts between Kabul and Kandahar for several months.

OSD 1.4 (b)(7)(A)

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

OSD 1.4 (b)(7)(d)

OSD 1.4 (b, c, d)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

00335

~~(S//NF)~~ AL SAIF, KHALID SAAD MOHAMMED - US9SA-000335DP: Possible Al-Qaida.

[REDACTED]

00338

~~(S//NF)~~ AL-WASM, WASM 'AWWAD 'UMAR - US9SA-000338DP:

[REDACTED]

It is likely that the detainee can provide information pertaining to terrorist fund raising and financial distribution networks through the use of NGOs. Detainee is capable of organizing, coordinating, or participating in acts against the U.S. or its allies.

00493

~~(S//NF)~~ BUKHARY, ABDUL HAKIM - US9SA-000493DP: Suspected Taliban, Al-Qaida associated, and Jamaat Al-Tablighi member. Admitted traveling to AF for jihad and stayed at the Al-Ansar and Abu Hodefa guesthouses.

[REDACTED]

Detainee admits going to AF after 9/11 to participate in the jihad. Detainee is a suspected member of Taliban, Al-Qaida, and Jamaat Al-Tablighi.

00516

~~(S//NF)~~ AL HARBI, GHANIM ABDUL RAHMAN - US9SA-000516DP: Al Qaida member. Detainee worked as a supervisor in the accounting department for Hayat Al Ighatha, (aka International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) - identified as a NGO providing funds to the Al-Qaida and Ansar Al-Islam terrorist organizations).

[REDACTED]

00535

~~(S//NF)~~ AL SAWAH, TARIQ MAHMOUD AHMED - US9BK-000535DP: Explosives Trainer.

Detainee served Al-Qaida as an explosives expert appointed by [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Detainee taught two classes on explosives to approximately 20 students in June and July of 2001 at the Abu Obeida (Tamak Farm) training camp near Kandahar, AF. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] tasked detainee to create special Improvised Explosive Devices. In response, detainee developed many different IED such as the infamous "shoe bomb" worn by Richard Reid and a limpet mine designed to destroy U.S. Navy warships in the Arabian Gulf.

00551

~~(S//NF)~~ AL RABIA, FOUAD MAHOUD HASAN - US9KU-000551DP: Terrorist ties. Detainee traveled in July 2001 for a series of four meetings with UBL. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] During the U.S. bombing campaign in Tora Bora in December 2001, the detainee assisted Al-Qaida with their logistics and supply problems. Detainee worked directly under [REDACTED] by helping in the distribution of money, weapons, ammunition, and food.

OSD 1.4 (b, c, d)

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

OSD 1.4 (c)

OSD 1.4 (c)

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

OSD 1.4 (b, c, d)

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

SECRET//NOFORN

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00552 ~~(S//NF)~~ AL KANDARI, FAIZ MUHAMMAD AHMED - US9KU-000552DP: Kuwaiti Extremists. Detainee claimed to have been in AF performing charity work with the Al-Wafa NGO. However, the Al-Kandari clan has substantial ties to terrorism in Kuwait. [REDACTED] considers the detainee a "Most Dangerous Extremist". The detainee spent time in the Tora Bora cave complex with [REDACTED] and UBL. The detainee has admitted association with known Al-Qaida terrorist Abu Layth al Libi from 1997 to 1999. The detainee's name was found on a list of captured 'brothers' found in a computer hard drive [REDACTED]. The hard drive originally belonged to Khalid Shaykh Muhammad.

00559

[REDACTED]

00560 ~~(S//NF)~~ MOHAMMED, HAJI WALI - US9AF-000560DP: Al-Qaida, Islamic Party, attacks on US forces. Mohammed replaced [REDACTED] as the financial manager of Al-Qaida and is also very closely associated with UBL. Detainee is believed to have been the financier of two major Al-Qaida operations and has been tied to Al-Qaida weapons procurement, including an attempt to acquire surface to air missiles. Detainee was named as a former leader of the Islamic Party (Qaib Al-Din Hikmatyar), which has been linked to Al-Qaida, [REDACTED].

00564 ~~(S//NF)~~ AWAD, JALAL, SALAM AWAD - US9YM-000564DP: Jihadist training. Detainee may be able to provide information on a recruiter in Hadromount, Yemeni named [REDACTED] including specific recruiting practices and locations, and methods of facilitation of documents and travel. He may be able to provide specific information on an Al-Ansar guest house in Kabul, AF to include personalities and activities at guest house. Detainee was trained at an Afghan training camp known as the "Libyan Camp" for a period of two months. [REDACTED]

He should be able to provide information about exfiltration routes into PK from AF used by Arabs. Detainee should be able to provide information about a safe house used by Arabs that was maintained and operated by a man known as FNU (Aziz), in Karachi, PK.

00565 ~~(S//NF)~~ ABDUL, HAKIM MOUSA - US9SA-000565DP: Al-Qaida. Mousa traveled to AF and was received for a month-long period at a house in Kandahar. He has provided details of forged entry and exit passport stamps [REDACTED] to aid former Al-Qaida fighters fleeing AF into PK.

2A

OSD 1.4 (b)(5)(d)

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

3A

OSD 1.4 (c)

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

3B

OSD 1.4 (b)(5)(d)

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

3C

OSD 1.4 (c)

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

OSD 1.4 (b,c,d)

SECRET//NOFORN

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

00568 (S//NF) AL ZAMEL, ADEL ZAMEL ABD AL MAHSEN - US9KU-000568DP: NGO ties - Al-Wafa. Detainee worked directly under the Al-Wafa NGO director, Abdallah Aziz al-Matrafi (ISN 0005), as the director of the Kabul, AF Al-Wafa office and has extensive knowledge of financial procedures associated with the NGO. He has strong ties with Al-Qaida spokesman Sulayman Abu Ghaith. Detainee provided assistance to relocate Ghaith's family out of AF just before the September 11, 2001 attacks. Detainee has knowledge of the Al-Qaida financing.

39

[REDACTED] Detainee was arrested by Pakistani forces [REDACTED]

00569 (S//NF) AL SHARABI, ZUHAIL ABDO ANAM SAID - US9YM-000569DP: Al-Qaida and Taliban. Detainee claims to have traveled to AF to receive military training and then intended to return to YM. Detainee has ties with Al-Qaida and Taliban, an extensive history of living in guesthouses, and possesses information on the daily activities of a terrorist training camp in Libya. Although he denies any involvement, detainee has been placed in Malaysia, possibly linking him to the 9/11 attacks.

40

00570 (S//NF) AL QURASHI, SABRI MOHAMMED EBRAHIM- US9YM-000570DP: Al-Farouq training camp. Detainee spent one year in AF, including two months at Al-Farouq training camp. Detainee fled AF after the start of U.S. bombing and was arrested in Karachi at a guest house [REDACTED]

41

00571 (S//NF) SAAD MADHI SAAD HAWASH AL AZMI - US9KU-000571DP: Al-Qaida, Takfir Wa Hijra, Al-Wafa. Detainee is a self-taught businessman with small arms training. Al Azmi belongs to the Takfir Wa Hijra organization. [REDACTED]

42

[REDACTED] Detainee also worked for the Al-Wafa NGO. Detainee was captured [REDACTED] other Al-Qaida members in Karachi, PK [REDACTED]

00574 (S//NF) AL WADY, HAMOUD ABDULLAH HAMOUD HASSAN - US9YM-000574DP: Al-Qaida. Detainee met suspected Al-Qaida/Taliban recruiter Abu Abdul Rahman in the Hayel Said Mosque in Aden, Yemen, and subsequently traveled to AF with Rahman's assistance. While fleeing U.S. bombing, detainee stayed at a confirmed Al-Qaida guesthouse in Karachi, PK and was arrested with several suspected Al-Qaida members. Detainee also stayed at an Al-Qaida guesthouse in Kandahar, PK.

45

00576 (S//NF) BIN HAMDOUN, ZAHER OMER KHAMIS - US9YM-000576DP: Al-Farouq training camp. Hamdoun attended Al-Farouq training camp for about two months. [REDACTED]

44

[REDACTED] Detainee was arrested at a house belonging to Al-Qaida operative Riyadh the Facilitator.

00577 (S//NF) MAR'I, JAMAL MUHAMMED 'ALAWI - US9YM-000577DP: Al-Qaida; Al-Wafa (CBRN program). From approximately 1997 to 1999, detainee worked for a Saudi Arabian humanitarian organization known as Al Haramayn in Baku, Azerbaijan. Detainee was later recruited to open an office for Al-Wafa in Karachi, PK in July 2001. Detainee was director of Al-Wafa in Karachi until his arrest in September 2001. [REDACTED]

45

OSD 1.4 (b,c,d) OSD 1.4 (c) 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

OSD 1.4 (c)

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OSD 1.4 (b)(1,4)

00578 ~~(S//NF)~~ AL SUADI, ABDUL AZIZ ABDULLAH ALI - US9YM-000578DP: Al-Qaida, Al-Farouq training camp. Al Suadi was recruited for jihad in Yemen and traveled to AF in fall of 2000. Detainee stayed at a safe house [redacted] before proceeding to the Al-Farouq training camp. Detainee was a member of the Yemeni National Guard and trained with infantry weapons from 1991 to 1992. [redacted]

46

OSD 1.4 (b)(1,4)

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

00579 ~~(S//NF)~~ KHAIRKHA, KHIRULLAH - US9AF-000579DP: Taliban Governor. Detainee stated that he served for 2 years (1999-2001) as the Taliban governor of Herat province, AF. He also served as an associate press secretary and Taliban spokesperson, which put him in contact with many influential Taliban leaders, [redacted]. It is believed that he also served as the Taliban Minister of the Interior, although the detainee denies this. [redacted]

47

00581 ~~(S//NF)~~ REHMAN, MOLLAH SHED ABDUL - US9AF-000581DP: Taliban, ISID. Detainee may provide information on Taliban leadership and terrorist operations, [redacted] and support of subversive activities in support of terrorism, and possible connections to Al-Qaida. Detainee was recently identified as a former Taliban judge in Kabul, AF, where he was directly responsible for the execution of persons he sentenced to death under the Taliban rule. [redacted]

48

00627 ~~(S//NF)~~ BATARFI, AYMAN SAEED ABDULLAH - US9YM-000627DP: Al-Qaida; NGO Ties: Al-Wafa (CBRN program). Detainee grew up in Saudi Arabia, but is a Yemeni citizen. Detainee worked as a medical advisor for the Al-Wafa Organization in AF. [redacted]

49

OSD 1.4 (b)(1,4)

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

00641 ~~(S//NF)~~ KARIM, ABDUL - US9TI-000641DP: [redacted]

50

00661 ~~(S//NF)~~ HABIB, MAMDOUH AHMED - US9EG-000661DP: Al-Qaida. Detainee is associated with a member of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing conspiracy. Detainee has indicated that he possessed prior knowledge of the 9/11 attacks. [redacted]

51

OSD 1.4 (b)(1,4)

00662 ~~(S//NF)~~ SULEYMAN, AHMED HASSAN - US9JO-000662DP: Al-Qaida. [redacted]

52

Detainee has been identified as a member of Al-Qaida, with possible contacts with UBL, Sheikh Al-Liby, and Abu Zubaida, [redacted]. The detainee worked for the Islamic Aid Committee, PK and traveled to AF four times. [redacted]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

00669 (S//NF) ZUHAYRI, AHMAD ZAYID SALIM - US9SA-000669DP: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Detainee is a suspect in an FBI  
investigation of the murder of a US citizen in Bosnia in 1995. [REDACTED]

53

00675 (S//NF) RAHMAN, ABDUL - US9UZ-000675DP:  
[REDACTED]

54

00695 (S//NF) ABU BAKR, OMAR KHALIFA MUHAMMED - US9LY-000695DP: Libyan Islamic  
Fighting Group (LIFG), Al-Qaida Sudan ties. Detainee was a high-level member and military  
trainer at a camp in AF for members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Detainee also  
had a great deal of experience in arms dealing, and assisted UBL in the purchase of weapons.  
Detainee was formerly in the Sudan where he was in charge of some of UBL's projects. The  
detainee administered the Libyan Training Camp, [REDACTED] Detainee's  
alias, Abu Umar al Libi [REDACTED]

55

OSD 1.4 (b)(1)

00703 (S//NF) LABED, AHMED BIN KADR - US9AF-000703DP:  
[REDACTED] The  
detainee was taken into custody by the Pakistani police as part of a raid on a suspected group of  
Al-Qaida members. [REDACTED]

56

00707 (S//NF) MUHAMMED, NOOR UTHMAN - US9SU-000707DP: Weapons trainer, Al-Qaida  
associate. Muhammed is a Sudanese citizen who was captured in an Al-Qaida safe house in  
Faisalabad, PK. He was captured with Abu Zubaydah, a Senior Al-Qaida member, and several  
other Al-Qaida associated individuals. Muhammed was the primary weapons trainer at Khalden, a  
known Al-Qaida training camp, for 5 years until it closed in July 2000. He was also the Amir of the  
camp [REDACTED] a Senior Al-Qaida member, was absent. [REDACTED]

57

OSD 1.4 (b)(1)

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

00713 (S//NF) AL ZHRANI, MUHAMMED MURDI ISSA - US9SA-000713DP: Massoud  
assassination / 9-11 hijackers. Zahrnai is an admitted Al-Qaida member who was on the  
planning committee for the 2001 assassination of Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Shah  
Massoud. [REDACTED]

58

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Detainee claims to have been friends with 9/11 hijacker [REDACTED]

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

00728 ~~(S//NF)~~ NASSIR, JAMIL AHMED SAID - US9YM-000728: Al-Qaida ties. Nassir is a Yemeni citizen who was arrested in an Al-Qaida safe house in Faisalabad, PK [REDACTED]

S9

[REDACTED] also stated that Nassir might have functioned in a medical capacity at the safe house. Nassir [REDACTED] may have been involved in Yazid Sufaat's anthrax program, with Nassir using the [REDACTED] has identified Qasim as a microbiologist who supported the Al-Wafa organization.

00743 ~~(S//NF)~~ MADNI, HAFEZ QARI MOHAMED SAAD IQBAL - US9PK-000743DP: [REDACTED]

G1

OSD 1.4 (b)(6)

00753 ~~(S//NF)~~ ZAHIR, ABDUL - US9AF-000753DP: Translator for Hadi al Iraqi. Detainee worked as a translator for senior Al-Qaida military commander Abdul Hadi al-Iraqi in approximately 1998.

G1

00757 ~~(S//NF)~~ AZIZ, AHMED OULD ABDEL - US9AF-000757DP: [REDACTED]

G1

OSD 1.4 (b)(6)

00760 ~~(S//NF)~~ MOHAMEDOU OULD SLAHI - US9MR-000760DP: Al-Qaida recruiter and facilitator. Detainee has admitted that he is an Al-Qaida member. [REDACTED]

G5

[REDACTED] Detainee knows numerous associates of the Al Sunna mosque in Montreal, Canada

[REDACTED] Detainee has provided financial support to Al-Qaida through money laundering. [REDACTED]

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(7)

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OSD 1.4 (b)(4)

00788 ~~(S//NF)~~ AL DARBI, AHMED MUHAMMED HAZA - US9SA-000768DP: ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
maritime attack planning. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ Detainee was handpicked by Usama Bin Ladin and was involved in  
planning for terrorist attacks against oil tankers in the Straits of Hormuz. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

62

00798 ~~(S//NF)~~ WAKIL, HAJI SAHIB ROHULLAH - US9AF-000798DP: Al-Qaida, JDQ, ISID. U.S.  
forces apprehended detainee under suspicions that the detainee was involved in rocket attacks  
against U.S. forces in Konar Province, AF. Detainee is a member of the executive council of the  
Jama'at Ul Dawa Al Qurani (JDQ), an Islamic extremist group with connections to Saudi  
extremists, Al-Qaida, and the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID). ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ Detainee ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ assisted Al-Qaida Arabs fleeing the  
Tora Bora mountains of AF into the North-West Frontier Provinces of PK. The JDQ organization  
is a supporter of terrorist operations in AF.

67

OSD 1.4 (b)(4)

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

00801 ~~(S//NF)~~ MELMA, SABAR LAL - US9AF-000801DP: Taliban and Al-Qaida ties. Detainee was  
a Brigadier General, responsible for 600 border security troops along the Konar border in AF after  
the Taliban left Konar province in September 2001. Detainee has met numerous times with Haji  
Rohullah (ISN 798) and was involved in smuggling Arabs and their families from Konar into PK;  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ Detainee was arrested due to suspicion that he may have been involved  
in rocket attacks against U.S. forces and assisting Al-Qaida border crossings.

66

OSD 1.4 (b)(4)

OSD 1.4 (b)(4)

00832 ~~(S//NF)~~ OMARI, MOHAMMAD NABI - US9AF-000832DP: Taliban Official. Detainee was  
Taliban Chief of Border Security ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ May be able to provide specific  
information on activities of the Taliban Ministry of Border Security and information on local players.

67

OSD 1.4 (c)

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

00837 ~~(S//NF)~~ AI MARWALAH, BASHIR NASIR ALI - US9YM-000837DP: Attack Planning - ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ Detainee was arrested along with ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ and two others during a raid conducted  
on 11 September, 2002. Documents belonging to UBL's family, ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
were seized. Detainee requested ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ a martyrdom mission and prepared a  
last will and testament in anticipation of such an assignment.

68

00839 ~~(S//NF)~~ AL MUDWANI, MUSAB OMAR ALI - US9YM-000839DP: Al-Farouq training  
camp/Attack Planning - ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ Detainee trained at Al-Farouq in August 2001, but his  
training was interrupted due to the September 11, 2001 attacks. Al Mudwani is ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ was part of a special team designated to attack targets in Karachi, PK. This  
group was arrested on September 11, 2002 after a violent, two and a half hour firefight with  
Pakistani forces. This series of raids netted several high value Al-Qaida operatives. ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

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5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

OSD 1.4 (b)(5)(d)

00905 ~~(S//NF)~~ ELBANNA, ABDUL LATIF - US9JO-000905DP: Al-Qaida associate. Detainee is an associate of suspected Al-Qaida facilitator Abu Qatada. Elbanna participated in a fraudulent scheme to obtain refugee status in the UK, and was involved in fund raising for Abu Qatada through an NGO named the Human Aid Trust. After coming under suspicion at the Gatwick airport in the UK, Elbanna was arrested at the Banjul, Gambia airport in early November 2002 by Gambian authorities. [REDACTED] Elbanna and [REDACTED] were transferred to U.S. control after one month in Gambian custody.

70

00906 ~~(S//NF)~~ AL RAWI, BISHAR AMIN KHALIL - US9IZ-000906DP: Al-Qaida associate. This detainee has a close relationship with Abu Qatada, a suspected Al-Qaida facilitator in the United Kingdom. Detainee conducted financial transactions for Abu Qatada. Was travelling with [REDACTED] when detained in Gambia.

71

00931 ~~(S//NF)~~ KUCHI, HAJI NAIM - US9AF-000931DP: [REDACTED]

72

01007 ~~(S//NF)~~ SADIQI, ABDUL HALIM - US9PK-001007DP: [REDACTED]

The detainee was tasked [REDACTED] to recruit two thousand soldiers to fight in AF.

01016 ~~(S//NF)~~ AL HUMARY, SOUFIANN ABAR - US9AG-001016DP: [REDACTED] Algerian citizen captured in the Pankisi Gorge region of Georgia as the result of a "sting" operation

74

01017 ~~(S//NF)~~ RAMMA, OMAR MOHAMMED ALI - US9YM-01017DP: [REDACTED]

75

01021 ~~(S//NF)~~ COMMANDAR CHAMAN - US9AF-001021DP: Hezb-E-Islami-Gulbuddin (HIG), Taliban, Al-Qaida. Detainee is an acclaimed mujahideen fighter from the Soviet occupation era in AF. For four years he served as bodyguard for Hekmatyar Gulbuddin [REDACTED]. He knew Taliban and Al-Qaida leaders in AF and PK, and reportedly defected to the Northern Alliance for a payment late in 2001. He is a high level figure in the Hezb-E-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG), an extremist organization currently attempting to gain control of AF. [REDACTED]

76

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

OSD 1.4 (b)(5)(d)

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

OSD 1.4 (b)(5)(d)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

OSD 1.4 ( C )

- 01036 ~~(S//NF)~~ MOHAMMAD, AKHTIAR - US9AF-001036DP: Hezb-E-Islami Gulbiddin (HIG), Itihaad-E-Islami. Akhtiar was captured on 05 May 2003 in Gardez, Paktia Province, AF by U.S. forces based on reporting that his residence was a HIG safe house. Detainee was captured with a HIG identification card, a phone book with HIG names and numbers, and a U.S. sniper rifle and ammunition. Detainee was the HIG commander in charge (colonel) [REDACTED] 77  
[REDACTED] Gardez Command in the Seyyed Karam district in AF. Detainee belongs to Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) and Itihaad-E-Islami.
- 10002 ~~(S//NF)~~ LAHMAR, SABIR MAHFOUZ - US4AG-010002DP: Attack planning. Detainee conspired with Bensayah Belkacem (ISN 10001) to commit an act of terrorism against the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Detainee also worked at the Saudi High Commission for Refugees, a suspect NGO, in Sarajevo. 73
- 10006 ~~(S//NF)~~ AL HAJJ, BOUDELLA - US9AG-010006DP: Armed Islamic Group (GIA); NGO Ties - Human Appeals International. Detainee was arrested by Bosnian authorities on 21 October 2001 with five other Algerians, all suspected of planning a bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo, Bosnia. Detainee has worked for four NGOs in the past, two of which are Tier 2 terrorist organizations (have demonstrated intent and willingness to attack U.S. interests) and one of which is a Tier 3 organization (is in position and has resources to attack U.S. interests.) Detainee is assessed as having ties to the Armed Islamic Group (GIA.) 79

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Chief, DoD Ofc of Security Review

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

DOS

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1.4(D)

~~SECRET~~ RELEASED IN PART

RECOMMEND AND TRANSFER - DOD 1.4(D)

NSC 50.5.C.  
552(b)(5)

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
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Date: SEP 17 2010

NSS Declassification Review [EO 13526]  
Declassified in Part on 8/16/2010  
By Mary Ronan

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19 JAN 2010 7

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NSC 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5)

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
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
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July 21, 2006


NSC 5 U.S.C. 552(b)  
(S)

QUESTIONS





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Date: SEP 17 2010

~~SECRET~~

July 06, 2006

TO: Steve Cambone  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Uzbekistan

OSD 1.4 (d )  
DOS 1.4 (d)  
NSC 1.4 (d)

I talked to Hadley and he is going to have Negroponte do a lessons learned on Uzbekistan  You better get involved in it also.

From my perspective what happened was this: 



Please see me about this.

Thanks.

DHR:ss  
SF070506-03

.....  
*Please Respond By 07/13/06*

~~SECRET~~

09-M-2627

RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 2098  
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 9596  
RUEHBI/AMCONSUL MUMBAI PRIORITY 3554  
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 7525

BT

CONTROLS

~~SECRET~~ ISLAMABAD 014077

~~EXDIS~~

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/12/2016

*NONE OF THIS WILL  
BE NEW TO YOU OR  
THE CJCS, BUT IT IS  
A NICE WRAP UP OF  
CHALLENGES W/ FACE*


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TEXT

TAGS: PK, PREL, PGOV, MASS, MARR, PHUM, KDEM, ECON  
SUBJECT: PAKISTAN POLITICAL SCENESETTER FOR JCS CHAIRMAN  
GENERAL PETER PACE

~~CLASSIFIED BY: AMBASSADOR RYAN C. CROCKER, REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D)~~

1. ~~(S/NF)~~ EMBASSY ISLAMABAD WELCOMES YOUR JULY 27 VISIT TO PAKISTAN. YOU ARE ARRIVING AT THE END OF A TUMULTUOUS SIX-MONTH PERIOD FOR PRESIDENT PERVEZ MUSHARRAF. WHEN PRESIDENT BUSH VISITED PAKISTAN IN MARCH 2006, MUSHARRAF'S GOVERNMENT HAD JUST EMERGED FROM MASSIVE EARTHQUAKE RELIEF OPERATIONS, PUBLIC OUTRAGE AND VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS FOLLOWING THE DANISH CARTOON CONTROVERSY, AND HIGHLY-CHARGED MEDIA SPECULATION THAT U.S. MISSILES HAD CAUSED INDISCRIMINATE CIVILIAN DEATHS IN BORDER VILLAGES TARGETED AS SANCTUARIES FOR AL QAEDA MILITANTS.



*C.R. 7*  
OSD 1.4 (d)  
DoS 1.4 (d)  
JS 1.4 (b)  
NSC 1.4 (d)

DOS 1.4 (d)  
NSC 1.4 (b), (d)  
OSD 1.4 (b), (d)  
IS 1.4 (b)


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GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR  
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DOS 1.4(d)

OSD 1.4(d)




U.S.-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

7. (U) SINCE PRESIDENT BUSH LAUNCHED THE U.S.-PAKISTAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP DURING HIS MARCH 2006 VISIT, THE INITIATIVE HAS BEEN INSTITUTIONALIZED IN THE FRAMEWORK OF A STRATEGIC DIALOGUE ADDRESSING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PROSPERITY, ENERGY COOPERATION, PEACE AND SECURITY, SOCIAL SECTOR DEVELOPMENT, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, DEMOCRACY, AND NON-PROLIFERATION. THE INAUGURAL MEETING OF THE STRATEGIC DIALOGUE HELD IN WASHINGTON FROM APRIL 26-27 WAS A STEP FORWARD IN REASSURING PAKISTAN OF THE BREADTH AND DEPTH OF OUR LONG-TERM COMMITMENT.

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8. (SBU) UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE SHINER LED THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE FIRST ECONOMIC DIALOGUE MEETING ON MAY 23, WHICH FOCUSED ON REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND PAKISTAN'S BUSINESS CLIMATE REFORMS; THE SECOND MEETING OF OUR ENERGY WORKING GROUP, DESIGNED TO HELP PAKISTAN FIND SOLUTIONS TO ITS LOOMING ENERGY SHORTFALL, WAS HELD IN WASHINGTON IN LATE JUNE. ADDITIONALLY, THE STUDY TEAM FOR THE RECONSTRUCTION OPPORTUNITY ZONE TRADE INITIATIVE IS CURRENTLY BEING CONSTITUTED IN WASHINGTON AND SHOULD VISIT PAKISTAN BY AUGUST 2006.



DOMESTIC ISSUES



A-102 47 22

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Dos 1.4 (d)

OSD 1.4 (d )

NSC 1.4 (b), (d)


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THE NEIGHBORHOOD

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~~SECRET~~

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~~ENDIS~~  
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
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NSC 1.4 (b), (d)  
OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

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~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~  
~~EXDTS~~  
20160712



DOS 1.4(d)

OSD 1.4(b), (d)

IS 1.4(b)

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~~SECRET~~  
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DOS 1.4(d)

OSD 1.4(b),(d)

IS 1.4(b)

CROCKER  
END OF MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



DoS  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

TRANSFERRED/RECOMMEND RELEASE  
RECOMMEND AND TRANSFER - DOD

JAN 18 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR VICE PRESIDENT

SECRETARY OF STATE (by hand)  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
WHITE HOUSE CHIEF OF STAFF  
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL  
SECURITY AFFAIRS

cc: Ambassador L. Paul Bremer  
General Richard B. Myers

**DECLASSIFIED IN FULL**  
**Authority: EO 13526**  
**Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS**  
**Date: SEP 17 2010**

Quick thoughts following the January 16 meeting on Iraq:

- There's a danger in being (or appearing to be) inflexible on the details of plans for moving toward Iraqi sovereignty.
- On all but a few key points of strategic importance, the U.S. has no interest in pushing ideas on the Iraqis. Iraq is their country, and the Iraqis should make political arrangements that best suit them.
- What is important to us is that Iraq:
  - Forswears weapons of mass destruction,
  - Does not support terrorism,
  - Seeks to live in peace with its neighbors,
  - Remains unified, and
  - Is on a path toward prosperity and democratic governance.
- The November 15 agreement is not "Holy Writ." What is important is the essence of the agreement:
  1. A basic law for the transition period (the period between recognition of Iraqi sovereignty and establishment of a permanent, elected government under a constitution) that protects basic human rights.
  2. A provisional national assembly and government for the transition period that the Iraqi people will accept.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by Douglas J. Feith  
Reason 1.4(f)  
Declass on 16 Jan 14


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Date: SEP 17 2010

3. A timetable for early recognition of Iraqi sovereignty, so that the Coalition can shed the "occupying power" label.
  4. A timetable to assure the Iraqi people that the transitional government will be replaced by a new Constitution and a permanent government elected in accordance with it.
- It might be best to stop referring to the November 15 agreement and refer instead to the principles (or the essence) of the agreement.
  - The U.S. should not (and should not appear to) oppose elections.
    - There are many different kinds of elections, including indirect elections.
    - It is not clear that the proposed caucus process can be completed in time for a July 1<sup>st</sup> transition.
    - It is not clear that the proposed caucus process is more likely to produce a pro-moderate result than direct elections; the better organized a group is, the better able it will be to make the best of *any* process.


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- Money (reconstruction aid and other funds, e.g. subsidies to parties),
- Troops, and
- Recognition of their sovereignty.

OSD 1.4 (b),  
(d)

- In particular, we should take a firm line with the Kurds, who need our support over the longer term.

- The Kurdish leaders have been important friends and deserve respect for their resistance to Saddam.

- 

OSD 1.4 (b),  
(d)

- We have leverage that we should use boldly.

- 

OSD 1.4 (b),  
(d)

 We might be able to support the establishment of an international *civilian* airport north of the Green Line.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OSD 1.4 (b2), (d)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Date: SEP 17 2010

- It is important to get our attitude right:
  - The U.S. is in a strong position.
  - The U.S. will not run away.
  - The U.S. does not want to design a specific system of government – that is for Iraqis to decide.
- The U.S. should encourage the UN team to:
  - Remain flexible – while supporting the principles of the Nov 15<sup>th</sup> agreement.
  - Help the Iraqis to determine the most appropriate kind of selection process for the Transitional National Assembly. Whatever selection process is chosen will be a form of elections, direct or indirect.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to be 'P. R. ...', is written in a cursive style.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Date:

AUG 25 2010

DRAFT  
~~TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

Note taker: Feith

NSC on Iraq by SVTC  
Wednesday, May 12, 2004

(President, Powell, Wolfowitz, Pace, Miscik, Rice, Card, Cheney, Miller, Hadley, Gonzales, Libby, Armitage, Feith, Sharp, Bremer & Blackwill (both by SVTC))

Pace: [Gave military briefing.]

President: Why are casualties from IEDs going down?

Pace: Tactics, Techniques & Procedures (TTPs) are improving.  
Abizaid will check with Rumsfeld before action is taken against [REDACTED]

JS 1.4(a), (d)

Wolfowitz: There are demonstrations by Shia against Sadr.

President: In Fallujah it would be important to find someone who was dancing over the US bodies and show that justice is being done.

[Cheney arrived]

President: If Sadr is brought to trial by Iraqis, what will be the reaction in Sadr City?

Bremer: It will help. Bringing services to Sadr City would be good. If we use violence [REDACTED] we'll have trouble.

JS 1.4(a), (d)

Cheney: Should we push Sadr issue to conclusion now and not let him have time to recover from recent setbacks.

Pace: Our forces think things are moving in the right direction now and should be allowed to run their course.

Bremer: Update on political process. Daily contact with Brahimi. He's asked for our ideas on people for the government.

He'll have first cut of government within next 10 days.

[REDACTED]

OUSDP(P) 1.4(b), (d)

09-M-2629

DERIVED FROM: MULTIPLE SOURCES DRAFT  
~~DECLASSIFIED ON 12-11-2011 TOP SECRET SENSITIVE~~

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[REDACTED]

045D(P) 1.4 (b), (d)

President: Make sure Brahimi gets plenty of protection. Really important he's not harmed.

President: We need an Iraqi leader to say to US: Thanks for your sacrifice. I don't expect ~~today~~ *today* but he should be grateful for what we've done. We want American people to support our mission.

The Iraqi should want the job. We should see it in his body language.

Must have courage---be willing to take the heat.

Some in U.S. says Iraqi can't be free so we should find a tough general and put him in charge and let him torture people to achieve stability. But that's not my policy. We need someone courageous enough to stand up.

[REDACTED]

045D(P) 1.4 (b), (d)

Wolfowitz: Sanchez and Petraeus are high on the current Minister of Interior. This argues for keeping him given our interest in continuity in the Ministry.

President: I agree with that. I heard that at the Pentagon Monday. Work with Brahimi on this.

Bremer: We'll talk again with Brahimi.  
Regarding Sadr we've said that he must present himself to Iraqi justice and disband his militia.

President: Tell me about reconstruction.

Bremer: Some big contractors have come back.

Insurgents are going after the infrastructure. Has hurt oil exports and electrical grid.

Wolfowitz: Flag controversy is not good.

Bremer: Iraqi Governing Council did it on their own. I said they don't have the authority to change the flag.

AUG 25 2010

President: Blair's idea: bring new Iraqi PM to UN when we're debating the UNSCR. Should be done before June.

Pace: [REDACTED]

JS 1.4(a), (d) DOS 1.4(b), (d)

Powell: I recognize the need. But this is a big deal. We need to think about consultation process. Will affect [REDACTED]

JS 1.4(a), (d)

President: What's the alternative?

Pace: There are some, but they're not as good.

Powell: People will argue that we're in trouble in Iraq so we're pulling troops out of other theaters.

Cheney: [REDACTED]

DOS 1.4(b), (d) JS 1.4(a), (d)

President: Sounds like option is right but we must get notification right.

Powell: Let Deputies Committee work the notification plan.

Rice: We need the trigger date.

Pace: May 23<sup>rd</sup> is notification date.

President: Put this announcement in a package with announcement of extra capability [REDACTED]

DOS 1.4(b), (d)

Pace: Stryker and other items.

JS 1.4(a), (d)

2005 NOV 10 AM 9: 32

November 9, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

FROM: General Wayne Downing, US Army (Retired) *9/11/05*

SUBJECT: Special Operations Forces Assessment

Provided below is my assessment of U.S. Special Operations Forces. I was assisted in this assessment by Major General Bill Garrison, US Army (Retired) and Mike Vickers of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. I was asked to:

- Conduct an assessment and report back on the state of SOF mission capabilities and overall GWOT preparedness; and
- Provide recommendations on adjustments needed to DoD systems and future SOF capabilities and capacities to anticipate, prepare for, and defeat the myriad unconventional, asymmetric threats our global enemy may employ.

A summary of the statement of work pursuant to this assessment is included as Annex A. I was asked specifically to address ten elements. Answers to these are included as Annexes B through K.

In conducting this assessment, I consulted senior officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Counterterrorism Center, the Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands, United States Special Operations Command, and the Theater Special Operations Commands. I also consulted several United States Ambassadors in priority and high priority GWOT countries and other current and former senior US Government officials. A list of those consulted is included as Annex L.

**SOF Mission Capabilities and GWOT Preparedness**

There have been impressive gains in SOF capability since September 11, 2001. Prior to the September 11 attacks, many SOF units were experiencing manning shortfalls in their existing force structures.

SOF was structured for and conducted short duration deployments and combat operations. SOCOM concentrated almost exclusively on its force provider role. Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) required substantial augmentation to command and control operations. Among

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July 07, 2009  
CH, WHS R & D Div

ED 14750

X5  
X6

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ED12955  
X5, 6

the nine core SOF tasks, unconventional warfare (UW) had received reduced emphasis in the period following the end of the Cold War, and capabilities in this area had atrophied. The Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) maintained superb counterterrorism and counterproliferation capabilities, but operated from a reactive rather than a proactive posture, and was not structured for the complex, extended-duration operations they currently conduct. Although it had superb, direct assault, "finish" capabilities to find and respond to WMD threats, JSOC lacked the "find" and "fix" and intelligence fusion capabilities essential to the GWOT. More broadly, SOF intelligence capabilities, particularly in human intelligence, were very limited.

Since 9/11, additional resources and authorities have been provided to SOF, and substantial improvements in SOF capability have been made in each of these areas. Today's SOF operators are conducting more operations in a week, at a higher rate of complexity, than their pre 9/11 predecessors conducted in a career. The baseline budget provided to SOF has increased 81 percent, from \$3.7B in FY 2001 to \$6.7B in FY 2006. SOCOM also received \$5.5B in supplemental appropriations between FY 2002 and FY 2006. The Army Special Forces School has increased throughput from 282 new active duty enlisted Special Forces troops in 2001 to 617 new SF troops in 2005 – the equivalent of an additional SF Battalion a year -- with a further goal of 750 students per year. SF ODAs and Companies are now manned at full strength. Unconventional warfare capabilities have improved dramatically as a result of Operation Enduring Freedom, and renewed emphasis is being placed on developing UW skills. JSOC has increased capacity, and has begun its transformation toward a blacker/low visibility force and preemptive posture, with improved find and fix capabilities for sustained operations.

X5  
X

To operationalize its new warfighting role under UCP 2004, SOCOM created the Center for Special Operations (CSO), which combines the functions of intelligence, operations and planning into a single directorate to eliminate stove pipes and capitalize on the natural synergy of efforts created when these functions are colocated under a single commander. This synergy ultimately will allow the synchronization and prosecution of the Global War on Terror in a timely and coordinated manner. TSOC

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July 07, 2009  
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manning has been increased by a factor of more than two in Major Force Program-11, and by a factor of five across all MFPs.

**Recommendations on Needed Adjustments**

Despite the substantial progress that has been made since 9/11, much remains to be done. Five major recommendations follow from my assessment:

- Posture SOF for the future indirect and clandestine GWOT fight in countries with which we are not at war;
- Increase SOF capabilities and capacities for the GWOT in several areas, most importantly in SF and SMU capacity;
- Make JSOC a 3-Star command temporarily reporting to the SECDEF;
- Fix GWOT organization and processes within the Department and make reform across the USG a top priority; and
- Provide SOCOM with sufficient authorities, supported missions and Washington presence to realize the intent of UCP 2004.

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July 07, 2009  
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SOF is well postured for the current GWOT main effort in Iraq and Afghanistan, but not for the future fight, which will take place in countries with which we are not at war. The major SOF effort in the GWOT has been on pursuit of high-value targets (HVTs) and on combat unconventional warfare and foreign internal defense (FID). SOF has achieved remarkable success on the battlefield. With almost SOF located in Iraq and Afghanistan, there is little capacity left for operations in other priority countries. Looking to the future, we must increase capabilities and capacities to conduct sustained operations in multiple, sensitive, non-permissive and denied areas. The future GWOT fight will much more than the military. Broad cooperation across the Interagency, beginning in Washington and extending to field operations, will be required.

EO. 12958  
X5,6

The future GWOT fight will be conducted principally using indirect and clandestine ways and means. It will require sustained UW, FID and operational preparation of the environment (OPE) in multiple countries. Building and leveraging partner capacity will be a core element of strategy, and the employment of surrogates will be a key method for accomplishing many GWOT missions.

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
X5  
X5



The Quadrennial Defense Review and PR 07 and POM 08 decisions appear to be headed in the right direction. It is imperative that SOF capacity be increased. We have essentially the same SOF ground force structure that we had prior to 9/11. To shift to a global persistent presence force, collect low-level intelligence and build partner capacity in multiple countries, there is a need to add two additional active SF Groups (6 SF Battalions) for UW/FID missions. To conduct persistent, distributed/

there is a need to increase SMU capacity by 53 percent (additional Sabre and Trident Squadrons). We should also create two additional Ranger Battalions for increased JSOC forward sustained operations and support to the TSOCs, and, most importantly, to provide additional "seed corn" for Army SMUs and SF.

X5  
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X5  
X6



~~The GWOT reporting chain should be flattened and JSOC's role enhanced.~~ JSOC should be elevated to a 3-star command (O-9), with two, 2-star (O-8) and two, 1-star (O-7) deputy commanders. This would provide the ability to field 5 task tailored JSOTFs commanded by a flag officer for world wide deployment as supported or supporting command. White and Black SOF in the field could be assigned to these JSOTFs when the mission and geographic areas dictate. The "wall" between White and Black SOF must be lowered, and joint field command of all units should be the norm, not the exception. When performing irregular warfare tasks, conventional units should be placed under the JSOTFs or TSOCs. The best practices of current SOF combat operations, such as JIATFs, Computer Network Operations Task Force, Detainee Temporary Screening Facilities and the Joint Reconnaissance Task Force, need to be institutionalized.

To flatten the chain of command, JSOC should report directly to the SD for the immediate future. There is precedent for this new approach to the combat employment of SOF that will better position DoD for the future fight. JSOC reported directly to the CJCS prior to Goldwater-Nichols legislation and the Nunn-Cohen Amendment. Placing JSOC directly under the SD would improve responsiveness and allow SOCOM and DoD time to adjust to UCP 2004 changes. In addition to its new warfighting responsibilities, SOCOM has a full-time task in manning, training and equipping the force, which is absolutely essential to the current and future viability of SOF. JSOC would continue to

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operate supporting or supported to the GCCs, as mission needs dictate. In recognition of SOF's expanded role, the TSOCs should be upgraded to 2-star commands. SOF flag officers, as available, should also be placed in other key GCC and JTF positions to leverage their irregular warfare expertise.

Current GWOT staffing processes within DoD are cumbersome, producing lowest common denominator recommendations which are timid, unimaginative and out-of-date. Bold, creative, timely proposals rarely percolate to SD attention. JSOC is the exception, but even their actions take too long to get approved. Decisions must be made 24/7, not on peacetime battle rhythms. When actions finally leave DoD, initiatives move at glacial speed. Operations outside of Iraq and Afghanistan are complicated by Title 10 vs. Title 50 authorities, and inability to flexibly detail personnel.

XS

The interagency planning process and structure for the GWOT must also be addressed. This is a war-stopper. The USG must plan long term, and act beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. The National Security Council appropriately does strategy. The new National Counterterrorism Center has unique authorities and capabilities. Its Strategic Operational Planning Directorate (SOP) has the charter to conduct operational planning for the GWOT and to report to the President/NSC. This should be leveraged to advance operational planning of the war. To facilitate interagency planning and execution, COMJSOC should be moved to the DC area. JSOC planners, supported by the CSO, should be located in the NCTC's SOP Directorate.

What is still missing, however, is national level tasking and synchronizing agency for all interagency efforts including, but not limited to, military action. A National Interagency Task Force (NIATF), perhaps headed by a military flag officer with

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SOCOM's role under UCP 2004 to plan, synchronize, and, as directed, execute the GWOT is counter-culture, and places it in direct conflict with the Joint Staff, GCCs and Interagency taskings and traditions. Under current authorities and institutional resistance, SOCOM cannot accomplish its assigned task. It needs to be given the appropriate power and Washington presence to execute this role. The current confusion caused by multiple lines of GWOT guidance must be eliminated. Acceleration of SOCOM plans through the staffing process must be demanded. The SOCOM command element and LNOs must be moved to the Washington area to work the DoD/Interagency piece, including 2-star representation in the NCTC's SOP Directorate. SOCOM should have shared command

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links (COCOM or OPCON) to global SOF, to include the TSOCs and MLEs, and should be given a supported mission to execute within 60 days.

I am available for further questions or comments as you see fit. Thanks for the opportunity to serve.

The briefing upon which this memo expands is included as Annex M.

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July 07, 2009  
CI, WISR & D Div

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IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

30 Mar 03, 1600

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Douglas J. Feith

SUBJ: Iraqi Interim Authority

Here is a draft memo from you to the principals on the Iraqi Interim Authority. It is important to send it out to them as soon as possible because it will be discussed at tomorrow morning's PC meeting.

While the package is lengthy, the main thing for the principals to read is the 4 ½-page, easy-to-skim, summary.

Please comment/approve. If I don't hear from you earlier, I plan to call you at 5:30 pm today to get your thoughts.

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Date: 7 July 2009  
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09-M-2634

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**DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES**  
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OSD Policy  
30 March 2003

**Iraqi Interim Authority Implementation Concept – Summary**

**NOTE:** The following is for discussion purposes. Further inputs and suggestions are welcome.

**Objectives:**

- Promote creation of a Free Iraq in line with the President's ideas as set forth in:
  - Declaration of the Atlantic Summit in the Azores
  - American Enterprise Institute Speech
  - National Security Strategy
- A Free Iraq should be:
  - Not a tyranny
  - Not a threat to its neighbors.
    - Not ambitious for WMD.
    - Not a supporter of terrorism.
  - Friendly to the U.S.
  - A country unified by non-oppressive means:
    - This implies breaking with Iraq's history of domination by the Sunni Arab minority – a potentially painful political process.
- US objectives in Iraq go beyond WMD and terrorist infrastructure. US interest is in an Iraq that can become a model for the Arab and Muslim worlds.
  - This would be a victory in the "Battle of Ideas" in the War on Terrorism.
- Accordingly, the new Iraq will need:
  - Representative institutions (power sharing among the ethnic and sectarian groups).

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~~Reason: 1.5b~~  
~~Declassify on: 30 March 2008~~

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OSD Policy  
30 March 2003

- Rule of law and individual liberty.
- Private property and private enterprise.

**Strategy to Achieve these Objectives:**

- Use Coalition power to dismantle the instruments of Iraqi Baathist tyranny.
- Support those Iraqis who share the President's objectives for a free Iraq.
- Iraqis have had different political experiences in recent years:
  - Kurds and many expatriates have experienced life with democratic institutions; many have come to share the President's vision for Iraq.
  - But those under Saddam's control have lived heavily oppressed--
    - Without exposure to democratic ideas or the opportunity to participate in voluntary political organizations.
    - Will take time before many become familiar with democratic ideas and before democratic-minded leaders can emerge.
- **Key:** US interest is to give those who share the President's ideas a head start in the post-Saddam Iraqi political process.
- There is tension between our interests in steering the process toward a moderate and free Iraq, and our interest in winning immediate broad support in and out of Iraq for our policy.
- In other words, there is tension between:
  - The *substantive* goal of a free Iraq as envisioned by President Bush and
  - The *procedural* goal for the US to be as inclusive, and as "hands off" as possible.
- The USG should not now raise procedural considerations above our substantive goal. An excessively "hands off" approach may produce an anti-democratic result (as premature elections in Algeria some years ago, for example, produced a victory for anti-democratic Islamist extremists.)

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Reasons: 1, 2, 3  
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- It will take time to cultivate a political culture of self-government in Iraq, especially among those who have lived their lives under Saddam's tyranny.

**Iraqi Interim Authority:**

- **Two main functions:**
  - **Form government.** Devise the means by which the new Iraqi government will come into being – that is, the constitutional, legal reform and electoral processes.
  - **Run ministries.** Take responsibility for those governmental offices and ministries that the Coalition will turn over to Iraqi control on a case-by-case basis.
- **Basic Structure:**
  - **Leadership Council** – approximately 35 people
  - **Constitutional Commission** – approximately 150 people
  - **Legal Reform Commission** – approximately 9 people

**Summary of Constituting the Iraqi Interim Authority:**

- **Build on existing leadership structures.**
  - This should help protect us against the charge that the Coalition is arbitrarily selecting Iraqi leadership.
  - As we have to start somewhere, we should start with Iraqis with whom we are familiar and who have already endorsed principles that the USG supports.
  - Each person to serve in the IIA structures should be required to subscribe to a set of principles – e.g., those set out in the statement of the US-UK-Spanish-Portuguese leaders at the Atlantic Summit in the Azores.

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Reason: ~~1.5h~~  
Declassify on: 30 March 2008

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- **Organizing Committee for Iraqi Interim Authority**
  - Core of the Organizing Committee should be a half-dozen Iraqis who have already exercised leadership roles either in northern Iraq or in the opposition groups.
    - Draw on the "Leadership Committee of the Iraqi Opposition" which was elected by the 65-member Free Iraqi Advisory Committee that was itself elected by the December 2002 London Conference of the Iraqi opposition.
  - In coordination with Coalition (details in attachment), and perhaps with advice from UN Special Coordinator for Iraq, this six-person core group should invite seven newly-liberated Iraqis to join them in forming the Organizing Committee for the IIA.
- **IIA Leadership Council.** The Organizing Committee – comprising thirteen expatriates, Kurds, and other "internals" – will select twenty-one additional people to serve with them as the IIA Leadership Council.
  - The twenty-one will be:
    - (1) one person representing each of Iraq's eighteen provinces and
    - (2) one person representing each of the following communities:
      - Chaldeans (Christians)
      - Assyrians (Christians)
      - Yezidis (a pre-Islamic sect)
      - Turkoman (an ethnic group)
  - This will provide geographic distribution, ethnic distribution, and a bridge between the expatriates and the "internals."
- **Constitutional Commission.** This Commission will comprise:
  - The Group of 65 elected by the London Conference of the Iraqi Opposition (minus those already serving on the IIA Leadership Council)  
*plus*

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OSD Policy  
30 March 2003

- Ninety people representing Iraq's provinces (seats allocated according to relative population size)
- In coordination with the Coalition (details in attachment), and perhaps with advice from the UN Special Coordinator for Iraq, the IIA Leadership Council will elect the ninety representatives of the provinces.
- *Legal Reform Commission.* In coordination with the Coalition (details in attachment), and perhaps with "advice" from the UN Special Coordinator for Iraq, the IIA Leadership Council will elect the nine members.

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**Iraqi Interim Authority Action Plan**

**NOTE:** The following is for discussion purposes. Further inputs and suggestions are welcome.

- **Formation of the IIA Leadership Council [approximately 35 members]**
  - The 35-member Leadership Council will be formed through a multi-step process:
    - **Step 1: Formation of Organizing Committee core [6 members]**
      - The six members of the "Leadership Committee of the Iraqi Opposition" which was elected by the 65-member Free Iraqi Advisory Committee at Salahuddin in February 2003 will constitute the initial core of the IIA Organizing Committee:
        - The following four members have accepted their mandate:
          - Masud Barzani (Sunni Kurd), Kurdistan Democratic Party
          - Ahmad Chalabi (Shi'a Arab), Iraqi National Congress
          - Jalal Talebani (Sunni Kurd), Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
          - Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim (Shi'a Arab), SCIRI
        - The following two members have yet to accept their mandate:
          - Adnan Pachachi (Sunni Arab), Independent
          - Ayad Allawi (Shi'a Arab), Iraqi National Accord
      - A senior USG official should telephone Allawi and Pachachi to solicit a final decision about their willingness to serve.
        - If Pachachi is unwilling to serve, the Coalition should offer the position to Sadoun Dulaimi, a Sunni Arab from the Dulaim tribe and a member of the 65-person Advisory Council elected in December 2002.
        - If Allawi is unwilling to serve, the Coalition should offer the position to Tawfiq Yassiri, a secular Shi'a Arab from

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30 March 2003

the Iraqi National Coalition and a member of the 65-person Advisory Council.

- Members of the core of the Organizing Committee will then gather in a liberated part of Iraq to complete the formation of the Organizing Committee. (See step 2 below.)
  - There should be a public announcement of the six-person core of Organizing Committee.
- **Step 2: Completion of Organizing Committee [13 members]**
- In coordination with the Coalition, and perhaps with advice from the UN Special Coordinator for Iraq, the six-person core group will select from newly-liberated provinces seven additional internal Iraqis to join their ranks.
    - Throughout this draft, the phrase "coordination with the Coalition" means that the Coalition can nominate people and can disapprove people.
  - This will ensure majority representation for "internal" Iraqis.
  - The seven additions to the Organizing Committee must enhance the Committee's ethnic and geographic diversity, as well as diversity of sectarian practice (e.g. not all Shi'as are Islamists).
  - The seven additions must agree to uphold key principles based on those outlined by President Bush at the Atlantic Summit in the Azores.
  - There may not be multiple members of a single political party or slate (e.g. no proxy groups).
  - The Organizing Committee must coordinate with the Coalition on the selection of members.

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Reason: 1.3b

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- There are two options for naming these seven additional members: rolling (as provinces are liberated) or in one shot (upon liberation of entire country).
- The seven new members should assume their roles simultaneously to avoid skewing the ethnic or sectarian composition of the Organizing Committee.
- **Step 3: Establishment of Leadership Council of IIA [35 members]**
  - The 13 members of the Organizing Committee will select one Iraqi from each province (18 in total), in coordination with the Coalition.
  - The election of these members will require the agreement of a two-third majority of the 13-member Organizing Committee.
  - Ideally, the 18 new members will be chosen at one time, to prevent at any time a skewed ethnic or sectarian composition of the Organizing Committee. But the Coalition will want to retain the flexibility to have the IIA come into being before the complete liberation of Iraq.
  - The 13 members should choose the 18 as soon as possible after the liberation of Iraq.
  - In addition, one member of each of the following minority groups will be added to the Leadership Council through a caucus for each specific group to be held as soon as possible:
    - Assyrians
    - Chaldeans
    - Yezidis
    - Turkomans
  - A reserved slot for minorities who might otherwise fail to win representation will reinforce the idea that all Iraqis have a stake in Iraq's future.

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Revised by:  
Declassify on: 28 March 2008

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30 March 2003

• **Mandate of the IIA Leadership Council:**

- The 35-member Leadership Council will be charged with:
  - Establishing a Constitutional Commission;
  - Establishing a Legal Reform Commission in coordination with the Coalition;
  - Issuing an interim Bill of Rights;
  - Conducting a census;
  - Organizing municipal, provincial, and national elections; and
  - Taking responsibility for those government offices and ministries that the Coalition will turn over to Iraqi control on a case-by-case basis.

• **Constitutional Commission [approximately 150 members]:**

- The Commission will comprise:
  - The members of the 65-person Advisory Council, but those who serve on the Leadership Council will not be members of the Constitutional Commission. This establishes a precedent of separation of powers.
  - Advisory Council members should sit according to their ancestral provincial affiliation rather than political party.
- The Leadership Council will select 90 internal Iraqis delegates to add to Constitutional Commission.
  - The size of each province's delegation will be in proportion to its population.

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30 March 2003

- Geographic divisions accommodate tribal, sectarian, and ethnic diversity without aggravating Iraq's ethnic and religious fault-lines.
- Kanan Makiya will chair the Constitutional Commission.
- **Legal Reform Commission [9 members]:**
  - The Legal Reform Commission will recommend reform of Iraq's legal code, judicial courts, and oversee trials of prominent members of the Ba'ath regime.
  - The IIA Leadership Council, in coordination with the Coalition and perhaps with advice from the UN Special Coordinator for Iraq will select nine members based on their legal expertise and personal integrity.
- **Census:**
  - The IIA Leadership Council will be charged with organizing a census.
  - The census should be non-ethnic and non-sectarian in order to:
    - Prevent "proportional representation" arguments.
    - Reinforces the notion of individual liberty.
    - Avoid disputed results by those ethnic and sectarian groups that have overstated their numbers.
  - The census should be transparent and open to international observation.
- **Elections:**
  - The IIA Leadership Council will be charged with organizing elections.
  - Rolling municipal elections will introduce Iraqis to voting, will allocate city council and mayoral seats, and expedite an "Iraqi face."

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30 March 2003

- Municipal elections should begin within 90 days of Iraq's liberation in the Kurdish-controlled provinces of Duhok, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah.
- Elections might next be held in the sparsely-populated, Sunni-dominated Anbar province (along Jordan's border).
- Municipal elections might be followed by:
  - Provincial elections to elect governors; and depending on the direction of the Constitutional Commission,
  - Delegate elections to one or two houses of representation.
- **Ratification and assumption of power by an elected government:**
  - There are various mechanisms to ratify the constitution:
    - The Constitution Commission itself might ratify the constitution.
    - One or more elected houses of representation (e.g., a Parliament, or a Senate and a "Majlis"), might ratify the new constitution.
    - A direct plebiscite.
  - Upon ratification of the Constitution, an elected government might take power.

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**Proper Arabic Terms for Interim Authority**

1. **Hukumah Mua'qata** means, "Temporary Government. Used in reference to the INC, Arabs view this as a step towards a permanent government and this term could be problematic.
2. In looking for an Arabic term that denotes an Interim Authority, we recommend using the following to refer to the Iraqi Interim Authority:

**(A). SULTA AL-IRAQIA AL-MUAQATAH**

**Pronounced: sul-TAA al-EIRA-qiyah al-MOO-aa-QA-TAH**

**Arabic Script:**

**Means: The Iraqi Temporary Authority**

**OR**

**(B). SULTA AL-IRAQIA AL-SHARTEEA**

**Pronounced: sul-TAA al-EIRA-qiyah al-shar-TEEAH**

**Arabic Script:**

**Means: The Iraqi Provisional Authority**

**Note:** SHARTEEA means provisional, and in Arabic, it denotes conditions attached. **Recommend using (A).**

3. The term **SULTA** denotes Authority and cannot be misconstrued as government, like **HUKUMAH**. When shortening it to **Al-Sulta Al-Iraqia** (The Iraqi Authority), the term **Sulta** itself denotes a governance that is temporary.

Prepared by LCDR Aboul-Encin

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SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
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PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000

APR 1 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Iraqi Interim Authority

DECLASSIFIED LAW EO12958  
July 07, 2009  
CH, WHSR & D Div

It is crucial to our war effort to convince the Iraqi people that:

1. There will be no cease fire.
2. We are intent on changing the regime – there will be no deal that leaves Baathists in power, and
3. The new regime is going to be a free Iraqi government, not a US military government.

In particular, Generals Franks and Abizaid want to organize a highly-visible event *soon* to make these points.

We have developed a mechanism to do this – the Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA). On Sunday, I distributed to the Principals a plan to implement the IIA concept.

We have got to get moving on this. We can't afford to have a protracted interagency debate. This is now a matter of operational importance – it is not too much to say that time can cost lives.

Publicly beginning the process of creating an IIA would be a major boost to our psychological operations, and could be the "tipping point" that energizes Iraqis to throw off the Saddam regime.

The implementation plan we distributed may not be perfect, but we've talked with Generals Franks and Abizaid, and others, and I'm convinced the plan is a reasonable one. Outside the National Military Command Center here in the Pentagon hangs a sign that quotes George Patton: "A good plan executed now is better than a perfect plan next week." I'm sure the interagency process could, over time, come up with a lot of good ideas, but we need a good idea cut-off date.

Unless there is a fundamental objection to what we have proposed, I intend to direct General Franks to coordinate an announcement in Iraq of the formation of an organizing committee to begin implementation of the IIA. This would be the centerpiece of the major public event he described to you at the NSC meeting on Tuesday.

Classified by: ~~Douglas Feith, USD(P)~~

Reason: 1.5(b)

Declassify on: X6

MATERIAL ENCLOSED

WAS DECLASSIFIED 30 MAR 2008

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

09-M-2634

X01171 /03

DEF CONTROL#

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~


cc: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
The Honorable Colin Powell  
The Honorable George Tenet  
The Honorable Andrew H. Card Jr.  
The Honorable Condoleezza Rice

DECLASSIFIED LAW EO12958  
July 07, 2009  
CH, WHS R & D Div

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
*Handwritten scribble, possibly 'X' or '11/10'.*

# Iraqi Interim Authority Action Plan

31 March 2003

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## *Iraqi Interim Authority*



- **Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA) will have two main functions**
  - To devise the means by which the new Iraqi government will come into being
  - To have responsibility over those government functions (such as ministries) that the Coalition Provisional Authority will turn over on a case-by-case basis
  
- **Formation of the Iraqi Interim Authority (3 Steps)**
  - Form the Organizing Committee core (6 members)
  - Complete formation of Organizing Committee (13 members)
  - Establish the Leadership Council of IIA (35 members total)

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## *Mandate*

- The 35-member Leadership Council will be charged with:

- Establishing a Constitutional Convention
- Establishing a Judicial Commission in coordination with the Coalition
- Issuing an interim Bill of Rights
- Conducting a census
- Organizing municipal, provincial, and national elections
- Assuming responsibility for any government function (I.e. running of selected ministries) as identified by the Coalition

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA) Action Plan

It would be helpful to our military commanders to begin to put an Iraqi face on the operation. We can do this through an Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA).

The attached package describes the IIA and lays out objectives and strategy.

I understand there is a PC meeting on Monday to discuss the IIA concept.

The package is lengthy, but it is important to read the summary. The detailed action plan is provided for further information.

We would like to communicate to the Iraqi people that the United States intends both to liberate their country from the current regime, and to transfer political authority to Iraqis as soon as possible.

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**General Abizaid Talking Points on Tank/SECDEF Post-MCO Lesson Learned**

**First Look Issues – Post Major Combat Operations – and key Recommendations (9/20/03/13:31)**

**Capabilities That Exceeded Expectations**

- **Initiative and Adaptation**—local action is buying time for CPA programs to gain traction
  - Align ongoing CPA-Military actions and policies
  - Sustain CERP funding; accelerate national level action before local acceptance dissipates
- **Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)**—Money is ammunition
  - Continue program and increase limits; make this part of normal tactical unit operations
  - Retain DERF like guidelines and sustain funding from Iraqi or US assets (CERP=Seized Iraqi \$; CERP=US \$ with DERF guidelines; CERP=Iraqi generated \$ (Industry))

JS 1.4 (a)(c), (g)

**Capabilities That Demonstrated Considerable Effectiveness**

- **SOF and SOF-Conventional Integration**—SOF remains an important enabler
  - Continue SOF integration, [REDACTED]
  - [REDACTED]
- **Civil Affairs**—CA is important to planning/execution while filling gaps in absence of other assets; manpower shortfalls will challenge mission support
  - Review/modify CA forces redeployment decisions
  - Increase relief/reconstruction assets (CPA regional offices, NGOs, contractors, etc.) so CA can focus on planning & coordination
- **Campaign Planning**—Uneven planning & awareness resulting in misaligned actions
  - Develop interagency plan to align agency objectives, assets, actions and timing
  - Assemble expert planning cell to develop/nest CPA, CJTF & subordinate Campaign Plans to align operations & carry them past the rotation
- **Training, Experience & Doctrine**—Uneven experience resulting in discovery learning
  - Deploy training team to establish a common baseline in current and relieving units

CIA 1.4(c)

**Capabilities That Fell Short of Expectations or Needs**

- **Resources**—Insufficient / untimely resources impede effectiveness of operations
  - Develop prioritized resource appraisal reflecting regional/brigade requirements
  - Fill CPA, military manning documents; reassess requirements; align military & CPA tours
  - Align reconstruction investment/contracting with military costs and flexibility
- **Intelligence Support**—Intelligence is not delivering the precision needed for successful and proactive tactical and operational action

JS 1.4 (a), (c), (g)

[REDACTED]

- **Joint Command and Control**—Ad hoc organizations impeding effectiveness
  - Fill manning documents; align CPA personnel policies, tours and rotation with military schedules
  - Establish functional components for CJTF-7
- **Communications Infrastructure**—Shortfalls undermining operational effectiveness
  - Reallocate resources to provide operational C2I/collaborative information environment
  - Implement joint military-CPA communications review recommendations
- **Strategic Communications (Public Affairs and Diplomacy, Information Operations)**—Absence of coherent activities undermines reconstruction effort

JS 1.4 (a), (c), (g)

[REDACTED]

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### General Abizaid Talking Points on Tank/SECDEF Post-MCO Lesson Learned

- Accommodated 28 AUG your issues; briefed CJCS and DEPSECDEF two weeks ago; briefed Tank last Friday afternoon and SECDEF Saturday
- Key issues covered (see summary enclosed).
- Key messages:
  1. Emphasis on getting this right—potential window of opportunity resources for or fixes to shortfalls such as HUMINT, manning, JC2, etc.
  2. SECDEF understands contributions of troops (initiative, agility, and adaptability); Wants action and results more than bureaucratic perfection; OSD not fully committed on role of a robust CPA, but now recognize manning shortfalls;
  3. Per SECDEF, will brief Bremmer this week
  4. One area where we are pushing beyond our 28 AUG session is on ISR. Think this needs a relook beyond HUMINT—Economy of force for critical infrastructure, border surveillance, etc. and support on assessing/identifying external support of internal resistance. DEPSECDEF particularly concerned with our ability to have previous knowledge of and now detect / anticipate resistance / jihad efforts
  5. How can I help you? Of 28 AUG offers of assistance, CENTCOM staff showed interest in:
    - Extending the JFCOM training team in country for 30 days; *(CJTF-7)*
    - CIE development for J2
    - Assistance with developing effects-based processes
    - Assistance with the individual augmentation process
    - Assistance with IO moving, particularly with putting a commercial media team together
    - 2 items not agreed to: J2's NO to JWAC help & J6 NO to theater CIE (down to division sufficient?).
- Want to send a team to work with CJTF-7 / components to help on above and sort out force provider issues
- Tank Feedback:
  - All very supportive but they recognize that the “wartime, make it happen” mentality is waning—bottom line if you make your needs known, there is a window of opportunity
  - CSAF very supportive; USMC noted that lack of contingency contracting an issue with big projects
  - Jumper concerned that theater components aren't being asked to contribute and thinks his strategic and operational ISR assets can be retasked to assist with tactical intel challenges
  - Clear recognition of CPA manning/tours shortcomings
  - General concern (CNO) on intelligence investment direction (long term) exposed by OIF experience
  - Discussion of other Services supporting back fill of shortfalls in Army CS and CSS for OIF 2 (CSAF caveated that USAF support in these areas come at expense of recovery by next spring).
- SECDEF feedback—“we needed this, this is helpful”
  - Discussed difficulty of putting Iraqi leadership in charge early
  - Acknowledged and pleased with initiative—wants action/results more than bureaucratic perfection
  - Recognizes manning shortfall, but some push back CPA role versus handing off to Iraqi's (Rand: 5 years the minimum and, more people and more money is better if you want to exist successfully)
  - Recognizes importance of CERP (talked Iraqi assets, Iraqi revenue, or US appropriated \$)
  - Wondered if we cut SOF too low, too soon
  - Recognized intel system is not set up for tracking and finding numerous individuals and small groups
  - Discussed dual chain of command with CPA answering to SECEF and CJTF-7 coming thru CENTCOM

*SC working this*

*Collaborate with components*

*- help*

*- link*

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DRAFT

Joint Lessons Learned:  
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM



*First Look*  
Post Major Combat Operations  
as of  
20 September 2003

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CIA - □ EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs

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## Collection Methodology

### -Methodology

- Experienced, multi-disciplined, joint team
- Embedded in Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), CJTF-7, and liaison with Iraqi Survey Group (ISG)
- Cross-cutting, collaborative issue identification and synthesis

### -Basis of Findings

- Observations (ongoing since March)
- Interviews (continuing)
- Ongoing data collection and analysis

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First link is to slide 42

Second link is to slide 45

**Current Assessment**

**DRAFT / SECRET ORCON**

**Power + Industry = Employment**

**Employment + Security = Stability**

**Stability + Governance + Justice = Success**

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**Unemployment + Security = Confrontation.**

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***First Look Issues – Post Major Combat Operations***

- **Capabilities That Exceeded Expectations**
  - Initiative and Adaptation
  - Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)
- **Capabilities That Demonstrated Considerable Effectiveness**
  - SOF and SOF-Conventional Integration
  - Civil Affairs
  - Campaign Planning
  - Training, Experience & Doctrine
- **Capabilities That Fell Short of Expectations or Needs**
  - Resources
  - Intelligence Support
  - Joint Command and Control
  - Communications Infrastructure
  - Strategic Communications (Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy, Information Operations)

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## Initiative and Adaptability

DRAFT / SECRET ORCON

**Finding:** Adaptive tactical action is meeting near term civil and humanitarian needs, setting (transitory) conditions for national development and appears to impede enemy options.

### Why It Happened:

- Experience with stability and support operations and value of Joint Readiness Training Center experience
- Aggressive tactical action against the enemy coupled with civil and humanitarian support to the community
  - US Military character enabled by decentralized execution
  - Exploiting civilian backgrounds and military organization and resources to meet civil and humanitarian needs
- Leveraging cultural power structures
- Military action builds near-term local support
- Local integration of special operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs by conventional forces



### What should be done:

- Align ongoing Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)-Military actions and policies
- Sustain coordination by establishing a collaborative information environment to achieve unity of effort
- Sustain CERP funding and accelerate national level action before local acceptance dissipates
- Integrate experiences and lessons into training and education processes; focus on how, vice what to think
- Increase resources to fully integrate training in stability & support and low intensity conflict operations

### WHAT HAPPENED:

Great initiative and flexibility in transitioning to post-MCO tasks at tactical levels. Divisions:

Focused Campaign Plan and associated actions

Aggressive outreach/engagement across full range of operations

Setting conditions for success at strategic level.

#### BN/BDE:

Aggressive balance— combat and humanitarian outreach activities.

Unique adaptation to local environments

Leader flexibility and adaptation to non-doctrinal and non military tasks.

Individuals rising to occasion in unique and powerful ways

#### Individuals/Troops:

Disciplined, adaptive, compassionate, combat and support troops moving agilely between aggressive discriminant, violent operations and humanitarian tasks.

Restrained response in discriminant application of force.

#### ENEMY ACTION:

Adapt more rapidly than the enemy that severely reduces their effectiveness options.

#### LOCAL REACTION:

These actions, at tactical level, gain the near term acceptance and support which has bought time at the strategic and operational level.

Military experience in the execution of SASO operations

MG Dayton, CDR Iraqi Survey Group (ISG)

BG(P) Dempsey, CDR, 1<sup>st</sup> AD

COL Hogg, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 4<sup>th</sup> ID

COL Rudesheim, 3<sup>rd</sup> BCT, 4<sup>th</sup> ID

COL Stramara, DIVARTY, 4<sup>th</sup> ID

COL May, CDR, 2<sup>nd</sup> ACR

-Character of American service member enabled by decentralized execution

MG Wodjakowski, DCG, CJTF-7

MajGen Mattis, CDR I MEF

COL Moody, 4<sup>th</sup> BCT, 4<sup>th</sup> ID

COL Anderson, CDR, 2<sup>nd</sup> BDE, 101<sup>st</sup> ABN Div

COL Rudesheim, 3<sup>rd</sup> BCT 4<sup>th</sup> ID

COL Hogg, 2<sup>nd</sup> BDE, 4th ID

JSOTF-AP (Group Discussion)

-Evidence of value of training experience

BG(P) Dempsey, CDR, 1<sup>st</sup> AD

COL Moody, 4<sup>th</sup> BCT, 4<sup>th</sup> ID

COL Stramara, DIVARTY, 4<sup>th</sup> ID

-Ability of individual to adapt to challenging circumstances and act with

minimal guidance and direction

MajGen Mattis

COL Hogg, 2<sup>nd</sup> BDE, 4<sup>th</sup> ID

COL Rudesheim, 3<sup>rd</sup> BCT, 4<sup>th</sup> ID

COL Anderson, CDR, 2<sup>nd</sup> BDE, 101<sup>st</sup> ABN Div

COL Stramara, DIVARTY, 4<sup>th</sup> ID

Col Rhodes, G-2, I MEF

-Application of civilian skills and experience, coupled with military organization and resources, to civil and humanitarian needs

MG Petraus, CDR 101<sup>st</sup> ABN Div

COL Rudesheim, 3<sup>rd</sup> BCT, 4<sup>th</sup> ID

COL Teebles, CDR, 3<sup>rd</sup> ACR

Col Rhodes, G-2 I MEF

-Aggressive tactical action against the enemy coupled with civil and humanitarian support to the community

COL May, CDR, 2<sup>nd</sup> ACR

COL Rudesheim, 3<sup>rd</sup> BCT 4<sup>th</sup> ID

COL Teebles, CDR, 3<sup>rd</sup> ACR

COL Gold, 3<sup>rd</sup> BCT, 1<sup>st</sup> AD

-Local commanders recognize informal religious power structures and leverage them to support conditional goals

BG(P) Dempsey, CDR, 1<sup>st</sup> AD

COL Hogg, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 4<sup>th</sup> ID

COL Rudesheim, 3<sup>rd</sup> BCT 4<sup>th</sup> ID

COL Stramara, DIVARTY, 4<sup>th</sup> ID

COL Gold, 3<sup>rd</sup> BCT, 1<sup>st</sup> AD

-Military action provides near-term fixes that have gained limited local support

MG Mattis, CDR I MEF

COL Stramara, DIVARTY, 4<sup>th</sup> ID

Col Rhodes, G2, I MEF

-Local commanders successfully integrated SOF, PSYOPS, and civil affairs into conventional operations

LTG Sanchez, CDR, CJTF-7

MG Petraus, CDR, 101<sup>st</sup> ABN Div

BG(P) Dempsey, CDR, 1<sup>st</sup> AD

BG Barbero, ADCM, 4th ID

COL Moody, 4<sup>th</sup> BCT, 4<sup>th</sup> ID

JSOTF-AP (Group Discussion)

COL Mayville, 173<sup>rd</sup> ABN BDE

COL Teebles, CDR, 3<sup>rd</sup> ACR

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## Commander's Emergency Response Program ~~DRAFT / SECRET OR CON~~

**Finding:** Innovative use of Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding buys time and goodwill and sets the condition for larger programs to take hold.

### Why It Happened:

- Immediate mechanism to fulfill localized human and economic needs, building coalition credibility
- Decentralized approach empowers commanders in touch daily with local Iraqi populace
- Procedures bypass bureaucratic obstacles
- CERP funded local projects complement national priorities by enabling local priorities simultaneously
- Innovative use has backstopped Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) shortfalls
- CERP funding drawn from seized Iraqi assets (\$79.4M)

**CERP Funding is  
Ammunition in the "close  
fight" of stability and  
reconstruction operations**

There is nothing that can't be solved with money.  
... CERP is the single most productive asset.  
"\$\$ is ammo."  
Maj Gen Petraeus, Cdr 101<sup>st</sup> Abn Div

### What Should Be Done:

- Continue program and increase limits; make this part of normal tactical unit operations
- Retain DERF like guidelines and sustain funding from Iraqi or US assets
  - CERP=Seized Iraqi \$; CERP=US \$ with DERF guidelines; CERP=Iraqi generated \$ (Industry)
- Minimize limitations/controls to provide Commanders the greatest flexibility with these funds
- Ensure approved projects remain funded when unit and program transitions occurs
- Use funding and programs to promote decentralization of government; integrate local commander priorities as large scale projects gain funding and mature
- Build flexible funding mechanisms into all contingency planning (DERF, CERP, etc.)

### WHAT HAPPENED:

1. Money is ammunition. MG Petraeus
2. Commander's think CERP is a critical enabling mechanism
3. All Commanders stated current limits are inadequate
4. CERP being used to
  - a. Engage and influence Iraqi leadership
  - b. Improve socio-economic well being and stimulate and restore local economy.
  - c. Gain information
  - d. fill gaps to enable National level programs
  - e. contributes to conditions for secure environment.
  - f. Reestablish civilian institutions

### WHY It HAPPENED

-CERP creates immediate impacts focused on basic human and economic needs influencing population and building credibility of coalition.

- The CERP funds provide us the ability to influence people. BG Dempsey
- CERP funds are essential. We use them for standing up the police, to fix sewage and medical and other basic human needs.

#### COL Mayville

- CPA adopted decentralized approach empowering division and subordinate commanders critical for success.
  - 2ACR Commander feels that he should push CERP funds down to the Squadron Commander level where intimate knowledge of local conditions can enable more effective use of them. COL MAY
- Innovative and flexible use of funds by division and subordinate commanders.
  - It is helping with security first, then stability. I am beginning to work CERP projects through the local Sheiks. COL Mayville
  - There is nothing that can't be solved with money. We are paying off blood feuds, including the families of those we have killed after attacking our own forces. MG Petraeus
- CERP procedures bypass bureaucratic procedures and obstacles.
  - We at the local level with our limited funds and assets are working faster than the national level.... COL Rudesheim
- CERP funding is limited in ability to achieve large scale projects and short-term fix.
  - CPA funds the bigger projects and the bureaucratic system is too slow. Money is not coming in from outside the AO. COL Rudesheim
- Some concern remains about accountability of funds and alignment with overall CPA effort
  - Let me give you an example. CPA promised to pay irrigation workers. They hired them and then didn't pay them because of a screw up. We paid them using our CERP funding. Name withheld
  - In a recent example, one of the division commanders decided to pay local security guards to a standard that could not be matched by a successor civilian regional office. The consequent choice was to either leave the military organization in place longer than intended or risk serious unrest and a loss of local security when the unit departs. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE: Provide ERF support on the basis of geography and population, regardless of the organization in charge. This potentially eases the transition from military to civilian authority. Interview with AMB Walt Slocum and COL Greg Gardner
- Additional info/gaps
  - Need data rollup for all of Iraq and breakdown by region of CERP \$\$ spent and projects completed
  - Some unique funding stories

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## SOF and SOF-Conventional Integration

DRAFT / SECRET ORCON

**Finding:** SOF integration remains important to the success of combat and stability operations

### Why It Happened:

- SOF missions/capabilities understood; SOF and conventional forces are mutually supporting
- SOF enables successful conventional operations by developing key intelligence and targeting
- Some view SOF as only other useful intel source



- Effectiveness of some SOF-Conventional relationships appear personality dependent; tactical level understanding of contributions is mixed
- Absence of theater collaboration tools limits the situational awareness that enables unity of effort

### What Should Be Done:

- Strengthen the theater collaborative environment
- Establish guidelines to standardize SOF-Conventional integration and command relationships
- Sustain training, tactics, techniques and procedures and coordination to build on the enhanced SOF-conventional integration
- Improve SOF interoperability, logistics and communications to enhance support of others

JS 1.4 (C)

CIA 1.4 (C)

JS 1.4 (a)

### What Happened:

- Contributions at low tactical levels appear to be personality dependent
- All units visited described capability to rapidly conduct cordon for TF 20/SOF
- Many units described importance of SOF in providing/sharing intelligence

- All division level commanders cited importance and success of SOF integration
- Operational level integration not as advanced as MCO phase of OIF

### Commanders understand missions and capabilities of SOF operating in their battlespace

- Interview with MG Miller (Incoming C3, CJTF-7) and BG Williams (Outgoing C3, CJTF-7)
- CJSOTF-AP (Open Discussion)
- Interview with COL Mayville, Commander, 173<sup>rd</sup> Airborne Brigade
- Interview with COL Anderson, Commander, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 101<sup>st</sup> AA Div
- Interview with COL Moody, Commander, 4<sup>th</sup> BCT (Avn), 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Interview with BG (P) Dempsey and ADCs, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division
- Interview with LTG Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7

### SOF and conventional forces are mutually supporting and interdependent

- Interview with MG Dayton, Commander, Iraq Survey Group (ISG)
- CJSOTF-AP (Open Discussion)
- Observation Paper, "J2X and HUMINT Collection Within OIF and ISG," Capt [REDACTED]
- Interview with COL Mayville, Commander, 173<sup>rd</sup> Airborne Brigade
- Interview with COL Moody, Commander, 4<sup>th</sup> BCT (Avn), 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Interview with BG (P) Dempsey and ADCs, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division
- Interview with LTG Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7

### SOF helps set conditions for successful conventional operations by developing key intelligence and targeting

- Interview with CJSOTF-AP (Open Discussion)
- Observation Paper, "J2X and HUMINT Collection Within OIF and ISG," Capt [REDACTED]
- Interview with COL Mayville, Commander, 173<sup>rd</sup> Airborne Brigade
- Interview with COL Moody, Commander, 4<sup>th</sup> BCT (Avn), 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Interview with LTG Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7

### Some evidence of personalities of actors as intervening variables in SOF performance

- Interview with CJSOTF-AP (Open Discussion)
- Interview with BG Barbero, Assistant Division Commander, 4<sup>th</sup> ID (M)
- Interview with MG Petraus, Commanding General, 101<sup>st</sup> Air Assault (Division)
- Interview with Maj Gen Mattis, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, IMEF
- Interview with COL Anderson, Commander, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 101<sup>st</sup> AA Div
- Interview with BG (P) Dempsey and ADCs, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division

- Interview with CJSOTF-AP (Open Discussion)
  - Interview with MG Petraus, Commanding General, 101<sup>st</sup> Air Assault (Division)
  - Interview with COL Gutzler, CFLCC C-2
  - Interview with CPT [REDACTED] CJTF-7, J2X, HUMINT Officer
- Concept of unity of effort not universally understood at tactical level of command

- Interview with CJSOTF-AP (Open Discussion)
- Interview with MG Stadler, DCG, IMEF
- Interview with MAJ [REDACTED] CJTF-7, CASE Chief
- Interview with MG Petraus, Commanding General, 101<sup>st</sup> Air Assault (Division)
- Interview with Maj Gen Mattis, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, IMEF
- Interview with COL Anderson, Commander, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 101<sup>st</sup> AA Div
- Interview with BG (P) Dempsey and ADCs, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division

### Collaborative environment not fully supporting of situational awareness necessary to achieve unity of effort

- Interview with MG Petraus, Commanding General, 101<sup>st</sup> Air Assault (Division)
- Interview with MG Stadler, DCG, IMEF
- Interview with MAJ [REDACTED] CJTF-7, CASE Chief
- Interview with Maj Gen Mattis, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, IMEF
- Interview with COL Anderson, Commander, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 101<sup>st</sup> AA Div
- Interview with BG (P) Dempsey and ADCs, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division

### Follow-on Actions, Requirements and Interviews

- Working (Pending Review from BG Cone, Analysts and other key leaders)
- Need to relook interview sources and linkage with paper/ issue
- Prepare to conduct additional interviews as required
- Analyze topic for possible application of Spider chart/ collect all required data
- Adjust or update paper, as needed based on current or emerging information
- Collect additional information to strengthen issues
- Vet paper through key proponent (as permitted)

OSD/JS

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

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## Civil Affairs

DRAFT / SECRET OBSO

**Finding:** Civil Affairs (CA) are important to post-Major Combat Operations (MCO) missions. Utilization, equipment, enablers and impending redeployment limit effectiveness and options when demand/need is increasing.

### Why It Happened:

- CA provides focused planning/coordination capability for the employment of other assets
- Military planning began last summer; interagency coordination just prior to the conflict
- CA assets task organized to maximize tactical coverage in the absence of other support (NGOs, etc.)
- CA employment demands significant support (transport, security, communications, etc.)
- Most Reserve US Army and Marine CA committed early
- Nearly 60% of total capability committed; USMC 100%
- Reserve CA personnel provide diverse, useful skills
- CA skills not regularly integrated in training events
- CPA field offices desire more CA capability

Civil Affairs (CA) is the PLANNERS and COORDINATORS and not necessarily the "DOERS". The DOERS should be NGOS, PVOS, other agencies, contractors and the conventional force. CA plans for the effects that the Conventional Force commander desires; then thru the CMOC or CMCC orchestrates the available resources to accomplish the tasks.

### What Should Be Done:

- Review/modify CA forces redeployment decisions
- Increase relief/reconstruction assets (Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) regional offices, NGOs, contractors, etc.) so CA can focus on planning & coordination
- Establish Iraq Theater Civil-Military Operations Center focused on country wide operations
- Foster increased Non-governmental organization (NGO) presence and cooperation
- Review force structure for number of CA units and allocation between RC and AC
- Incorporate CA events into training at all echelons, include interagency involvement in the same events

## What Happened

- Task organized to conventional unit -MG Petraeus, CJSOTF-AP
- GS assets in support of IAD, DS assets in support of 4ID. Did not see this in interviews
- Gap of assets at operational unit. Did not see this in interviews
- Redeployment of Bde sized element in Oct-CJTF-7. Did not see comment in LTG Schez' interview notes.
- One hundred percent of Marines capability deployed. Col Jakucs-I MEF HACC
- Lack of organic equipment protection, BFT. COL Foster, COL West Have not see their interviews, however, there is info on this issue from CJSOTF-AP
- Overwhelming BDE, DIV CDR and Tactical CDR employment is positive-some negatives. Positive: MG Odierno, Stadler, COL Hogg, COL Mayville. Negative: COL Anderson.
- Excellent source of info on population. Did not see this comment in interviews I have seen.
- Association skills with mission hit or miss-CDR 358<sup>th</sup> Don't have this interview.
- CPA felt better used under their control. CPA CS Did not see this comment in the interview notes.

## Why It happened

- CA units tasked organized to units maximized tactical coverage
- Division has 2 CA Battalions, but effectiveness is best while employed under the control of a brigade commander with the requisite staff and resources. The brigade is far more powerful than a CA team running around, particularly in effecting the big stuff that matters. MG Petraeus
- CA has its own command and has sliced its units to the various conventional forces. CJSOTF-AP collective interview
- CA folks are a combat multiplier, but must be linked into the TOC. COL Hogg
- Nearly all US Army and Marine CA units committed early. Early deployment of CA units started "deployment clock."
- Many Reserve CA units are running out of AC time precisely when they are needed the most. We must figure out how to better manage their deployed time in order to keep them on station during post hostilities. CPA CS Chief Mike Gfoeller 20 Aug 03
- All USMC CA units are in the reserves and in Iraq: Col Jakucs-I MEF HACC
- Losing or reducing numbers of my CA folks will be a major impediment to combat opns. MG Odierno
- CA: Cuts that are pending are a big worry; can't do this without them. Maj Gen Stadler
- ...large demand for certain troops...CA. These are all to be reduced in the near future...have no visibility into who is replacing them. BG Demsey
- Reserve CAs bring in significant and diverse skill sets
  - As reservists they bring great civilian skills and mindset; this helps. COL Mayville
  - Given the need to take over most government functions, CA units became a critical asset in short supply. MG Strock
- CA skills not regularly integrated in training events
  - We need to have CA elements incorporated in our major training events. It is extremely difficult to incorporate them at the last minute of after the start of operations; in addition we don't have enough teams. COL Rudesheim

## Additional info/gaps

- Previous slide; answer those in red
- Interviews with CA unit personnel to get an idea of deployment/redeployment and to get ideas on recommendations.
- How were CA units task organized in Divs/Bdes?
- If here prior to MCO, what was unit's mission?
- When were CA units designated HD/LD units?

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## Campaign Planning and Awareness

DRAFT / SECRET ORCON


**Finding:** Uneven post-Military Combat Operations (MCO) planning and awareness is resulting in misaligned actions and *discovery learning* across civil & military organizations.

### Why it Happened:

- Combatant Command plan developed in detail
- Post-MCO preparation began during combat, limiting iteration, development of unity of effort
- Pre-war assumptions inconsistent with post-MCO environment
- Knowledge of post-MCO plans appears to be spotty at each level within Iraq
- Tactical action, informed by previous experience, not nested within commonly understood civil-military plan
- Communication, coordination and cooperation between civil & military entities appears limited

### What should be done

- Develop interagency plan to align agency objectives, assets, actions and timing
- Assemble expert planning cell to develop/nest CPA, CJTF & subordinate Campaign Plans to align operations & carry them past the rotation
- Provide post-MCO operations the same focus and scrutiny as major combat operations planning
- Initiate and align interagency planning with military planning for combat and post-MCO operations
- Initiate interagency planning in parallel with the initiation of military planning
- Expand training and education, incorporating the interagency, to address operational and tactical operations



REF: Joint Pub 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War.

- Insufficient doctrinal awareness at the operational and tactical level  
Interviews with Gen Abizaid and LTG Sanchez, AMB Slocum, MG Petrus (CDR 101), Col Gold (CDR, IAD, 3BDE)
- Pre-war assumptions inconsistent with post-MCO environment  
LTG Sanchez, MG Odierno ( Cdr 4 ID), MG Strock (DDO CPA), MG Petrus, BG Williams(CJTF7 C3)
- Knowledge of post-MCO plan not well known in tactical units  
MG Stadler (DC, IMEF), BG Barbero (ADC 4ID)
- Applicable training experience uneven; only Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) cited as valuable  
LTC Keightly(British Army), MG Petrus, BG Williams
- Experience in other operations does not appear to uniformly contribute to success in Iraq  
MG Petrus(positive), BG(p) Dempsey(Neg) (CDR, IAD), COL Gold(Neg)
- Tactical leader and individual initiative appears to have overcome lack of formal preparation  
MAJGEN Mattis , COL May (Cdr 2<sup>nd</sup> ACR), COL Gold

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## Training, Experience & Doctrine

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**Finding:** Post-Military Combat Operations (MCO) planning, training, experience, and doctrinal awareness is uneven, resulting in *discovery learning* in both civil and military organizations.

### Why it Happened:

- Knowledge of post-MCO plan lacking in tactical units
- Insufficient doctrinal awareness
- Training experience uneven; Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) cited as valuable
- Mixed contribution of experience from other operations
- Tactical leader and individual initiative appears to have overcome lack of formal preparation

MOEFW Principle

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### What should be done

- Assemble expert planning cell to develop/nest CPA, CJTF & subordinate Campaign Plans to align operations & carry them past the rotation
- Develop & deploy training team to establish a common baseline in current and relieving units
- Implement applicable tactical Balkan initiatives (tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), organizations, equipment, Intel processes, etc.)
- Examine applicability of doctrine to merged counter-insurgency and civil-military operations
- Expand training and education, such as JRTC, to address operational level as well as tactical operations and incorporate other government and non-governmental agencies; build into JNTC
- Document operational / tactical lessons learned for use in future training, doctrine, & operations

REF: Joint Pub 3-07 Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War.

- Insufficient doctrinal awareness at the operational and tactical level  
Interviews with Gen Abizaid and LTG Sanchez, AMB Slocum, MG Petrus (CDR 101), Col Gold (CDR, 1AD, 3BDE)
- Pre-war assumptions inconsistent with post-MCO environment  
LTG Sanchez, MG Odierno ( Cdr 4 ID), MG Strock (DDO CPA), MG Petrus, BG Williams(CJTF7 C3)
- Knowledge of post-MCO plan not well known in tactical units  
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- Tactical leader and individual initiative appears to have overcome lack of formal preparation  
MAJGEN Mattis , COL May (Cdr 2<sup>nd</sup> ACR), COL Gold

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## Resources

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
**Finding:** Insufficient and untimely resources impede effectiveness of post-MCO operations.

### Why it happened:

- Wartime urgency and emphasis not sustained
- Many resources redeployed / reallocated following Major Combat Ops
- Post-MCO plans do not fully accommodate current conditions
- Division plans reflect available resources, not endstate
- Joint Manning process does not provide timely personnel fill
- Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) manning voluntary, ranging from 90-180 days and currently short 708 out of 1205
- CPA manning limits regional interface with military
- Evident difference in focus of personnel on 1-year tours vice 90-day rotations
- Insufficient assets for communications, information management, and databases, etc.
- No evidence of contingency contracting mechanism

### What should be done:

- Develop prioritized resource appraisal for OSD reflecting regional/brigade requirements
- Fill CPA, military manning documents; reassess manning requirements; align military & CPA tours
- Strengthen CPA regional offices to better tailor policies and resources to requirements
- Align reconstruction investment and contracting with costs of military presence and flexibility to speed execution; prioritize resources to achieve power, TELECON, and border security
- Increase specialty personnel (CA, MP's, HUMINT, Linguists)
- Re-examine "business rules" for raising, manning, training of joint force headquarters



IRAQI

## Supporting Data

**MCO plans not robust enough to accommodate actual conditions due to looting and infrastructure decay.**

- No current Post-MCO Campaign Plan to determine resource needs (Strock)
- Shortfalls in assumptions for post-MCO planning caused a lag in obtaining resources. Power, telecommunications, ministries, distribution, border security (Strock)

### Resources not tied to conditions

- Artillery & Engineers conducting security operations (4ID)
- While troop levels were not an expressed concern, there was concern about the size of the area to be covered. (Teeples, 4ID on area; (Mattis, Stalder, Dempsey on satisfaction)
- Desire for more specialty troops (CA, MPs, ENG, THTs, Linguists) (Hogg, Dempsey)

### Divisional plans based on resources available, not desired endstate

- No linkage from strategic thru operational to tactical (Dempsey)

### JMD process failed to deliver critical personnel

- Insufficient CPA personnel (Strock, Mattis)
- Insufficient CPA regional personnel (Gfoeller-others)
- JMD @ 60% fill @ CPA (Dempsey) 16% fill at CJTF standup 15 June 2003

### Selected critical resources removed from OIF after MCO (ISR, personnel, HQs, etc.)

- ISR Removed; multiple headquarters, despite increase troops, key personnel

### Insufficient force structure for key enablers (THTs, CA, MP, Linguists)

- Desire for more specialty troops (CA, MPs, ENG, THTs, Linguists) (Hogg, Dempsey)

### Insufficient focus on key areas (communications, information management, and databases)

- Areas are lacking, have degraded since MCO

**CERP funding is a critical gap filler; buying time for the operational and strategic - All**

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## Rand Study: The American Role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq

- Inverse relationship between troop strength and casualties
- Better funded and manned operations also more successful
- Long operations more successful than short; No short cuts—five years seems a minimum
- Democracy can be transferred to non-Western societies
- Among controllable factors, however, most important variables were level and duration of effort in men, money and time

# Intelligence Support

DRAFT / ~~SECRET~~ ORCON

**Finding:** Intelligence is not delivering the precision needed for successful and proactive tactical and operational action; tactical initiative is creating islands of knowledge and action.

**Why it happened:**

- Actionable intelligence is almost totally tactical
- Shortage of HUMINT capability and sporadic sharing of HUMINT
- Integrated analysis just now forming

DIA  
1.4(c)

- Prisoner feedback to tactical units not evident
- Reduced ISR footprint; inadequate architectures, databases & feedback
- Strategic ISR contribution not apparent in this phase



**What should be done:**

- Fix interrogation and information sharing shortfalls
- Examine worldwide resources for post-major combat operations (MCO): HUMINT, Surveillance, analysts...
- Eliminate stovepipes by leveraging technology for architectures; communications, and databases
- Reallocate strategic and operational ISR to support tactical requirements
- Provide JFCOM tiger team to inculcate current link analysis/tools and create effects-based capability (CIE intelligence & planning tools, Operational Net Assessment, PMESII analysis)
- Develop joint policies, techniques and procedures for post-MCO Intelligence
- Reexamine intelligence investment strategy to address the full range of military operations
- Reinforce academic component of intelligence analysis and production

**What happened:**

[Redacted] JS 1.4 (a)

- Capability for intel integration at joint level not at the same level as MCO
- Joint HUMINT analytical capabilities not available
- Joint ISR not aggressively applied in theater
- Actionable intelligence flows from bottom up 95%/Some SIGINT valuable

DIA 1.4(c)

- ODA contribution significant
- Use of UAVs very good in theater
- Linguist support inadequate
- Coalition information sharing systems and procedures are slow in developing

**Supporting Data:**

- Reduced ISR footprint in theater after MCO
  - Interview with COL Outjahr, C-2, CFLCC
  - Interview with MAJ [Redacted] Col Mgr (night), CJTF-7
  - Interview with MAJ [Redacted] ACE Chief, CJTF-7
  - Interview with MG Dayton and Cr [Redacted] ISG
  - Comparative Analysis of MCO and Post MCO ISR Task Org
- Difficulty providing timely feedback to subordinate elements on high value detainees

- Interview with LTG Sanchez, Cdr, CJTF-7
- Interview with MG Petraus, Cdr, 101<sup>st</sup> ABN Div
- BG (P) Dempsey, Cdr 1<sup>st</sup> AD (Group Discussion)
- Interview with MG Dayton, Cdr, Iraqi Survey Group
- Interview with COL Rudisheim, Cdr 3<sup>rd</sup> BDE, 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Interview with COL Stramara, Cdr, DIVARTY, 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Interview with COL Howcroft, G-2, 1<sup>st</sup> MARDIV
- CJTF-7 CI/HUMINT Conference, 10 Aug 2003
- CI Assessment, Army G-2, COL Dillon, 10 Aug 2003

**Sporadic information sharing by all HUMINT Org at all levels**

- Interview with MG Petraus, Cdr, 101<sup>st</sup> ABN Div
- BG (P) Dempsey, Cdr 1<sup>st</sup> AD
- Interview with COL Rudisheim, Cdr 3<sup>rd</sup> BDE, 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Interview with COL Stramara, Cdr, DIVARTY, 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Interview with COL Rhoades, G-2, 1<sup>st</sup> MEF
- Interview with COL Skelly, Dpty G-2, CFLCC
- Interview with MAJ [Redacted] ACE Chief, CJTF-7
- MAJ [Redacted] 3<sup>rd</sup> BDE, 1<sup>st</sup> AD S-2 (Group Discussion)
- Interview with CPT [Redacted] CJTF-7, J2X HUMINT
- JSOTF-AP (Group Discussion)

**-Slow to establish strategic/operational level integrated analysis capability to support the warfighter**

- Interview with LTG Sanchez, Cdr, CJTF-7
- Interview with MG Petraus, Cdr, 101<sup>st</sup> ABN Div
- Interview with MG Stadler, DCG, 1 MEF
- Interview with MG Wodjakowski, DCG, CJTF-7
- Interview with MG Dayton, Cdr, Iraqi Survey Group

**-Slow to establish strategic/operational level integrated analysis capability to support the warfighter**

- BG (P) Dempsey, Cdr 1<sup>st</sup> AD (Group Discussion)
- Interview with BG Barbero, DCG, 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Interview with COL Howcroft, G-2, 1<sup>st</sup> MARDIV
- Interview with COL Rhoades, G-2, 1 MEF
- Interview with LTC [Redacted] S-2, 101<sup>st</sup> ABN Div
- Interview with MAJ [Redacted] ACE Chief, CJTF-7
- Interview with MAJ [Redacted] Col Mgr (night), CJTF-7
- MAJ [Redacted] JSOTF-AP, G-2 (Group Discussion)
- Interview with CPT [Redacted] CJTF-7, J2X HUMINT
- Disproportionate distribution of joint intelligence analysis capability to support the warfighter

- Interview with LTG Sanchez, Cdr, CJTF-7
- Interview with MG Petraus, Cdr, 101<sup>st</sup> ABN Div
- Interview with MG Dayton, Cdr, Iraqi Survey Group
- Interview with COL Outjahr, CLPCC C-2
- Interview with COL Rudisheim, Cdr 3<sup>rd</sup> BDE, 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Interview with COL Rhoades, G-2, 1 MEF

- Inadequate architectures and databases
  - BG (P) Dempsey, Cdr 1<sup>st</sup> AD (Group Discussion)
  - COL Outjahr, C-2, CFLCC
  - Interview with LTC [Redacted] (UK), Dpty G-2, SJTF-7
  - Interview with LTC [Redacted] S-2, 101<sup>st</sup> ABN Div
  - Interview with MAJ [Redacted] ACE Chief, CJTF-7
  - CJTF-7 CI/HUMINT Conference, 10 Aug 2003
  - Multi-National CI HUMINT Conference, 8 Aug 2003
  - CI Assessment, Army G-2, COL Dillon, 10 Aug 2003
  - JSOTF-AP (Group Discussion)

**-Intel primarily used and acted on at the tactical level**

- Interview with LTG Sanchez, Cdr, CJTF-7
- BG (P) Dempsey, Cdr 1<sup>st</sup> AD (Group Discussion)
- Interview with LTC [Redacted] S-2, 101<sup>st</sup> ABN Div
- MAJ [Redacted] JSOTF-AP (Group Discussion)
- MAJ [Redacted] 3<sup>rd</sup> BDE, 1<sup>st</sup> AD S-2 (Group Discussion)
- Interview with MAJ [Redacted] ACE Chief, CJTF-7
- Interview with COL Rudisheim, Cdr 3<sup>rd</sup> BDE, 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Interview with COL Howcroft, G-2, 1<sup>st</sup> MARDIV

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**Joint Command and Control** **DRAFT / SECRET OOBON**

**Finding:** Ad hoc military and political components remain immature, impeding planning, coordination, and policy formulation.

**Why It Happened:**

- Multiple CJTF iterations—CJTF-4, CJTF Iraq and two variants of CJTF-7
- Inadequate manning of CJTF-7
- Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) coordination processes hampered by turnover, absences, and slow fills
- CPA manning is voluntary; ranging from 90-180 days and currently short 708 out of 1205
- Regional Military and CPA linkages are tenuous due to limited CPA presence

**What Should Be Done:**

- Fill military and civilian manning documents; reassess manning requirements
- Establish collaborative information environment to link planning and execution
- Establish functional components for CJTF-7
- Align CPA personnel policies, tour lengths and rotation schedules with military policies/rotation
- Re-examine "business rules" for raising, manning, training of joint force headquarters

**COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY**

**What Happened:**

- CJTFs evolved through three iterations as planning assumptions changed from CJTF-4, CJTF-Iraq (using CFLCC and CJTF-180 models) and two variants of CJTF-7
- V Corps Commander designated CJTF-7 on 15 June 03; Staff still operating at 60% Army and 30% for the other services in JMD authorization nearly three months later (CJTF supports 2 JOCs (split based operations) at the CPA/CJTF-7)
- Several separate Commands exist in Iraqi theater with different reporting authorities: ISG reports to DCI; CJTF-7, JSOTF-AP and TF20 reports to CENTCOM; ODAs to their National authorities and CPA reports to SECDEF
- Changing mission for the ISG: Mission focus as well as reporting and tasking authority shifted from CENTOM and CJTF-7 to DCI and Dr. David Kay
- CPA manning and coordination processes maturing slowly; hampered by rapid turnover, periodic absences and slow fills

**ISG reporting to DCI; CJTF-7, JSOTF-AP and TF20 reports to CENTCOM; and CPA reports to SECDEF**

- Interview with LTG Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7
- Interview with MG Dayton, Commander, Iraq Survey Group (ISG)
- Interview with David Kay, DCI Advisor, Iraq Survey Group (ISG)
- Interview with MG Petrus, Commanding General, 101<sup>st</sup> Air Assault Division
- Interview with MG Stadler, Deputy Commanding General, IMEF
- Interview with COL Russ Gold, Commander, 3<sup>rd</sup> BCT, 1<sup>st</sup> AD
- Interview with COL Gutzler, CFLCC C2
- Interview with MG Miller (Incoming CJTF-7 C3) and BG Williams (Outgoing CJTF-7 C3)
- Interview with ADM @ David Oliver, OSD, SES, Ministry of Finance
- Interview with MG Wodjakowski, DCG, CJTF-7

**V Corps was pushed into the CJTF role without adequate training and manning: it was about 30% full for first 6 weeks**

- Interview with LTG Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7
- Interview with MG Miller (Incoming CJTF-7 C3) and BG Williams (Outgoing CJTF-7 C3)
- Interview with BG Barbero, ACD (M), 4<sup>th</sup> ID (Over 700+ FRAGOs)
- Interview with MG Strock, Deputy Director of Operations, CPA
- Interview with Maj Gen Mattis, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, IMEF
- Interview with ADM @ David Oliver, OSD, SES, Ministry of Finance
- Interview with BG (P) Dempsey and ADCs, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division
- Interview with MG Wodjakowski, DCG, CJTF-7
- Interview with MG Ray Odero, Commanding General, 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Lessons Learned Data from CPA South Central

**Necessary Communications capabilities not available**

- Interview with MG Miller (Incoming CJTF-7 C3) and BG Williams (Outgoing CJTF-7 C3)
- Interview with COL Shelly, CFLCC Deputy C-2
- Interview with MG Petrus, Commanding General, 101<sup>st</sup> Air Assault Division
- Interview with MG Strock, Deputy Director of Operations, CPA
- Interview with BGen Moran, CCM6, CENTCOM
- Interview with COL Hogg, Commander, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Interview with ADM @ David Oliver, OSD, SES, Ministry of Finance
- Interview with Mike Gfoeller, Chief, CPA Central South
- Interview with MG Wodjakowski, DCG, CJTF-7
- Interview with BG (P) Dempsey and ADCs, CDR, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division
- Interview with AMB Walt Stocum and COL Greg Gardner, CPA, Director of Security Affairs
- Interview with MG Ray Odero, Commanding General, 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Lessons Learned Data from CPA South Central
- Interview with LTG Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7

**Most non-Army joint billets remain unfilled, CPA's high turnover and rotation rates**

- Interview with MG Miller (Incoming CJTF-7 C3) and BG Williams (Outgoing CJTF-7 C3)
- Interview with BG Barbero, Assistant Division Commander (M), 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Interview with COL Gutzler, CFLCC C2
- Interview with MG Stadler, Deputy Commanding General, IMEF
- Interview with MAJ [redacted] CJTF-7 CACE Chief
- Interview with MG Strock, Deputy Director of Operations, CPA
- Interview with Mike Gfoeller, Chief, CPA Central South
- Interview with BG (P) Dempsey and ADCs, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division
- Interview with LTC [redacted] (British Army), CJTF-7 Deputy C2
- Interview with AMB Walt Stocum and COL Greg Gardner, CPA, Director of Security Affairs
- Interview with MG Wodjakowski, DCG, CJTF-7
- Interview with MG Ray Odero, Commanding General, 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Lessons Learned Data from CPA South Central
- Interview with LTG Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7

**DIRA transition to CPA resulted in under-manning especially in regions**

- Interview with MG Petrus, Commanding General, 101<sup>st</sup> Air Assault Division
- Interview with MG Stadler, Deputy Commanding General, IMEF
- Interview with COL Russ Gold, Commander, 3<sup>rd</sup> BCT, 1<sup>st</sup> AD
- Interview with MG Strock, Deputy Director of Operations, CPA
- Interview with BGen Moran, CCM6, CENTCOM
- Interview with Maj Gen Mattis, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, IMEF
- Interview with COL Teeples, Commander, 3<sup>rd</sup> ACR
- Interview with ADM @ David Oliver, OSD, SES, Ministry of Finance
- Interview with Mike Gfoeller, Chief, CPA Central South
- Interview with BG (P) Dempsey and ADCs, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division
- Interview with AMB Walt Stocum and COL Greg Gardner, CPA, Director of Security Affairs
- Interview with MG Ray Odero, Commanding General, 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Lessons Learned Data from CPA South Central

**CPA planning and decision-making remains highly centralized; groups does not manage tactical command**

- Interview with CJSTF (Group Discussion)
- Interview with COL Shelly, CFLCC Deputy C-2
- Interview with COL Rudesheim, Commander, 3<sup>rd</sup> BCT, 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Interview with MG Strock, Deputy Director of Operations, CPA
- Interview with BGen Moran, CCM6, CENTCOM
- Interview with Maj Gen Mattis, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, IMEF
- Interview with COL Teeples, Commander, 3<sup>rd</sup> ACR
- Interview with COL Mayville, Commander, 173<sup>rd</sup> Airborne Brigade
- Interview with COL Hogg, Commander, 2<sup>nd</sup> BCT, 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Interview with ADM @ David Oliver, OSD, SES, Ministry of Finance
- Interview with Mike Gfoeller, Chief, CPA Central South
- Interview with BG (P) Dempsey and ADCs, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division
- Interview with MG Ray Odero, Commanding General, 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Lessons Learned Data from CPA South Central
- Interview with LTG Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7

**Boundaries of Iraqi political divisions, CPA regions and CJTF-7 tactical zones are not aligned**

- Interview with COL Rudesheim, Commander, 3<sup>rd</sup> BCT, 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Interview with MG Petrus, Commanding General, 101<sup>st</sup> Air Assault Division
- Interview with MG Stadler, Deputy Commanding General, IMEF
- Interview with MG Strock, Deputy Director of Operations, CPA
- Interview with Maj Gen Mattis, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division, IMEF
- Interview with COL Teeples, Commander, 3<sup>rd</sup> ACR
- Interview with COL Mayville, Commander, 173<sup>rd</sup> Airborne Brigade
- Interview with ADM @ David Oliver, OSD, SES, Ministry of Finance
- Interview with BG (P) Dempsey and ADCs, Commander, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division
- Interview with MG Ray Odero, Commanding General, 4<sup>th</sup> ID
- Lessons Learned Data from CPA South Central
- Interview with LTG Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7

**ISG focused on priority missions for WMD and HVTs reporting back to DCI**

- Interview with MG Dayton, Commander, Iraq Survey Group (ISG)
- Interview with David Kay, DCI Advisor, Iraq Survey Group (ISG)
- Iraq Survey Group Daily SITREPs
- Interview with BGen Moran, CCM6, CENTCOM
- Interview with LTG Sanchez, Commander, CJTF-7
- Interview with MG Wodjakowski, DCG, CJTF-7

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## Communications Infrastructure

DRAFT / SECRET ORSON

**Finding:** Diminished operational level post-MCO communications capabilities strain operational linkages and complicate coordination as Iraq-wide requirements increase.

### **Why It Happened:**

#### -General

- Telecommunications significantly damaged during Major Combat Operations, exacerbating the effects of the 12 year embargo
- Military operations requirements exceed organic capabilities
- Use of military infrastructure for key civilian agencies limited

#### -Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)

- Regional communications impacted by state of civil infrastructure
- Centralized control requires extensive communications to dispersed regions; contract support has yet to make contribution

#### -Within CJTF 7

- Communications capabilities challenged by dispersed forces
- Tactical communications demands to remote locations exceeds support infrastructure—constrained at the last tactical mile



### **What Should Be Done:**

- Reallocate resources to provide operational level C2I and collaborative information environment for CJTF-7 and robust secure and non-secure network for CPA
- Implement joint military-CPA communications review's recommendations
- Develop collaborative information environment for civil-military and operational / tactical C2
- Invest in Iraqi communications network as a second priority behind power restoration
- Ensure tactical communications investment reflects 21st century realities/capabilities

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## CJTF7

Post-MCO distances between units expanded dramatically, making FM communications impractical. Inadequate (COL Rudeshiem)

There is insufficient wideband TACSAT to support the distances and speed of operations (MG Petraus). One TACSAT net for 4 ID (COL Rudeshiem)

Key joint communications capabilities have not been redistributed to accommodate new realities

Only digital flow from CJTF7 is C2PC (BG Barbero)

SIPR and NIPR was needed to interface with CPA and other organizations

Communications and databases do not support Intelligence operations (BG(P) Fast)

## CPA

Lack of secure comms and internet capability limit communications with regions and provinces(CPA SC interviews)

CPA regions use commercial hotmail addresses

## Iraqi Infrastructure

Destruction of Iraqi domestic communications capabilities left a void that confounds military communications problems

Near total looting of telecommunications infrastructure.

Iraqi Media Network is not liked by Iraqis (MG Petraus)

Many Iraqis are now viewing Satellite TV as one of their main means of getting information (COL Gold)

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Date:

NOV 05 2010

**Strategic Communications  
(Public Affairs, Public Diplomacy, Information Operations)**

**DRAFT / SECRET ORCON**

**Findings:** Absence of integrated strategic communications activities (public affairs, public diplomacy, IO) in the face of concerted opposition effort undermines reconstruction progress, despite local efforts at direct communication that mitigate the problem.

**Why It Happened:**

- Strategic communications void following post-major combat operations
- Apparent lack of strategic communications direction hinders all players from working toward a common end state
- IO efforts are not coordinated nor aligned
- CPA lacks infrastructure to promulgate central messages
- Resourcing of people and equipment has fallen short
- Tactical PSYOP integrated with local commanders and "command information programs" are locally effective
- Satellite dish proliferation, competing commercial and hostile non-commercial media challenge Coalition



**What Should Be Done:**

- Gain leadership support of an strategic communications effort similar to Major Combat Operations program
- Develop Iraq Stratcom Campaign plan to align strategic, interagency, operational and tactical actions
- Develop a post-MCO strategic communications effort for both internal and external audiences
- Reenergize and expand the media embed program
- Establish commercial media team to enable Iraqi produced, entertaining programming, interspersed with news that tells the story of post-major combat Iraq through press and local and satellite radio and TV
- Conduct offensive IO to counter hostile non-commercial media inside and outside Iraq

What  
can  
STRATCOM  
do?

**What happened:**

- CPA, CJTF7, National Regions not aligned
- IO not properly resourced at operational level. No strategic communications at CPA (one person deep)
- IO planning at Operational level incomplete
- Tactical PSYOPS teams integrated at BDE level
- BDEs/BNs focused on delivery of IO through media and word of mouth at local level

Unclear relationship between PA, IO, and Command Info  
IO Strategy not yet published

**Why it happened**

- Disconnected IO being conducted at different levels of command
- Information Operations inadequately resourced at CPA
- Information Operations plans not nested at all levels
- Information Operations appear to be reactive vice proactive in response to competing IO themes

SAM buy back example: Parallel chains of command

**IO Themes and Messages:**

Tactical PSYOP teams integrated with command effort (operations) effective in delivery of IO products at local levels.

IO Strategy in draft form; four months after the fact. (not yet published)

**What Happened**

- CPA, CJTF7, National Regions not aligned
- BG Heimick
- IO not properly resourced at operational level. No strategic communications at CPA (one person deep)

MAJ [redacted] interview  
LTC [redacted] interview

- IO planning at Operational level incomplete

[redacted] Martel interview  
[redacted] Carolin interview

- Tactical PSYOPS teams integrated at BDE level

COL Hogg  
COL Anderson

- BDEs/BNs focused on delivery of IO through media and word of mouth at local level

COL Mayville  
COL Hogg

- Unclear relationship between PA, IO, and Command Info

IO Strategy not yet published

MAJ [redacted] interview  
LTC [redacted] interview

**Why It Happened**

- Disconnected IO being conducted at different levels of command

MAJ [redacted] interview  
MG Odiemo interview  
Maj Gen Stalder

- Information Operations inadequately resourced at CPA

LTC [redacted] interview  
MAJ [redacted] interview

- Information Operations plans not nested at all levels

MAJ [redacted] interview

- Information Operations appear to be reactive vice proactive in response to competing IO themes

LTC [redacted] interview  
MAJ [redacted] interview

- SAM buy back example: Parallel chains of command

LTC [redacted] interview  
MAJ [redacted] interview

- IO Themes and Messages:

- Tactical PSYOP teams integrated with command effort (operations) effective in delivery of IO products at local levels.

COL Hogg  
COL Anderson  
Maj Gen Stalder

- IO Strategy in draft form; four months after the fact. (not yet published)

LTC [redacted] interview  
MAJ [redacted] interview

Call  
Jim  
Ellis

~>

OSD/JS  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

~~SECRET ORCON~~  
DRAFT

Joint Lessons Learned:  
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM



*First Look Back Up Slides*  
Post Major Combat Operations  
as of  
14 September 2003

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**Collection: Interviews**

**DRAFT / SECRET ORCON**

**CENTCOM**

- GEN Abizaid, CG
- BG Custer, J2
- COL Dietz, JAICG

**CJTF7**

- LTG Sanchez, CDR CJTF-7
- MG Wodjakowski, DCDR CJTF-7
- MG Miller, C3, CJTF-7
- BG Hahn, Chief of Staff CJTF-7
- BG Williams, C3, CJTF-7
- MG Petraeus, CG 101<sup>st</sup> ABN DIV
- MG Odierno, CG 4ID
- MajGen Stalder, DCG I MEF
- MajGen Mattis, CG I MARDIV
- MajGen Tyszkiewicz, CG MN DIV
- BG(P) Dempsey, CG 1AD
- BG Barbero, ADC 4ID
- BG Helmick, ADC 101<sup>st</sup>
- BG Crear, CG TF RIO
- COL Gold, CDR 3BCT 1AD
- COL Nesbit, C/J-2 CJTF-7
- Col Rhoades, G-2 IMEF
- Col Howcroft, 1MARDIV

- COL May, CDR 2LCR
- COL Moody, CDR 4BCT, 4ID
- COL Rudesheim, CDR 1 BCT, 4ID
- COL Stramara, CDR, DIVARTY 4ID
- COL Mayville, CDR 173d
- COL Hogg, CDR 2BCT, 4ID
- COL Anderson, CDR 2BCT 101<sup>st</sup>
- COL Teeple, CDR 3 ACR
- COL Carter, Acting C4, CJTF-7
- COL Norton, Chem Off, CJTF-7
- LTC [REDACTED] G2 101<sup>st</sup>
- LTC(BA) [REDACTED] Dep C-2, CJTF-7
- LtCol [REDACTED] G4, 1 MARDIV
- LTC [REDACTED] Chem Off, 3ID
- LTC [REDACTED] Dep Chem Off, CJTF-7
- Lt. Col [REDACTED] Eng Of, 1 MARDIV
- LTC [REDACTED] Dep C1, CJTF-7
- LCDR [REDACTED] Dep Eng Of, 1 MARDIV
- MAJ [REDACTED] Collection Mgr, CJTF-7
- MAJ [REDACTED] ACE Chief, CJTF-7
- CPT [REDACTED] J2X, CJTF-7
- CPT [REDACTED] MD off, C1, CJTF-7

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OSD/J5  
 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

### Collection: Interviews

#### CPA

- Mr. Walter Slocombe, MOD, CPA
- MG Strock, D/DIR Operations CPA
- Mr. Dave Oliver, MOF, CPA
- MG Eaton, OMC
- RDML Poe, IG
- RDML(SEL) McGee, CofS, Ops
- Mr. Michael Gfoeller, DIR CPA-SC
- COL(UK) Bruce, CoS CPA-SC
- LTC [REDACTED] CPA-SC
- LTC [REDACTED] CPA-SC
- Wing CDR(AUS) McHugh, CPA-SC
- MAJ [REDACTED] CPA-SC
- Ms [REDACTED] CPA-SC
- Mr. [REDACTED] CPA-SC
- Mr. [REDACTED] CPA-SC

#### ISG/OTHER

- MG Dayton, DIR ISB
- Mr. [REDACTED] (ISG DCI Advisor)
- COL Adams (ISG CoS)
- LTC [REDACTED] (ISG LNO)
- Ms [REDACTED] (USAID)

#### CISOTE-AP

- LTC [REDACTED] DCO
- LTC [REDACTED] CoS
- LTC [REDACTED] CDR, FOB 53
- LTC [REDACTED] C/J3
- MAJ [REDACTED]
- MAJ [REDACTED] C/J2
- CPT [REDACTED]
- MAJ [REDACTED]
- MAJ [REDACTED]

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
NOV 05 2010

OSD/JS

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)



# Commander's Emergency Response Fund DRAFT / SECRET OROON



There is nothing that can't be solved with money. We are paying off blood feuds, including the families of those we have killed after attacking our own forces. CERP is the single most productive asset. "SS is ammo." Maj Gen Petross, Cdr 101<sup>st</sup> Abn Div

CERP is irreplaceable. "God help us if it ever goes away." Maj Gen Stadler, I MEF DEP CDR

CERP funds are essential. We use them for standing up the police, to fix sewage and medical and other basic human needs. It is part of our targeting process...it is helping with security first, then stability. I am beginning to work CERP projects through the local Shriks. Col William Mayville, Cdr 173<sup>rd</sup> Abn Bde

Education	1,381	\$99,110
Reconstruction	1,238	\$79,820
Other Public Services	1,843	\$72,220
Police/Security	893	\$57,240
Health	819	\$44,880
Water/Sewer	788	\$43,890
Rule of Law/Government	898	\$33,280
CPR Programs	289	\$19,820
Electricity	289	\$14,880
Humanitarian	182	\$11,120
Social Programs	173	\$9,840
Operations Support	142	\$9,180
Transportation	88	\$4,820
Research	184	\$7,720
<b>Total</b>	<b>8,899</b>	<b>\$48,837K</b>

*\$74.9M allocated by CPA*

Date	Program	Level	Amount
7 May	BDE CDR Discretionary Recovery Program	O-4 CDR	\$25K
V Corps Page 104d			\$2.5K/project
5 Jun	BDE CDR DRP	O-4 and Governor CDRs	\$180K
V Corps Page 45d			\$16K/project
19 Jun	CDR Emergency Relief Program	O-4 and Governor CDRs	\$380K
CJTF-7 Page 89			\$50K/project
17 Jul	CERP	Base plus non-US forces	\$380K
CJTF-7 Page 43d			\$50K/project
Pending approval	CERP	Base	\$400K
			\$50K/project

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**SOF & SOF-Conventional Integration** ~~DRAFT / SECRET ORCON~~


**CJSOTF-AP Statistics**

Planned missions: 2172	Executed: 1883 (87%)
<b>Enemy</b>	<b>Recovered</b>
Killed/Wounded/Captured 7 / 6 / 173	869 RPGs; 546 AK-47; 500 Mine/IEDs; \$50K
<b>Coalition</b>	<b>Daily Avionics</b>
Coordinate with: 1210	27 missions
Executed with: 76	17 coordination
Passed to: 33	1 combined mission


Period: 15 Jun - 23 Aug 03 (70 Days)  
Source: CJSOTF-AP Operational Activity Overview

"SOF integration was great, particularly with TF-20", BG, 4ID  
"Great value to having someone out there lurking around", CG, 1MARDIV  
"SOF integration was good... very personality based", CG, 1AD


**TOP 55**



**BLACK LIST**



As of 30 Aug 03  
Source: CJSOTF-AP Black List Status Brief



SOF - Conventional  
Raid on Uday and  
Qusay


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# Campaign Planning Timelines

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


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# Training – Experience – Doctrine


DRAFT / SECRET OBOON

## OIF 2 Training Experience



Low Intensity Training  
 Combat Training

Lots of doctrine  
 covering  
 many  
 specific  
 areas



- CC, 3<sup>rd</sup> BDE, IAD: "...situation is so different from what the doctrine says..."
- I MEF G-2: "...Italians...brought an entire battalion of [Italian Police] with them...it is working perfectly." Linguists...not enough of the right mixes...ton of Russian and Slovak...not enough Arabic, Farsi..."
- CJTF-7 J2X HUMINT Officer: "...V Corps only has tactical HUMINT personnel..."
- 3<sup>rd</sup> BDE CC, 4<sup>th</sup> ID: "...this is all a learning experience, we were not trained...for this."

24

## CTC EXPERIENCE FOR OIF2 UNITS

UNIT	BGT	NTC	JRTC	GMTG
1 <sup>st</sup> BDE	1 <sup>st</sup> BDE	NOV 02		
	1 <sup>st</sup> BDE	OCT 03		
	2 <sup>nd</sup> BDE	AUG 01		
	3 <sup>rd</sup> BDE	JUL 01		
		NOV 01	DEC 03	
30 <sup>th</sup> INF	30 <sup>th</sup> INF BDE		FEB 04	
	(Arkansas)			
3 <sup>rd</sup> SFG	3 <sup>rd</sup> BDE	MAR 03	MAY 03	
	(1 CORPS)		SEP 03	
1 <sup>st</sup> SFG	1 <sup>st</sup> BDE	SEP 03	MAR 04	
	(1 CORPS)			
30 <sup>th</sup> INF	2 <sup>nd</sup> BDE			MAR 02
	3 <sup>rd</sup> BDE			SEP 02
30 <sup>th</sup> INF	30 <sup>th</sup> INF BDE	JUN 03	JAN 04	
	(North Carolina)			

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## Resources

CPA HQ  
 OMAAT  
 OJTF-7  
 ISG

**Common Section 12 Support**

- Armored HUMVVs
- TACSAT
- Data connectivity
- Linguists
- HUMINT Teams
- Civil Affairs units
- HQ staffing

**IRAQ FUNDS STATUS (\$ Millions)**

Category	Available	Committed
US Appropriations	~3500	~2000
International	~2500	~1500
UN	~1500	~1000
UNICEF	~1000	~500
UNDP	~1000	~500

**CPA Critical Manning**

- Total Requirements: 1285 Total US Vacancies: 708
- Highlight areas:
  - 136 Government Team vacancies
    - 129 to be filled by contractors
  - Vacancies by Departments:
    - Defense 47
    - State 44
    - Justice 36
    - Energy 36
    - DHS 31
    - Treasury 16

\*CPA has a 1900 man organization with a 5,000 man mission\*

25

BG C wants to get way from force levels. More to do we have the right people – eg low density folks (CA, THT, etc) Do we have enough money and communications and other resources?

Terri, can you get how many CPA guys have turned over in the last period of time, say over 60 or 90 days. He is looking for something to support the turnover bullet in CPA? Do you have any other ideas in this area?

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## Coalition Provisional Authority Manning

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### CPA Civilian Manning

- Total Requirements: 1205 Total US Vacancies: 706
- Manning is voluntary
- Tours range from 90 to 180 days; military ground units on 1 year tours
- Highlight areas:

–330 Governance Team vacancies

- 129 to be filled by contractors

–Vacancies by Departments:

• Defense	47
• State	44
• Justice	36
• Energy	26
• DHS	21
• Treasury	15

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**"CPA has a 1500 man organization with a 5,000 man mission"**

Source: AB 16 SEP 03 Operations Update Draft Aug 2004

26



DIA 1.4(c)

Need to clean up the data on HUMINT Teams. Can wis help here? Its hard to sort out THTs and CI/Humint teams and just folks helping out. Is there a good set of data on this?

Working the linguists – BG C wants it sorted by MSC. Grabowski says he has this data.



Is there other pertinent quantitative data to support this area to replace the left side of the chart? Thoughts?

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**Joint Command and Control**

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*C2 Over Time*



C2 over time source data -


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# Strategic Communications

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## Pre War Radio and Television Stations

- 16 AM Radio Stations
- 51 FM Radio Stations
- 4 Short-wave Radio Stations
- 13 Television Stations
- 0 Legal Satellite Dishes

## Post War Radio and Television Stations

- 7 AM Radio Stations
- 6 FM Radio Stations
- 13 Short-wave Radio Stations
- 21 Television Stations
- ??? Satellite Dishes

Source: USAID Study

30

Make the data in lower are in a map; add sources – Brantley

Doogie, any ideas on how to improve this one to cover IO and PAO more completely?

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JS 1.4 (a), (c), (g)

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AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT  
27-Apr-2010


09 M-2747

# Ambassador Bremmer Engagements

- **Monday:**
  - Senate Appropriation Committee
- **Wednesday:**
  - Senate Foreign Relations committee
  - House Appropriations' Defense and Foreign Operations Subcommittees
- **Thursday**
  - Senate Armed Services Committee
  - House International Relations Committee

**Page determined to be Unclassified**  
**Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS**  
**IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5**  
**Date: NOV 05 2010**

151.4(a), (c), (g)



# Ambassador Bremmer Engagements

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IS 14 (a), (g)  
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
### Outline

- Methodology and Presentation Structure
- The Big Issues – Quick Look
- ➔ –Capabilities That Reached New Levels of Performance
- Capabilities That Demonstrated Considerable Effectiveness
- Capabilities That Fell Short of Expectations or Needs
- Second-Tier Issues
- Insights to Future Concepts
- Initial Impressions and Way Ahead

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### Joint Force Synergy

- **Finding:** OIF characterized "...by shock, by surprise, by flexibility, by the employment of precise munitions, on a scale never before seen, and by the application of overwhelming force." (GEN Franks)
- **Context:** Strategic imperatives demanded rapid, simultaneous operations. Strategic exposure, access, basing constrained force size and flow. Strategic imperatives and an uncertain threat required swift, agile ground maneuver integrated with precision strikes, SOF, and long-haul logistics.
- **Why it happened:**
  - Highly flexible and thoroughly developed plan
  - Robust, well-trained, quickly adaptable joint capabilities
  - Early & continuous emphasis on strategic imperatives
  - Improved Service capabilities
- **What should be done:**
  - Develop a fully joint, interoperable C2 and C31 network
  - Sustain and expand lethality and survivability overmatch for all ground forces
  - Develop high resolution live/virtual Joint & Multinational training capability
  - Develop transparent Joint Fires system



### Outline

- Methodology and Presentation Structure
- The Big Issues – Quick Look
- ➔ –Capabilities That Reached New Levels of Performance
- Capabilities That Demonstrated Considerable Effectiveness
- Capabilities That Fell Short of Expectations or Needs
- Second-Tier Issues
- Insights to Future Concepts
- Initial Impressions and Way Ahead

### Joint Integration and Adaptive Planning

- **Finding:** A joint culture, developed over time, forged through continuous operations (Operations Southern and Northern Watch, OEF), and aided by improved C2 and C31 networks, enabled CENTCOM to eliminate many of the gaps and seams that typically challenge cohesion in an ad hoc joint force.
- **Context:** The traditional approach assembles an ad hoc joint command and control headquarters with components that have little experience working together in a joint environment. OIF provided an opportunity to observe a near-standing joint force in action.
- **Why it happened:**
  - Long-term joint command and staff relationships, trust and confidence, led to unified action
  - Highly flexible and thoroughly developed plan
  - Accelerated joint training, mission rehearsals
  - Clearly understood commander's vision informed decision-making within the components
  - Improving Joint C2 and C31 networks
- **What should be done:**
  - Enhance Joint Operations through integrated concepts, capabilities, doctrine, education and training
  - Develop high resolution live/virtual Joint & Multinational training capability
  - Reform business model for forming, training, and deploying joint forces
  - Develop a fully joint, interoperable C2 & C31 network



### SOF and SOF-Conventional Integration

- **Finding:** Coherent, willing, interdependent application of SOF and conventional air, ground, and naval forces aided achievement of strategic, operational & tactical objectives.
- **Context:** SOF-conventional force integration in OEF foreshadowed expanded OIF partnership; warfighting potential of combining conventional and SOF capabilities was more fully exploited in OIF.
- **Why it happened:**
  - High priority SOF responsibilities
  - Supported & supporting command with assigned operations areas
  - Leadership fully supported integration
  - Conventional forces leveraged SOF for asymmetric threats and precision targeting
  - Strategic imperatives & operational constraints dictated both selected (covert) & continuous (large-scale) SOF employment
- **What should be done:**
  - Continue to enhance SOF-conventional integration thru training and doctrine
  - Improve SOF operational C2 structure and interoperability
  - Continue SOF integration as a force multiplier
  - Support SOCOM GWOT operational battlespace preparation initiatives and transformation concept



### Urban Operations


- **Finding:** Innovative Service approaches, integrating transformational thinking & recent urban lessons, were violently executed against a poorly organized, but aggressive enemy.
- **Context:** Slow, costly urban fights were anticipated. Due to operational speed, shaping actions, and lack of Iraqi competence, sustained, high-intensity urban combat never occurred.
- **Why it happened:**
  - Extensive joint and Service effort
  - Rapid maneuver precluded deliberate Iraq urban defense
  - Planning leveraged recent urban experience and thought
  - Significant intelligence preparation
  - Specific urban schemes of maneuver
  - Joint Urban CAS and precision weapons
  - UK experience exploited in Basra
  - SOF capabilities leveraged
  - Exploited maneuver, survivability, firepower
  - Learned from each engagement, battle
  - Each fight was unique
- **What should be done:**
  - Conduct detailed review with key participants. Identify strengths and weaknesses
  - Sustain Joint Urban Operations Roadmap initiatives
  - Expand joint urban doctrine with functional tactics, techniques, procedures
  - Apply resources for required capabilities



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## Information Operations

- Findings:** Information Operations appeared to contribute to the achievement of many operational and tactical objectives. However, execution was marked by friction, difficulties in assessment, and, at times, a lack of sophistication.
- Conclusions:** Unique, long-standing relationships and expertise from OEF were significant. An aggressive operational to tactical information operations campaign was planned to achieve, or enable achievement, of operational and tactical objectives.
- Key Lessons:**
  - Theater-wide advocacy & integration
  - Started early, fully integrated into every phase
  - Information Operations objectives linked strategically, operationally, and tactically
  - OEF lessons incorporated into planning
  - Delayed assessment of information effects hindered adjustment of ongoing operations
- What should be done:**
  - Provide national-level policy guidance to support information operations planning/execution across all activities
  - STRATCOM/COMCOM co-develop organizations, processes, training, & institutionalize changes
  - Refocus Information Operations training, equipping, manning, and doctrine across the force
  - Provide commanders with systems to rapidly disseminate critical, time-sensitive IO messages



IS 1.4 (a), (c), (g)

## Outline

- Methodology and Presentation Structure
- The Big Issues – Quick Look
  - Capabilities That Reached New Levels of Performance
  - Capabilities That Demonstrated Considerable Effectiveness
  - Capabilities That Fell Short of Expectations or Needs
- ➔ • Second-Tier Issues
  - Insights to Future Concepts
- Initial Impressions and Way Ahead

JS 1.4 (a), (c), (g)

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## Second-Tier Issues

- Joint Fires
  - Joint fires were employed successfully despite shortfalls in common targeting picture, fire support coordination, and battle management command and control (C2)
  - Integrate networked targeting systems and C2 communications suites, Integrate Blue Force Tracker and assured combat identification (friend or foe) into fire control systems, standardize fire support coordination procedures, increase high-resolution joint training, develop advanced airspace procedures and mechanisms, and improve target measurement systems.
- Time-Sensitive Targeting (TST)
  - State of the art in Time Sensitive Targeting was advanced dramatically but is perishable
  - Sustain and improve advances through joint training, development of joint tactics, techniques, and procedures, and development of advanced concepts and capabilities
- Overmatching Skills
  - The overmatching mobility, survivability, and joint firepower used to spearhead OIF ground maneuver proved decisive in sustaining momentum and breaking the back of the enemy in open, mixed, and urban terrain. Achieving rapid air and sea supremacy enabled focused support. Armored and mechanized forces moving to contact were able to re-establish enemy contact when the situation was uncertain. Paramilitary attacks failed to slow the speed of the advance and enemy prisoner interviews indicate Iraqis feared these capabilities.
  - Review transformation guidance and roadmaps to ensure overmatching mobility, protection, and firepower are maintained—through current or emerging technologies and capabilities

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## Second-Tier Issues

- Training
  - An untrained force cannot expect to succeed against a well trained and equipped force. The US focus on training, at the Service, joint, and theater levels, empowered leaders who demonstrated agility and innovation in the face of a variety of unexpected and asymmetric challenges. However, a lack of routine, integrated training was exposed in shortcomings found in enabling capabilities (ISR, Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), etc.). Conversely, Enemy prisoner interviews indicate that Republican Guard units received no more than 3 tank rounds and 6 rounds per rifle a year.
  - Sustain the current training focus and take that training foundation to the next level by creating a high resolution live/virtual joint and multinational training capability
- Theater Logistics
  - The Land Component (CFLCC) Director of Logistics and 377<sup>th</sup> Theater Support Command (TSC) created a Theater Support Command Center to manage and coordinate logistics for all Services
    - Formalize joint doctrine and organizations, develop joint logistics command and control systems, and align joint theater logistics standards and cross-Service arrangements, to include support of SOF forces and operations
  - Battlefield distribution was challenged to support the operational reach and demand of CFLCC maneuver due to deployment phasing of transportation assets and deficiencies in the C2 and C2I capabilities of Combat Service Support units
    - Develop a C2 and C2I architecture for theater distribution and CSS and ensure adequate distribution assets are in place to dynamically support maneuver (Dynamic Routing and Dispatching)

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## Second-Tier Issues

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
- **Public Affairs/Media Integration**
  - Embedded press concept was successful for the US domestic audience, but sapped military public affairs focus from non-embedded regional and international media, thus missing opportunities to provide the US message to those key audiences
  - Revise joint PA doctrine and organization to exploit military public affairs capabilities to meet the demand of real-time reporting. Develop joint training, exercise opportunities to increase command/Public Affairs Officer effectiveness
- **Shaping Interagency Involvement**
  - Joint Interagency Coordination Group leveraged the capabilities of other government agencies.
  - Define interagency roles, responsibilities, and capabilities at the combatant command level and more fully integrate the Joint Interagency Coordination Group into the planning process.
- **EUCOM/CENTCOM Seam**
  - CENTCOM designated as the supported command. CENTCOM-EUCOM exceeded the typical supporting-supported relationship, often creating overlap and increasing complexity of coordination.
  - Refine Unified Command Plan responsibilities and reinforce supporting and supported command relationships.

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## Emerging Battlespace

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- **Enlighten:** A more powerful individual soldier, enabled by knowledge and a previously unimagined control of firepower, fought intense, small scale battles that influenced and, at the same time, were constrained by political, social, economic, information, and infrastructure objectives.
- **Context:** Strategically and operationally critical goals were achieved in widespread, simultaneous, coherently joint, non-contiguous operations, often with small numbers of combat troops operating with temporary, shifting, and flexible lines of communications.
- **Why it happened:**
  - Greater integration of military and interagency
  - Flexible mix of forces and capabilities
  - Mixed battlefields of conventional and unconventional threats
  - US shaping of Iraq
  - Constraints of national policy
  - Global War on Terrorism
  - Precision, speed, audacity
  - Advances in technology
- **What should be done:**
  - Conduct full-scale experimentation to integrate mature concepts, capabilities and processes
  - Develop high resolution live/virtual joint & multinational training capability
  - Sustain overmatching lethality & survivability
  - Develop a fully joint, interoperable C2 and C2I network



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## Outline

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- **Methodology and Presentation Structure**
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  - Capabilities That Fell Short of Expectations or Needs
  - Second-Tier Issues
  - Insights to Future Concepts
- **Initial Impressions and Way Ahead**




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## Knowledge-Enabled Warfare

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- **Enlighten:** Detailed preparation enhanced initial understanding of the enemy & enabled rapid strikes, maneuver, and information collection. However, collection, analysis & dissemination failed to provide the knowledge needed to achieve effects & sustain speed.
- **Context:** Knowledge-enabled warfare leverages networked information, forces and capabilities to create freedom of action and achieve success faster, with fewer forces. While evident in OP, key knowledge gaps demanded ground forces gain physical contact with the enemy to restore necessary knowledge and freedom of action.
- **Why it happened:**
  - Operational scope, scale, complexity and speed exceeded process capabilities
  - Process and tool integration fell short in creating necessary awareness of the enemy (Karbala)
  - Effective enemy denial and deception techniques
- **What should be done:**
  - Enhance analytic tools and processes to create knowledge on pace with decision requirements
  - Integrate and focus ongoing programs to create new sensor management and analysis tools
  - Conduct full-scale experimentation to integrate and mature concepts, capabilities and processes
  - Develop vertically & horizontally integrated collection, analysis & dissemination system to provide relevant knowledge at all levels




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## Effects-Based Operations (EBO)

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- **Enlighten:** Based on initial understanding of the enemy, integrated kinetic and non-kinetic actions and multiple, high-tempo lines of operation were unleashed to achieve enemy disintegration and regime collapse; when execution exceeded capacity to understand change, operations reverted from an effects to attrition focus.
- **Context:** Hedging strategic risk thru rapid regime collapse required surprise and swift, focused action that leveraged all elements of national power. Military actions exploited reduced footprints, integrated information operations, rapid strikes and maneuver, and economy of force to reduce risk, induce capitulation and incite popular uprising.
- **Why it happened:**
  - Difficulty gaining knowledge to identify appropriate effects, desired actions, & cascading or 2d & 3d order effects
  - Limited collection on non-kinetic actions, notably IO
  - Over focused on measures of performance, rather than measures of effectiveness and merit
  - Insufficient interagency, joint and Service integration hindered execution / support of effects-based action
- **What should be done:**
  - Enhance C2 and C2I technology, procedures, & organizations to deal with war's new character/conduct
  - Create routine joint and function integration via training & organization, extend jointness to the lowest levels possible
  - Institute EBO via world-class experiment & training venues



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


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# Initial Impressions

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Payoff For Outweighs Investment Cost!  
Enhance Transformation  
and  
Force Effectiveness

- Caused Reassessments**
- Joint Training and Experiences
  - Fully joint, interoperable C2 and C2I networks
  - Established Joint C2 Organizations
  - High resolution Bio/Virtual Joint & Multinational training capability
  - SOF-Conventional Force Integration
  - Blue Situational Awareness & Combat ID
  - Transparent Joint Force System
  - Overmatching lethality & survivability
  - Joint Experimentation
- Elements of a Transformed Force**
- Increasingly capable networked C2 and C2ISR
  - More, smaller, increasingly lethal, survivable formations
  - Precision weapons and precision ISR
  - Smaller footprints with rapid follow-on force
  - "Pressure" from all elements of national power (DIME)
  - Mutually supporting lethal and non-lethal force
  - Collaborative and Virtual Information Environment
  - Simultaneous operations
  - Effects-based operations

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Back Up

# The Big Issues – Quick Look

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
1. Capabilities that reached new levels of performance, and need to be sustained and improved
  - Joint Integration and Adaptive Planning
  - Joint Force Synergy
  - SOF and SOF-Conventional Integration
2. Capabilities that demonstrated considerable effectiveness, but need enhancement
  - Urban Operations
  - Information Operations
  - Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
3. Capabilities that fell short of expectations or needs, and need to be redressed through new initiatives
  - Battle Damage Assessment
  - Fratricide Prevention
  - Transition to Post Hostilities
  - Deployment Planning and Execution
  - Reserve Mobilization
4. Second-Tier issues
  - Coalition Information Sharing
  - Joint Fires
  - Time Sensitive Targeting
  - Overmatching Strike
  - Training
  - Theater Logistics
  - Public Affairs/Media Integration
  - Shaping Interagency Involvement
  - EUCCOM/CENTCOM Seam
5. Capabilities that fell short of expectations or needs, and need to be redressed through new initiatives
  - Coalition Information Sharing
  - Joint Fires
  - Time Sensitive Targeting
  - Overmatching Strike
  - Training
  - Theater Logistics
  - Public Affairs/Media Integration
  - Shaping Interagency Involvement
  - EUCCOM/CENTCOM Seam
6. Insights to future concepts
  - Emerging Battlespace
  - Knowledge-Enabled Warfare
  - Effects-Based Operations

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# Lessons Learned Methodology

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- Focus on what mattered to the operational warfighter in the conduct of operations.
- Observe, analyze and leverage insights / expressed concerns of the participants and underlying empirical data.
- Purpose: Identify issues important to operational success/failure, assist and enable operations where possible. Provide template for future active collection of lessons learned
- Composition: Senior mentor in theater; Brigadier General chief; experienced O&O&S team members; analysis cell at JFCOM for reach back



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# Lessons Learned Methodology


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- Methodology
  - Identify & embed lessons learned personnel in key operational level commands / functions
  - Observe command and staff processes and identify key operational issues:
    - Observe
    - Collect data
    - Interview participants
    - Assist, coach, facilitate, problem solve
    - Provide feedback through cross component collaboration
  - Analyze issues and expand with relevant background data (doctrine, previous performance, etc.)
  - Draw preliminary conclusions to produce a Quick Look Report
  - Conduct detailed analysis / post mortem of preliminary conclusions to confirm, deny, or discover new lessons
  - Publish a final report recommending adjustments to organizations, procedures, and technology
- Leverage other JFCOM forums
- Implement through joint and Service transformation mechanisms

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# Lessons Learned Methodology

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
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### US Combat Power Against Ground Forces

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
US GROUND COMBAT POWER	
Committed Ground Forces	66,000 / OF
Committed Ground Forces (30 April 2003)	48,000 / 38,000
Attack Helicopters	473 / 300
Reinforcing Artillery Platforms	340 / 20
Total Artillery Platforms	774 / 270
Air Attack on Ground Forces (Percent of total air effort)	55.5% / 75.5%
Armor & Infantry Battalions	74 / 27



### Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance

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
JSTARS Showing Target Indicator Hours  
 - DBOC 800 / OF 1700  
 ISR Aircraft Sorties  
 - DBOC 3238 / OF 1688  
 Coalition ISR Aircraft  
 - DBOC - 118 / OF 118  
 Average Surface-to-Surface Missile Launch Warning Times  
 - DBOC 3.5 min / OF < 1 min  
 Commercial Satellite Resolution  
 - DBOC 10 meter / OF 1 meter  
 Commercial Satellite Imagery Systems  
 - DBOC 2 / OF 8  
 All Weather Imagery Aircraft (Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System [US ASARS] / Global Hawk)  
 - DBOC 4 / OF 5  
 US Unmanned Aerial Vehicles  
 - DBOC 1 / OF 8  
 Average Low Earth/High Orbit ISR assets deployed in theater  
 - 80%



### US Combat Power Against Air Forces

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
Iraqi Air Force Personnel Strength  
 - Total Reported Strength  
 (DBOC 15,000 / OF 15,000)  
 Iraqi Air Force Combat Aircraft  
 - Total Mission Capable Aircraft (DBOC 710 / OF 170)  
 Iraqi Aircraft Damaged  
 - Total Aircraft Destroyed by Friendly Forces  
 (DBOC 52 / OF 52)  
 Iraqi Surface to Air Missile Systems  
 - Total Capable Launch Systems  
 (DBOC 200 / OF 700)  
 Surface to Air Missile Launches  
 - Total Surface to Air Launches  
 (DBOC 200 / OF 14)  
 Surface to Air  
 - Total United States Sortie Power  
 (DBOC 18,000 / OF 41,000)  
 Friendly Aircraft Losses  
 - Total Aircraft Losses  
 (DBOC 27 / OF 7)  
 Surface to Surface Missile Launches  
 - Total Launches  
 (DBOC 51 / OF 10)  
 Commercial Pocket Missile Engagements  
 - Interceptions as percentage of total missile intercepts  
 (DBOC 80% / OF 100%)  
 Total Effort Against Coalition Air  
 - Surface and Standoff Coalition Air as a Percentage of total effort  
 (DBOC 70% / OF 70%)



### Iraqi Ground Force

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
Iraqi Corps Numbers  
 - (DBOC 8 / OF 7)  
 Iraqi Division Numbers  
 - (DBOC 70 / OF 20)  
 Iraqi Infantry Platoons  
 - (DBOC 5000 / OF 1000)  
 Iraqi TBM Numbers  
 - (DBOC 61 / OF 100)  
 Iraqi TBM Launches  
 - (DBOC 61 / OF 10)  
 Iraqi Ground Troop Strength  
 - (DBOC 1.2 million / OF 300,000)  
 Iraqi Unconventional Strength  
 - (DBOC 1.4 million / OF 200,000)  
 Iraqi Artillery Number Types & OP  
 - (DBOC 2000 / OF 1000)  
 Iraqi Tank Numbers  
 - (DBOC 2000 / OF 2000)



### US Fratricide Fatalities

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
Type	Number of Fatalities	DBOC	OF
Ground to Ground	26	4	
Air to Ground	0	10	
Ground to Air	0	1	
Total	26	15	
Size of Coalition Forces	553,301	342,811	
Days of Ground Combat	4	44	
Fatalities per Million Man-days of Combat	15.3	1.2	



### Coalition Fratricide Casualties

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
Type	Number of Casualties	DBOC	OF
Ground to Ground	91	63	
Air to Ground	46	28	
Ground to Air	0	3	
Total	136	96	
Size of Coalition Forces	663,301	342,811	
Days of Ground Combat	4	44	
Casualties per Million Man-days of Combat	83.1	6.3	



**Low Density / High Demand ISR Commitment**

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Percentage of Global Military Force Policy (GMFP)  
 Low Density / High Demand ISR Assets  
 Deployed to CENTCOM & EUCOM 20 Mar-24 APR



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**Battle Damage Assessment (BDA)**

SAMPLE BDA as of 30 April

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PHASE	START	END	STATUS	REMARKS
PH I	1 OCT 2002	14 APR 2003	PLANNING	
PH II	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	RECONSTRUCTION	
PH III	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	TRANSITION	
PH IV	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	PLANNING	
PH V	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	RECONSTRUCTION	
PH VI	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	TRANSITION	
PH VII	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	PLANNING	
PH VIII	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	RECONSTRUCTION	
PH IX	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	TRANSITION	
PH X	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	PLANNING	
PH XI	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	RECONSTRUCTION	
PH XII	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	TRANSITION	
PH XIII	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	PLANNING	
PH XIV	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	RECONSTRUCTION	
PH XV	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	TRANSITION	
PH XVI	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	PLANNING	
PH XVII	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	RECONSTRUCTION	
PH XVIII	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	TRANSITION	
PH XIX	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	PLANNING	
PH XX	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	RECONSTRUCTION	
PH XXI	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	TRANSITION	
PH XXII	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	PLANNING	
PH XXIII	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	RECONSTRUCTION	
PH XXIV	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	TRANSITION	
PH XXV	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	PLANNING	
PH XXVI	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	RECONSTRUCTION	
PH XXVII	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	TRANSITION	
PH XXVIII	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	PLANNING	
PH XXIX	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	RECONSTRUCTION	
PH XXX	14 APR 2003	14 APR 2003	TRANSITION	

JS 1.4 (a)

**Fratricide Prevention**

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- Blue Force Tracker does not equal Combat Identification
- Blue Force Tracker AND Combat Identification combined provide the technological solution to Fratricide
- Blue Force Tracker provides an entity based operational picture of equipped US and Coalition units
- Combat identification systems provides identification of friend or foe
- JP 8.892:
  - Combat identification measures must be consistent with ROE. These measures also must allow units and individuals to conduct actions appropriate for self-defense.
  - Combat identification measures must be established early in the JTF planning cycle.
- Fratricide Fatalities as of 30 May 03\*
  - US: 18
  - Coalition (UK): 6
  - Coalition (Kurd): 16
  - Fatal incidents:
    - 8 ground-ground; 4 air-ground; 2 ground-air



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**Transition to Post Hostilities**

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
	PH IV PLANNING STARTED	OPORD ISSUED	SI ITO	SI IRAQ
CENTCOM FORWARD	8 OCT-DEC 2002	PH IV RECONSTRUCTION 14 APRIL 2003	NOV 2002	NA
Land Component (CPLCC)	DEC 2002	ECLIPSE II 12 APRIL 2003	NOV 2001	19 MAR 2003
JF 4 PLANNING CELL	JAN 2003	NA	JAN 2003	NA
OFFICE of RECONSTRUCTION and HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (ORHA)	FEB 2003	NONE	26 MAR 2003	13 APR 2003 (Jan Gen) 23 APR 2003 ( Baghdad)
CJTF 4/IRAQ/7	NA	NA	16 APR (CPLCC TRANSITION)	19 APR (CPLCC TRANSITION)

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**Joint Fires**

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- **Challenges:** Joint fire employed successfully despite deficient enabling capabilities: common targeting picture, standard fire support coordination measures, interoperable battle management command and control (C2), and deconfliction procedures/measures.
- **Context:** In executing OIF, CENTCOM combined joint fires to create effects across a vast non-contiguous battlespace. Joint precision fires, non-lethal fires, and special operations enabled CENTCOM ground forces with a one to six numerical disadvantage to decisively defeat the Iraqi Army and its surrogates.
- **Why it happened:**
  - Synergistic union of combat power
  - Improved technology, persistent ISR, precision munitions
  - Organizations, procedures, & technology not optimized for dynamic battlespace
  - C2 systems insufficiently networked
  - Insufficient Combat ID and blue situational awareness systems
- **What should be done:**
  - Develop high resolution live-virtual Joint & Multinational training capability
  - Develop networked targeting systems and C2 suites
  - Integrate Blue Force Tracker and assured combat identification (friend or foe) into fire control systems
  - Standardize fire support coordination procedures
  - Develop advanced airspace control procedures and systems
  - Improve target manuestration systems



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**Time Sensitive Targeting (TST)**

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- **Challenges:** The state of the art in TST has advanced dramatically but this capability is perishable and should be preserved.
- **Context:** CENTCOM commenced OIF with a dramatic TST strike against Saddam, and proceeded to execute 188 more against leadership, BSM, terrorist, and other critical targets without fratricide or high collateral damage.
- **Why it happened:**
  - OEF lessons and experience significantly enhanced the joint TST effort for OIF
  - Updated and expanded CONOPS, SOP's, C2 and C3 architecture
  - Integrated TST into CENTCOM, components
  - Real time Theater/Regional response to support detection, tracking, targeting & PID
  - Expanded to take out 40 critical, but not time-sensitive, SECDEF & JFC targets
  - Automated Deep Operations Coordination System (ADOCS (an ACTD)) provided real-time enroute collaboration with components, SOF and OGA
- **What should be done:**
  - Sustain and improve advances through joint training, development of joint tactics, techniques, and procedures, and development of advanced concepts and capabilities
  - Maintain ADOCS as an interim solution




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## Overmatching Strike

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
- Findings:** The overwhelming mobility, survivability, and joint firepower used to spearhead OIF ground maneuver proved decisive in sustaining momentum and breaking the back of the enemy in open, mixed, and urban terrain.
- Context:** Armored and mechanized forces moving to contact were able to re-establish enemy contact when the situation was uncertain. Paramilitary attacks failed to clear the speed of this advance. Enemy prisoner interviews indicate Iraqi fear of these capabilities.
- Why it happened:**
  - Ground operations were simultaneous with air operations, not sequential
  - Rapid Air and Sea supremacy focused support
  - Weather, Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), ISR challenges, and enemy deception created periods of uncertainty
  - Ground operations conducted in all types of terrain
  - Ground forces sustained speed and mobility
  - Joint fires shaped the fight and were closely integrated with maneuver
  - Ground system protection and firepower blunted enemy paramilitary attacks
- What should be done:**
  - Review transformation guidance / roadmaps to ensure overwhelming mobility, survivability, and firepower are maintained—through current or emerging technologies and capabilities.



## Training

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- Findings:** Training provided an insurmountable warfighting edge at the tactical level; by comparison, critical operational level capabilities are less well trained.
- Context:** Superior training of US forces empowered leaders from the tactical to operational level, as demonstrated by agility and innovation in the face of unexpected challenges. Enabling processes such as Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), interagency integration, and theater level ISR management fell short due to lack of high-quality training.
- Why it happened:**
  - Services individual and collective training stands in sharp contrast to the best trained Iraqi unit
  - OEF experience informed many aspects of OIF
  - Deployed US forces were continually trained
  - CENTCOM increased pre-battle training for forces apportioned to OPLAN 1003V
  - Interagency-military integration rarely trained
  - Current training does not replicate scale or scope of federated BDA and ISR management nor provide experience with low-density/high-demand systems
- What should be done:**
  - Take the current training foundation to the next level. Expand operational level training
  - Develop a high resolution live/virtual joint and multinational training capability
  - Increase leader training and experience



## Theater Logistics

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
- Findings:** The Lead Component (CPLC) Director of Logistics and 377<sup>th</sup> TBC created a Theater Support Command Center (TSCC) to manage and coordinate logistics for all Services on the ground in ITO South. One of its responsibilities was battlefield distribution which proved to be a challenge in supporting the operational reach of maneuver units.
- Context:** The campaign was based on rapid advance and bypassing enemy fortifications & sites in order to strike the strategic center of gravity. Logistics concept was a shift from Iran Mountains to a distribution based theater support architecture.
- Why it happened:**
  - Desire to maintain the smallest logistics footprint in theater
  - Corps and Theater distribution assets late in the flow
  - 377<sup>th</sup> Theater Support Command predominantly Reserve Component
  - Leveraging collaboration during BRIGHT STAR 01/02, CPLCC/CA and 377<sup>th</sup> TBC combined 18 other logistics commands into the TSCC to optimize logistics support.
- What should be done:**
  - Theater Support Command Center
    - Formalize doctrine and the organization (boards, centers, and cells) through experimentation and establish a Joint Table of Marginal Products outlining potential requirements
    - Further develop C2 and information management systems
    - Align joint theater logistics standards and cross-service arrangements to isolate SCF support.
  - Battlefield Distribution
    - Develop theater distribution and Combat Service Support C2 and C2I architecture
    - Develop Model & Simulation capabilities for mission analysis and feasibility assessment, and execution tools
    - Continue CENTCOM in Theater Viability/Total Asset Viability Strategy
    - Enhance the capability to resupply on the move (Dynamic Routing and Dispatching)



## Public Affairs/Media Integration

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
- Findings:** Embedded press concept was successful for the US domestic audience, but sapped military public affairs focus from non-embedded regional and international media, thus missing opportunities to provide the US message to these key audiences.
- Context:** The plan to provide embedded access for journalists was largely successful, but without a balanced coverage among different categories of media to provide context and perspective, real time reporting would become a limiting factor to understanding operations.
- Why it happened:**
  - Centralized management of media embed jump started program, but missed opportunities for international and regional media coverage
  - Interagency coordination failed to highlight disconnects in coverage opportunities for international and regional press
  - Military technology & communications is not interoperable with Media requirements
  - Ad hoc coalition Press Information Centers
- What should be done:**
  - Revise joint PA doctrine and organization to exploit military public affairs capabilities to meet the demand of real-time reporting
  - Develop joint training, exercise opportunities to increase commander/Public Affairs Officer effectiveness



## Shaping Interagency Involvement

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- Findings:** In the Combined Force Headquarters, interagency capabilities were successfully integrated into OIF.
- Context:** The Global War on Terrorism ushered in a new era of DoD and interagency cooperation. In addition to the traditional support agencies (DOS, CIA, NSA, DIA, and NGA) expanded support from the Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) was pivotal to enhancing mission accomplishment.
- Why it happened:**
  - SECDEF directed interagency incorporation in Combatant Commands
  - CENTCOM mission analysis led to robust interagency involvement
  - The new JIACG organization lacked clear processes and procedures
- What should be done:**
  - Define interagency roles, responsibilities, and capabilities
  - Create Memorandums of Understanding defining funding, resources and manpower issues
  - Intuse support agencies into Combatant Command planning earlier and throughout campaign



There is no single interagency environment

## EUCOM/CENTCOM Seam

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- Findings:** CENTCOM-EUCOM exceeded the typical supporting-supported relationship, often creating overlap and increasing complexity of coordination.
- Context:** CENTCOM was designated as the supported command for OIF. All other commands were designated supporting. EUCOM, because of its boundary with CENTCOM, had a significant supporting role including the plans for Turkey and keeping Israel out of the fight.
- Why it happened:**
  - EUCOM developed extensive plans and organizations to support 1003v
  - CENTCOM requested Operational Control of all forces in Turkey and the Joint Staff approved
  - Information exchanges between commands were done by briefing and VTC bypassing the Liaison Officers
- What should be done:**
  - Refine Unified Command Plan implementation instructions to define responsibilities and reinforce supporting and supported command relationships



## Joint Lessons Learned Issues

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### Tier I Issues

- Joint Integration and Adaptive Planning
- Joint Force Synergy
- SOF and SCF Conventional Integration
- Urban Operations
- Information Operations
- Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
- Battle Damage Assessment
- Fratricide Prevention
- Transition to Post Hostilities
- Deployment Planning and Execution
- Reserve Mobilization
- Coalition Information Sharing
- Emerging Battlespace
- Knowledge-Enabled Warfare
- Effects-Based Operations

### Tier II Issues

- Joint Fire
- Time Sensitive Targeting
- Overmatching Strike
- Training

### Tier II Issues (Continued)

- Theater Logistics
- Public Affairs/Media Integration
- Shaping Interagency Involvement
- EUCCOM/CENTCOM Seam

### Tier III Issues

- Rotary Wing Attack Aviation
- Targeting
- Information Management
- Collaborative Information Environment
- Non-embedded Media
- Message to the Arab World
- SSE/DTRA/ISG/JTF-CM Integration
- Battlespace Geometry
- Command Relations
- Cruise Missile Defense
- In-transit Visibility
- Joint Movement Control
- Contractor Support
- Training/Exercise Design
- Coalition Integration

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
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# IRAQI FREEDOM in Context

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A Campaign of significant scope, scale, complexity and risk, and new capabilities

- Contributing Factors**
- Northern/Southern Watch—12 yr prep / 1 yr selected air interdiction
  - OEF Afghanistan Experience
  - Existing Component (Land, Sea, Air, SOF) & JTF HQ's
  - Existing C2 facilities
  - Land and Sea prepositioned stocks
  - LIR improvements (\$48B)
  - Greater bandwidth capability
  - Mission rehearsal exercises
  - Overmatching Power
    - Determined time and place of attack
    - Rapid Air and Sea supremacy
    - Precision fires, Speed and depth of maneuver
- OIF vs Desert Storm**
- Fewer land and air forces
  - Extensive use of SOF
  - First use of Land Component Commander
  - Robust Collaborative Planning Effort
  - Greater maneuver distances
  - Fewer Iraqi missile launches
  - Fewer oil wells set ablaze
  - Fewer munitions used
  - Reduced costs



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# OIF in Context

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ASPECT	DESERT STORM (Source)	IRAQI FREEDOM (Source)
INPUT: US forces	•539,831 (p.61 GWAPS vol 5) •Approx. 106,000 RC (p.471, Conduct of Gulf War) •1918 aircraft (p.48, GWAPS Vol 5) (3108 aircraft w/ army helos)	•310,503 (CENTCOM J1 PERSTAT 24 APR 03) •39,258 RC (CENTCOM) •1863 aircraft (p. 7, OIF by the Numbers) (2236 w/ Army helos)
INPUT: Iraqi Ground Forces	1.2 million (Conduct p.83)	350,000 (p.75 Marine Corps Hand Book)
INPUT: Coalition Nations	50 (p. 20 Conduct, APR 92) (23 Fought)	65 (SECDEF, 4 May, News of the World) (5 Fought (8/03 CCPony 23 in ITO, 12 in Iraq))
INPUT: Special Operations Forces	1+ SF Groups (5SFGA and 3SFGA (-)) 5103 (GWAPS VOL V, P.61)	10636 (3 SF Groups (10th, 8th, 3rd SFGA) 8672 (CENTCOM J1 24 APR 03 PERSTAT)
INPUT: Sea Ports of Debarcation	5 Dammam, Al-Jubayl, UAE, Bahrain, Oman (Naval Historical Center website)	3 Kuwait Naval Base, Shuaibeh, Aqaba
INPUT: Bandwidth	100MB (HQAF Briefing "Battlespace Bandwidth")	4.21 GB (3.6 GB commercial (C6))
INPUT: Force Closure (months)	7 Months (AUG 90-FEB 91)	3 Months (JAN 03 (1st DEPODS) -MAR 03)
INPUT: LIR Required	•25 APS/MPS (p.13, USN in DS/DS) •\$7B asset investment during 1980s •3.7 mil tons EQ/Cargo (p.88 GWAPS Vol V)	•42 (TRANSCOM Fact Sheet) •\$48B post DS IR investment •668,289 tons EQ/Cargo (CENTCOM J4)
PERFORMANCE: Air Launched Precision Weapons + TLAMs	8% PGM use (p581-2, GWAPS Vol 5) 210,004 unguided, 17,844 guided	66% PGM use (J8/J4 Update, 23/05/03) 10,878 unguided, 21,186 guided
PERFORMANCE: Scale of Maneuver	420km (24ID, p297 Conduct, APR 92)	788km (USMC to Tikrit)
PERFORMANCE: Integrated Combined Arms	10% (38 days air, 4 days air-ground)	98% (44 days, 43 air-ground)
PERFORMANCE: ISR	3236 sorties (Gulf War Air Power Survey Vol V, p.251, Table 74) •Moving Target Indicator Hours 500 (FAS website) •Battlefield Images •SIGINT Hours •Full Motion Video Hours	•1656 sorties (OIF By The Numbers) •Moving Target Indicator Hours 1,700 •Battlefield Images 42,000 •SIGINT Hours 2,400 •Full Motion Video Hours 3,200
PERFORMANCE: Moving Target Indicators	•Moving Target Indicator Hours 500 (FAS)	•Moving Target Indicator Hours 1,700 (OIF By the numbers p4)
RESULT: Duration	42 (p112&290 Conduct, APR 92)	44 days (19 Mar-1May)
RESULT: Oil Wells set ablaze	750 (DoD, Oil Well Fires Environ. Exposure Report)	9 (CCJ3-OG "Pony" 8 May)
COST: Fratricide	23% (33 of 146 KIA) (DSB Report)	18% (18 (CCJ3-OG)/102 KIA CENTCOM J1 15 MAY)
COST: Personnel Employment (% total force)	12% (539,831 deployed /4,805,967 total) (GWAPS Vol V)	12% (310,503 deployed/2.6million) (CENTCOM J1)
COST: Cost (\$Billions) under development	\$61 (p.634, Conduct, APR 92) (76.6B in 2003 \$)	\$63.3B+7.2B reconstr (4 JUN 03 est. (USD-C))

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## The Big Issues – Quick Look


1. **Capabilities that reached new levels of performance, and need to be sustained and improved**
  - Joint Integration and Adaptive Planning
  - Joint Force Synergy
  - SOF and SOF-Conventional Integration
2. **Capabilities that demonstrated considerable effectiveness, but need enhancement**
  - Urban Operations
  - Information Operations
  - Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
3. **Capabilities that fell short of expectations or needs, and need to be redressed through new initiatives**
  - Battle Damage Assessment
  - Fratricide Prevention
  - Transition to Post Hostilities
  - Deployment Planning and Execution
  - Reserve Mobilization
3. **Capabilities that fell short of expectations or needs, and need to be redressed through new initiatives**
  - Coalition Information Sharing
4. **Second-Tier Issues**
  - Joint Fires
  - Time Sensitive Targeting
  - Overmatching Strike
  - Training
  - Theater Logistics
  - Public Affairs/Media Integration
  - Shaping Interagency Involvement
  - EUCOM/CENTCOM Seam
5. **Insights to future concepts**
  - Emerging Battlespace
  - Knowledge-Enabled Warfare
  - Effects-Based Operations

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## Deployment Planning and Execution

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- **Finding:** Demands for flexibility and adaptation exceeded capabilities of mobilization and deployment processes.
- **Context:** The deployment process necessitated by late changes in planning assumptions caused turbulence in the force flow. Force closure achieved by inefficient workarounds.
- **Why it happened:**
  - Validated TPFDD failed to meet political and operational realities of basing, access, overflight
  - TPFDD refinement impractical as deployment commenced
  - Flexibility required adaptive force module approach
  - Joint force provider and transporter brought in late
  - Mobilization & deployment delinked during execution
  - Maximized prepositioned stocks & combat loading
- **What should be done:**
  - Develop database access & collaborative planning tools to speed sourcing, planning, and execution
  - Create Joint capabilities modules as building blocks for speed and flexibility of planning / execution
  - JFCOM-TRANSCOM develop business rules for supporting and supported commands/agencies to solve deployment challenges
  - Review Active-Reserve mix & mobilization policies
  - Sustain continuity of deployment expertise
  - Review disposition and scale of prepositioned stocks



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**Finding:** Demands for flexibility and adaptation exceeded capabilities of mobilization and deployment processes.

- LTG McKiernan 1 May: The 2-year planning cycles should be dead. We do not operate this way but expend all our energy and training time on it.

**Context:** The deployment process necessitated by late changes in planning assumptions caused turbulence in the force flow. Force closure achieved by inefficient workarounds.

- LTG McKiernan 2 March: I am spending 50% of my time on force deployment. 1 May: Tools do not support fast operations planning. Too many deliberate planning processes. JOPES & Army's AMOPES work in peacetime (efficiency) but not war (effectiveness). JOPES not worth a damn; does not support contingency operations. Even if OSD was not in the equation, JOPES is still messed up. There are too many scars from JOPES – need a new process.

**Why it happened:**

- **Failure of validated TPFDD to meet operational and political realities**
  - JFCOM J3 point paper; statement from ADM Giambastiani (9 May) the joint deployment process owner and force provider
- **TPFDD refinement impractical as deployment commenced**
  - References: Interviews with personnel of various organizations; MTMC, TRANSCOM, JSJ3, JFCOM J3. Karl Lowe did the interviews and one of the conditions was non-attribution, so he doesn't have this attributed to anyone in particular. Additionally, this is not a direct quote, but the idea is reinforced through statements from people at these commands
- **Joint force provider and transporter brought in late**
  - Planning conducted at TS/PS and SECRET SPECAT, JFCOM, TRANSCOM, and needed planners not brought in until late (COL Hatch visits to TRANSCOM and CENTCOM in Jan03; Adm Giambastiani phonecon with GEN Handy)
- **Flexibility required adaptive force module approach**
- **Mobilization & deployment delinked during execution**
  - References: Interviews with personnel of various organizations; MTMC, TRANSCOM, JSJ3, JFCOM J3. Karl Lowe did the interviews and one of the conditions was non-attribution, so he doesn't have this attributed to anyone in particular. Additionally, this is not a direct quote, but the idea is reinforced through statements from people at these commands

• **Basing, overflight, and access challenges**


• **Maximized prepositioned stocks & combat loading**

- 3 ID drew from APS; V Corps JOC drawn from APS; IMEF used MPSRON

**What should be done:**

- **Develop database access & collaborative planning tools to speed sourcing, planning, and execution**
  - MajGen Renuart 7 APR: JOPES sucks. We need to have a fundamental change in business processes.
  - LTG McKiernan 1 May: There are no logistics planning tools (worthy of use).
- **Create Joint capabilities modules as building blocks for speed and flexibility of planning**
- **JFCOM-TRANSCOM develop business rules & collaborative tools for supporting and supported commands/agencies to solve deployment challenges**
- **Review Active-Reserve mix / mobilization authorities**

19



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**ODS:**

Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. V, p. 61, Table 19, week of 27 Feb 91. Total is derived by adding numbers for CENTAF, ARCENT, NAVCENT, MARCENT, and SOCCENT. The 106,000 Reserve figure comes from "Conduct of the Gulf War" page 471. This is an approximation.

**OIF:**

Active and Reserve Source: CENTCOM J1 "Total Forces Dedicated to OPLAN 1003V" daily brief 24 April 2003 (same data provided to JS J4)


**\*\*Navy number for OIF includes 750 Coast Guard personnel to make sum of Active/Reserve equal sum of Services/Special Ops.**

Service and Special Ops Source: CENTCOM J1 "Personnel in AOR in Support of Iraq" daily spreadsheet of 24 April 2003 (same data provided to JS J4)

# Special Operations Forces

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Level of Effort		
	DS	OIF
Theater Operations	1	3
Mission Areas	8	9
Joint Special Operations Area	1	3+
Command & Control	1	4+
LNO Teams	3	8+
Integration	0	11
Combat Power	2	9
Civil Affairs	2	4
Psychological Operations Battalion	1	4



**PSYOP:** DS – 1 Psyop BN  
OIF – 4 Psyop BNs

**Civil Affairs:** DS – 1 CA BDE; CMO in Kuwait  
OIF – CA CMD; 2 CA BDEs; CMO throughout Iraq; Full SPT to Civil Reconstruction

**CBT PWR:** DS – 2 SFG; National JSOTF; 16 SOW(-); 160 SOAR(-); Ranger Co.; Seal TM  
OIF – 2 SFG; National JSOTF; 16 SOW; 352<sup>nd</sup> SOG; 160 SOAR; Ranger Regt (-); NSWTG – One; 720<sup>th</sup> STG; Coalition Forces (TF 64; TF7; TF14)

**Integration:** DS – None  
OIF – 173<sup>rd</sup> ABN BDE; 26<sup>th</sup> MEU; ARNG; UK Royal Marines; Tank Co; HIMARS; CSS; NBC; EPW HSV; 3/325 IN; Dedicated CAS

**LNO Teams:**  
DS – 2 SOCCE w/ Army Corps; 1 SOLE w/ JFACC  
OIF – LNO TMs w/ CFC, CFACC, CFLCC, CFMCC, JTF20, [REDACTED] SOCCEs w/ V Corps/1 MEF; SO LNO TMS w/ Div / BDE

**C2:** DS – SOC; JSOTF for Scud  
OIF – CFSOCC; AOR ops; CJSOTF North; CJSOTF West; NSWTG; JSOACC; JTF 20

OSD 1.4 (d)

**JSOAs:** DS – JSOA in West Iraq  
OIF – JSOAs in W. Iraq; N. Iraq; Independent SOF ops in S. Iraq; vic. HVT Targets

**Mission Areas:** DS – Coal. SPT Teams; Scud Hunting; Limited Spec Recon; Limited Direct Attack; personnel recovery  
OIF – Area Denial in W. Iraq; UW in N. Iraq; UW in S. Iraq; UW in W. Iraq; Counter TBM ops; Spec Recon; Direct Atk; Securing / patrolling maritime locs;; Sensitive Site Exploit


**Theater Ops:** DS – Single Mission Focus  
OIF – Multiple Mission Focus – OIF, Afghanistan, HOA

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# US Combat Power Against Ground Forces

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US GROUND COMBAT POWER		
	DS/DS	OIF
Committed Ground Forces (24 April 2003)	462,288	232,888
Attack Helicopters	473	208
Reinforcing Artillery Platforms	348	38
Total Artillery Platforms	774	278
Air Attack on Ground Forces (Percent of total air effort)	86.3%	79.8%
Armor & Infantry Battalions	74	37



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**Committed Ground Forces (24 April 2003):**

ODS: Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. V, p. 61, Table 19, week of 27 Feb 91. Total is derived by adding numbers for ARCENT, MARCENT, and SOCCENT.

OIF: CFLCC "History of the Ground War" VIP Update Briefing, Quick Look, 26 April 2003, slide 90, "OIF: Forces in Iraq."

**Attack Helicopters:**

ODS: Operation Desert Shield Brief, 3<sup>rd</sup> Army, 24 Feb 1991, Slide Titles: Warfighting Command and Control (XVIII ABN CORPS) and (VII CORPS) and Current Combat Capability (Number includes 257 AH64s and 141 AH1s from US Army w/ an additional 75 AH1s from USMC - GWAPS Vol V pg 32)

OIF: 20 March, 150 A & D models, 3<sup>rd</sup> COSCOM, 19<sup>th</sup> Support Command update. By mid-April the number had grown to 184 (LTC Eric Nelson, G-3 Air, V Corps) because of 3<sup>rd</sup> ACR and 4ID. \*\*This number includes Apache A & D models only. Number includes 58 AH1s deployed with Marines (OIF By the Numbers - p.8)

**Reinforcing Artillery Platforms:**

ODS: Operation Desert Shield Brief, 3<sup>rd</sup> Army, 24 Feb 1991, Slide Titles: Warfighting Command and Control (XVIII ABN CORPS) and (VII CORPS)

OIF: CFLCC "History of the Ground War" VIP Update Briefing, Quick Look, 26 April 2003, Slide 69, "FA Forces" (as of 17 Mar 03)

**Artv Platforms:**

ODS: Operation Desert Shield Brief, 3<sup>rd</sup> Army, 24 Feb 1991, Slide Title: Current Combat Capability

OIF: CFLCC "History of the Ground War" VIP Update Briefing, Quick Look, 26 April 2003, Slide 69, "FA Forces" (as of 17 Mar 03)

**Air Attack on Ground Forces:**

ODS: Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. II, Part 2, pg. 346, figure 41.

OIF: OIF by the Numbers (SECRET), pg 6, Execution graph.

**Armor & Infantry BNs:**

ODS: Operation Desert Shield Brief, 3<sup>rd</sup> Army, 24 Feb 1991, Slide Title: Current Combat Capability

OIF: CFLCC "History of the Ground War" VIP Update Briefing, Quick Look, 26 April 2003,

# Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance

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**JSTARS Moving Target Indicator Hours**  
 -DS/DS 500 / OIF 1700

**ISR Aircraft Sorties**  
 -DS/DS 3236 / OIF 1656

**Coalition ISR Aircraft**  
 -DS/DS -115 / OIF 118

**Average Surface-to-Surface Missile Launch Warning Times**  
 [REDACTED]


**Commercial Satellite Resolution**  
 -DS/DS 10 meter / OIF 1 meter

**Commercial Satellite Imagery Systems**  
 -DS/DS 2 / OIF 5

**All Weather Imagery Aircraft (Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar System [L2 ASARS] / Global Hawk)**  
 -DS/DS 4 / OIF 5

**US Unmanned Aerial Vehicles**  
 -DS/DS 1 / OIF 9

**Average Low Density/High Demand ISR assets deployed in theater:**  
 -80%



JS 1.4 (9)

**Coalition ISR Aircraft**

OIF: 118 Sources -Operation IRAQI FREEDOM - By The Numbers CFACC Assessment and Analysis Division 30 April 2003]  
 ODS: -115

**Manned ISR Aircraft Sorties**

OIF: 1656 Sources - Operation IRAQI FREEDOM - By The Numbers CFACC Assessment and Analysis Division 30 April 2003]  
 ODS: 3236 Sources - Gulf War Air Power Survey Vol V p 251 Table 74]

**JSTARS/MTI Hours**

OIF: 1700 Sources - Operation IRAQI FREEDOM - By The Numbers CFACC Assessment and Analysis Division 30 April 2003]  
 ODS: 500 Sources -

**US UAV Systems**

OIF: 9 [Global Hawk, Predator, Shadow 200, Hunter, Pointer, Pioneer, Dragon Eye, FPSS, Silver Fox] UAV Planning Task Force Deputy quoted at www.auva.org/iraq/index.cfm  
 ODS: 1 [Pioneer] Multiple sources

**Commercial Satellite Imagery Systems**

OIF: 5 [Commercial imagery systems used in OIF include SPOT, Quickbird, IKONOS, Indian Remote Sensing (IRS) and Canada's RADARSAT 1] Sources - Aerospace Daily May 16, 2003, "Commercial Satellite Imagery 'Key' In Iraq, NIMA Official Says"; US Army Space Command Spectral Operations Resource Center (FWD) Spectral Imagery Support to Combined Forces Special Operations Command Central Command (CFSOCC) Interim Progress Review Briefing  
 ODS: 2 [SPOT & LANDSAT] Sources - Final Report to Congress: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War April 92 page 888

**All Weather Imagery Aircraft (i.e. ASARS / Global Hawk)**

OIF: [-5 ASARS + 1 Global Hawk]  
 ODS: [4 ASARS] Source - IDA Paper P-2661 Desert Storm SCUD Campaign, April '92 Table II-7

**Average SSM Launch Warning Times**

[REDACTED]


**Commercial Satellite Resolution**

OIF: 1 m. [IKONOS panchromatic]  
 ODS: 10 m. [SPOT 1 panchromatic]


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Aspect	DESERT STORM	OIF (Secret Version)
Iraqi Air Force Personnel Strength	18,000 (GWAPS Vol 1, pg 218)	18,000 (OIF by the Numbers) ;p.3
Iraqi Air Force Combat Aircraft	779 (GWAP Vol V)	173 (328 total—173 operational; OIF by the Numbers) p. 3
Iraqi Aircraft Downed	39 (GWAPS Vol V, pg 665)	0 (OIF by the Numbers)
Iraqi Surface-to-Air Batteries	200 (GWAP Vol V, pg 19)	210 (OIF by the Numbers) p.4
Total SAM Launches	386 (NAIC-1320-0612-03)	14 (OIF by the Numbers) p.4
Total US Sorties Flown	128,000 (Facts and Figures COMUSCENTCOM)	41,404 (OIF by the Numbers) p.8
Friendly Aircraft Losses	27 (GWAPS Vol 5, pg 670)	7 (OIF by the Numbers) p.4
Surface-to-Surface Missile Launches	88 (Facts and Figures, COMUSCENTCOM)	19 (OIF by the Numbers) p.4
Patriot Engagements	50% (92 Launched destroyed 46; GWAP Vol 5)	100% (9 for 9 minus two fratricides; CFLCC 32 <sup>nd</sup> AAMDC)
Total Effort Against Counter Air	15% ( GWAP, Vol 2, Part 2., pg 346 and Vol 5, pg 251) Computed by adding msns against airfields and SAMS and air CAP sorties	7% (OIF by the Numbers) p.6



**Sources:**

•Iraqi Corps

DS- Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (p.83) OIF- Marine Corps Hand Book (Iraq) and CENTCOM Force Dispositions 19 Mar 03( p.74)

•Iraqi Div

DS- Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (P.83) OIF- Marine Corps Hand Book (Iraq) and CENTCOM Force Dispositions 19 Mar 03 (p. 74)

•Iraqi Enemy POWs

DS- Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (p.296) OIF- CFLCC BUA 28 APR 03

•Iraqi TBM Numbers

DS- Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (p.97) OIF- CENTCOM daily sitrep dated as of 28 FEB 03

•Iraqi TBM Launched

DS- Gulf War Air power survey (p.562) OIF- OIF by the numbers ) (p.4)

•Iraqi Troop Ground Strength

DS- Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (p.83) OIF- Marine Corps Hand Book (Iraq) (p.75)

•Iraqi Unconventional Strength

DS- 1M (DIA, MEK, SSO, DGS, Ba'ath Party Militia, People's Army/Popular Army, Def and Scty Bns, Regional Forces Cmds, Petroleum Defense Command); OIF- 250k (MEK, SSO, DGS, Fedeyeen Saddam, al Quds)

•Iraqi Artillery Numbers

DS- Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (p.83) OIF- Marine Corps Hand Book (Iraq) (p.77)


•Iraqi Tank Numbers

DS- Conduct of the Persian Gulf War (p.83) OIF- Marine Corps Hand Book (Iraq) (p.76)

# US Fratricide Fatalities

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Type	Number of Fatalities	
	DS/DS	OIF
Ground to Ground	24	4
Air to Ground	9	13
Ground to Air	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>18</b>
Size of Combat Force	539,931	310,503
Days of Ground Combat	4	44
Fatalities per Million Man-days of Combat	15.3	1.3



Incident Type	Number of Fatalities	
	DS/DS	OIF
OIF		
Ground to Ground	24	4 (+3UK)
Air to Ground	9 (+9UK)	13 (+1UK)
Ground to Air	0	1(+2UK)
<b>Total</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>19</b>

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
ODS Data from Defense Science Board Report  
 OIF data from CENTCOM CJ-1 data as of 15 May 2003, reconciled with CENTCOM SJA  
 Size of Combat Force 539,931 310,503  
 Force size from GWAPS vol v pg 61 and 24 April 2003 CENTCOM personnel data  
 Days of Ground Combat 4 43  
 96 hours for ODS; 19 March to 2 May for OIF  
 Incidents /Million Cbt Mday 15.3 1.3  
 ODS =33/(.539X4)  
 OIF =18/(.310X44)

# Coalition Fratricide Casualties

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Type	Number of Casualties	
	DS/DS	OIF
Ground to Ground	81	63
Air to Ground	45	29
Ground to Air	0	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>95</b>
Size of Combat Force	593,393	342,511
Days of Ground Combat	4	44
Casualties per Million Man-days of Combat	53.1	6.3

Investigations are still pending



For OIF, Coalition = US, Aus, Brits. No fratricide occurred with Aus  
 For ODS, Coalition = US and Brits

Incident Type	Number of Casualties	
	DS/DS	OIF
Ground to Ground	81	63
Air to Ground	45	29
Ground to Air	0	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>95</b>

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ODS Data from DSB. OIF data from CENTCOM CJ-1 data as of 15 May 2003, reconciled with CENTCOM SJA

Size of Combat Force 593,393 342,511

ODS Force size from GWAPS vol v pg 61 (US) and UK Ministry of Defence web site (UK)

OIF Force size 24 April 2003 CENTCOM personnel data

Days of Ground Combat 4 43

96 hours for ODS; 19 March to 2 May for OIF

Casualties /Million Cbt Mday 53.1 6.3

ODS =126/(.593X4)

OIF =95/(.343X44)

## Fratricide Prevention

- Blue Force Tracker does not equal Combat Identification
- Blue Force Tracker AND Combat Identification combined provide the technological solution to Fratricide
- Blue Force Tracker provides an entity based operational picture of equipped US and Coalition units
- Combat Identification systems provides identification of friend or foe

- JP 5.002:

- Combat identification measures must be consistent with ROE. These measures also must allow units and individuals to conduct actions appropriate for self-defense.
- Combat identification measures must be established early in the JTF planning cycle.



- Fratricide Fatalities as of 30 May 03\*

- US: 18
- Coalition (UK): 6
- Coalition (Kurds): 18
- Fatal Incidents:
  - 6 ground-ground; 4 air-ground; 2 ground-air

\*Investigations pending

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### OIF CASUALTIES

(as of 8 MAY)

- Total Deaths: 174 (US - 140, UK - 34)
- Total KIA: 114 (US - 102, UK - 12)
- Total WIA: 591 (US - 555, UK - 36)

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### ONGOING INVESTIGATIONS (FOUO)

#### FRIENDLY FIRE

<u>DATE OF INCIDENT</u>	<u>EVENT</u>	<u>OPR</u>
20 MAR 03	COBRA FIRES ON TANK	CFLCC
22 MAR 03	PATRIOT SHOOT DOWN TORNADO	CFACC
24 MAR 03	A-10 FIRES ON MARINES	CFACC
24 MAR 03	F16 FIRES ON PATRIOT RADAR	CFACC
25 MAR 03	MARINE FIRES ON MARINE	CFLCC
26 MAR 03	MARINES FIRE MORTARS AT MARINES	CFLCC
26 MAR 03	SOLDIER SHOOT SOLDIER	CFLCC
28 MAR 03	A-10 FIRES ON BRITISH VEHICLES	CFACC
02 APR 03	PATRIOT SHOOT DOWN F/A-18	CFLCC
03 APR 03	F-15E DROPS GBU-12 ON V CORPS 1-39 FA	CFACC
03 APR 03	3 ID BRADLEY ENGAGES V CORPS SOLDIER	CFLCC
06 APR 03	U.S. AIRCRAFT BOMBS CONVOY	CFACC
08 APR 03	1AD FIRES ON TF20	CFLCC
14 APR 03	U.S. SNIPER HITS MARINE	CFLCC

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as of 160903

**Situation:**

The coalition has a narrow window of opportunity before impatience intensifies the level of Iraqi and regional hostility. The elements of success and the current dilemma described in a series of illustrative equations:

- Success = Stability + Governance + Justice
  - Stability = Employment + Security
  - Employment = Power + Industry

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Conversely,

Confrontation = Unemployment + Security

Barring aligned, linked and resourced action by the CPA and CJTF-7, the risk of widespread confrontation is increasing. While other actions might be taken to influence the course of events in Iraq, what follows are a series of recommendations based on the observations from the Joint Lessons Learned team's recent *First Look* briefing.

Foremost among our impressions is a general sense from military and CPA leaders outside of Baghdad that concerted action is constrained by key resource constraints and a cumbersome bureaucracy. These constraints limit agility, responsiveness, and unified action, and have wasted a significant portion a limited window of opportunity to produce outcomes that co-opt the Iraqi population. The longer the present situation continues, the more difficult it will be to achieve an outcome that avoids keeping Americans in harm's way for an unforeseeable period. There is a clear sense of urgency among these leaders that bold steps are needed now.

**Organization**

This paper summarizes a short list of actionable recommendations that could have an immediate or near term impact on the Iraqi situation by better enabling and empowering CPA and CJTF-7. Following this one page summary is an enclosure with more detail to provide action agents with a starting point in developing policy or programs. The second enclosure identifies the 11 issues identified by the Joint Lessons Learned Post-Major Combat Operations First Look briefing and shows the linkage between those issues and the recommendations that follow.

This paper does not repeat actions in coordination between CENTCOM and JFCOM:

- Deploy a joint command and control training team for 30 days with two senior mentors.
- Provide CJTF-7 an intelligence-based collaborative information tiger team.
- Provide CPA and CJTF-7 infrastructure for effects-based planning to aid longer term execution.
- As the Joint Force Provider, assist the individual augmentation process.

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
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**Proposed Quick Wins Top 15.** A summary of actionable recommendations that can have a positive immediate to near term impact on the Iraqi situation by better enabling and empowering CPA and CJTF-7.

1. **Recommendation:** synchronize CPA and regional military commands' policies to accommodate difference based on regional diversity of the people and economy.
2. **Recommendation:** immediately implement recent CPA-CENTCOM communications survey recommendations; reassess requirements for state of the art solutions as available.
3. **Recommendation:** increase and sustain Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding until CPA/Ministry reconstruction programs have achieved results that gain recognition of by the Iraqi population; include regulatory guidance or law (as required) to treat CERP money as a grant.
4. **Recommendation:** establish contingency contracting rules that enable prime contractors to rapidly subcontract work until CPA/Ministry reconstruction programs have achieved results that gain recognition of by the Iraqi population.
5. 
6. **Recommendation:** define non-governmental organization (NGO), reconstruction/recovery contractor, etc. presence that would warrant a reduction in civil affairs (CA) manning; sustain current CA manning until those conditions are achieved. JS 1.4 (a), (c)
7. **Recommendation:** initiate NSC led, DoD facilitated, interagency planning to integrate Federal agency and coalition activities with the CPA-CENTCOM plan (to be briefed 20 Sep 03). Include timelines and associated conditions for achievement of national, interagency, DoD, CPA and CENTCOM goals and objectives.
8. **Recommendation:** develop a mobile training team to train designated OIF 2 and 3 rotation units in OIF plans, lessons learned low and intensity conflict/MOOTW doctrine to minimize "discovery learning."
9. **Recommendation:** implement Personal Services Contracts (as used in the Moscow Embassy reconstruction) for stable CPA staffing and development of other shortfall capabilities in the Iraq mission; concurrently direct minimum CPA tours at 180 days.
10. **Recommendation:** increase the interpreters per capita in all military and CPA organization.
11. **Recommendation:** conduct an assessment of resource requirements from brigade to CPA level and realign current budget requests and resource plans to existing conditions.
12. **Recommendation:** review CPA and CJTF-7 military and civilian manning documents against actual requirements, increase and fill authorized manning as required.
13. **Recommendation:** rapidly survey military commanders to determine what ISR capabilities available during combat operations or other assets are required and provide them immediately.

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- 14. Recommendation:** invest in restoration of the civilian communications infrastructure with similar levels of effort as devoted to the power grid.
- 15. Recommendation:** re-energize strategic communications, including formation of an interagency working group, [REDACTED] reenergizing media embeds, and commercial media assistance.

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JS 1.4 ( a )

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**Proposed Quick Wins Top 15 Detailed Recommendations** These actionable detail ed recommendations provide action agents with a starting point in developing policy or programs that can have a positive immediate to near term impact on the Iraqi situation by better enabling and empowering CPA and CJTF-7.

- 1. Recommendation:** synchronize CPA and regional military commands' policies to accommodate difference based on regional diversity of the people and economy.
  - Coordinate and align all emerging CPA policies with or phase them in so that local policies established by regional military commands, in the absence of CPA / ministry policies, are not inadvertently overturned, undermining the credibility / authority of local commanders.
- 2. Recommendation:** immediately implement recent CPA-CENTCOM communications survey recommendations; reassess requirements for state of the art solutions as available.
  - Increase US local and countrywide military and civil authority communications infrastructure to facilitate integrated coordination, collaboration, and action. Begin by implementing recommendations from the recent CPA-CENTCOM communications survey and follow up with an outside survey to further assess and improve the network.
  - Deploy a collaborative information environment tiger team to conduct a survey of Iraq wide US military and civilian C2I requirements and then engage with the various PEO's, DISA, NII, etc. to rapidly relevant field systems of record and ACTD capabilities. This action should provide the same collaborative environment infrastructure that supported CENTCOM's combat operations.
- 3. Recommendation:** increase and sustain Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding until CPA/Ministry reconstruction programs have achieved results that gain recognition of by the Iraqi population; include regulatory guidance or law (as required) to treat CERP money as a grant.
  - Develop alternative funding mechanism to replace seized Iraqi assets as they are consumed. At a minimum, this funding must meet CERP projects commitments until CPA/Ministry reconstruction programs have achieved results that gain recognition of by the Iraqi population.
  - Establish regulatory guidance or law (as required) to treat money expended under CERP as a grant, not as an accountable fund. Current accountability requirements preclude commanders from taking immediate action to resolve crises where "throwing money" at the problem can have an immediate calming effect.
  - Approve the current proposal to double the amount under brigade and division commander's control and authorize division level funding to current and future O-6 commanders with division areas of responsibility.

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4. **Recommendation:** establish contingency contracting rules that enable prime contractors to rapidly subcontract work until CPA/Ministry reconstruction programs have achieved results that gain recognition of by the Iraqi population.
- Change contracting regulations so that lead contractors are able rapidly subcontract work under contingency contracting rules. Where DERF and CERP allowed for non-regulatory expenditures of funds by the military; similarly regulations must be changed to allow for immediate action on key infrastructure reconstruction. Currently, time is the most critical variable; compressing completion of essential reconstruction and recovery projects is preferable to efficient expenditures of funds or execution of contract vehicles in accordance with peacetime regulations and procedures.



JS 1.4 ( C )

6. **Recommendation:** define non-governmental organization (NGO), reconstruction/recovery contractor, etc. presence that would warrant a reduction in civil affairs (CA) manning; sustain current CA manning until those conditions are achieved.
- CJTF-7 and subordinate CA and Division commanders must define acceptable levels of NGO, reconstruction/recovery contractor, etc. presence necessary to warrant a reduction in CA manning. Currently, CA force levels are planned to decrease; however until CA assets are able to focus on their doctrinal role of planning and coordination and not on the execution of civil-military operations and projects, current CA manning should be sustained pending arrival of the resources necessary to reduce the execution requirement.
7. **Recommendation:** initiate NSC led, DoD facilitated, interagency planning to integrate Federal agency and coalition activities with the CPA-CENTCOM plan (to be briefed 20 Sep 03). Include timelines and associated conditions for achievement of national, interagency, DoD, CPA and CENTCOM goals and objectives.
8. **Recommendation:** develop a mobile training team to train designated OIF 2 and 3 rotation units in OIF plans, lessons learned low and intensity conflict/MOOTW doctrine to minimize "discovery learning."
- Task JFCOM and a designated Department of the Army agent to develop a mobile training team to train designated OIF 2 and 3 rotation units in low intensity conflict / MOOTW doctrine and lessons learned. The model should be the Army's BCTP Team F urban operations mobile training team that taught doctrine, history, and contemporary lessons learned at the tactical and operational levels. This effort must include current plans, lessons and TTP currently assessed as effective in Iraq as well as lessons and TTP

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that will become relevant as the situation transitions to greater levels of stability, internationalization, etc. The objective is to establish a common doctrinal and experience baseline to allow rotating units to "hit the ground running" and avoid /minimize "discovery learning."

9. **Recommendation:** implement Personal Services Contracts (as used in the Moscow Embassy reconstruction) for stable CPA staffing and development of other shortfall capabilities in the Iraq mission; concurrently direct minimum CPA tours at 180 days.

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JS 1.4 (a), (c)

- As manning increases, push more CPA staff out of Baghdad to man regional offices to strengthen the regional offices and improve interface with the Iraqi populace and regional military commands—recognizing the politics are local and practical solutions flow from the bottom.
  - Direct minimum CPA tours at 180 days. Military tours provide continuity over a 360-day period; CPA manning policies contribute to discontinuity. The CPA is staffed with personnel from the State Department, DoD civilians, contractors and other government agencies. Each sourcing organization has established its own rotation structure.
10. **Recommendation:** increase the interpreters per capita in all military and CPA organization.
11. **Recommendation:** conduct an assessment of resource requirements from brigade to CPA level and realign current budget requests and resource plans to existing conditions.
12. **Recommendation:** review CPA and CJTF-7 military and civilian manning documents against actual requirements, increase and fill actual manning as required.
- Review CPA and CJTF-7 military and civilian manning documents against actual requirements; specifically for CJTF-7, compare current manning authorizations to the strength of CENTCOM components during major combat operations. Where critical or unrealistic shortfalls are identified, increase and fill authorized manning as required. While joint military manpower accounts are shown to be above 90% for both CPA and CJTF-7, the authorized manning is significantly smaller than that found in any of the joint headquarters that conducted major combat operations through 1 May 03.
13. **Recommendation:** rapidly survey military commanders to determine what ISR capabilities available during combat operations or other assets are required and provide them immediately.

JS 1.4 (a)

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- [REDACTED]
- IS 1.4 (a), (c)
- Examine operational level intelligence functions and their contributions to providing actionable intelligence from a customer perspective (CJTF, division and brigade command level). Reallocate and reconstitute, as necessary, HUMINT and other ISR assets necessary to influence the fight on the ground. [REDACTED] CIA 1.4(c)  
[REDACTED] DIA 1.4(c)
  - Consult with US Border patrol on useful tactics, techniques, procedures and assets for border control. Similarly, assemble an interagency [REDACTED] to assess the needs of CJTF-7 for [REDACTED] DIA 1.4(c)
  - Provide a JWAC tiger team to assess where their advanced tools and processes link and pattern analysis, crony networks, etc. can be applied.
  - Develop an intelligence network to support countrywide integration and access to national, Middle East-regional, and Iraq specific countrywide, regional, and tactical databases.
- 14. Recommendation:** invest in restoration of the civilian communications infrastructure with similar levels of effort as devoted to the power grid.
- Provide the same focus and resources into restoration of the civilian communications infrastructure as with power; begin with the same US Army Corps of Engineer effort and rapidly transition to commercial reconstruction as contingency contracting regulations are established.
- 15. Recommendation:** re-energize strategic communications, including formation of an interagency working group, execution of offensive IO, reenergizing media embeds, and commercial media assistance
- [REDACTED] IS 1.4 (a), (c), (g)
  - Redirect all US/CPA satellite based media to the correct regional satellite commonly accessed by the Iraqi population; there are two principal regional satellites in the region; access to US friendly media requires the dish to be physically moved to the secondary satellite that does not carry the bulk of popular programming.
  - Engage regional allies and friendly nations to take action against local media outlets that are promulgating hostile messages. While overt censorship is a challenge for the US, many of the organs promoting anti-US/Coalition messages are owned by governments that are allied, aligned with or cooperating with the US in the region.

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- Reenergize the media embed program. While the media embed program continues, it is at a much lower level of participation (currently 38 embedded media vs 800 (500 domestic and 200 international journalists under US control and 100 under UK control). This lower level of participation, even with the CJTF-7 "embark" program with 40 to 50 daily occurrences, fails to overcome the negative press and misinformation inundating the local population.
- Establish commercial media teams to help the Iraqi's produce programming that can compete with regional commercial and hostile media sources. Current CPA sponsored programming does not receive the market share that other, negative organs do. The sophistication of these competing sources outclasses our efforts. Support by professionals in radio, local and satellite TV, and print media programming, production, and equipment can help overcome this situation.

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**Joint Lessons Learned *First Look* Issues**

- **Capabilities That Exceeded Expectations**
- **Initiative and Adaptation.** Adaptive tactical action is meeting near term civil and humanitarian needs, setting (transitory) conditions for national development and appears to impede enemy options. Since major combat operations concluded, US forces are concurrently executing combat and civil-military operations on a scale similar to WWII. Actions include governing, supervising elections, urban raids, HUMINT exploitation, supporting special operations, repair of infrastructure, and reestablishing social services. US military innovation is meeting these challenges and buying time for national solutions.
- **Commander's Emergency Relief Program.** Innovative use of Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) funding buys time and goodwill and sets the condition for larger programs to take hold. Military commanders are given wide discretion to exploit seized Iraqi assets to effect civil action projects that provide immediate impact in the local area and gain the confidence of the populace and their official and unofficial leaders in the absence of national level programs.
- **Capabilities That Demonstrated Considerable Effectiveness**
-  JS 1.4 (a)
- **Civil Affairs.** Civil Affairs (CA) is important to post-MCO missions. Utilization, equipment, and impending redeployment limit effectiveness and options when demand/need is increasing.  JS 1.4 (a)
- **Campaign Planning and Awareness.** Uneven post-Military Combat Operations (MCO) planning and awareness is resulting in misaligned actions and *discovery learning* across civil & military organizations.
- **Training, Doctrine, and Education.** Post-Military Combat Operations (MCO) planning, training, experience, and doctrinal awareness is uneven, resulting in *discovery learning* in both civil and military organizations. Recent experience in the Balkans, Somalia, etc., while uneven across the force, provided a basis for action, particularly in the absence of commonly understood doctrine, inconsistent training and uneven planning.
- **Capabilities That Fell Short of Expectations or Needs** JS 1.4 (a)
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
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IS 1.4 (a), (c), (g)

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
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CIA 1.4(c)

DIA 1.4(c)

IS 1.4 (a), (c)

151.4 (a), (c)



1.1.1 (a), (c)

# *Afghan National Security Forces - Operations Summary*

## Week of 09 Jan 2006 – 15 Jan 2006:

**ANA:** Unit 2/2/205<sup>th</sup> w/TG ORCA (27 Dec – 21 Jan) OP SOR STERGE II, Special Recon Patrols, Oruzgan province.

**ANA:** Unit 2/1/203<sup>rd</sup> @FOB 32 (10 Jan – 10 Feb) OP FOLAD BORAN II, Dismounted/Mounted, Paktika province.

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January 26, 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: PRT Memos

Attached is a memo George Casey sent on the subject of the PRTs. I wanted you to have it before the meeting.

As you correctly indicated, he supports them as the only way to strengthen the provincial governments and get the U.S. military free of some of the responsibility. However, he points out that we should not do them unless there is a rock solid commitment that State will perform their tasks, otherwise it doesn't accomplish anything.

We have still not completed filling the Afghan PRTs. Indeed, Abizaid's attached note points out that vacant positions are scheduled to be filled, but the actual fill today is less than it was six months ago, so there is a problem.

Attach. 1/26/06 Abizaid memo to SecDef; Casey.PRT Message

DHR.dh  
012606-01

DECLASSIFIED JUL 8 2010  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

~~SECRET~~

09-M-2762

~~SECRET NOFORN~~

Eyes Only

CCCC

January 26, 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: PRTs in Iraq

Mr. Secretary,

I concur with General Casey's PRT message. His point concerning support however must be emphasized. Having just returned from Afghanistan, I noted that DOS, USAID, and DOA participation in our PRTs continues to be challenged. Although I am told that vacant positions are scheduled to be filled, actual fill is less today than six months ago. If we are to have PRTs, we need and welcome good people to participate from these agencies. ✓

V/R

John

CC: CJCS

DECLASSIFIED JUL 8 2016  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
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~~SECRET NOFORN~~

Eyes Only

09-M-2762

SUBJ/PERSONAL FOR SECDEF

CC CJCS / CENTCOM COMMANDER / AMBASSADOR KHALIZAD,

SUBJECT: PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS (PRTS)

1. (U) MR SECRETARY, MY REVIEW OF THE 60 DAY PRT PROOF OF PRINCIPLE ASSESSMENT HAS REINFORCED MY CONVICTIONS THAT THIS IS THE RIGHT INITIATIVE, FOR THIS PERIOD IN OUR MISSION HERE, BUT IT HAS NOT ALLEVIATED MY CONCERN WITH RESPECT TO THE DEDICATED RESOURCES AND COMMITMENT NECESSARY TO POSITION THE PRTS FOR SUCCESS. HERE ARE MY THOUGHTS:

2. (S/REL) IT IS CLEAR THAT THE PRT'S CONTRIBUTIONS TOWARD ESTABLISHING CAPABLE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS ARE CENTRAL TO THE CAPACITY BUILDING IN THE PROVINCES AND OUR COUNTERINSURGENCY EFFORT. I SUPPORT THE PRT INITIATIVE AND BELIEVE IT IS THE BEST WAY TO TRANSITION THE ONGOING POLITICAL / ECONOMIC ADVISORY MISSIONS OUT OF THE HANDS OF THE MILITARY AND TO THE IRAQIS. ROBUST ENGAGEMENT AT THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL WILL BE CRITICAL DURING THE UPCOMING GOVERNMENT TRANSITION AS IRAQ WORKS THRU DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER.

3. (U) THAT SAID, THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT RESOURCE INVESTMENTS THAT ARE REQUIRED TO ENSURE THE SUCCESS OF THIS PROJECTED TWO YEAR PROGRAM.

A. FOR THE NOMINAL PRT, THE ASSESSMENT HAS SHOWN THAT THE MILITARY CONTRIBUTION (TEAM MEMBERS, CIVIL AFFAIRS PERSONNEL AND 2 MILITARY MOVEMENT TEAMS) WILL NEED TO BE APPROXIMATELY 50 PERSONNEL AND 14 UAHs PER PRT.

B. ASSUMING WE WILL SUPPORT UP TO 10 PRTS CO-LOCATED ON FOBS AND TWO OF THE THREE MOVEMENT TEAMS, THE LIFE SUPPORT COSTS ALONE ARE EXPECTED TO BE APPROXIMATELY \$2M PER PRT PER YEAR.

C. THERE ARE INHERENT LOGISTICS AND INFRASTRUCTURE SUPPORT ASSOCIATED WITH PRT CO-LOCATION ON THE FOBS (E.G. VEHICAL AND FACILITY MAINTENANCE, HELO SUPPORT, COMMUNICATIONS) THAT WE WILL ABSORB.

WHILE WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THIS RESOURCE ALLOCATION, WE NEED TO ENSURE THE REQUISITE DOS COMMITMENT AND SUPPORT IS FORTHCOMING AND ENDURING.

4. (U) I REMAIN CONCERNED ABOUT THE FIDELITY OF THE DOS SUPPORT FOR THE PRTS. SPECIFICALLY:

A. THERE IS STILL A DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN US AND THE EMBASSY ABOUT WHO SHOULD PROVIDE THE MOVEMENT SECURITY TEAMS FOR THE PRT'S. THE EMBASSY POSITION IS THAT ALL OF THE MOVEMENT SECURITY TEAMS SHOULD BE PROVIDED BY THE MILITARY, FREEING DOS RESOURCES FOR OTHER MISSIONS INSIDE IRAQ.

B. DOS SECURITY RESTRICTIONS CONTINUE TO IMPACT PRT ENGAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES AND NEED TO BE ADDRESSED BY DOS LEADERSHIP.

C. THE FUNDING FOR THE USAID LOCAL GOVERNANCE PROGRAM (LGP), THE CORNERSTONE OF THE PRT CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT AND THE IRAQI FACE OF THE PRT, HAS BEEN FRONT-LOADED FOR THE INITIAL PRT STAND-UP AND RUNS OUT IN LATE

SPRING, ADDITIONAL FUNDING REQUIRED FOR FY06 (\$225M) IS CONTINGENT UPON DOS BUDGET PRIORITIES; WITHOUT THE LGP THE PRTS REMAIN A CIVIL AFFAIRS SHOW.

D. DOS AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES MUST BE COMMITTED TO ASSIGNING EXPERIENCED PERSONNEL TO THE PRT TO REDUCE STRESS ON OUR CA, CS AND CSS FORCES, OTHERWISE THE BURDEN WILL REMAIN WITH THE MILITARY FORCES. THIS IS A KEY COMMITMENT.

E. THERE IS IN-THEATRE CONSENSUS THAT SUPPORTS RENAMING THE PRTS TO BETTER REPRESENT THEIR TRUE ROLE. WE NEED TO STEP AWAY FROM "RECONSTRUCTION" AS IT RELATES TO THIS PROGRAM, IT IS MISLEADING AND CONFUSES THE IRAQIS; PROVINCIAL "DEVELOPMENT" TEAM (PDT) MAKES MORE SENSE AND IS THE CLEAR FAVORITE AMONG THOSE CLOSE TO THE PROGRAM.

5. (U) THE PROOF OF PRINCIPLE ASSESSMENT HAS PROVIDED A SOLID SELF EXAMINATION AS WELL AS HIGHLIGHTED AREAS THAT NEED TO BE ADDRESSED AND FINE TUNED. AMBASSADOR KHALILZAD AND I REMAIN COMMITTED TO MAKING THE PRT CONCEPT WORK. WHILE WE CONTINUE TO WORK THE RELATED ISSUES WE HAVE CHALLENGED OUR TEAM TO CONTINUE TO EXAMINE PRT OPTIONS THAT MAY REFLECT CHANGES IN RESOURCING, COALITION AND BATTLESPACE DYNAMICS.

6. I WILL GET BACK TO WITH YOU AS WE FINALIZE THE MILITARY REQUIREMENTS.

DECLASSIFIED - JUL 8 2010  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

09-M-2762

~~TOP SECRET~~

FOR GEN MYERS AND  
DSD

JAN. 3, 2005  
7:53 PM

From:

[REDACTED] (Defense-NSC)

Sent:

Monday, January 03, 2005 6:47 PM

OSD 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

Cc:

[REDACTED] (Defense-NSC); [REDACTED] (Defense-NSC); [REDACTED] (Defense-NSC); [REDACTED] (SPSWA-NSC)

Subject:

FW: [REDACTED] ISF training assessments [TOP SECRET, Record]

CIA 1.4 (c)

*Account team*

The key assessments [REDACTED] of the US-led ISF training program are:

- The current effort to train regular police is a complete failure.
- The overall program to train Iraqi military from the bottom up is not succeeding and is deeply and fundamentally flawed.
- The coalition training effort is under-resourced both in terms of trainers and equipment, and even trained, deployable Iraqi units many times lack sufficient transport and communications.
- The fundamental problem of Iraqi forces is leadership.
- We train enlisted and officers separately, then thrust these units into combat having established no bonds of loyalty or trust. They often fail to fight or simply fall apart.
- We are not training an Iraqi Army but a collection of battalion-size militias, designed to be dependant on coalition forces for their organic support. This undermines nationalistic pride and esprit de corps and defies the common practice in most armies in the world, whose units are formed from the top down.
- The decommissioning of the entire Iraqi military has left military officers unemployed or underemployed and without the socialized benefits routinely received during Saddam's regime – many of these soldiers are embittered and have used their skills to fuel the insurgency.

Recommendations: CIA 1.4 (c)

- Bring back respected elements of the former Army, supported by key national leaders of all major groups, employing a top-down approach.

DECLASSIFIED In Part JUN 14 2010  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, DoD Ofc of Security Review

~~TOP SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~ REL MCFI//X1



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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 01 2010

# *Iraq Security Strategy*

## Transition to Iraqi Security Self-Reliance

~~This briefing is classified~~

~~SECRET~~

~~REL MCFI~~

~~Derived from: Multiple sources~~

~~DECL ON: X1~~

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
2005 Iraq SECSTRAT - 3/5/2005

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09.M.2748



# Transition to Iraqi Security Self-Reliance





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Date: OCT 01 2010

## *Situation*

- Insurgency will continue at roughly present level throughout 2005 in Sunni areas; security situation across the country will not be uniform
- Iraqi Armed Forces and Special Police will have 90+ battalions by February with most of the Iraqi Armed Forces largely trained and equipped by mid-2005. Police, Border Police and some military training will extend into 2006
- Iraqi Security Forces are gaining expertise, but it will be mid-2006 before most are able to conduct and sustain independent counterinsurgency operations
- Counterinsurgency operations historically take years to achieve success
  - Philippines 1898-1902 (4 yrs); Malaya 1958-60 (12 yrs); Salvador 1979-91(12 yrs)
- The longer Coalition forces carry the brunt of the counterinsurgency fight, the more dependent the Iraqis will be on the Coalition
- Any post – election turbulence in Iraqi government will adversely impact the pace at which ministry counterinsurgency capacity can increase
- Timely demonstration that Coalition presence is not permanent will enhance Iraqi Transitional Government legitimacy
- Need to build on momentum of 30 January elections



## ***Strategy: Transition to Iraqi Security Self-Reliance***

***“We will increasingly focus our efforts on helping prepare more capable Iraqi security forces”***      *President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, 2005*

- **Progressively shift the Coalition main effort from fighting the counterinsurgency to building Iraqi capacity to conduct independent counterinsurgency operations at the local, regional and national levels**
- **Accomplish this through “Teaming” and Transition Teams to assist the Iraqis to:**
  - **Improve the operational effectiveness of Iraqi units**
  - **Building strong Iraqi Chains of Command**
  - **Build Iraqi Military and Police Institutions**
  - **Build independent Iraqi Command and Control capability**
  - **Build Iraqi Counterinsurgency Capability**
- **As conditions warrant, transition areas of Iraq to capable Iraqi Security Forces and assign Coalition forces to supporting roles with a decreasing Coalition presence**



## *What's Teaming ?*

---

- **Matching Coalition units with like – size Iraqi units**
  - **Purpose:**
    - **Provide additional training support and assistance beyond capability of Transition Teams**
    - **Provide role models for Iraqi leaders to instill a wartime mentality and ethos of service to Nation**
    - **Provide force protection, quick reaction forces, and administrative and logistical support for Transition Teams**
  - **Coalition units will progressively shift their efforts from fighting to helping their counterpart Iraqi units develop the capability to fight the insurgency**
-

SECRET//REL MGFI//X1



## *What Are Transition Teams?*

- Eight to ten person teams of experienced Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers
- Expansion of programs already in place and working well in some units
- Under Coalition command
- Assist and provide Coalition effects to Iraqi military forces, special police, border units. Assist government ministries in developing counterinsurgency capability
- Embedded - ultimately live, work and fight along side Iraqi forces
- Operate on Train – Fight – Train cycle
- Supported by Special Forces in an area support role
- Approximately 2400 experienced leaders devoted to the mission
- Requires approximately 1000 additional leaders for the mission; rest will be diverted from other missions



# Implementation



- Prepare for security discussions with the new government
- Assure agreement with the Iraqi government for Transition Team concept
- Discuss a conditions-based reduction strategy with the Iraqi Transitional Government
- Begin "Teaming" and Transition Team implementation
- Periodically assess progress and Iraqi capability and hand-off the counterinsurgency lead to competent Iraqi security forces that will still be enabled by selected Coalition support
- Adjust Coalition presence as conditions permit

Centcom  
1.4(a), (c)



## *Risks*

- Implementation during a period of key transitions
- Lack of inclusiveness by new government
- Politicization of security and intelligence ministries
- Lack of competent key leaders in security and intelligence ministries and forces
- Failure of Iraqi Transitional Government to develop effective counterinsurgency organizations
- Continued/increased external support for terrorists and insurgents
- Force protection of Transition Teams

~~SECRET~~ ~~REL-MGFI//X1~~



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Date: OCT 01 2010

## *Recommendation*

- Approve the Iraq Security Strategy and Transition Team concept for implementation

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Date: OCT 01 2010

**Back Up**

~~SECRET~~ REL-MCPI//X1



## *Mission and End state*

### ■ Mission

- In partnership with the Iraqi Government, MNF-I [REDACTED]


[REDACTED] progressively transitions the counterinsurgency campaign to the ITG and ISF while aggressively executing counterinsurgency operations to create a security environment that permits the completion of the UNSCR 1546 process on schedule. (entcom 1.4 (a),(c))

### ■ End State

- Iraq at peace with its neighbors and an ally in the War on Terror, with a representative government that respects the human rights of all Iraqis, and security forces sufficient to maintain domestic order and to deny Iraq as a safe haven to terrorists.



# Projected Security Transition



CIV, OSD

From:  
Sent:  
Cc:  
Subject:

SECRET/SENSITIVE

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

1. DoD attendees included SD & CJCS.  
(We were not permitted a +1, even though we made a special request for Dr. Cambone to attend. Yesterday, [REDACTED] informed us that there was no room, as 18 agencies were invited.)

2. Upon his return, CJCS quickly shared the following:

A. 10 of the 11 recommendations went. (Note: I assume "went" means that it will be presented to the President as agreed upon.)

B. The one that did not go was "Authorized Disclosures."  
(CJCS said that he thought that this was #7.10.)

C. SD read down the list of things he was supposed to read.

Mr. Card said that we need to work this fast or else Congress will put it into legislation.

E. Next steps include figuring out how to work this over the next 30 days.

3. Upon his return, SD shared the following:

A. There were 3 empty seats in the room.

B. Some other agencies had +1s with them.

C. The meeting was confused. The paperwork was confusing. (Not ours -- theirs.)

D. DoD was not listed in the matrix -- not one time -- so how could they say there was agreement?

E. (At that point, SD and CJCS talked to each other in the hallway about it, agreeing that the meeting was confusing. CJCS added that the gross generalizations in the meeting were not helpful.)

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2), (6)

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 15 2010

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DRAFT

OSD Policy  
21 Apr 05  
5:08 PM

**Security Update: Update on Training the ISF  
NSC Meeting on Iraq, April 22, 8:55 – 9:40 a.m.**

GEN Casey will brief. *No paper provided.*

- LTG Petraeus briefed you Wednesday on the enormous progress made training Iraqi Security Forces. (LTG Petraeus Training Chart Attached)
- Total Iraqi Security Forces trained: 155,845
- Iraq now has 102 operational combat battalions.

DECLASSIFIED JUN 30 2010  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

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
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DRAFT

09.M-2771

# Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces



Trained and Equipped Iraqi Security Forces



Page determined to be Unclassified  
 Reviewed Ch RDD, WHS  
 Date: 30 Jun 2010  
 IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5

A 2-year investment paying dividends



## *Bad Things That Could Happen*

---

- Inability to persuade Sunnis to join, or collapse of, political process
- Assassination of key leader
- Muqtada Sadr uprising
- System collapse of Key Infrastructure (electricity, fuel, food distribution)
- Major attack on oil export infrastructure
- Eruption of sectarian violence over Kirkuk
- Detention scandal – Major Iraqi mishandling of detainees
- Major failure of Security Forces
- Catastrophic Terrorist attack against U.S., Iraq, or key ally linked to Iraq
- Increased foreign support for insurgents and terrorists
- Subversion and infiltration of government and Security Forces by Sunni and Shia extremists that leads to coup

Talking Points For Prime Minister Jafari and Other Key Iraqis, and Also Some Thoughts for the June 28 Speech

- Iraqi leaders' key theme should be: Iraq is taking responsibility for its own future. 2005 is the crucial year.
- There should be absolutely no delays in drafting or voting on the new Iraqi Constitution.
- There should be no delays in electing a new Iraqi government in December, under the new Constitution.

Timely completion of the political process is the most important objective for the near term and is critical for success in weakening the insurgency and getting essential services up to the goals.

- They must strengthen all Iraqi Ministries, particularly the Ministries of Defense and Interior – as fast as is possible.
  - The rate at which the Iraqi Ministries develop will directly impact the capability of the Iraqi Security Forces and the Iraqi government's ability to provide the needed services for the Iraqi people.
  - The Iraqi government must allocate the necessary financial support for the security Ministries.
  - Stronger and more effective Ministries will reduce the impression of an occupation force and thereby weaken the insurgency
- Iraqi Transitional Government will need to be more aggressive diplomatically with its neighbors and other Coalition nations to encourage them to:

~~SECRET~~

- assist Iraq in raising funds from the international community,
- close their borders to insurgents, terrorists and criminals,
- return Iraqi financial assets, and
- provide broader political support for:
  - the Coalition countries,
  - the NATO train-and-equip activities, and
  - getting the additional troops needed during the referendum vote and the December election.
- Encourage regional Sunni governments to engage Iraqi Sunnis to oppose the insurgency and support the government.
- To successfully reduce violence prior to the election it is crucial that senior Iraqi leaders – particularly the Sunni leadership – speak out against the insurgency.
  - Ethnic leaders cannot play both sides of the fence.
- The Iraqi government and the Coalition should work closely together to look for opportunities to reduce the Coalition presence as the Iraqi Security Forces mature and to turn over principal responsibility for some cities and provinces to Iraqi Security Force control to show Coalition publics and the Iraqi people that progress is being made.
- Because there will still be a requirement for a Coalition presence after the elections, it is necessary to begin joint discussions immediately to draft the authorities necessary for that presence.

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Date: JUL 19 2010


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September 29, 2005

SUBJECT: Zawahiri Letter

The President would like to release the Zawahiri letter. He knows that Abizaid thinks that may not be a good idea. He does not want to embarrass the President by raising it with him, personally. So I have to talk to Abizaid before the NSC meeting tomorrow and find out how strongly he feels and why.

DHR:ss  
092905-19



OSD 1.4 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h)

~~SECRET~~

09-M-2780

0382

JAN. 20, 2006  
5:18 PM

SECRET  
NSC PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE MEETING ON IRAQ

DATE: January 26, 2006  
LOCATION: White House Situation Room  
TIME: 10:30 - 11:15 a.m.

AGENDA

- I. Provincial Assistance Teams ..... State
- II. Staffing Ministerial Capacity Building ..... State

DECLASSIFIED JUN 22 2010  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

SECRET  
Classified by: V. Phillip Lago  
Reason: (d)  
Declassify on: 1/19/16

09.M-2794


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Donald H. Rumsfeld

OSD 1.4 ( b ), (d)

SUBJECT: Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA) Action Plan

  
The attached package describes the IIA and lays out objectives and strategy.

I understand there is a PC meeting on Monday to discuss the IIA concept.

The package is lengthy, but it is important to read the summary. The detailed action plan is provided for further information.

We would like to communicate to the Iraqi people that the United States intends both to liberate their country from the current regime, and to transfer political authority to Iraqis as soon as possible.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
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09.M.2916

**DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OSD Policy  
30 March 2003

**Iraqi Interim Authority Implementation Concept – Summary**

**NOTE:** The following is for discussion purposes. Further inputs and suggestions are welcome.

**Objectives:**

- Promote creation of a Free Iraq in line with the President's ideas as set forth in:
  - Declaration of the Atlantic Summit in the Azores
  - American Enterprise Institute Speech
  - National Security Strategy
- A Free Iraq should be:
  - Not a tyranny
  - Not a threat to its neighbors.
    - Not ambitious for WMD.
    - Not a supporter of terrorism.
  - Friendly to the U.S.
  - A country unified by non-oppressive means:
    - This implies breaking with Iraq's history of domination by the Sunni Arab minority – a potentially painful political process.
- US objectives in Iraq go beyond WMD and terrorist infrastructure. US interest is in an Iraq [REDACTED]
  - This would be a victory in the "Battle of Ideas" in the War on Terrorism.
- Accordingly, the new Iraq will need: OSD 1.4 (b), (d)
  - Representative institutions (power sharing among the ethnic and sectarian groups).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~Classified by: DUSD-SP/NESA W/1000/PLH  
Declassify on: 30 March 2008~~

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**DECLASSIFIED IN PART**  
**Authority: EO 13526**  
**Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS**  
**Date: JUL 28 2010**

09-M-2918

DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES  
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OSD Policy  
30 March 2003

- Rule of law and individual liberty.
- Private property and private enterprise.

**Strategy to Achieve these Objectives:**

- Use Coalition power to dismantle the instruments of Iraqi Baathist tyranny.
- Support those Iraqis who share the President's objectives for a free Iraq.
- Iraqis have had different political experiences in recent years:
  - Kurds and many expatriates have experienced life with democratic institutions; many have come to share the President's vision for Iraq.
  - But those under Saddam's control have lived heavily oppressed--
    - Without exposure to democratic ideas or the opportunity to participate in voluntary political organizations.
    - Will take time before many become familiar with democratic ideas and before democratic-minded leaders can emerge.
- **Key:** US interest is to give those who share the President's ideas a head start in the post-Saddam Iraqi political process.
- There is tension between our interests in steering the process toward a moderate and free Iraq, and our interest in winning immediate broad support in and out of Iraq for our policy.
- In other words, there is tension between:
  - The *substantive* goal of a free Iraq as envisioned by President Bush and
  - The *procedural* goal for the US to be as inclusive, and as "hands off" as possible.
- The USG should not now raise procedural considerations above our substantive goal. An excessively "hands off" approach may produce an anti-democratic result (as premature elections in Algeria some years ago, for example, produced a victory for anti-democratic Islamist extremists.)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classified by: DUSD-SP/NESA William J. Luti  
Reasons: 1.5b  
Declassify on: 30 March 2008

**DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES**  
~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

OSD Policy  
30 March 2003

- It will take time to cultivate a political culture of self-government in Iraq, especially among those who have lived their lives under Saddam's tyranny.

**Iraqi Interim Authority:**

- **Two main functions:**
  - **Form government.** Devise the means by which the new Iraqi government will come into being – that is, the constitutional, legal reform and electoral processes.
  - **Run ministries.** Take responsibility for those governmental offices and ministries that the Coalition will turn over to Iraqi control on a case-by-case basis.
- **Basic Structure:**
  - **Leadership Council** – approximately 35 people
  - **Constitutional Commission** – approximately 150 people
  - **Legal Reform Commission** – approximately 9 people

**Summary of Constituting the Iraqi Interim Authority:**

- **Build on existing leadership structures.**
  - This should help protect us against the charge that the Coalition is arbitrarily selecting Iraqi leadership.
  - As we have to start somewhere, we should start with Iraqis with whom we are familiar and who have already endorsed principles that the USG supports.
  - Each person to serve in the IIA structures should be required to subscribe to a set of principles – e.g., those set out in the statement of the US-UK-Spanish-Portuguese leaders at the Atlantic Summit in the Azores.

~~**CONFIDENTIAL**~~

~~Classified by: DUSD-SP/NESA William J. Luti  
Reasons: 1.5F  
Declassify on: 30 March 2008~~

DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES

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OSD Policy  
30 March 2003

- *Organizing Committee for Iraqi Interim Authority*
  - Core of the Organizing Committee should be a half-dozen Iraqis who have already exercised leadership roles either in northern Iraq or in the opposition groups.
    - Draw on the "Leadership Committee of the Iraqi Opposition" which was elected by the 65-member Free Iraqi Advisory Committee that was itself elected by the December 2002 London Conference of the Iraqi opposition.
  - In coordination with Coalition (details in attachment), and perhaps with advice from UN Special Coordinator for Iraq, this six-person core group should invite seven newly-liberated Iraqis to join them in forming the Organizing Committee for the IIA.
- *IIA Leadership Council.* The Organizing Committee – comprising thirteen expatriates, Kurds, and other "internals" – will select twenty-one additional people to serve with them as the IIA Leadership Council.
  - The twenty-one will be:
    - (1) one person representing each of Iraq's eighteen provinces and
    - (2) one person representing each of the following communities:
      - Chaldeans (Christians)
      - Assyrians (Christians)
      - Yezidis (a pre-Islamic sect)
      - Turkoman (an ethnic group)
  - This will provide geographic distribution, ethnic distribution, and a bridge between the expatriates and the "internals."
- *Constitutional Commission.* This Commission will comprise:
  - The Group of 65 elected by the London Conference of the Iraqi Opposition (minus those already serving on the IIA Leadership Council)  
*plus*

~~Classified by: DMSD-SP/NESA William J. Luti  
Reasons: 1.5b  
Declassify on: 30 March 2008~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OSD Policy  
30 March 2003

- Ninety people representing Iraq's provinces (seats allocated according to relative population size)
- In coordination with the Coalition (details in attachment), and perhaps with advice from the UN Special Coordinator for Iraq, the IIA Leadership Council will elect the ninety representatives of the provinces.
- *Legal Reform Commission.* In coordination with the Coalition (details in attachment), and perhaps with "advice" from the UN Special Coordinator for Iraq, the IIA Leadership Council will elect the nine members.

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Classified by: DUSE-SP/NESA William J. Luti  
Reasons: 1.5b  
Declassify on: 30 March 2008

**DRAFT FOR DISCUSSION PURPOSES**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OSD Policy  
30 March 2003

**Iraqi Interim Authority Action Plan**

**NOTE:** The following is for discussion purposes. Further inputs and suggestions are welcome.

- **Formation of the IIA Leadership Council [approximately 35 members]**
  - The 35-member Leadership Council will be formed through a multi-step process:
    - **Step 1: Formation of Organizing Committee core [6 members]**
      - The six members of the "Leadership Committee of the Iraqi Opposition" which was elected by the 65-member Free Iraqi Advisory Committee at Salahuddin in February 2003 will constitute the initial core of the IIA Organizing Committee:
      - The following four members have accepted their mandate:
        - Masud Barzani (Sunni Kurd), Kurdistan Democratic Party
        - Ahmad Chalabi (Shi'a Arab), Iraqi National Congress
        - Jalal Talebani (Sunni Kurd), Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
        - Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim (Shi'a Arab), SCIRI
      - The following two members have yet to accept their mandate:
        - Adnan Pachachi (Sunni Arab), Independent
        - Ayad Allawi (Shi'a Arab), Iraqi National Accord
    - A senior USG official should telephone Allawi and Pachachi to solicit a final decision about their willingness to serve.
      - If Pachachi is unwilling to serve, the Coalition should offer the position to Sadoun Dulaimi, a Sunni Arab from the Dulaim tribe and a member of the 65-person Advisory Council elected in December 2002.
      - If Allawi is unwilling to serve, the Coalition should offer the position to Tawfiq Yassiri, a secular Shi'a Arab from

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Reasons:  
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30 March 2003

the Iraqi National Coalition and a member of the 65-person Advisory Council.

- Members of the core of the Organizing Committee will then gather in a liberated part of Iraq to complete the formation of the Organizing Committee. (See step 2 below.)
  - There should be a public announcement of the six-person core of Organizing Committee.
- Step 2: Completion of Organizing Committee [13 members]**
- In coordination with the Coalition, and perhaps with advice from the UN Special Coordinator for Iraq, the six-person core group will select from newly-liberated provinces seven additional internal Iraqis to join their ranks.
    - Throughout this draft, the phrase "coordination with the Coalition" means that the Coalition can nominate people and can disapprove people.
  - This will ensure majority representation for "internal" Iraqis.
  - The seven additions to the Organizing Committee must enhance the Committee's ethnic and geographic diversity, as well as diversity of sectarian practice (e.g. not all Shi'as are Islamists).
  - The seven additions must agree to uphold key principles based on those outlined by President Bush at the Atlantic Summit in the Azores.
  - There may not be multiple members of a single political party or slate (e.g. no proxy groups).
  - The Organizing Committee must coordinate with the Coalition on the selection of members.

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- There are two options for naming these seven additional members: rolling (as provinces are liberated) or in one shot (upon liberation of entire country).
- The seven new members should assume their roles simultaneously to avoid skewing the ethnic or sectarian composition of the Organizing Committee.
- **Step 3: Establishment of Leadership Council of IIA [35 members]**
  - The 13 members of the Organizing Committee will select one Iraqi from each province (18 in total), in coordination with the Coalition.
  - The election of these members will require the agreement of a two-third majority of the 13-member Organizing Committee.
  - Ideally, the 18 new members will be chosen at one time, to prevent at any time a skewed ethnic or sectarian composition of the Organizing Committee. But the Coalition will want to retain the flexibility to have the IIA come into being before the complete liberation of Iraq.
  - The 13 members should choose the 18 as soon as possible after the liberation of Iraq.
  - In addition, one member of each of the following minority groups will be added to the Leadership Council through a caucus for each specific group to be held as soon as possible:
    - Assyrians
    - Chaldeans
    - Yezidis
    - Turkomans
  - A reserved slot for minorities who might otherwise fail to win representation will reinforce the idea that all Iraqis have a stake in Iraq's future.

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- **Mandate of the IIA Leadership Council:**
  - The 35-member Leadership Council will be charged with:
    - Establishing a Constitutional Commission;
    - Establishing a Legal Reform Commission in coordination with the Coalition;
    - Issuing an interim Bill of Rights;
    - Conducting a census;
    - Organizing municipal, provincial, and national elections; and
    - Taking responsibility for those government offices and ministries that the Coalition will turn over to Iraqi control on a case-by-case basis.
  
- **Constitutional Commission [approximately 150 members]:**
  - The Commission will comprise:
    - The members of the 65-person Advisory Council, but those who serve on the Leadership Council will not be members of the Constitutional Commission. This establishes a precedent of separation of powers.
    - Advisory Council members should sit according to their ancestral provincial affiliation rather than political party.
  - The Leadership Council will select 90 internal Iraqis delegates to add to Constitutional Commission.
    - The size of each province's delegation will be in proportion to its population.

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- Geographic divisions accommodate tribal, sectarian, and ethnic diversity without aggravating Iraq's ethnic and religious fault-lines.
- Kanan Makiya will chair the Constitutional Commission.
- **Legal Reform Commission** [9 members]:
  - The Legal Reform Commission will recommend reform of Iraq's legal code, judicial courts, and oversee trials of prominent members of the Ba'ath regime.
  - The IIA Leadership Council, in coordination with the Coalition and perhaps with advice from the UN Special Coordinator for Iraq will select nine members based on their legal expertise and personal integrity.
- **Census:**
  - The IIA Leadership Council will be charged with organizing a census.
  - The census should be non-ethnic and non-sectarian in order to:
    - Prevent "proportional representation" arguments.
    - Reinforces the notion of individual liberty.
    - Avoid disputed results by those ethnic and sectarian groups that have overstated their numbers.
  - The census should be transparent and open to international observation.
- **Elections:**
  - The IIA Leadership Council will be charged with organizing elections.
  - Rolling municipal elections will introduce Iraqis to voting, will allocate city council and mayoral seats, and expedite an "Iraqi face."

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Reasons: 1.5B  
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- Municipal elections should begin within 90 days of Iraq's liberation in the Kurdish-controlled provinces of Duhok, Erbil, and Sulaymaniyah.
- Elections might next be held in the sparsely-populated, Sunni-dominated Anbar province (along Jordan's border).
- Municipal elections might be followed by:
  - Provincial elections to elect governors; and depending on the direction of the Constitutional Commission,
  - Delegate elections to one or two houses of representation.
- **Ratification and assumption of power by an elected government:**
  - There are various mechanisms to ratify the constitution:
    - The Constitution Commission itself might ratify the constitution.
    - One or more elected houses of representation (e.g., a Parliament, or a Senate and a "Majlis"), might ratify the new constitution.
    - A direct plebiscite.
  - Upon ratification of the Constitution, an elected government might take power.

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Reasons: [REDACTED]  
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low!

# *Iraq Way Ahead*

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, DoD OSR  
Date: 20 MAY 2010  
IAW EO 12958 Section 3.5



30 March  
1210 E

## NOTE:

TUES  
1:15 PM

- LATEST ABIZAID BRIEF
- S-MAP ADDENDUM IS FORTHCOMING, AS ABIZAID IS DOING A QUALITY CONTROL CHECK WITH CJTF-7.
- BRIEF DISTRIBUTED JUST NOW TO PRINCIPALS.

1

09.M-2922



## *What we expect*

- Insurgent and terrorist violence likely to rise inside Iraq
- Enemy attempting to leverage transition, weather, uncertainty and ethnic fault lines
  - Create impression of chaos; win battle of perception
- Iraqi Security Forces becoming more visible and taking casualties
- Iraqis seeking clarity on Coalition presence post sovereignty
- Early testing of the legitimacy and effectiveness of new government
- UN and International Community seeking a greater role and guarantees
- Militias testing coalition authority

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## *What we are doing*

- **Continuing to pressure insurgents and terrorist networks**
  - **Build intelligence partnerships with Iraqis - Iraqi special security forces key**
- **Building quality into Iraqi Security Forces**
  - **Building chains of command and responsibility – Ministries of Defense and Interior, Joint Coordination Centers and Joint Staff**
- **Putting Iraqis in charge... with silent support**
  - **Begin locally while building regional capability**
- **Tailoring Coalition Force Presence**
  - **Consolidating Base Camps – moving to urban perimeter and returning Palaces and key facilities to the Iraqis**
- **Building and sustaining the Coalition**
  - **34 nations supporting with forces in Iraq**
  - **Spain, Korea...UN resolution?**

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# Things to watch for

- Increased violence as political process gains momentum
- Terrorist strikes against high profile targets – Arbaeen pilgrimage
- Attacks on soft targets (senior Iraqis, UN workers, contractors)
- Stronger ties between Former Regime Elements and terrorists
- Increased maneuver and rhetoric by major ethnic groups for political power and influence
- Attacks on critical infrastructure
- Outside influences (e.g., Syria, Iran, Turkey) increasing their activities to sway the political process

*Handwritten notes:*  
 eg. Sunni + Shia  
 I [unclear]  
 Ch. [unclear]  
 [unclear]

***A legitimate, authoritative and responsible Iraqi Government is crucial to success***

*Handwritten signature:*  
 [unclear]

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*Handwritten notes:*  
 (1) Sec [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]  
 (2) [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]  
 (3) [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

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REVISED

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: September 23, 2001

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Using Special Forces on "Our Side" of the Line

Don,

In addition to using Special Forces to attack targets associated with Al Qaida or the Taliban, we should consider using those as a kind of armed liaison with anti-Al-Qaida or anti-Taliban elements in Afghanistan.

JS 1.4 (a)

The concept would be to use the mobility of our Special Forces to make contact with elements throughout Afghanistan [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] U.S. special forces could deploy to establish temporary links with those potential allies at times and places of our choosing.

OSD 1.4 (c), (d)

Such contacts could be used to exchange information, to bring in key elements of logistical support (including some appropriate weapons) or to provide communications gear. It could also facilitate coordinations of our offensive strikes with action by our internal allies.

It might even be possible, for short periods of time, to establish logistics points inside Afghanistan where we could bring in larger quantities of supplies with fixed wing aircraft.

Using Special Forces in this way could have both military and political-strategic advantages:

JS 1.4 (a)

OSD 1.4 (c), (d)

Military Advantages

- It would provide us with better intelligence - [REDACTED]
- It allows us to use our forces at times and places of our own choosing. [REDACTED] - or hedge against such a risk with AC-130 gunships or other protective cover - we could move about Afghanistan relatively freely instead of going after targets that are actively defended.

JS 1.4 (a)

OSD 1.4 (c)

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- It can help us to enlist allies throughout the country as word spreads around that the Americans are able to help those who help us;
- Conversely, it would send a strong message, to those who are sitting on the fence, that being on the wrong side will have serious costs. After the initial bombing strikes, most of our potential opponents may cease to be afraid of US airpower. They will be much more fearful of what we can do to them if they see us working actively in coordination with their competitors;
- The nature of this kind of operation minimizes the risk of early failures, which could be disastrous for our campaign;
- This kind of action allows us to minimize collateral fatalities. We could focus on killing our enemies, not innocent Afghans;
- Perhaps most importantly, if this strategy develops, it gives us the opportunity to use our air power in a way that could be truly effective instead of merely pounding sand.

#### Political-Strategic Advantages

- This type of direct action would underline that we are not fighting the Afghan people, but only those in Afghanistan who conduct or support terrorism;
- It emphasizes that we are using Afghans to do the fighting for us instead of gratuitously sacrificing Americans. At the same time, the boldness of our actions will make it clear that we are not unwilling to take risks;
- This would be particularly true if we can use this strategy to bring humanitarian relief to those areas of the country that have been deliberately starved by the Taliban;
- It would demonstrate to the American people and to the world that we know how to fight smart;
- It allows us to leverage the many elements of opposition to the Arab presence in Afghanistan, to the leadership of Mullah Omar within Taliban and to the Taliban itself;
- By improving our ability to manage our internal allies, it helps to reduce the chances that we will have a vacuum inside Afghanistan if the key elements of the Taliban are neutralized;
- As it becomes clear that this is part of our strategy, it will help to underscore that we are in for a sustained, but intelligent campaign, countering the impression either that we expect quick results or that we are heading for a long-term

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occupation of Afghanistan with all of the potentially catastrophic consequences,  
which that entails.

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### A Bold Shift in Iraq Policy

#### "Accelerate the Transition, Sustain the Partnership, and Stabilize the Region"

OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

Success in Iraq remains critical to U.S. national security and to success in the global struggle against violent extremists. There is no more pressing national security challenge. Failure would have disastrous consequences for the U.S. and the region, and stability would weaken globally. Aside from the impact of instability within Iraq, the consequences of failure would likely include an emboldened al-Qaeda movement, strengthened [REDACTED] influence, a loss of confidence in the U.S. among key allies in the region and a severe setback to American credibility, freedom of maneuver and influence in the region and throughout the world. Some may think the U.S. can walk away from this enemy, but the enemy will not walk away from us, nor will the effects.

It is critical to U.S. national security that we continue to seek a unified Iraq that can govern, secure and sustain itself and is an ally in the global war on terror. It is also critical that we continue to prosecute the fight in Iraq against al-Qaeda and its associated movements. While more of the counterinsurgency efforts can be assumed by the Iraqi Security Forces, we must also continue efforts to destroy al-Qaeda.

Our objectives in Iraq must also be seen in a regional context, where we seek a sustainable regional presence to secure national interests, protect allies, deter adversaries and respond rapidly to crises in Iraq or elsewhere. Interference by [REDACTED] rising concerns of Iranian nuclear and regional ambitions and numerous other causes of instability mandate the following objectives for Iraq:

1. ensure that no terrorist safe haven exists in Iraq;
2. strengthen Iraq's institutions and government capacity;
3. accelerate Iraqi assumption of political and security responsibilities;
4. counter subversive activity in Iraq by its neighbors, especially Iran which seeks Iranian hegemony in the region; and
5. foster improved relations between Iraq and the region.

OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

Three foundational elements are critical to ensuring Iraqi success:

1. unity of effort within the USG, among coalition partners and between the coalition and the Iraqi government;
2. GoI implementation of security policies and actions that address the underlying issues which currently forestall progress; and
3. solid progress toward reconciliation.

Prepared by: ~~DASD Mark Kimmitt, OSD/ISA/ME, [REDACTED]~~

Derived from: Multiple Sources

Reason or Reasons: 1.3(d)

Declassify On: 04 Dec 2018

OSD

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5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

09-M-2929

While there has been progress towards some of these goals, the U.S. strategic position today is

Thus there is a need to reexamine and promptly modify our current approach in Iraq -- and in the region -- to accelerate progress and sustain our engagement. A bold shift in our Iraq policy to a new phase is needed to overcome these multiple challenges.


The Next Phase:

OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

Accelerate Transition to the Iraqis, Sustain the Partnership, and Stabilize the Region


1. Within Iraq:

- The GoI will assume control of the Iraqi Army not later than June 2007.
- The GoI will assume control of all 18 Iraqi provinces not later than November 2007. Six to seven provinces will be under Provincial Iraqi Control by 31 December 2006, another six to eight by May 2007, and the remaining provinces by November 2007.
- The GoI will accelerate their pursuit of comprehensive national reconciliation and political accommodation, with agreed-upon public benchmarks to demonstrate progress.
- The GoI will take prompt action to rein in and demobilize militias, and to defeat extremist elements that fail to comply with GoI directives.
- In response to the request by the GoI, the U. S. and Iraq will reach agreement on the terms of a longer-term security partnership by April 2007, to include an invitation by the GoI for Coalition forces to remain on an agreed basis beyond the current U.N. timelines.
- U.S. forces will shift their main effort to the support of Iraqi Security Forces. U.S. advisory personnel will be increased as appropriate.
- U.S. forces, with Iraqi forces in support, will continue operations to defeat al-Qaeda and other extremist movements in Iraq.
- The Coalition will maintain sufficient quick reaction and strike forces in Iraq and neighboring areas, not partnered with Iraqi forces, to shape the environment, defeat threats exceeding Iraqi Security Force capabilities and prosecute the fight against al-Qaeda and associated movements.

- The GoI will take actions to increase the contributions and presence of Iraqi Security Forces, leading to a reduction in Coalition visibility, and a corresponding reduction to six to eight U. S. operating bases by November 2007. OSD 1.4 (b), (d)
- Coalition forces will map, isolate and attack hostile networks in Iraq which are destabilizing and disrupting the country, in particular those originating from 
- The U.S. will surge civilian and military resources to and/or within Iraq in support of specific civilian or military objectives to neutralize radical influences and the violence being perpetrated against the Iraqi people.
- The U.S. will expand efforts to help Iraq build effective police, justice, and prison systems to establish rule of law and keep enemy fighters off the street.
- The U.S. will develop incentives and disincentives to influence the Iraqi government, key leaders and factions at the national, provincial, district and local levels. For example, increased CERP funding to advisors and commanders to revitalize small business, create jobs and put unemployed Iraqis to work.

2. Regionally:

- The U.S., in concert with regional partners, will strengthen the regional deterrent posture against Iran's pursuit of hegemony and nuclear weapons.
- The U.S. will seek to invigorate cooperative security arrangements in the Gulf.

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OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

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OSD Draft: 12/04/#10

**3. Additionally:**

- The U.S. will expand the U.S. military force structure, and continue to increase the proportion of the operational (vice institutional) components within the U.S. military.
- The U.S. will unify and consolidate all U.S. political, diplomatic and military initiatives in Iraq under a single U.S. individual in Washington D.C., reporting to the U.S. President.
- The U.S. will identify the obstacles to full resourcing of the execution of these objectives, and implement ways to remove the obstacles.
- The U.S. will fully coordinate changes in strategic direction with the GoI, Coalition partners, key U.S. security partners, and regional states.
- The U.S. will communicate this reinvigorated approach to national and international audiences through a significantly improved campaign to restore the resolve of our partners and our publics.

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TALKING POINTS FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Principals Committee Meeting  
December 6, 2006 3:15 PM – 4:30 PM  
Ongoing Iraq Review

- A bold shift in our Iraq policy-- to a new phase-- is needed. We must accelerate the transition to the Iraqis, sustain the partnership, and stabilize the region
- There is no more pressing national security challenge. Failure would have disastrous consequences for the U.S. and the region, and stability would weaken globally.
- To use GEN Abizaid's words, "Some may think the U.S. can walk away from this enemy, but the enemy will not walk away from us." Nor will the effects.
- Our objectives in Iraq must be seen in a regional context, not simply through the "soda-straw" of Iraq. Our action (or inaction) will have consequences far beyond Iraq.



- The U.S. should be prepared to surge civilian and military resources to and/or within Iraq in support of specific civilian or military objectives.



- The U.S. should also take on forces which are destabilizing and disrupting the country, in particular those originating from Iran and Syria, such as IRGC proxies and elements in Iraq.



OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

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
OSD Policy  
October 26, 2006

2:41 PM

National Security Council Meeting  
October 27, 2006 8:35 AM -9:20 AM  
Security Update: Situation in al-Anbar

MNF-I will brief. *No brief provided.* From Embassy, military, and intelligence reporting, we note the following:

- ~~(S)~~ Anbar continues to be the most contested province. Reporting on the situation in Anbar is mixed.
  - USG reporting suggests that Anbar tribal leaders are leading resistance against al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).
  - Press reports indicate that AQI fighters paraded openly in the principal cities of Anbar last weekend.



Key Points:

DOS 1.4 (d)

- ~~(S)~~ Is there anything that the USG can do to help publicize any helpful declarations by Anbar Sheikhs (e.g. Coalition Forces are "friendly forces")?
- ~~(S)~~ Is there anything that the USG or the GoI can do to make this current tribal engagement effort more successful than the tribal engagement efforts in 2005?

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October 10, 2006

TO: President George W. Bush

CC: Vice President Richard B. Cheney  
Stephen J. Hadley

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 

SUBJECT: A New Construct for Iraq – Establish and arrange a plan for Iraq, with benchmarks, to turn over to the Iraqis responsibility for Governance, Economic Progress and Security, and thereby permit a reduction of Coalition forces

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Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 16 2010

Some months ago, General Pace and I discussed with Generals Abizaid and Casey the desirability of a new construct for Iraq. Several weeks ago, I discussed it in Washington, D.C. with President Talabani. And recently I discussed it with you and the NSC (on the SVTC when you were at Camp David) during our second long discussion on Iraq with Abizaid and Casey. At that meeting, I believe you indicated general agreement with my proposal and asked us to flesh it out. We have done so.

I would characterize our current construct is U.S.-centered and somewhat dependent on our actions. The new construct tips the current approach on its head and focuses on Iraqi efforts to be executed against the projected dates, thereby enabling the Iraqi Government to demonstrate its political will, and publicly fixing accountability and responsibility on the Iraqis, where they belong.

#### The Current Construct for Iraq

Current U.S. Iraq policy has the following elements:

- "The U.S. will stay in Iraq until we have won (succeeded)."
- "The U.S. will stay as long as we are needed."
- "We oppose a set timetable for withdrawal of Coalition forces, because it would advantage the enemy, since they could simply wait us out."
- "As the Iraqi Security Forces stand up, we will stand down."

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- "U.S. military commanders will determine the number of U.S. troops, not politicians in Washington, D.C."
- "Conditions on the ground will determine the pace at which U.S. and Coalition forces are withdrawn."

The metrics on Governance the U.S. has tracked thus far include:

- Establishing the Governing Council.
- Establishing the Interim Government.
- Establishing the Transitional Government.
- Drafting of the new Iraqi Constitution.
- The referendum on the Constitution.
- Election of the permanent government – executive and legislative branches.
- The appointment of the new Cabinet.
- etc.

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**Date: SEP 16 2010**

To our detriment, Coalition progress currently is being measured not against those types of benchmarks, but instead by the level of violence and the number of US casualties, which, of course, can be determined by the enemy.

**The New Construct or Approach:**

1. We would continue to say:
  - "US troop levels will be based on conditions on the ground."
  - "We oppose setting an artificial withdrawal date."
2. However, the new approach would flip the old construct upside down. It would announce publicly a list of specific goals, benchmarks or projections by the Iraqi Government (IG). The specific goals would be developed by the IG in close coordination with Zal and Casey, and would be announced either by the Iraqi government or jointly as plans for the remainder of 2006 and through 2007. The new element would be that the projections would mark a path of the achievement of major objectives and the planned transfer

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of responsibility to the Iraqi government for many aspects of governance, economic progress, and the security of Iraq.

3. The IG and the Coalition would acknowledge that some of the dates will slip, but that there may also be dates that will be accomplished earlier than projected. In addition, we would acknowledge that in some instances an activity may regress and need to be readdressed by the Coalition. In that case, the Coalition might have to re-establish authority and set a new target date to turn it back again to the Iraqi government.

The Iraqis would announce a specific month (or a two-month span, but not a specific date) when each of the benchmarks or projections are planned to occur.

For example:

- The month each of the 18 Iraqi provinces are planned to be turned over to the Iraqi government.
  - The month each Iraqi division and/or military capabilities will be placed in the Iraqi chain of command.
  - The month key elements of the reconciliation process will be completed and approved by the Iraqi Parliament, etc.
4. Finally, we would state, as we have before, that while these are our joint plans, they are dependent on conditions on the ground. This is not a timetable – it is a forecast. Of course, we will be held to our projections. We expect to be. Therefore, we would qualify it carefully, and say we don't know if the Iraqis can meet the targets, but that it is our current view that they should be able to do so.
  5. We will state that, as more and more responsibility is passed to the Iraqis along the announced schedule, we expect to be able to reduce Coalition forces accordingly.
  6. Using this new construct has the possible disadvantage of offering the enemy a timetable to disrupt. However, it also offers several important advantages:
    - Those Iraqis who want us to stay in Iraq will see that this process is rational, not precipitous, will be dependent upon conditions on the ground, and will be executed at a pace where the Iraqis should be able to assume responsibility;

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Date: SEP 16 2010

- It should demonstrate to neighboring countries – whose help the Iraqis and we need – that there is a workable plan and reasonable prospects for success;
- Those Iraqis who want the Coalition out of Iraq (Sadr, some neighbors, etc.) might see that there is a plan for the Coalition to turn over responsibilities to the Iraqis, and that, as we do so, Coalition forces will “stand down”;
- This approach might help get a new UNSCR passed, which we must have, in that it would demonstrate increasing Iraqi sovereignty; and,
- The publics in Iraq and in Coalition countries would see a bold plan that should persuade them that Coalition involvement in Iraq need not be interminable.

General Casey has an illustrative draft update of the benchmarks and projections, including the dates they should be accomplished. A final list of the benchmarks requires additional inputs by Zal, agreement by the NSC, and buy-in by Prime Minister Maliki and the Iraqi Government.

General Casey and I will be prepared to discuss this with you on Wednesday, October 11, 2006.

Respectfully,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Bonus

AUG 04 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: Nature of the Long Struggle

OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(5)

Today the President mentioned the fact that it is difficult to sustain support because of the imperfect understanding in our country and in the world about the nature of the long struggle we are in against violent extremists.

We call it the War on Terror, but in my view that label hasn't sold in the public's mind.

I continue to worry that we will never fully understand it ourselves, or organize to deal with it effectively, if we don't have NSC meetings on the Long War / Global War on Terror / the Struggle against Violent Extremists. I don't believe we have ever had one, or at the most two in all these years. Our NSCs are always on Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.

The difficulty of continuing on this path is that we fail to get clear in our own minds what needs to be done, and who ought to be doing it. And as a result, we fail to organize, train and equip to win the Long War.

I urge you to think through this matter and give thought to shifting our focus to the long war, so that Iraq is seen for what it is -- one of the fronts in the long struggle.

DHR:es  
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DECLASSIFIED In Part JUL 9 2010 ~~SECRET~~  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS



OSD 76390-06

8/4/2006 10:06:35 AM

09-M-2933

~~TOP SECRET~~

October 24, 2001

MEMORANDUM OF 21 OCTOBER SECURE CONFERENCE CALL WITH  
CINCENT

FROM: Vice Admiral E. P. Giambastiani and Larry DiRita

The Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary, Chairman, Vice Chairman, and the Commander in Chief of Central Command conducted a regularly scheduled conference call via secure telephone from 10:00 a.m. to 10:25 a.m. EDT on Sunday October 21, 2001. The Senior Military Assistant and the Special Assistant monitored the call.

The call began with a lengthy discussion of the previous day's operations in Afghanistan followed by a detailed review of the air operations planned for the 24th. In the course of the conversation, the Secretary asked a series of questions concerning the targeting of Taliban Command and Control elements. In particular, he asked: "How long did it take to target" a suspected Taliban leadership location once detection had been confirmed. During our notetaking, we both noted that the Secretary's intention and tone "implies that it takes too long."

The CinC responded by describing the process from detection by the UAV to actual targeting. His description of the process is summarized as follows:

The CinC commented that the "long pole in the tent" is the CIA deciding whether to hand off the target to the CinC or to use Predator.

The Secretary inquired: "Did they hand this off?" referring to the target in question.

DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 12.58  
9 SEP 2009

09-M-3072

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CinC: "Yes. I had CAP [Combat Air Patrol aircraft]."

SecDef: "I'm concerned that the process of deciding high collateral damage is causing us to lose opportunities."

CinC: "While the CIA is making a determination [whether to hand off], they're already talking to us and I decide fast whether I need to talk to you [SecDef] or not. It's very fast."

SecDef: "What about the CIA's decision chain?"

CinC: "It's pretty fast. We watch the Predator video, too."

SecDef: "You don't think we're missing opportunities because of lags in CIA decision making or lags in determining collateral damage?"

CinC: "Lags in collateral damage? No. That's not a problem. It takes time to get jets on targets. Could take 30-40 minutes. The Agency sometimes takes 15 minutes to get the hellfire lined up."

SecDef: "I hope we can move more quickly and keep figuring ways to accelerate because they are moving quickly and are frightened. Can you move the jets early? Before the decision is made." Implying that the CinC should have aircraft in position prior to a decision to engage.

CinC: "We do that, but it still takes time. My goal is 10 to 15 minutes [to get the aircraft on the target.] We're getting better."

DepSecDef: "Can they detect Predator?"

CinC: "Sometimes they can see it, in day and sometimes they can't. Can't hear it."

SecDef: "The payoff for getting a key leader is high. Look for a new process. Anything to speed it up. I have a high tolerance level for mistakes."

CinC: "I will make the hard calls on collateral damage and not use the need to call you as a reason to slow it up. I'll take the hit on that."

SecDef: "That's what I'm asking for. I'll be right there with you when you make the call."

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9 SEP 2009

IqW 12959

~~TOP SECRET~~

CinC: "We're going to catch these bastards sooner or later. It's just going to take time."

There was minimal discussion after this exchange and the call ended at 10:25 a.m.

E. P. Giambastiani

Larry DiRita

DECLASSIFIED IAW EO 12958  
9 SEP 2005

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECLASSIFIED in Part JUL 9 2010  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

INFO MEMO

USDP  
I-06/009451-ISA

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)


FROM: Peter W. Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA), [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Saturday 22 Jul 2006 SVTC on Iraq (U)

(U) You asked my assessment of the Saturday SVTC.

OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

(S) Our friends in Baghdad, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] More encouraging, however, was that a shift of  
strategy seems to be underway, which I think is right.



DOS 1.4(d)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~CLASSIFIED BY: ASD:ISA PETER W. RODMAN  
Derived from MULTIPLE SOURCES  
DECLASSIFY ON: 19 JUL 2016~~

OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

09-M-3073



(b) You may want to discuss this concept with Maliki.

OSD 1.4 (b), (d)  
OOS 1.4 (d)

DECLASSIFIED In Part JUL 9 2010  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

## Al Anbar Update

- Anbarites are tired of violence. “Wedge” between Al Qaida (AQIZ) and Sunni resistance groups exists, but it is not expanding.
- AQIZ has used intimidation and assassinations to maintain a presence and keep “wedge” from expanding – especially in Ramadi.
- AQIZ persistently trying to re-establish itself throughout WERV.
- Anbar Consolidation Program
  - Police: 8000 recruited, trained and equipped by end of year.
  - Army: 6500 recruited, trained and equipped by October.
  - Reconstruction: \$75M in projects from GOI being executed.
- Military operations continue to disrupt and pressure AQIZ network.

↓  
Western  
Euphrates  
River Valley

## *Baghdad Situation*

- Al Qaida lashed out in late June/early July with series of kidnappings, suicide and car bomb attacks that have spurred retaliatory kidnappings and murders in Baghdad.
- Violence against civilians already high in June, has spiked further in July.
- Security operations have had some successes, but have not affected sectarian killings.
- Death Squads increasingly responsible for violence. Must deny them political, religious and physical sanctuary.
- National Police performance has been fair to poor. Army and most local police performance has been good.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 19, 2005

TO: The Honorable Andrew H Card Jr

CC: The Honorable Dr Condoleezza Rice  
Stephen J Hadley  
Karen Hughes  
Gen Dick Myers  
Vice President Richard B Cheney

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld

SUBJECT: Mobilizing Moderate Muslims

We need a plan to mobilize moderate Muslims -- both in the U.S. and around the world. As the death toll of innocents rises -- from New York to Madrid to London to Baghdad -- the vast majority of mainstream Muslims must be increasingly revolted by the actions of a tiny number of extremists. Moderate Muslims are the force that will be critical in defeating the violent extremists.

I don't know whose charter mobilizing moderate Muslims would be, but I do know that it needs to be done effectively and as soon as possible. I think we should get a group together to determine how best to approach this, and to do it quickly. This is a national security issue and a vital part of winning this war.

Such a group, which perhaps should include some leading secular American Muslims, could consider:

1. Appropriate message, tone, style
2. Desired outcome -- what moderate Muslims will need to do.
3. Means of delivering the message -- what are the best channels.
4. Lead Agencies within the USG for U.S. and for the world
5. Funding and Congressional Support
6. Metrics to evaluate effectiveness

DECLASSIFIED JUL 8 2010  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

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7. Etc.

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DECLASSIFIED JUL 8 2010  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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Are we committed to the effort in Iraq? This question was asked by the SOF numerous times, in many forms and fashions. The SOF stressed that there is a perception that a draw-down is occurring and that the Americans, the Iraqis, and the insurgents feel it and act accordingly. This sense pervades how the U.S. military does its job since if it believes there is no long term commitment, it will not build capacity for an extended mission. A perception of withdrawal is also diminishing the risk commanders are willing to accept. One SOF noted that although the decline in U.S. casualties is a good thing, it needs to be seen in comparison to the total number of personnel going outside "the gate." The fight is still out there and "if we aren't engaged in it, of course there will be fewer casualties." According to the SOF, average Iraqis also think the American draw-down is coming. It is getting harder and harder to convince them to defer short-term advantages in order to make longer-term gains.

**High Value Targets versus Area Security Operations:** The SOF were concerned that the focus of our strategy was too much on "killing the bad guys" and not enough on achieving area security—the efforts needed to make an area safe for regular activity. As one SOF put it, "the insurgency is a resource race, and the resource are the citizens." [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The point being that we need to make the environment inhospitable for the insurgency to breathe and expand.

To do so, we must develop the relationships with Iraqis to develop overall intelligence. [REDACTED]

OSD 1.4 (a),(d)

DECLASSIFIED In Part JUN 21 2010  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

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09-M-3082

JUN 23 2010

FROM SITE 88 WHSR

(FRI) JUL 21 2008 21:14/ST 21:13/NO. 8160476760 P 3

DECLASSIFIED In Part  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

**TOP SECRET**

██████████ Unfortunately, at the same time, we reduced our Mosul presence from two Brigades down to one and that one became mounted instead of operating on foot. ██████████

██████████  
The SOF made clear that force levels are not the answer. In fact, they insisted, we have less than 10,000 troops in regular active combat. More important than the number of troops themselves, is the commander's willingness to get the forces into the population and to leave them there long enough to build the relationships needed to gain a regular stream of actionable intelligence. "We don't need to win hearts, we need to win trust. And you do that by showing the commitment to win." Nighttime patrols, for instance, gain the confidence of the population. If you have their confidence, they "will put their cards with you instead of the insurgents and you will gain control." Ineffective commanders, whom the SOF said are numerous, "do not deal with the local leaders, are not working toward a long term goal, and are not showing a long term commitment."

The SOF all complained that the way the U.S. military handles rotations makes it difficult to establish the contacts needed to gain control of an area. While they made it clear they aren't asking to be given lengthier assignments, they stressed that it could be done in a smarter way. While the Marines and Stryker Brigades often rotate back into the same areas, Special Forces do not. "We seem to be fighting this war one year at a time, there is no ownership over an area."

**The Iraqi Army:** The SOF were generally very impressed with the Iraqi army, whom they found to be committed and willing and able to be trained effectively. They mentioned how, despite deliberate targeting by insurgents, the lines are still long for those wishing to join the Iraqi security forces. The SOF saw this as the Iraqis wanting to be involved in their own liberation, in a way they weren't when we defeated Saddam and his army.

The SOF who worked with the Iraqi Counterterrorism Force (ICTF) were particularly impressed. According to the SOF, we do an excellent job of selecting Iraqis for the ICTF, training them in Jordan, and deploying them to the field. "The record of the ICTF is proof positive that Iraqi forces can get the job done." The SOF stressed, however, that the U.S. military has to expend much more effort on *developing* the security forces. We need to embed with squads on a much larger scale and a much longer duration. This is fundamental, the SOF made clear.

As to whether the Iraqi army should be stationed in the area from which they come or purposefully moved to other parts of Iraq, the SOF were split. ██████████

A major problem exists with the Iraqi police, who are very infiltrated and get paid more than their military counterparts. The SOF do believe, however, that the importance and strength of the

OSD 1.4 (a), (b), (d)

**TOP SECRET**

09-M-3082  
OSD 1.4 (a), (b), (d)

JUN 22 2010

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 Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
 Chief, Records & Declass Div. WHS

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militias will decrease dramatically as the Iraqi army gains control and the Iraqi police become more professional with a "local face that the citizenry can trust." OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

As to whether we should supply the Iraqi Army with U.S. or Eastern European equipment, the SOF thought there was a sensible, middle option.

**Provincial Reconstruction Teams:** The SOF stressed both the importance of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the frustration that they are not adequately funded and staffed. There is a widespread perception that the State Department is not pulling its weight and that the PRTs are simply a "new military tasking". Civil Affairs units are being tasked to backfill into PRTS but are neither qualified nor trained to do the work, but they have no choice as State and other agencies have not fulfilled their pledge to send more people. The SOF are concerned that if this problem is not addressed quickly, the PRTs will be seen as another broken promise to the Iraqi people with the predictable ramifications of loss of intelligence and population control.

**Afghanistan:** The SOF that recently returned from Afghanistan believe that we risk losing the significant gains made in that country over the last few years if we allow our attention to be distracted from the fact that we still have a lot of work to do on the ground. As in Iraq, the SOF are concerned that we are not committing enough personnel and resources to come in "behind the operations" to build up infrastructure and gain the trust of the population needed for continued intelligence dominance. "The hot spots of the Spring Offensive didn't pop up spontaneously, they were brewing during the down times but we had diminished our ability to collect intelligence because we had diminished our presence and connection to the people." The SOF also underscored the importance of building the roads, saying, "The bad guys don't want the roads because they want the areas to remain inaccessible to the central government."

**Contractors:** The SOF from both Afghanistan and Iraq expressed significant concerns over U.S. contractors. "They are out of control, make our jobs harder, and often work against us." The SOF said that the contractors disrespect the Iraqi Army and ANA, at the same time we are trying to empower these institutions. Finally, the SOF said the high salaries paid to the contractors by the USG demoralizes the U.S. military. "We aren't in this for the money but if our government can spend that much money on the contractors, why can't they spend it on our own troops?"

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OSD 1.4 (a), (b), (d)

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Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

- The main insurgent groups have rejected Maliki's reconciliation plan. They see no need for reconciliation because they think they are winning.
- The insurgency is not going to come in and make peace in response to a reconciliation offer. They are going to fight for a long time.

- 
- The insurgency is composed of several groups. They have diverse long-term interests. But they all share two core goals: drive U.S. forces out and destroy Iraq's new, Shiite-dominated political order.
  - The only U.S. withdrawal that will satisfy the insurgents is a total U.S. withdrawal. Anything less will only fuel more attacks to finish the job. Even then, the insurgency will not end. On the contrary, driving out U.S. forces will embolden the insurgents to achieve their second objective of destroying the U.S.-backed government.

- 
- While sectarian fighting is now a much more prevalent phenomenon, we must understand that the core cause of civil strife has been the Sunni insurgency. Accordingly, it is essential that defeating the insurgency remains our primary objective. To divert our focus to fighting the militias will perversely play into the insurgency's hands.
  - The Battle for Baghdad is the crucial battle. Why were no additional U.S. troops put into the fight? How could we have relied on the Iraqi police to lead the effort? Why wasn't there a better plan? Why isn't there an executive U.S.-Iraqi committee coordinating and directing the Plan's implementation on a day-to-day basis?
  - We are still not giving adequate priority to training and equipping Iraqi forces. We need to accelerate it. Iraqi forces are being treated too often as second-class citizens.

OSD 1.4 (a), (b), (d)

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## *What changes are needed?*

- Empower ISF to enforce the law against illegal armed groups
- Increase availability and professionalism of National Police
- Develop dedicated forces to target leadership of illegal armed groups
- Increase operations against illegal armed groups and terrorists
- Complete bonus payments to ISF
- Develop and announce program to counter illegal armed groups
- Engage national political leaders and the Council of Representatives in support of the Baghdad Security Plan

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Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

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Bonus

AUG 04 2006

TO: Stephen J. Hadley  
CC: Eric Edelman  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR.*  
SUBJECT: Nature of the Long Struggle

DECLASSIFIED JUL 12 2010  
Authority: EO 12958 as amended  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Today the President mentioned the fact that it is difficult to sustain support because of the imperfect understanding in our country and in the world about the nature of the long struggle we are in against violent extremists.

We call it the War on Terror, but in my view that label hasn't sold in the public's mind. I continue to believe it is a long struggle against violent extremists who use terrorism as a weapon -- a struggle within the Muslim faith.

I continue to worry that we will never fully understand it ourselves, or organize to deal with it effectively, if we don't have NSC meetings on the Long War / Global War on Terror / the Struggle against Violent Extremists. I don't believe we have ever had one, or at the most two in all these years. Our NSCs are always on Iraq, Afghanistan, etc.

The difficulty of continuing on this path is that we fail to get clear in our own minds what needs to be done, and who ought to be doing it. And as a result, we fail to organize, train and equip to win the Long War.

I urge you to think through this matter and give thought to shifting our focus to the long war, so that Iraq is seen for what it is -- one of the fronts in the long struggle.

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
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DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: AUG 17 2010

TALKING POINTS FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Principals Committee Meeting  
December 6, 2006 3:15 PM – 4:30 PM  
Ongoing Iraq Review

- A bold shift in our Iraq policy-- to a new phase-- is needed. We must accelerate the transition to the Iraqis, sustain the partnership, and stabilize the region
- There is no more pressing national security challenge. Failure would have disastrous consequences for the U.S. and the region, and stability would weaken globally.
- To use GEN Abizaid's words, "Some may think the U.S. can walk away from this enemy, but the enemy will not walk away from us." Nor will the effects.
- Our objectives in Iraq must be seen in a regional context, not simply through the "soda-straw" of Iraq. Our action (or inaction) will have consequences far beyond Iraq.



- The U.S. should be prepared to surge civilian and military resources to and/or within Iraq in support of specific civilian or military objectives. This surge could also be done on a regional basis, so that the effect would be felt not only in Iraq, but Iran would observe this as well.



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**Principals Committee Meeting  
December 7, 2006 4:00 PM – 5:30 PM  
Surge Options**

**DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: AUG 17 2010**

The Joint Staff will brief the paper.

**Background:**

- The NSC requested “one or more proposals on how we might mitigate the risks of the approach discussed on Sunday night (11/28), to include but not limited to temporary surge in Iraqi and Coalition forces”.
- The Joint Staff is focused on capability and mission while we believe the White House is focused on optics.
- The paper discusses:
  - The concept of surge would extend troops already in theater and accelerate deployment of programmed replacement brigades by several months.
    - Five brigades could be generated and deployed in about 4 months.
  - The need for GoI approval.
  - US Army readiness will be challenged with personnel, training and equipment.
  - The battlefield effects will likely have only a temporary and local effect.
  - Risk will increase in the U.S.’s ability to respond to a contingency crisis.
  - The Reserve forces will need to be involuntarily remobilized with less than 1:5 dwell ratio.

**Key Points**

- The value of a surge can demonstrate U.S. resolve and attain effects limited in scope and duration.
  - The surge can have a lasting effect if it is based on clearly defined military objectives that can be secured in the defined time.
- Significant risks and costs accompany a surge.
  - More troops will not solve what is fundamentally a political problem.

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 13 2010



OSD 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

Overall Classification: ~~SECRET~~  
Pre-Disstonal  
Not RELEASABLE Under FOIA

22 Nov 06

Classified By: ~~██████████~~  
~~Deputy Director, G-35~~  
~~Reason: 1.4(a,b,d)~~  
Declassify On: 31 May 2016

10-M-0451  
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Date: JUL 13 2010

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## Enabling a Surge to Iraq

- **A surge would likely result in decreased time between rotations for active Army BCTs (would have to acknowledge it as a wartime surge similar to a deployment to Korea).**
- **To reduce near-term stress on the active force during a surge:**
  - **Explore potential for Guard and reserve troops to volunteer for the surge to Iraq.**
  - **Explore force substitutions (e.g., surge other Services' personnel to support deployed Army units (headquarters support, unit security, truck drivers, etc.))**
- **After the surge, to reduce stress on the active force and increase their "dwell time" time at home station between deployments:**
  - **Reduce post-surge deployment levels (e.g., following the surge, decrease from the current 15 Army BCTs in Iraq to 10 BCTs) will significantly improve Army active unit "dwell time."**
  - **Mobilize and deploy a number of Guard and reserve BCTs to Iraq following the surge – they pick up part of the next force rotation.**
    - **Deploying Guard and reserve units to Iraq following a surge will give the units 8-10 months to train, equip, and be ready to deploy.**
    - **No Guard or reserve units have deployed a second time to Iraq or Afghanistan.**
    - **To mobilize the Guard and reserve, DoD would have to relax their current policies (cannot reactivate more than 1 year in a 6 year period, nor reactivate for a second 24 month period).**
- **Over the long-term, increasing the size of the active Army will improve rotation ratios, reduce stress on the force, and better support global demands of the GWoT.**
  - **60K end strength increase is equivalent to about 9 additional Army active BCTs.**


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## Illustrative Surge / Redeployment Profile



- Redeploying U.S. forces as transfer to Iraq is accelerated would reduce stress on U.S. forces, improve dwell times of Army active units.
- Accelerating growth and increasing the size of Iraqi Security Forces would replace capabilities of redeploying U.S. forces.
  - Grow Army from planned 10 divisions to 18 divisions (+96K personnel) plus attrition, fully equipped and trained. Address deficiencies, including lack of interoperability with U.S. forces, mobility, counter-IED, combat support.

12/06/1700

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November 6, 2006

SUBJECT: Iraq – Illustrative New Courses of Action

The situation in Iraq has been evolving, and U.S. forces have adjusted, over time, from major combat operations to counterterrorism, to counterinsurgency, to dealing with death squads and sectarian violence. In my view it is time for a major adjustment. Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough. Following is a range of possible options:

ILLUSTRATIVE OPTIONS

Above the Line: (Many of these options could and, in a number of cases, should be done in combination with others)

- Publicly announce a set of benchmarks agreed to by the Iraqi Government and the U.S. – political, economic and security goals – to chart a path ahead for the Iraqi government and Iraqi people (to get them moving) and for the U.S. public (to reassure them that progress can and is being made).
- Significantly increase U.S. trainers and embeds, and transfer more U.S. equipment to Iraqi Security forces (ISF), to further accelerate their capabilities by refocusing the assignment of some significant portion of the U.S. troops currently in Iraq.
- Initiate a reverse embeds program, like the Korean Katusas, by putting one or more Iraqi soldiers with every U.S. and possibly Coalition squad, to improve our units' language capabilities and cultural awareness and to give the Iraqis experience and training with professional U.S. troops.
- Aggressively beef up the Iraqi MOD and MOI, and other Iraqi ministries critical to the success of the ISF – the Iraqi Ministries of Finance, Planning, Health, Criminal Justice, Prisons, etc. – by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve/National Guard volunteers

JS 1.4(d)

- Conduct an accelerated draw-down of U.S. bases. We have already reduced from 110 to 55 bases. Plan to get down to 10 to 15 bases by April 2007, and to 5 bases by July 2007.

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- Retain high-end SOF capability and necessary support structure to target Al Qaeda, death squads, [REDACTED] while drawing down all other coalition forces, except those necessary to provide certain key enablers for the ISF.

JS 1.4 (d)      OSD 1.4 (d)

- Initiate an approach where U.S. forces provide security only for those provinces or cities that openly request U.S. help and that actively cooperate, with the stipulation being that unless they cooperate fully, U.S. forces would leave their province.
- Stop rewarding bad behavior, as was done in Fallujah when they pushed in reconstruction funds, and start rewarding good behavior. Put our reconstruction efforts in those parts of Iraq that are behaving, and invest and create havens of opportunity to reward them for their good behavior. As the old saying goes, "If you want more of something, reward it; if you want less of something, penalize it." No more reconstruction assistance in areas where there is violence.

• [REDACTED]

- Withdraw U.S. forces from vulnerable positions – cities, patrolling, etc. – and move U.S. forces to a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be available when Iraqi security forces need assistance.

JS 1.4 (d)      OSD 1.4 (d)

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Below the Line (less attractive options):

- Continue on the current path.
- Move a large fraction of all U.S. Forces into Baghdad to attempt to control it.
- Increase Brigade Combat Teams and U.S. forces in Iraq substantially.
- Set a firm withdrawal date to leave. Declare that with Saddam gone and Iraq a sovereign nation, the Iraqi people can govern themselves. [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- Try a Dayton-like process.

OSD 1.4 ( d )

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EF/650

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 27 2010

May 17, 2002 7:40 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Opposition

SECDEF HAS STR

JUL 27 2010

*EF/650*

*4/20 - sorry I'm late  
Hef/ed*

I think an info memo to the senior people in the NSC on the subject of Rodman's memo here might be useful. Why don't we get one fashioned. 6/25

Thanks.

*Response attached. Feith has approved!*

Attach.  
05/09/02 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: Support for Iraqi Opposition

*D.R.*  
Larry Di Rita  
4/24

DHR:ah  
051702-5

.....  
Please respond by 5/21/02

*USDP  
ISA must*

*5/27/02*

*5/19/02*

*→ plw  
This shd go out  
on Monday 5/20.  
Glad that SD  
liked your memo.  
Do it/20 a memo  
from SD to (Hingzls  
(P, Powell, Rice, Tenet) DJF*

05-17-02 16:07 .IN

SECDEF CONTROL# X01860 /02  
UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)  
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

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Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 27 2010

**TAB B**



~~SECRET~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

EF 1536

BCH  
5/9

INFO MEMO

I-02/007190

INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

OSD

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
(Peter W. Rodman, [REDACTED])

09 MAY 2002

SUBJECT: Support for Iraqi Opposition (U)

(U) Organizing the Iraqi Opposition to assist with regime change is needed for two basic reasons:

- legitimacy, particularly in the region, and
- making sure the wrong people don't fill the vacuum.

Legitimacy

OSD 1.4 (d)

(S) Regional leaders seem to be of the view that Iraqis need to be seen as participating in the liberation of their country. It should not be seen as just an "American invasion." [REDACTED]

- This is likely to be an important factor in obtaining regional support.

Filling the Vacuum

(S) Even more important may be the need to ensure that the post-Saddam vacuum is filled quickly by the right people.

A historical analogy is instructive:

- In 1943-44, FDR and Churchill had plans for an Allied Military Government for postwar France (i.e., an occupation government for France as well as Germany). They considered deGaulle a phoney. Only when deGaulle was greeted by millions of cheering Frenchmen in June 1944 did they conclude that he indeed represented free France.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 27 2010

~~CLASSIFIED BY ASD/ISA PETER W. RODMAN  
Reason(s) [REDACTED]  
DECLASSIFY ON 9 May 2012~~



05-09-02 11:02 IN

~~SECRET~~

- Had FDR and Churchill stuck to their plan, the Communists would have been the only significant political force in the country. The Gaullists would have been neutered, and the Communist-dominated resistance would have ruled the countryside.
- DeGaulle, in power from 1944-47, was able to build up his own political movement and effectively neutralize the Communists.



(U) An international presence or interim international "commission" would not be an adequate substitute for helping friendly indigenous forces establish their political authority quickly on the ground.

OSD 1.4 ( d )

COORDINATION: TAB A

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COORDINATION

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Mr. Douglas J. Feith

*DJF* 5/13/10

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 27 2010

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EF/650

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 27 2010

May 17, 2002 7:40 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Opposition

*NESEA  
pr sk*

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Thanks.

Attach.

05/09/02 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef re: Support for Iraqi Opposition

DHR:dh  
051702-5

.....  
Please respond by 5/21/02

*USDP*

*ISA has 1*

*5/17/02*

*5/19/02*

*→ PWR*

*This shd go out  
on Monday 5/20.  
Glad that JD  
liked your memo.  
Do it as a memo  
from JD to principals  
(R, Powell, Rice, Tenet) DJP*

05-17-02 16:06 AM

~~01860 /02~~

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Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 27 2010

**TAB C**

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: JUL 27 2010

Coordination Page

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

Mr. Douglas J. Feith

DFJ 6/24/02

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA)

Mr. Peter C. W. Flory

PCW

~~SECRET~~



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 27 2010

JUL 01 2002

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Supporting the Iraqi Opposition (U)

(S) Organizing the Iraqi Opposition to assist with regime change is needed for two reasons: to ensure legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of other regional players, and to make sure the wrong people don't fill the vacuum created by the end of the Saddam regime.

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(S) Even more important, however, is the need to ensure that the post-Saddam vacuum is filled quickly by the right people. An attempt to run Iraqi affairs by ourselves *without* a pre-cooked umbrella group of Iraqi Opposition leaders could backfire seriously. A historical example may be instructive:

- (U) In 1943-44, FDR and Churchill had plans for an Allied Military Government for postwar France (i.e., an occupation government for France as well as Germany). They considered deGaulle a phony. Only when deGaulle was greeted by millions of cheering Frenchmen in June 1944 did they conclude that he indeed represented free France.
- (U) Had FDR and Churchill actually imposed an occupation government, the Communist-dominated resistance would have been the only significant political force on the ground in the country. The Gaullists would have been neutered, and the Communists would have ruled the countryside.

Classified by DASD William J. Luti  
Reason: 1.3(a)(d)  
Declassify on: 14 June 2012

~~SECRET~~

SECDEF CONTROL #

X01861 /02

10-M-1025

**SECRET**

OSD 1.4 (d)

- (U) DeGaulle, in power from 1944-46, was able to expand his own political movement and effectively neutralize the Communists.



④ An international presence, or interim international "commission", would not be an adequate substitute for helping friendly indigenous forces establish their political and military authority quickly on the ground.

*D. A. [Signature]*

**DECLASSIFIED IN PART**  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: JUL 27 2010

~~Classified by DASD William J. [Redacted]  
Reason: [Redacted]  
Declassify on: 17 June 2012~~

**SECRET**

~~SECRET~~

EF/LSO

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 12 2010

May 17, 2002 7:40 AM

TO: Doug Feith  
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  
SUBJECT: Iraqi Opposition

SECDEF HAS SIGNED

*Handwritten signature/initials in a circle*

*Handwritten notes: 4/2/02, 4/17/02, 4/20/02*

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*Handwritten signature: Larry Di Rita*

DHR:db  
051702-5

4/2-4

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*USDP  
ISA bust*

*5/17/02  
5/19/02*

*Handwritten notes: This should go out on Monday 5/20. Glad that SD liked your memo. Do it w/ memo from SD to principals (ie, Powell, Rice, Feith) DSR*

05-17-02 16:07 IN

~~SECRET~~

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DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

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Date: OCT 12 2010

**TAB B**



INTERNATIONAL  
SECURITY  
AFFAIRS

~~SECRET~~

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2400 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2400

EF 1536

BCH  
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INFO MEMO

OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(z)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 12 2010

I-02/007190

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs  
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~~CLASSIFIED BY ASD/ISA PETER W. RODMAN  
Reason(s) 1.5(d)  
DECLASSIFY ON 9 May 2012~~

~~SECRET~~



05-09-02 11:02 IN

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 12 2010

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~~(S)~~ In Iraq, there are many undesirable opposition elements – a Communist faction, Sunni fundamentalists, and radical Shia – all with presumably some support around the country and in some institutions. Organizing the groups we favor is essential to preempt these groups, avoid a vacuum, and avoid a chaotic post-Saddam free-for-all.

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COORDINATION: TAB A

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2

COORDINATION

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Mr. Douglas J. Feith

*4/13/02*

Page determined to be Unclassified  
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS  
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5  
Date: OCT 12 2010

~~SECRET~~

EF/LSO

May 17, 2002 7:40 AM

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
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FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *TR*  
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*NESA  
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DHR:dh  
051702-5

.....  
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*USDP*

*ISA has 1*

*5/17/02*

*5/19/02*

*→ PWR*

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05-17-02 16:07 AM

*X01860 /02*

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Date: OCT 12 2010

Coordination Page

Under Secretary of Defense (Policy)

Mr. Douglas J. Feith

DF

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (ISA)

Mr. Peter C. W. Flory

PCW

~~SECRET~~



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000



DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 12 2010

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
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Classified by DASE William J. Luti  
Reason: 1.5 (a), (d)  
Declassify on: 17 June 2012

~~SECRET~~



SECDEF CONTROL #

X01861 /02

10 M-1025-AR-4

#1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 12 2010

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~~Classified by D ASD William J. Luti  
Reason: 1.5 (d)  
Declassify on: 17 June 2012~~

~~SECRET~~



## ***Bad Things That Could Happen***

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OSD 1.4 (b), (d)

- **Sunni insurgents link with Al Qa'eda to hedge against Shia/Iranian influence.**
- **Government unable to establish control over armed groups.**
- **Security forces fracture along ethnic lines.**
- **Iraqi government demands greater control over coalition military operations and/or timetable for coalition withdrawal.**
- **Resources for economic development fail to materialize.**
- **Iraqi detainee situation deteriorates.**
- **Sectarian violence bubbles over into civil war.**
- **Coalition force reductions embolden terrorists and insurgents.**

*R1*

*10-M-1152*

~~SECRET~~

November 6, 2006

**SUBJECT:** Iraq – Illustrative New Courses of Action

The situation in Iraq has been evolving, and U.S. forces have adjusted, over time, from major combat operations to counterterrorism, to counterinsurgency, to dealing with death squads and sectarian violence. In my view it is time for a major adjustment. Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough. Following is a range of possible options:

### ILLUSTRATIVE OPTIONS

**Above the Line:** (Many of these options could and, in a number of cases, should be done in combination with others)

- Publicly announce a set of benchmarks agreed to by the Iraqi Government and the U.S. – political, economic and security goals – to chart a path ahead for the Iraqi government and Iraqi people (to get them moving) and for the U.S. public (to reassure them that progress can and is being made).
- Significantly increase U.S. trainers and embeds, and transfer more U.S. equipment to Iraqi Security forces (ISF), to further accelerate their capabilities by refocusing the assignment of some significant portion of the U.S. troops currently in Iraq.
- Initiate a reverse embeds program, like the Korean Katusas, by putting one or more Iraqi soldiers with every U.S. and possibly Coalition squad, to improve our units' language capabilities and cultural awareness and to give the Iraqis experience and training with professional U.S. troops.
- Aggressively beef up the Iraqi MOD and MOI, and other Iraqi ministries critical to the success of the ISF – the Iraqi Ministries of Finance, Planning, Health, Criminal Justice, Prisons, etc. – by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve/National Guard volunteers (i.e., give up on trying to get other USG Departments to do it).
- Conduct an accelerated draw-down of U.S. bases. We have already reduced from 110 to 55 bases. Plan to get down to 10 to 15 bases by April 2007, and to 5 bases by July 2007.

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10-M-1231 Doc # 2

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- Retain high-end SOF capability and necessary support structure to target Al Qaeda, death squads, and Iranians in Iraq, while drawing down all other coalition forces, except those necessary to provide certain key enablers for the ISF.
- Initiate an approach where U.S. forces provide security only for those provinces or cities that openly request U.S. help and that actively cooperate, with the stipulation being that unless they cooperate fully, U.S. forces would leave their province.
- Stop rewarding bad behavior, as was done in Fallujah when they pushed in reconstruction funds, and start rewarding good behavior. Put our reconstruction efforts in those parts of Iraq that are behaving, and invest and create havens of opportunity to reward them for their good behavior. As the old saying goes, "If you want more of something, reward it; if you want less of something, penalize it." No more reconstruction assistance in areas where there is violence.
- Position substantial U.S. forces near the Iranian and Syrian borders to reduce infiltration and, importantly, reduce Iranian influence on the Iraqi Government.
- Withdraw U.S. forces from vulnerable positions – cities, patrolling, etc. – and move U.S. forces to a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be available when Iraqi security forces need assistance.
- Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and Coalition forces (start "taking our hand off the bicycle seat"), so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.
- Provide money to key political and religious leaders (as Saddam Hussein did), to get them to help us get through this difficult period.
- Initiate a massive program for unemployed youth. It would have to be run by U.S. forces, since no other organization could do it.
- Announce that whatever new approach the U.S. decides on, the U.S. is doing so on a trial basis. This will give us the ability to readjust and move to another course, if necessary, and therefore not "lose."
- Recast the U.S. military mission and the U.S. goals (how we talk about them) – go minimalist.

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~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: OCT 18 2010

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**Below the Line (less attractive options):**

- Continue on the current path.
- Move a large fraction of all U.S. Forces into Baghdad to attempt to control it.
- Increase Brigade Combat Teams and U.S. forces in Iraq substantially.
- Set a firm withdrawal date to leave. Declare that with Saddam gone and Iraq a sovereign nation, the Iraqi people can govern themselves. Tell Iran and Syria to stay out.
- Assist in accelerating an aggressive federalism plan, moving towards three separate states – Sunni, Shi'a, and Kurd.
- Try a Dayton-like process.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 30 2010

~~SECRET~~  
Working Paper

File:  
Terrorism  
INFO  
10/10  
10A-3

October 10, 2001  
6:45 AM

TO: Gen. Dick Myers, CJCS  
Gen. Pete Pace, VCJCS

CC: Paul Wolfowitz  
Doug Feith, USD(P)

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld  

SUBJECT: What Will Be the Military Role in the War on Terrorism?

The success of the nation's effort against terrorism will depend on our country's ability to disrupt the terrorist networks and to make life unacceptably difficult for nations harboring, facilitating, financing and/or tolerating those networks, as well as for the NGOs and individuals who assist them.

Success will depend on our ability to combine political, financial, economic, law enforcement and overt and covert military activities in a way that puts powerful, continuous pressure on terrorists and their supporters in countries, across the globe. To do this, DoD must participate to a vastly greater extent than it has. For a month, DoD has produced next to no actionable suggestions as to how we can assist in applying the urgently needed pressure on terrorists other than cruise missiles and bombs.

The American people are paying one-third of a trillion dollars per year for DoD. We have tens of thousands of dedicated, talented, creative people who are anxious to be helpful in this international effort. But something is fundamentally wrong in the Department. Somewhere, between the President's repeated urgent requests and my strong and repeatedly expressed urgings, and the 1.5 million people in the Department, there is a complete disconnect. I am seeing next to nothing that is thoughtful, creative or actionable. How can that be? Is it because the Defense establishment has spent the last decade becoming increasingly risk adverse?

The Department of Justice and its counterparts in other nations have arrested hundreds of suspects. The Department of the Treasury and its counterparts in other nations have frozen hundreds of bank accounts totaling hundreds of millions of dollars. The Department of State has organized many dozens of nations in support. But DoD has come up with a goose egg.

Working Paper  
~~SECRET~~

10-M-1397

SECDEF CONTROL# X02202 /02

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

Working Paper

All I can imagine is that down the line, in many locations in OSD, the Joint Staff, and the CINCs, there are middle-level people making terribly wrong judgments with respect to political risk and military risk, decisions they are not qualified to make and ought not to be making. They must be systematically dumbing down all proposals that anyone creative is coming up with to the point that they block every idea except cruise missiles and bombers.

It has to stop and fast. It is been a month since the attack on the Pentagon. More people are going to be killed if we don't produce some results fast. The options do not have to be brilliant, but there must be some options. The NCA will decide whether or not we think they are actionable. We will make judgments as to risk. That is our job. We must put pressure on the terrorist networks and their supporters fast. If we are to be successful in doing that, we must push them off balance, increase their costs and, over time, they will run out of money, be frightened, recruits will decline, defections will rise and their supporters will fall away.

You must figure out a way for us to get this job done. You must find out what in the world the problem is and why DoD is such a persistent and unacceptably dry well.

You must drive the staffs to solve this problem. I am available to do whatever is necessary to provide the stimulus, the incentive, or the threats necessary to drive the people who have the responsibility for producing actionable ideas to meet their responsibilities.

We are not doing our jobs. We owe it to the country to get this **accomplished**—and fast. Your job is to get me military options. It is the NCA's job to balance risks and benefits. We cannot do our job unless you do your job. If we delay longer, more Americans could be killed.

Let's get it done.

--Note: You may use this memo in any way you feel will be helpful.

DHR/dh  
100801-2C

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: SEP 30 2010

Working Paper

~~SECRET/NOFORN~~

10-M-1397