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DSB Office  
Room 301040

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

COMMUNICATIONS, COMMAND,  
CONTROL, AND INTELLIGENCE

September 26, 1977

OSD 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)

Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S.C. § 552  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 08 May 2012 Authority: EO 13526  
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Reason: 3.3(b)(1)(i) - U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)  
MDR: 08-M-2704-A1

[REDACTED]  
c/o ITT Corporation  
500 Washington Avenue  
Nutley, New Jersey, 07110

Dear [REDACTED]

Attached for your information is a copy of the "talking points" memorandum.

Best regards,

[REDACTED]  
Executive Secretary  
DSB Cruise Missile Study

Attachment

~~When the attachments are removed,  
this transmittal letter becomes  
Unclassified.~~

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Authority: EO 13526  
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Date: MAY 08 2012

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OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

SEP 23 1977

**MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION**

**SUBJECT: Cruise Missile Task Force Meeting, 20-21 September 1977**

Dear Jim,

Enclosed are a few "talking points" which were put together by the DSB Cruise Missile Task Force at the September meeting. They are transmitted to you and others on the distribution because of their timeliness.



OSD  
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

C. M. Herzfeld  
Chairman  
DSB Task Force on Cruise Missiles

Enclosure

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POINT PAPER -- DSB TASK FORCE ON CRUISE MISSILES

1. Nuclear cruise missiles in NATO can raise NATO's strategic posture to approximate equivalence with the Soviet level confronting NATO.
2. Nuclear cruise missiles in NATO can be more survivable than present Pershing missiles and QRA aircraft. Survivability is dependent on host country requirements and operating constraints.
3. Nuclear cruise missiles in NATO can release the dual-capable aircraft (about 600) for conventional TACAIR missions.
4. Range requirements for non-nuclear cruise missiles in NATO vary from country to country and according to the target set.

OSD 3.3(b)(4),(5)

A way to consider the range requirement is to consider the Prompt Strike Plan (PSP) target set. [redacted] PSP targets fall within about [redacted] to which must be added about [redacted] to meet defense-evasion and terrain-following needs. Stand-off for survivability adds more depending on deployment.

These points argue for a range of at least [redacted] for deployments in Germany, and greater range for UK deployments.

A range of [redacted] restricts PSP target coverage [redacted] not including additional range needed for defense-evasion, terrain-following, and stand-off for survivability.

5. Non-nuclear cruise missiles deployed in NATO could significantly impact the effectiveness of Soviet air, SAM, and logistic operations, provided that adequate numbers (several thousand) and appropriate munitions are available.

The feasibility and possible implications of such large-scale deployments must be carefully assessed.

6. Both nuclear and non-nuclear cruise missiles have potential for cheaper, lower manning deployments. Lower manning levels are feasible with proper design and if organizational difficulties can be overcome.
7. Both nuclear and non-nuclear cruise missiles have potential for better C<sup>3</sup> including more survivable and more secure communications (satellite communications, frequency hopping for better jamming resistance).
8. Cruise missiles make clearer the need to revisit the technical assumptions and objectives of MBFR. A number of new systems (SS-20, Backfire, and ATEM--in development) and conventional improvements have appeared since the talks began.
9. Any high-technology nation can produce cruise missiles. Some can produce small nuclear warheads, but none can get adequate guidance accuracy for non-nuclear warheads the way we do it. They may achieve adequate non-nuclear accuracy using other approaches (e.g., radio-aided guidance).

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10. Technology Transfer

- o There is very little technology which needs to be transferred to enable some NATO nations to build their own cruise missiles.

- o They can build engines, airframe, and several types of guidance including TERCOM. If they want to use TERCOM, however, they will need high quality maps.

- o High quality mapping data are available to some NATO nations to varying degrees. Digitized map data suitable for TERCOM would be needed by the NATO nations.

- o A policy is needed as to whether (and how much) digitized mapping data should be transferred to our allies.

- o The NATO allies can use other guidance systems, like GPS or map matching.

11. If the US is to encourage joint NATO participation in cruise missiles, find for each NATO country the appropriate format consistent with their interests. Then let each country redesign and produce them. If possible the US should effect interoperability; SLBMs should be launchable out of our tubes, etc. Also, we should sell the NATO countries the parts and subsystems they need.