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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Memo For Jim Wade 7 Sept 77
SA670

The attached are the
papers Dave Bohan prepared during
the DSB Summer Study.

— They should provide
background for today's 1400 meeting.

Harold Epstein
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08-M-2731-A1

FROM: Dave Bobrow
SUBJECT: Issues Which Merit Analysis

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Given the limits of time and energy, we have unavoidably left unaddressed many critical issues about the national security implications and thus the ultimate military benefit of cruise missiles. At the request of Chairman Herzfeld, this memorandum notes some of these broader issues which need further examination by DoD and the U.S. Government more generally.

1. Diffusion and Proliferation of Cruise Missile Weaponry.

Numerous nations make cruise missiles and many others have secured them over the years. The component technologies are generally available to nations with substantial technological capability. The often-cited exception of the mapping which makes high accuracy feasible is overstated. One expert briefer indicates that it is fully feasible to get within a factor of two of expected U.S. accuracy for land attacks with available know-how and technology. Generally available maps of the U.S. can be of great value and the contribution of current and future civil satellites remains to be determined. The world which we can expect to confront by 1985 will then be one in which many nations are likely to manufacture, or purchase from the manufacturers economically driven to export, cruise missiles which will have substantial destructive potential even without U.S. high accuracy innovations.

Accordingly, we recommend studies on the implications of cruise missile proliferation (varying nuclear proliferation as a part of the analyses) for the following matters of clear concern for U.S. defense policy: (1) the potential costs to the superpowers of attempts to project their power be it in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, or other developing regions; (2) the implications for U.S. security support assistance in arms and material to friendly states involved in regional conflict; (3) more demanding requirements for the U.S. to be able to accurately identify the source of attacks by small numbers of cruise missiles. One hypothesis which merits serious examination is that cruise missile proliferation with nuclear proliferation will shrink the deterrence gap between the superpowers and mid-level military powers. Another is that it will vastly raise the escalation rate and geographical extension of destruction in conflicts between third parties should they break out. A third is that the feasibility of decentralized and in large measure decoupled regional deterrent balances will be substantially increased.

2. Stability and Indistinguishability.

Navy presentations on the contributions of sea-based, nuclear armed, land attack cruise missiles raise a number of issues most clearly which apply to a lesser extent to ground and air cruise missiles as well. Admiral Long has argued for the stabilizing contribution of

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...Tomahawk based on the ability to deliver nuclear weapons anywhere in the world free of political and geographic constraints. He proposes that this role be played by missiles on non-dedicated platforms. Another Navy study makes many of the same claims and calls for dual-capable CMs which can be nuclear armed in the field. A Navy briefer has stated that there would be few if any remotely observable differences between nuclear and non-nuclear armed Tomahawks. Expert members of our task force have stated that range for cruise missiles is essentially unverifiable and easily open to extension. Taken as a whole, these possibilities would substantially obliterate for other governments distinctions between U.S. strategic and tactical forces and between U.S. nuclear and non-nuclear forces. What are the likely benefits to the U.S. from progressive indistinguishability on these counts? What positive options does such blurring provide that would otherwise be unavailable? Do these options hold up when one factors in the likely reaction of other countries or their likely weaponry in the period after 1985? What are the implications for arms control arrangements of a regional nature? for other U.S. naval activities which require third party consent? for deceptive actions by others to falsely attribute nuclear use to the U.S.?

Of course, these areas of potential costs may turn out to be modest in themselves or to be outweighed by other considerations. That judgement should follow rather than precede serious analyses which treat governments other than the Soviet Union as adaptive, resourceful, and wary about U.S. intentions.

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FROM: Dave Bobrow *EM*
SUBJECT: Political-Military Considerations and GLCMs in Europe

U.S. decisions about ground launched cruise missiles in the NATO theater involve choices about:

1. Warhead -- nuclear, dual capable, non-nuclear, OSD 3.3(b)(4),(5)
2. Range -- most importantly whether or not the range will limit reach to the East European countries or will extend it far into the Western Soviet Union,
3. Ownership -- most importantly whether or not the U.S. will facilitate German acquisition.

The current GLCM concept presented by the Air Force enables a nuclear warhead to be carried a range of at least [REDACTED] Ownership questions are not addressed.

If deployed to Germany, the U.S. will be changing current political constraints on targetting the USSR with systems based in the NATO Guidelines Area (NGA). The U.S. has never deployed a nuclear system to the FRG without providing it to the German military forces. Deploying the currently planned GLCM in Germany probably amounts to providing the German military with nuclear capable weapons which can strike the USSR. For the Europeans, including the Soviets, the proposed GLCMs are strategic weapons. And there is little reason to have confidence in the feasibility of remote verification that those deployed are really conventionally armed and/or limited in range to the NGA.

GLCMs as proposed will blur the distinction between strategic and tactical weapons. One can understand why this appeals to some Europeans as coupling the U.S. more tightly to NATO as well as for its' contribution to possible future independent European strategic nuclear forces.

Nevertheless, these considerations also suggest that GLCM decisions will have extremely serious implications to the Soviets and for de jure and de facto arms control and crisis management arrangements. The consequences for U.S. freedom of decision, for U.S.S.R. weapons and doctrine, and for discrete levels and stopping points on escalatory ladders in Central Europe may be acceptable on balance. The need is to be sure that the consequences have been thought through and that weapons development and procurement decisions are related to broader policy issues.

...to compete with other alternatives to bolster European defenses which preserve or strengthen current distinctions between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, allow for clear signalling of U.S. nuclear resolve to defend Europe without contributing unnecessarily to nuclear pre-emption, or squarely address the merits of different degrees of regional self-defense. One can unquestionably develop a scenario under which the currently proposed GLCMs with some improvements with respect to survivability and security look very attractive for deterrence and defense. However, that scenario needs to be shown to be more likely than other more unattractive possibilities. Long-range, nuclear armed GLCMs are not the only alternative to the status quo.

P.S. Chart on range implications attacked.

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
OSD 3.3(b)(4),(5)

RANGE

Considerations:*

SHORT

LONG



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