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Report to The President and the Secretary of Defense

on the Department of Defense

BY THE BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL

1 July 1970

rame and Control Capability

Defense Intelligence



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
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BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

July 1, 1970

My dear Mr. President:

It is my honor to submit to you herewith the Report of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel on Command and Control and Defense Intelligence. Because of the sensitive nature of the subject matter and the effect its disclosure could have on our national well-being, the Panel asked its subcommittee on Operations to undertake the examination of these two important areas.



Intelligence activities are spread throughout the Department of Defense with little or no effective coordination. There is, as has often been charged, evidence of duplication between the various organizations. Redundancy in intelligence, within reason, is desirable, and it is particularly important that you and other decision-makers have more than one independent source of intelligence. We feel, however, that there is a large

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imbalance in the allocation of resources, which causes more information to be collected than can ever be processed and used.

Furthermore, there is a tendency within the intelligence community to produce intelligence for the intelligence community and to remain remote from and not give sufficient attention to the requirements of others who have valid needs for intelligence. The basic objective of the intelligence community should be to get the right information to the right people at the right time.

I hope the Panel's recommendations will not be considered criticisms of individuals, but will help to solve the problems associated with Command and Control and Intelligence in a way that effectively supports the objectives of the Department of Defense and the Nation:

I know my colleagues on the Panel join me in expressing to you our appreciation for giving us the privilege of undertaking this important assignment at this critical period in our Nation's history.

Respectfully yours,

ulax W. Fithingh

GILBERT W. FITZHUGH

Chairman

The President The White House

Report to The President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense

BY THE BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL I July 1970

National Command and Control Capability

Defense Intelligence





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THE PANEL

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*Members of the Operations Subcommittee.

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PREFACE

The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel was appointed by the President and the Secretary of Defense in July 1969, and given the following broad Charter, with instructions to submit its Final Report by July 1, 1970:

The general scope of the Panel is to study, report and make recommendations on:

- (1) The organization and management of the Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Agencies and the military services, as it affects the Department's mission performance, decision-making process, the command and control function and facilities, and the coordination with other governmental departments and agencies, with emphasis on the responsiveness to the requirements of the President and the Secretary of Defense.
- (2) The Defense research and development efforts from the standpoints of mission fulfillments, costs, organization, time and interrelation with the scientific and industrial community.
- (3) The Defense procurement policies and practices, particularly as they relate to costs, time and quality.
- (4) Such other matters as the Secretary may submit to it from time to time.

It is important to note that, while the Charter is very broad as to the Panel's function in the fields of structure, organization, and operating procedures of the entire Department of Defense, it excludes considerations of broad national policy. The Panel has endeavored to hew closely to this line.

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We were told that this is the first broad-scale study of the Department of Defense in many years -- in fact since the two Commissions on Organization of the Executive Department of the Government chaired by former President Herbert Hoover.

We decided to approach our assignment with the same broad objectives as stated in the Hoover Commission Report, namely:

- (1) That the primary objectives of the National Security Organization is to preserve the peace, but that it must at all times be ready and able, promptly and effectively, to marshall all of our resources, human and material, for the protection of our national security.
- (2) That civilian influence must be dominant in the formulation of national policy and that civilian control of the military establishment must be clearly established and firmly maintained.
- (3) That the Nation is entitled to the maximum possible return for every dollar of military expenditure.
- (4) That military efficiency -- in other words, readiness for war -- must be the fundamental objective of the National Military Establishment.
- (5) That elimination of wasteful duplication is essential to good government, but that the preservation, within sound limits, of a healthy competitive spirit and of service pride and tradition are basic to progress and morale.

Because of the vast scope of the operations of the Department of Defense, the Panel divided itself into four sub-committees, as follows:

- (1) Organization and Personnel Management.
- (2) Management of Materiel Resources (including research, levelopment, procurement and management of weapons and supplies) planning, programming, budgeting, and similar procedures.
- (3) Military operations, intelligence, communications, automatic data processing.
- (4) Conflicts of interests, contract compliance, domestic action, equal employment opportunity, etc.

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The Panel interviewed many witnesses in depth, and the sub-committees many more. It made a functional survey of the Defense headquarters organizations in the Washington area covering some 1,600 organizational elements to elicit information on the actual operation of and interface between units of the Department of Defense. It also sent a questionnaire to a large number of people outside the Department of Defense who we thought might wish to give us the benefit of their thinking. We enjoyed a remarkable response, with answers ranging from a page to dozens of pages of detailed suggestions.

The Panel members and the staff carefully reviewed many earlier reports of studies of the Department of Defense, and many visits were made to important elements of the Department outside the Washington area. Members representing sub-committees Three and Four visited a number of military Commands in Europe, the Mediterranean, and Southeast Asia, to see how policies determined at Washington Headquarters were carried out in the operational units.

Because of the sensitive nature of the subject matter and the effect its disclosure could have on the national well-being, the Panel asked sub-committee Three to undertake an examination of the areas of National Command and Control and Defense intelligence and make a classified report.

The Panel wishes to extend its deep appreciation to the many people in the Department of Defense -- both military and civilian -- who contributed generously of their time in answering its innumerable questions and volunteering so many constructive suggestions. We found them uniformly anxious to help and enthusiastic about the possibilities for improving operations. We realize that this would not have happened without the strong support of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, and Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard.

To all these people who contributed so much to its endeavors, the Panel extends its deep thanks.



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
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BLUE RIBBON DEFENSE PANEL REPORT ON NATIONAL COMMAND AND CONTROL AND DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY




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
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


We do not see any quick, simple or inexpensive solutions to any of these problems. We do, however, recommend that:



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


- Personnel security investigations are performed by the investigative elements of the Military Departments. The regulations of each of the Military Departments make reference to accepting the validity of previous investigations completed by any agency of the Federal Government which meet the minimum investigative requirements of that particular Department. For all practical purposes, the Departments interpret this narrowly and usually do not accept the investigations of another Department as meeting their standards.

- Each Military Department has a large organization devoted primarily to Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MC&G) activities. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) attempts to coordinate these activities to eliminate duplication and set priorities for production. However, DIA coordinates through the intelligence elements of the Departmental staffs, and only the Air Force MC&G agency is within the purview of the intelligence staff. The Army and Navy MC&G agencies are not a part of the intelligence community.

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JS 3.3(b)(1)



The Panel recommends that the Defense intelligence community be restructured to provide a better management structure and to assure the provision of intelligence, as required, to the President, other consumers at the national level and to all levels of the Department from the Secretary of Defense to operating units in the field. The new intelligence structure should:

- 1. Function in response to consumer requirements for intelligence and provide timely and quality products, responsive to those requirements, with a proper balance between collection, processing, and production activities.
- 2. Provide a clear chain of command from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the collection and production units that will assure the timely flow of intelligence information and minimize the injection of bias arising from Service affiliations, or operational location.
- 3. Provide for a single individual in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who is the clearly designated representative of the Secretary of Defense to other Departments and Agencies of Government for intelligence matters and who is responsible to coordinate or direct all intelligence activities within the Department.



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- 4. Provide flexibility for timely development and distribution of limited, costly resources, both trained personnel and equipments, to meet changing priorities."
- 5. Provide the proper environment to develop an effective and efficient professional intelligence career service for both military and civilian personnel.

Specifically, it is recommended that the Secretary of Defense:

- 1. Designate the Deputy Secretary for Operations to be his agent for all matters relating to intelligence, to include the authority to designate those activities to be considered intelligence activities.
- 2. Establish under the Deputy Secretary for Operations an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD(I)), with the additional title of Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI). The ASD(I)/DDI would be delegated the responsibility to represent the Secretary of Defense with other Departments and Agencies of Government for intelligence matters and to coordinate or direct all DOD intelligence activities, including national programs which are managed in the Department, in accordance with existing law and applicable National Security Council and Director of Central Intelligence Directives. Among his specific responsibilities, the ASD(I)/DDI would:
- a. Serve as the Defense representative on the United States Intelligence Board, and appoint, with approval of the Deputy Secretary for Operations, representatives to other government-wide intelligence committees and boards.
- b. Direct and control all DOD intelligence activities not specifically designated by the Deputy Secretary for Operations as organic to combatant forces.
- c. Have the authority to delegate operation of any of these activities which he deems necessary to assure maximum exploitation of DOD resources.
- d. Review all proposed intelligence programs, monitor and evaluate all on-going intelligence activities and make recommendations to the Deputy Secretary for Operations with regard to allocation of resources.

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e. Establish procedures to review and validate requirements for intelligence production and collection and evaluate the product against the requirement.

f. Establish procedures for and periodically conduct a systematic evaluation of the intelligence process in the Defense intelligence community. This evaluation should include an assessment of the utility of the intelligence products provided to consumers outside the Defense intelligence community.

g. Review and consolidate requirements for research and development in support of intelligence activities.

h. Develop policies and procedures to insure the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. This will include the establishment and control of special access systems for sensitive programs not already covered by systems initiated by higher authority. He will insure that balanced judgment is applied between the need for exploitation and the need for protection, particularly recognizing that the balance of this relationship shifts through the phases of intelligence operations: identifying requirements and concept formulation; development, procurement and implementation; collection; processing; production; and dissemination.

3. Establish under the ASD(I)/DDI:

a. A Defense Security Command (DSECC) to be composed of the present Service Cryptologic Agencies and all other Defense intelligence collection activities except for those which have been specifically designated by the Deputy Secretary for Operations as organic to combatant forces. The DSECC should perform those processing activities which are most efficiently associated with collection facilities. Among his specific responsibilities, the Commander, DSECC would, under the direction of the DDI:

(1) Command all those designated Defense intelligence collection and associated processing and reporting activities, with authority to delegate administrative management or operational control as he deems necessary.

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(2) Serve as Director, National Security

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- (3) Insure the most judicious use of common staff elements between his DSECC and NSA.
- (4) Insure the timely dissemination of intelligence information to all appropriate Departments, Agencies, Commands or operating units.
- (5) Prepare the Defense Security Program for those activities for which he is responsible, and review and coordinate the programs of intelligence collection activities organic to the combatant forces to insure maximum exploitation of resources.
- b. A Defense Intelligence Production Agency (DIPA), to replace the Defense Intelligence Agency, whose Director would be responsible for Defense Intelligence production except for those production activities specifically assigned to the combatant forces by the Deputy Secretary for Operations. Among his specific responsibilities, the Director, DIPA would:
- (1) Direct those intelligence production activities which have been placed under his purview, with the authority to delegate administrative management or operational control as he deems necessary.
- (2) Provide current intelligence to designated individuals and organizations.
- (3) Provide threat assessments for all elements of DOD, as required.
- (4) Provide finished intelligence to appropriate elements of the Department in response to expressed needs.
- (5) Provide all DOD intelligence estimates and inputs to national estimates as directed by the DDI.
- (6) Manage all Defense intelligence production information systems, including those of the intelligence activities organic to the combatant forces, to insure inter-operability and optimized intelligence flow to and from all echelons of DOD.
- (7) Prepare the Defense Intelligence Program for those activities under his direction, and review and coordinate the programs of intelligence production activities organic to combatant forces to insure maximum exploitation of resources.



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4. Expand the responsibilities of the National Security Agency to include the processing, data base maintenance and reporting of all intelligence information as directed by the DDI.

- 5. Establish within the DSECC a unified Defense Investigative Service responsible for all personnel security investigations within the DOD and its contractors.
- 6. Combine the Army Topographic Command, the Naval Oceanographic Office and the Aeronatuical Chart and Information Center into a unified Defense Map Service reporting to the Secretary of Defense through the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Management of Resources).
- 7. Take the actions necessary (a) to extend to the entire Defense intelligence community the authority that the National Security Agency presently has to develop a professional career service, and (b) to establish an intelligence career service for military officers.

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COMMAND AND CONTROL

A. Introduction

The Operations Sub-Committee of the Blue Ribbon Defense Panel has attempted to assess the capability of the National Military Command System (NMCS) to perform its missions in a strategic nuclear war, in which the United States would be attacked by long-range nuclear weapon delivery vehicles such as ballistic missiles. Such attacks could conceivably vary from limited strikes with a few weapons against selected targets to an "all-out" or indiscriminate attack with many weapons.

The NMCS consists of the facilities, equipment, doctrine, procedures, personnel, and communications supporting national authorities in the exercise of their military operational command function.

All elements of the NMCS are planned to be continuously manned and ready for use by national authorities or their alternates or successors, who may exercise command from any one of them or from external points through them.

JS 3.3(b)(5)



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The role and mission of the NMCS is crucial to U.S. deterrence strategy, which requires the existence of a credible capability to retaliate in the event of nuclear attack. Since such an attack can conceivably occur with little or no warning, this requires a capability to direct the execution of strategic retaliatory forces even after an attack has started. This inturn requires a command system which can survive under attack, arrive at an appropriate decision, and transmit it to retaliatory forces before the bulk of them can be destroyed. JS 3.3(b)(5)

U.S. policy and doctrine complicate the matter.

Physical and procedural safeguards have been instituted to prevent unauthorized or accidental launch of nuclear weapons, and to insure that they are launched only by express decision and according to approved plans.



B. Warning Time

JS 3.3(b)(5)

The compression of time available for attack detection, decision, and response is one of the most demanding conditions to be met in order to assure the execution of retaliatory forces. Strategic (advance) warning might be available, particularly if the motivation for attack arose in the context of escalating tensions or hostilities. Such warning would almost certainly be equivocal, however. It might provide valuable time in which to alert forces, increase their readiness, and reduce their vulnerability, but not sufficient grounds for execution. In theory, it might also provide time to move key command personnel to safer locations, or to prepare command arrangements which did not depend on their survival in order to execute.

JS 3.3(b)(5)

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)

In any case, strategic warning cannot be guaranteed, and it is more than likely that conclusive warning would not be available until an attack was actually underway. A number of electronic sensors -- Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) radars, over-the-horizon "forward scatter" radars (440L), the Space Detection and Tracking System (SPADATS) -- might provide 15 to 20 minutes warning that ICBMs had been launched. Future satellite systems with infrared detectors (Project 647) might extend this to as much as 28 minutes. However, no system in operation or under development can provide more than 5 to 10 minutes warning of attack by shorter-range sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) using a depressed trajectory.

JS 3.3(b)(5),(7),(8)

C. Presidential Survival

An essential condition for the execution of retaliatory forces according to present plans is the survival of Presidential authority. It is also one of the most uncertain conditions, if not the most uncertain.

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The President and his 15 legal successors* are highly vulnerable as a group (as is the national government as a whole). Their day-to-day duties keep them in Washington nearly all the time, where they are virtually unprotected. With

JS 3.3(b)(T),(6)

Procedures could be devised to insure that one of the Presidential successors was always away from Washington, or

notice.

plans could be developed to implement such procedures at short


Another solution with considerable merit from a purely operational standpoint would be for the

JS 3.3(b)(5)(8)

^{*} The Vice President, Speaker of the House, President pro tempore of the Senate, and the 12 Cabinet members in order of the seniority of their departments.

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JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)

An enemy could not reasonably plan on preventing a substantial retaliation by destroying political leaders at the top. He could not be sure that some Presidential successor would not survive, that Presidential authority would not be predelegated, or that military commanders would not decide things for themselves.

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)


D. The Military Command Centers

JS 3.3(b)(5)(8)

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JS 3.3(b)(5),(6),(7),(9)



The NEACP is the most accessible alternate command center for national authorities,

JS 3.3(b)(7)(6)

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The intentions of national command authorities have not been ascertained, but it is necessary to know something about them if the design of a supporting command system is to be useful.

E. Communications

JS 3.3(b)(5),(7),(8)

Another major requirement is the survival of communications once an attack has begun, in order to insure that execution orders can be delivered to strategic forces. Fast, reliable, and secure means of communication are generally available for peacetime operations,

JS 3.3(b)(8)

If a decision is made to retaliate, planned procedures call for sending a simple, short, formatted emergency action message to retaliatory forces. In principle, all U.S. communications assets are available for transmission of the message.

JS 3.3(b)(5),(8)

The JCSAN and EMATS are dependent on landline circuits and landline injection links to a



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A system of airborne transmitters tied to space satellites might significantly improve the situation. Present communications satellites are susceptible to direct attack or damage from collateral effects of high altitude nuclear bursts, but future ones could be made less vulnerable by shielding and antijamming or decoy and other deception techniques. Airborne transmitters would require air-to-air relay for long-range coverage. Such a communications system would be expensive and take some years to develop, but would be much more reliable and survivable under nuclear attack.

JS 3.3(b)(8)

F. Strategic Decisions

Present NMCS concepts require the continuation of command and communications well after an attack has begun, not only to execute the strategic forces but also to "manage" the nuclear exchange by controlling, limiting, or terminating it. The latter imposes a severe information requirement to meet in an environment in which command and communications would probably be seriously degraded.

Current plans and procedures assume that national authorities will need to know very quickly whether the United States is being attacked, by whom, on what scale, and against what kind of targets, prior to making a retaliatory decision.

JS 3.3(b)(5),(8)

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
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JS 3.3(b)(8)

Current plans and procedures also assume that surviving decision-makers will require considerable additional information for subsequent "battle-management" decisions. They will need to know what U.S. forces have been destroyed, what U.S. forces have been launched, and what U.S. forces might still be available for launch. They will need to know what enemy forces have been launched and what enemy forces remain for launch. They will need to know what battle damage has been inflicted on the enemy and what on the United States.

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)

Elaborate plans and preparations have been made to obtain the above information. Complex reporting systems from field forces to the national level have been developed, and sophisticated computers have been installed in the command centers to process the data rapidly. Plans are underway to employ satellites with infrared and other sensors to monitor a nuclear exchange, and to use military communications satellites for transmission of the data.



G. Strategic Launches

JS 3.3(b)(5),(6)

It was assumed in the design of the present command and control capability that in a nuclear exchange strategic missiles would be launched in a simultaneous or near-simultaneous salvo (except perhaps for whatever residual force might be held in



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
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reserve). In fact, however, and for good military reasons, it is virtually certain that missile launches would be staggered and spread out over time.

Missiles in the launch phase are extremely vulnerable to blast effects on the missiles themselves, the effects of EMP and TREES upon their guidance systems, and nuclear effects on their warheads.

JS 3.3(b)(5),(7),(8)

Missile warheads are also vulnerable over target, when other nuclear weapons are detonating. If their delivery is not sufficiently separated in space and time, the explosion of an adjacent weapon could easily neutralize another. Many uncertainties are involved in determining the necessary spacing, but the risk provides a reason to stagger missile deliveries rather than have them arrive simultaneously.



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H. Strategic Defense

A major unresolved command and control problem relates to the forthcoming Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) defenses. The question of how to coordinate the two, especially if control of offensive and defensive forces continues in two independent military commands, will become a major problem as the ABM becomes operational.

JS 3.3(b)(5),(b)

Recommendations

The Panel does not see any quick, simple or inexpensive solutions to any of these problems. We do, however, recommend that: JS 3.3(b)(5),的

The Secretary of Defense should direct, as a matter of urgency, a comprehensive and objective analysis of the requirements for the National Military Command System in the next decade. The analysis should address the continuity of political authority, as well as the facilities, equipment and concept of operations needed to provide maximum support to the National Command Authorities and to provide

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the greatest possible assurance of positive command and control of U.S. and allied forces for general war, as well as limited war, crisis situations and day-to-day operations. An objective of the analysis should be to achieve the best immediate posture with available equipment and procedures and to provide guidance for research and development toward a more capable system. In this latter regard, the analysis should include a consideration of operational concepts which might arise after SALT agreements, or in the absence of SALT agreements, and should take fully into account the advancing technology of warning systems and of weapons delivery systems.

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DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE

I. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The National "intelligence community" consists of the Departments and Agencies of the Government which are responsible for the collection of information and production of foreign intelligence essential to the security of the United States. The principal departments and agencies of the intelligence community are the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of State, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is essential that the activities of these departments and agencies be closely coordinated to assure efficient and effective operation.

The DCI is responsible for the general management and coordination of the intelligence community, in addition to serving as the Director of CIA.

The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) is the formal instrument established by the National Security Council (NSC) to advise and assist the DCI, as he requires, in discharging his statutory responsibilities. The responsibilities and functions of the USIB are set forth in National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 1. Its primary responsibility is to achieve an effectively coordinated intelligence community in the interest of National Security.

The major functions assigned in NSCID No. 1 are:

- 1. To establish policies and develop programs for the guidance of all departments and agencies concerned.
- To establish appropriate intelligence objectives, requirements and priorities.
- 3. To review the national intelligence effort and report to the NSC on its adequacy, integration and gaps identified.

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- 4. To make recommendations on foreign intelligence matters to appropriate government officials, including particularly recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on intelligence matters within the jurisdiction of the Director, NSA.
- 5. To develop and review security standards and practices as they relate to the protection of intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.
- 6. To formulate, as required, policies in regard to arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters.

The functions of USIB are performed through its 14 committees and sub-committees. Most of the Chairmen of the USIB committees and sub-committees are representatives of the DCI, provided from the National Intelligence Program Evaluation Staff, which supports him.

The Department of Defense is represented on the USIB by the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). When DIA was established, its Director replaced the senior intelligence officers of the three military departments on the USIB; however, they are permitted to participate in board meetings as observers and to add footnotes to USIB papers stating their points of disagreement. The military departments still retain full membership on the committees and sub-committees of the USIB. There is little or no coordination among the Defense representatives and observers on the USIB and they often appear to be working at cross purposes.

Intelligence requirements at the national level are determined in the USIB entirely by representatives of the intelligence community. It is not clear that consumers of intelligence outside the intelligence community make a significant contribution to this process.

The Board of National Estimates (BNE) is composed of a number of distinguished men, appointed by the DCI, from industry, the academic community and the professions. The BNE periodically submits to USIB a program of proposed production of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) for approval. Upon approval, terms of reference for each estimate are prepared and contributions are obtained from the member agencies of the USIB. The BNE completes its evaluation and submits a first draft for coordination with the member agencies. After revision, the estimate is submitted

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to the USIB for approval. If any member of the USIB or any of the senior intelligence officers of the Services disagree with the estimate, the dissenting opinions are published as integral parts of the estimate. The value of the estimate process is often destroyed in the coordination - revision cycle as watereddown compromises are accepted rather than establishing the basic document, and then adding the disagreements.

The National Intelligence Resources Board (NIRB) was recently established to advise the DCI on needs for intelligence resources to support the U.S. foreign intelligence effort. The members of the NIRB are the Deputy, DCI, Chairman; the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration.

II. THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

The Defense Intelligence effort is normally programmed in two major packages: The Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), with the Director, NSA designated Program Manager; and The General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP), with the Director, DIA designated Program Manager.

JS 3.3(b)(1)

From time to time special programs are established to develop some new intelligence resource or capability. In such cases a program manager is designated by the Secretary of Defense and the program becomes a part of the intelligence community.

A. The Office of the Secretary of Defense

Currently the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration (ASD(A)) is clearly the senior official in the Defense organization for managing the intelligence effort. On August 1, 1969, the Secretary of Defense assigned "additional responsibilities for intelligence" to the ASD(A) and stated:

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"In discharging these responsibilities, I fully expect the ASD(A) to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the Defense intelligence community. In order to accomplish this improvement, he is charged with the following responsibilities:

- 1. To establish an intelligence resource review and decision-making process which will comprise:
- a. A mechanism for making comparisons and appropriate trade-offs between major intelligence activities and programs so that DOD decision makers can select the most efficient and effective systems for collecting, processing, producing and disseminating intelligence.
 - b. A Five-Year Intelligence Resource Plan.
- c. A procedure for identifying and surfacing major issues of intelligence resource allocation and management.
- d. A continuing system for review of intelligence collection requirements balanced against collection resources.
- 2. To improve intelligence communications among DOD agencies and between the Department of Defense and other agencies.
- 3. To evaluate intelligence organizational relationships, roles and missions.
- 4. To review security policies and eliminate unnecessary classification and compartmentations."

The ASD(A) has limited his purview, initially, to resource allocation and has established a review process wherein each Program Manager is responsible for resource management within his program. Procedures are worked out whereby each Program Manager conducts his review and then reports to the ASD(A). The ASD(A) then performs a review across all the programs to identify areas where there is a possibility of duplication or inefficiency.

The ASD(A) has adopted the Consolidated Intelligence Resources Information System (CIRIS) as a management tool to assist in his cross-program review.

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The CIRIS is a modification of an older system called the Target Oriented Display. It is intended to display, by type, the number and value of resources aimed at collecting intelligence information about a given target.

JS 3.3(b)(1)(6)

The CIRIS contains only information on intelligence resources and how they are related to targets. It does not include information about the nature of the requirement to collect intelligence information about a target nor does it provide an assessment of the value of the information that is collected.

It is not possible to make valid judgments on the proper allocation of a collection resource to a target without considering why, and with what urgency, the information is required and balancing that against the degree to which the information collected by the resource satisfies the requirement.

There is a real need to make comparisons and trade-offs between the major intelligence activities and programs to select the most efficient and effective systems for collecting, processing producing and disseminating intelligence. Resources should be allocated to attain a balance in the capability to collect, process and produce intelligence.

B. The Cryptologic Community JS 3.3(b)(1)

The organizations involved in the signals intelligence (SIGINT) effort are referred to collectively as the Cryptologic Community. This community consists of the National Security Agency (NSA), at its head, and the service cryptologic agencies (SCAs). Also holding membership in this community, though not generally included in the term, is the SIGINT Committee, with its sub-committees, of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB).

The current authority for organization and operation of this community is the National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 6, effective 15 September 1958, and revised 18 January 1961. This document provides the national policy for Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic Intelligence (ELINT), collectively referred to as SIGINT. It defines the responsibilities of the USIB, Secretary of Defense, NSA, Director NSA, DCI and Military Departments.

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The fundamental community, NSA and the SCAs, can be described as a two-part system. NSA is the part providing the system manage ment, through operational and technical control, processing of the raw SIGINT data and disseminating the processed SIGINT information to the consumers. The SCAs are basically the collection portion of the system.

The size relationship (personnel) between the two parts is roughly 18-19,000 for NSA and 70-75,000 for the combined SCAs. This relationship is deceptive, as approximately 30% of the NSA figure are military members of the SCAs assigned to duty at NSA. This does not mean that a double count of these people is involved, as 88-94,000 does describe the general bounds of the community. However, the 70-75,000 SCA personnel are not all directly involved in the collection process. A varying percentage is support chargeable to the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), hence the personnel are counted as part of the cryptologic community. standard value for the amount of support is impossible in today's system, as each Service provides and counts its support under a separate set of ground rules, and the chargeability of support at any given unit will vary depending on whether the cryptologic unit is a tenant on a base and receives its support (not chargeable to the CCP), or is a host and furnishes support to other organizations (all chargeable to the CCP).

The Cryptologic Community, within the Department of Defense, is also responsible for national communications security (COMSEC). The authority for this is a National Security Council Communications Security Directive, dated 26 August 1968. This directive reaffirms a national COMSEC structure including the Secretaries of State and Defense as a Special Committee of the NSC for COMSEC matters, the United States Communications Security Board (USCSB), the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent of the Government for COMSEC, and the Director, NSA acting for the Executive Agent in COMSEC matters.

With regard to SIGINT operational relationships, NSA is charged by NSCID-6 with providing an effective unified organization and control of the U.S. COMINT and ELINT intercept and processing activities to provide for integrated operational policies and procedures and to produce COMINT and ELINT information in accordance with objectives, requirements and priorities of the USIB.

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In order to accomplish this, NSCID-6 provides the Director, NSA (DIRNSA) with operational and technical control of all U.S. COMINT and ELINT intercept and processing activities. Normally DIRNSA issues operational instructions through the Chiefs of Agencies of the Services or civilian departments or he has authority to issue tasking and instructions directly to operating elements. NSCID-6 also provides that DIRNSA is obliged to delegate operational control of SIGINT efforts to the armed services as he deems necessary to meet their stated direct support requirements.

The Services are tasked with establishing, maintaining, operating and administering SIGINT intercept and processing facilities as authorized and directed by the Secretary of Defense. Also, they will conduct, outside the scope of NSA, such search, intercept, direction-finding, range estimation and signals analysis as must be undertaken to permit immediate operational use of the information in support of electronic measures and counter-measures and rescue operations.

These relationships, paraphrased here, are spelled out in NSCID-6. Current program and budget management is left to the prerogatives of the Secretary of Defense as Executive Agent. Over the years, he has delegated this responsibility to various offices in OSD. Currently, the ASD(A) is tasked with this responsibility by Secretary of Defense Memorandum. The ASD(A), in turn, uses DIRNSA as his cryptologic Program Manager. DIRNSA is charged with preparing the CCP, with coordinated SCA inputs submitted through Service channels, to the ASD(A), who is to merge it with other intelligence programs and make trade-offs between programs. The merger of programs, the Consolidated Defense Intelligence Program is presented by ASD(A) for approval by the Secretary of Defense. DIRNSA is then charged with managing the budgeted DOD program.

In the past, it has been particularly difficult to manage the program properly, as the funds justified in the cryptologic program for the SCAs are not specifically identified in the Services' budgets. The funds have been subject to diversion to other activities as it was impossible to audit trail the expenditure against the program. New authority vested in DIRNSA of being his own Primary Action Officer and new procedures breaking out accounting in greater detail may reduce the diversion of programmed funds by the Services.

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NSA has statutory authority to develop a professional career service for its civilian employees. DIRNSA has the authority to recruit, train, assign and promote the civilian employees of NSA. He can prescribe as a condition of employment that NSA employees must serve any place in the world as the needs of the Agency dictate. In addition, he has authority to establish professional positions, primarily in research and development, at the basic compensation equal to rates of basic compensation authorized for Grades 16, 17 and 18 of the General Schedule.

DIRNSA is charged with conducting research and development to meet the needs of NSA and the military and civilian departments and agencies which are engaged in COMINT and ELINT activities and with coordinating the related research and development conducted by the departments and agencies.


JS 3.3(b)(i),(8)

Although NSA has operational and technical control of the SCA SIGINT activities and establishes base line configuration of positions, each Service has (1) its own operational command structure and procedures, (2) expansions on position base line configurations, (3) support criteria and (4) methodology. This disparity is attributed to the "uniqueness" of Service missions, and the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, reserving to each Service Secretary the authority to administer that Service to fulfill its mission. This is a jealously guarded prerogative of the Services as each maintains that the SCA is a major command of that Service.

With four independent sets of regulations and varying primary interests, it is easy to understand how differing operational and management concepts have evolved.

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The revised JCS-MOP-95, by redefining "Electronic Warfare" and by defining "Electronic Support Measures" provides a justification for duplication of resources and activities in the cryptologic community and the Service component commands.

C. General Defense Intelligence

General defense intelligence encompasses the intelligence activities, other than cryptologic, performed by elements of the Department of Defense, primarily the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the Military Services. The General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) is the management tool used to program and manage the general defense intelligence effort. The Director, DIA is designated Program Manager and consolidates the submissions of the Military Departments.

There is no substantial corps of professional intelligence officers in the Military Services and no professional intelligence career service for civilians in the general defense intelligence community.

JS 3.3(b)(1)



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DIA was established in 1961 in an effort to create a mechanism to solve the problems presented by the disparate intelligence estimates being produced and duplicative efforts being engaged in by the Military Departments.

DIA is assigned the responsibility for:

- 1. The organization, direction, management, and control of all DOD intelligence resources assigned to or included within the DIA.
- 2. Review and coordination of those intelligence functions retained by or assigned to the Military Departments.
- 3. Supervision of the execution of all approved plans, programs, policies, and procedures for intelligence functions not assigned to DIA.
- 4. Obtaining the maximum economy and efficiency in the allocation and management of Defense intelligence resources.
- 5. Responding directly to priority requests levied upon the DIA by the United States Intelligence Board.
- 6. Satisfying the intelligence requirements of the major components of the Department of Defense.

Its charter reveals that DIA was originally intended to (1) provide for the assembly, integration and validation of all Defense intelligence requirements, the policies and procedures for collection, and the assignment of relative priorities to the requirements, and (2) develop and produce all finished intelligence for the Department of Defense. It was intended that the Military Departments would retain the resources to collect and process intelligence information, under the supervision of DIA.

Concurrent with the establishment of DIA, the Directorate of Intelligence (J-2) of the Joint Staff was disestablished and its functions assigned to the Director of DIA. The established reporting line for DIA was and is through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense.

JS 3.3(b)(1)

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Two areas of conflict are apparent. In addition to his administrative responsibilities as the Director of a Defense Agency, the Director of DIA must provide the staff assistance on intelligence matters to the Secretary of Defense and must also provide the staff assistance on intelligence matters to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

JS 3.3(b)(1)

The second area of conflict is between DIA and the Military Services. The Director, DIA is charged with preparing the GDIP and with responsibility to supervise the collection and processing of intelligence by the Military Services, specifically by prescribing procedures, validating requirements, assigning collection and production tasks, and reviewing the total intelligence programs of the Services. Yet, the Director of DIA reports directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, comprised in four-fifths majority by the Senior Officers of the four Military Services for whose intelligence programs the Director of DIA is charged with the responsibility to provide coordinated supervision. In addition, the Services determine which officers of what qualification are assigned to DIA, and they retain the power of promotion and future assignment over those so assigned.

JS 3.3(b)(1)

The Military Departments are charged with organizing, training and equipping intelligence forces for assignment to combatant commands, and to conduct those intelligence functions which peculiarly relate to departmental missions, including the development and support of intelligence systems organic to combatant forces. In addition, each department has retained the responsibility to manage and operate certain types of intelligence activities, including counter-intelligence and investigative services, scientific and technical intelligence, mapping, charting and geodesy as well as their respective cryptologic agencies.

While the DIA was established primarily to consolidate the intelligence activities at Washington level, each Military Department currently has a larger intelligence staff than it had before the creation of DIA. Each departmental staff is still engaged in



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activities clearly assigned to DIA such as intelligence production including the preparation of current intelligence. The Military Departments justify these activities on the basis that DIA does not have the capability to provide the intelligence they need.

JS 3.3(b)(1)

1. The Intelligence Process

The intelligence process can generally be considered as consisting of five functions: requirements, collection, processing, production and dissemination. There is now no effective mechanism to effect a proper balance in the allocation of resources between these various functions.

JS 3.3(b)(1)


a. Requirements

In March 1962, shortly after the establishment of DIA, the JCS issued to DIA a memorandum, entitled: "Actions to Strengthen the Intelligence Capabilities of the Unified and Specified Commands," and concomitantly, a memorandum to the Commanders of each Unified and Specified Commands, entitled: "Authority to Strengthen Intelligence Capabilities of Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands." These memoranda directed that intelligence staffs and attendant intelligence activities be established. Specifically, an Intelligence Requirements/ Collection Office was directed to be established at each Unified and Specified Command Headquarters which would perform functions compatible with the requirements and collection functions of DIA. DIA was directed to issue guidance as to policies, procedures, format and priorities of intelligence requirements to achieve standardization of requirements processing throughout DOD. ments flow would follow command channels to DIA for validation and for levy. This action was the basis for establishing layers of

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review. In a message of March 1962, from the JCS to the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands, that body clearly pointed out that the channel for requirements is between DIA, acting for the JCS, and the Unified and Specified Commanders; and in turn from the Unified and Specified Commanders to their components. The original intent of these actions was to take the staffs and activities from the component commands and move them one echelon higher, but this did not happen, since the Military Department Headquarters were still authorized direct access to the component commands.

Throughout the 1960s, the various intelligence elements of the Military Departments complained about the inordinate time it takes for a requirement to be validated by DIA. The complaints are well-founded.



Another problem has existed concerning the handling of collection requirements for scientific and technical intelligence. When DIA was given the responsibility for management of scientific and technical intelligence, a specific Assistant Directorship was established and the Directorate took as its charter the DOD Directive 5105.28, which included the responsibility for the assembly, integration, validation, and assignment of priorities for all Defense technical intelligence collection and production requirements.

The requirements process is slow, cumbersome and unwieldy. It functions almost entirely within the intelligence community and is fraught with an unyielding sense of sovereignty

JS 3.3(b)(1)

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at every level.

b. Collection

JS 3.3(b)(1)

The Departments have developed different organizational structures for controlling intelligence collection; however, they have two very important points in common: the senior intelligence officer of the Departmental Headquarters has some degree of operational control; and the intelligence units are structured in a common chain separate from the operational command structure.

JS 3.3(b)(1)

The Army has established the U.S. Army Intelligence Command (USAINTC) to discharge some of the Army's intelligence responsibilities including all collection, other than that performed by the Army Security Agency. While USAINTC is a major command reporting directly to the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, maintains direct operational control of some of its more sensitive elements.


The Navy has all of its general defense intelligence resources in the Naval Intelligence Command (NIC). The Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence) is also the Commander, NIC.

The Air Force has retained the control of non-technical sensor intelligence collection in the Departmental Staff. A world-wide human collection effort is controlled by the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, while all the resources for counterintelligence and investigations are assigned to the Inspector General.

There is no effective mechanism for the allocation of collection resources to assure that needed information is collected in the most economical manner, consistent with the urgency of the need.

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(1) Personnel Security Investigations

Personnel security investigations are a particular type of collection performed by the investigative elements of the Military Departments: The Army Intelligence Command; the Air Force Office of Special Investigations; and the Naval Investigative Service. All background investigations are controlled by these organizations at headquarters level. They perform the background investigations for all military and civilian personnel of their respective departments and a pro rata share of civilians assigned to the various agencies and elements of the Department of Defense not in one of the Military Departments. They participate by quota in industrial security background investigations.

The purpose of a personnel security investigation is to establish that the individual is responsible, loyal and trustworthy. These investigations can generally be considered in three categories:

a. A National Agency Check (NAC) is required for granting access to SECRET defense information. In addition, a final TOP SECRET clearance may be granted to Air Force and Navy military personnel based upon an NAC which has been made any time during the previous 15 years, provided that the individual has been in continuous government service or on active duty during the past 15 years with no break in service in excess of six months. An NAC includes a check of the criminal and subversive files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and, as appropriate, the files of the Military Departments, the Civil Service Commission, Immigration and Naturalization Service, the House Internal Security Committee and others.

 \underline{b} . A Background Investigation (BI) is required for granting a TOP SECRET clearance to Defense Department civilians, Army personnel on active duty and Navy and Air Force personnel who do not meet the criteria in a above. A BI is a "thorough inquiry" covering the individual's life during

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the last 15 years or since the 18th birthday, whichever is shorter. It includes verification of date and place of birth, citizenship, education, employment, military service, foreign travel, foreign connections, character references, and a National Agency Check.

c. An Expanded Background Investigation (EBI) is a prerequisite to granting access to special intelligence, compartmented intelligence and for assignment to an Ultra Sensitive Position. Only U.S. citizens are eligible for these accesses, and reinvestigation is mandatory at least every five years. An EBI includes an NAC, not over 12 months old, and a BI. In addition, the individual's immediate family, including spouse and former spouse(s) are checked with FBI files. Passport Office and CIA files are checked if the individual has traveled outside the US for pleasure or for non-US Government-sponsored trips. Verification of citizenship is made on members of the individual's immediate family. A credit check is made on the individual at each place of residence of more than six months. Neighborhood investigations are conducted to verify the current residence and at each of the former residences where the individual resided for six months or more. Court records are reviewed if the individual was divorced or legally separated to ascertain any financial obligations prescribed by the courts.

In addition to the differing requirements of the Military Departments for granting security clearances as indicated above, there are variations in the manner in which the investigations are done. For instance, all Departments require an NAC as a part of a BI. The Army and Navy require an NAC without reference to previous NACs. The Air Force will accept an NAC if it is less than two years old. Army and Navy neighborhood investigations and credit record reviews are conducted "when deemed necessary" to prove or disprove derogatory information. Air Force regulations do not mention neighborhood investigations nor credit record reviews. The Army requires a check of court records if the individual is divorced. Navy and Air Force do not require this check.

The Army and Air Force grant access to cryptographic materials based on a BI, while the Navy requires an EBI.

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The regulations of each of the Military Departments make reference to accepting the validity of previous investigations completed by any agency of the Federal Government which meet the minimum investigative requirements of that particular Department. For all practical purposes, the Departments interpret this narrowly and usually do not accept the investigations of another Department as meeting their standards.

c. Processing

Most raw intelligence information must be processed in some way to put it in a form suitable for use by a production analyst. Each type of information requires its own processing; e.g., captured documents are translated or SIGINT is processed by NSA.

The Director, Central Intelligence (DCI) provides as a service of common interest within the community the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) (C). The Director, NPIC (C), is appointed by the DCI and the member departments and agencies of the United States Intelligence Board furnish personnel and support as required. NPIC (C) provides selective preliminary interpretation and distribution of imagery interpretation, maintains a selective central file of photo data, engages in and sponsors the development of specialized equipment and makes recommendations to USIB on any special security controls required.

d. Production

The intelligence production activities of the DOD can be classified into four major groups: Current Intelligence; Scientific and Technical Intelligence; Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MC&G), and general intelligence production.

The March 1962 memoranda from the JCS to DIA and the Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands mentioned previously also directed that the Unified and Specified Commands establish and/or operate activities, except for activities under Service cryptologic agencies, to perform intelligence functions of common interest. This was amplified and specified in July 1962 by JCS memorandum to establish a current intelligence/indications function; intelligence production including estimates function; and target intelligence function.

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It should be noted at this point that the Military Departments had not yet transferred to DIA their intelligence production elements. That was done in January, February and March 1963.

The assignment of intelligence production mission to the Unified and Specified Commands directly contradicted the function spelled out in the DOD Directive 5105.21 which established DIA, that DIA would "develop, produce, and provide all Defense finished intelligence and supporting data, including area analysis, military capabilities, biographic data summaries, target intelligence, and related publications for the use of all DOD components..." The JCS further had charged DIA with ensuring that there would be no duplication in the production of intelligence.

By 1966, DIA acknowledged the realities of the situation by issuing the Defense Intelligence Plan which had been extensively coordinated with the Military Departments and the Unified and Specified Commands. The purpose of the Plan was to provide the basis for integrated planning, programming and management of Defense intelligence. It delineated the intelligence responsibilities and relationships of Department of Defense components and instituted a Department-wide system for review and analysis of intelligence operations to facilitate One of the mutual support and eliminate wasteful duplication. principles which this Plan spelled out was that "intelligence produced at higher echelons must be supplemented by local production at lower echelons in order to satisfy particular command requirements." The Plan further acknowledged that "some degree of parallel and overlapping effort is normal and necessary. primary role of DIA thus shifted from the production of all Defense intelligence to the production of some strategic or that intelligence used at the JCS/OSD/national level. The members of the JCS, as chiefs of service, still maintain current intelligence and estimates capabilities on their respective staffs to support their positions vis-a-vis those of DIA.

It should be borne in mind that these actions were the result of extensive negotiations with the Military Departments and the Unified and Specified Commands including component commands. DIA has no directive authority over military intelligence activities, but only review, coordination, supervisory and a nebulous management authority. But more and more, DIA has been pushed into a management role by those very elements which maintain that DIA is incapable of producing intelligence to meet their needs.

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Each of the Military Departments has continued to strengthen the capability of its staff to produce general and current intelligence and to supervise the production of S&T intelligence and mapping, charting and geodesy (MC&G) activities.

Each Department has a large organization devoted primarily to MC&G activities: The Army Topographic Command of the Corps of Engineers; The Naval Oceanographic Office under the Oceanographer of the Navy; and The Aeronautical Chart and Information Center reporting to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.

DIA attempts to coordinate these activities to eliminate duplication and set priorities for production. However, DIA coordinates through the intelligence elements of the Departmental staffs, and only in the Air Force is the MC&G agency within the staff purview of the intelligence staff. The Army and Navy MC&G elements are in agencies which are not a part of the intelligence community.

There appears to be great potential for savings of personnel and expensive equipment by consolidating these three agencies into one Defense Map Service with a single command staff.

Each of the Military Departments produces S&T intelligence. The Army has two S&T production agencies; both subordinate to the Army Materiel Command: The Foreign Science and Technology Center reporting to the staff of the Army Materiel Command Headquarters; and the Missile Intelligence Directorate, an element of the Army Missile Command. The Air Force S&T intelligence production agency is the Foreign Technology Division of the Air Force Systems Command. The Naval Scientific and Technical Intelligence Center is an element of the NIC.

Both the Army and Air Force agencies are an integral part of the research and development community and their efforts are substantially augmented from research and levelopment funds.

DIA has tasking authority over each of the Centers and assigns the specific production tasks to be accomplished with a specified scope and format. The large majority of the requirenents for S&T intelligence production arise in the research and



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development laboratories of the Services. DIA reviews the individual requirements and generalizes them so that many requirements will be satisfied by one general product. The format and scope of the product is aimed primarily at the Departmental or major command staff planners.

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Threat assessments are a type of intelligence product that are based on S&T intelligence but are usually prepared by an agency other than an S&T intelligence producer. Any recommendation or decision to develop or produce a weapon or weapons system should include consideration of the enemy threat in the time period when the weapons or weapons systems will be operational. Such recommendations and decisions are made in the Services and OSD.

The general defense intelligence community has not yet succeeded in producing threat assessments which are accepted by the research and development community, largely because each Service tends to see the threat that will advance the weapons or systems it owns or proposes. There are, of course, many instances, such as the so-called "missile gap" of 1960, where an intelligence threat assessment has been used to bring about major weapons decisions.

DDR&E has established his own group to prepare threat assessments for use at the OSD level.

There is always a danger that intelligence will be misused when an organization prepares the intelligence assessments that provide a basis for its operating decisions.

e. Dissemination

The DIA, on a daily basis, disseminates reports to elements of the DOD intelligence community based on requests from the individual elements. Dissemination of a general nature is based on statements of intelligence needs compiled by the Military Departments and the Unified and Specified Commands. Bulk copies are shipped to the Military Departments who further disseminate them to their subordinate elements and component commands of the Unified Commands. For those products not produced by DIA, dissemination lists are compiled by DIA and furnished to the producing organization for direct dissemination.

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
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f. Evaluation

There is one other function which should be associated with the intelligence process: evaluation. Discussions with users and potential users of intelligence seem to indicate that only a small proportion of the intelligence produced is useful. Many individuals who are familiar with the Defense intelligence community are critical of its operation. Responsible witnesses have told our sub-committee that:

(1) The Defense intelligence community does not have an effective mechanism for accomplishing the selective validation of requirements for intelligence collection or production;

(2) More intelligence information is collected than can ever be processed or used, much of it is collected because the sensor represents an advance in technology without regard to the need for the information;



None of these allegations can be either proved or disproved today, because there is no substantial effort or procedure to systematically evaluate the intelligence process in the Defense intelligence community or its substantive output.

D. Special Programs

From time to time, special programs are established to manage the development of some new collection resource or capability. Such developments are usually expensive and involve some degree of cooperation with some other agency of Government. A program of this type is often designated as a "National Program" and the Secretary of Defense is designated Executive Agent for the Government. As a consequence, the responsibility for such a program tends to be placed at a relatively high level in the

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Headquarters of one of the Military Departments. In addition, the Secretary of Defense has established a committee to review such programs and advise him with regard to the allocation of funds to them. Some program managers attempt to use the existence of this committee and the "National" designation of the program to avoid reporting to the ASD(A). Neither the Secretary of Defense nor the head of the cooperating agency sees any ambiguity in the reporting lines, but many manhours are wasted in debate and the task of the Secretary's senior representative is made more difficult. Another effect of this type of parochial tactic is that it establishes a fiction that permeates the entire staff of the program.

A different type of problem also exists with programs of this sort. Since they are predominantly concerned with the development of a new capability, the management of the program is usually assigned to a development agency. This is necessary and proper for the development of the capability; however, it does not appear necessary that the output of the new capability also be managed by the development agency. Proper safeguards can be established to permit wider exploitation of the product on a more timely basis than at present.

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E. Tactical Intelligence


All of the intelligence effort discussed to this point is called "strategic" or "national" intelligence. It is the intelligence needed for planning and making decisions at the top levels of the Department of Defense as distinguished from "tactical" intelligence which is needed by the field commander for use in combat. In large part, the resources required to collect and process the raw intelligence information are identical for both strategic and tactical intelligence. However, "tactical" intellience resources are not specifically identified as such in the programming process and are not reviewed or funded in an intelligence program.

The Military Departments, in fulfilling their responsibility to develop and support intelligence systems organic to combat forces, can develop a significant intelligence capability that is managed external to the intelligence community.

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There is a continuum between peace and general war through which the priority needs for intelligence tend to shift from primarily strategic to primarily tactical. The same resources can be used to satisfy both needs by adjusting the application of resources to the changing priority.

In time of peace or cold war, the priority is for the most timely and accurate intelligence at the national (Washington) level to provide a basis for the best policy and guidance decisions. The field commander should want this to be the case to insure that policy decisions affecting the force structure he might have to fight with were the best. In this period of cold war, his principal intelligence need is continuity on strengths and positions of forces which might engage him if fighting erupts.

In time of limited warfare, a localized force commander must have the best intelligence to conduct his operations and the national level needs timely intelligence to formulate national policy, insure the fighting commander sufficient forces, and best deploy the remaining forces to meet other commitments.

In time of general war the priority is to provide the fighting force commander with the intelligence needed to prosecute the war; relatively less emphasis is placed on long-range policy decisions.


The intelligence resources integral to the combatant forces must be programmed, developed and operated as a part of the Defense intelligence community. At the same time, it is necessary to manage and operate these resources in a way that assures that commanders at all levels have appropriate access to intelligence information they need without regard to the location or control of the sensors.



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
F. Compartmented Intelligence

There is a recognized need to limit access to extremely sensitive intelligence materials because their disclosure or even knowledge of their existence could cause the source to be denied, lives to be in peril, or political repercussions that could jeopardize a U.S. position. The National Security Act of 1947, as amended, states: "The Director of Central Intelligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure."



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Each of the major systems was initially designed to protect a specific functional area and their domains were relatively independent, but as technology and applications have moved forward, the domains have developed areas of overlap.

We now find technical information, collection and processing operations and product which contain information that is protected by more than one of the systems.

It is necessary, therefore, for the user to demonstrate a need-to-know and be authorized access under each of the compartmentéd areas which affect control of a particular document.

Investigative requirements and criteria for granting access to all compartmented areas under the cognizance of the DCI are formalized in Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/14. However, access is actually granted by the manager of the compartmented system.

Since each of the major compartmented systems is managed by a different organization which jealously guards its prerogatives to control access to its information, many potential users have difficulty in determining that useful information is available and more difficulty in getting the multiple access required.

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Recommendations

The Panel recommends that the Defense intelligence community be restructured to provide a better management structure and to assure the provision of intelligence, as required, to the President, other consumers at the national level and to all levels of the Department from the Secretary of Defense to operating units in the field. The new intelligence structure should:

- 1. Function in response to consumer requirements for intelligence and provide timely and quality products, responsive to those requirements, with a proper balance between collection, processing, and production activities.
- 2. Provide a clear chain of command from the President and the Secretary of Defense to the collection and production units that will assure the timely flow of intelligence information and minimize the injection of bias arising from Service affiliations, or operational location.
- 3. Provide for a single individual in the Office of the Secretary of Defense who is the clearly designated representative of the Secretary of Defense to other Departments and Agencies of Government for intelligence matters and who is responsible to coordinate or direct all intelligence activities within the Department.
- 4. Provide flexibility for timely development and distribution of limited, costly resources, both trained personnel and equipments, to meet changing priorities.
- 5. Provide the proper environment to develop an effective and efficient professional intelligence career service for both military and civilian personnel.

Specifically, Defense:	it	15	recommended	that	the	Secretary	of
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	1.	Desi	ignat	e th	e D	eputy	Sec.	reta	iry	for	Ope	rati	ions	to
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- 2. Establish under the Deputy Secretary for Operations an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (ASD(I)) with the additional title of Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI). The ASD(I)/DDI would be delegated the responsibility to represent the Secretary of Defense with other Departments and Agencies of Government for Intelligence matters and to coordinate or direct all DOD intelligence activities, including national programs which are managed in the Department, in accordance with existing law and applicable National Security Council and Director of Central Intelligence Directives. Among his specific responsibilities, the ASD(I)/DDI would:
- a. Serve as the Defense representative on the United States Intelligence Board, and appoint, with approval of the Deputy Secretary for Operations, representatives to other government-wide intelligence committees and boards.
- b. Direct and control all DOD intelligence activities not specifically designated by the Deputy Secretary for Operations as organic to combatant forces.
- c. Have the authority to delegate operation of any of these activities which he deems necessary to assure maximum exploitation of DOD resources.
- d. Review all proposed intelligence programs, monitor and evaluate all on-going intelligence activities and make recommendations to the Deputy Secretary for Operations with regard to allocation of resources.
- e. Establish procedures to review and validate requirements for intelligence production and collection and evaluate the product against the requirement.
- f. Establish procedures for and periodically conduct a systematic evaluation of the intelligence process in the Defense intelligence community. This evaluation should include an assessment of the utility of the intelligence products provided to consumers outside the Defense intelligence community.

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g. Review and consolidate requirements for research and development in support of intelligence activities.

h. Develop policies and procedures to insure the protection of intelligence and of intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. This will include the establishment and control of special access systems for sensitive programs not already covered by systems initiated by higher authority. He will insure that balanced judgment is applied between the need for exploitation and the need for protection, particularly recognizing that the balance of this relationship shifts through the phases of intelligence operations: identifying requirements and concept formulation; development, procurement and implementation; collection; processing; production; and dissemination.

3. Establish under the ASD(1)/DDI:

a. A Defense Security Command (DSECC) to be composed of the present Service Cryptologic Agencies and all other Defense intelligence collection activities except for those which have been specifically designated by the Deputy Secretary for Operations as organic to combatant forces. DSECC should perform those processing activities which are most efficiently associated with collection facilities. Among his specific responsibilities, the Commander, DSECC would, under the direction of the DDI:

(1) Command all those designated Defense intelligence collection and associated processing and reporting activities, with authority to delegate administrative management or operational control as he deems necessary.

(2) Serve as Director, National Security

Agency.

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(3) Insure the most judicious use of common staff elements between his DSECC and NSA.

(4) Insure the timely dissemination of intelligence information to all appropriate Departments, Agencies, Commands or operating units.

(5) Prepare the Defense Security Program for those activities for which he is responsible, and review and coordinate the programs of intelligence collection activities organic to the combatant forces to insure maximum exploitation of resources.

b. A Defense Intelligence Production Agency (DIPA), to replace the Defense Intelligence Agency, whose Director would be responsible for Defense Intelligence production except for those production activities specifically assigned to the combatant forces by the Deputy Secretary for Operations. Among his specific responsibilities, the Director, DIPA would:

(1) Direct those intelligence production activities which have been placed under his purview, with the authority to delegate administrative management or operational control as he deems necessary.

(2) Provide current intelligence to designated individuals and organizations.

of DOD, as required. (3) Provide threat assessments for all elements

(4) Provide finished intelligence to appropriate elements of the Department in response to expressed needs.

(5) Provide all DOD intelligence estimates and inputs to national estimates as directed by the DDI.

(6) Manage all Defense intelligence production information systems, including those of the intelligence activities organic to the combatant forces, to insure inter-operability and optimized intelligence flow to and from all echelons of DOD.

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6. Combine the Army Topographic Command, the Naval Oceanographic Office and the Aeronautical Chart and Information Center into a unified Defense Map Service reporting to the Secretary of Defense through the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Management of Resources).

7. Take the actions necessary (a) to extend to the entire Defense intelligence community the authority that the National Security Agency presently has to develop a professional career service, and (b) to establish an intelligence career service for military officers.