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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date OCT 08 2014

23 August 1974
Refer to: 1-35193/74ct

Mr. John A. Woodworth
US Mission to NATO
Avenue de la Paix 11
Brussels, Belgium

Department of State, A/GIS/IPS/SRP
Change to SECRET
(X) Release () Excise () Deny (X) Declassify
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With concurrence of: _____

Dear John,

(U) Attached are eight page changes to be made to the Memorandum of Conversation from the recent NPG Meeting which was dispatched to you earlier this month. It is requested that you substitute the attached in your copy of the MemCon, and destroy the incorrect pages. There will be no further communication on this subject.

~~FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA~~
Unauthorized disclosure subject to
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Handle as Restricted Data on foreign
dissemination. Section 114b, Atomic
Energy Act 1954

Cordially,

Jack
Jack G. Callaway
Colonel USA
Chief, Nuclear Planning
European Region

Attachment: as stated

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Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHIS
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Reason: 3.3(b)(2)(4)(5)(6)(8)+6.1(a)
MDR: 10 -M-0526-74

repd by: Col. J.G. Callaway, 4B-870, x-79682:jgb/23-8-74
ISA/ED/NPA

EO 13526 PER EO 13526 as amended
Date to Sep 2017
GDSFS 212 (Other Security Equity and
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Chief, Declassification Division, WHS

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: OCT 08 2014

Refer to: 1-35193/74
22 August 1974
30-1-6

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

SUBJECT: NATO Nuclear Planning Group MemCon

(U) Attached are eight page changes to be made to the Memorandum of Conversation from the recent NPG Meeting which was dispatched to you earlier this month. It is requested that you substitute the attached in your copy(s) of the MemCon, and destroy the incorrect pages. The changes which were made are listed below:

1. page 5, para 5, next to last line: change "could" to "count".
2. page 11, para 2, line 4: change "dependent" to "independent".
3. page 14, next to last para, line 7: change "pursu" to "pursue".
4. page 16, para 3, line 4: change to read "... different types ..." vice "... defense types ...".
5. page 34, last para, last line: change "equipment" to "weapons".
6. page 35, para 2, line 5: change "options" to "observations".
7. page 35, para 2, line 12: change "by" to "be".
8. page 37, para 5, next to last line: change to read "... thoughts and plans ..." vice "thought and plan".

bl. h. 1. 8. m. n.

Jack G. Callaway
JACK G. CALLAWAY
Colonel USA
Chief, Nuclear Planning
European Region

11/20
30-1-6
Office of Security Review

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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334 712 NATO

16 August 1974
Refer to: 1-35193/74ct

Mr. John A. Woodworth
US Mission to NATO
Avenue de la Paix 11
Brussels, Belgium

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: OCT 08 2014

Dear John,

(U) On 8 August we sent to you cy 13 of the NPG MemCon from Bergen. Since that time, Mr. Kaufmann in Secretary Schlesinger's office, informed us of three errors and requested that the MemCon be revised to show the corrections.

(U) Attached you will find 1 cy each of pages 4, 5 and 15. I would appreciate it if you would pull the original pages from the MemCon, destroy them and substitute the attached therefor.

(U) The corrections that were made are as follows:

On page 4 - last para, line 3 - changed to read: "In the real world, we do not know ...".

On page 5 - second para, line 4 - changed to read: "... 80 percent ... 2/3".

On page 15 - para 4, last line - changed to read: "than to technical problems" vice "and technical problems".

(U) I am also enclosing a copy of the "Conference Report on H.R. 14592, Military Procurement Appropriations - 1975" dealing with nuclear weapons which you had requested earlier.

Cordially,

Jack

Jack G. Callaway
Colonel USA
Chief, Nuclear Planning Affairs
European Region

Attachments: a/s

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- 1 cy - ISA/Policy Plans (Col. Granger)
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Prepd by: Col. J.G. Callaway, 4B-870:jgb/x-79682 (22 August 1974)
ISA/ED/NPA

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Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
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
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Distribution: (1-35193/74ct of 16 August 1974)
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Prepd by: Col. J.G. Callaway, 4B-870, x-76301:jgb/16-8-74
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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

334 U.S. NATD

Dr. William B. Prendergast
Defense Advisor
US Mission to NATO
Autoroute Brussels ZAVENTUM
Brussels, Belgium

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: OCT 08 2014

Dear Bill,

(U) In accordance with the practice we have followed in the past, you will find attached a copy of the minutes from the recent Nuclear Planning Group meeting held in Bergen, Norway on 11-12 June 1974. This copy is for your information and retention.

Sincerely,

D. P. McAuliffe
Major General, USA
Director, European Region

Attachment: a/s
1-35193/74, cy 13

Distribution:
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repl by: Cdr. W.J. Thearle, 4B-870, x-76301:jgb/8Aug74
1SA/ED/NPA

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OASD/ISA INTRAOFFICE CONTROL SHEET				DATE 8 August 1974		LOG NO. 1-35193/74ct	
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation - NPG				NAME, DIRECTORATE, EXTENSION, AND SIGNATURE OF ORIGINATING OFFICIAL: Cdr. W. J. Thearle, ED/NPA, x-76301			
		INITIAL	DATE			INITIAL	DATE
	ASSISTANT SECRETARY	S			DASD NE, AF&SA AFF	N	
	EXECUTIVE OFFICER	XO			DIR, NE&SA REG	NE	
	ASST FOR ADMINISTRATION	AO			DIR, AFRICAN REG	NA	
2	RECORDS & CONTROL	RC					
	DEP FOR MC&TO	TO			DASD-P/PL&NSC AFF	P	
	PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT	SA			DIR, P/PL&NSC AFF	PD	
	SP ADV (POW AFF)	PW			NSC COORD	PN	
	CONF ASST TO ASD	CA			DIR, MBFR TF	PF	
	DIR, LAW OF SEA TF	LS					
	SPEC ASST (NUCLEAR POLICY)	RS					
	PRINCIPAL DASD	D			DASD FOR SA	M	
	MILITARY AS ST	DM			DIR, SA PLANS & POLICY	MD	
	SPEC ASST FOR CONG REL	DS			PLANS & PROGRAMS DIV	MP	
	SPEC ASST TO PDASD	DT			POLICY DIV	MN	
	DASD FOR EA&PAC AFF	A			DEF SCTY ASST AGCY		
	DIR, EA&PAC REG	AD			DIRECTOR	T	
					DEP DIR	TD	
					SPEC ASST	TB	
	DASD EUR&NATO AFF	E			COMPTROLLER	TC	
1	DIR, EUR&NATO AFF	ED	19	5 F	DIR FOR MIL ASST	TM	
					DIR FOR SALES NEG	TS	
	DASD I-A, FTD&MR AFF	I					
	DIR, I-A REGION	IA			DASD - INT'L ECON AFFAIRS	B	
	DIR, FMR AFFAIRS	IF			DIRECTOR, IEA	BD	
	DIR, ST&D	IT					
COORDINATION OUTSIDE ISA							
	ACTIVITY	NAME AND TITLE			INITIAL	DATE	
	GENERAL COUNSEL						
	THE JOINT STAFF						
	DEPT OF STATE						

REMARKS (Including Coordination Outside ISA Not Shown Above)

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Date: OCT 08 2014

In reply refer to:
1-35193/74ct

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation - ACTION MEMORANDUM (U)

(U) Attached for your approval is the Memorandum of Conversation which occurred at the 15th Ministerial Meeting of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group in Bergen, Norway during the period 11-12 June 1974. The individuals who took the notes during the Ministers' discussions are listed below:

US Mission NATO

Mr. John A. Woodworth

State Dept.

Mr. Geryld B. Christianson
Mr. Allen L. Kelswetter
Mr. John A. Grahm

HARRY E. BERGOLD, JR.
Deputy Assistant Secretary
European and NATO Affairs

Attachment:
Memcon of NPG 15th Meeting

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Prepd by: Col. Jack G. Callaway, 1C-459, x-79682:jgh/6Jul74
ISA/ED/NPA

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22 JUL 74
In reply refer to:
1-35193/74ct

MEMORANDUM FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS)

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation - ACTION MEMORANDUM (U)

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US Mission NATO

Mr. John A. Woodworth

State Dept.

Mr. Geryld B. Christianson
Mr. Allen L. Keiswetter
Mr. John A. Grahm

Signature: Harry E. Bergold, Jr.

HARRY E. BERGOLD, JR.
Deputy Assistant Secretary
European and NATO Affairs

Attachment:
Memcon of NPG 15th Meeting

APPROVE _____

OTHER _____

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Prepd by: Col. Jack G. Callaway, IC-459, x-79682:jgb/6Jul74
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OASD/ISA INTRAOFFICE CONTROL SHEET				DATE	LOG NO.
				6 July 1974	1- 35193/74ct
SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation - (15th NPG Meeting) - for approval				NAME, DIRECTORATE, EXTENSION, AND SIGNATURE OF ORIGINATING OFFICIAL: Col. Jack G. Callaway, ED/NPA, x-79682	
				INITIAL	DATE
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3	EXECUTIVE OFFICER	XO		DIR, NE&SA REG	NE
	ASST FOR ADMINISTRATION	AO		DIR, AFRICAN REG	NA
6	RECORDS & CONTROL	RC			
	DEP FOR MC&TO	TO		DASD-P/PL&NSC AFF	P
	PRINCIPAL ASSISTANT	SA		DIR, P/PL&NSC AFF	PD
	SP ADV (POW AFF)	PW		NSC COORD	PN
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	DIR, LAW OF SEA TF	LS			
	SPEC ASST (NUCLEAR POLICY)	RS			
4	PRINCIPAL DASD	D		DASD FOR SA	M
	MILITARY ASST	DM		DIR, SA PLANS & POLICY	MD
	SPEC ASST FOR CONG REL	DS		PLANS & PROGRAMS DIV	MP
	SPEC ASST TO PDASD	DT		POLICY DIV	MN
	DASD FOR EAPAC AFF	A		DEF SCTY ASST AGCY	
	DIR, EAPAC REG	AD		DIRECTOR	T
				DEP DIR	TD
				SPEC ASST	TS
2	DASD EUR&NATO AFF	E		COMPTROLLER	TC
1	DIR, EUR&NATO AFF	ED		DIR FOR MIL ASST	TM
				DIR FOR SALES NEG	TS
	DASD I-A, PTD&MR AFF	I			
	DIR, I-A REGION	IA		DASD - INT'L ECON AFFAIRS	B
	DIR, FMR AFFAIRS	IF		DIRECTOR, IEA	BD
	DIR, ST&D	IT			
COORDINATION OUTSIDE ISA					
ACTIVITY		NAME AND TITLE		INITIAL	DATE
GENERAL COUNSEL					
THE JOINT STAFF					
DEPT OF STATE					

REMARKS (including Coordination Outside ISA Not Shown Above)

(25 Jul 1974)
25 JUL 1974

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1 JUL 1974

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Mr. John A. Woodworth
US Mission to NATO
Avenue de la Paix - ZAVENTUM
Brussels, Belgium

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Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: OCT 08 2014

Dear John,

(U) Attached for your information is a reproduced copy of the Memorandum of Conversation from the NPG Meeting in Bergen which I am pre-positioning with you. The original has gone forward to the Front Office for approval prior to being committed to the printers. When final approval is received, Dr. Prendergast will receive the copy for USNATO as he has in the past. The attached is for your information and retention.

Cordially,

SACRE
Jack G. Callaway
Colonel USA
Deputy Director for Nuclear
Planning Affairs
European Region

Attachment: a/s
draft copy of MemCon for info

Distribution:

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Prepd by: Col. Jack G. Callaway, IC-459, x-79682:jgb/6Jul74
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: June 11-12, 197

SUBJECT: Fifteenth Meeting of the
Nuclear Planning Group

PLACE: Norwegian Naval
Academy, Bergen,
Norway

PARTICIPANTS: See attached list.

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Accordingly, dissemination of this Memorandum of Conversation is to be rigorously limited and recipients are directed to restrict distribution within their respective activities in strict observance of the letter and intent of our understandings with the other NPG member countries. Only a limited number of action officers should in the normal course of events have access to this document.

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1-35193/74

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NATO NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP MEETING

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: OCT 08 2014

15TH MEETING - BERGEN, NORWAY

OPENING REMARKS -- 11 JUNE 1974

Secretary-General Luns: I would like to call the meeting to order. We will begin with a short photo-taking session and then I will turn the floor over to the Norwegian Defense Minister for a few opening remarks.

(Photo-Taking Session)

I think we can continue now.

Minister Fostervoll (NOR): It is our pleasure to welcome you to Norway and we look forward to seeing you this evening at dinner.

Secretary-General Luns: I would like to extend our appreciation to Norway for hosting the NPG in this country of sturdy inhabitants and extend a special welcome to Ministers Latsoudis (GR), Andreotti (IT) and Mason (UK) who are attending their first time and to Adm. Sir Peter Hill-Norton who is attending his first time in his capacity as head of the Military Committee. Finally, I would like to commend Admiral Moorer (US, CJCS) who will be leaving his position as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for his high competence and wish him the best. I would also like to welcome Ambassador Menzies (CAN) who is attending for the first time in a ministerial role.

Ambassador Menzies (CAN): Minister Richardson (CAN) cannot attend because of the elections which will take place in Canada on the 8th of July. However, I would like to reaffirm Canadian interest in the NPG. Now that Canada is about to rotate off, I would like to say Canada intends to continue to play a full part. I know today that targeting will be discussed and I hope the DPG members can be informed of such important discussions.

Secretary-General Luns: For new members. I would like to explain that the NPG is different from other NATO meetings. It offers a chance to discuss important nuclear matters and the Major NATO Commanders (MNC) are present to contribute. Now I would like to turn to the first agenda item. I note that it is the custom of the NPG to begin with the briefing on the strategic balance. At its conclusion, there will be an opportunity for

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questions and discussion. I would also like to point out the precedent of safeguarding the sensitive matters of this information.

AGENDA ITEM 1 - STRATEGIC BALANCE BRIEFING

Secretary Schlesinger: First I would like to start with a few initial observations about individuals and then about the recent evolution of events concerning NATO and the United States. As Secretary-General Luns pointed out, Admiral Moorer is about to depart. He has been extremely effective in supporting NATO and we will miss him both in NATO and in Washington. I would like also to introduce Robert Ellsworth whom I'm sure you know already. He is Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security matters. He is always knowledgeable, always gentlemanly, and always firm.

Regarding the recent evolution of issues in the United States, I think there have been several articles in the press concerning American troops in Europe. They represent a favorable trend. A number of people who were disenchanted by the Vietnam War have come to realize the fundamental importance of NATO to American security. This is good news. The bad news is that this is only a respite. As I said last December, the American public must see that the Europeans are helping to provide forces to support NATO's strategy of flexible response, with an emphasis on forward defense.

There has been a certain amount of self-pity in recent years. The problem is that we may somehow delude ourselves into thinking that one can strengthen the Alliance by reducing forces. I point this out because the Alliance depends on American public opinion's support for keeping U.S. forces in Europe. This is not possible if the American public perceives that the Europeans are providing less than adequate support themselves. We need something more than good intentions. I note that national spending by NATO countries for defense is declining. Nations that were spending 5.0 percent are now spending 3.5 percent (of their GNP) for defense, and the U.S. that was spending 8 percent before the Vietnam War is now spending 6 percent. Everywhere force structure and defense resources are under challenge.

Turning to Secretary-General Luns, Secretary Schlesinger stated, I hope you don't mind if I begin with these few remarks.

Secretary-General Luns: No, on the contrary, I welcome them.

Secretary Schlesinger: In beginning my briefing on the strategic balance, I thought I might summarize some of the relevant aspects of the Soviet force structure which I presented last December and then go on to their implications. I will discuss three topics:

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
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- Changes in targeting doctrine
- Strategic situation
- Strategic initiatives that relate directly to Soviet expansion.

Slide F-12 please (See TAB A). On the left, this chart points out where we were May 26, 1972 when the SALT I agreement was concluded. Prior to this, there had been little Soviet activity in development of new missiles. Since then, there has been literally an explosion of activity. It may or may not be related to SALT I. Obviously, the planning for these programs had to be underway for some time. However, the Soviets did defer certain tests and initiatives until after the SALT I agreement was signed. What we see here is a massive R&D program underway. In July-August 1973 the Soviets tested for the first time on-board computers on their missiles.



JS 3.3(b)(6), (9)

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JS 3.3(b)(6), (9)


OSD 3.3(b)(2), (4),
(5), (8)

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Date: OCT 08 2014

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Corrected Page
21 August 1974



JS 3.3(b)(6), (9)

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
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
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
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Secretary-General Luns: I endorse Minister Leber's remarks regarding conventional forces and I would like to point out that Dr. Schlesinger has emphasized that strategic forces be retargeted against selected targets.

Minister Andreotti (IT): I am grateful to the Secretary of Defense for his briefing. It serves the purpose of diffusing doubts which have arisen from public press conferences. Increasing options enhances deterrence. Some people have objected that retargeting will degrade forward-based systems (FBS) in Europe and lead to reduction. This is dangerous for the Alliance. FBS are necessary for flexibility and to exploit opportunity targets. I would appreciate Dr. Schlesinger's views.

Secretary Schlesinger: I would like to make a point that I didn't make earlier. I would like to pay tribute to General Goodpaster who has responsibility for nuclear weapons on the European Continent and for POSEIDONS assigned to the area. This deserves the full attention of General Goodpaster and the MNC's. In regard to regional nuclear forces, some of the problems are the same as for strategic forces. For example, we need




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Secretary-General Luns: Thank you. Are there other comments?



Secretary-General Luns: You may well be right. (Laughter)

Minister Vredeling (NL): The only answer I can give you is that of my government and I hope it will be forthcoming within a month.

I note that although Secretary Schlesinger has said that retargeting has been done for Europe, it seems to have been done without the Europeans.

Secretary-General Luns: The U.S. has had the major responsibility for nuclear targeting since the beginning of the Alliance.

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
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
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
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Secretary Schlesinger: I would like to tick off a few remarks in reply. They are in no particular order.



In recent years relations with France have not been entirely in the spirit of Lafayette and most of their acclaim for U.S. efforts has been expressed only in private, not in public. I would like to point out that the French have received in a uniformly positive fashion the changes in targeting doctrine.




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
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
FORCE SIZING

We distinguish between strategic doctrine and sizing. As for sizing, we adhere to the principle of essential equivalence, also called equality. This principle is the concept which underlines the May 1972 US/USSR Agreement for the Prevention of Nuclear War. That agreement said that neither side would seek strategic advantage. We intend to ensure that they do not gain that advantage.

We have held out to the Soviets the opportunity to constrain the growth of strategic capabilities. We believe that this will be mutually advantageous. We say to the Soviets that we will match you. We can do it, if they are willing, by scaling down. But we will also go up if that is necessary. We think the latter alternative would be disadvantageous to both sides.



We do not know if we will be successful in dissuading the Soviets from further expansion of their strategic capabilities. We want to be sure, however, that any decision they make will not give them an advantage. I believe that if we can persuade Moscow that there is no advantage to be gained, that is the best incentive system.



The incentive we hold out to the Soviets is to impose limitations on US developments but only if the Soviets impose constraints upon themselves. This, historically, they have been reluctant to do.

Some aspects of our new programs are separable from the sizing problem. These include accuracy improvements and command and control. We are spending

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In other categories we have advantages. The POSEIDON throw-weight is better than that of the SSN-6 and SSN-8. Also we have MIRV. The Soviets are moving to MIRV technology for SLBMs but their progress is slow. They find it hard to deal with MIRV in small throw-weight missiles.

In sum, in range we are behind. In other features we are ahead. As far as numbers are concerned if they use their full production capacity that would be unfavorable to the US. Under the Agreement, the Soviets can have 740 sea-based missiles and they can go up to 950 if they reduce other missiles elsewhere. We have assumed that they would do this and reduce obsolescent SS-7 and SS-8 missiles.

Ambassador Menzies (CAN): As you know we have in the past discussed illustrative studies. Do you think that the new targeting doctrine would call for further illustrative studies in which the political part of the Alliance would examine different types of strike options? In the past, we know that the military authorities have developed a series of options, but in view of the political significance of the new doctrine is there further work that could be done in the NPG?

Secretary Schlesinger: Without attempting to be precise about the boundary line between the activities of political and military authorities, further work is necessary and the NPG should legitimately be involved, particularly to the extent involving possible options that require political support of the Alliance. Political authorities may wish to participate in war games. General Goodpaster may also have some further observations on this question.

Ambassador Menzies (CAN): To what extent do we feel that the Soviets have gotten the message of the new targeting doctrine? You indicated in the last NPG meeting at The Hague that the Soviets would not live up to the terms of the Agreement for the Prevention of Nuclear War. You said the Soviets would not consult with the US in the Mid-East crisis. Has the US had further discussions with the Soviets to improve the process of consultation? Has there been any focus at all in this connection on the new targeting doctrine?

Secretary Schlesinger: As to the general proposition of the lapse of strict Soviet adherence to the Agreement for the Prevention of Nuclear War, we have not put that to them directly. That would be a little embarrassing to the high degree of enlightenment that exists between the two blocs. I believe that the Soviets will behave opportunistically despite their rhetoric.

We have got some reactions from the Soviets on the doctrine, reactions which are healthy from the Soviet standpoint. The Soviets interpret detente

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with a meaning we cannot accept. Detente has not forced choices on them. They have not given up their objectives. Detente to them is a series of milestones in the shift of the balance of forces in favor of the East. To some extent the angry cries from the Soviets reflect the fact that they may be coming to understand that detente means they must make choices, they must make accommodations. There cannot be a shift in the balance of forces in their favor. They cannot go on with their game of increasing the forces of the East. This considers internal problems and it makes them angry because they don't want to make choices. Because of the recognition that their prior assumption that the shift of the correlation of forces would move in their direction may be illusory, there is frustration and anger.


In light of the aim to develop incentives to terminate any possible hostilities at lowest possible level, this requires intra-war consultation. We have not consulted with the Soviets on this, but it is built into the system.

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
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AGENDA ITEM III - FUNCTION OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE IN THE NUCLEAR CON-
SULTATION PROCESS

Secretary-General Luns: As you know, if the role of the Military Committee (MC) is to be compatible with the consultation guidelines, the MC must expedite the consultation process. If there are no comments, the report (NPG/D(74)S) will be endorsed by the silent procedure. It will then be sent to the NDAC with an annex on the function of the MC. The silent procedure will also obtain regarding the way the NDAC approves the report. (There was no discussion of this item and the report was adopted by the silent procedure.)

AGENDA ITEM IV - BRIEFING ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS R&D

Secretary-General Luns opened the session and drew attention to the fact that the Norwegian Delegation had distributed Minister Fostervoll's

Secretary-General Luns: Now we will deal with item IV, the briefing on US nuclear R&D. At the last NPG in The Hague, Secretary Schlesinger offered to give an R&D briefing at our next meeting. Also at that meeting,

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the NPG decided to implement a new study on the political and military implications of a new technology. It is likely that today's briefing will give us an idea of the direction in which technology is going and its effect for strengthening NATO's defense posture. With regard to the terms that we have continually stressed -- NATO has a three part, mutually reinforcing strategy -- strategic weapons, tactical nuclear weapons and conventional weapons. However, if NATO's tactical nuclear weapons are to be credible the USSR must be aware that they exist and they must be unable to conclude that NATO would never resort to their use. Since NATO is defending its own territory, our tactical nuclear weapons must have characteristics not unacceptable to our countries. Thus, factors like command and control, target acquisition, the level and the kind of various effects, including collateral damage, assume great importance and have a great impact on our defense options. I look forward to the briefing and to the contribution it will make. Secretary Schlesinger.

Secretary Schlesinger: Thank you. At the last meeting you requested a briefing in the tactical nuclear area and today I have brought considerable information and a film which I shall show later. Let me begin by showing you how much the US spends annually on tactical nuclear weapons.


ANNUAL EXPENDITURES ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1. We invest about \$170 million a year in research and development on new tactical nuclear warheads.
2. This amount does not include outlays on
 - the development of specialized nuclear delivery systems
 - or on dual-capable systems.
3. The actual production of tactical nuclear weapons costs, on the average, another \$300 million a year.
4. Operation and maintenance costs run to about \$1 billion a year, most of which goes for
 - the operation of the nuclear delivery units
 - the conduct of exercises
 - testing and the like.
5. All in all, the theater nuclear forces probably cost us over \$2 billion a year.

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2. However, I should stress 3 points in this connection.
 - These changes, for the most part, cannot come quickly.
 - How soon they are available depends on the effort and resources that we apply.
 - But, in general, even decisions made now will not lead to significant improvements in the forces before the 1980s.
3. One major exception to this long lead-time is higher accuracy, which we are moving ahead with now.

Secretary-General Luns: Excuse me. What is the difference between weapons safety and weapons security?

Secretary Schlesinger: By security I mean site protection. Safety means making the weapon safer to handle with less risk, for example, or scattering plutonium.

Secretary-General Luns: Thank you.



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
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
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


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


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
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
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Secretary-General Luns: Of course, we have already started such a study. I believe, too, that the Soviets are far less sensitive to damage to the territories of their Warsaw Pact allies than they are to damage to their own homeland. We will soon have a coffee break. The draft communique is ready and you will have a chance to look at it during coffee.

Minister Leber (FRG): My question is aimed at the discussion the Chairman has already mentioned, i.e., Soviet immunity to the tactical nuclear weapons. We know that the Soviets are not very active in this spectrum. That is, they have not done much to modernize their nuclear weaponry. I have three observations. First, we welcome the development indicated by Secretary Schlesinger. I think that in attempting to refine our weaponry we can increase the credibility of deterrence. But we should not let this discussion take us down side roads, in particular, not in the direction mentioned by Minister Vredeling, and second, discussions on whether or not tactical nuclear weapons are required at all and on whether or not they might be a replacement for conventional forces. We must not delude ourselves. Tactical nuclear weapons can never be a replacement for conventional weapons. At a minimum conventional forces will be required to supplement nuclear forces. Both conventional and nuclear weapons must make up the total deterrence concept if that concept is to remain credible. Also the credibility of our strategic nuclear weapons is enhanced by our tactical nuclear posture -- there is no doubt about that. This is the line we must follow and we must maintain it at all costs. Tactical nuclear weapons must not be a reason for us to look with less favor on conventional force. Third, I would like to underline the points made by Secretary Schlesinger on the great need for the physical security of nuclear weapons. We must be permanently on guard to prevent severe embarrassment. I have discussed this matter again and again and each time we find some new possibilities for making our security better.

Minister Vredeling (NL): I should like to stress the point made by Sir Edward (Peck, UK) for the necessity of discussing the political angle. I don't know the proper forum. At home there are a lot of questions about it -- what do all these new developments mean? We can only hope, I think, that the Warsaw Pact does not go in the same direction. As long as the Warsaw Pact will answer us in the old way, that's all right. But if the Warsaw Pact follows suit in developing new weapons of the type described by Secretary Schlesinger, then the nuclear threshold will be lowered.

Secretary-General Luns: The gap between tactical nuclear weapons and big weapons is so big that the use of small tactical nuclear weapons does not lower the threshold unless we let slip our conventional shield. Are there any further questions about Secretary Schlesinger's briefing?

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
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Ambassador Menzies (CAN): We appreciate Secretary Schlesinger's briefing and are interested in the doctrine for tactical use of nuclear weapons. You (Luns) indicate that a study on new technology is now underway. The point I want to raise is that this group, or some offshoot, should examine the doctrine for tactical use of nuclear weapons. We should move forward on this. Further, there is the question of involving the French.

Secretary-General Luns: Assistant Secretary-General Humphreys will answer the question.



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AGENDA ITEM V - WARSAW PACT POLITICO-MILITARY STRATEGY AND MILITARY DOCTRINE FOR THE TACTICAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Secretary-General Luns: I wish to draw your attention particularly to paragraphs 73 to 88 of the Study Team report which examines various options for the Warsaw Pact in responding to NATO's initial use of tactical nuclear weapons. The report briefly mentions the factors affecting Warsaw Pact decisions, and it should complement MC 161/74. Since the Netherlands headed the study group, I understand that Minister Vredeling has some introductory comments to make on the study.

Minister Vredeling (NL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The study which is now under discussion originates, as you mentioned already, from an initiative taken at the ministerial meeting of the NPG at Ankara in May 1973.

In the ACLANT follow-on use study that was presented to you at that meeting the question has arisen of the possible WP-response to NATO's use of nuclear weapons, and ministers requested permanent representatives to arrange for a study on this item.

Mr. Chairman, I think that the task of the study team has not been easy. We have asked them to enter into the minds of the Soviet leaders, and I think we all agree that if there is one spot on this earth where thoughts and plans are kept secret, it is the Kremlin in Moscow. And, of course, nuclear policy is the most secret aspect of all.

It is therefore a mixture of close reading of all kinds of Soviet statements of strategic literature and of quite a lot of intelligence piecing together of diverse bits of information, that has been the basis of the study group's report. We cannot, therefore, say that the report presents an exact statement based on documentary proof. What it does, however, is to provide us with a credible picture of what kind of thinking will probably govern Soviet policy decision-making in this matter, and that seems to me already a valuable contribution to our policy planning.

I think, therefore, Mr. Chairman, that all will join me in thanking the study team, composed of officials from many member countries and from NATO staffs, and for their hard and useful work.

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
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Secretary-General Luns: [REDACTED]

Minister Leber (FRG): I would hate to presume to be the spokesman of NATO as a whole. This is something that should be considered by the entire Alliance.

Secretary-General Luns: Yes, but the allies might ask Germany to speak for them and express their views. I might also raise this subject on the occasion of my call on the new French President, Giscard.

[REDACTED]

Minister Andreotti (IT): This is an excellent report. It is particularly valuable for providing new optics in the NATO decision-making process. We should, however, consider the report as a point of departure rather than as a point of arrival. Our study of the situation should continue. The prospect of hostilities impels a mutually cautious attitude, and while NATO has a variety of means available, the Soviets do not currently have flexibility and a great number of means available. NATO must study developments in the Soviet inventory to judge their ability to adopt a flexible strategy. I wish to support Mr. Leber on the necessity to be in touch with the French on nuclear strategy.

Admiral Hill-Norton (Chairman of the Military Committee): I would like to point out that I would be unhappy if the study group report alone were to form the basis of NATO planning, as it is speculative regarding Warsaw Pact intentions. MC 161 is the basic NATO document in which Warsaw Pact capabilities are dealt with in great precision. In contrast, NATO knows nothing for sure regarding Warsaw Pact intentions. While it would be useful to update studies on what the Warsaw Pact might do, the MNCs are instructed to make proposals on the basis of known Pact capabilities. I would like to sound a warning note regarding the status which the study group report receives in future. It is a useful adjunct to MC 161 but not a substitute. I would like to draw your attention to the passage in the report regarding the possibility that NATO's posture might provoke the aggression it is intended to deter. This passage, taken at face value, might lead to a situation where preparation for actions considered militarily essential during times of tension would be put off for

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fear of provoking the Warsaw Pact. For these reasons, I recommend that the DPC, when noting the report, have its attention drawn to the dangers seen by the NATO military authorities.

Secretary-General Luns: I agree that the study group report should not become the basic NATO document, and I assume that the Military Committee will make these points at the DPC Ministerial. I, therefore, hope that will satisfactorily provide for the expression of MC concerns.

Secretary Schlesinger: I wonder whether that would be a satisfactory disposition of Admiral Hill-Norton's points. As I understand them, Admiral Hill-Norton's comments do not delimit the value of the study group report. If the NPG is to pass on its best advice to the DPC, it might do so as part of the documentation. One of the problems of NATO is that in time of crisis, the Allies might fail to take necessary measures. The most provocative act is to be supine. I fear that the idea that doing nothing is the best policy will continue to raise its ugly head.

The study group report states that the West cannot anticipate the precise nature of the Warsaw Pact response and must be prepared for a wide range of reaction to NATO first use of nuclear weapons. We should also be aware of the possibility of arranging a set of circumstances to reduce the chances of provocation. It would seem advisable to maintain as high a nuclear threshold as possible. Studies such as the one prepared by the NATO study group draw on military doctrine which may or may not coincide with the actual action taken. I might refer to the writings of the Danish existentialist philosopher Kierkegaard who said that until we are faced with a crisis we do not know what emotions would be aroused or what actions demanded. Applying this to warfare, military doctrine may be swept away during time of crisis. To the extent that Pact military doctrine involves a high level response, and to the extent that that implies major damage, the Soviets would, therefore, be wary about actions leading to war, and that would be an advantage for us. If they see no possibility for flexibility, they would be faced with the prospect of cataclysm. If on the other, they see a possibility for flexibility, they must compare their own capability with NATO's and that should be advantageous for us.

Secretary-General Luns: I will see to it that the points by Admiral Hill-Norton and endorsed by Secretary Schlesinger will be underlined at the DPC. Regarding contacts with the French, I am wondering aloud whether the NPG would agree or propose to the DPC that the basic NATO nuclear guidelines be given to the French including the study group report.

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Minister Leber (FRG): All I had in mind was drawing attention of ministers to the problem, which touches on France's relations with NATO. The need for contact with the French is more urgent today than five years ago when the NATO consultation guidelines were approved as the French are now introducing their new tactical nuclear weapons. I would not, however, advocate a decision at this time. We should wait and see about the attitude and direction of the new French Government. It would be prudent not to decide now on specific actions. It might, for example, be better to wait and see what develops from the Secretary-General's discussions with Giscard.

Secretary-General Luns: In view of Mr. Leber's reserve, perhaps, if others agree, I should have a confidential discussion with the French Permanent Representative to NATO and get his reaction. Perhaps I can do so as early as this week.

Are there any objections to the study team report? No objections? The report and recommendations are then accepted.

AGENDA ITEM VI - FUTURE WORK PROGRAM

Secretary-General Luns: This discussion is based on my P0/74/50 revised, but Ministers are in no way restricted to the contents of this document. Are there any suggestions?

Admiral Hill-Norton (Chairman, MC): I wish to draw the attention of Ministers to paragraph 4 of the PO regarding future illustrative studies. The preparation of such studies consumes an inordinate amount of busy men's time. The NATO Military Authorities will, of course, prepare studies requested, but when tasking such studies in the future, it should be made clear exactly what they should be designed to illustrate.

Secretary-General Luns: I agree. Perhaps we could postpone any further consideration of additional studies until the autumn. Minister Andreotti, I believe you have something to tell us about the next NPG Ministerial meeting.

Minister Andreotti (IT): Yes, I would like to confirm my government's invitation for November 7-8 in Rome.

Secretary-General Luns: I would like to come back at a later time regarding the question of NPG membership during the last half of 1974. There will be several new members.

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AGENDA ITEM VII - ANY OTHER BUSINESS

(NOTE: This subject, to include the time and location of the next Ministerial meeting, was discussed under the previous agenda item.)

AGENDA ITEMS VIII AND IX - COMMUNIQUE AND MINUTE

Secretary-General Luns: The draft minute is not complete because much of our work was only just done in the last session. I suggest the Perm Reps finish it in Brussels, if that's OK. (No objection.)

Concerning the Communique, it will be distributed both here shortly after the meeting and also in Brussels.

Ambassador Menzies (CAN): Will it be distributed in French also?

Secretary-General Luns: Yes. If Canada wants it, we'll translate it in Brussels.

Minister Vredeling (NL): On behalf of the Benelux countries and especially my absent Belgian colleagues, I endorse the request for translation into French.

Secretary-General Luns: Are there any objections to para 1? Para 2? (Editorial discussion concerning para 5.) Etc. I note the communique has been approved.

I want to thank the US delegation, especially Secretary Schlesinger and Secretary Ellsworth. We are thankful for the US openness and frankness and the details that the US has provided in these discussions. For my part, I would also hope that the Ministers, when they return to their capitals, will see their way clear to inform the public about the significance of military issues. With the inflation in many of our countries, there are many pressures on defense resources. It is necessary to keep the public informed. After the last meeting the Belgian Minister of Defense went on television and said that sacrifice for defense was necessary if detente is to succeed.

As Secretary Schlesinger said, the recent turn of events in the United States is just a respite and positive action by European governments remains of great importance. I urge you to heed his call.

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I want to thank the Norwegian government for hosting this conference and for the splendid dinner last night.

Finally, this is the last NPG for Mr. Harvey Seim, Director of Nuclear Planning on the International Staff. He has served the Alliance in an excellent way. We are grateful for his work and effort.

Attachments:

List of Participants

Tab A - Slides used in Agenda Item I

Tab B - Charts used in Agenda Item IV

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NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP MEETING
BERGEN, NORWAY 11-12 JUNE 1974

LIST OF DELEGATES

NATO

His Excellency Mr. Joseph M.A.H. Luns
Mr. D. C. Humphreys

Mr. Eddie G. Luff
Mr. Harvey B. Seim
Mr. Jorg Mentzel
Mr. R. Serio
Mr. M. Wilson
Mr. A. Devries

Secretary General
Assistant Secretary General,
Defense, Planning and Policy
Deputy Executive Secretary
Director, Nuclear Planning
Nuclear Planning Directorate
Nuclear Planning Directorate
NPG Staff Group
Head, NATO Press Service

Canada

His Excellency Arthur R. Menzies
General J. A. Dextraze
Mr. M. D. Bell

Colonel A. G. Christie

Colonel C. A. Green
Lieutenant Colonel W. J. Newlands

Major J. E. R. Steel

Commander W. M. Beckett

Ambassador to NATO
Chief of Defence Staff
Defence Relations Division,
Department of External Affairs
Executive Assistant to the Chief
of National Defence
Nuclear Planning Co-ordinator
Policy Group, Department of
National Defence
Aide de Camp to the Chief of
Defence Staff
First Secretary, NATO Delegation

Federal Republic of Germany

The Honorable Georg Leber
Admiral Armin Zimmerman

Ambassador Franz Krapf
Rear Admiral Herbert Trebesch

Colonel Sabe
Lieutenant Colonel P. H. Carstens

Dr. W. Stutzle

Mr. A. Halle

Lieutenant Colonel Klaus Abel

Mr. C. Amthor
Mr. E. Dudka
Mr. K. Freudenstein
Capt. H. Kujat

Master Sergeant R. Wenz

Colonel G. Brugman

Colonel W. vonAltenburg

Mr. A. Welland

Dr. F. Pfeffer

Colonel Rolf Thyse
Dr. R. Hofstetter

Greece

The Honorable Eustathios Latsoudis
His Excellency A. Chorafas
Lieutenant Colonel A. Papadopoulos
Lieutenant General Othon Kyriakopoulos
Colonel S. Politis

Minister of Defense
Chief of Staff, Federal Armed
Forces
Ambassador to NATO
ACOS, Politico-Military Affairs
Ministry of Defense
Planning Office MOD
Personal Staff Officer to Mini
of Defense
Personal Advisor to Minister
of Defense
Chief, Press and Information
Office
Staff Officer, Politico-Military
Policies Branch
Interpreter
Interpreter
Interpreter
Aide de Camp to Minister of
Defense
Administrative Assistant,
Armed Forces Staff
Adjutant to the Chief of Staff,
Federal Armed Forces
Chief, Politico-Military Policies
Staff Officer, Politico-Military
Policies Branch
Cosmic Registrar and Security
Officer
Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Delegation to NATO
Counsellor, German Delegation
to NATO

Minister of Defense
Ambassador to NATO
Interpreter
Deputy Chief, Supreme Hellenic
Armed Forces Command
Director, Third Joint Staff
Group of SHAFC

Greece (Cont'd.)

Colonel Ath. Peppas
Lt. Colonel Constantin Dimitroulopoulos
Major D. Sardellis

Lt. Commander N. Papadogonas

Captain A. Kyriakopoulos

Lieutenant G. Katsirdakis

Mr. John Grigoriadis

Staff Officer of the SHAFC
Delegation to NATO
Staff Officer of the Minister
of National Defense
Aide de Camp to the Minister
of Defense
Aide de Camp to Deputy Chief
of SHAFC
Interpreter Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
Director of NATO Affairs Division

Italy

The Honorable Dr. Giulio Andreotti
His Excellency Ambassador Felice
Catalano di Mellilli

Admiral Eugenio Henke
Major General Aldo Giambartolomei
Dr. Salvatore Chieffi

Minister Eric Da Rin

Minister Francesco Spinnelli
Colonel Rinaldo Rinaldi
Colonel Giuseppe Capaldi

Brigadier General Fernando Butelli
Colonel Riccardo Bisogniero

Colonel Mariano Antoci
Captain Gabriele de Schoenfeld

Colonel Castore Azzari

Colonel Alberto Rossi
Lieutenant Colonel Giuseppe Peroncin
Lieutenant Colonel P. P. Bergami
Commander Leonardo Panebianco

Captain Natale Proto

Captain Alfonso Diana

Mr. Giovanni Ferraro
Warrant Officer C. C. Severino Laudati
Warrant Officer Antonio Vittoria
MR Corporal Emilio Libbi

Minister of Defense
Permanent Representative to NATO

Chief of Defence General Staff
Chief Cabinet, Ministry of Defence
Vice Chief Cabinet, Ministry of
Defence
Head NATO Section, Ministry of
Defence

Italian Delegation to NATO
Chief of Public Information Cabinet
Chief Military Policy Division,
Cabinet

Chief 3d Div, Defense General Staff
Chief Military Policy Division,
Defence General Staff

Aide de Camp to Minister of Defence
Chief Special Weapons Section,
Defence General Staff

Advisor to Permanent Representative
to NATO

Interpreter
Interpreter
Security Officer

Aide de Camp to Chief Defence
General Staff

Special Weapons Section, Defence
General Staff

Aide de Camp to Chief Defence
General Staff

Security Officer
Security Officer
Administrative Assistant
Security Officer

Netherlands

His Excellency H. Vredeling
His Excellency A.F.K. Hartogh

Lieutenant General A.J.W. Wijting, RNLA

Mr. E.J. Van Vloten

Lieutenant Colonel J. Van Valderen, RNLA

Commander A.H. Lind, RNLN
Mr. A.F. Duyverman

Mr. A.J. Sligting

Minister of Defence
Ambassador, Permanent
Representative to NATO
Chairman, Committee Joint
Chief of Staff
Head Military and Civil
Defence Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
Staff Officer, Delegation to
NATO
Staff Officer Joint Staff
Head Military Cooperation Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Director of Information,
Ministry of Defence

Norway

The Honorable Alv Jacob Fostervoll
His Excellency Rolf Busch
General A.F. Zeiner-Gundersen

Mr. Sverre Skjetnes
Mr. Ole M. Engh

Mr. Haakon W. Freilow

Colonel Olav Edland
Mr. Erik Himle

Minister of Defence
Ambassador to NATO
Chief of Defence, Defence
Command Norway
Deputy Defense Advisor
Head of Division, Ministry
of Defense
Head of Division, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
Defence Command Norway
Permanent Secretary

United Kingdom

The Rt. Honorable Roy Mason
Field Marshal Sir Michael Carver
His Excellency Sir Edward Peck
Mr. A. P. Hockaday

Colonel The Lord Alvingham
Group Captain R. Ashford
Dr. I. Shaw
Mr. J. O. Kerr

Mr. C. Groves
Mr. W. F. Mumford

Mr. N. J. Beaumont
Mr. J. M. Legge
Mr. M. G. Dunmore

Captain J. Lowther

Secretary of State for Defense
Chief of Defense Staff
Permanent Representative to NATO
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Policy and Programmes)
Staff of Chief of Defense Staff
Ministry of Defense
Asst. Chief Scientific Advisor, MOD
Western Organizations Department,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Controller Public Relations, MOD
Private Secretary to Secretary of
State
NATO Delegation
Defense Secretariat
Assistant Private Secretary to
Secretary of State
Aide de Camp to Chief of Defense
Staff

United States

The Honorable James R. Schlesinger
The Honorable Robert Ellsworth
The Honorable Donald Rumsfeld
The Honorable Jerry Friedhelm

Admiral Thomas H. Moorer
Dr. William B. Prendergast
Mr. Harry E. Bergold, Jr.

Brigadier General H. Lobdell, Jr.
Brigadier General Robert Taylor
Mr. Joseph Zalca
Colonel Edward Dinges
Colonel Jack Callaway
Dr. Robert Goldwin
Captain S. A. Swartzrauber
Lt Colonel David Mabry
Mr. Arva Floyd
Mr. John Graham

Secretary of Defense
Asst. Secretary of Defense, ISA
Permanent Representative, US NATO
Asst. Secretary of Defense, Public
Affairs
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Defense Advisor, US NATO
Deputy Asst. Secretary of Defense,
Europe & NATO, ISA
Director, European Region, ISA
Military Asst. to Secretary of Defense
Asst. to Secretary of Defense, Security
Military Assistant, ISA
Dep Director, Nuclear Affairs, ISA
Special Advisor, US NATO
Assistant to Chairman, JCS
Aide to Chairman, JCS
NATO Affairs, State Department
International Security, State Department

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Observers

Admiral Sir Peter Hill-Norton
General Andrew J. Goodpaster, USA
Admiral Ralph W. Cousins, USN

Chairman, Military Committee
SACEUR
SACLANT

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
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
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
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
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
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