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Dooley

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

PTTSZYUW RUEADWD945Z 0750706  
PRIORITY  
P 152110Z MAR 82

FM HQ DA WASHDC//DAMO-000-EX//

TO JCS WASHDC //J3 (JED)//

INFO AIG 7403//

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DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: **FEB 19 2014**

AIG 7031//

SECTION 01 OF 09

SUBJECT: EXERCISE IVY LEAGUE 82 FIRST IMPRESSIONS REPORT (U)  
REFERENCES:

- A. (U) JCS EXPLAN 0021 EXERCISE IVY LEAGUE 82, DATED 4 AUG 81.
- B. (U) JCS MSG, 270132Z FEB 82, SUBJ: EXERCISE IVY LEAGUE FIRST IMPRESSIONS CONFERENCE 19 MAR 82.
- 1. EXERCISE OVERVIEW: EXERCISE IVY LEAGUE 82 WAS A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL ACTIVITY FROM AN ARMY PERSPECTIVE IN THAT IT HIGHLIGHTED PRECISELY THOSE AREAS CONTAINED IN JCS AND ARMY OBJECTIVES. THE NUCLEAR ENVIRONMENT WHICH REQUIRE DEDICATED STUDY ON BOTH JCS AND ARMY LEVELS. ADDITIONALLY PROCEDURES WERE EXERCISED WHICH INDICATED THE NEED FOR IMPROVEMENT MAJOR ISSUES EVOLVING FROM THE EXERCISE ARE ADDRESSED IN PARAGRAPH 2. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS RELATIVE TO THE CONDUCT OF THE EXERCISE ITSELF ARE CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 3.
- 2. THE FOLLOWING SUBPARAGRAPHS IDENTIFY AND DISCUSS THE MAJOR FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF THE ARMY RESULTING FROM EXERCISE IVY LEAGUE 82. EACH TOPIC IS STRUCTURED WITH THE HEADINGS OF ISSUE DISCUSSION, AND RECOMMENDATIONS. FURTHER, IN THREE AREAS WHICH WE CONSIDER THE MOST IMPORTANT TO EVOLVE FROM THE EXERCISE THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ISSUES OR ASPECTS WHICH NEED STUDY AND CORRECTIVE ACTION. THE ISSUES PERTAINING TO THESE GENERAL AREAS HAVE BEEN APPROPRIATELY GROUPED. THE THREE GENERAL AREAS ARE MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE CIVIL SECTOR, CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS, AND COMMUNICATIONS.

A. MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE CIVIL SECTOR IS A BROAD AREA ENCOMPASSING SEVERAL OBSERVED SHORTCOMINGS. A JCS IVY LEAGUE OBJECTIVE WAS TO EVALUATE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES (MACA) AND MILITARY SUPPORT OF CIVIL DEFENSE (MSCD) PLANS AND PROCEDURES DURING A PERIOD OF ANTICIPATED NUCLEAR ATTACK (PARA 2N, BASIC PLAN, REF A). THE ARMY EXPERIENCE IN IVY LEAGUE INDICATES THAT, WHILE SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE SINCE EXERCISE PRIZE GAUNTLET 80, A GREAT DEAL REMAINS TO BE DONE IN THE MACA AND MSCD AREA. THE ARMY ENCOUNTERED SERIOUS ANOMALIES AND DEFICIENCIES IN ALMOST EVERY ASPECT OF MACA AND MSCD. WHEREAS THE PROBLEMS LISTED BELOW WERE OBSERVED DURING THE EXERCISE IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS EXERCISE WAS PLAYED TO A LARGE EXTENT BY STAFF PERSONNEL WHO DO NOT NORMALLY EXECUTE MACA/MSCD PLANS AND PROCEDURES. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY TRUE IN THE CASE OF FEMA PLAYERS. ONLY THREE OF THE TEN FEMA REGIONS PLAYED, EMPLOYING SKELETAL STAFFS DURING NORMAL DUTY HOURS ONLY. THIS IN ITSELF SEVERELY LIMITED THE COORDINATION AND PROBLEM-SOLVING ABILITY INHERENT IN THE SYSTEM WHEN IT IS FULLY FUNCTIONING. MANY OF THE OBSERVED PROBLEM AREAS WOULD HAVE BEEN LESS SEVERE OR NON-EXISTENT IF FULL TIME OPERATING STAFF PERSONNEL HAD PLAYED AT ALL LEVELS AND FROM ALL FEDERAL AGENCIES. ADDITIONALLY MANY OF THE PROBLEMS WERE ENCOUNTERED AS A RESULT OF THE ARTIFICIALITIES OF PLAY THAT WERE NOT FULLY UNDERSTOOD BY ALL CONCERNED. GENERIC PROBLEM AREAS ARE OUTLINED BELOW:

(1) THE TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY FOR MACA TO OSD AND THE JCS WHEN MSCD PROCEDURES ARE IMPLEMENTED IS POORLY DEFINED. TRANSITION FROM MACA TO MSCD DURING IVY LEAGUE WAS LATE AND FRAGMENTED.

(A) ISSUE: THERE IS NO AGREED TRIGGER MECHANISM THAT CAUSES A SHIFT TO MSCD PROCEDURES AND CHAIN OF COMMAND.

(B) (U) DISCUSSION:

-1- (U) THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY IS THE APPOINTED DOD EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR PLANNING AND PROVIDING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES FOR DISASTER RELIEF AND CIVIL DISTURBANCE. HE THEREFORE HAS AUTHORITY TO TASK ELEMENTS OF THE OTHER SERVICES FOR THESE FUNCTIONS. THE SA COORDINATES DIRECTLY WITH FEDERAL CIVIL AGENCIES ASSISTED BY THE ARMY STAFF AND PLANS AND PROCEDURES FOR THE EXECUTION OF THESE FUNCTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED AND ARE IN PLACE (AR 500-60 DISASTER RELIEF AR 500-50 CIVIL DISTURBANCE, AND CIVIL DISTURBANCE OPLAN GARDEN PLOT).

-2- (U) IF A SERIOUS THREAT OF NUCLEAR ATTACK ON CONUS DEVELOPS, MSCD PLANS AND PROCEDURES ARE IMPLEMENTED. MANAGEMENT OF MSCD IS VESTED IN THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (USD-P). ACTION IS VIA OJCS, USREDCOM (FORSCOM) AND THE CONUSAS.

-3- THE IVY LEAGUE SCENARIO PORTRAYED A SERIOUS NUCLEAR THREAT AT STARTEX WHICH RAPIDLY GREW. NEVERTHELESS, MSCD PROCEDURES WERE NOT INITIATED UNTIL SHORTLY BEFORE THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR EXCHANGE. THIS COMPLICATED THE SMOOTH TRANSITION TO MSCD IN THAT MAJOR FUNCTIONS SUCH AS SUPPORT TO SPONTANEOUS EVACUATION WERE REQUESTED AT THE PEAK OF THE CRISIS RATHER THAN EARLY ON WHEN THE INTENSITY OF THE SITUATION WAS MUCH LESS.

(C) RECOMMENDATION: THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY AND THE JSD-P, IN COORDINATION WITH THE OJCS AND FEMA, SHOULD DEVELOP A SYSTEM WHICH ENSURES EARLY CONSIDERATION AND A TIMELY DECISION TO INITIATE MSCD OPERATIONS. AN APPROPRIATE TRIGGER DEVICE MIGHT LIE IN THE DEFCOM SYSTEM. THE DECLARATION OF A SPECIFIED DEFCOM COULD CAUSE AUTOMATIC SHIFT TO MSCD. ALTERNATELY, A GIVEN DEFCOM COULD REQUIRE A CONFERENCE OF MILITARY AND CIVIL PRINCIPALS TO DECIDE THE MACA/MSCD ISSUE.

(2) (U) THE LAWS, REGULATIONS, DIRECTIVES, AND AGREEMENTS GOVERNING THE PROVISION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT NEED REVISION AND RATIONALIZATION.

(A) (U) ISSUE: THE LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND PROCEDURES WHICH GOVERN BOTH PLANNING AND PROVISION OF MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES AND MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVIL DEFENSE ARE SO COMPLICATED AND DIVERSE THAT EFFICIENT DELIVERY OF ASSISTANCE IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE.

(B) (U) DISCUSSION:

-1- (U) THE DELIVERY OF MACA AND/OR MSCD BY THE MILITARY IS MANDATED BY VARIOUS FEDERAL STATUTES. THERE IS NO SINGLE REFERENCE DOCUMENT THAT DEFINES MILITARY RESPONSIBILITIES, THE CONDITIONS UNDER

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Declassify in Part: **X**

Reason: **33(b)(7)(D)+6.2(a)**

MDR: **10-M-0757**

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ACTION J3(5) (A.7.F)  
INFO OJCS(4) OJCS(3) SJCS(1) J4(4) J5(2) CJS(5)  
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WHICH THEY WILL BE DISCHARGED, OR THE CHAIN OF APPROVAL AND COMMAND. RATHER, THERE IS A COLLECTION OF LAWS, INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS, AND PLANS THAT SEEK TO SPECIFY WHO PROVIDES WHAT TO WHOM UNDER VARIOUS EMERGENCY CONDITIONS. MANY DIFFERENT TYPES OF EMERGENCY CONDITIONS OR DISASTERS HAVE UNIQUE PROPONENTS AMONG THE FEDERAL CIVIL AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENTS. OIL OR HAZARDOUS WASTE SPILLS FALL UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY. RESPONSE TO MAJOR FOREST FIRES IS MANAGED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR. RESPONSE TO NATURAL DISASTERS FALLS WITHIN THE FEMA MANAGEMENT SPHERE AND SO ON.

(U) EVEN IF THE RESPONSIBLE MILITARY COMMANDER KNOWS WHICH

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(U) EVEN IF THE RESPONSIBLE MILITARY COMMANDER KNOWS WHICH AGENCY HAS FEDERAL CIVIL COGNIZANCE HE FREQUENTLY HAS DIFFICULTY DETERMINING HIS OWN AUTHORITY TO ACT. THE RULES VARY DEPENDING ON THE IMPINENCE OF THE THREAT, HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE ABILITY OF FEDERAL, CIVIL, STATE, AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES TO RESPOND, AND THE EFFECTS OF THEIR RESPONSE ON HIS PRIME MILITARY MISSION. WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESIDENT DECLARES THE EMERGENCY OR DISASTER TO BE SUCH RADICALLY AFFECTS THE ACTIONS OF RESPONSIBLE MILITARY COMMANDERS.

-3- (U) IN SHORT, IT IS EXCEEDINGLY DIFFICULT FOR MILITARY PLANNERS AND EXECUTORS TO DECIDE WHETHER TO PROVIDE MACA OR MSCD. HAVING DECIDED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE, STANDING GUIDANCE AS TO HOW MUCH TO PROVIDE AND TO WHOM IS FRAGMENTED AND CONFUSING.

-4- (U) ALL THE ABOVE PROBLEMS ARE COMPOUNDED IF ONGOING MACA ACTIVITIES ARE OVERTAKEN BY ENEMY NUCLEAR THREATS OR ACTIONS. UNDER THESE CRISIS CONDITIONS THE MILITARY CHAIN OF COMMAND CHANGES.

(C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

-1- (U) THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY AND THE USD-P SHOULD SEEK CHANGES IN THE U.S. CODE THAT WOULD SIMPLIFY AND RATIONALIZE MACA AND MSCD RESPONSIBILITIES, AUTHORITIES, AND PROCEDURES. TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE, SUCH LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES SHOULD SEEK STANDARD RESPONSE GUIDANCE IN LIEU OF THE CURRENT TANGLE OF SITUATION-SPECIFIC LAWS.

-2- (U) PENDING SUCCESS OF THE MACA AND MSCD LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES, THE SA AND USD-P SHOULD LAUNCH A CONCERTED EFFORT TO CLARIFY AND IMPROVE CURRENT REGULATIONS, PLANS AND DIRECTIVES. —

(3) (U) THE MANY FEDERAL CIVIL AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENTS WHO MAY REQUIRE MILITARY ASSISTANCE TEND TO KNOW LITTLE OF MACA AND MSCD PLANS, CAPABILITIES, AND LIMITATIONS.

(A) (U) ISSUE: THE FEDERAL CIVIL AGENCIES REQUIRE MORE COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE OF MILITARY SUPPORT RESPONSIBILITIES AND REQUEST PROCEDURES.

(B) DISCUSSION: THERE IS A FUNDAMENTAL LACK OF UNDERSTANDING WITHIN THE CIVIL AGENCY EMERGENCY PLANNING COMMUNITY WITH REGARD TO THE CAPABILITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE DURING EMERGENCIES. ALMOST WITHOUT

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INFO CJCS:(\*) CJCS(3) SJCS(1) J4(4) J5(2) C3S(5)  
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EXCEPTION CIVIL AGENCY PLAYERS HAD NOT HEARD OF MACA/MSCD PRIOR TO THE EXERCISE. HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROGRAM BEYOND WHAT WAS PRESENTED BY OSD IN A 3 MAR 82 BRIEFING. HAD NOT SEEN, NOR HAD ACCESS TO ANY REGULATION OR OTHER AUTHORITY DOCUMENT ON THE SUBJECT. PLANNERS DID NOT KNOW WHAT ASSISTANCE THEY MIGHT APPROPRIATELY ASK FOR, AND THEY WERE CONCERNED WITH EMBARRASSING THEMSELVES OR THEIR AGENCY BY ASKING FOR THE WRONG KIND OF HELP. MOREOVER, EACH AGENCY BASICALLY VIEWS THEIR EMERGENCY ROLES AS INDEPENDENT AND AUTONOMOUS. REQUESTS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE -- OF MESSAGES DESCRIBING SUCH ASSISTANCE DID NOT REFLECT A COORDINATED INTERAGENCY EFFORT.

(C) (U) RECOMMENDATION: THE SA AND USD-P SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE TO EDUCATE THE COMMUNITY OF CIVIL AGENCY EMERGENCY PLANNERS WITH REGARD TO ALL ASPECTS OF MACA/MSCD. THE EMERGENCY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS BOARD (EMPB) IS AN EXCELLENT FORUM FOR CONDUCTING SUCH A PROGRAM. A SIMPLE, CLEAR HANDBOOK SHOULD BE PREPARED, IN CONJUNCTION AND COORDINATION WITH FEMA, FOR USE BY CIVIL AGENCY EMERGENCY PLANNERS. FINALLY, PERIODIC MACA/MSCD COORDINATION AND PLANNING MEETINGS SHOULD BE HOSTED BY DOD ON A REGULARLY SCHEDULED BASIS TO ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE WITH CIVIL AGENCY EMERGENCY PLANNERS.

(A) NO SYSTEM FOR TRANSLATING BROAD CIVIL SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS INTO SPECIFIC MILITARY SUPPORT TASKINGS IS CURRENTLY IN BEING.

(A) ISSUE: AN ACCURATE CIVIL REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION AND QUANTIFICATION METHODOLOGY IS NEEDED.

(B) DISCUSSION: CIVIL AGENCIES REQUIRING MILITARY ASSISTANCE TEND TO EXPRESS THAT REQUIREMENT IN TERMS OF NUMBERS AND TYPES OF MILITARY RESOURCES -- 68 BATTALIONS, 6 HELICOPTERS, 12 BULLDOZERS, ETC. REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE STATED IN A FORMAT THAT ALLOWS MILITARY PLANNERS TO DETERMINE AND ASSIGN THE MOST APPROPRIATE AND AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO SATISFY THEM. CIVIL AGENCY PLANNERS HAVE NO TECHNICAL BASIS TO DETERMINE A NEED FOR 68 BATTALIONS, BUT THEY ARE FULLY QUALIFIED TO PROJECT A REQUIREMENT FOR A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF TRAFFIC CONTROL POINTS ALONG PARTICULAR EVACUATION ROUTES ETC. IT IS AGAINST SUCH REQUIREMENTS THAT JUDICIOUS DECISIONS CAN BE MADE BY MILITARY AUTHORITIES.

(C) (U) RECOMMENDATION: DOD SHOULD IDENTIFY THE TYPE OF INFORMATION REQUIRED OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES IN ORDER TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE, APPROPRIATE AND RESPONSIVE MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT. A MACA/MSCD REQUEST FORMAT CAN THEN BE DEVELOPED THAT WILL ENABLE CIVIL AUTHORITIES TO PROVIDE ALL ESSENTIAL INFORMATION NEEDED IN ORDER TO ALLOW SOUND MILITARY SUPPORT DECISIONS.

(5) (U) DURING PERIODS OF MAJOR DOMESTIC EMERGENCY OR RISING

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SESSSED IN THE LIGHT OF THE CURRENT THREAT

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NUCLEAR THREAT THE NEED FOR CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS CIVIL MILITARY  
COORDINATION INCREASES.

(A) ISSUE: THE OVERALL LEVEL AND EFFICIENCY OF THE CIVIL/  
MILITARY INTERFACE DURING EXERCISE IVY LEAGUE WAS INADEQUATE.

(B) DISCUSSION: THERE IS INADEQUATE INTERFACE BETWEEN  
CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES DURING PERIODS OF LIKELY MACA/MSCD  
IMPLEMENTATION. THE ARMY, AS EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR MACA, DOES NOT  
PROVIDE A LIAISON GROUP TO FEMA DURING PERIODS OF EMERGENCY. THE  
TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITIES FROM THE ARMY TO JCS/REDCOM ONLY  
COMPLICATED THE PROBLEM. NOT ONLY WERE CIVIL AUTHORITIES UNAWARE  
THAT SUCH A TRANSFER WOULD OCCUR, BUT ONCE INFORMED THEY EXPRESSED  
DISMAY THAT IT SHOULD OCCUR. SIMILAR INTERFACE PROBLEMS OCCURRED IN  
THE FIELD. FEMA WAS NOT REPRESENTED AT FORSCOM ALTHOUGH FORSCOM/  
ARRED IS THE LEAD AGENT FOR REDCOM DURING MSCD EXECUTION.

(C) (U) RECOMMENDATION: THE SA, USD-P, AND FEMA SHOULD REVIEW  
CURRENT LIAISON GROUP EXCHANGE PLANS TO ENSURE THAT ADEQUATE LIAISON  
IS EFFECTED AT ALL APPROPRIATE LEVELS DURING PERIODS OF LIKELY  
IMPLEMENTATION.

(6) (U) CIVIL AUTHORITIES TURNED TO THE MILITARY FOR EMERGENCY  
MEDICAL SUPPORT DURING THE EXERCISE. HOWEVER, THE ARMY WILL BE  
UNABLE TO PROVIDE SUCH SUPPORT DURING A MAJOR WAR.

(A) ISSUE: DUE TO THE DEPLOYMENT OF LARGE NUMBERS OF CONUS  
BASE HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND THE NECESSITY TO PROVIDE MEDICAL CARE  
FOR A LARGE VOLUME OF RETURNING WAR CASUALTIES THE ARMY MEDICAL  
DEPARTMENT'S ABILITY TO SUPPORT CIVIL AUTHORITIES IS LIMITED.

(B) DISCUSSION: THE USA HEALTH SERVICES COMMAND CONUS  
HOSPITAL SYSTEM DOES NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT OPERATING BEDS TO SUPPORT  
THE EXPECTED HIGH VOLUME OF RETURNING WAR CASUALTIES. AS A RESULT,  
THE ARMY HAS ASKED FOR ASSISTANCE FROM THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY BY  
MEANS OF CIVILIAN-MILITARY CONTINGENCY HOSPITAL SYSTEM (CMCHS)  
RESERVE COMPONENT MEDICAL UNITS THAT HAVE NOT DEPLOYED CAN PROVIDE  
CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES WITH A VERY LIMITED LEVEL OF MEDICAL SUPPORT.  
THESE RESERVE UNITS ARE SEVERELY SHORT OF EQUIPMENT AND PERSONNEL  
AND CAN PROVIDE ONLY OUTPATIENT CARE, MINOR SURGERY AND IN MANY  
CASES ARE REDUCED TO PROVIDING SHELTER AND PATIENT EVACUATION.

(C) (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

-1- OSD(MA) SHOULD CONTINUE TO SEEK AUTHORIZATION TO PRE-  
REGISTER PHYSICIANS AND NURSES FOR THE DRAFT


-2- OSD(MA) SHOULD CONTINUE TO DEVELOP PROCEDURES FOR  
IMMEDIATE USE OF THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION HOSPITAL SYSTEM.

B. CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS IN THE ENVIRONMENT DEPICTED BY  
EXERCISE IVY LEAGUE 82 WAS A MAJOR AREA OF TESTING AND EVALUATION AS  
INDICATED BY THE PERTINENT JCS OBJECTIVES (PARA 21, 22, AND 20, BASIC  
PLAN, REF A). THE EXERCISE REVEALED TWO BROAD CATEGORIES OF INTEREST  
RELATIVE TO CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS NAMELY: RELOCATION STRATEGY,  
AND WARTIME FUNCTIONS AND STAFFING. THESE CATEGORIES OF CONTINUITY  
OF OPERATIONS CONCERNS ARE INDIVIDUALLY ADDRESSED IN THE FOLLOWING  
SUBPARAGRAPHS.

(1) (U) RELOCATION STRATEGY IN ITS TOTALITY NEEDS TO BE REAS-

ACTION J3(5) (A,7,F)  
INFO CJCS(1\*) CJCS(3) SJCS(1) J4(4) J5(2) C3S(5)  
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REALISTIC HQ SURVIVAL PLANS AND PROVIDE FOR RESIDUAL CAPABILITY  
ASSESSMENT AND RECONSTITUTION.

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(2) (U) EXCEPT FOR THE POST ATTACK PERIOD COMMUNICATIONS, THERE  
WAS NOT ENOUGH EXERCISE PLAY IN CONNECTION WITH SIMULATED  
COMMUNICATIONS DEGRADATION AND RESTORATION.

(A) ISSUE: THE SCENARIO DID NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT DETAILED  
INFORMATION ON LOSS OF CONNECTIVITY AND/OR ESTIMATED TIME TO RESTORE  
VITAL COMMUNICATIONS TO THE CONTROLLERS TO RESTRICT COMMUNICATIONS  
TRAFFIC FLOW.

(B) (U) DISCUSSION: A SYSTEMATIC METHOD OF DETERMINING THE  
AVAILABILITY OF COMMUNICATIONS AND ESTIMATED RESTORATION TIME WAS  
NOT AVAILABLE TO CONTROLLERS. FOR EXAMPLE THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT  
COMMUNICATIONS DEGRADE PLAY AS A RESULT OF MAJOR COMMUNICATIONS  
OUTAGE EVENTS SUCH AS LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

[REDACTED]

(C) RECOMMENDATIONS:

- 1- ALL OPTIONS OF FUNCTIONAL BREAKOUT BY THE JCS BE ENUMERATED AND ADDRESSED IN THE COOP AND THEN IMPLEMENTED ACCORDINGLY
- 2- THE JOINT STAFF ASSESS THE MINIMUM NEEDS OF ANY HEAD-QUARTERS ASSUMING THEIR FUNCTIONS IN RECONSTITUTION AND RECOVERY AND DETERMINE THE AUGMENTATION/LIAISON WHICH SHOULD BE PROVIDED TO ALL CANDIDATES FOR THAT ROLE WHEN NUCLEAR ATTACK IS IMMINENT

(3) SECURE VOICE SERVICE CONTINUES TO BE INADEQUATE A4D AT  
TIMES UNREALISTIC.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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(B) (U) DISCUSSION:

[REDACTED]

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(C) (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

[REDACTED]

-2- THE COMMUNICATIONS REQUIREMENTS MUST BE SUPPORTED BY

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PRIORITY  
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RETAIN CRITICAL CIVILIAN OR DEFENSE CONTRACTOR PERSONNEL DURING  
TIMES OF TENSION OR WARTIME

JS 3.3(b)(8)

FM HQ DA WASHDC//DAMO-000-EX//

TO JCS WASHDC //J3 (JED)//

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(4) (U) ADDITIONAL TV COORDINATION LINKS WOULD PROVIDE VALUABLE ASSISTANCE TO STAFF ELEMENTS.

(A) ISSUE: TELEPHONE/RECORD COMMUNICATIONS PROVIDE FOR SLOW INFORMATION DISSEMINATION WITHIN A FAST MOVING SCENARIO.

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATIONS.

(5) THE WMMCCS INTERCOMPUTER NETWORK (WIN) WAS AT TIMES SLOW AND UNRESPONSIVE.

(A) ISSUE: THE WIN SUFFERED SERIOUS THROUGHPUT DEGRADATION AT CRITICAL TIMES DURING THE EXERCISE.

(B) DISCUSSION: THE RESIDUAL CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (RECAS) DATA BASE IS CONTAINED ON THE WMMCCS COMPUTER AT THE ALTERNATE NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER (ANMCC) DURING IVY LEAGUE 82 THE ENTIRE WMMCCS COMMUNITY WORLD WIDE TRIED TO ACCESS RECAS SIMULTANEOUSLY THROUGH THE WIN. THIS CAUSED A COMMUNICATIONS OVERLOAD WHICH MADE THE ANMCC TOTALLY INACCESSIBLE THROUGH WIN AND SERIOUSLY SLOWED THROUGHPUT IN THE ENTIRE NETWORK. HIGH PRECEDENCE INFORMATION REQUIRED EXCESS PROCESSING TIME.

(C) (U) RECOMMENDATIONS THERE ARE FOUR RECOMMENDATIONS, TWO OF WHICH ARE ALREADY BEING ACTED UPON AS FOLLOWS.

-1- (U) IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS HARDWARE ACTION HAS BEGUN ON THIS; NEW INTERFACE MESSAGE PROCESSORS (IMP) ARE TO BE INSTALLED ON OR ABOUT OCT 82.

-2- (U) IMPROVE SOFTWARE THAT CONTROLS THE WIN. ACTION HAS BEGUN ON THIS; NEW SOFTWARE IS TO BE INSTALLED ON 19 APR 82

-3- (U) JCS LOCATE THE RECAS DATA BASE ON ADDITIONAL WMMCCS COMPUTER(S). THIS WOULD SPLIT THE POTENTIAL USERS AND REDUCE OVERLOAD OF WIN AT THE ANMCC AND INCREASE THE SURVIVABILITY OF THE DATA BASE.

-4- (U) AS AN INTERIM ACTION, JCS LIMIT THE NUMBER OF USERS THAT HAVE ACCESS TO THE ANMCC COMPUTER. JUDICIOUS LIMITATION WOULD REDUCE THE TRAFFIC, THEREBY REDUCING OVERLOAD OF WIN AT THE ANMCC.

D. THE RETENTION OF CRITICAL CIVILIAN AND DEFENSE CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEES DURING MOBILIZATION/HOSTILITIES CONSTITUTES A REAL WORLD PROBLEM.

(1) ISSUE: THERE IS NO LEGAL AUTHORITY TO INVOLUNTARILY

E. (U) EVACUATION OF ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR (EPW) CONTINUES TO BE A PROBLEM FOR THE THEATER COMMANDER

(1) (U) ISSUE: CURRENT POLICIES DO NOT PROVIDE FOR THE EVACUATION OF CAPTURED EPW TO CONUS.

(2) (U) DISCUSSION: CURRENT POLICY CALLS FOR THE RETENTION IN THEATER OF ALL EPW CAPTURED BY U.S. FORCES. SINCE MOST OF THE U.S. EPW HANDLING CAPABILITY IS IN THE RESERVE COMPONENTS, THE THEATER COMMANDER MUST DIRECT IN-THEATER FORCES TO THE EPW MISSION AT THE ONSET OF HOSTILITIES. THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN HIGHLIGHTED IN REMEDIAL ACTION PROJECTS (RAPs) FROM PREVIOUS EXERCISES. ACTIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR HOST NATION AGREEMENTS ARE CURRENTLY BEING MADE WITH EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND FOREA. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY AS THE EXECUTIVE AGENCY FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IS DEVELOPING AN EVACUATION POLICY TO MEET ALL CONTINGENCIES.

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:

(A) (U) DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE HOST NATION AGREEMENTS FOR THE HANDLING OF EPW.

(B) (U) DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CONTINUE TO DEVELOP A CONUS

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ACTION J315) (I,M)  
INFO CJCS:(\*) CJCS/J3 SJCS(1) J4(4) J5(2) C3S(5)  
SECDEF:(\*) SECDEF(7) DI-2(1) DIA(1)  
SECTIONAL(1)

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF MESSAGE CENTER

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OSD 3.3(b)(5)

FM HQ DA WASHDC//DAMO-000-EX//

OSD +

Section 6.2 (a)

TO JCS WASHDC //J3 (JED)///

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AIG 7031//

XMT CDR USARJ CPZAMA JAPAN//  
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ARMY 3.3(b)(5)(8)

Section 6.2(a)

SECTION 06 OF 09  
EVACUATION POLICY FOR THE NUMBERS OF EPW WHICH EXCEED HOST NATION  
CAPABILITY.



G. A WARNING SYSTEM FOR NUCLEAR ATTACK ON CONUS WAS NOT  
EXERCISED. THIS ISSUE RELATES TO A JCS EXERCISE OBJECTIVE (PARA 2C,  
BASIC PLAN, REF A)

(1) ISSUE: CIVIL DEFENSE NUCLEAR ATTACK WARNING AND/OR  
NOTIFICATION PROCEDURES WERE NOT PLAYED DURING THE EXERCISE.




(3) RECOMMENDATIONS:

(A) JCS INCLUDE IN THE NEXT EXERCISE WHICH HAS NUCLEAR  
ATTACK PLAY ON CONUS, PROVISIONS FOR TESTING OF THE CIVIL DEFENSE  
NUCLEAR ATTACK WARNING SYSTEM.

(B) JCS PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO THE SERVICES FOR PROCEDURES TO  
BE USED FOR WARNING OF A NUCLEAR ATTACK WHEN THE CIVIL DEFENSE WARN-  
ING SYSTEM IS NOT OPERATIONAL.

H. A LACK OF A RESIDUAL INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT  
PROGRAM WAS IDENTIFIED DURING THE EXERCISE.



ACTION J3(5) (A,7,F)  
INFO CJCS:(\*) CJCS(3) SJCS(1) J4(4) JS(2) CJS(5)  
SECDEF:(\*) SECDEF(7) DI-2(1) DIA(1)

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(3) (U) RECOMMENDATIONS:  
(A) AT SOME POINT DURING MOBILIZATION THE CENSUS CONFIDEN-  
TIAL RESTRICTION ON FEMA RECA DATA SHOULD BE LIFTED AND PROVISIONS  
MADE TO DUPLICATE DATA BASE FILES AT THE VARIOUS EMERGENCY RELOCATION  
SITES.


(B) EFFORTS TO UPGRADE THE QUALITY OF DATA AVAILABLE TO  
PERFORM INDUSTRIAL RECAS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN. AVAILABLE SOURCES OF  
DATA SUCH AS KEY FACILITIES LISTS, THE DLA REGISTER OF PLANNED  
EMERGENCY PRODUCERS, INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS PLANNING FILES AND  
OTHERS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR ADDITION TO THE RECAS DATA BASE

(C) THE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR INDUSTRIAL RECAS BETWEEN THE  
SERVICES, JCS, DOD, AND FEMA SHOULD BE CLEARLY DEFINED AND COMMUNI-  
CATED SO THAT DUPLICATE EFFORTS CAN BE AVOIDED OR ELIMINATED AND  
COMPLIMENTARY EFFORTS CAN BE EXPLOITED

1. (U) A CLEAR LINE OF SUCCESSION TO THE CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS  
OF STAFF (CJCS) HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED

(1) (U) ISSUE: THE CHAIN OF SUCCESSION TO THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF  
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF IS UNCLEAR.

(2) (U) DISCUSSION:



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SECTION 07 OF 09  
BETWEEN THOSE COMMANDERS.

Army 3.3(b)(5)(8)

(G) [REDACTED] BECAUSE OF THE CHAOTIC CONDITIONS THAT ARE LIKELY TO EXIST DURING THE EXECUTION OF CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS PLANS, IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT THE LINES OF AUTHORITY BE WELL DEFINED. ALTHOUGH THE INDIVIDUAL SURVIVORS CANNOT BE PREDICTED, A CLEAR STATEMENT ORDER OF SUCCESSION, BY POSITION, IS NEEDED.

J. (U) THE EXERCISE DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS A NEED FOR A BACKUP SYSTEM FOR RESIDUAL CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT SYSTEM (RECAS). THIS ISSUE RELATES TO A JCS EXERCISE OBJECTIVE (PARA 2C, BASIC PLAN, REF A).

K. (U) LOGISTICS PLAY WAS LACKING FOR THE TRAINING BASE DURING THE EXERCISE. THIS ISSUE RELATES TO A JCS EXERCISE OBJECTIVE (PARA 2M, BASIC PLAN, REF A).

(1) [REDACTED] ISSUE: THE LACK OF LOGISTICS PLAY AFFECTING THE TRAINING BASE WAS APPARENT.

(2) [REDACTED] DISCUSSION: ALTHOUGH SEVERAL ACTIONS WERE GENERATED TO EXERCISE THE LOGISTICS COMMUNITY THERE WAS A DEFINITE LACK OF LOGISTICS PLAY AFFECTING THE TRAINING BASE. ATTENDANCE AT THE JCS (J-4) LOGISTICS FINAL COORDINATION CONFERENCE ON 3-4 FEB 82, INDICATED THAT NO SPECIFIC EVENTS (MSELS) WERE FOCUSED ON THE TRAINING BASE. TRADOC IDENTIFIED ACUTE EQUIPMENT SHORTFALLS AT EXPANDING ARMY TRAINING CENTERS (ATC) (FORTS MOOD AND BLISS) AND OTHER SIGNIFICANT SHORTAGES AND CONCERN FOR REDISTRIBUTION FOR POMCUS UNIT RESIDUAL EQUIPMENT (PURE) ASSETS. WITHOUT ACTIVE PARTICIPATION FROM THE WHOLESALE LEVEL, RECOGNITION OF TRADOC PRIORITIES (AW MOPS, VOL III, AND EXTENSIVE COORDINATION WITH PLAYING INSTALLATIONS, MEANINGFUL LOGISTICS PLAY CANNOT BE EXPECTED.

ACTION J3(5) (A,7,F)  
INFO CJCS:(\*) CJCS(3) SJCS(1) J4(4) J5(2) C3S(5)  
SECDEF:(\*) SECDEF(7) DI-2(1) DIA(1)

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(3) (U) RECOMMENDATION: JCS ENSURE THAT FUTURE EXERCISES OF THIS NATURE RECOGNIZE TRAINING BASE EXPANSION FOR LOGISTICS PLAY.

L. (U) THE NEED FOR RELIEF OF PEACETIME REGULATIONS AND STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS DURING WARTIME IS APPARENT.

(1) [REDACTED] ISSUE: CONSIDERABLE TIME IS LOST IN DETERMINING IF ADMIN RELIEF FROM PEACETIME REGULATIONS/STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS HAS BEEN GRANTED.

(2) [REDACTED] DISCUSSION: A PRESET CONDITION REGARDING RELIEF OR A SEPARATE COMPILATION LIST OF RELIEF WOULD ELIMINATE THE DELAYS CURRENTLY BEING ENCOUNTERED.

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATION: JCS PROVIDE GUIDANCE TO THE SERVICES CONCERNING RELIEF FROM REGULATIONS TO BE GIVEN UPON DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY BY THE PRESIDENT.

M. (U) TOTAL MOBILIZATION PLANNING IS DIFFICULT UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS.

(1) [REDACTED] ISSUE: REQUIREMENTS FOR TOTAL MOBILIZATION HAVE NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED.

(2) [REDACTED] DISCUSSION: TOTAL MOBILIZATION NEEDS TO BE DESCRIBED IN TERMS THAT CAN BE MANAGED BY ARMY AND DOD PLANNERS. REQUIREMENTS BEYOND THE 24 DIVISION FULL MOBILIZATION FORCE ARE LARGELY UNKNOWN. MACOM PLANNERS (TO INCLUDE THOSE OF THE OTHER SERVICES) MUST BEGIN DEVELOPING REQUIREMENTS TO SATISFY TOTAL MOBILIZATION. HOWEVER, THEY ARE HINDERED BY THE LACK OF A CLEAR UNDERSTANDING OF HOW WE WOULD REACH TOTAL MOBILIZATION. THE ATTAINMENT OF TOTAL MOBILIZATION WILL PROBABLY OCCUR IN STEPS OR PHASES. KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROBABLE STEPS WOULD PROVIDE A STANDARD FOR PLANNING AND ENABLE THE DEFINITION OF REQUIREMENTS TO BE MADE IN MANAGEABLE PARTS.

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATION: JCS/DA DEVELOP A MULTI-PHASED PROGRAM FOR REACHING TOTAL MOBILIZATION. THIS STRATEGY WOULD BECOME THE BASIS FOR MACOM PLANNING AND THEIR IDENTIFICATION OF TOTAL MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS.

N. (U) FEMA AND HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT (HUD) NON-INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES (NIF) ALLOCATION PROCEDURES ARE NON-EXISTENT.

(1) [REDACTED] ISSUE: FEMA AND HUD HAVE NOT PUBLISHED ALLOCATION PROCEDURES FOR NIF TYPE PROPERTY.

(2) [REDACTED] DISCUSSION: ALTHOUGH AR 500-10 AND DOD DIR 3005.2 (NON-INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES FOR MOBILIZATION) PREALLOCATE PROPERTY WITHIN DOD, THEY HAVE NO EFFECT ON THE WIDER SCOPE OF NATIONAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION COORDINATED BY FEMA. THE MAIN POINT OF A RESOURCE ALLOCATION SYSTEM IS TO ALLOCATE RESOURCES IN THE BROAD CONTEXT OF THE NATION'S REQUIREMENTS. FEMA AND HUD HAVE NOT PUBLISHED NIF ALLOCATION PROCEDURES.

(3) [REDACTED] RECOMMENDATION: FEMA AND HUD PROCEDURES NEED TO BE

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SECTION 08 OF 09

DEVELOPED -- HQDA CAN COORDINATE CORPS OF ENGINEERS INPUT.

O. (U) AUTHORITY TO REQUISITION FACILITIES IS INCOMPLETE.

(1) (U) ISSUE: DRAFT DEFENSE RESOURCES ACT (DRA) PROVISION ON REQUISITION AUTHORITY RESTRICTS SUCH AUTHORITY TO INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY.

(2) (U) DISCUSSION: THE RESTRICTIONS IN THE DRAFT DRA PREVENT THE USE OF THIS PROPOSED LEGISLATION'S AUTHORITY TO ACQUIRE NON-INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES (NIF).

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATION: FEMA NEEDS TO AMEND DRAFT DRA TO REMOVE RESTRICTION OR DOD DEVELOP ALTERNATIVE LEGISLATION.

P. (U) IDENTIFICATION OF DOD CHANNELS ON REAL ESTATE ACQUISITIONS REQUIRING FEMA APPROVAL IS NEEDED.

(1) (U) ISSUE: IT IS NOT ESTABLISHED THROUGH WHAT CHANNELS A DOD ACTION REQUIRING FEMA APPROVAL SHOULD BE PROCESSED, NOR WHAT OFFICE OF DOD, IF ANY, SHOULD ACT AS POC WITH FEMA FOR OBTAINING APPROVALS.

(2) (U) DISCUSSION: THE EXERCISE USED A CHANNEL THROUGH ARMY COMMAND LEVELS TO FORSCOM AS AN EXPEDIENT TO ULTIMATELY REACH FEMA FOR APPROVAL OF REAL ESTATE ACQUISITIONS. THIS CHANNEL WAS BASED ON TWO OUTDATED REGULATIONS, AR 500-10 (7 NOV 74) AND DOD DIR 3005 C (7 DEC 64). A MORE DIRECT CHANNEL IS NEEDED SINCE CORPS OF ENGINEERS COORDINATION HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN OUTSIDE OF COMMAND CHANNELS FOR REAL ESTATE ACQUISITION. THE CENTRAL DOD OFFICE FOR REAL ESTATE MATTERS HAS BEEN DISSOLVED.

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATION: DOD STUDY FEASIBILITY OF REESTABLISHING A CENTRAL REAL ESTATE FUNCTION FOR NATIONAL LEVEL COORDINATION.

3. (U) IN ADDITION TO THOSE ITEMS ABOVE PERTAINING TO POLICIES AND PROCEDURES THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS ARE SUBMITTED PERTAINING TO THE CONDUCT OF THE EXERCISE IN ITS DESIGN, CONTROL AND LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION.

A. (U) NUMEROUS POSITIVE COMMENTS HAVE BEEN RECEIVED REFERENCE THE TRAINING PROVIDED TO PARTICIPANTS IN IVY LEAGUE.

(1) (U) ISSUE: PLAYER AND CONTROLLER PREPARATION WAS BETTER THAN IT HAD BEEN ON PREVIOUS EXERCISES OF THIS NATURE.

(2) (U) DISCUSSION: TRAINING WAS CONDUCTED BY BOTH JCS AND THE ARMY FOR PARTICIPANTS IN IVY LEAGUE 82. THIS TRAINING WAS DIRECTED AT PLAYERS AT ALL LEVELS AND HIGHLIGHTED IN THE BRIEFEST MANNER POSSIBLE THE INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR THEIR EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE EXERCISE. DETAILED CONTROLLER TRAINING WAS ALSO PROVIDED BY THE ARMY TO THEIR CONTROLLERS ON BOTH THE JCS AND ARMY SCENARIOS.

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATION: THE GENERAL INTEGRATED PROGRAM OF TRAINING FOR EXERCISE PARTICIPANTS GIVEN BY JCS AND THE ARMY BE UTILIZED IN FUTURE EXERCISES.

B. (U) EXERCISE SCHEDULING CONFLICTS EXISTED BETWEEN IVY LEAGUE 82 AND OTHER MAJOR EXERCISES.

(1) (U) ISSUE: MAXIMUM TRAINING VALUE FROM IVY LEAGUE 82 WAS NOT REALIZED IN EUROPE DUE TO TIMING CONFLICT WITH EXERCISE CRESTED EAGLE 82.

ACTION J3(5) (A,7,F)  
INFO CJCS (\*) CJCS(3) SJCS(1) J4(4) J5(2) CJS(5)  
SECDEF (\*) SECDEF(7) OI-2(1) OIA(1)  
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(2) (U) DISCUSSION: ALTHOUGH EXPERIENCE WAS GAINED FROM EXERCISE IVY LEAGUE 82 IT WOULD HAVE BEEN OF MORE VALUE TO USAREUR AND THE ARMY HAD THE EXERCISE BEEN SCHEDULED SO AS NOT TO CONFLICT WITH CRESTED EAGLE 82. CRESTED EAGLE 82 IS A TRADITIONAL NATO EXERCISE THAT REQUIRES FULL USAREUR PARTICIPATION DOWN THROUGH BATTALION LEVEL. IT HAD ALSO BEEN SCHEDULED LONG BEFORE ANY OTHER EXERCISE DURING THE SAME TIME FRAME. THEREFORE USAREUR'S PARTICIPATION IN IVY LEAGUE 82 WAS MINIMAL.

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATION: THAT FUTURE JCS EXERCISES BE COORDINATED SO THAT THEY ARE NOT CONDUCTED AT THE SAME TIME AS A MAJOR AFFCENT EXERCISE.

C. (U) THE LACK OF SENIOR OFFICER PLAYER PARTICIPATION UPON RELOCATION CAUSED EXERCISE ARTIFICIALITIES.

O. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE DEALING WITH THE SENSITIVITY OF IVY LEAGUE RELATED INFORMATION WAS LACKING.

(1) (U) ISSUE: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE WAS RECEIVED BY THE SERVICES AFTER THE SAME INFORMATION HAD APPEARED IN LOCAL NEWSPAPERS.

(2) (U) DISCUSSION: NEWS ARTICLES BY SYNDICATED COLUMNIST JAKE ANDERSON, APPEARED NATIONALLY ON 29 JAN 82 ANNOUNCING THE EXERCISE START DATES AND PART OF THE SCENARIO. ADDITIONALLY DOD CONTINUED TO TREAT THE EXERCISE START DATES AS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. A STORY WHICH HAS RUN IN MAJOR NEWSPAPERS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD IS NO LONGER CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATION: GUIDANCE TO THE FIELD SHOULD HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED WELL IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF THE EXERCISE. RECEIPT OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE PRIOR TO MR. ANDERSON'S PUBLICATION OF HIS BT

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~~SECRET~~ FINAL SECTION OF 09  
ARTICLE WOULD HAVE BEEN BENEFICIAL, ASSUMING ADVANCE KNOWLEDGE OF  
HIS PUBLICATION DATE WAS KNOWN.

E. (U) FIRST IMPRESSIONS REPORT DUE DATES DO NOT ALLOW FOR  
PROPER ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF COMMENTS SUBMITTED FROM THROUGHOUT  
THE ARMY.

(1) (U) ISSUE: FIRST IMPRESSIONS REPORT SUSPENSE DATES ARE  
UNREALISTIC.

(2) (U) DISCUSSION: FIRST IMPRESSION REPORTS WERE DUE AT JCS  
122100Z MAR 82. THE SUSPENSE DATE IMPOSED WAS EXACTLY ONE WEEK AFTER  
THE EXERCISE ENDED. THIS TIME CONSTRAINT DID NOT ALLOW FOR A COM-  
PREHENSIVE REVIEW OF THE EXERCISE AND TO WRITE THE REQUIRED REPORT.

(3) (U) RECOMMENDATION: THAT THE SUSPENSE DATE FOR THE FIRST  
IMPRESSIONS REPORT ON FUTURE EXERCISES BE EXTENDED TO TWO WEEKS AFTER  
CLOSE OF THE EXERCISE.

4. ~~SECRET~~ IN SUMMARY EXERCISE IVY LEAGUE 82 WAS EXACTLY THE BAROMETER  
IT WAS INTENDED TO BE IN THAT IT SURFACED MATTERS INVOLVED IN NUCLEAR  
CONFLICTS REQUIRING DEFINITE ATTENTION BY BOTH THE JOINT STAFF AND  
THE ARMY STAFF. THE ARMY'S EXTENSIVE PARTICIPATION IN THIS EXERCISE  
WAS USEFUL IN EVALUATING OPERATIONS AT ALL LEVELS. IT SHOULD BE EM-  
PHASIZED THAT THE COMMENTS GOVERNING MILITARY SUPPORT TO THE CIVIL  
SECTOR (MACA/MSCD) SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THE CONTEXT OF PLAYERS WHO  
WERE NOT FAMILIAR WITH THESE TYPE REQUESTS, AND EXTREME EXERCISE AR-  
TIFICIALITIES. FURTHER, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THESE COMMENTS AND  
RECOMMENDATIONS ARE INDEED ONLY PLAYER IMPRESSIONS. THE ADDRESSAL  
AT THE JCS AND NCA LEVELS OF THE VERY REAL AND SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS  
OF MILITARY RESOURCE ALLOCATION DURING NUCLEAR ATTACK WAS HOWEVER A  
SIGNIFICANT PLUS OF THIS EXERCISE.

~~SECRET~~ 15 MAR 82  
BT

ACTION J3(5) (I,M)  
INFO CJCS (4) CJCS(3) SJCS(1) J4(4) J5(2) C3S(5)  
SECDEF (4) SECDEF(7) DI-2(1) DIA(1)  
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