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FM USMISSION USNATO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5535
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS PRIORITY
RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 4018
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 5673
BT

15 NOV 78
TOR: 1654
CN: 03027
ACTION: CTB 15
INFO: ~~SECRET~~
SALT/RAMEE
17 W

~~SECRET~~ USNATO 10502

~~EXDIS~~

GENEVA FOR CTB DELEGATION

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~
TAGS: PARM, NATO, US, UR, UK
SUBJECT: NOVEMBER 16 CTB BRIEFING

Office of the Secretary of Defense
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
Date: 04 Dec 2012 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: X Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: _____
MDR: 11 -M- 1359

REFS: (A) STATE 289324, (B) USNATO 9996

1. JOHN EDMONDS, CHIEF UK CTB DEL, WAS FOG-BOUND IN GENEVA AND UNABLE TO ATTEND NOVEMBER 16 NAC. UK REP (KILLICK) THEREFORE SIMPLY CIRCULATED EDMONDS' SPEAKING NOTES (PARA 2 BELOW) AND OFFERED TO SEEK RESPONSES FROM EDMONDS TO ANY WRITTEN QUESTIONS DELEGATIONS MIGHT WISH TO POSE.

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2.
BEGIN TEXT:

COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS
NATO BRIEFING ON 16 NOVEMBER, 1978:
STATEMENT BY MR. EDMONDS,
LEADER OF THE UK CTB DELEGATION

INTRODUCTION:

1. IT IS EXACTLY A YEAR SINCE I LAST HAD THE PRIVILEGE OF REPORTING ON PROGRESS IN THE TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM, THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

2. I BELIEVE THE COUNCIL WAS LAST BRIEFED ON THE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN AMBASSADOR PAUL WARNKE SPOKE TO YOU ON 24 APRIL. THIS HAS BEEN A BUSY YEAR IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE 3 DELEGATIONS MET FOR 9 WEEKS BETWEEN JANUARY AND MARCH, A FURTHER 17 WEEKS BETWEEN MAY AND AUGUST, AND 7 WEEKS HAVE NOW PASSED SINCE THE PRESENT ROUND BEGAN ON 28 SEPTEMBER. THIS MAKES 33 WEEKS OF NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA ALREADY THIS YEAR, ILLUSTRATING BOTH THE COMMITMENT OF THE 3 GOVERNMENTS TO ACHIEVING A TREATY, AND THE COMPLEXITY OF THE ISSUES. THE CTB HAS ALSO BEEN DISCUSSED AT SEVERAL MEETINGS THIS YEAR BETWEEN PRESIDENT CARTER, SECRETARY VANCE AND DR. OWEN ON THE ONE HAND AND MR. GROMYKO ON THE OTHER.

Department of State, AIGIS/IPS/SRP
Change to
(X) Release () Excise () Deny () Declassify
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Declassify after _____
With concurrence of: _____
IPS by [Signature] obtained _____ Date 1.31.12 not obt.

OBJECTIVES:

3. FIRST, I SHOULD LIKE TO SET OUT THE OBJECTIVES OF THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE FULLY SHARED BY THE UNITED STATES. WE WANT TO ACHIEVE A TREATY WHICH WILL HAVE THE FOLLOWING IMPORTANT EFFECTS:

. A. CURB THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS BY THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES WITHOUT ADVERSELY AFFECTING WESTERN SECURITY.

. B. CONTRIBUTE TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS.

. C. SHOW THE WORLD THAT 3 NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES ARE CAPABLE OF GIVING PRACTICAL EFFECT TO THEIR LONGSTANDING COMMITMENT TO GENUINE MEASURES OF ARMS CONTROL.

. D. MAKE A WORTHWHILE CONTRIBUTION TO OUR NON-PROLIFERATION OBJECTIVES BY ATTRACTING THE SUPPORT AND ADHERENCE OF IMPORTANT NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, ESPECIALLY THOSE WHO ARE NOT PARTIES TO THE NPT.

4. WITH THE OBVIOUS DIFFERENCE THAT THEY ARE MORE CONCERNED WITH THEIR OWN SECURITY THAN THAT OF THE WEST, WE BELIEVE THAT THESE OBJECTIVES ARE SHARED BY THE SOVIET UNION.

THE NEGOTIATIONS:

5. I SHOULD NOW LIKE TO SUMMARIZE THE PROGRESS MADE IN THE TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS, AND TO INDICATE THE MAIN ISSUES ON WHICH AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED AND THOSE WHERE IT HAS NOT. I SHALL DEAL IN TURN WITH 3 MAIN SUBJECTS - THE SCOPE OF THE TREATY (THAT IS, WHAT IT WILL BAN), THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ITS VERIFICATION, AND THE MORE IMPORTANT POLITICAL ISSUES.

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THE SCOPE OF THE TREATY:

6. FIRST, WHAT WILL THE TREATY BAN? THE 3 PARTIES HAVE AGREED THAT IT SHOULD BAN ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS IN ALL ENVIRONMENTS. MOREOVER, THEY HAVE AGREED TO ESTABLISH, UNDER A PROTOCOL WHICH WILL BE AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE TREATY, A MORATORIUM ON PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS WHEREBY STATES PARTIES WOULD BE LEGALLY BOUND NOT TO CARRY OUT SUCH EXPLOSIONS, UNLESS AND UNTIL ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE WORKED OUT FOR CONDUCTING THEM WITHOUT MILITARY BENEFITS. THE PROTOCOL WILL HAVE THE SAME DURATION AS THE TREATY. THIS REPRESENTS A CONSIDERABLE CONCESSION ON THE PART OF THE THE SOVIET UNION, WHOSE ORIGINAL POSITION WAS THAT PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS SHOULD BE EXEMPT FROM THE SCOPE OF THE TREATY.

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VERIFICATION:

7. AN EXTENSIVE SET OF VERIFICATION MEASURES HAVE BEEN AGREED. UNDER THESE, THE PARTIES WILL HAVE THE FOLLOWING RIGHTS WHICH WILL GIVE THEM AN ACTIVE ROLE IN VERIFICATION OF THE TREATY:

A. TO USE THEIR NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WITHOUT INTERFERENCE FROM OTHER PARTIES.

B. TO PARTICIPATE IN AN INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA.

C. TO PARTICIPATE IN A COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS WHICH WILL ESTABLISH THE EXCHANGE, REVIEW ITS OPERATION AND CONSIDER IMPROVEMENTS TO IT.

D. TO CONSULT WITH ONE ANOTHER TO RESOLVE QUESTIONS CONCERNING COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY.

E. TO REQUEST AN ON-SITE INSPECTION IF THEY HAVE SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE INDICATING THAT A NUCLEAR EXPLOSION MAY HAVE OCCURRED ON THE TERRITORY OF ANOTHER PARTY. IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE "VOLUNTARY" OR "CHALLENGE" PRINCIPLE, THE REQUESTED PARTY WILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO REJECT THE REQUEST, BUT IT MUST STATE ITS REASONS FOR DOING SO.

F. TO LODGE A COMPLAINT WITH THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL, IF THEY CONCLUDE THAT ANOTHER PARTY IS ACTING IN BREACH OF ITS OBLIGATIONS.

G. TO AGREE TO ADDITIONAL VERIFICATION MEASURES AS BETWEEN THEMSELVES.

8. UNDER THE LAST OF THESE PROVISIONS, THE UK, US AND USSR ARE ALREADY NEGOTIATING A SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT BETWEEN THEIR 3 GOVERNMENTS. THIS WILL COME INTO FORCE ON THE SAME DATE AS THE TREATY AND BE CO-TERMINOUS WITH IT. THE AGREEMENT WILL:

A. SPELL OUT IN GREATER DETAIL THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR REQUESTING AND CONDUCTING ON-SITE INSPECTIONS.

D. PROVIDE FOR THE EXCHANGE OF DATA FROM NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS ON THE TERRITORIES OF THE PARTICIPANTS.

WE ARE CLOSE TO AGREEMENT ON THE PROVISIONS FOR ON-SITE INSPECTION, AND THE RUSSIANS HAVE AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS. HOWEVER, THE 3 DELEGATIONS HAVE NOT YET AGREED UPON THE SPECIFIC ARRANGEMENTS FOR IMPLEMENTING THIS PROVISION.

9. THE US AND UK ARE SEEKING THESE ADDITIONAL MEASURES FOR 3 BASIC REASONS:

A. OUR SECURITY INTERESTS, AS NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, WILL BE MOST DIRECTLY AFFECTED BY A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY.

B. THE LARGE LAND MASS OF THE SOVIET UNION MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR EXTERNAL SEISMIC STATIONS ADEQUATELY TO ACTIVITIES THERE.

C. WE BELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD AGREE TO A LEVEL OF DETAIL IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT WHICH COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED IN THE MULTILATERAL TREATY - A LEVEL WE CONSIDER NECESSARY TO PROTECT THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF THE ENTIRE ALLIANCE.

POLITICAL ISSUES

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10. THE 3 DELEGATIONS HAVE REACHED A LARGE MEASURE OF AGREEMENT ON ALMOST ALL OTHER ISSUES RELATING TO THE TREATY. THE TREATY WILL PROVIDE FOR:

A. AN AMENDMENTS PROCEDURE, WHICH FOLLOWS THE PRECEDENT OF EXISTING ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS.

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B. WITHDRAWAL ON THE GROUNDS OF SUPREME NATIONAL INTEREST.

C. ITS ENTRY INTO FORCE UPON RATIFICATION BY 20 GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING THOSE OF THE 3 NEGOTIATING PARTNERS.

D. A REVIEW CONFERENCE.

11. THE IMPORTANT OUTSTANDING AND RELATED ISSUES ARE THE DURATION OF THE TREATY AND THE TERMS OF REFERENCE OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE. ON 2 NOVEMBER 1977, THE RUSSIANS PROPOSED A TREATY, WHICH WOULD AUTOMATICALLY TERMINATE AT THE END OF 3 YEARS, UNLESS ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES HAD ADHERED. THE UK AND US COULD NOT ACCEPT THIS AND THE RUSSIANS HAVE MODIFIED THEIR POSITION. THEY NOW PROPOSE THAT IN CONSIDERING EXTENDING THE TREATY, THE REVIEW CONFERENCE SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT TESTING BY NON-PARTIES, AND THAT THIS WOULD BE REFLECTED IN THE TREATY TEXT. THE UK AND US POSITION HAS ALSO BEEN MODIFIED. IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANT SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN, WE BELIEVE THAT THE TREATY SHOULD BE, IN EFFECT, A TRIAL PERIOD AND CONSEQUENTLY THAT THE TREATY HAVE A FIXED INITIAL DURATION. WHILE NO FINAL DECISION HAS YET BEEN TAKEN ON HOW LONG THIS INITIAL DURATION SHOULD BE, WE ARE CURRENTLY WORKING ON THE BASIS OF 3 YEARS. WE CONSIDER, HOWEVER, THAT ALL PARTIES SHOULD HAVE A ROLE IN DECIDING, AT A REVIEW CONFERENCE TOWARDS THE END OF THE TREATY'S TERM, WHAT SHOULD FOLLOW. WE BELIEVE THAT STATES WILL BE INFLUENCED BY A VARIETY OF FACTORS IN REACHING A DECISION. THESE FACTORS COULD INCLUDE:

A. THE STATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS, INCLUDING THE MILITARY BALANCE.

B. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS.

C. IN THE CASE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES PARTIES, THEIR EXPERIENCE IN MAINTAINING THEIR NUCLEAR STOCKPILES WITHOUT NUCLEAR TESTING.

D. THE TREATY'S CONTRIBUTION TO NON-PROLIFERATION.

E. FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW, THE CONSEQUENCES OF ANY TESTING BY NON-PARTIES.

PROSPECTS:

12. IT IS ALWAYS DIFFICULT TO FORECAST WHEN NEGOTIATIONS OF THIS KIND WILL BE COMPLETED. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT ON MANY ISSUES, SOME OF THE OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS

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STILL REQUIRE A LOT OF WORK, INCLUDING WORK IN OUR CAPITALS. MY PERSONAL OPINION IS THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COMPLETE THE TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS BY MARCH 1979. IN PRACTICE IT MAY TAKE A LITTLE LONGER BUT I SHOULD BE SURPRISED IF WE HAD NOT ACHIEVED AGREEMENT ON THE ESSENTIALS BY THEN. I THEREFORE EXPECT THAT THE US AND UK WILL WISH TO REPORT PROGRESS TO OUR NATO ALLIES QUITE FREQUENTLY IN THE EARLY PART OF THE YEAR.

END TEXT. GLITMAN

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