

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 01 2014

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CLASSIFICATION

Handwritten notes:
Hush up here
SecDef
already
(12)

WASH FAX COVERSHEET
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
CABLES

JS 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)

N

TIME TRANSMITTED (LOCAL)

TIME RECEIVED (LOCAL)

FROM: [REDACTED] OFFICE/DESK: OSD/CCB PHONE NBR: [REDACTED]
 SUBJECT: TRIP REPORT FAX NBR: [REDACTED]
 DELIVERY INSTRUCTIONS: PAGES: 5
 (including cover)
 XX HOLD FOR NORMAL DUTY HOURS/ROUTINE
 IMMEDIATE/URGENT

NOTE: Furnish after duty hour contact telephone number for each addressee requiring after duty hour delivery.

TRANSMIT TO

AGENCY	INDIVIDUAL (NAME)	OFFICE	ROOM NBR	PHONE NBR
CENICOM	GEN. ABIZAID	COMMANDER		
CPA (Iraq)	J. BREMER			

REMARKS: X03706 / 03
For Cables: Return copy of transmission receipt to OSD/CCB. - NO FURTHER DISTRO NECESSARY

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. 552
 Chief, RDD, FSD, WHS
 Date 01 DEC 2014 Authority: EO 13526
 Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
 Declassify in Part: X
 Reason: 1.4(a)(1) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(2), (6)
 MDR: 11-M-1800

WASH FAX OPERATOR [REDACTED]
SECDEF CABLES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ^{OSD} 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)
CLASSIFICATION

R-5
11-M-1800

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 21, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Gen. Pete Pace
Doug Feith
Jerry Bremer
Gen. John Abizaid

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 01 2014

FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*

SUBJECT: Trip Report

Attached is a trip report from Les Brownlee that is worth seeing.

Thanks.

Attach.

10/15/03 SecArmy memo to SecDef re: Trip Report, Visit to Iraq, Kuwait, Germany 22-29
September 2003

DHR:dh
102103-6

.....
Please respond by _____

X03706 / 03

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
DOCUMENT BECOMES UNCLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date:

DEC 01 2014



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFO MEMO

15 October 2003, 1:30 PM

FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

FROM: Acting Secretary of the Army, Les Brownlee

Brownlee Oct 16, 2003

SUBJECT: Trip Report, Visit to Iraq, Kuwait, Germany 22 - 29 Sep 03

I traveled to the CENTCOM area of responsibility during the period 22 - 29 September 2003 (itinerary attached). Key observations are presented below.

Iraq

- There has been significant progress in quality of life for our troops since my visit in June. All soldiers are now receiving hot meals, adequate water, and most are in climate-controlled shelters. All Army units have developed morale and welfare activities, and the recently initiated Rest and Recuperation program has been very well received.
- Although not reflected in media accounts, substantial progress is being made in reconstructing Iraq - especially in the northern regions. Children are attending school; businesses are starting to operate; hospitals are functioning. Challenges remain with electricity generation and transmission and oil production, but the newly established Task Force Restore Iraqi Electricity and Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil are synchronizing their efforts and will make a difference.
- The role of the Reserve components remains critical to our success. Guard and Reserve forces are performing magnificently, and are making enormous sacrifices. I spoke to soldiers of the 53d Infantry Brigade forces from the Florida National Guard. They are extraordinary professionals! While many of them face grave challenges at home, all expressed a willingness and commitment to complete their mission. Nevertheless, the Army staff will re-double their efforts in evaluating the mission and need for replacements of our reserve units and try to send them home as soon as possible.
- I met with officials responsible for the U.S. information campaign in Iraq and came away surprised that more had not been done. A more creative, robust program could, I believe, assist in winning and maintaining Iraqi support for coalition efforts and reduce stress and danger to our troops. The first 3 months of effort appeared to produce little and continues now on a modest scale with inadequate resources. Production facilities and equipment do not exist. The television, radio, and satellite markets appear to have had marginal impact

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

up to this point. Therefore, the U.S./coalition message does not appear to be reaching the Iraqi people in ways that could have significant impact. I believe the overall success of the CPA and CJTF-7 could be measurably enhanced with a first class, imaginative, well-resourced program. (Since I returned, Ambassador Bremer called to say he agrees that they need more resources. He indicated that he needs an additional \$250M for equipment and \$150M for operations.)

- I met with MG Eaton and several prospective officers and soldiers of the New Iraqi Army. Despite MG Eaton's best efforts, I left with concerns regarding this program. While it may be too early to judge, I am concerned that eight weeks of training per battalion will not change the culture and lack of leadership of the forces. Accelerating the training of 9 brigades of the new Iraqi Army may not yield a viable force by September 04, and as these units are released to integrate with coalition forces, CJTF-7's resources will be strained to continue the Iraqi Army's training.
- Army commanders report that they are conducting effective training for local police forces, civil defense, border guards and facilities protection personnel. Properly equipping these forces is recognized as equally important as training and organizing. //
- As noted above, significant successes have been achieved, especially at the local and regional level as a result of the work of commanders on the ground. In contrast, CPA does not appear adequately staffed to achieve their mission. Either the scope of CPA's task needs to downsize and resources released to CENTCOM, or CPA's manning must increase to the full authorization allowed by the Joint Manning Document. Additionally, CPA's rotation of their personnel every 3-6 months impacts continuity. (This issue now appears to be overcome by other events and approaches within the administration.)
- Commanders with whom I spoke believe they have adequate forces to accomplish their current missions, but that additional international forces in the field might tend to dispel Iraqi perception of a "U.S. occupation." Most commanders indicated that they did not believe they could get by with fewer forces now, but might be able to do so by mid year next year. //
- The Army continues to rebalance and adjust within current strength levels and force structure to meet theater requirements as well as examining how the Army might cope effectively with potential long-term implications of continued instability and violence in Iraq, Afghanistan, or some other contingency.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 01 2014

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Kuwait

JS 1.4(a)(b)



I recognize the above notes are quite cryptic. I look forward to discussing these matters with you directly and will seek to arrange a time when you are available to do so.

COORDINATION: NONE

Attachment:
As Stated

Prepared by:

JS 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~