

XI 436 134-01

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Review by SIO/IDO DAN/DIA on 23 Sep 11. No DIA objection to declassification.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: NOV 24 2014

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: July 25, 2003

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

OSD 1.4 (d)

SUBJECT: What to Call the So-Called "Sunni Triangle"

Don,

[REDACTED] the Turks call it the "Devil's Triangle."

That might be a good phrase for us to adopt. [REDACTED]

Office of the Secretary of Defense 5 U.S.C. 552
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS +
Date: 24 NOV 2014 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: X
Reason: 1.4(d) + 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(2), (b)
MDR: 11 -M- 2603

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Date: NOV 24 2014

Cc: GEN John Abizaid
LTG Ricardo Sanchez
AMB Paul Bremer
Clay McManaway
Larry DiRita

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11-M-2603

031016-31

October 14, 2003

TO: Gen. Dick Myers
CC: Gen. John Abizaid
Jerry Bremer
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith
FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *DR*
SUBJECT: Sunni Triangle


Page determined to be Unclassified
Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: NOV 24 2014

Attached is an e-mail from a person on the ground in Iraq with some strong views.

It is worth reading and thinking about.

OSD
5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6)

Thanks.

Attach.  e-mail to James Schlesinger re: Report from Sunni Triangle

DHR:ah
101-403-17

.....
Please respond by 10/31/03

Subject: Fwd: Report from Sunni Triangle
Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2003 13:58:42 -0400
From: [REDACTED]
To: Schlesinger James R. [REDACTED]

✓
10/14

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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
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The Marines should be sent into the toughest area ASAP.
Begin forwarded message:

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5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2), (6)

Original Message
From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Monday, September 29, 2003 10:34 AM
To: Schlesinger James R. [REDACTED]
Subject: Report from Sunni Triangle

Below is a sobering report from a friend who is a Foreign Service officer and a major in the Army's Special Forces

Dear [REDACTED]

I spent a week in Baghdad and then a week in the Shia heartland in Hillah and finally landed six weeks ago as Ambassador Bremer's Governance Coordinator in Ramadi, southern piece of the Sunni Triangle. I worked with the 3d ACR for four weeks and am now with the 82d Fascinating assignment, but the most consistent danger I have experienced. These IEDs and RPG attacks are psychologically worse than combat and are taking a toll on the troops. While it is statistically improbable that one will be hit, they remain menacing, especially for those of us that have been through an attack

Difficult to establish ground truth here, because of the diversity from North to Center to South. It certainly is a different world in Najaf and Karbala than what we experience here with the angry Sunnis. Marines in Karbala [REDACTED] and his battalion -- did really incredible work

All depends on whether one is a winner or a loser in the new Iraq I suppose. The game is to expand the realm of winners so they squeeze out the operating space of the losers, but I have to say that in my neighborhood we are losing that fight, as the bad guys are playing a contrary game with some effectiveness. Fallujah has a level of rage that I haven't seen since Mogadishu and I would have to guess is right at the tipping point of a wholesale revolt. The problem is we lost so much time that we are now playing a desperate game of catch up, and it may be too late

I think we have six months here, and whatever we accomplish in six months is what we will be able to do. We can stay around through pure force, but Iraq will be set in the next half year and if we are still in the muddle we are in now I think we will have completely lost the initiative.

It is all about power (electoral power), police, and political process, and if we can deliver on those three, we could still make this work. But we need a surge on all three, not the little of this little of that kind of approach we have had to date. I still find the police program maddening for its lack of focus and the inability five months into this to have something in place that would be producing a quality force

During the Cold War America employed a "we pay, you fight" policy of national defense, using proxies to wear the Soviet Union down on its behalf. This evolved during Gulf I to a "you pay, we fight" policy, as wealthy Arab sheikhs and Asian oil consumers financed the U.S.-led expulsion of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. We have now adopted a "we pay, we fight" policy, as around the globe America is doing it all, and paying for it all. It is a policy that is wearing us down, made all the worse by the ready availability of allies that have not been fully empowered to enter the fight

2013 7111

A quality Iraqi police force, properly armed and equipped, could take over many of the risky jobs American soldiers are performing, such as keeping the roads cleared of improvised explosive devices and controlling the borders that are reportedly being infiltrated by terrorists. Police in Iraq could be employed for \$2 per day. But they are not being employed in anything close to the numbers that are needed, and those that are on the beat, are shabbily armed and largely untrained.

Forming quality security forces in a hurry has been done before. In 1983 President Reagan made a determination to stop the advance of FMLN guerrillas in El Salvador. Over a period of four months the entire Salvadoran junior officers corps was brought to the United States for basic officer's training, while whole battalions were brought to bases in the U.S. and Honduras for unit training. A newly empowered Salvadoran Army took to the field and rapidly nursed the tide, leading the country into peace talks in 1989 and to a full participatory democracy that included the country's former guerrilla foes thereafter.

Iraq needs a proficient and well-equipped police force in a hurry so that our soldiers can go home -- for our sake, and for Iraq's sake, since our welcome is quickly wearing out.

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5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(2)



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