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ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE

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Mr. Zablocki: Professor Kirkpatrick testified before this subcommittee that the role played by the intelligence community in the formation of policy is established by the President. Please comment.

Dr. Collins: (U) This is correct. The intelligence community provides intelligence to policy makers on a continuing basis, tailoring products to their needs in regard to timeliness, detail, and subject. The intelligence community supports and/or participates in NSC activities in accordance with Presidential DIRECTIVE. The DIA supports both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, JCS.

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FOREIGN POLICY CRISES

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Mr. Zablocki: In what ways is the intelligence community structured to be a predictor of impending foreign policy crises? Is fulfilling this role of predictor more a structural problem within the community or an attitudinal one on the part of the consumers?

Dr. Collins: This is a major responsibility of the U.S. Intelligence Community and as such, a major portion of the structure is dedicated to this function. Through such things as Alert Memoranda, National Intelligence Estimates and Interagency Intelligence Memoranda, the community attempts to predict trouble spots. The accomplishment of this function is influenced both by intelligence intro - community factors and attitudinal coordination among consumers. Structural problems within the community are minimal. Through some years of experience, professionalism, improved procedures and communications, and support among the intelligence community, these problems have become less burdensome and in many instances, they are resolved through standard operating procedures. The facilitation of analyst-to-analyst contact through facsimile transmissions, secure telephone lines, and increased personal association has promoted commonality of understanding of events and appreciation of problems. An intensive effort has been made to enhance the effectiveness of the Indications and Warning (I&W) function through introduction of methodology systems and exercises encompassing a community-wide and DoD wide effort which continues to be ongoing. Attitudinal factors among consumers are inevitably influenced by operational and policy considerations. Usage of the Key Intelligence Requirements (KIRs) has been helpful in assisting many high level DoD consumers formulate their intelligence needs in terms of anticipation of international developments. A much closer producer - consumer rapport and a better understanding of intelligence capabilities in recent years has been important in surmounting attitudinal factors which had served to dilute effectiveness of intelligence.

*Multiple Sources
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POLICIES EFFECTING ANALYSES

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Mr. Zablocki: How are analysts kept informed of U.S. policies which effect their analyses? Is it working? Is it any different than in the past?

Dr. Collins: (U) Analyst are kept informed of U.S. policies through various written and verbal means. For example, National Intelligence Topics (NITs), issued by the Policy Review Committee of the NSC, articulate national level policy maker's intelligence requirements, which are reflective of current national policy. Key Intelligence Requirements (KIRs), issued by the Secretary of Defense, articulate DoD policy maker's intelligence requirements, which are reflective of current DoD policy. In addition, priority intelligence requirements levied in writing by policy makers also reflects U.S. policies. Verbally, policy feeds back through debriefing attendees at NSC meetings, through ISA staff actions, etc. This in turn, filters to analysts through DIA management. Individual analysts also work extensively with their counterparts in the community and through this informal network are kept apprised of current policy thinking. DIA encourages more direct contact between the analysts and consumers thru face to face briefings (NSC staff members, OSD, JCS, etc.). Often direct written analysis tasking is a result of direct feedback from the policy maker. There is very little difference than in the past, although U.S. policy dissemination is more open, direct and effective.

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COLLECTION METHODS

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Mr. Zablocki: Do you believe the agency is relying too heavily on technology rather than human intelligence to do the job, as some critics have contended?

Dr. Collins: No. Intelligence producers rely on all types of information and data to perform analysis. Reliance on a particular collection resource is governed by a number of factors: (1) whether there is access or denial to a country, its resources, and its people; (2) what type of intelligence requirement is levied on the agency by consumers; and (3) what type(s) of intelligence collection assets are available. Human intelligence offers advantages of gaining perceptions and intentions, and access to certain types of material which are not attainable by technical means. For example, in certain areas, such as S&T intelligence on small tactical systems, the only way to acquire the data is from HUMINT or exploitation. Similarly, we can learn of government policies, military intentions, doctrine and tactics, and a host of other very important matters best from human sources. I would say that we must have the technical means plus greatly strengthened human source collection.

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HISTORY OF CIA

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Mr. Zablocki: In the History of the CIA prepared by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the concern is raised that during the communication and exchange necessary for analysts to calibrate, anticipate and respond to policy makers never really developed. How is the community presently structured insofar as communication and exchange of intelligence with senior policy makers?

Dr. Collins: Within the Department of Defense, the Director, DIA is the contact for communication and exchange of intelligence. Lt Gen Tighe is responsive to the DoD policy maker, ensuring that products are of greatest value to key personnel in the policy arena.

In late 1977, the DIA established a Director's Staff Group, at the direction of the Secretary of Defense to provide tailored intelligence support to the OSD policy level. Personnel maintain direct personal contact with OSD leadership and their staffs -- to anticipate requirements, determine needs of leadership, respond to those needs. The full spectrum of views is provided, to include the views of other agencies, as appropriate.

In addition, the Defense Intelligence Officers (DIOs), who are appointed for specific geographic or functional areas, have as a primary responsibility, the duty to personally assist the Vice Director for Foreign Intelligence (VF) in the identification and evaluation of the needs of key intelligence users. For this purpose, they maintain close personal contact with both OSD and JCS consumers. They also host specific conferences with consumers on problems of concern. These conferences with such organizations as ISA provide immediate feedback on consumer needs and explain analytical problems and limitations upon satisfying requirements.

To support the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), the Directorate for JCS Support (JS) maintains close daily relationships with all offices of the organization and insures prompt and responsive DIA participation and support in intelligence matters. They provide intelligence staff support to the OJCS by producing all-source DoD and National level current/indication and warning intelligence, operating the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) on a 24-hour basis, providing intelligence support and personnel to the National Military Command Center (NMCC), establishing and staffing Task Force operations during crisis situations, and supporting reconnaissance programs.

DIA also reaches senior policy makers through a daily (5 days per week) current intelligence briefing for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and a weekly briefing for the Secretary of Defense. Numerous key officials of the DoD are also briefed on current intelligence.

All-source DIA publications are produced on a 24-hour basis and disseminated to many high level users. Primary focus is on the Intelligence Notices (DINs), Warning Appraisals, Intelligence Appraisals and Defense Intelligence Estimative Briefs are produced to aid the policy maker.

DIA responds to senior policy makers' needs through memoranda prepared by the Intelligence Community and the Department of Defense.

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CONCEPT OF MULTIPLE ADVOCACY

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Mr. Zablocki: Some argue that the concept of multiple advocacy maximizes exposure of dissent analysis to policy makers. Do you agree or disagree? On the negative side, does it not highlight ambiguity and result in the policy maker relying more upon his pre-conceptions than the facts?

Mr. Collins: In the area of general intelligence, the exposure of dissent ~~analysis~~ does not need to highlight ambiguity; it may very well serve to sharpen a policy maker's awareness of such circumstance. Further, the analytic process is designed to present facts and assessments objectively as possible; and, in the course of so doing, should not create an atmosphere which would compel the policy maker to rely upon his preconceptions.

Estimative intelligence, on the other hand, can rarely be based on "facts", but rather need to examine every possible eventuality of problem. Judgments are weighted in estimative analysis, and the policy maker is free to rely on his preconceptions, meshed with the weight of these considered judgments in view.

In the scientific and technical intelligence area ambiguity can be resolved only through additional data or additional research and analysis. As long as the ambiguity persists it must be accepted by the policy maker and recognized in his decisionmaking.

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AMBIGUITY

Mr. Zablocki: Based on your experiences, does the drive for more and more data tend to resolve ambiguity or compound it by virtue of enabling the policy to maker to use the data which correspond to his preconceptions? Is there any way out of this dilemma in an organizational context or is simple awareness and common sense the best managerial tool?

Dr. Collins: More qualitative and quantitative data, both in the general and S&T intelligence field tends to eliminate ambiguity.

However, the intelligence manager cannot prevent a policy maker from using data in a manner which corresponds to his preconceptions. This is not necessarily a dilemma for the intelligence manager. The managers responsibility is to develop the best measure of collection resources, employ highly qualified analysts, and present assessments to meet consumer needs that are as comprehensive and as objective as possible. Through reliable analysis and reporting, analysis and reporting, the intelligence manager presents to the policy maker as clear a picture of a situation as possible. Common sense and awareness are essential components of good management; however, by providing to the policy maker a thorough understanding of a situation, he is better equipped to appreciate the circumstances in his policy making process.

An organization structure will not influence how the policy maker uses the intelligence provided him.

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INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION PROCESS

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Mr. Zablocki: Is the nature of the intelligence production process more oriented toward community consensus or competition? What kind of implications does this have on production and on policies and for the policy makers?

Dr. Collins: Although the process generally leads to consensus, consensus and competition are not necessarily exclusive. The intelligence process does not force you to have either one or the other. In fact, both competition and consensus exist, not only between agencies, but also within individual agencies as well. For example, some scientific products present divergent views, although on the whole, the S&T community is pretty much in agreement. DIA's effort has been strongly directed toward research and methodology which produces a convincing case and thus leads toward community consensus.

Policies are based on many factors, including intelligence. The policy maker views intelligence through his own perceptions, taking what he views as the most reasoned and convincing evidence at his disposal and downplaying apparently spurious data. Thus, the policy maker himself looks for some sort of consensus in his intelligence. This is not to say that divergent views cannot be presented -- they can and are given exposure.

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QUALITY OF COLLECTION

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Mr. Zablocki: Given the fact that more data is now collected, does this necessarily mean an improved product? Or, is it the reverse?

Dr. Collins: The mere fact of greater quantity does not necessarily mean an improved product, nor does it connote a poorer product. Assuming the quality of this new data is acceptable the main consideration is that analytical resources must be matched to the volume of the product. Unless there is a sufficient allocation of personnel and equipment resources to conduct effective analysis, the data collected and systems employed in its collection are inefficiently used.

Within the S&T community more data does not necessarily mean an improved product, assuming that a "critical mass" of data is available. Given the availability of adequate data, another important factor is the availability of the necessary resources to perform good indepth analysis which gives high confidence in the results. This means adequate numbers of qualified analysts with the requisite engineering, scientific and technical expertise to perform the required analysis and adequate external assistance contract support in those cases where it is needed.

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COLLECTION CAPABILITY

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Mr. Zablocki: One area of intelligence that has sustained the greatest change as a result of the technological revolution is in collection capability. How do you address this enormous wealth of information and process and evaluate it in such a way that it is useful to policy makers? What has happened to the human intelligence capability as the technological capability has burgeoned? What mechanisms are established to meld human intelligence activities with the vast quantity of data from technological systems into a useful relevant document?

Dr. Collins: The intelligence process is governed by national level requirements and priorities on the intelligence community's collection and production resources. The wealth of information collected from technical resources (governed by priorities) is processed and evaluated consonant with those priorities. The balance of our intelligence process -- production of finished intelligence and dissemination -- are similarly governed to meet consumer requirements. When the needs of policy makers change to meet a changing world situation, our intelligence process is responsive.

In the area of current intelligence [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Each report is evaluated as it crosses an analyst's desk and it may be translated into a DIN, Appraisal, CJCS Briefing or other suitable intelligence product depending upon the analyst's assessment of the data and its source.

One problem area is lack of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This situation will not be corrected until substantial numbers of [REDACTED]

The human intelligence capability has diminished but, interestingly, has become a more effective component in the intelligence process as a consequence of the technological revolution. More than ever, the human factor must be relied upon to exercise judgment over the validity and quality of data collected and to assess its significance. Sophisticated equipment can assist this process but cannot supplant the human mental capacity. Moreover, the technology again has in many ways freed the analyst from routine clerical filing and makes possible more analyst time on the substantive aspects of intelligence work.

Our analysts must work with all sources of data in order to develop their various products. The analyst receives -- among other resources -- photography, intelligence information reports, messages, open source reports, SIGINT derived data, as well as human intelligence in order to feel confident that he has all necessary information for the preparation of his reports.

From an operational or systems view point, the ADP systems allow the analyst to integrate all forms of intelligence. [REDACTED]

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disciplines and/or search across the spectrum of intelligence for supporting/negatory information. The most important aspect of these ADP systems are the ability of the analyst to search -- by keywords or functions -- intelligence reports in an expeditious manner.

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DCI ROLE

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Mr. Zablocki: The DCI is often a bearer of bad news, or complicated or uncertain analysis. Are policy makers aware of this and do they understand this role?

Dr. Collins: Policy makers are aware of and understand the role but do not necessarily appreciate the DCI bears the "responsibility" for real or imagined intelligence failures almost exclusively, i.e., disregarding that national policies and fiscal decisions dictate allocation of intelligence resources and there simply are not enough resources (production, collection or support) left to treat all geographic areas and functional disciplines (order of battle, terrain, economic, transportation, etc.) equally. The DCI must work with what he has.

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INTERSERVICE INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS

Mr. Zablocki: On interservice intelligence products what steps are taken to coordinate divergent viewpoints and to represent dissent from prevalent opinions or findings?

Dr. Collins: The use of substantive footnotes in interservice products allows dissenting opinions, to include alternate text, to be presented. This also applies in interagency documents, such as National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs).

Every scheduled Defense Department S&T product and many unscheduled ones which have particular significance are reviewed by DIA for substantive correctness, accuracy of data and validity of conclusions. About 10 percent of these products are approved by DIA and are published under a DIA cover; the remainder, if DIA has no objections, are published by the Services. During the course of drafting and review, all possible efforts are made to resolve divergent viewpoints by seeking out more data and conducting more research and analysis. When divergent views cannot be resolved they are included in the executive summary so that they will not escape the attention of the reader.

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MAJOR WEAK POINTS IN DIA

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Mr. Zablocki: What are the major organizational and procedural weak points in DIA? What, if anything, is being done to correct these? At what cost to other parts of the system?

Dr. Collins: There is no "optimum" organization, all have weaknesses. Organizational design, however, is driven by satisfaction of objective. Our current organization emphasizes responsiveness: DIA organization was built to provide maximum support to consumers.

One possible "cost" of external responsiveness is the complication of internal coordination. The dispersal of various DIA elements in some cases in antiquated facilities, reduces effective coordination, in addition to defeating employee morale. Another problem which we face is stabilizing our cadre of analysts to "professionalize" our analytical work force. Rotation and promotion often rob us of talented personnel after they have been in the analytical ranks. Naturally, we try to keep our people as long as we can and provide them career incentives to remain in place. One means is through the Career Ladder, which identifies personnel who are deserving of promotion, and allows them to progress to the GS-16 level without entry into management or assuming management responsibilities. This approach does not present any costs to other parts of the system.

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DIA RESPONSES

Mr. Zablocki: What is the timeliness of DIA responses: (1) in crisis; (2) to requests for straightforward information?; (3) to requests for broader analyses?

Dr. Collins: The responsiveness of DIA to crises environments and the generated requirements has significantly improved since the establishment of the new Alert Center in March 1977. The secure phone systems, messages and the provided the Alert Center/DIA with round-the-clock secure transmission capabilities. While the ADP systems in the Center provide the data necessary to fulfill crises requirements. The Indications Communications (INDICOM) network

provides virtually instantaneous communications. It was used quite successfully in May 1978 to support

It has proven to be a viable means of exchanging intelligence during these two crises and the other major crises which have occurred since mid-1978.

The inception in the mid-1970's of the has significantly upgraded the timeliness and quality of intelligence produced to the consumer. The transmission of the has allowed DIA to provide intelligence on an as needed recurring basis, not tied to a once a day, bulk reportin vehicle.

Responses of substantive information are normally handled by the production divisions in the form of Responses to Requests for Intelligence (prepared format) to OSD and JCS requesters or by message to others. If an Intelligence Task Force (ITF) is in being, these responses are prepared by individuals assigned therein. These responses are in most instances completed within a few minutes to a few hours, depending upon the scope of the query. Responses to changes in distribution (adding or deleting) is normally completed within a few minutes (for messages) and a few hours for hard copy products.

To requests for straightforward information: As with crises support, response time to non-crisis requirements has significantly increased due to the improved Alert Center facility. There are however, some in DIA accomplishing crisis missions in a timely fashion.

While little problem exists during normal duty hours, release becomes a major problem for other organizations during non-duty hours. Often these agencies must contact a reports officer or desk officer

To requests for a broader analysis: Dispersion of DIA Analytical Elements: A broad ranging or in-depth request would normally be answered by the VP elements (DB, DE, DT). When received in the Pentagon, these requests must be sent to VP elements, who then may have to coordinate (internally) the answer. Such coordination sometimes in-

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CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE

Mr. Zablocki: How do you feel strengthened Congressional oversight of intelligence has affected your activities? What particular costs and benefits can you cite?

Dr. Collins: The two oversight committees represent an improvement over previous methods of congressional oversight. It is our view that the oversight process could be improved by having all congressional committee requests come through these committees, if possible. The costs of oversight have been negligible and we have seen benefits: 190 additional personnel have been hired on to augment our coverage of the Third World.

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Dr. Collins: I feel that the legislation should be revised to include repeal of Hughes/Ryan amendment. We should report to the two intelligence committees, but without restrictive conditions of prior notification, and whatever new language is devised should become part of Charter legislation, particularly under conditions of the War Powers Act when the President may place covert actions under DoD. In such conditions, statutory requirements for prior notification restricts Presidential flexibility and endangers lives.

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C. Clark, John A. Clark, and Edward M. Collins def House
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THE ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN FOREIGN POLICY

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 8, 1980

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U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on International
Security and Scieicific Affairs,
of the
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, D.C.

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AND SECURITY REVIEW (DFOISR-PA)
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The subcommittee met, pursuant to other business, in executiv session, at 11:08 a.m., in Room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, the Hon. Clement J. Zablocki (chairman of the subcommitt presiding.

Present: Representatives Zablocki, Quayle, Fountain, Winn, Broomfield and Lagomarsino.

Chairman Zablocki. The subcommittee will resume its hearings in executive session.

Does Dr. Spiers or Dr. Collins or Mr. Clarke wish to comment?

Perhaps we should proceed with Mr. Clarke's testimony.

STATEMENT OF BRUCE C. CLARKE, JR., DIRECTOR, NATIONAL FOREIGN ASSESSMENT CENTER, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; ACCOMPANIED BY RICHARD LEHMAN, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

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STATEMENT OF:nt'l Sec
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1
2
3 Bruce C. Clarke, Jr.
4 Director, National Foreign Assessment Center,
5 Central Intelligence Agency;

1

accompanied by

6 Richard Lehman,
7 Chairman, National Intelligence Council

8 Hon. Ronald Spiers,
9 Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
10 U.S. Department of State

15

11 Dr. Edward M. Collins,
12 Acting Vice Director for Foreign Intelligence,
13 Defense Intelligence Agency

18

One item withheld by DIA per EO 13526. No other
DIA objection to release subject to the results of
concurrent CIA and State review. JDC 21 Feb 12.

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22,

Mr. Clarke. Before I begin, I will introduce Mr. Richard Lehman, who is my colleague, the chairman of the National Intelligence Council. You have called him to be present at your next meeting as well, but I thought in light of the nature of the questions that might come up at this session, it would be useful to have him here now.

Chairman Zablocki. Good.

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Mr. Clark. Sir, I want to respond to the questions that have been suggested by your agenda, and so I would like to go quickly through my statement.

Beginning with the question of authority, the Central Intelligence Agency has the responsibility under the National Security Act of 1947 "102(d)(3) to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security, and provide for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the Government, using when appropriate existing agencies and facilities..."

Now, within the Central Intelligence Agency the National Foreign Assessment Center is that part of the Agency which is responsible for the analysis and production of intelligence. This component within the Agency is the only intelligence production component in the U.S. intelligence community system whose mission is solely to produce what we can call "national intelligence." That is to say, all other agencies, all other intelligence agencies such as INR and DIA have first and foremost a departmental responsibility and then they have in addition a responsibility

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1 to participate in the production of national intelligence.

2 Under the authority outlined above, the National Foreign
3 Assessment Center has long been an "all source" center. It draws
4 its source material from all of the intelligence collection
5 systems and programs of the Government, and offers several
6 different kinds of support to the National Security Council and
7 other appropriate policy officials, and to the Congress.

8 The authority has always been adequate to provide for, first,
9 coordinated national-level daily intelligence publications, and
10 these are the ones, Mr. Chairman, to which I was referring in
11 my earlier statement; second, coordinated national level current
12 intelligence publications under which the Central Intelligence
13 Agency draws upon INR, the Defense Intelligence Agency, for the
14 statement of its final product.

15 Chairman Zablocki. One should presume, for example, the
16 Under Secretary of State would have read it?

17 Mr. Clarke. Yes, sir. He may not agree with it, sir.
18 He presumably could have read it.

19 Secondly, sir, coordinated national intelligence assessments
20 such as the coordinated national intelligence assessments such as
21 National Intelligence Estimates, NIEs, Interagency Intelligence
22 Memoranda, IIMs, and other ad hoc interagency products such as
23 alerting or warning memoranda and ad hoc policy-support documents
24 that inform some special policy review process.

25 Here, Mr. Chairman, I would note, for example, if a paper is

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1 taken under NSC auspices which requires an intelligence input,
2 it is the Central Intelligence Agency which normally will sit
3 as the member of the group proceeding under NSC auspices and
4 which will draw upon the rest of the intelligence community to
5 provide the information that goes into whatever particular
6 intelligence contribution this particular policy paper may require.

7 Finally, the National Foreign Assessment Center itself
8 produces and coordinates internally memoranda, assessments,
9 briefings, responses to ad hoc inquiries, et cetera.

10 With respect to timeliness, a major problem of the intelli-
11 gence professional is to present to the policy makers at the
12 optimum time the best appreciation possible of the factors that
13 bear on their national security problems. The interagency coordi-
14 nation process is quite efficient for the daily publications,
15 where the issues discussed tend to be narrowly defined. Long
16 articles in the dailies are only tacitly coordinated and are
17 usually time sensitive within the week, rather than within a 24-
18 hour period.

19 Coordination of NIEs and IIMs is another matter. The
20 questions addressed in these formats are generally more complex
21 and more encompassing. Differences of view are more likely to
22 be fundamental and coordination is a learning and refining
23 process and call for strong constitution. Properly planned and
24 executed, these issuances can be timely, but with questions of
25 this size and scope it is much more difficult to meet a sharply

defined deadline.

Indeed, Mr. Chairman, the failure of NIEs and IIMS to be produced in a timely manner over the past several years has meant that only those with the longest time horizons have been in high demand by the policy community. I refer here to what is the one major NIE that deals with Soviet strategic offensive and defensive capability, a very important document indeed, one which literally requires the full year and fullest participation on the part of the intelligence community, working jointly to accomplish.

From my perspective, this failure on the production side has deprived the Government of a community response on major issues, whereas in other years such a response would have been sought out. It is in part to address this issue of timely interagency production that we have recently created the National Intelligence Council, of which Mr. Lehman is the Chairman and its analytical group. This is a new group coming into being now, sir, and is not yet fully operational.

The focus of the Council will be to find out when interagency papers will be of use to policymakers, and to convene the community to work against the deadlines. The Council will have its own small staff of analysts, so that it will control its own production resources in the interests of producing a timely contribution to the policy process.

Each member of the intelligence community produces

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1 uncoordinated finished intelligence according to the needs and
2 timing of its own policy community. NFAC's targets are mainly th
3 National Security Council principals, the NSC staffs and the
4 Assistant Secretary levels of the NSC departments and agencies.

5 We in CIA work in response not only to the National Security
6 Council and its machinery but also to the demands of people at
7 the Secretary and Assistant Secretary levels in the other depart-
8 ments, and it is not at all unknown for an Assistant Secretary of
9 State or of Defense to call me or to call the Director and say,
10 "I would be interested in your view of a particular problem and
11 ask you to consider whether it would not be worthwhile calling
12 the intelligence community together under the context of the
13 National Intelligence Council to prepare such a view.

14 Chairman Zablocki. Could it be the other way around, that
15 an Assistant Secretary of State or Defense or Mr. Brzezinski
16 would call on the Agency as far as gathering intelligence in
17 this or that country and say, "You must not deal with the
18 minority or the politicals out of government"?

19 I am thinking now of Iran, which I understand was the policy
20 decision, and therefore hampered our intelligence gathering.
21 In other words, does it go the other way around, you give them
22 information but do they give you instructions?

23 Mr. Clarke. Yes, sir. It has been known to happen.

24 Chairman Zablocki. How can we have a really solid foundation
25 in our own national security interests, good foreign policy

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that happens, and a policy that is made before they get the intelligence?

Mr. Clarke. Perhaps, sir, in the question and answer period we ought to come back to that in detail.

Chairman Zablocki. You give me the answer. It does happen the other way around?

Mr. Clarke. Yes, sir.

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Chairman Zablocki. You not only give advice but you are also instructed?

Mr. Clarke. Yes, sir; we have people who instruct us.

Chairman Zablocki. Not at the highest level?

Mr. Clarke. I was speaking here, of course, to how requests for and directions to us in terms of telling us what are the things that policymakers are interested in, and to which they would like to have an intelligence analytical response which may be received.

A great volume of short deadline work is prepared by NFAC for these intelligence consumers to use in their regular ongoing policy deliberations. The timeliness of these products is best and we believe that they are also of generally high quality.

By and large, the members of the intelligence community believe there is great value in the competitive analysis of major intelligence issues. The all-source departmental producers analyze the same data as NFAC, most often from a different perspective and for different purposes. They serve the

operational responsibilities of their departments.

National Foreign Assessment Center addresses its analyses to the people who worry about the context in which departmental activities will take place. The two perspectives often come together as analysts exchange ideas informally. In a formal way we build in competition when we execute interagency analyses at the national level.

The value of this kind of duplication of effort is education for the policymaker and for the analysts and their organizations. The common data become richer because they are examined from any sides and for several purposes. Uncertainty, of which there is always uncertainty, Mr. Chairman, can become better defined, and when we do well we communicate that uncertainty in addition to matters about which we collectively have high confidence.

Not all problems warrant competitive analysis or duplicative consideration. By and large, the community is, and must be, attentive to this distinction because it does not have resources to waste. Increasingly, the members of the community share and discuss their production plans so that we can focus on necessary duplicative work with some care.

Within NFAC all offices now plan their research production on a common annual cycle, and in the planning process compare their objectives. When it is useful to do so, the activities of the two offices on a particular subject may be combined in an effort to create a stronger finished product and to eliminate unwarranted

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1 duplication.

2 Many observers have concluded that coordination strives for
3 consensus and that such consensus is inevitably always a watered-
4 down judgment of limited value. I would not deny that this has
5 sometimes been the case. I do not believe that this is or has
6 ever been the norm or the goal of the coordination process.

7 The Government spends a great deal of money on its intelli-
8 gence efforts. The Community has an obligation to see to it
9 that the important information we collect is analyzed as fully
10 as possible, No one center of analysis has unique insight into
11 the meaning of often ambiguous and fragmentary data. And on tough
12 problems, whether we are data rich or data poor, no one has the
13 resources to pursue alone all of the possible avenues of inter-
14 pretation.

15 for these reasons, when we produce intelligence on particu-
16 larly important or controversial subjects we try formally and/or
17 informally to seek out the views of our colleagues in other
18 offices and other agencies. As I have said, the objective is to
19 make analysis stronger, not to reach a lowest common denominator
20 consensus. When controversy besets the analytical lines, we
21 strive to present carefully articulated countervailing arguments
22 so that the nature of any disagreement is comprehended and instruc-
23 tive.

24 As I have explained, within NFAC we try to coordinate our
25 production planning in such a way that all offices with an

1 interest in any particular problem will participate in the
2 analysis. On unscheduled work of either short-range or long-range
3 perspective, we have standard coordination requirements that are
4 designed to improve the product.

5 Dissemination is an important aspect of the problem.

6 Intelligence production is of limited value if it does not
7 reach the right authorities at the right time, and this is a
8 responsibility I take quite seriously.

9 One of the most serious responsibilities of an NFAC Division
10 Chief is to ensure that the dissemination list for each product
11 is tailored to a precise understanding of who in the government
12 has operational responsibility for the problem addressed. When a
13 policy decision is under review, dissemination routinely includes
14 all participants in the review process. When we have written
15 on a subject on our own initiative, we see to it that all
16 readers who will be likely to need the information in fact
17 receive it.

18 We use a variety of means to move our product around. Some
19 of it is delivered in briefings, as you well know. Some is sent
20 in daily courier runs from NFAC to the many Washington addresses
21 of the foreign policy community. Within Washington a great deal
22 of our product is sent to consumers electrically, so that they can
23 have it by a particular hour in the day.

24 Because we are mindful of the way in which seemingly unrelated
25 problems can interact, we share our findings as widely as

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classification controls permit.

Looking at intelligence as a predictor or foreign policy crises, it is a major responsibility of the U.S. Intelligence Community to anticipate changes in the international environment that will be of policy concern to the U.S. Some of each day's current analysis and reporting is devoted to articles that alert or inform the policy community. Much of our production originates because an analyst or manager feels the need to tell a policy maker that events are coming together in ways expected or unexpected. Most of our planned research is designed to make us smart enough to recognize changes in the patterns of international events that will become important to the U.S. Of course, Alert Memoranda, National Intelligence Estimates and Interagency Intelligence Memoranda are estimative, predictive, by special intent.

There are some things that we can predict well and others that we cannot. We can tell the policymaker that the Chinese are building up forces on the Vietnamese border in a way that is unusual, or we can document the threatening aspects of a Soviet buildup on its South Asian borders. The alert is implicit in the information.

We try also to make a judgment about the likelihood of attack, using every available insight. Whether we are right in our specific prediction of intent, we have warned of a possibility that should be taken seriously.

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1 We can also write extensively about forces for internal
2 change in a foreign country. We can document social dissidence,
3 economic growth or decline, population pressures, food and
4 resource constraints, and the implications of these for U.S.
5 foreign policy. We can tell a policymaker that these forces added
6 together pose increasing difficulty for a government. We can
7 rarely predict a specific coup. Indeed, there is an intelligence
8 law that says that any coup you know about in advance won't happen.
9 Nevertheless, when we hear about them in advance we report them.

10 We can rarely predict or precisely call an election and our
11 record with respect to foreign elections is no better than other
12 people's election records with respect to domestic elections.

13 We still believe that we have served a warning function,
14 however, when we have gathered together the information, spelled
15 out the possibilities and delivered it to the people in a position
16 to act on the warning.

17 To offer more than an attempt to be right would be to offer
18 too much. An old rule of thumb was that to estimate events correctly
19 50 percent of the time was an unexpected achievement. To do so,
20 we would have to know more about the intentions and capabilities
21 of foreign governments than they themselves know. We would have
22 to know how the U.S. Government will react to our predictions, and
23 how that reaction would in turn affect world trends.

24 Our best course is to continue to examine and estimate on the
25 most important subjects, changing our perceptions as circumstances

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change. We must risk being wrong in order to fulfill the alerting function. Both the policy maker and the intelligence managers and analysts must understand that the penalties for failing to warn are greater than the penalties for failure to be correct.

Chairman Zablocki. Thank you, Mr. Clarke, for your statement

Perhaps we deal with this matter of intelligence from a different perspective. You say that to estimate events correctly 50 percent of the time is an unexpected achievement. If we voted correctly 50 percent of the time, our constituents would certainly pull ou out. You do have problems.

I think I will defer to Mr. Broomfield because he wants to leave for Michigan.

Mr. Broomfield. I find this very interesting. Taking the Iran situation, how could we be so wrong, or was the intelligence wrong, or were the policymakers wrong in their assessment if the situation of the Shah?

Maybe that is not a fair question, but it seems to me that they misread the problems that exist in Iran that caused the downfall of the Shah.

Mr. Clarke. Yes, sir. I believe there are as many answers to that question as there are people of whom you ask it.

Let me offer a few thoughts and then ask Ambassador Spiers or Ed collins to contribute there.

I think it is fair to say that Iran is a good example of a particular king of problem for U.S. intelligence, where the U.S.

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1 Government in its policy aspects is deeply committed to a particu-
2 lar situation, a particular government, and the depth of that
3 commitment; and the significance of revolutionary change with
4 respect to the situation that is so profound that even though
5 warned, the policymaker proceeds in such a way as to try to
6 prevent what is implicit in the warning from coming to pass.

7 The days are gone, I think, when we kill the bearers of bad
8 tidings; but there is nothing to keep the policymaker confronted
9 with a judgment adverse to that which he wants to believe from
10 acknowledging its validity and acting on the basis of it.

11 Furthermore, objectively with respect to the situation in
12 1978, I don't believe that you can say that the downfall of the
13 Shah was inevitable up until a very late point; but to say just
14 because we could have in January of 1979 said, as we did, there
15 are problems brewing here of a very serious and fundamental nature
16 does not mean that 1978 necessarily had to end the way it did.

17 Mr. Broomfield. I guess what really troubles me -- we have
18 the best information and I sense that we have got a pretty good
19 operation, maybe there are areas of improvement -- I guess what
20 disturbs me from a different perspective is not only the Iran
21 situation but also, as the Chairman pointed out, the situation in
22 Pakistan.

23 Now, a few weeks ago, boy, we cannot rush in there too
24 fast to give them \$400 million even before a consortium had been
25 worked out, and now it seems that is off the track.

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1 I am not even sure about Turkey. We have been getting
2 adverse reports there, and tha was a situation where we had to
3 rush right in to give them some military and economic assistance
4 or everything would be off the track. I guess this is what really
5 bothers me about this whole process, Ambassador.

6 STATEMENT OF THE HON. RONALD SPIERS, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF
7 INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE;
8 DR. EDWARD M. COLLINS, ACTING VICE DIRECTOR FOR FOREIGN
9 INTELLIGENCE, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

10 Mr. Spiers. I guess in foreign affairs you are dealing
11 with mor of an art than a science. I very much like politics.
12 I can remember colleagues of yours coming to see me in Turkey
13 and berating me as a Foreign Service Officer about the allowance
14 situation, in ability to make specific predictions about what was
15 going to happen, and it was ironic because it was just a few
16 minutes after I asked him about American politics.

17 I asked, "Who is going to be the next President in the United
18 States?" and he laughed at me. He said, "There are too many
19 variables, too many things can happen; too many undertainties."

20 I said, "Well, you know, you are a specialist in American
21 politics and you can't answer this kind of a question for me?"

22 Chairman Zablocki. He was probably too modest to say, "I
23 will be." (Laughter.)

24 Mr. Spiers. I was nice to him.

25 Chairman Zablocki. Not I, but he.

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Mr. Spiers. You know, there are just limits to this, but I would also echo, I think, what Bruce Clarke has said is very important here, because I can remember in my last job in the State Department as Director of Political/Military Affairs, and I can remember participating in meetings between the period 1969 and 1973 where my colleagues and I pointed out possible consequences and courses of action on which we were then embarked, for overriding reasons politically, the top decisionmaking people in our country, because of all of these things are fraught with uncertainty there is no way to say, "If you do X, Y will happen." You can say you can increase the probability of Y happening or diminishing the possibilities of Z happening, but you cannot introduce certainties in those circumstances.

In Iran, most of the decisions were made at the presidential level during the period I was involved in it, over the recommendation of the people that were more involved.

On the question of contact with our position there, I think you do have to realize, if you are the ambassador, that you are there and you are accredited to a country, to a government, to a certain extent you jeopardize the contacts with that government who, after all, is the decision making authority who can produce the decisions in which the United States is interested if you violate their precepts. Luckily, I have never been in a country like that. In Turkey, there were no such problems.

There may be other countries which I am not particularly

1 familiar with where we may be building up the same problems by
2 having to restrict the kinds of contact that our diplomats or
3 intelligence authorities have contact with for fear of the impact
4 that this will have on our relationships with the government,
5 and that is a difficult question to address.

6 Mr. Broomfield. Iran?

7 Mr. Spiers. My understanding is that it happened, but there
8 are more contacts than are generally recognized in public discus-
9 sion of this because some of it normally we will make sure. You
10 know, when I was in Turkey I made sure that our younger officers
11 were in contact with the leftists and some of the extremist trade
12 union movements and so on.

13 Turkey is a democracy. We would never have had real trouble
14 with the government; I don't think they like it, and that is a
15 matter of individual judgment and of the individual chief of
16 mission.

17 Chairman Zablocki. Would you yield?

18 Mr. Broomfield. Yes.

19 Chairman Zablocki. Those younger officers were also exposed
20 to some future criticism as being fellow travelers only because
21 they talked to them.

22 Mr. Spiers. I think that would be an unintelligent reaction.
23 The reason we put our younger officers is that these people tended
24 to be the younger people, and they could communicate with them.



25 Chairman Zablocki. If the gentleman will further yield --



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DIA 3.3(b)(1)



35(c)
CIA 33(b)(1),(6)¹⁹


1 The second factor, I think, is the shortage throughout the
2 Community of people who are ~~real~~ experts on a society and country
3 ~~Such as Iran.~~ ^{AND} We had  people who had ~~ever~~ been in Iran, who
4 spoke the language and knew something about the country. 

5 
6  They knew the leadership of the
7 country or the elite, knew something about its customs, and I will
8 say to their credit that they were responsible for reporting in
9 September, 1978, that the Shah was on the way out. ^{BUT PERHAPS} ~~perhaps~~ that
10 is ~~probably~~ too strong to so state it, that ^{the Shah} ~~he~~ was in trouble.

11 I ~~just~~ would like to make a comment with respect to Pakistan.

12 We also were aware before recent events that 

13 
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22 policymakers or Department of Defense that 

23 
24 Chairman Zablocki. Bill?

25 Mr. Broomfield. I would just like to ask one further

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question:

Both the Chairman and myself served on the Murphy Commission back in 1975 and one of the questions that came up was the military attache program, and it was felt that many of the senior assignments were considered retirement positions. Can you comment on that?

^{Dr.}~~Mr.~~ Collins, ^{Although} the attache program, of course, is not within my jurisdiction within DIA, ~~but~~ I think I can comment by saying that over the past number of years there has been a very strong effort on the part of DIA and on the part of the services to be ~~very~~ careful about the qualifications of the attaches and, to some degree, to look at the extent to which they are going to be supported by their families and ~~that type of thing.~~ ^{soon}

I believe that the attache system has been significantly strengthened over the past several years and is definitely not regarded as a retirement post.

Mr. Spiers. Perhaps I could make a comment on that, having served in a number of posts overseas and in the past having been very critical of the attache program for precisely this reason. There tended to be people who didn't have much of a future in the armed forces and were almost being put out to pasture. There were a very few people who were going to be a general or admiral, some notable exceptions, who argued very strongly that this is a very important function for the United States and really that our best military people, the people who did have a

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1 very active future, ought to be selected for this. That ought
2 to be one of the things that you really ought to have done if
3 you are going to become a general or an admiral.

4 I think this is something that there has been a noticeable
5 improvement of in recent years, and I can certainly second Dr.
6 Collins' comments on this, that the efforts that the Defense -
7 Department has put in to upgrade it, I think, are beginning to
8 pay off. I think there are very few military assignments that
9 could be more important than attache.

10 Chairman Zablocki. Maybe it is an unfair question to ask
11 you, Ambassador Spiers, but do you think the same test should be
12 applied for an ambassador, to be sure they have past experience
13 and knowledge and particularly knowledge in evaluation of
14 intelligence?

15 You know, I was one time frustrated. There was a political
16 appointment to a very important country. As a matter of fact,
17 the Philippines. The nominee did not know where the Philippines
18 was, geographically.

19 Mr. Spiers. The irony of it for me is that I have only
20 served under three political ambassadors, and they happened to
21 be David Bruce, Elliott Richardson and Anne Armstrong, and I
22 think it would be hard to find three more competent people, so
23 that there would be a minority. I am in favor of political
24 ambassadors.

25 Chairman Zablocki. With political experience?

1 Mr. Spiers. That is right. If you can find people like
2 David Bruce, Anne Armstrong, Elliott Richardson, I will take them
3 anytime; they are a minority.

4 Mr. Broomfield. I have to leave.

5 Chairman Zablocki. Have a safe trip. Will you be here
6 Monday?

7 Mr. Broomfield. No.

8 Chairman Zablocki. Thank you. (Laughter.)

9 Mr. Fountain?

10 Mr. Fountain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
11 Ambassador Spiers and Mr. Clarke and Dr. Collins for their state-
12 ments. I have been looking through a list of the questions which
13 the staff, I assume, prepared, and they have done a very thorough
14 job of preparing. They are immediate questions and I am sure they
15 spent considerable time preparing them.

16 I know we couldn't have time to ask them, but I hope that
17 they will be submitted to the appropriate witnesses, and that we
18 will get responses to those questions.

19 Chairman Zablocki. Without objection, the unanimous consent
20 request.

21 (The questions follow:)

22 COMMITTEE INSERT

23

24

25

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Mr. Fountain. One follow up before I ask one basic question:
Time is always a problem.

How much did the Shah himself know about the situation in Iran? Did he have access to as much information as we have, or did he have more? What was he doing about it?

Mr. Clarke. Let me ask Mr. Lehman, who was involved in this to a greater degree than I was at the time.

Mr. Lehman. I think, if your question, sir, is whether the Shah had access to information, he undoubtedly had more access than we did. Whether it reached him or not is another matter.

Mr. Fountain. That is the question.

Mr. Lehman. As sychophantic as the clique around the Shah had become, it is doubtful that he got all the bad news that he should have gotten. On top of that, he was a sick man; he was sicker than we knew at the time. This is one of the important things about the situation, is that the Shah in 1978 was not the man he was in 1963 when almost a parallel situation arose in which he proceeded to suppress with some serenity.

I think perhaps the largest element of weakness in our assessment of the situation was our assumption that sooner or later as this situation got worse and worse, the Shah would indeed step in and suppress it. He never did. He, in effect, lost his nerve and it was hard for us to believe that, knowing what the man had been like.

Chairman Zablocki. Ambassador Spiers?

Mr. Spiers. I was one of the recipients of the cables on these subjects that canceled his talks with the Shah, and I remember being impressed how isolated this man was, so mthat my conclusion would be that he didn't know the facts of the situation largely because of the system in which he had walled himself.

Mr. Fountain. My other question, which I think you partially answered, is: If he did know, what could he have done about it, because of the extent to which he committed himself to become isolated? Did he have anybody immediately under him who could carry out whatever instructions he might have had?

Mr. Spiers. I think at a certain point he probably did, and I think you will still get disputes from Dr. Kissinger, on the one hand, and Dr. Bell, on the other hand, where people would have said if the Shah had acted firmly, decisively, early on, he would have gotten control of the situation, and then he might have used it to institute the measures of political reform which would allow the peaceful transition to a more democratic system.

There is no way of proving whether that would be the case or not.

Mr. Fountain. Based on the information we had, and the close relationship we had with the Shah, did we dissiminate our information or make any recommendations to him because of our knowledge of what might be approaching?

Mr. Spiers. My understanding is that he was given advice through our ambassador, but I don't know what it was, because I

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1 was not involved in that question.

2 Mr. Fountain. The main question I want to ask any one of
3 you, maybe all of you can answer it, are there still any statutory
4 legal or policy limitations or inhibitions which make it difficult
5 for you to perform your job of gathering, disseminating, inter-
6 preting and putting together from what you get in the collective
7 community and getting it to the Administration or responsible
8 policymakers for responsible action? In other words, have we in
9 the Congress done anything?

10 I might give an example: To what extent does the Freedom
11 of Information Act relate to your activities and has it imparied
12 your operation? I am frightened by the fact that we have hearings
13 here, open hearings, and I am satisfied that we have representa-
14 tives from most of the countries who are maybe talking about every
15 time we have a foreign affairs hering, I am frightened by the
16 fact that in the public sessions it is so easy for something
17 which you may think is not material but when put together by them
18 can become extremely significant in that interpretative process.

19 So, when we have public hearings, we say we are having them
20 for the benefit of America, and that is what it is, but actually
21 they are used.

22 Mr. Clarke. You cannot limit the utility of the information
23 only to the people bearing an American passport.

24 Mr. Fountain. That is right.

25 Mr. Clarke. Well, if I may respond briefly.

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Mr. Fountain. Please.

Mr. Clarke. You mentioned the Freedom of Information Act. Under the FOIA the Central Intelligence Agency, for example, is required to review in intimate detail all of the information in its most sensitive files with an eye toward release of all of or part of that information. Although the Agency employs the existing positions in FOIA, the perception overseas and -- this is what I am particularly concerned about -- is that the Agency cannot guarantee the protection of information provided to us by both individual human sources and cooperating foreign intelligence services.

We have witnessed an increasing reluctance on the part of clandestine sources of information--whether it is a friendly foreign intelligence service cooperating with us, or an individual cooperating with us -- an increasing reluctance on their part to be forthcoming and to cooperate fully because of their fear, whether legitimate or not, that the information provided by them and even their identities could become public knowledge.

I am not speaking here at all of the administrative burden of dealing with FOIA requirements which in an agency like ours is quite severe in terms of numbers of people, and I presume it is the same for NIA and DIA.

We certainly have gotten ourselves into a situation where the Second Secretary of the Polish Embassy can levy a requirement upon the Central Intelligence Agency to disgorge the information

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1 in its file and that seems to me to be nuts.

2 There must be a better way.

3 Chairman Zablocki. Unfortunately, they are not stupid
4 enough not to ask for it.

5 Mr. Clarke. No, sir.

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6 Chairman Zablocki. And what's more, you have a real problem
7 getting a covert operation?

8 Mr. Clarke. I had not run through the whole litany, but
9 perhaps Mr. Collins or Ambassador Spiers has a comment.

10 Mr. Collins. I think I would have to second what Bruce Clarke
11 has said, that, first of all, there is a serious administrative
12 burden because people come in with very shotgun requests,
13 "Tell us everything you have in your files about this subject."

14 First of all, a number of people have to look at what we hold
15 in the file. Secondly, we have to go through the file and determine
16 what can be released. Third, we have to check with our legal
17 counsel as to whether we are adequately complying.

18 I think that we are beginning to perceive a certain reluc-
19 tance on the part of allied countries with whom we exchange
20 military intelligence to continue that exchange as freely
21 as in the past because they would have domestic problems at home
22 if some of these arrangements were made known. They might lose
23 some of the intelligence they were getting if some of them were
24 made known.

25 So, I would say that the overall effect of the Freedom of

1 Information Act has been to inhibit intelligence collection and
2 production activities.

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3 Chairman Zablocki. Ambassador Spiers?
4 Mr. Spiers. I have been out of Washington since we have had
5 the Freedom of Information Act, so I have not had much experience
6 here. I was stationed in London at the time it was put into
7 effect, and I know at that time the British were quite concerned,
8 particularly with the exchanges in the intelligence area, about
9 the implications it has.

10 In Turkey, I don't really think it had a major impact,
11 because I don't think the Turks know anything about the Freedom
12 of Information Act. My observations that I got back here are
13 that the administrative requirements of the Freedom of Information
14 Act are supplying employment for a lot of retired Foreign Service
15 Officers. (Laughter.)

16 Mr. Fountain. As a question, that being the case, then I
17 anticipated what your response would be. I don't see how it
18 could be otherwise. We just so overly reacted to our mistakes that
19 we have put ourselves in a straitjacket. We just open the doors
20 to the world. They know where our military installations are;
21 they know where our bombers are; they even tell them where the
22 guided missiles are going to be and where the tracks are going to
23 be, and how they are going to run. I don't understand the
24 intelligence of those of us who are making those kinds of decisions,
25 to be frank with you. I question the intelligence of those people,

whether they be Members of Congress of staffers, bureaucrats
or the White House. I don't know.

Mr. Clarke. There must be a way to deal with the legitimate
needs of the people to be informed without imposing such a burden
upon that element of the United States Government which is engaged
in trying to provide the quality of intelligence which the Chairman
was speaking to earlier.

The world ought there that we are trying to provide you and
the policymakers and the executive side with information concern-
ing is not a benign world and we cannot act on the assumption
that it is. If we do so, we do so at our peril, I believe.

Mr. Fountain. Just one further question: Is any group or
any panel or any of you individually or collectively within your
various intelligence operations doing any thinking or planning
in terms of making the kinds of recommendations that ought to be
made as to how maybe we might modify the Freedom of Information
Act or any other acts we have on the books that would enable us
to do the job that needs to be done to protect our own national
security?

Mr. Clarke. Speaking for what I know, sir, and I am not
directly involved in the doing of that, the answer is yes; but I
am not in a position to know the details.

Mr. Fountain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Zablocki. There was an example where there was a
recommendation of a goodly number of Members of Congress interested

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1 in safeguarding our intelligence. The newspapers will shoot down
2 the legislation as being unconstitutional.

3 You know which one I am referring to?

4 Mr. Fountain. Yes. I am not impressed by the press when
5 it comes to things like that, but nonetheless some people are

6 Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Winn?

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7 Mr. Winn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

8 All of this sounds very good, and I really appreciate the
9 opportunity to hear how the Community is interwoven and communi-
10 cating and working together, but I think you can tell by the line
11 of questions that we don't necessarily believe it, based on
12 certain instances that have happened. We cannot understand it,
13 maybe that is a better way to put it.

14 I think two of the three of you, or maybe all three of you,
15 in your prepared remarks, talked about your policies, communicating
16 and coordinating policies, and how it would affect our foreign
17 policy and it is a little hard for me as a member of the
18 Foreign Affairs Committee to figure out how you can do that,
19 because the country as a whole is trying to figure out what is
20 our foreign policy.

21 So, my point is, how can you make your estimates and your
22 judgments based on our foreign policy because I don't know what
23 our foreign policy is.

24 Mr. Clarke. You are the most recently returned.

25 Mr. Spiers. Well, Congressman, I must admit that some of the

same questions occur to me, especially back in Washington, and certainly in trying to predict--take my last post, Turkey.

Mr. Winn. As Henry Youngman says, you take it.

Mr. Spiers. They are trying to predict the evolution of the situation in Turkey. It depends very much on how we respond to some of the problems in that area and if there are uncertainties about the American direction. I feel myself that the public consensus which underlie the general direction of the American foreign policy for the 20 years after the war, it began to break down and I hope it is in the process of being reestablished, but it clearly has not been re-established so that there is not.

I think one of our problems in the world the Chairman referred to -- Pakistan. I am personally convinced that one of the problems in Pakistan is the same kind of problem you encounter in many countries in that general area, and that is, uncertainty about the United States, uncertainty about the degree of United States conviction, the clarity of its direction, the national priorities of the country. I as an American have to admit that exists and that is a problem. We are in a democracy; we have the problem of reestablishing in the American public mind a clear sense of direction for our country, a clear sense of priorities and a sense of the need to stay the course; and until that is done I think we are going to continue to have problems in our foreign policy, and there is no way that intelligence can make up for this fundamental gap in the nation. It is a political problem; it is

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a political problem; it is a problem much more for you or for me as a citizen, not as an intelligence officer and for the average bureaucrat. It is a condition in which we have to operate.

Mr. Winn. I agree, when you say it is a problem of everybody in the United States. I think it is more than that. I served as a delegate to the U.N. for three months and I think it is a problem for everybody in the world, because those people up there that I talked to, they just don't understand the Americans at all. They don't really personally dislike us; they just don't understand us, and they don't trust us because they don't see any consistency. They like parts of whatever our foreign policy is, other parts they cannot understand, and that is understandable from our standpoint, because we don't either.

Mr. Clarke. Sir, if I could go back to your question, I would try to answer it this way: For the analytical intelligence components that we three represent, the problem is to identify the policy question, which is not the same as the policy.

Mr. Winn. I understand that.

Mr. Clarke. And if we are given it, so much the better, or if by reading the papers and talking to people we come to our own description of it, we nevertheless can identify the question, and the question having been identified, we then can set about collecting the facts, marshaling the arguments, producing the analysis which is related to the question; and it then being available, it presumably helps to inform yourselves and the

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1 policymakers as they come to grips with the formulation of the
2 policy itself.

3 I would like to in this connection take note of a point that
4 I think we slid over relatively too easily when we were thinking
5 about the evolution of American intelligence.

6 American intelligence came out of a fundamental military
7 concern. Historically, intelligence was concerned initially with
8 the capabilities and intentions of the enemy. In the years since
9 World War II we have moved more and more into intelligence that
10 is defined in nonmilitary terms, and we have had to develop the
11 capacity to respond to the nonmilitary kinds of questions, and it
12 is no longer useful, for example, from a policy point of view,
13 and therefore from an intelligence point of view, to look at a
14 country solely in terms of what is the degree of Communist
15 penetration. We have moved beyond that.

16 We now have to look at the country in terms of trying to
17 understand it as a country -- its society, its economy, its
18 people, the social conditions and all of this. This is a new
19 demand upon us and if we don't do it yet as well as we ought to,
20 it is because (a) it is relatively new and (b) we are trying to
21 develop the expertise that will enable us to do this better; but
22 we do see this as a growing problem.

23 I brought with me something -- I didn't have Ambassador
24 Spiers' specifically in mind, but here is an intelligence assess-
25 ment which was done in the National Foreign Assessment Center in

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The Chairman and members, all these gentlemen, have traveled together many times and we really sometimes get a little tired of hearing religious and historical backgrounds of those countries. It is important to them, but it is not important to us in a briefing that we only get in about a two hour period of time. I

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1 don't know what is in that book, but I cannot believe that there
2 is anything that is top secret or any kind of secret that the
3 members of the Foreign Affairs Committee should not have in
4 helping make our judgments in right now going through the
5 process of trying to figure out our aid programs, for instance, to
6 these various countries, and why they should have this thing,
7 and how it is going to benefit us in the long run, if at all.

8 Chairman Zablocki. If the gentleman from Kansas will
9 yield at this point, may I ask to what extent has that particular
10 document that you have there --

11 Mr. Clarke. Indiscretely exposed to you, sir?

12 Chairman Zablocki. To what extent have the policymakers
13 or Department of State paid any attention to it? Do they look at
14 the appendix and file it for future use?

15 Mr. Spiers. He has been indiscrete; let me be really
16 indiscrete and say that at the time this document was done, I was
17 Ambassador in Turkey and this is the first time I have ever seen
18 it.

19 Chairman Zablocki. Isn't that sad?

20 Mr. Winn. Sad but not surprising.

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21 Chairman Zablocki. After all, we are charged with being
22 on junkets but we do absorb a few things and make some
23 observations. Surprisingly, the people who are least interested
24 are the last to read the reports. We make our foreign policy
25 while every embassy here in town asks for those reports, and they

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1 read them. Our people don't.

2 It is too bad that you didn't have that. I think it would
3 have been very helpful. There is a waste of effort.

4 Mr. Spiers. I am sure that a document like that is not done
5 for my consumption.

6 Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Clarke and Ambassador, this is the
7 very purpose of these hearings, to find out to what extent
8 the producers of intelligence, the findings, are really used by
9 the consumers in formulating any foreign policy.

10 Mr. Clark. Well, this is, of course, a difficult answer to
11 give. What I can tell you with respect to this was that it is
12 only Confidential in its classification. It was quite broadly
13 disseminated throughout the policy areas of the Executive Branch.
14 I believe you would find that it has also been sent to some of the
15 committees of Congress. It is of the nature of a document which
16 is not addressing any burning immediate issue, but is attempting
17 to provide on a careful policy oriented analytical basis the back-
18 ground to matters relating to the social and economic situation
19 in Turkey that forms the backdrop against which the action takes
20 place.

21 I would assume that this may have been read by individuals
22 in State and the Department of Defense who have Turkey as a general
23 responsibility. It is perhaps of more use to the staff than to
24 the principal, although in my experience I have always found it
25 terribly important to take care of the staff, because that was the

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1 best way that you often took care of the needs of the principal.

2 So, I would not be too despairing, Mr. Chairman, if we didn't
3 manage to get it right into the hands of the U.S. Ambassador
4 in Turkey at the time. Who is to say that your staff may have
5 protected you from it when it reached Ankara?

6 Mr. Spiers. That is quite possible. I think that this points
7 up one of the real dilemmas, particularly in the State Department
8 where I have been impressed the years that I have been there with
9 the amount of the material, the amount of reading, hundreds of
10 thousands of cables a year. A person in my job, really the
11 most important service that he can provide is to get the right
12 information at the right level of detail at the right time to the
13 people that have to make the decisions.

14 It would be pointless to send papers like this to the
15 Secretary of State. He would not read it; he has too much to
16 do; but that information will go into the kind of information
17 bank we maintain. When the dedision has to be made on this point,
18 this will be factored in.

19 I am sure this document has been sent up here, and I would
20 be surprised if any Congressman has had occasion to read it;
21 but when the Executive Branch comes up here and testifies on
22 foreign assistance or on other elements of this, this will
23 certainly go into the preparation of the testimony and the answers
24 to the questions here.

25 I mean, these documents are terribly important.

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1 I was being a little bit facetious. There is no reason that
2 I should have seen this, because I doubt that there is an awful
3 lot of information there that I didn't have myself. It is more
4 important for me to have something on a country that I don't know
5 firsthand. This is the problem of linking this massive body of
6 information that is available to the U.S. Government and making
7 it relevant at the right time -- that is a real challenge.

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1 Chairman Zablocki. From our past hearings we have learned
2 that the problem of dissemination and who makes the decision as
3 to whether reports or information should be made available to the
4 field is very often a decision of a second level officer. For
5 example, the major difficulty identified by our committee was
6 the examination of Jonestown, the death of our colleague Leo Ryan.
7 The information was not being sent from Guyana when it was sent
8 to the Department, it was filed, and so there was a gap. This is
9 very serious.

10 Mr. Winn. I am sorry I took up so much time.

11 Mr. Winn. That is all right.

12 I don't think Dr. Collins ever got a chance to respond to
13 my original question about foreign policy and how you can direct
14 your correspondence and communication toward foreign policy when
15 we are not sure what it is. I don't know if you care to or not.

16 Dr. Collins. Well, I can only report what I sense among my
17 colleagues in foreign countries and so forth, and I think I could
18 reiterate what has been said here; that they are looking ^{to} for the
19 United States to have a consistent and long-term foreign policy
20 which the United States understands and can convey to people
21 around the world. I think from reading the daily intelligence
22 which shows that it is not clear how one can lead any band of followers if you
23 don't tell them where you are going. the improvisation and, what
24 is widely referred to by even our friends as the faddism, in
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American foreign policy is very damaging to us.

~~Also,~~ ^(ANOTHER AREA IS) the sense of a lack of determination and even of a sensible plan for dealing with the problems those countries have. Only one of those is Soviet penetration but there are many other problems and many vulnerabilities. In many parts of the world ~~we have recently formed~~ very structurally weak governments ~~(HAVE RECENTLY BEEN FORMED)~~ which don't know how to deal with the "hug of the bear" and ~~so~~ they are looking to us for some alternatives. I suppose we are not supplying it so I ^{AM} support ^{ING} what I said.

I would like to ~~make some~~ comment about something else Mr. Winn mentioned, and that is the understanding of foreign military forces. In the past it was thought sufficient if you could count the number of tanks, divisions and so forth. Now, as Bruce Clarke mentioned, we know a lot better. The military is an expression of a society and economy which lies underneath it. Unless you know what the stresses are in the society and the structure of the society you really can't estimate what they are capable of doing in the field, ~~and~~ [≡] that is an especially great problem and the newly formed countries, which, in some cases are only superficially a country ~~and~~ [≡] underlying that is a reality that they are a bunch of competing tribes ^{AND} ^{IN} contending bodies of political thought ~~or leadership, and some type of thing or so~~ [≡] and to direct our attention much more to ~~that~~ ^{these issues} and we will have to do more so in the future.

Mr. Winn. I am glad to hear that because if I didn't learn

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1 anything else in my service up there I sure learned that because
2 I learned that I didn't know beans about the social fabric of
3 most of the countries of the people that I was talking to. They
4 knew an awful lot about us. The number one interest up there,
5 which shows one of our weaknesses or strengths -- I think it is
6 a weakness instead of a strength -- they were extremely interested
7 in who we all thought was going to be the next President of the
8 United States and I am sure they are looking at it from the policy
9 standpoint, not from the radio and TV appearances, debates and
10 anything else. They would probably care less about that.

11 The other thing that I would like to bring up, Mr. Chairman,
12 was about the Shah. I met with the Shah twice in Iran.

13 Chairman Zablocki. I was there in 1978, January of 1978.
14 If somebody said by the end of that year he would be out, I would
15 have said, How much do you have to put on the line?

16 Mr. Winn. It didn't look that way. We were talking about
17 everybody else's problems and not his..

18 Anyway, behind the scenes after we met with the Shah and all
19 that stuff why the talk before we went to Iran and then after we
20 left was he has got some problems. The main problems are from
21 1973, the tremendous number of political prisoners he is holding,
22 the way he has walled himself off where the inner court is
23 controlling everything. There were some discussions about human
24 rights to the people that were not in the Shah's crowd and I just
25 wondered if that was the feeling fairly strong both times. So

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1 obviously that was a problem that was brewing, boiling.

2 Now if the State Department or if our intelligence community
3 knew this, were we telling the Shah that by God this is inter-
4 national, everybody knows this and you have a problem coming your
5 way because of this? I mean how strong are we going to tell him
6 he was a bad boy? We knew he was a bad boy but we didn't know
7 how bad he was because he was our bad boy.

8 Mr. Clarke. Well, I will have to --

9 Mr. Spiers. I don't know.

10 Mr. Winn. You don't know how strong we were in our communi-
11 cations?

12 Mr. Spiers. No. It was the period I was away. I know we
13 gave him advice about opening up the government and about pre-
14 empting the movements that were developing. I think what Dr.
15 Lehman says certainly conveys my impression that the man was ill,
16 he could not act, he was like Hamlet.

17 Mr. Winn. He was not very ill in 1978 when he met with us.

18 Chairman Zablocki. Larry, you will recall we were there in
19 1978 and at the hotel where the American flag was flying and the
20 ambassador advised us, "When the Secretary of State was here we
21 didn't fly the American flag." That was a decision made by the
22 ruling government and it indicated to me, and some did say, they
23 were unhappy with some of the advice we were giving him so when
24 we came there the flag flew but not when Secretary Vance was
25 there because they were unhappy with Vance. So apparently we

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1 were giving them some advice.

2 Mr. Winn. But he didn't seem like he was ill to me. He
3 didn't act like an ill man. I don't know. Does anybody have
4 any comment?

5 Dr.

Mr. Collins. ~~I think~~ our Director was

9 Mr. Winn. That was my feeling. Thank you.

10 Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Lagomarsino.

11 Mr. Lagomarsino. You know, it has been said by some and
12 it was just pointed out by the Chairman that the Shah didn't like
13 some of the information or some of the advice we gave him even
14 though he followed it and there are those who say that is what
15 got him into trouble, that that was perceived as a sign of
16 weakness on his part, not as a concession or a device by which
17 to build popular support in the country. I don't know. In any
18 event, it has been my impression, too, that there was a great
19 surprise that the Shah did not react in a more violent way to
20 keep himself on the throne and also there was the question of
21 whether or not the army was going to stage a coup.

22 ~~have a~~ OSD 3.3(b)(1), (6)

23 this point.

CIA 3.3(b)(1), (6)+3.5(c)

24 You know, one of the things after listening to the testimony
25 we have had in these hearings as well as other briefings and so on

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1 since the time I have been here, I have kind of come to the
2 conclusion that the bad press that the CIA particularly and the
3 other intelligence community also, except people don't know as
4 much about that, but the CIA is right out there. I think a lot
5 of the bad press is frankly very much undeserved and I share what
6 must be your very deep frustration because you cannot really say
7 anything about it. You cannot go out in the public and say, hey,
8 you know, it is a bad rap that we didn't know the Shah was in
9 serious trouble before he fell.

10 We heard testimony as you have just repeated here this
11 morning that by the end of September there was a pretty clear
12 picture but as I recall it they sent a letter to the head of the
13 CIA sometime much later than that in effect or at least giving
14 the impression or the impression was had, whatever you intend it
15 to be given or not, that there had been a failure of intelligence
16 and that he had been caught unawares of what happened. Obviously
17 there is no way that you can go out and say, hey, we did tell the
18 President in September that this was going to happen or that it
19 might happen.

20 One, it would be violating the very nature of your work and
21 secondly it would not be a very respectful thing to do to the
22 commander-in-chief. So many of us are in the same boat, we can
23 do it generally. I can do it generally to say I think in many
24 ways the intelligence communities have gotten an undeserved
25 reputation here but you cannot give the specifics. It is very

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1 frustrating.

2 Just to give you two specifics and sort of get off of that
3 a little bit, we were told by the CIA, some of us, not very long
4 ago that by September of this year that it was very apparent that
5 Russia was going to invade Afghanistan. When we asked the
6 Secretary of State about that he said they didn't know until
7 what, December?

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8 Mr. Winn.. Early December.

9 Mr. Lagomarsino. Another one closer to home, we were told
10 by the CIA that Nicaraguans were training Salvador guerrillas in
11 Nicaragua. We asked the ambassador to Nicaragua about that and
12 he denied it completely, said it was not true, and said that he
13 knew of the reports but that they were not accurate. I don't
14 know. I guess there is no answer to this because all you gentle-
15 men can do and your agency can do is to provide the best informa-
16 tion and you certainly cannot make people use it; and if they
17 don't use it, you cannot say so, obviously.

18 Mr. Clarke. Well, there are lots of problems. One, of
19 course, is simply we rarely operate in the presence of complete
20 knowledge. And even where, as in the case of Afghanistan, we
21 were able to follow the military buildup on the Soviet side as
22 the Soviets began to pull their forces together, flush out units
23 which up to that point had not been fully flushed out and under-
24 take the logistics and other preparation attendant upon a military
25 intervention of this dimension, one could merely report that this

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is happening. One could not say that the decision to employ them in the way they ultimately were employed had been made or if it had when it would come and so the intelligence community's record with respect to Afghanistan, I believe, is quite good in terms of alerting people to a possibility and it was a possibility that was taken seriously enough that I understand efforts were made by the Administration to impress upon the Soviets the gravity of the situation that might come about. Now here is an area where I simply do not speak from knowledge and therefore I cannot go any further.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Correct me if I am wrong, the gentlemen who were there. As I understand it, the efforts to dissuade the Soviets from doing whatever it was they might have been doing at that time was not made until December. Do you agree?

Mr. Winn. That is my understanding. In the wires that I had access to at the UN there was practically no talk until late November across the wires.

Mr. Lagomarsino. I can understand obviously when the President said he was surprised that that could be because before the invasion he had talked to Brezhnev and Brezhnev had just told him they were not going to do that, so I guess you can say he was surprised by that. But if you say he was surprised by the fact that they were gathered there already to do that, that is something else.

Mr. Fountain. In the situation the way it is in Russia,

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1 maybe Brezhnev didn't know.

2 Mr. Lagomarsino. That is true.

3 Mr. Spiers. There is no way to get black and white answers
4 without enforcing a degree of conformity. I found myself this
5 past time when I have disagreed with CIA assessments that some-
6 times I was right, sometimes I was wrong. So two men cannot look
7 at the same body of facts and not disagree over the facts. They
8 can disagree over the implications or meaning and that will always
9 be the case.

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10 Mr. Winn. Ybs.

11 Mr. Spiers. All we can do is get the best facts we can get,
12 make the best analysis we can make, get the best order of
13 probability. You can never get 100 percent certainty.

14 Chairman Zablocki. Well, one of the handicaps we operate on,
15 one of our policies, is to be absolutely sure before we accuse but
16 the Soviets don't pay any attention to the truth -- they think it
17 gives them a propaganda advantage. Chemical warfare in Afghanistan:
18 we have not said anything about it because we are not sure, we
19 don't have hard evidence. If we catch them with their hands in
20 the cookie jar, all right. They take every propaganda advantage
21 possible. They don't particularly care about covert restrictions
22 in their operations. (Laughter)

23 One of the examples in Afghanistan is where they used
24 assassination. If our government would do that, we would have
25 every newspaper in the country clamoring for an investigation of

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1 the CIA for not giving the proper aspirin to the one who
2 unfortunately died of a headache, so we are operating under a
3 handicap. I don't want to take any more of your time.

4 Let me just correct you, Bill, and I am trusting when the
5 President said he was surprised at the time in the latter part
6 of November on the Afghanistan issue it was because he was
7 surprised with Brezhnev's explanation.

8 Mr. Lagomarsino. I don't know.

9 Back to Afghanistan.

10 Chairman Zablocki. Calling him a diplomatic liar.

11 What is the Russian word for liar?

12 Mr. Lagomarsino. I don't know.

13 Chairman Zablocki. I only know nyet.

14 Mr. Lagomarsino. That is all you need to know over there.

15 Do we have any information on the use of chemical warfare in
16 Afghanistan other than just rumors?

17 **Dr.** Collins. We have one report from a former Afghanistan
18 officer who states that the Soviets have used chemical weapons
19 in Afghanistan and, to the best of my recollection, he describes
20 some of the effects. Some of those reports correspond with other
21 reports of similar effects of the Vietnamese use of gas in Laos
22 but I have not seen any other reports of the Soviet victim
23 of this and there is absolutely no confirmation.

24 The Soviets do have chemical warfare decontamination units
25 in their own organizations and those units are present in

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Afghanistan and they serve two purposes in any military organization -- to decontaminate people or vehicles or equipment which have been subject to enemy gas attack or to decontaminate your own chemical warfare troops who are handling those materials.

Now there are two reasonable explanations for that. One would be they intend to be prepared to use chemical weapons which is a very iffy story and the other is that in a typical military fashion when you call up a division you call up everybody so there is no confirmation at all that they have done that.

Mr. Lagomarsino. Do you have any information on that alleged massacre of a thousand people at Karala.

Mr. Clarke. Yes, I saw that in the papers myself. We have no information that would confirm that.

On the CW aspects I have in mind one report of a conversation with one of the chiefs of one of the major insurgent groups who was asked about reports of chemical warfare by the Soviets against them. His response, for what it is worth, was that whereas the Soviets regularly used napalm in trying to burn out concentrations of the insurgents he had not encountered any chemical warfare.

I suppose the other thing is neither the winter time nor the use of CW and the great deterrent on the use of CW historically, it is one of those things that can come back and bite you if you did not to it very carefully. So I am perfectly ready to credit

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1 that it could have happened but as you noted and as the Chairman
2 has noted we don't have yet that solidity of evidence that would
3 enable us to say with certainty that it happened.

4 Mr. Lagomarsino. That is reassuring to me because that tends
5 to give at least in my mind a lot more credence to the times when
6 you come up and say something is happening because I think the
7 common perception is that the Russians are using it there because
8 there have been a lot of rumors in the papers and so on, so I
9 think it is to your credit.

10 Mr. Clarke. I don't see anything wrong with letting that
11 rumor run.

12 Mr. Lagomarsino. They certainly would if they wanted to.

13 Chairman Zablocki. Too bad the Soviets don't have a CBS
14 following their troops around.

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15 Any other questions?

16 I have just one. Mr. Clarke, on page 5 of your statement
17 you say, "Uncertainty becomes better defined, and when we do well
18 we communicate that uncertainty in addition to matters about which
19 we collectively have high confidence."

20 Could you give us an example?

21 Hey, fellows, where are you going? Don't you like my
22 question?

23 Mr. Winn. WL have already won.

24 Chairman Zablocki. Give us an example of where in case of
25 uncertainty or high confidence -- how do the policy makers

respond to these two different types of reports? How did they respond when you are uncertain? How do they respond when you have a high confidence in making policy decision?

Mr. Clarke. Well, I think perhaps the most useful area to draw the example from lies in the military area which is an area where uncertainty has a definable policy result. If, for example, we cannot give the force planner in the Pentagon a well defined certain estimate with respect to, for example, the hardness of a Soviet ICBM silo or, for example, the CEP of a Soviet ICBM, then he takes the range of uncertainty which we do try to define and works with it in trying to evolve alternate force responses in terms of the kinds of weapons or systems or force structures the United States ought to have taking into account the range of uncertainty we gave him.

It is no longer necessary to argue about a bomber gap or a missile gap because the power of American intelligence gathering has eliminated the question of how many ICBMs do the Soviets in fact have as a question of difference. When I think back to bomber gap and missile gap days and the acrimony which beset the intelligence community as it attempted not having certainty and having to estimate the size of the Soviet bomber fleet present and prospective based on a very little bit of information indeed, I am pleased that we have put that order of questions behind us. Then the Soviet ICBM count, the number of antiballistic missiles deployed around Moscow are matters which CIA and DIA, for example,

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1 can agree on with high confidence and therefore to the degree
 2 that that becomes important and those numbers become important
 3 in making a policy decision in forming the U.S. defense budget,
 4 then the policy maker is not presented with a problem in that
 5 area.

6 Chairman Zablocki. Would that also apply to the policy
 7 decision in the State Department?

8 Mr. Spiers. I think the same considerations fundamentally
 9 apply. To the extent there are uncertainties in your analyses,
 10 this means the policy makers will have to adopt policies which
 11 deal with the range of possibilities so that therefore it is
 12 less pointed than it would be if you have a high probability or
 13 or a certainty of a given course of action. There is only one
 14 thing your policy has to deal with so it means sometimes less
 15 clarify, more ambiguity, the ability to accommodate yourself to
 16 a righter range of possibilities.

17 You have a situation now in Afghanistan. There are those
 18 who will argue that the Soviet action in Afghanistan is a limited
 19 action that deals with a specific set of circumstances in
 20 Afghanistan. There is another point of view that this is just
 21 one more step towards the warm water ports with homogeneity in
 22 Southeast Asia. It would be dangerous to adopt a policy that did
 23 not accord with both of those possibilities being correct but one
 24 policy is assumed that this was the end of the road, that it was
 25 a limited thing, could be very dangerous for the future. The

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1 policy that made the opposite assumption could close out courses
2 of action that might be desirable if that didn't turn out to be
3 right.

4 My rule is that there may be no preset Soviet intension but
5 that the capabilities of the Soviet Union provided its opportuni-
6 ties and its opportunities shape its intentions so that if the
7 United States has to deal with narrowing the range of opportuni-
8 ties that are confronted with the Soviet foreign policy and that
9 really I think is the essential challenge for the United States in
10 dealing with the Soviet Union.

11 Chairman Zablocki. On the basis of your experience of
12 providing the consumer with the intelligence for the purpose of
13 formulating foreign policy, where would you say to set your
14 highest priority, with Brzezinski or with Secretary Vance?

15 Mr. Spiers. Watch it now.

16 Mr. Clarke. The President of the United States.

17 Chairman Zablocki. Well, you got up this morning with the
18 right foot. (Laughter) I could not trap you on that one.

19 Mr. Spiers. All of the above.

20 Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Ambassador, in your statement you
21 state less than a quarter of a million dollars. I am not
22 quarreling with the basic concept of getting a little input into
23 Foggy Bottom that has been stagnant for so long but I am a little
24 worried about the scholar analyst teams. I am a little fearful
25 that you will be getting these theorists, these cloud 9

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1 professors who already have a firm policy position and will try
2 to foist it upon you.

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3 Mr. Spiers. That is a real problem.

4 Chairman Zablocki. How are you going to insulate yourself
5 from the press and the scholars at the same time?

6 Mr. Spiers. On the matter of knowing the people but I know
7 people that are specialists in areas who would have a great deal
8 to contribute. I think it would have been good to have a rela-
9 tionship with somebody like Professor Bell in Turkey, Walt Rostow.
10 We have to find some way to harness this.

11 Now there are different kinds of scholars and I would hope
12 we would have the wisdom to avoid the people who are just out
13 with the precept position and an axe to grind. I think you can
14 usually tell who those people are. It is a matter of selectivity
15 but I think there are a lot of resources out there that the United
16 States Government should not deprive itself of and you just have
17 to be prudent and watch the pitfall that you describe which is
18 one that certainly exists.

19 Chairman Zablocki. And the scholar analysts will be by
20 invitation; you invite them, they don't write to you.

21 Mr. Spiers. No, sir.

22 Chairman Zablocki. Go on sabbatical and say, I have some
23 time on my hands and I have an idea.

24 Mr. Spiers. No. We know the people who have the knowledge
25 and can make a contribution.

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1 Chairman Zablocki. I am stating from experience because we
2 have a lot of letters from scholars and people who have ideas and
3 they want to come on the staff of the Foreign Affairs Committee,
4 and we have enough of them now. (Laughter)

5 Thank you very much, gentlemen.

6 Mr. Clarke. Thank you.

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7 Mr. Fountain. Mr. Chairman, I have a few questions.

8 Chairman Zablocki. Mr. Fountain.

9 Mr. Fountain. I noted in going through the staff memorandum
10 that I think it ought to be answered here. In the subcommittee's
11 hearings last week Dr. Bets pointed out the need for the intelli-
12 gence producers to know what the policy, priorities and positions
13 are so that appropriate products could be prepared as long as the
14 conclusions are not dictated. I would like to ask, in your
15 experience as producers have there been occasions when the
16 conclusions have been dictated to you by the policy makers?

17 Dr. Collins. I can state that I have no experience of any
18 successful attempt in that direction. I have several experiences
19 with some rather candid exchanges as to who reached the conclu-
20 sions and how they would be presented.

21 Mr. Fountain. In 1975 the Murphy Commission on which I
22 took the Chairman and maybe Mr. Broomfield served recommended
23 greater contact between the intelligence officers, and before the
24 subcommittee last week both Dr. Klein and Professor Kirkpatrick
25 felt that the intelligence analysis tended to be kept at a

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distance by policy makers. As intelligence producers, how do you view the present relationship with policy makers? Is there more and better contact today than in 1975?

Mr. Clarke. I am having to go back to 1975. There certainly is a wide range of continuing contact but I think it is important to recognize that the capacity of the intelligence community in this area is very much dependent upon what gets set up at the other end. It is a little bit like playing tennis; if you have got a good opponent, he brings out your better game and if you have a poorer opponent, somehow you don't play as well as you could because of his game.

I think that the way we operate at this point provides -- now speaking for people in the National Foreign Assessment Center and in CIA -- the opportunity to interact with the policy people in State, Defense, the NSC staff who reasonably well --- we have a myriad of ways such as the existence of the national intelligence officer, Senator Peoples, whose responsibility it is specifically to get out and be active in the policy areas of their competency in order to come back and inform us as to what their concerns are but the relationships in this respect proceed at all levels and for good reasons.

This anonymous policy maker of whom we speak is a real live human being who among other things needs to know what is going on and what are the latest facts and what is the latest information and where is his own organization which often exists to supply a

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1 great deal. He also comes to know and appreciate that this
2 specialist or that specialist in this agency or that agency also
3 is a knowledgeable person that he ought to be in touch with and
4 in this fashion we frequently learn what it is we need to know
5 with respect to the development of policy.

6 I would not overlook the contribution that the U.S. press
7 plays in this capacity because even if State won't tell us they
8 often seem to tell somebody else just for example and that finds
9 its way into the press and thereby we know about it. The problem,
10 it seems to me, from the standpoint of intelligence professionalism
11 is and always will be to be close enough but not too close and it
12 is finding that balance that we are engaged in every day.

13 Mr. Fountain. To avoid having your point of view either
14 ignored or bypassed by the policy makers, are there circumstances
15 in which that is done?

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16 Mr. Spiers. I am sure that there is.

17 Mr. Clarke. Humans being humans, I am sure that there is.

18 Mr. Collins. ~~I think~~ whom in the Department of Defense we have
19 made many institutional changes since 1975 which improve the flow
20 of intelligence to the policy maker; ~~and~~ that includes the Defense
21 Intelligence Officers whom I have mentioned, the special group who
22 ~~are~~ to the ISA and others.

23
24 We have set up one whole organization to support the joint
25 staff in JCS and we have a lot of direct contacts and we have had

~~any number of meetings with people in ISA, and that type of thing.~~
~~I would say that~~ I think we have done a great deal. At times, we
on the intelligence side would like to know more about where the
U.S. or its allies are doing some things militarily because we
fear that we are watching ~~the other side~~ and reporting ^{ON THE OTHER SIDE} that but
we are not able to judge what the motives of the other side were.
~~and~~ maybe they are in reaction to something the U.S. or its
friends have done. So that is a bit of a problem. I think things
are improved over what they were in 1975.

Mr. Fountain. Ambassador Spiers, let me first commend you
for the great job that you have done and I express my delight
that you are back here and serving in this capacity.

You have made mention of the fact that in many places you
have been one of the concerns of the leaders of government and
even people in other parts of the world has been the uncertainty
as to where America stands on certain issues and what it will do
and what position it will take in a given set of circumstances.
I think we all generally know some of them but you may think of
some of them. I wonder if you will give us some of the things
that were related to you as examples of that uncertainty -- what
were the concerns? Why did they feel that there was that

I got the same thing from the Shah of Iran when I was with
him last, how people here, he says, loo, upon America as the last
bastion of freedom on earth -- the last -- and if you don't take

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1 advantage of the opportunity to reassume the leadership which
2 you once had in the world, militarily and otherwise, we are gone
3 either by some cooperating and some fighting and becoming
4 subjugated.

5 Mr. Spiers. I think one of the things that causes great
6 concern, and let me be very frank on this, is the Executive
7 Branch/Congressional. One starts on the course of action that
8 there is not the consensus in the United States for staying with
9 and we recently had an interesting experience before I left
10 Ankara when we got a congressional group to visit and we had
11 established after some argument the Executive Branch position.
12 The Turks knew that there were differences that you and the
13 Executive Branch had but when the decision is made by the
14 President, it is made.

15 Here we had a congressional group and the range of opinion
16 that was expressed there, and it is perfectly natural I think,
17 it was deeply upsetting to these people. On the one hand you
18 had someone like Congressman Carr expressing one idea and another
19 Congressman with a completely opposite point of view. I remember
20 the chief of the general staff coming to me and saying, I mean
21 what the hell can we do here? I mean what can we rely on? What
22 can we expect? I mean how do we really make these links with you
23 that we can be sure will stick, and if they are confronted by
24 this measure of uncertainty this is the mirror image of our
25 problems.

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They have design policies which deal with the variety of contingencies, some of which may be mutually inconsistent and then we get unhappy about them for not adopting a clear mind when very often that is just a response to what they perceive as the absence of a clear sense of direction on the part of the United States. I don't mean this as just a Congressional/Executive Branch problem, it is a press problem. I mean we are confronted with the embargo issue here where you had a wide variety of opinion expressed in the press by public leaders, by congressional leaders, by people in the Executive Branch.

Now that is a condition of life in this country. My own view, I would take a broader range view of it. I think that we will get over it. I think that we will rediscover in this country a consensus about what America is all about but we ought to stand for, what we ought to aim for, what relations are important -- I think that we are still in the period of the aftermath of great and basic changes in the world that have created this unsettling and we are paying a price for it.

Zia's response does not surprise me. The one man who has really taken a courageous step is Sadat. If we don't follow through on support for Sadat, that is going to reaffirm the opinion in other parts of the world that you better not tie yourself too closely to this country, you can get the rug pulled out from under you.

Mr. Fountain. The interesting thing about that is all the

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1 leaders in that part of the world except maybe for Israel
2 understand how we operate here in this country better than any
3 of the other leaders in the world because this matter with the
4 Shah of Iran and saying the Congress and he knows how we operate,
5 I think you hit the nail on the head. Our very system itself
6 creates uncertainty.

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7 Mr. Spiers. Mystifying.

8 Mr. Fountain. System of checks and balances to find some
9 way to so condition these people that before they start jumping
10 to conclusions they would wait and see what kind of consensus we
11 do come to after the President and Congress and other branches.

12 Mr. Spiers. They can do a better job of predicting it.
13 One person, I said all of your predecessors have made mistakes.
14 You go talk to the State Department and think you have done the
15 job. I said this country is full of people and you better know
16 the people in the press, you better know the people on the Hill
17 and not just the Members of Congress but the staffs, you better
18 know the people in the Defense Department and then maybe you will
19 be able to make a more accurate assessment yourself about where
20 we are going.

21 Mr. Fountain. President Sadat has taken the position he has

22 Mr. Spiers. Sadat has done it. Sadat has done it.

23 Chairman Zablocki. In addition to becoming exposed to the
24 various news, I personally believe that, Ambassador.

25 Mr. Spiers. He was an old style man.

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Chairman Zablocki. He met with members of Congress; he was fully informed and advised of the problems, but he didn't report them. That is my opinion.

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Well, any further questions?

Mr. Fountain. I might just add that when we went to Turkey, I think Larry and Mr. Lagomarsino--Dr. Morgan was in charge -- fortunately those of us who went to Turkey, every one of us voted against the embargo which let us look at it in a more favorable light. We tried to explain to the members of parliament how our system operated, and not to become discouraged. I don't know how effective it all became. More friendly and sociable, and they came to understand that they had some friends who were there who had worked on their side. I don't have a turkey in my district, but I was not concerned about that.

Mr. Spiers. I will see if I can find you some.

Mr. Fountain. Se how bad we need the Turks.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Zablocki. I hope you didn't give them the impression that we are all in favor of lifting the embargo, because there is a real problem in getting that accomplished.

Mr. Fountain. At that time.

Chairman Zablocki. Gentlemen, thank you very much.

The subcommittee stands adjourned until Monday.

(Whereupon, at 12:57 p.m., the hearing was adjourned, to reconvene on Monday, February 11, 1980, at 2:00 p.m.)