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POLICY

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

In reply refer to:
1-35306/80/ct

23 September 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)


SUBJECT: Congressional Transcript Review

Directorate for Freedom of Information and Security Review (PAFOI)

Forwarded for your review, in accordance with existing procedures for Congressional transcript review, is testimony by Mr. Slocombe (DUSD/PP) before the HASC.

Bracketing of classified text was performed by Mr. Slocombe and concurred in by myself and a representative of JCS/J-5 (Nuclear Division).

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Date: SEP 10 2012


Charles E. Estes
Director, Strategic Policy
DUSD(PP)

Attachment
a/s

Office of the Secretary of Defense ^{5 USC. 552}
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS
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BRIEFING ON
IN THE MATTER OF STRATEGIC DOCTRINE
DATE.. Tuesday, September 5, 1980
PAGE... 1 ... TO ... 42 ... VOLUME ...

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CLASSIFIED BRIEFING ON STRATEGIC DOCTRINE

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Date: SEP 10 2012,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Committee On Armed Services
Washington, D. C.
Tuesday, September 9, 1980

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m.,
in Room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable
Melvin Price, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.

The Chairman. The Committee will be in order.

The first order of business this morning will be a
classified briefing on strategic doctrine. The briefer will
be the Honorable Walter Slocombe, Deputy Under Secretary for
Policy Planning, Department of Defense.

Mr. Slocombe, would you proceed with your briefing?

Mr. Slocombe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am grateful of the opportunity to talk to the
Committee about the countervailing strategy and to have this
opportunity to explain the background of the decision and its
significance, and I will be happy to take your questions when
I'm finished, or if you want to interrupt I will be glad to
take questions as I go along.

One of the major policy directives of the Administration
has been a review and restatement of our doctrine for target-
ing nuclear weapons. This began with the Nuclear Targeting

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Policy Review

1 which took place in 1977 and 1978. It was one of a series of
2 studies which was mandated by President Carter's decision in
3 August of 1977, called PD-18, which set out the basic guide-
4 lines for our defense policy, including our strategic targeting
5 policy. The policy review was conducted by a group in the
6 Defense Department. The executive director was Dr. Leon
7 Sloss, whom I think some members of the committee may be
8 familiar with. This produced a report, which the Secretary
9 of Defense forwarded to the President in November of 1978,
10 and thereafter the Defense Department began certain steps to
11 implement the basic thrust of the conclusions of the Target-
12 ing Policy Review.

Nuclear

13 Because some of the issues raised in the Targeting
14 Policy Review and the strategic doctrine that was established
15 as a result of it raised general issues beyond simply those
16 of implementation and the effective carrying out of a policy,
17 there were a series of SCC meetings conducted under NSC
18 auspices in the *spring and summer* ~~middle~~ of 1979.

19 There are a number of public statements, perhaps in most
20 detail in the FY 81 Defense Report, that have outlined the
21 major points of the countervailing strategy, although the term
22 itself, as near as I can discover, ~~first arose~~ was first
23 used, in the FY 80 Defense Report the previous year.

24 The announcement and implementation of this policy had,
25 therefore, begun well before PD-59 was actually issued, and it

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1 has produced some important ^{results} -- ~~at least~~ the early implementa-
2 tions have produced some important increases in our targeting
3 flexibility.

4 The White House decided that it was appropriate to codify
5 this policy, which had been stated in a variety of places, in
6 an authoritative fashion, and that was the reason for the
7 issuance of PD-59.

8 I want to summarize the policy which is reflected in the
9 PD briefly.

10 The fundamental strategic objective of the United States
11 is, and remains, deterrence, but not simply of massive attacks
12 on American cities. We need to consider also how to make our
13 nuclear power contribute to the deterrence of less than all
14 out attack and, in particular, how to disabuse the Soviets of
15 any belief that a large scale, but still limited, nuclear
16 exchange could work to their advantage. More generally, we
17 need to have forces and plans that will convince the Soviet
18 leadership that in reality they could not win a nuclear war,
19 whether or not they believe that such wars are in theory
20 winnable.

21 In general, this concern with being prepared for large
22 scale, but less than all out, exchanges is most applicable to
23 a situation in which a major war has already begun and in
24 which tactical nuclear weapons would quite likely already

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1 In such a context it would be critical to make clear to
2 the Soviet Union that there is no intermediate level of es-
3 calation at which they could be successful. Hence, our ex-
4 plicit enunciation of a countervailing strategy, both publicly
5 and in the formal Presidential Decision Memorandum.

6 The fundamental feature of a countervailing strategy is
7 the proposition that deterrence over the full range of con-
8 tingencies of concern requires, in an age of strategic parity,
9 that we have forces and the plans for their use such that the
10 USSR would recognize that no plausible outcome of aggression
11 would represent victory ^{by} ~~for~~ any plausible definition of
12 victory. That is, that at a variety of levels of exchange
13 their aggression would either be defeated or would result in
14 unacceptable costs that exceeded their gains.

15 ~~This capability of~~ Convincing the Soviets of this pro-
16 position is particularly important in the Alliance ^(NATO) context,
17 where we need a doctrine for our strategic forces that is
18 consistent with and supportive of our proclaimed willingness
19 to resort to nuclear escalation if conventional defense
20 fails and our repeated commitment of the ~~central~~ ^{central} strategic
21 ~~forces~~ to deterrence and defense in Europe. ✓
22 ✓

23 The Secretary of Defense outlined this policy to the ~~NATO~~ ^{NATO} ✓
24 Nuclear Planning Group in June, and I think it is safe to say
25 that the allies understand the way in which this policy helps

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We also need to make clear to the Soviets that we would not be forced by Soviet attacks on our ICBMs to choose between inaction and an all-out attack on Soviet cities.

The implications of these general doctrinal statements for our targeting plans are important. For ^{us} to meet these needs we must have plans and capabilities to use strategic forces in less than all out strikes that would exact a high cost in the things that the Soviet leadership values most: political and military control, military forces, both conventional and nuclear, and the industrial and economic capacity to sustain military operations.

These planning requirements are distinct from the need for planning for battlefield use of tactical nuclear weapons and for quite limited use of nuclear weapons, on the order of a few tens of weapons, essentially for signalling purposes.

Concurrently, to deter all-out Soviet attacks and to serve as a continuing deterrent to escalation and coercion, we need a survivable and enduring capability that is sufficient to attack a broader set of urban and industrial targets.

It is worth emphasizing that the strategy does not involve a reduction in our capability to launch a general attack on the full target set if that were judged to be the appropriate response.

Implementing this policy will require, and has required,

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1 introduction of more flexibility, that is, more options and
2 more choices.

3 In general, the thrust of our work ^{on increasing options} is not so much on
4 adding targets of a kind which we have not attacked in the
5 past, ^{OR} which have not been covered in the targeting in the
6 past, as ⁱⁿ providing more flexibility in having the option
7 to attack sub-groups of ^{the current total} these targets ~~set~~.

8 Work to this end is now going on within the Joint
9 Strategic Targeting ^{Planning Staff} ~~Service~~ and by SAC. New plan revisions
10 will provide significantly more options [for the use of 
11  weapons against selected classes of targets,
12 especially those of direct military significance.]

13 On the whole, this is an issue of the increased numbers
14 of options 

15  JS 3.3(b)(5) OSD 3.3(b)(5)

16 As I mentioned, we still retain the option of a massive
17 attack on the whole Soviet target system, military and civ-
18 ilian, should the President determine that this would be the
19 appropriate response.
20

21 Equally important, we must also act to improve our
22 ability to conduct a sustained exchange, which requires
23 improved endurance in our forces, and particularly in their
24 Command, Control and Communications and Intelligence support.
25

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1 means a new departure. The recognition of a need for flexi-
2 bility and for effective targeting of military and political
3 control targets, not just Soviet cities and industry, is by
4 no means new. The United States has never, at least never
5 since significant numbers of nuclear weapons were available,
6 had an employment policy based primarily on massive attacks
7 on Soviet cities. Instead, the United States historically has
8 always targeted military and control installations. However,
9 with the increased numbers of weapons and massive retalia-
10 tion having long since lost its effectiveness as an all-
11 purpose, universal deterrent, we need more explicit attention
12 to the need for flexibility in employment policy and its
13 contribution to deterrence.

14 Work in this field has, of course, been carried on for a
15 good many years. The PD-59 and the countervailing strategy
16 are in an important sense a direct evolutionary development
17 of the work done under Secretary Schlesinger around 1974,
18 which also emphasized the importance of increased flexib-
19 ility in our strategic capability.

20 Nor do we have any illusions about the character of the
21 problem that we are addressing. We have no illusions that a
22 large scale nuclear war would be either a sensible, ^{or} indeed,
23 a ^{feasible} ~~useable~~ deliberate instrument of national policy or a means
24 of obtaining victory for ourselves, nor, and this is
particularly important in the Alliance context and indeed

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generally, ^{can} ~~is~~ the cleverest strategy for the use of nuclear weapons or the most flexible options ^{be} ~~in~~ an adequate compensation for conventional ^{force} ~~weakness~~. Improving our conventional forces remains a high priority. ^R ~~A~~ Nor do we have any illusion that a nuclear war could be easily, or even probably, limited below maximum escalation.

→ The uncertainties, the tendency to overreact, the difficulties of maintaining command and control effectively during such an exchange, would create serious pressures for further escalation.

On the other hand, it is possible that the initial limited use of nuclear weapons would induce both sides to be very cautious and to pull back. That is, after all, the essence of the Alliance policy and the United States policy of seeking to control escalation, which remains an element of our doctrine. Of course, the limited nuclear options and, more, a variety of tactical options, remain relevant to this proposition. JS 3.3(b)(5) OSD 3.3(b)(5)

In this context, however, the context of PD-59, we are talking more about [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This would be involved, for example, in a hypothetical Soviet attack on U.S. ICBMs and some of the U.S. response options. Unquestionably, there would be very large numbers, probably millions, of fatalities on each side. However, these would be much less than the ^A ~~tens~~ of millions

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1 that would result from a large scale attack. No doubt there
2 would be ~~lead to~~ tremendous pressures to overreact. We
3 recognize the probability that escalation would be essentially
4 uncontrollable.

5 Nevertheless, it is legitimate and important to plan for
6 the possibility of such relatively large scale and yet still
7 less than all-out exchanges.

8 First of all, we cannot ignore the differences between
9 even the horrible carnage of such exchanges and the still
10 greater horrors of a truly all-out exchange.

11 Apart from any questions of credibility, which I think
12 are very important in this context, it would in a fundamental
13 sense be wrong to put ourselves in a position of having no
14 options other than surrender or all-out attack.

15 Second, the problem is not to deter believers in
16 assured destruction. The problem is to deter the Soviet
17 leadership, to deter Soviet actions. Deterrence, by defini-
18 tion, depends on shaping the potential enemy's predictions of
19 the consequences of a war if he embarks on aggression.

20 There is some reason to believe, some reason to be
21 concerned, that the Soviet leadership, or at least certain
22 circles within the Soviet leadership, take the possibility
23 of victory in such a war quite seriously. *Moreover, [we have*
24 business amounts to conclusive proof that *and what in this* the Soviet leader-
25

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
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1 fail and that in that event a relatively prolonged exchange
2 in which military targets would be of particular importance
3 would ensue.

4 We cannot ignore the Soviet mind set, even if we think
5 it is unrealistic. In a sense, a fundamental concept of the
6 countervailing strategy is to deal with Soviet concepts of
7 what a nuclear war might be like on their own terms, rather
8 than to try ~~argue against~~ what I think is the likely in-
9 effective course of attempting to argue, about the correct-
10 ness, one way or the other, of their concepts.

11 The PD builds, then, on an ongoing study of nuclear
12 doctrine. It is consistent with public statements which have
13 already been made, notably in the 1981 Defense Report, and
14 with the statements, the discussions of our doctrine in a
15 variety of forums. JS 3.3(b)(5) OSD 3.3(b)(5)

16 Its principal features are E formal statements of counter-



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
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We recognize that this is a long term effort. There are practical problems of implementation. [One of the principal reasons for the relative inflexibility of the SIOP historically has been the very difficulty of introducing a

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1 [Complex a planning task.]

2 We also recognize that it is important that the doctrine
3 not get ahead of our capabilities, especially the endurance of
4 Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence. The
5 doctrine is, however, an important restatement of U.S. policy
6 and is intended to maximize deterrence in a ^{period} ~~major~~ strategic
7 parity.

8 With that background, I will be happy to take the
9 Committee's questions.

10 Mr. Charles Wilson. Mr. Chairman.

11 The Chairman. Mr. Wilson.

12 Mr. Charles Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

13 Mr. Secretary, you read from PD-18. Is that what the
14 doctrine is that you've been talking about?

15 Mr. Slocombe. The doctrine is most fully stated in
16 PD-59, which was signed by the President in July of this year.
17 But the study, the so-called Nuclear Targeting Policy Review
18 Study, was initiated in connection with the President's
19 signature in August ~~in~~ ^{of} 1977, ~~in~~ PD-18, which states the
20 general military policy of the United States.

21 Mr. Charles Wilson. Would you briefly tell me what is
22 different about this than what our policy has been right
23 along in connection with our nuclear strategic policy?

24 Mr. Slocombe. Not a great deal is different, sir.
25 *about*

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1 Mr. Slocombe. It is very much an evolutionary develop-
2 ment. It is certainly the case that the elements of continu-
3 ity are far greater than the elements of change. I think
4 what is ^{most} important about ^{the doctrine} ~~it~~ is essentially in the elements of
5 continuity; ~~that~~ ^{It} emphasizes the United States has the
6 capability, and will make the plans to use that capability
7 within the limits of practicality, to ensure that there is no
8 course of action by which the Soviets could attain a
9 meaningful victory in the event of a nuclear war.

10 Mr. Charles Wilson. Mr. Secretary, you indicated after
11 you read from PD-18 that this would reassure our allies of
12 what our plans would be and how we would protect them with
13 our nuclear arsenal.

14 What specifically does it do to reassure our allies?

15 Mr. Slocombe. It makes clear that the United States
16 has options and will expand the range of those options so
17 that we have responses other than an all-out attack on the
18 full Soviet target system.

19 Mr. Charles Wilson. Haven't they known this all the
20 time, that we had options?

21 Mr. Slocombe. I hope that they have, and I believe that
22 they have, but they have found this restatement helpful.

23 I agree that it's ^{by} ~~no~~ means an entirely new idea.

24 Mr. Charles Wilson. The reason I am asking this ques-

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1 wondering if it's just something that's being put out for
2 political purposes or if it's something that has no meaning
3 whatsoever really, in effect, in relationship to what we've
4 been having as a policy ever since we've had nuclear weapons.
5 Obviously, they are for deterrence and they are intended to
6 be used if an emergency occurs. Not strategic weapons, but
7 the other nuclear weapons that we have that are available to
8 NATO I would assume that they are over there for the purpose
9 of reassuring our allies that they are available for use in
10 the event of an emergency.

11 I just wonder what significance this all is.

12 Mr. Slocombe. Mr. Wilson, I think people who work on
13 these issues, as the committee does, on a day-to-day basis
14 almost, are fully aware of these things. ^{However,} It is always sur-
15 prising to me the number of people who believe that the
16 United States at one time or another has relied on a doctrine
17 of primarily attacking Soviet cities.

18 I agree with you, there is nothing particularly
19 surprising in this doctrine to a person who has been follow-
20 ing the matter carefully. ^(P) I think it is useful to make it
21 clear, to restate the policy of the United States. I think
22 there is one difference...

23 Mr. Charles Wilson. I don't think the concern is what
24 we're going to attack. I think the concern is are we going
25 to use them at all. That's the concern of the American

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1 people. And I don't think anybody has defined it among the
2 rank and file of the American people as to whether it's going
3 to be people, or cities, or industry, or what will eventually
4 be the target.

5 Mr. Slocombe. The principal addressees of all these
6 messages are the Soviet leaders, and I think it is important
7 to make clear to them, it is important to make clear to our
8 allies and, for that matter, ~~I think~~ to the American public,
9 that the reason that we can credibly threaten to use these
10 terrible weapons is in part that there exists ^{if needed, it is} options for
11 their use other than an all-out attack.

12 To convince people that the weapons will be used, ^{if needed, it is} im-
13 portant ~~is necessary~~ that you have preplanned options which
14 will permit them to be used in a variety of circumstances in
15 which an all-out attack might not be the most appropriate
16 response. That's not to say that the consequences of such
17 use wouldn't be terrible. It would be. But it is, I believe,
18 a far more credible proposition that they would be used if
19 there are options for their use in a more limited way, and I
20 think that is an important function. ^(H) Obviously, the
21 principal deterrent effect is the character of the weapons
22 themselves. But to some degree the doctrine and the plans
23 for their use are also important elements of deterrence, and
24 that's what this effort and its predecessors are addressed

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1 Mr. Stratton. Mr. Chairman.

2 The Chairman. Mr. Stratton.

3 Mr. Stratton. Doctor, what is the classification of
4 this briefing?

5 Mr. Slocombe. I understood that it was to be at a Top
6 Secret level, that is, ^{Not} perhaps to go into code word intelli-
7 gence, ~~but not~~ ^{may} to go into the operational details.

8 Mr. Stratton. What you have told us is Top Secret?

9 Mr. Slocombe. I don't believe that what I have told you
10 is Top Secret, no, sir. *[Note: The particular passages marked above*
11 *are class. free as indicated. The general thrust is not classified.]*

12 Mr. Stratton. Isn't this, as Mr. Wilson has indicated,
13 essentially the same sort of thing that Secretary Schlesinger
14 developed some years ago?

15 Mr. Slocombe. Yes. I said so in the statement.

16 Mr. Stratton. The thing that bothers me is, what you
17 have been telling us is perfectly understandable, and I think
18 most of us were aware of it before you started. What bothers
19 me is what you have been telling us you ought to be telling
20 the general public.

21 I was in New York at the Democratic National Convention
22 when this thing was announced, and to one group of delegates
23 there supporting one particular candidate, whose name I
24 won't mention, you would have thought the world had crashed
in when we said that we were actually going to hit specific

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1 colleagues on the Hill, practically had a heart attack
2 because he said he hadn't been consulted, and it looked like
3 an enormous change in our policy.

4 Don't you think instead of coming up here and trying to
5 give us this rationale labelled "Top Secret", which is simply
6 the basic thing that you're trying to accomplish, it would be
7 a good idea to explain this to the American people?

8 Mr. Slocombe. Secretary Brown made what I think is a
9 reasonably important speech in Newport on August 20th, which
10 was an effort to explain it to the American people, and I
11 agree. There is a fairly --

12 Mr. Stratton. He's not very good at expressing --

13 The Chairman. I would like to clear up one thing.

14 The Secretary is here at the invitation of the committee
15 on this subject.

16 Mr. Stratton. I don't hesitate on that invitation, but
17 what I am saying is I think it's important that the American
18 people ought to know what our policy is because obviously
19 they don't, and the so-called "doves," and the anti-nuclear
20 people, the people who are always cutting defense budgets,
21 are the ones who are making the most fuss about this.

22 Mr. Slocombe. There are ^{such} people. As I said in response
23 to Mr. Wilson's question, I'm always surprised with the
24 number of people on both sides, if you will, of the defense

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1 what our strategic policy has been for a long time.

2 The President has discussed this. It was discussed in
3 reasonable detail in the Defense Report.

4 But I agree with you. One of the reasons why doctrinal
5 statements are important is that they play an educational
6 role. I also hope they play an educational role with the
7 Russians, who are the principal addressees.

8 Mr. Stratton. Let me ask you another question.

9 It's my understanding that regardless of what our
10 specific policy may be and what specific changes you have
11 instituted General Ellis, the head of the Strategic Air
12 Command, has indicated that we don't, in fact, have the
13 equipment available today to put this strategy into effect.

14 Is that correct?

15 Mr. Slocombe. It is certainly the case that General
16 Ellis supports the concept of increased flexibility and
17 supports the concept of the countervailing strategy. ~~Gen-~~
18 ~~eral Ellis has~~, I find every time I talk to him, a sense of
19 awe at the incredible responsibilities which ^{GEN. ELLIS} ~~he~~ bears per-
20 sonally, ^{GEN. ELLIS} ~~and he~~ has emphasized to us that we have to
21 recognize ^{and} what is not in dispute ^{and} that there are severe
22 practical limitations, particularly in the area of ~~command~~,
23 ~~control~~, ~~communications~~ and ~~intelligence~~ endurance and sur-
24 vivability, on being able to proceed rapidly to carry out all

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1 Mr. Stratton. We don't have the accuracy yet, do we?
2 We don't have the yield, do we? We will after we get the MX
3 presumably, but not now.

4 Mr. Slocombe. The problem, Mr. Stratton, is not that
5 you have it or you don't have it. It is certainly the case
6 that General Ellis is uncomfortable with the state of the
7 strategic balance. I have heard him so testify to Con-
8 gressional committees and I assume he has so testified to
9 this committee.

10 But I think in terms of implementing the countervailing
11 strategy his concern is much more -- and he has to speak for
12 himself -- with the state of Communications and Intelligence
13 and also with the particular problem of the incredible com-
14 plexity of a large scale nuclear plan, which makes it
15 difficult to fine tune an extremely complicated set of sub-
16 options. But, obviously, General Ellis will have to speak for
17 himself as to what his particular concerns are.

18 The Chairman. Mr. Dickinson.

19 Mr. Dickinson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

20 Mr. Secretary, you are here at our invitation, and I
21 was trying to find out during the course of your comments why
22 you are here. I listened to what you said, but in trying to
23 sift out what you're saying from what we already knew I have
24 difficulty in coming up with anything.

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1 You say that the recently announced policy as to target-
2 ing is not substantially different from what it had been
3 before and that we have a capability of responding in
4 variations, or degrees, and if we ever decide to use nuclear
5 weapons it may not be an ICBM exchange.

6 If that is correct, what else have you said that we
7 didn't already know? We know we have the Hawk. We know we
8 have the Pershing. We tried to get the Enhanced Radiation
9 Weapon, the so-called neutron bomb, that the administration
10 killed. All of these were designed for and intended to be
11 graduated responses in, hopefully, surgical precision uses.
12 But when you boil down what you've said so far, what have you
13 said now, so that I can understand why I'm here and we're
14 taking your time and you're taking mine?

15 Mr. Slocombe. I am not surprised that the committee
16 does not find, and if I may say so I am pleased that the
17 Committee does not find, any surprises in PD-59.

18 The policy which it enunciates was stated publicly, as
19 I said, recently and in considerable detail, for example, in
20 the FY 81 Defense Report.

21 It is not the purpose of PD-59 to surprise people, but
22 to state the policy of the United States on these matters.

23 I agree with you, sir, that there are very important
24 elements of continuity in what's been stated. If I can

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1 in emphasis are.

2 One of the most important, I think, is trying to focus
3 on what the Soviet view of the problem is because that's what
4 we have to influence. We have to influence their judgments
5 about the risks of aggression. ~~It is not enough to say, as~~
6 ~~I believe, sir, it is a misnomer to talk about the surgical~~
7 ~~use of nuclear weapons.~~

8 Mr. Dickinson. I agree with that. But that's what
9 we're talking about.

10 I've sat in on disarmament talks in Geneva and we have
11 sat in on SALT talks, and certainly the Soviets understand
12 that we retain the option of either using ICBMs, or Pershings
13 or Hawks, or whatever, and that we also retain the option of
14 retargeting if we deem it necessary, and that we don't
15 necessarily go against military targets or necessarily
16 against civilian targets. It could be all, or either, or a
17 combination of both.

18 I don't understand the impact or the import of any new
19 statement on PD-59 or even what you're telling us. It all
20 boils down to so what, what's the difference from what we
21 have had.

22 Mr. Slocombe. I understand it, and you understand it,
23 and I'm sure the committee understands it, but, as Mr.
24 Stratton was saying earlier, there are a lot of people who
25 don't understand what our strategic policy is.

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1 Mr. Dickinson. Why is it important? I guess maybe I
2 understand why some people would be critical. But the
3 Soviets understand it.

4 Mr. Slocombe. I believe that they do.

5 Mr. Ichord. Would the gentleman yield on that point?

6 Mr. Dickinson. Yes.

7 Mr. Ichord. If you will tell us the changes. I've sat
8 here, Mr. Slocombe and I feel the same as the gentleman from
9 Alabama. I think we're all just wasting our time. I haven't
10 learned anything. Let me put it this way: I think what the
11 gentleman from Alabama wants to know is what specifically
12 is the change in SIOP 5-D. If you will start getting into
13 that maybe we will be listening and learning something and
14 it will be worth our while being here.

15 Mr. Slocombe. The new revisions of the SIOP will, as a
16 result of ~~At the beginning I talked about~~ the beginning
17 of the implementation of the policy, will include signifi-
18 cantly increased numbers and kinds of options that will be
19 available when the ^{revised} plans are completed and put into effect.

20 which

21 There

22 will be significantly increased numbers of sub-options, of

23 which I think you are

24 probably aware, ~~of these options~~ JS 3.3(b)(5) OSD 3.3(b)(5)

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1 The Chairman. The time of the gentleman from Alabama
2 has expired.

3 Mr. Dickinson. Mr. Chairman, just for the record, I was
4 using the word "Hawk." I really thought the Improved Hawk had
5 a nuclear capability, but the staff tells me that I omitted
6 Lance, which does. Just for the record, I correct that.

7 Thank you.

8 The Chairman. Mr. Brinkley.

9 (No response.)

10 The Chairman. Mr. Dan Daniel.

11 Mr. Dan Daniel. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

12 The Chairman. Mr. Kazen.

13 Mr. Kazen. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

14 The Chairman. Mr. Carr.

JS 3.3(b)(5)

15 Mr. Carr. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

16 Mr. Slocombe, just to get off from Mr. Ichord's point of
17 departure, as I understand it, we are divided into [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED]
19 [REDACTED]
20 Mr. Slocombe. That is correct.

21 Mr. Carr. As I understand it, the major attack options
22 under the current SIOP are [REDACTED] and the
23 [REDACTED]
24 [REDACTED]

OSD 3.3(b)(5)

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1 Mr. Slocombe. The numbers are right for [REDACTED]

2 [REDACTED] I think [REDACTED] is about right for [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED] the plan which is now in effect.

4 Mr. Carr. So the [REDACTED] there are about

5 [REDACTED] of them, and then there's [REDACTED] as

6 you said.

7 Mr. Slocombe. We're talking about the [Soviet case].

8 Mr. Carr. I understand there are some [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED]

10 Mr. Slocombe. Yes. The number of combinations and

11 permutations gets very large [REDACTED]

12 [REDACTED]

13 Mr. Carr. I understand. But we're just talking now

14 about [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED]

16 Mr. Slocombe. Those numbers are in the ballpark, sir.

17 Mr. Carr. Then there are these [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED]

20 Mr. Slocombe. As I say, by the time you put together

21 all the combinations of theoretical possibilities the numbers

22 get very large.

23 Mr. Carr. Okay.

24 My point, though, is that if you put the permutations

25 together you come up with a factor of what [REDACTED]

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1 Mr. Slocombe. [The numbers are very large. But that's
2 kind of a mathematical trick, not a factor of strategic
3 significance.] JS 3.3(b)(5) OSD 3.3(b)(5)

4 Mr. Carr. I understand.

5 Mr. Slocombe. What we're trying to do [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED]
7 [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED]

9 That's the kind of thing that's being talked about. The
10 difference between that and just [REDACTED]
11 [REDACTED]

12 Mr. Carr. [The number of combinations, while perhaps
13 not having a practical significance, have significance as a
14 measure, to your testimony, as to flexibility.] In other
15 words, under the new idea of the SIOP will the number of the
16 permutations double, or increase by 50 percent, or do you
17 have any number?

18 Mr. Slocombe. The number of permutations will always be
19 very large. But the point is that the number of rationally
20 chosen objective attacks will also increase very substanti-
21 ally. For example, [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED]
24 [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED]

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JS 3.3(b)(5)

OSD 3.3(b)(5)

Mr. Carr. You and I can talk about this some other time, but I did have a couple of items before the five-minute runs out, two final questions.

One, I think the point you do say, that the major element of change is a new focus on the Soviet view. The popular press reports Samuel Huntington doing a major study in that area. Was that a key element?

Mr. Slocombe. He was the manager of that part of the study which led to PD-18, yes. JS 3.3(b)(5) OSD 3.3(b)(5)

Mr. Carr. We don't need to get into a long response here, but I think the Committee would like to know upon what did he base his study? That would be something which was not in the popular press, and maybe your office could supply that to the Committee, if you don't have time to give it here.

Mr. Slocombe. I could give it very briefly, ^{now,} ~~though~~... ~~that~~ The sources that we rely on for our understanding of how the Soviets view a nuclear war are, first of all, what they say about it, sometimes in public

Second,

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1.5-1 [REDACTED] and ^{third,} to some degree from the
2 character of their forces. The details of how one constructs
3 ~~a sense of Soviet doctrine from these sources~~
4 ~~are from that~~ are complicated. But those are the main sources.

5 Mr. Carr. Thank you. JS 3.3(b)(5) OSD 3.3(b)(5)

6 The Chairman. Mr. Whitehurst.

7 Mr. Whitehurst. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

8 The Chairman. Mr. Beard.

9 Mr. Beard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

10 Mr. Secretary, let me make sure I understand.

11 The new American strategy involves a nuclear attack
12 launched not at the enemy's population centers, but now at
13 the ballistic missile launchers, the strategic air bases,
14 nuclear submarine ports, military command control centers,
15 and, I think [REDACTED] et cetera.

16 Is that kind of in general the new flexibility that
17 we're discussing? JS 3.3(b)(5) OSD 3.3(b)(5)

18 Mr. Slocombe. No, because that's not new. The U.S.
19 strategy involves that as a possibility, and that was true
20 both before and after the issuance of PD-59.

21 Mr. Beard. What is the mechanical situation? This is
22 pretty naive probably on my part to ask.

23 In other words, there's not a mechanical aspect of
24 saying, all right, we want to place more emphasis on
25 ballistic missile launchers, et cetera, and military targets
versus population targets, so you guys out there with the

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1 ICBMs and everything change the targeting?


2 Mr. Slocombe. That's right. As I said earlier, the
3 problem is as much to break up the current large sets of
4 targets, for example, all military targets, into relatively
5 smaller packages. All the military targets essentially
6 are already in the target base in varying degrees ~~of attack~~.

7 Mr. Beard. There are actual missiles or actual weapon
8 systems that are there that are assigned to those particular
9 targets?

10 Mr. Slocombe. Yes, that's right.

11 Mr. Beard. So in other words, you pretty well have them
12 covered. OSD 3.3(b)(5) JS 3.3(b)(5)

13 Mr. Slocombe. That's right. But the point is that in
14 general, as I'm sure the committee is aware



15
16
17
18
19 and that in
20 an important sense is what PD-59 is -- it ^{the idea} hasn't invented --
21 but it's to keep up the impetus to do this.

22 Mr. Beard. A sub-option then would be like in the heat
23 of an exchange somebody were to push a button we would have
24 some sub-options.

25 Just from a mechanical aspect, how much time does it

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1 take to change the direction to fulfill one of those options,
2 to change the targeting of an ICBM or to change the target-
3 ing of whatever?

4 Mr. Slocombe. To change the targeting of one ICBM can
5 be done very, very quickly. OSD 3.3(b)(2),(4),(5)

6 Mr. Beard. For example, how long?

7 Mr. Slocombe. In, strictly speaking [REDACTED] 2.

8 To change the targeting of the whole of a significant
9 number of weapons, however, is a much more complicated
10 operation. JS 3.3(b)(5)

11 To give an example, and let's take a straightforward
12 one, the Minuteman III has three warheads. If you are
13 trying to plan for a general attack on the whole target
14 structure you can take that Minuteman III [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED]
17 [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED]
19 [REDACTED]
20 [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED]
22 [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED]
24 [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED]

OSD 3.3(b)(5)

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1 That's a greatly oversimplified example, but it is
2 essentially that problem which is one of the important limi-
3 tations on the flexibility of the system and which requires
4 that to make major sub-options you have to do the planning in
5 advance, and that is a very time consuming process.

6 Mr. Beard. Those options and those sub-options, with
7 the number of weapon systems that we may have and warheads
8 that we may have versus the number of different potential
9 optional targets that they may have, do we have the time and
10 do we have the numbers to make those options feasible options?

11 Mr. Slocombe. It is a very difficult task to plan

12 [REDACTED]
13 [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED] OSD 3.3(b)(5)

15 The problem is not so much concocting the attacks that
16 you're interested in but, *making sure that you do* not destroying the effectiveness of
17 the force which is withheld as a result of making this new
18 plan. That requires that the planning be done in advance.

19 The planning cycle for SIOP now is something on the order of

20 [REDACTED] That is, if you and I think of a bright idea

21 that we would like to see instituted as a sub-option and get
22 people interested in it it takes, with the best will in the
23 world, [REDACTED] for that to show up in a real plan.

24 That's the reason why it is important to continue to press
25 in this field and why it has to be done, on the whole, on a

OSD 3.3(b)(5)

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preplanned basis for large options. [For small attacks it's



Mr. Beard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. JS 3.3(b)(5)

The Chairman. Are there any other questions?

Mr. Lloyd. Mr. Chairman. OSD 3.3(b)(5)

The Chairman. Mr. Lloyd.

Mr. Lloyd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Slocombe, I won't go into the philosophy. I concur with the remarks that have been made. I think that you clearly understand the thrust of the attitude of this committee at this point, which is, I will say it briefly and then will go on, why are we here in the first place.

But perhaps you can answer a question for me with regards to that why, and that is: On this presentation do you plan to make any kind of a press release to the public?

Mr. Slocombe. After this presentation?

Mr. Lloyd. Yes, sir.

Mr. Slocombe. Certainly not.

Mr. Lloyd. I would have said that that would be a beneficial approach, saying you made this utterance to the Armed Services Committee today defining this kind of a policy. I would think that would have some positive effect.

In other words, we have very little that is new in your

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... as I understand it. You have

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1 clearly articulated in your presentation that of course this
2 Committe should know all of these things. I don't set myself
3 up as an expert, any more than the rest of these people do,
4 but I do say that when you come and take the time of this
5 number of Representatives there has to be a benefit to some-
6 body. I'm not really sure we have benefitted anybody today,
7 other than the fact that you got to speak for a while. As a
8 matter of fact, it was exactly 26 minutes, if you would like
9 to know. I watched it very carefully because I kept my eye
10 on it, and finally it was down to, well, I'll use that as the
11 criteria, and obviously I'm negatively oriented to where we
12 are today. I really don't know what we are talking about,
13 other than we seem to have reiterated that which not only
14 obviously you know.

15 I did ask for your background because I was interested
16 in whether or not you had ever served in the military. You
17 obviously have not. So that took care of that. And I was
18 interested in the presentation you were making, the back-
19 grounds which you were bringing, the capabilities which you
20 bring to this presentation.

21 So all in all I guess my question is, simply stated,
22 could you, accepting the fact I really don't know, and while
23 I'm negatively oriented I want you to clearly know that my
24 mind is definitely open, would you tell me what we have
25 accomplished for the last hour? Assume that I'm not very

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1 bright -- that might well be -- or maybe I didn't pay
2 attention. Just tell me what we have accomplished. I want
3 to go away from here with a good feeling.

4 Mr. Slocombe. I am here at the request of the committee
5 to explain what is in PD-59 and what the nature of our
6 strategic policy is. I have tried to do that to the best of
7 my ability. It would be surprising --

8 Mr. Lloyd. Let me say this, Mr. Slocombe: What do you
9 want me to take away from here then? When you say "at the
10 request of the committee," you do understand that I, Jim
11 Lloyd, never made that request. That was made at some other
12 level. So that's not really a big issue with me. I think
13 you understand that. What I want you to do is tell me, Jim
14 Lloyd. I'm very much interested in national defense. I'm
15 interested in what you're doing. I'm interested in your
16 interface relationships, not only as it pertains to the
17 legislative but as it pertains to the military. I am
18 interested in those things.

19 So what do I come away with?

20 Mr. Slocome. I hope you come away, sir, with two
21 propositions: One, that the basic strategic policy of the
22 United States is to make clear to the Soviet Union that any
23 course of aggression which led to the use of nuclear weapons
24 would not result in a Soviet victory, and that we believe

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1 Second, with respect to the current controversy about
2 PD-159 I hope that you come away with the sense, ^{and} ~~it~~ it is
3 the correct sense. ^I I'm sorry if it's boring ^A but it is the
4 correct sense ^A that this policy is not a radical departure
5 from prior policies, is an evolving continuity and, indeed,
6 ~~that~~ it has already been stated in some detail, both publicly and,
7 of course, to the House Armed Services Committee.

8 I would be troubled if I were in the position of coming
9 up here and having to explain to the House Armed Services
10 Committee that the United States' strategic doctrine is
11 something that they hadn't already heard about.

12 Mr. Lloyd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

13 The Chairman. Mr. Badham.

14 Mr. Badham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

15 I just have a couple of things to say, and I would like
16 to get them into the record.

17 Mr. Secretary, you made the comment about the awe that
18 General Ellis feels. All of us know General Ellis and have
19 met with him, and I would have a feeling of awe too if I was
20 responsible for sending 30-year-old airplanes with 30-year-
21 old pilots, carrying gravity bombs ^{of} ~~of~~ nuclear silo over the
22 Soviet Union as part of my responsibility in case of an
23 attack, and I think that is a very great responsibility.

24 The implication -- I believe it's true -- that our
25

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1 cities of the Soviet Union, no matter what we say, and the
2 implication then of the press announcement on this business
3 was clearly reported in the press press that MAD was being
4 scrapped and that MAD was civilian targeting and that that was
5 going to change.

6 Now, if we are telling the Soviets that in the past we
7 used an MAD policy but now we're strong enough that we don't
8 have to target cities but can destroy the military - indus-
9 trial complex of the Soviet Union so as to defeat the Soviet
10 Union no matter what they might do, the message, if that was
11 the message, that was reasonably clear in the press report,
12 was not clear to those of us who know different, and it must,
13 therefore, be regarded by the Soviet Union as a bunch more
14 talk, just plain talk, and meaningless talk, because nobody
15 believed that anyway or was in a position to believe it. So
16 that makes it seem as though it was political.

17 Then you went on to say that we get their targeting
18 philosophy and policy from what they say, assuming that they,
19 like Harold Brown in the business of Stealth says, "We can't
20 lie to the press. We can only tell the committee, "No
21 comment," but we can't say "No comment" to the press, or
22 like President Carter, who says "I'll never lie to you."

23 Mr. Slocombe. I didn't say that.

24 Mr. Badham. Are we assuming, then, that the Soviet
25

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lie to us?

Mr. Slocombe. Sir, I did not say that we get our information about the Soviet targeting policy only from what they say publicly. We get it from a variety of Soviet views on military strategy.. We get it from a variety of sources: in part what they write publicly about the subject,

OSD 3.3(b)(5)

The obvious reason that -- JS 3.3(b)(5)

Mr. Badham. If we don't get a better and faster indication of what the Soviets are doing in a classified sense than what Harold Brown, Secretary Brown, our Secretary of Defense, claimed we knew prior to Afghanistan then we're in pretty deep trouble and have to move very fast unless we're going to believe what they say in the press.

I yield back.

The Chairman. Any further questions? Mr. Dan Daniel?

Mr. Dan Daniel. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Bob Daniel.

Mr. Robert Daniel. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I'll be

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1 I just think it would be well to characterize General
2 Ellis' feeling in the way that he does, rather than express-
3 ing some general doubts about the adequacy of the assets
4 under his command. In his own words he says that: "It is
5 apparent that the principal of maintaining countervailing
6 strategy cannot be supported in the 1979 - 1986 time period,"
7 and in other descriptions of his position on this question he
8 has used the word "incapable." So I know that he will do
9 the best he can, but his doubts are pretty grave about being
10 able to carry out this new policy.

11 Mr. Slocombe. I agree ^{that} with General Ellis ^{...} I said
12 earlier that I was in awe of General Ellis' responsibilities
13 and General Ellis personally. I know that he has grave
14 concerns, and he is, of course, the appropriate witness on
15 what those concerns are. I don't presume to speak for him.

16 Mr. Robert Daniel. Thank you.

17 The Chairman. Are there any other questions?

18 Mr. Ichord. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

19 The Chairman. Mr. Ichord.

20 Mr. Ichord. I only have one question of Mr. Slocombe.

21 The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Bailey, has been
22 asking witnesses a series of questions as to the capabilities
23 of the U.S. forces vis-a-vis the Soviet and the Warsaw Pact
24 forces, both in the strategic, overall strategic nuclear

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1 It's always hard to answer those questions because of
2 the various scenarios involved, and personally I happen to
3 have a very pessimistic view of the capability of the U.S.
4 in most of those areas vis-a-vis the Soviets.

5 My question to you is: I have heard all of this. What
6 changes, specific changes, have you made in procurement
7 plans to implement SIOP-5-D?

8 Mr. Slocombe. I don't think there are any ^{procurement} changes that
9 you can say are particularly related to the SIOP ^{SD redesign.} But the
10 procurement plans that are underway are intended to ^{and} and will
11 if carried out ^{substantially} substantially enhance our ability to carry
12 out the countervailing strategy. For example, the increased
13 survivability and accuracy of the MX is very important. The
14 increased accuracy and penetrativity of the ALCMs is
15 important. The increased range of the Trident missiles, the
16 submarines which will carry Trident missiles is important.

17 Mr. Ichord. All of those ^(programs) were in operation before the
18 change in SIOP 5-D, were they not?

19 Mr. Slocombe. Yes, ^{those programs} ~~they~~ were. But both the SIOP and
20 our procurement plans are a long term effort, and the
21 procurement plans conform well to the overall strategy of
22 being able to have flexibility in the forces. There is a
23 great deal of debate, at least in other circles, about
24 whether or not we need the kind of flexibility which some of
25 these weapons systems give us, and the principal reason that

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1 we need to have these weapons systems is to have this
2 increased flexibility and the increased endurance and sur-
3 vivability.

4 Mr. Ichord. Where is the money for more C³? Where is
5 the money for more reconnaissance? I do not see any monies
6 in the new budget. I don't even hear it being talked about.

7 Mr. Slocombe. There are significant improvements
8 underway in the C³ area, and I agree with the implication in
9 your question that that's one of the areas where we need to
10 do perhaps more even than in the forces area. There are
11 significant programs underway.

12 One of the problems is that the problem is inherently
13 very difficult. It is not easy to make a redundant, and
14 mobile, and flexible C³ system. But we're working on
15 things like increased retargeting capability. On the whole,
16 you can only make communications systems survivable by
17 redundancy, increased numbers, and increased hardness of the
18 communications systems.

19 Mr. Ichord. Is there any more money in the budget for
20 nuclear materials, for example?

21 I've been advised that if we don't start putting money
22 in the budget for nuclear materials we are not going to have
23 any money to continue our nuclear weapons program.

24 Mr. Slocombe. That's an issue which is under review,
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1 Mr. Ichord. You admit that's the fact?

2 Mr. Slocombe. I'm admitting the fact that the question
3 of special nuclear materials procurement is under review, yes,
4 sir.

5 Mr. Dickinson. If we don't do something we're not going
6 to have the capability to produce the warheads at the time we
7 need them. Is that right?

8 Mr. Slocombe. It's a little more complicated than that.

9 My own personal view -- and I can only speak personally
10 on this -- is that there are some actions that it seems me it
11 would be appropriate to take to increase SNM production so
12 that we are confident of our ability to do that and, in a
13 sense more important, so that we are confident that the
14 availability of SNM is not a limitation on our options for
15 the future.

16 The Chairman. Mr. Hopkins.

17 Mr. Hopkins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

18 I would just simply remind our guest that I am somewhat
19 perplexed, like some of my colleagues, but I understand that
20 you are here as a guest, an invited guest, of this committee.
21 I appreciate your coming.

22 I would say to you though that I have personally found
23 your Top Secret briefing underwhelming, and I trust that the
24 leadership of this committee will continue to provide us
-- with more of these mountaintop experiences.

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Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Dan Daniel, do you have any questions?

Mr. Dan Daniel. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Mr. Bennett. Let me say something.

The Chairman. Mr. Bennett.

Mr. Bennett. I just think this man deserves my appreciation at least for him coming here. You were invited to come here before the committee, and I think most members of the committee agree, though it's not the most exciting thing on earth, these events have to do with our duty. I'm glad you came, for one, and I appreciate your coming and making the explanation that you did. Maybe I'm very simplistic. But I appreciate your coming. I think you've tried to do a good job. Thanks a lot for coming.

Mr. Slocombe. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. Mr. Carr.

Mr. Carr. Mr. Chairman, I want to associate myself with the remarks of my friend from Florida.

I think if this committee is disgruntled about this hearing we ought to talk about it as a committee. Perhaps the notices that go out on committee hearings ought to say at whose invitation and what the parameters of the briefing are. I have been to a lot of hearings here where I simply

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1 maybe off in my office I read more about the subject than my
2 colleagues had. But I don't think that that's any excuse to
3 heap abuse on a particular witness who has come here and
4 carried out his assignment.

5 I appreciate your being here, Mr. Slocombe.

6 Mr. Slocombe. Thank you, sir.

7 Mr. Brinkley. Mr. Chairman.

8 The Chairman. Mr. Brinkley.

9 Mr. Brinkley. Mr. Chairman, I simply rise to associate
10 myself with the remarks of Mr. Hopkins of Kentucky.

11 Thank you.

12 The Chairman. Thank you.

13 If there are no further questions, thank you very much,
14 Mr. Secretary. We appreciate your candor and the information
15 you have given to the committee.

16 Mr. Slocombe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

17 The Chairman. We thank you for coming.

18 (Whereupon, at 11:09 a.m., the committee recessed, to
19 reconvene in open session.)
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