

Ch. II (40)

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HEET

SUBJECT: Logistic Support of Hostilities in Korea (U) .

PROBLEM: To recommend the time at which an order to divert major items of equipment and ammunition from Southeast Asia to support possible hostilities in Korea should be made.

DISCUSSION:

JS 3.3(b)(5)

1. Ground Forces

[REDACTED]

of these items are common to those being used in Southeast Asia and current production and funding levels will not meet requirements for both areas simultaneously. Principal shortages exist in areas of combat vehicles and helicopters, although significant amounts of tactical and support vehicles and electronics and communications equipment would be required to fill all Eighth Army requirements.

[REDACTED]

d. Current distribution patterns for major equipment and ammunition are such that only those supplies are being

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JS 3.3(b)(6)

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supplied to Southeast Asia as are required to meet combat consumption and to modernize the RVNAF. CONUS stocks of major items have been drawdown, as have been those in Europe to the point where no further assets can be considered available from these sources. OSD-approved funding programs to replace items already drawdown below currently approved levels are adequate to replace only those required to return stocks to the authorized base line or peacetime levels. Continued hostilities in Southeast Asia will delay replacement of drawdowns. Significantly increased ammunition availability from production will require at least 180 days. 7-

e. Under the current logistic situation major items and ammunition relief for Korea can come only from diversion of stocks currently en route or programmed for Southeast Asia. Given the number of ships en route to Vietnam at any given time diversion could be accomplished on an average so that some relief could reach Korean ports within 1 week after the decision is made. These will not be balanced loads but should afford some help. Even this relief, however, would require action by the ROK Government to commandeer trucks, railcars, materiel handling equipment, and manpower. ✓

JS 3.3(b)(6)

2. Naval Forces

a. The current logistic status of the US Navy in the Korean area is good. Additional ships moved into the area would bring their own mobile logistic ships with them.

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JS 3.3(b)(5)

[REDACTED]

c. POL. Using the following ships supported for planning purposes:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>
CVA	2
DD	10
AO	2
AE	1
AFS	1

[REDACTED]

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to Japan would be required to efficiently sustain the support in the Korean area after that time. If force levels in WESTPAC are increased, additional procurement and resupply initiation would be necessary within 30 to 45 days of the time of increasing the forces.

d. Food and General Supply Items. Supplies in and en route to WESTPAC are adequate to support all the forces currently in WESTPAC. The sustained operation of forces in NEA will merely necessitate redirecting a proportionate share of the supplies to NEA from CONUS.

[REDACTED]

JS 3.3(b)(6)

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JS 3.3(b)(6)

[REDACTED]

JS 3.3(b)(5)

[REDACTED]

3. Air Forces. The logistics support base in Korea has been examined utilizing both the existing force structure and a force structure increase of two additional F-4 wings.

(1) Prompt initiation of resupply action to transport additional JP-4 fuel from external and in-country sources to primarily those bases not resupplied by pipeline. Sufficient cargoes in the WESTPAC area between 19 April and 10 May are available for diversion. In-country transport capability is adequate unless limited by enemy air attack.

(2) External fuel tanks for F-4 aircraft will have to be brought in from 5th Air Force sources to satisfy total requirements.

b. With regard to the expanded force structure, it too can be supported for 45 days at standard planning factor rates. Principle considerations and/or extraordinary actions required would be:

(1) Immediate initiation of resupply action to transport additional JP-4 fuel from external and in-country sources to primarily those bases not served by pipeline.

[REDACTED]

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(3) External fuel tanks will have to be brought in from 5th Air Force sources to satisfy total F-4 aircraft requirements.

(4) With minor exceptions, munitions on hand in Korea, which total 16,361 tons, can easily support the in-place force of 125 aircraft for 45 days. The augmented force of 233 aircraft can also be supported with but a few diversions of en route munitions ships to fill minor shortfalls. Diversion of sufficient tonnage to support the augmented force for an additional 45 days would have only a slight impact on Southeast Asia support, at most reducing the current 45 day stock level by approximately 5 days and requiring some temporary adjustment for specific items.

CONCLUSIONS:

[REDACTED]

JS 3.3(b)(6)

in other major items would be equally difficult in view of lack of funding or of an active production base. Korean requirements, therefore, must be filled through selective diversion of the Southeast Asia pipeline but scheduled diversion need not be ordered prior to an additional overt act on the part of the North Koreans.

[REDACTED]

JS 3.3(b)(5)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That diversions from Southeast Asia not be made until there is a US decision to retaliate or until the North Koreans commit an additional overt act.

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2. That selective diversions of major items of equipment, POI, and ammunition be made from Southeast Asia until shortages in Korea are filled and production can be accelerated to meet requirements.

3. That mandatory shipments to Southeast Asia be limited to replacement of consumption until the above has been accomplished. This includes a stand-down on RVNAF modernization until Korean requirements are satisfied and imposition of Authorized Supply Rates for ammunition as required.

4. That all administrative preparations to include allocation of funds be made at once to increase ammunition production to cover both requirements, but that contracts not be awarded until further developments so dictate.

JS 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)

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