

**FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA**  
Unauthorized disclosure subject to  
administrative and criminal sanctions  
Handle as Restricted Data on foreign  
dissemination. Section 11, Atomic  
Energy Act 1954

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 16 2012

**SUBJECT: Strategy Guidance**

Strategy Guidance, as called for in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting system and referenced in my memorandum of 15 January 1970, subject: "FY 72-76 Fiscal Guidance Memorandum," is enclosed. It reflects relevant policy decisions communicated by the President in National Security Decision Memoranda and other pronouncements and provides general guidance affecting all aspects of the DOD program.

Some major policy issues affecting over-all strategy and force planning have not been resolved and are therefore referred to but not definitively treated in the Strategy Guidance Memorandum. A number of these issues are currently under study, as for example by National Security Study Memoranda and in SALT preparations.

Volume II of JSOP should be submitted to arrive by 25 February 1970.

David Barker

**As stated**

12-X-0001

3

Nicht

OSR DOC 10-2

12-M-0437  
0502

Sec Def Cont Mr. X

Copy 80 of 80 Copies

Page 1 of 1 Pages

~~TOP SECRET~~

1

STRATEGY GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM

January 28, 1970

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 16 2012

REPRODUCTION OF THIS DOCUMENT  
IN WHOLE OR IN PART IS PROHIBITED  
EXCEPT WITH THE PERMISSION OF THE  
ISSUING OFFICE

Enclosure to:  
OSD Control CCS X0502

~~EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC  
DECLASSIFICATION  
RECORDING: DOD DIR 5200.10  
DOES NOT APPLY~~

Page 1 of 30 pages  
Copy 1 of 650 copies

FOR INTERNAL USE IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date:

MAY 16 2012

~~TOP SECRET~~

2

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND	1
A. Scope and Objective	1
B. Factors Affecting Strategy Guidance	1
C. The Context of Strategy Guidance	2
1. A Period of Transition	2
2. Treaty Obligations and Military Contingencies	2
3. Foreign Policy Considerations	3
II. THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES	5
A. Strategic Concepts	5
B. Military Objectives	6
III. PROGRAMS FOR U.S. FORCES AND SUPPORT OF ALLIES	7
A. Nature of the Threat	7
B. U.S. Strategic Policy	8
1. Criteria for Strategic Sufficiency	8
2. Missions for Strategic Forces	9
3. Force Planning	9
C. The Role of General Purpose Forces (GPF's)	11
1. GPF Objectives	11
2. U.S. GPF Posture	11
D. Support of Allies	13
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT	15
A. Europe and NATO	15
1. U.S. Security Interests, Objectives, and Commitments	15
2. U.S. Military Strategy and Objectives	16

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

3

B. East Asia and the Pacific	18
1. U.S. Security Interests, Objectives, and Commitments	18
2. U.S. Military Strategy and Objectives	20
C. Middle East, South Asia, and Africa	22
1. U.S. Security Interests, Objectives, and Commitments	22
2. U.S. Military Strategy and Objectives	22
D. The Western Hemisphere	26
1. U.S. Security Interests, Objectives, and Commitments	26
2. U.S. Military Strategy and Objectives	27

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 16 2012

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

4

## I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

### A. Scope and Objective

~~(S)~~ This document provides guidance to the military services and all agencies of the Department of Defense on the strategic framework within which planning, programming, and budgeting decisions are to be made for the period FY 1972-76. In its preparation, account has been taken of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as stated in the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP) Vol. I, Book II, Strategic Concept and Force Planning Guidance for Military Planning - Revised, FY 1972-79.

~~(a)~~ The guidance presented here is consistent with Presidential decisions, including those contained in National Security Decision Memoranda 16, Criteria for Strategic Sufficiency, and 27, U.S. Military Posture, and corollary strategic concepts and military objectives. The President states in NSDM-27 that, in the future, he will approve revisions in fundamental aspects of the defense program as the results of National Security Study Memoranda and changes in the international environment become known. These decisions consequently serve as the basis for U.S. defense strategy in the early 1970's.

~~(a/ww)~~ This document also discusses important unresolved issues affecting the strategic framework of U.S. military policy and appraises the international environment in which our defense programs will have to function. It attempts to identify those elements of the international environment that can most probably be expected to remain constant as opposed to those that are most likely to change.

### B. Factors Affecting Strategy Guidance

~~(S)~~ The approach taken in the preparation of this memorandum is two-fold:

- First, it identifies those parametric requirements and objectives that affect our strategic planning independently of the detailed nature of the world environment. These parameters are generally referred to as security objectives, military objectives, or strategic concepts.

- Second, it identifies those variable factors in the environment that affect our strategic planning. While we can be reasonably sure that these will change during the 72-76 time frame, we cannot foresee when, in what combination, or in what direction they will move.

~~(a/ww)~~ The parametric factors may, of course, change over the long term. For instance, selective alliances and forward defense have been a bulwark of strategic planning since the conception of NATO. However, if nationalism intensifies among our allies simultaneously with the growing capability of the Soviet Union to project its power around the world, the effectiveness of selective alliances in our strategic posture may diminish, and if so we must search for something to replace them such as new concepts in forward defense.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

5

The variable factors, which we must continually monitor, may be grouped as follows:

1. ~~(S)~~ The international political scene, including policies of other nations.
2. ~~(S)~~ Changes in technology and major changes or developments in weapons systems.
3. ~~(U)~~ Our own actions and reactions.
4. ~~(S)~~ The domestic climate.

C. The Context for Strategy Guidance

1. A Period of Transition.

The early 1970's will be a period of transition for defense policies in several basic respects:

a. ~~(S)~~ The nature of our strategic relationship with the Soviet Union is changing because of the rapid growth of Soviet strategic capabilities which has changed the strategic balance and which poses the most serious threat to the U.S.; an increasing Soviet capability to project its military power throughout the world; growing Soviet attention to such international problems as China; and consequences that may flow from strategic arms limitations talks (SALT).

b. ~~(S)~~ Many of our allies are becoming increasingly capable of providing for their own military requirements. At the same time, many of them are reluctant to devote sufficient resources to their defense requirements, or may lack technical know-how to operate and maintain modern weapons.

c. ~~(S)~~ Our bases overseas are being reduced in number and having operating rights curtailed. This development stems in part from nationalistic trends that cause the political liability of certain installations to outweigh their value, and in part from our own policy of reduced overseas military involvement.

d. ~~(S)~~ We will be required to cope with the expanding CPR nuclear threat as well as possible nuclear developments of other countries.

e. ~~(S)~~ The effectiveness of the U.S. phased withdrawal from South Vietnam while ensuring the capability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves will have a great impact on our future defense requirements.

f. ~~(S)~~ We must consider the potential growth of and changes in regional power centers in defense planning.

2. Treaty Obligations and Military Contingencies

~~(S)~~ Strictly speaking, we are not automatically obligated to become militarily involved in any case of attack on a treaty partner. Decisions

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 16 2012

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

6

on implementing a treaty will therefore be based on political and military criteria. While we shall honor all treaty obligations in both letter and spirit, the appropriate mode of implementation will differ from one situation to another.

~~(b)~~ To modify and, where necessary, to augment our Military Assistance Program, our policy is to provide technical assistance and to support economic development where it can be effective, so that our allies may expand their own capabilities to meet the most likely threats to their security and ours. Such a policy may lessen the need for U.S. military resources to the extent it successfully places the primary burden for defense on the country to be defended, and should help us make more selective and effective the use of such U.S. resources as may be employed.

~~(b)~~ It is clearly not in our interests to be placed in a situation in which we should have to meet all our commitments simultaneously. If such a situation were to occur, both we and our allies recognize that priorities would be established for the required responses. We must therefore make judgements as to the types and simultaneity of contingencies for which we will maintain military forces during peacetime.

~~(b)~~ In NSDM-27, the President instructs the Department of Defense to have, in peacetime, general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with two minor contingencies elsewhere.

### 3. Foreign Policy Considerations

~~(b)~~ The foreign policy of the United States rests upon the following intentions:

- We shall be faithful to our treaty commitments but we shall reduce our involvement and our presence in other nations' affairs.

- Neither the defense nor the development of other nations can be exclusively or primarily an American undertaking.

- We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

- In cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments or national interests. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense.

- We are entering an era of negotiation rather than confrontation.

- We shall seek to improve our relations with all countries in an atmosphere of mutual respect and reciprocity.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

7

- We shall eliminate both polemics and groundless euphoria in pursuit of a realistic foreign policy.

- We are committed to the principle that while all nations may enjoy equal rights, these nations need not have the same character.

- We recognize that nations may live in peace even though they have widely varying internal orders and economic interests.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 16 2012

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

8

## II. THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND MILITARY OBJECTIVES

### A. Strategic Concepts

~~(S)~~ Our fundamental minimum national security objectives are the preservation of the United States as a free and independent nation; the safeguarding of our national institutions and values; and the protection and advancement of the welfare of our people.

~~(S)~~ Through our foreign policy objectives, which are necessarily corollaries of our national security objectives, we seek to maintain a world environment conducive to the attainment of these objectives. To this end, we maintain a military posture based on (a) maintenance of forces to deter direct attacks against the U.S. and to meet our selective alliance obligations, (b) selective alliance arrangements with countries whose objectives regarding the world environment are similar to ours, and (c) deployment of U.S. forces overseas to meet the objectives of U.S. and allied security and to protect U.S. political and strategic interests.

~~(S)~~ The concept of deterrence underlies U.S. strategic concepts since the goal of deterring military attack on the U.S. and its allies is the basic objective of U.S. national security policy. Deterrence depends upon the ability to pose a credible threat of unacceptable consequences to any potential aggressor at any level of aggression. This may require the capability and the clear will to inflict an unacceptable level of damage on any aggressor or combination of aggressors, or the ability to deny an aggressor his goals, in the event deterrence fails.

~~(S)~~ Deterrence could fail, despite U.S. efforts, for a number of reasons including deliberate aggression at a time of enemy military advantage, enemy miscalculation of the consequences of aggression or of U.S. intent and resolve, commission of an "irrational" act, or as the culmination of a crisis or series of crises. Forces structured solely to deter by the threat of unacceptable punishment may be insufficient to achieve objectives such as national survival, damage limitation, and favorable war outcome upon the failure of deterrence.

~~(S)~~ Since there is an important relationship among all levels of deterrence, and since forces designed to deter a nuclear attack on the U.S. may not be adequate to deter attacks on U.S. allies or other U.S. interests, it is U.S. policy selectively to extend its deterrent by deploying forces abroad. We do not unilaterally deploy these forces but have sought, through a series of alliances and forward defense agreements, to provide mutually supporting forces which will support this approach wherever appropriate to the national interest. In recognition of the factors that influence our basic strategy, the President has decided to emphasize the regional and national self-defense capabilities of our allies against threats posed by non-nuclear powers supported by economic and military assistance from the United States. In cases of aggression by nuclear powers, the President has decided to back-up this support by the nuclear strength of the United States.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

9

B. Military Objectives

(u) Military objectives are derived from national objectives and strategic concepts. These specific objectives are described in the appropriate sections of this memorandum. The general objectives include:

We wish to have high confidence that the Soviet Union will never be tempted to launch an attack, surprise or otherwise, against the United States. We must also have confidence that the Soviets could not launch a partially disarming attack which would so weaken and disorient the United States as to make uncertain an effective counterattack.

We wish to be able to continue to support our allies and to deal with crises similar to the Berlin and Cuban missile crises with confidence the Soviets will shy away from an ultimate confrontation rather than press through on their demands.

We wish, in the event of nuclear war with the Soviet Union, despite our best efforts at deterrence, to have as large a percentage as possible of our citizens survive and to assure U.S. control of the situation.

We wish, in the event of a third country attack (i.e., China), to have high confidence in substantial damage denial to the United States.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 16 2012

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

10

### III. PROGRAMS FOR U.S. FORCES AND SUPPORT ALLIES

#### A. Nature of the Threat

~~(S)~~ We should expect U.S. security and international interests to be confronted by new challenges over FY 72-76.

~~(S)~~ Some will result from efforts of other major powers to gain political influence in key areas of the world and will not pose a direct military threat to the security of the United States or its allies. While military power will be used sparingly to protect our interests in such cases, we must be prepared to take those actions required to prevent serious erosion of our international position.

~~(S)~~ Direct threats to U.S. interests may be anticipated from six major situations over the near future:

1. A continually increasing ability of Soviet strategic nuclear forces to attack the U.S., its strategic forces, and allies with vast destructive force.
2. A growing capability of Soviet general purpose forces to conduct ground and naval operations, nuclear and conventional, in Europe and in areas not contiguous to Soviet territory.
3. The development by the Chinese Communists of a strategic nuclear weapons capability.
4. The continuing inability of a few of our allies to prevent and to cope with insurgencies, "wars of national liberation," or "people's wars."
5. The possibility of external aggression against some of our allies.
6. The possibility of nuclear proliferation despite the NPT.

Our defense program will be shaped primarily in accord with developments in these six situations. Less significant changes in the threat and variations in the threat from region to region will affect the deployment of forces but not the basic structure of the program.

~~(S)~~ We still have only a limited understanding of Soviet purposes and objectives for their strategic forces. However, we do know that they have deployed more than 1,100 ICBM's and have nearly 200 more under construction. By the mid-1970's they could have over 400 SS-9's operational. If the Soviets install accurate MIRV's on the SS-9, or if they improve the accuracy of their smaller ICBM's, the survivability of our Minuteman force as currently deployed would be virtually nil by the mid- to late-1970's. In addition, it is apparent that the Soviets could match us in numbers of SLBM's by 1974-75. With our present limited radar coverage of seaward approaches and without ABM defense of our bomber bases, the SLBM's constitute a threat

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL

Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: MAY 16 2012

~~TOP SECRET~~

11

to the survival of our bomber forces -- even those on ground alert. We are also concerned about the potential of Soviet SAM system for ABM defense, as well as the vigorous Soviet R&D programs directed toward the development of a new ABM.

~~(S)~~ If the Soviets continue to expand their strategic offensive and defensive capabilities beyond current levels, it would appear that they either have a different approach to, or understanding of, strategic relationships than we have or they seek a first-strike counterforce capability.

~~(S)~~ At the same time, continued military and economic assistance to North Vietnam, support of the hostile anti-Israeli policies of Arab States, and increased deployment of naval forces in the Mediterranean indicate Soviet willingness and ability to act with measured force in support of Soviet policies throughout the world. An even stronger resolve with respect to Eastern Europe is demonstrated by military intervention in Czechoslovakia and pronouncement of the Brezhnev Doctrine. A strategic balance moving in favor of the Soviet Union could encourage Soviet leaders to become increasingly aggressive in their pursuit of longer-range Soviet interests.

~~(S)~~ This growing Soviet military strength, coupled with Soviet willingness to use measured force and accept risks, seriously complicates our planning problems. In these forthcoming years, we will have to deliberately, carefully, and continuously re-assess our programs designed to counter the strategic threat as that threat undergoes change.

## B. U.S. Strategic Policy

### 1. Criteria for Strategic Sufficiency

~~(S)~~ The criteria for strategic sufficiency set forth in NSDM-16 reflect the essential minimum requirements of U.S. strategic offensive and defensive nuclear forces in support of the above strategic objectives. Studies are in progress on what modifications or additions, if any, may be desirable or necessary in the support of these objectives. In particular, the requirements for less-than-SIOP strategic nuclear exchanges, theater nuclear forces in Europe, and theater nuclear forces in Asia are being examined. The NSDM-16 criteria insofar as nuclear attacks on the United States are concerned are:

a. Maintain high confidence that our second-strike capability is sufficient to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces.

b. Maintain forces to ensure that the Soviet Union would have no incentive to strike the United States first in a crisis.

c. Maintain the capability to deny to the Soviets the ability to cause significantly more deaths and industrial damage in the United States than they themselves would suffer in a nuclear war.

d. Deploy defenses that limit damage from small attacks or accidental launches to a low level.

~~TOP SECRET~~



MAY 16 2012

~~TOP SECRET~~

12

## 2. Missions for Strategic Forces

~~(S)~~ These criteria imply corresponding missions for our strategic forces:

a. To reduce the likelihood of strategic nuclear war, we must deploy and maintain strategic forces that provide a credible capability to retaliate even after absorbing an all-out surprise Soviet attack on our strategic forces. Means of maintaining our confidence in this capability include redundant force capabilities, conservative assessments of the threat, hedges consistent with intelligence lead times, and a survivable and flexible command and control system.

b. Even if we maintain this second-strike capability, the Soviets might launch an all-out attack against U.S. forces and cities in a time of extreme crisis, when a strategic nuclear war has become an imminent possibility, if they believed that a U.S. first-strike was very likely. They would be even more likely to do so if launching a first-strike themselves would ensure a much better result (i.e., reduce the damage they would receive) for them than absorbing a U.S. first-strike. Thus, in addition to providing an adequate second-strike capability, our forces should be designed to eliminate Soviet incentives to strike first by reducing the pre-launch vulnerability of our strategic offensive forces and by providing adequate force levels and quality to ensure defense penetration and target coverage.

c. It is also important to consider the relative amounts of U.S. and Soviet deaths and industrial damage that could result from various types of strategic nuclear wars. If a strategic war could result in U.S. deaths and industrial damage significantly higher than the corresponding Soviet losses, the Soviets might risk such a war, even if their absolute losses were large. Thus our strategic forces must be able to inflict a level of damage on the Soviet Union that is not significantly less than that which the Soviets might cause on the U.S. for any circumstance of war initiation.

d. Against the Chinese, or any other hostile power that might develop a strategic nuclear capability, we should be prepared to limit damage significantly during at least the next decade. This protection can be provided by an ABM system. The same system should be capable of limiting damage from accidental launches by any country.

## 3. Force Planning

### a. To Maintain High Confidence in Our Deterrent

~~(S)~~ By careful design of our strategic forces, we can retain high confidence in our deterrent. In designing the forces, we must emphasize survivability against projected and foreseen threats.

~~(S)~~ When possible Soviet actions or technological developments threaten one of our major components (land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers), we should take steps to counter that threat. We should plan on alternative measures to ensure the necessary level of confidence in our deterrent.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

13

~~(S)~~ Of immediate concern is the vulnerability of our land-based missiles to a Soviet threat that combines accuracy with sufficient numbers of penetrating RV's. Our planned Safeguard deployment is a hedge to improve Minuteman survivability. The Air Force should continue an extensive investigation of programs for rebasing and protecting Minuteman.

~~(S)~~ The vulnerability of our strategic bombers would be significantly reduced by the Safeguard ABM system which can defend against attacks employing SLBM's. Our bombers would be further protected with establishment of a limited bomber dispersal plan and with a new early warning system which gives tactical warning of some missile launchers at nearly the time of missile launch.

~~(S)~~ ABM defense of the bomber bases against new long-range SLBM's can provide additional time to launch bombers by intercepting the initial portions of the SLBM attack. This defense, with the new warning system and limited dispersal, should significantly increase bomber survivability. If the SLBM threat continues to rise, however, it may be necessary to consider resuming a degree of airborne alert prior to full operation of the next early warning system.

~~(S)~~ As a hedge against major improvements in Soviet ASW capabilities, the Navy should continue tests and studies to maintain the relative invulnerability of our SSBN force.

~~(S)~~ Similarly, we will continue orderly development programs for the Undersea Long-range Missile System (ULMS) and the B-1A strategic bomber to improve the survivability of our strategic forces and to provide eventual replacement for aging systems.

b. To Limit Damage to the United States

~~(S)~~ It is, of course, a desirable objective to limit U.S. deaths and industrial damage to a minimum in the event a nuclear war actually occurs. We are able to build an ABM system which will provide an effective defense against small attacks and accidental launches. The President has therefore decided that it is in our security interests to have this limited defensive capability and has directed that we plan to deploy Safeguard to achieve it.

~~(S)~~ As a hedge against future uncertainties, we should also continue research and development programs designed to improve our ABM capabilities, both quantitatively and qualitatively.

~~(S)~~ There are two other ways to limit damage to the U.S.: (1) use offensive weapons to destroy the enemy's offensive weapons before he can launch them; and (2) protect ourselves with passive defenses such as shelters. After a Soviet first-strike on U.S. cities, it might be possible to destroy the remaining Soviet fixed land-based missiles if a real time assessment of empty silos were available, or by targeting all silos.

~~(S)~~ We should look to ways to improve our damage-limiting position by adjustments in our strategic offensive and defensive forces

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

14

that can be made within existing policy and budgetary guidelines. Decisions to proceed with specific programs for damage-limiting should be made subject to further guidance from SALT and NSC decisions.

~~(S)~~ Given uncertainties and the possibility that the Chinese Communists are willing to risk great loss of life, we have made the decision to deploy the Safeguard system to limit damage from a Chinese missile attack to a low level.

~~(S)~~ To defend against small bomber attacks and to maintain the peacetime sovereignty of our air space, we should continue research and development programs designed to improve our air defense capabilities.

#### c. To Facilitate SALT

~~(S)~~ Even though we are involved in strategic arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, we must take necessary steps to safeguard our relative strategic capabilities, so as to be able to continue the talks from a position of strength.

### C. The Role of General Purpose Forces (GPF's)

#### 1. GPF Objectives

~~(S)~~ Our GPF's, which must have an effective capability of nuclear or conventional combat, have an important role in deterring attacks and in prosecuting war if deterrence fails. Our capability to fight at levels below general nuclear war plays a vital role in making our treaty commitments credible to our allies as well as to potential aggressors. Our credibility with our allies provides the essential foundation for their cooperation in mutual security arrangements, since their own forces cannot, in the foreseeable future, provide an independent deterrent to nuclear attack, although they should be encouraged to expand their own self-defensive capability.

~~(S)~~ We maintain GPF's fundamentally to deter attacks against our treaty partners and to assist in their defense in the event deterrence fails. The deterrent provided by our GPF's is determined largely by our demonstrated willingness to use these forces. Where we are not disposed or able to commit land forces, we need to make other defensive plans. Since the GPF's account for approximately two-thirds of the DOD budget, we must carefully and continuously review the threats to our allies and the manner in which we can best honor our treaty commitments.

#### 2. U.S. GPF Posture

~~(S)~~ The strategy approved by the President in NSDM-27 for the use of general purpose forces calls for maintaining the capability, together with our allies, of providing simultaneously (1) an initial defense of NATO Europe against Warsaw Pact or of Korea or Southeast Asia against a Chinese attack, (2) assistance to our allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and (3) the forces needed to meet two minor contingencies elsewhere.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

15

~~(S)~~ In this strategy there has been a question whether NSDM-27 requires us to plan forces for one "large" minor contingency (four brigades) or two "small" minor contingencies (two brigades each) simultaneously. For planning purposes, we should be prepared to engage two minor contingencies simultaneously provided that we do not use more than a total of approximately four brigades for the two.

~~(S)~~ Implementation of the approved strategy will require maintenance of a strategic reserve force, a mobilization base, and continuation of overseas deployments and a supporting base structure (although not necessarily at present levels or locations).

~~(S)~~ Together with our NATO allies, we should maintain forces in Europe capable of conducting an initial defense against a full-scale Warsaw Pact invasion that occurs after a reasonable period of identifiable political crisis and military preparation by both sides. The NATO forces should also be sufficient to cope with smaller or more slowly developing crises and attacks. However, we do not require that peacetime NATO forces be capable of defending NATO Europe against a massive Warsaw Pact attack that follows a concealed mobilization. We also do not require that they and their logistic support be able to sustain a defense against a major attack for longer than about 90 days.

~~(S)~~ In Asia, our policy should be one of helping our allies develop and maintain the capability of defending themselves against threats short of an invasion supported by Chinese or Soviet forces. We should plan for materiel, logistics and intelligence support, and back-up tactical air support. We should plan for only a limited back-up ground force capability for non-Chinese, non-Soviet supported contingencies. We should not plan for U.S. force involvement of the recent level in Vietnam without diversion of forces oriented to NATO or creation of new forces.

~~(S)~~ While making it clear to likely adversaries that the U.S. will use its forces when necessary, we must recognize that an involvement of U.S. forces in Asia in any significant number could occur only with the diversion of forces oriented to NATO or with mobilization. We should accordingly maintain the capability of assisting our allies in conducting a defense against a Chinese attack with general purpose forces in either Korea or Southeast Asia, but not in both areas simultaneously, provided that we are not fighting in Europe. We should try to help defend Southeast Asia as far forward as possible.

~~(S/MI)~~ We should not plan to meet any major contingency involving the Soviet Union or Communist China without mobilizing our inactive reserve forces.

~~(S/MI)~~ If we are fighting against the Chinese in Asia, we must retain the capability to provide an initial defense against a Warsaw Pact invasion of NATO Europe. Insofar as possible, this defense in Europe should be carried out with NATO forces in Europe and CONUS reserve forces, including those mobilized when we become involved in Asia. We should also be prepared to curtail operations in Asia and redeploy selected units to Europe to assist in such a defense, should this become necessary.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

16

MAY 16 2012

(S//NF) The approved strategy also requires us to be able to meet two minor contingencies virtually anywhere in the world, excluding an invasion of Cuba. Our introduction of forces into the Dominican Republic in 1965 is an example of a minor contingency. If we were simultaneously fighting a major war in Europe or Asia, we would not be required to meet such minor contingencies without mobilizing some inactive forces, using strategic reserve forces, or temporarily reducing our capability to reinforce Asia.

#### D. Support of Allies

(S//NF) In the case of aggression by non-nuclear powers, we shall continue to provide military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments, but we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower. In essence, we will work with those who will work with us.

The following factors will have a direct impact on planning support for allies in FY 72-76:

1. (S//NF) Successful implementation of this policy will require larger military assistance programs than in the recent past.

2. (S//NF) Deployments of our combat forces on foreign soil will be reduced, and the thresholds at which they will be introduced will be raised. In the case of insurgency, assistance will take the form of equipment, training, and advice. The same response will generally apply in the cases of insurgency with active external support or of outside aggression not involving Soviet or Chinese combat forces. We shall be prepared to meet directly attacks by Soviet and Chinese forces should they occur, while relying heavily on active participation by the manpower of the besieged countries. Some allies should assume more naval and air responsibilities as well, as in the cases of Greece and Turkey in the Mediterranean and Japan in West Pacific. To the maximum extent possible, we should establish sales programs to develop the desired capabilities.

3. (S//NF) The concept of force interdependence -- provision of air and naval forces by the U.S. to support indigenous ground forces -- will remain important especially for countries facing a threat by nuclear power. The affected nations, while looking to the U.S. to provide sophisticated and expensive air and naval forces, will have to develop more than token air and naval forces of their own, through MAP if necessary. In this context, U.S. forces must be prepared to provide air and naval support for Greece and Turkey in the event of aggression by Warsaw Pact nations, and must be prepared to assume an important role in our plans for defense of Formosa.

4. (S//NF) As reductions in overseas deployments take place, we shall have to find answers to questions such as the following:

a. What initiatives can we take to bolster arrangements for regional security?

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

17

b. What level of defense can the recipients of grant aid support out of their own resources? What are the possibilities for assistance from third countries or multilateral sources?

c. To what extent can the roles and missions of U.S. general purpose forces be redefined?

d. To what extent does reduction of U.S. overseas deployments allow increases in funds to be applied to Military Assistance and Sales?

5. ~~(S)~~ A number of nations will have to resolve problems created by the need for increased self-reliance, particularly in the area of internal defense. However, the U.S. will not withdraw precipitously from programs intended to bolster local internal and self-defense capabilities. The Foreign Internal Defense Plan (FIDP) will provide guidance on priorities. What is required is a clear definition of our arms transfer policy toward each country separately. It will depend on answers to the following questions:

a. What, under the provisions of the FIDP, are the principal threats to internal security? Is the government willing and able to cope with these threats?

b. What is our interest in supporting the existing government?

c. What are the country's force goals for defense against external attack? Are they reasonable given its resource base? To what extent can local requirements be met through commercial sales? Government-to-government sales?

6. ~~(S)~~ We also face the problem of modernization costs. As weapon systems become more sophisticated, costs for human skills, training, operations, and maintenance increase. We may be reaching the point at which the cost and complexity of U.S. weapons make it impossible for a MAP recipient to have more than a limited military capability unless special equipment, less complex and less expensive, can be made available to them. This problem will also be affected by the military assistance programs developed by the Soviet Union and Communist China in the 1970's.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 16 2012

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

18

#### IV. THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

##### A. Europe and NATO

##### 1. U.S. Security Interests, Objectives, and Commitments

~~(S)~~ Except for strategic deterrence, the United States has no objective more important to its national security and other vital interests than to maintain a Western Europe free from domination by the Soviet Union or any other hostile powers. Soviet control of Western Europe would probably encompass the Mediterranean, North Africa, and the Middle East as well.

~~(S)~~ Because of our vital interest in a free and peaceful Europe, we have committed ourselves in the North Atlantic Alliance to treat an armed attack against any member as an attack against ourselves and to assist the ally under attack by taking such action as we deem necessary, "including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

~~(S)~~ The Soviet Union constitutes the principal threat to European security. Its policy is to perpetuate the division of Europe and Germany, to reduce U.S. influence, and to expand Soviet influence. To these ends, the Soviet Union seeks to disrupt and weaken the Atlantic Alliance while preventing a resurgence of West German military power as NATO disintegrates. Its complementary policy is to take whatever steps are necessary to strengthen its control over Eastern Europe.

~~(S)~~ The Warsaw Pact has the capability of assembling within three weeks after mobilization a force of about 1,300,000 men, 20,000 tanks, 5,600 artillery pieces, and 4,000 combat aircraft. These forces possess formidable armament not only in conventional weapons, but also in tactical nuclear weapons, most of which are concentrated in highly mobile missile systems. An additional threat is posed by the large number of Soviet MRBM's/IRBM's targetted on Europe.

~~(S)~~ Our NATO allies view their security as absolutely dependent on substantial deployment of U.S. troops in NATO Europe, the prospect of early but limited use of tactical nuclear weapons, and the assurance of U.S. strategic nuclear protection.

~~(S)~~ Despite its impressive military capability, in recent years the Soviet Union has exercised restraint in its dealings with the West, recognizing that NATO also possesses sizeable conventional forces and that the U.S. nuclear arsenal, tactical and strategic, stands behind them. As long as the NATO deterrent remains credible, we may expect the Soviets to exercise caution in risking military action west of the Elbe.

~~(S)~~ Nevertheless, serious consequences could arise in case of a Soviet miscalculation of U.S. intentions and resolve in a NATO crisis such as one over Berlin. Moreover, the rapid growth of Soviet naval forces

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

19

in the Mediterranean has increased the risk of U.S.-Soviet confrontation as the result of an incident or in some other way. It has also had some erosive effect on NATO's resolve and capability. A conflict arising from such situations would probably begin on a small scale but could quickly escalate. Finally, the possibility of a surprise massive Soviet ground attack against NATO cannot be dismissed.

~~(S)~~ This range of contingencies has formed the basis for NATO force planning in the past. The strengthening Soviet tactical nuclear posture makes it necessary to consider carefully whether major revisions in NATO force planning are now in order. Alternative strategies and force postures for the U.S. and NATO are being examined in the response to NSSM 84.

~~(S)~~ Without resorting to armed aggression, the Soviets may try to intimidate Western Europe with their deployed military power. There is a standing Soviet invitation to Western Europe to accommodate to Soviet hegemony in return for guarantees of stable peace. Such moves could become dangerous in the event of:

a. A loss of confidence by Europeans in the U.S. nuclear pledge to NATO. SALT, if not adequately discussed with the Europeans, may generate fears that the U.S. does not attach sufficient importance to European security interests.

b. Widespread European belief that neo-isolationism in the U.S. will lead to sharp reductions in important U.S. troops in Europe.

c. The unraveling of NATO's integrated forces by further reductions in national contributions.

## 2. U.S. Military Strategy and Objectives

### a. Strategy

~~(S)~~ The primary U.S. military objective toward Europe is to maintain sufficient strategic and general-purpose-force capability, in combination with other NATO forces, to deter attacks on NATO and, should deterrence fail, to terminate the hostilities under conditions as favorable for the North Atlantic Alliance as possible. A corollary objective is to keep the Soviets from successfully intimidating Western Europe to achieve their goals there. In working toward these objectives, it is important to remember that NATO strategy and force planning are not determined by the U.S. alone but in concert with the allies.

~~(S)~~ The President has made it clear in NSDM-27 and other pronouncements that the U.S. intends to maintain its nuclear and conventional commitment to NATO. Assuming successful completion of the Vietnamization program, the major peacetime deployment of our forces overseas will continue to be in NATO Europe.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

20

b. Force Deployments

~~(S)~~ For the time being but subject to later Presidential decisions on NSSM-84 and related studies, we should plan on the likelihood of maintaining U.S. forces in Europe approximately at current levels. Qualitative improvements should be made. In particular, we must make serious efforts to attain the prescribed readiness for all U.S. units committed to NATO as the requirements for Vietnam go down.

c. Base Structure

~~(S)~~ We must maintain through FY 76 a base structure, operating rights, and transit rights necessary to support our deployed forces. We should seek access rights to sufficient additional facilities to facilitate introduction of additional forces should large-scale hostilities break out.

~~(S)~~ It is highly probable that some bases will be shifted and that the base structure and operating rights will change during the FY 72-76 time period in such countries as Turkey, Spain, and Italy. We should make every effort to manage such changes in a manner consistent with maintaining the military capability to implement approved policies and strategies. Wherever possible, contingency rights for use should be preserved.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 16 2012

~~TOP SECRET~~

MAY 16 2012

~~TOP SECRET~~

21

B. East Asia and the Pacific

1. U.S. Security Interest, Objectives, and Commitments

a. Treaty Commitments

~~(U)~~ The relevant treaty structure in this area consists of the following:

(1) Bilateral treaties with Japan, and the Republics of Korea, China, and the Philippines.

(2) The trilateral ANZUS with Australia and New Zealand.

(3) The multilateral SEATO with Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand. In addition, South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are protocol states.

~~(U)~~ Although the U.S. has no treaty obligation to defend Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, developments in these countries will be of great concern to the U.S. because of their important resources, their strategic location and expanding Soviet naval activities in the Indian Ocean.

~~(S)~~ Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia are essentially capable of containing, controlling, and perhaps defeating insurgencies, even those supported externally. This capability in the Philippines has eroded, and the HUK insurgency may make significant gains. Laos, Cambodia, and Burma all face externally supported insurgencies that could overthrow the present order if North Vietnam and China exert sufficient pressure. Japan, the Republics of China and Korea, Australia, and New Zealand should not experience any serious domestic disturbances.

~~(S/AM)~~ Under the "Nixon Doctrine," we shall encourage regional arrangements to develop greater military self-sufficiency and avoid "creeping involvement" on our part. U.S. arms transfers, through both grants and sales, will support this program. We shall maintain a forward deployment posture in WESTPAC to deter aggression and facilitate fulfillment of our commitments within the context of the "Nixon Doctrine." Forward deployment will be adjusted in accord with changing threats, growing capabilities of allies, and improved strategic mobility. As conditions of local security permit, our forces should be positioned so that they will not become involved automatically should combat begin.

b. The Situation in Southeast Asia

~~(U)~~ A primary consideration will be the situation in Vietnam as it evolves through FY 76. Vietnamization is the first step in implementing our new Asian policy. It must be convincingly portrayed as evidence that we really mean it when we say that military defense in the future must be a responsibility increasingly shouldered by the Asian nations themselves. If

~~TOP SECRET~~

OSD  
Section 6.2 (a)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 16 2012

~~TOP SECRET~~

22

Vietnamization is labeled a failure, correctly or incorrectly, it will be hard to convince either friend or foe that the Nixon Doctrine is anything more than a policy of withdrawal.

~~(S/NF)~~ Our basic objective in Laos will continue to be maintenance of an independent neutral buffer state that will reduce the risk of direct confrontation between NVN/PRC and Thailand. As long as major hostilities exist in South Vietnam, we must retain sufficient influence with the RLG to permit continued interdiction operations in Laos without adverse political consequences. We will attempt to phase down the level of conflict and U.S. involvement, limiting our military and support actions and taking only those that would require NVN to make a major political decision and military effort to go beyond the bounds of the 1962 Agreements should they desire to seize Laos militarily. Our longer term objective is a political solution, which likely will have to involve some accommodation with the Lao Communists.

c. Sino-Soviet Dispute

~~(S)~~ Threats to the U.S. and to Asian nations originating from Communist China will depend in part upon developments in the Sino-Soviet dispute. We cannot exclude either active hostilities between the Soviet Union and Communist China or an internal political change in China that would result in closer cooperation between the two countries, possibly under Soviet dominance or leadership. The United States will attempt not to become militarily involved in any Sino-Soviet dispute.

d. Changes in Japan's Military Policy

~~(S/NF)~~ We must also look down the road to possible changes in the role played by Japan in the Far East. Japan has been a close friend of the United States, supporting our foreign policies while taking a deliberate non-military stance, with a special abhorrence for nuclear armament. However, there is a spreading uneasiness in Japan about how long the United States will have the power and will to act as Japan's protector, particularly outside the arena of nuclear conflict. In addition, the Japanese nuclear allergy may diminish sharply as the Japanese gain familiarity with their first nuclear-powered merchant vessel and the world's largest network of electric power plants based on nuclear fuel. There is a distinct possibility that Japan may opt for an indigenous capability in nuclear weapons. Emergence of Japan as a major military power could require us to alter our military stance significantly in the Far East. We must also be prepared for the possibility that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security may be abrogated by Japan after the reversion of Okinawa in 1972.

~~(S/NF)~~ The United States must be prepared to make substantive adjustments in our deployments in the Western Pacific as we approach the time when Okinawa reverts to Japan. Reversion will probably bring with it the same restrictions on use of Okinawa that now apply to our homeland bases in Japan.

There is even a possibility that we may be asked to evacuate Japanese bases altogether after 1973.

~~TOP SECRET~~

OSD  
Section 6.2 (a)

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EQ 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 16 2012

23

e. Asian Perceptions of U.S. Commitments

~~(S)~~ The rate of U.S. redeployment from Southeast Asia, the terms of Okinawa's reversion, and the reduction of Seventh Fleet activities will all have an important effect on the perception by Asian nations of U.S. will and capability to provide a nuclear umbrella and to honor outstanding commitments. We must be careful in implementing the Nixon foreign policy to clarify our resolve to both friend and foe.

f. Developments Elsewhere

~~(S)~~ Communist China can be expected to move forward with nuclear armament. Development of an ICBM capability may include acquisition of down-range facilities to support tracking and recovery operations, probably in the Indian Ocean. Chinese nuclear weapons represent primarily a threat to allied ports, airfields, and cities.

~~(S)~~ The Chinese army continues to pose a major threat to China's immediate neighbors, including the Soviet Union. We estimate that China will continue modernizing its conventional forces. Peking will have a substantial capability for simultaneously conducting covert aggression and supporting "people's wars."

~~(S)~~ The Soviet threat to U.S. interests in Asia consists principally in the supplying of materiel to North Vietnam and to North Korea. Without this support, North Vietnam could not sustain its effort in the South.

~~(S/AM)~~ North Korea will probably be constrained to harassment, provocation, and infiltration. Provocative acts against U.S. forces, similar to the seizure of the Pueblo and the EC-121 shootdown, cannot be excluded. We must bear in mind the high risk-taking propensity of the North Korean leadership and not rule out even such major acts as an invasion of the Republic of Korea. However, South Korea, with U.S. air and logistical support, should be able to contain such acts if they are mounted by the North Koreans alone.

2. U.S. Military Strategy and Objectives

a. Strategy

~~(S/AM)~~ Special attention must be given to the strategic implications ~~\_\_\_\_\_~~ Ready access to the weapons and demonstrated national resolve to use them if necessary are important deterrents to major hostilities in the area. Relocation must be accomplished with these considerations in mind.

b. Force Deployments

~~(S/AM)~~ Although we are assuming for purposes of fiscal planning that some U.S. forces will be withdrawn from the Republic of Korea in FY 1971, no decisions will be made on this issue until the NSC has addressed the response to NSSM-27.

~~TOP SECRET~~

OSD  
Section 6.2 (a)

~~TOP SECRET~~

24

~~(S)~~ We should maintain forces on Okinawa as required for a general theater reserve. We should plan to remove B-52 aircraft when they are no longer required for operations in Southeast Asia. An ASW capability will be retained. Air defense and local security will become a Japanese responsibility upon reversion. Plans for an orderly and phased transfer of responsibility should be made in the meantime.

~~(S)~~ We should continue to deploy tactical air squadrons in Japan, while withdrawing some of the support forces. U.S. military installations of secondary importance should be closed down.

~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ We should reduce the level of manning at our bases and facilities in the Philippines as the Vietnam conflict subsides. The same applies to Vietnam-related Air Force squadrons. [REDACTED]

~~(S)~~ We should reduce our forces deployed to Thailand in support of the Vietnam war as the need for their support diminishes. Since some support and contingency elements will probably remain in Thailand during the period under review, we should plan to retain a fairly large mission, in the form of a MAAG.

~~(S)~~ The Seventh Fleet should continue its West Pacific deployments and operations. As requirements for support of the Vietnam war diminish, deployments should be adjusted accordingly.

c. Base Structure

~~(S)~~ In general, we need to retain our major military facilities in East Asia and the Western Pacific. At the same time, those installations that are of secondary military importance and are significant irritants to our relations with host countries should be closed, operated at reduced levels, or turned over to the host country. These cases may be expected to arise particularly in Japan and the Philippines. Diminished requirements to support operations in Vietnam may permit similar action for other facilities. Whenever possible, we should obtain suitable rights for re-entry and emergency use before evacuating a facility.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 16 2012

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

25

C. Middle East, South Asia, and Africa

1. U.S. Security Interests, Objectives, and Commitments

Our security objectives in the area are:

a. ~~(S)~~ To maintain military presence and political involvement adequate to protect our economic, political, and military interests in the area. These include an eight billion dollar investment in the region's oil resources; air bases in Turkey; intelligence and communications facilities in Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Ethiopia; MIDEASTFOR's home port in Bahrein; overflight and landing rights in Greece, Turkey and Iran that provide access to the South Asia region from the Mediterranean; and continued free use of the Mediterranean, the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Sea of Marmara.

b. ~~(S)~~ To prevent any outside power from achieving a military or political position in the area that imperils U.S. interests. The primary threat envisioned is the Soviet Union.

c. ~~(S)~~ To improve our relations with Arab countries while maintaining those with Israel, for the purpose of at least reducing the chances of a major Arab-Israeli military confrontation and hopefully obtaining a political settlement to tensions in the Middle East.

~~(S)~~ The major threats to our interests that may become more manifest in this area in the future are as follows: (1) the emergence of the Fedayeen as a power in the Arab world; (2) new energies for national expansion in the Arab world and Israel; (3) increased Soviet presence in the entire area in political, military and economic terms, particularly troublesome in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean; (4) reluctance of Greece and Turkey to fulfill their NATO commitments, including possibly the adoption of foreign policies inimical to U.S. interests; (5) increased ChiCom presence in the Indian Ocean and the underdeveloped countries in Africa; (6) greater military self-sufficiency for India under Soviet patronage and Pakistan under ChiCom patronage; (7) Iran's further exploration of "independent nationalism," (8) the emergence of India and Israel as nuclear powers; and (9) regional systems of collective self-defense not sponsored by the U.S. that may be adverse to our interests and the interests of friendly countries in the area.

~~(S)~~ The greatest single problem is the Arab-Israeli crisis. This controversy is polarizing the entire Arab world and greatly intensifying the pressure for radical change in the more moderate and conservative countries. Prospects for even a temporary settlement of this dispute are not good.

2. U.S. Military Strategy and Objectives

a. General Situation

~~(S)~~ The Middle East, South Asia, and Africa have little in the way of direct U.S. military presence and involvement except for the

~~TOP SECRET~~



MAY 16 2012

~~TOP SECRET~~

26

Sixth Fleet, which functions primarily in a NATO role. U.S. military strategy in this region aims to protect American interests, while simultaneously working to prevent the hegemony of any outside power -- chiefly the Soviet Union during the 1970's -- from dominating this region. Military involvement will largely take the form of limited assistance to selected countries through grants and training, plus sale of military items. There will be very limited direct presence. Extreme circumstances, such as significantly increased Soviet presence or activities in the area or the imminent collapse of the Israeli state, may prompt a re-examination of the degree of U.S. military involvement required.

~~(S)~~ Normally, the U.S. should not plan to intervene unilaterally in Arab-Israeli combat operations. We may choose to contribute forces and logistical support to a multi-lateral effort such as a UN peace-keeping force.

~~(S)~~ The possible need for a capability to deploy U.S. forces through the Indian Ocean area may necessitate the development of facilities there to which the U.S. has unquestioned access.

b. Greece and Turkey

~~(S)~~ Greece and Turkey represent our major treaty commitment in this region. We plan, with the consent of Congress, to maintain MAP grant assistance to these two nations at adequate levels. U.S. security interests in Greece require that by FY 1971 there will be a full resumption of shipments of military equipment to Greece. After FY 1971, transition from grant to sales will require credit assistance. Both Greece and Turkey should be encouraged to modernize their forces within their resource limitations, and continue to make available important facilities to the U.S. and NATO. Given tendencies toward autonomous foreign policy in both states, noticeable now in Turkey but possibly a future development in Greece, the U.S. should be prepared for quid pro quo arrangements. Since the McNaughton force goals are not being implemented, they should be abandoned in favor of JSOP force goals. We should then support them as the NATO force goals.

c. Mediterranean Sea

~~(S)~~ The Sixth Fleet will continue to support NATO as its primary mission, but NATO will have to reckon with Soviet flanking maneuvers in North Africa and the Middle East. As the Soviet Union expands its naval presence and activities in the Mediterranean, greater attention should be paid to the Fleet's role in support of U.S. interests in North Africa, the Middle East, and (should the Suez Canal re-open) South Asia. Obtaining an alternate facility to Wheelus should be pursued as a matter of priority.

d. Moderate Arab States

~~(S)~~ The U.S. provides Jordan and Saudi Arabia with military sales and assistance. Prior to the start of the FY 72-76 period, we should keep a close watch on Jordan's dealings with the Soviet Union for military

~~TOP SECRET~~

MAY 16 2012

~~TOP SECRET~~

27

equipment while reevaluating our present military supply for Jordan's external defense requirements. Probably present U.S. support for Jordan's internal security should be continued. The U.S. should consider all Saudi requests for more credit, training, and assistance but not provide military assistance for uses clearly relating to fights for succession to the throne. Lebanon will still need select equipment for its internal security and perhaps for external defense.

e. Israel

~~(S/INT)~~ U.S. arms policy toward Israel is currently undergoing review at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, and more definitive guidance on military sales and loans may be forthcoming early in 1970.

f. Iran

~~(S/INT)~~ Every effort should be made to respond to the Shah's requests for military assistance, but the present \$100 million per year credit ceiling should be retained. If the results of the new U.S. oil import policy prove to be unfavorable to Iran, this ceiling may have to be re-evaluated to offset the adverse political-economic impact of this policy.

g. India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan

~~(S/INT)~~ Soviet arms and assistance will continue to flow into India, as the latter attempts to establish military self-sufficiency. Pakistan will probably continue to deal with both the Soviet Union and Communist China. Some U.S. effort should be made to retain and even expand military influence in these two states while continuing a limited-supply policy that might, by FY 1972, include a relaxation of our embargo on lethal end items.

~~(S/INT)~~ Afghanistan is a large recipient of Soviet assistance and is now buying SU-7's. These purchases will probably continue despite U.S. pressure that might be applied under the Conte-Long provisions. A low-profile U.S. involvement, through the CONUS training program, is all that should be planned for in FY 72-76. Even this program is dependent on securing MAP funding in sufficient amounts to satisfy other higher priority requirements.

h. Africa

~~(C)~~ Our principal aims in North Africa will be (1) to promote our interests in Libya, particularly U.S. oil investments, which have a book value of \$5 billion and currently produce \$750 million annual net receipts in the balance of payments; (2) to attempt by diplomatic actions to avoid Soviet utilization of relinquished U.S. and U.K. bases in Libya, which would increase Soviet capabilities to conduct military operations in the Western Mediterranean and possibly the Eastern Atlantic; and (3) to help lessen tensions and potential instability in the Maghreb, stemming from massive deliveries of Soviet arms to Algeria.

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~

28

~~(S)~~ Elsewhere in Africa, our military objectives will remain limited: (1) to help promote continued use of the Kagnev communication facility in Ethiopia (threatened by possible events following the demise of Haile Selassie, who is now 78), (2) to assist a few selected countries -- notably Liberia and the Congo (K) -- in the development of modest forces needed to maintain internal security (current legislation places a ceiling of \$40 million on the total of grants and sales, exclusive of training, that we can extend to all of Africa in any fiscal year), and (3) to preserve in southern Africa overflight rights, access to port and airfield facilities, and operating rights for tracking stations. There is U.S. military interest in alternative overflight routes through southern Africa to support our missile and space programs, and our contingency operations in the Indian Ocean and Middle East areas. The importance of the Cape route to the U.S. and its allies and the strategic significance of South African refueling and repair facilities for naval operations will increase as a result of the new modes of oil transport and recent Soviet activities in the Indian Ocean.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 16 2012

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

29

D. The Western Hemisphere

1. U.S. Security Interests, Objectives, and Commitments

~~(S)~~ The United States is militarily associated with Latin America by the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (RIO Treaty), under which "an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all American States." "On the request of the State or States directly attacked... each one of the Contracting Parties may determine the immediate measures it may individually take" to fulfill its treaty obligations until the Organization of Consultation of the Inter-American system has met and agreed "upon the measures of a collective character that should be taken."

~~(S)~~ We are tied militarily to Canada through our common commitment in NATO and through several joint defense ventures such as ballistic missile and air defense systems, as well as coordinated ASW operations.

~~(S)~~ Our interests in the hemisphere are determined by:

a. The physical proximity of many countries to the United States, and the common borders with Mexico and Canada.

b. Operating and transit rights at certain locations that are very important to our military and economic well-being. Examples are Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, the Panama Canal Zone and the access routes thereto, BMEWS and NORAD facilities in Canada, and a few locations throughout Latin America for communication, missile tracking, satellite, and nuclear test detection activities, without which these activities would be more costly and inconvenient.

c. Many strategically important raw materials that come from the Latin American areas.

d. Extensive and long-standing U.S. political, economic, ethnic, and cultural ties with Latin America and Canada.

~~(S)~~ Our objectives in the Western Hemisphere are to counter any threats to continued access to the transit and operating rights and strategic resources noted above, and solidification and improvement of our ties.

~~(S)~~ With the possible exception of a resurgence of nationalistically motivated or communist inspired action against U.S. control of the Panama Canal, the threat to major U.S. military/economic interests in the Western Hemisphere appears minimal. However, it is probable that the increase of nationalism in Latin states, some of it with anti-American overtones, will constitute a threat to the solidification and improvement of our political relationships with them.

~~(S)~~ Cuban exportation of subversion and insurgency will probably continue but should be containable by the existing security capabilities in Latin America.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

30

~~(S)~~ The likelihood of Soviet-directed insurgency is virtually non-existent, although increasing naval and Aeroflot presence in the area can be expected. The expansion of Soviet and other foreign ties of all kinds with Latin states will increase their independence of the United States.

## 2. U.S. Military Strategy and Objectives

~~(S)~~ Selective military presence and assistance will lend credence to our commitment to these treaties, serve as a deterrent to intervention, and help protect our interests in the Americas. Naval and air facilities in the Caribbean that continue to be important to our ASW posture in the Atlantic and the Caribbean must be retained, as must strategic defensive facilities in Canada and joint defensive ventures with the Canadians.

~~(S)~~ The conceivable contingencies that could lead to requirements for U.S. military forces are:

- a. The defense of the Panama Canal and the accesses thereto.
- b. The defense of Guantanamo Bay against an attack.
- c. The protection of U.S. lives in instances where the local authorities are unable to do so.
- d. Intervention in the unlikely contingency that communist-dominated forces threaten to overthrow a Latin American government whose continued existence is important to U.S. interests.

~~(S)~~ To help Latin American security forces cope with subversion and other internal security threats, there will be a need for selective and low-level U.S. military assistance in the forms of grant aid and sales, and training and advisory groups, but the main thrust of our activities will be development assistance, designed to solve the root problems of unrest and to improve the quality of life in Latin America.

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL  
Authority: EO 13526  
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS  
Date: MAY 16 2012

~~TOP SECRET~~