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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

February 9, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: US Force Deployments in Asia for FY 73

We are submitting for your consideration an outline of our planned FY 73 deployments with an assessment of the military, political and diplomatic sufficiency of these deployments and a scenario for notifying our Asian Allies and friends concerning them.

The JCS and the Services have recommended that for the period through 13 me maintain the following non SEA-related forces forward deployed in the Western Pacific:

- Graund Forces: one Army division in Korea and 2/3 of a Marine Division on Okinawa.
- 2. Tactical Aircraft: three Air Force wings, one each in Korea, Okinawa and the Philippines/Thailand, and twothirds of a Marine wing in Japan.
- 3. Theater Airlift: two squadrons on Taiwan and one on Okinawa.
- Naval Forces: three attack carriers, 18-24 cruisers and destroyers, seven attack submarines and three ASW squadrons.
- 5. Strategic Forces: one B-52 squadron on Guam and six ballistic missile submarines.

The JCS/Service plan rogether with Vietnam-related reductions outside SEA will produce the following net changes from our current West Pac posture by end FY 73:

- A reduction of 1,000 support personnel in Korea.
- A reduction of two airlift squadrons and a reduction in support personnel totaling 3,000 personnel in Taiwan.
- A reduction of 3,000 support personnel in Japan.
- An increase of one airlift squadron and a reduction in support personnel totaling a net reduction of 2,000 personnel in Okinawa.

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS

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Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

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- A reduction of one airlift squadron and one ASW squadron totaling 1,000 personnel in the Philippines.

- An increase of 1,000 personnel in Guam.

A detailed description of the deployment plan is at Tab A.

The Secretary of Defense has reviewed and approved this plan and recommends you approve it. In doing so he notes, however, that an OSD analysis of the requirements for building up combat forces in Korea or Southeast Asia in the event of hostilities indicates that there is flexibility in both the level and location of forces that must be deployed forward in peacetime. This analysis shows that the FY 73 force levels will provide us more than the minimum forces necessary in terms of military capability to support our Asian strategy and commitments. Thus, while for practical and political reasons we should retain the JCS recommended forces through FY 73, we should consider carefully changes we can make after FY 73 to exploit this deployment flexibility.

It is the assessment of the State Department and of our East Asian Embassies that the FY 73 JCS deployment plan is adequate to support our political and diplomatic objectives in Asia and that communicating its substance to friendly governments will help substantially to arreviate the sense of unease among Asian governments about US intentions and capabilities in the area.

All of our Embassies whose suggestions we have sought on this subject have emphasized that we should begin discussions of our force planning with friendly East Asian governments well before your trip to Peking, both because of the reassurance that these discussions will provide and to avoid any suggestion that our decisions were a product of your meeting with the Chinese. We would like to begin the discussions by the middle of this month. A scenario for these discussions and a summary of our Embassies reactions is at Tab B.

In discussing our FY 73 deployment plan with friendly East Asian governments, we should confine ourselves to identifying the major general purpose force units we intend to retain in the area through FY 73, and avoid getting into specifics on exact troop levels by country. We should also avoid detailed responses to questions about basing plans, future MAP levels, threat estimates, etc. We recognize that we will probably be queried on these subjects, but believe all questions should be referred to Washington and dealt with on a case-by-case basis.

The major purpose of these discussions should be to open a dialogue with our allies in the context of the Nixon Doctrine about our <u>mutual</u> force plans for the future. In presenting our own deployment plans for FY 73,

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we should emphasize that these decisions do not cover the period after June 1973. For that reason, we hope to engage in early discussions with our allies on the post-FY 73 period that would involve not only our own force planning but theirs as well. What we should seek to establish through this initiative is a continuing exchange with our major allies on these important security matters.

If the FY 73 deployment plan and scenario meet with your approval, we will send an instruction to our Ambassadors in East Asia to communicate the general substance of the Defense FY 73 deployment plan at the earliest possible date to their host governments. These discussions will help alleviate the uncertainty in Asia resulting from congressional attitudes on foreign aid, the China visit, the New Economic Policy and other security-related US actions. Moreover, such a dialogue will remove us from our current position of having every US force reduction in the Pacific area, even if purely Vietnam-related, interpreted by our allies as heralding an American disengagement from Asia.

#### Recommendation:

- 1. That you approve the FY 73 deployment plan.
- That you authorize the communication of the general substance of this plan to our key Asian friends.
   8 FEB 1972

William P. Rogers Secretary of State

Melvin R. Laird

Enclosures

A. Deployment Plan

B. Scenario/Sufficiency Assessment.

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## PROPOSED FY 73 ASIAN DEPLOYMENT PLAN

### Non-SEA Related Forces Planned for FY 73 a/

	Fighter/ Attk Sqdn	Ground Forces	Bomb er Sqdn	Airlift Sqdn	ASW Sqđo	Prep'd Material	Total Manpower
Taiwan	4 planes b/	_	-	2	_	~	6,000
Korea	3	1 div	_	_	**	_	44,000
Japan	5 <u>c</u> /	-	-	-	1	-	26,000
Okinawa	3	2/3 div	_	1	1	2/3 div	45,000
Philippines	1	_	_	_	. 1		16,000
Thailand	2 d/	-	-	-	-	1/3 div	5,000 e/
Guam			_1		<u> </u>		15,000
Total	14	1 2/3 div	1	3	3	l dív	157,000

OSD 3.3(b)(5)

a/ The FY 73 deployment plan currently is being staffed within the DOD and is expected to be submitted for Presidential review in late February.

b/ Planes are detached from the Philippines.

c/ Five Marine squadrons which equal about three Air Force squadrons.

d/ Although part of the nine Air Force squadrons authorized for the Pacific, these squadrons are currently being used in the SEA air effort.

e/ SEA related activities raise the total mampower in Thailand to 32,000 for FY 73.

Afloat forces will comprise three attack carriers, 18 to 24 cruisers and destroyers, six ballistic missile submarines, and seven attack submarines with a total afloat manpower of 30,500.

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