



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

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Doc. No. 49
(L. XII) 55

3 November 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Volunteer Army Actions

DECLASSIFIED IN FULL
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: JAN 24 2012

I have committed the Army to an all-out effort to reach zero draft calls by the end of FY 73.


To achieve this goal will require immediate effort on the part of the Army, and support from you. The Administration and the American taxpayers must finally make a decision, through funding, as to the extent of their determination to eliminate the draft as a source of military manpower. Delay of this decision can only weaken the probability of success by your target date.

In this memorandum, I shall describe examples of some actions we believe are important -- actions which should be initiated now to build a basis for your zero draft effort. This list alone will not achieve our goal; many more actions are required. Without your funding support for the balance of FY 71 and for FY 72, the zero draft objective cannot be achieved in the allotted time.

The Army's plan is to launch a two-pronged effort at once. Our focus is upon attraction and retention of two groups - junior enlisted men and junior officers in the combat arms. On the one hand, it will seek to recruit substantially more enlisted men; our goal is an improvement of at least 300%. At the same time, we will put into effect a package of improvements and incentives to boost reenlistments in all skills with emphasis on the critical skills.

The funding required for our basic program is \$131 million in FY 71, and \$718 million in FY 72. The latter amount can be allocated from the funds earmarked for the zero draft call effort. The funds we

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need in FY 71, to get started now, are not in the Army budget and cannot be provided by reprogramming without the self-defeating result of reducing or deleting other programs which are vital to the objectives of the zero draft.

In outline, there are five things that we must do:

- a. We must, and we will, increase both the size and the quality of our Recruiting Command.
- b. We must use money incentives to attract and keep men in those skills for which volunteers are the hardest to get. These are clearly the combat skills - infantry, artillery and armor.
- c. We must make service life more attractive, e.g., livable barracks, ending menial duties, adequate support facilities for dependents, and educational development. This will require money.
- d. We must prevent the number of people in the senior enlisted grades from falling significantly below requirements. The service must be kept attractive to these skilled career professionals during this period of transition. No additional funds are required for this. Our plan is already incorporated in our FY 71 budget update and FY 72 budget submittal. However, care must be taken to assure that our proposed grade structure is not reduced during the budget review process.
- e. We must provide flexibility in the management of the zero draft program to permit prompt shifting of money assets to those areas which appear to be paying off in enlistments and reenlistments.

The inclosure shows examples of the principal basic actions which we plan, and their costs. Briefly, the major items are these:

Recruiting: Our recruiting effort must be expanded substantially, and staffed with some of our best people, if the Army is to obtain the number of volunteers needed. We plan to increase the strength of the U. S. Army Recruiting Command by 536 as quickly as possible and to open over a hundred new recruiting stations. In FY 72 the size of our recruiting force may be increased further as experience dictates. We

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will double the force if necessary, since this may be a highly cost-effective way to increase enlistments. (Each recruiter today produces an average of 70 enlistments per year, and each three-year enlistee produces savings of 25% in travel and training costs over a two-year draftee.) We also will need to put more effort into obtaining officers, since enrollments for ROTC already have dropped sharply and are likely to decline further as the draft pressure subsides.

Incentives for Hard Skills: The Army currently is using the draft because enlistments are not sufficiently attractive in the open labor market. It is the only service in which this is the case. The problem is most acute in the combat skills - infantry, armor and artillery. In the past fiscal year, only 4% of our enlistees chose them. Only 2 1/2% of our basic infantrymen are volunteers.

Since only the Army is unable to compete successfully in the enlistment market, we must make Army enlistments more attractive. Rather than attempting to increase the pay of all soldiers, however, we want to put our money where the problem is greatest. To make service in the combat skills competitive, we plan beginning 1 April 1971 to provide special proficiency pay of up to \$150 per month to men serving in them. This addition will approximately double the pay of the average private. Experience with this incentive for a period of time will give us a good measure of what must be done to end reliance on the draft. It may develop subsequently that other skills in the Army, or skills in the other Services, become impossible to fill through enlistments. In that case, incentive pay in the form of proficiency pay or enlistments bonuses may be applied to those skill areas.

Advertising: We plan a substantially increased publicity campaign to attract volunteers beginning in calendar year 1971. We will start paying the combat proficiency pay in April, after the publicity about it has had time to take effect.

Service Attractiveness: There is no way to keep good men in the Army if they cannot find satisfaction in their day-to-day work, and a moderate degree of comfort for themselves and their families. We must

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take steps to improve the living standard of the soldier -- provide more privacy and less austerity in barracks, free him from menial duties, serve better food, give his family more and more attractive housing, improve commissaries and post services, and in other ways permit him to live as a proud professional. We will need money to maintain adequate living standards. We will need money for civilian labor contracts so that our helicopter mechanics or any other hard skill professionals are not cutting grass or washing dishes. Also, we must emphasize the educational development of our noncommissioned officers, and for this we will need money.

Restore Operations and Maintenance Funds: On the one hand, we espouse increasing reenlistments and bettering the soldier's life. At the same time, we have cut sharply the operations and maintenance budgets of posts in the United States and elsewhere. The results are the curtailment of post-provided services and the firing of civilian support personnel. Those essential support duties must now be performed by soldiers in addition to, or instead of, jobs for which they have been trained. It is unreasonable to expect the soldier to believe we are sincerely interested in his job satisfaction when he can see the deterioration in the services we provide to support him. As a minimum, we must restore the OMA funds to all combat arms posts and service schools. Part of this can be accomplished through funding of the experimentation concept described below. Additional cost of restoring services Army-wide will be provided you as soon as it has been determined.

Experimentation Concept: It is central to our effort that we have room for innovation, and that dollars be concentrated where they will do the most good. To this end, we plan an experimental program. We intend to test specific concepts on junior enlisted men and junior officers while they are in training. Additionally, we plan to conduct tests on more seasoned soldiers in their home environment. We anticipate using Forts Ord, Benning and Carson for these purposes. Not only would the presently-truncated budgets of these posts be restored to recreate normality in the environment, but additionally, we would give the commander of each sufficient money to improve living conditions and remove irritants immediately, without having to wait for implementation of an Army-wide program. For instance, they will be able to end KP as soon as possible, to hire civilians to perform post maintenance work,

to buy better barracks furniture. At the same time, these commanders will conduct special, local campaigns to recruit men for their own units. In FY 72 the program will expand to cover many other posts and training centers. We expect in this way not only to have a major public impact at the earliest possible date, but also to learn from and to economize on the basis of the experience which these posts will furnish.

On the inclosure to this memorandum, I have listed examples of actions which represent, as a minimum, a basis upon which to build our volunteer campaign. It is not my intent that you consider these the only actions which will be required; they are only examples. Flexibility must be retained to shift funds to those programs which prove to have the highest payoff. These actions are listed in order to show you the scope of the minimum budgetary support needed. Costs are estimates which can be made more precise as time allows. The innovations we are requiring will in some cases require relief from certain OSD-imposed constraints, such as on civilian hiring. The funding for FY 72 and beyond can be handled, I believe, within the \$1.3 billion set aside for FY 72 and the \$3.5 billion for subsequent years. But it is imperative that we begin at once. For FY 71 funds, we need your assistance.

I urge that you approve the program described above and authorize actions necessary to obtain for the Army an additional \$131 million in FY 71, and that funds for the Volunteer Army effort be specifically identified and not be subject to elimination or reallocation during the budget review process.

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Stanley R. Resor
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Secretary of the Army

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ESTIMATED COST OF ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMY EFFORT IN FY 71 - FY 72

	<u>FY 71</u>	<u>FY 72</u>
<u>Recruiting Campaign</u>		
o Dramatic improvement in Active Army advertising, including paid TV (beginning 1 Jan 71) 1/	\$ 10,000,000	\$ 30,000,000
o Reserve Components Advertising		1,000,000
o Increase recruiter strength by 536 and open 105 new stations in FY 71	3,000,000	
by 3,000 and open 500 new stations in FY 72 2/		34,800,000
o Proficiency/Superior Performance Pay (\$50 per mo. beginning 1 Jan 71)	900,000	3,900,000
o Out-of-pocket expense money (\$20 per mo. beginning 1 Apr 71)*	250,000	2,200,000
o Leased housing for recruiters - FY 71 850 units/ FY 72 1200 units	300,000	1,000,000
o ROTC scholarships - 1st increment of increasing number of scholarships from 5500 to 12,000*		2,000,000
o ROTC subsistence increase from \$50 to \$100 per month*		15,000,000
o ROTC recruiting	1,000,000	2,000,000
o Medical scholarships		4,700,000
<u>I. Incentives for Enlistment</u>		
o Proficiency Pay (P3) for Combat Arms (\$150 mo) (effective 1 Apr 71)	90,000,000	302,000,000
<u>I. Service Attractiveness</u>		
o Experimentation effort on selected posts and experimentation follow-on 3/	15,000,000	70,000,000
o Partitions for privacy in barracks (world-wide)		50,000,000
o Barracks furniture (world-wide)		10,000,000
o Civilianization of KP	5,600,000 4/	115,000,000
o Construction for increase of WAC strength by 80%		12,300,000
o NCO educational development		1,600,000
o First haircuts for new accessions	175,000	340,000
o Restoration of post support services cut this year, including civilian support personnel		To be determined
<u>V. Fill of Top Six Enlisted Grades as Submitted in FY 71 Update & FY 72 Budget</u>		
o There are no added costs for this program since it is included in the FY 71 Budget update and the FY 72 Budget		
<u>Funding Flexibility for Project Manager</u>	5,000,000	10,000,000
<u>Reserve for Army portion of DoD-wide contingencies</u>		50,000,000
ESTIMATED TOTAL	\$ 131,225,000	\$ 717,840,000

1/ Legislation required.

2/ Development of an intensive publicity campaign up to the maximum levels indicated, if experience supports.

3/ Assumes at least a doubling of the recruiting strength in FY 72, if experience with the first increment supports such a level.

4/ All-out effort to improve living conditions and remove irritants with a view to increasing significantly career attractiveness, thereby increasing retention. Part of the funds will be used to restore undesirable reductions in post operating funds which the Army has been forced to program.

5/ Civilianization of KPs in Europe effective 1 January 71.

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