

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JCSM-57-71

9 February 1971

FY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Tentative Strategy Guidance (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to:

a. Your memorandum, dated 16 December 1970, subject: "Strategic Guidance for Defense Planning (U)," with the attached Tentative Strategy Guidance (TSG).

b. A memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 28 January 1970, subject: "Strategy Guidance."

c. Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1973 Through FY 1980, Volume I, Strategy and Force Planning Guidance (JSOP, Volume I).

d. DOD Instruction 7045.7, dated 29 October 1969, subject: "The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System."

2. (U) Reference 1a states that the TSG supersedes reference 1b, and requests the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to the TSG by 10 February 1971. Reference 1a also states that after comments are reviewed, a final strategy guidance memorandum (FSGM) will be issued by 1 March 1971.

3. (U) It is recognized that the TSG in its present form could serve purposes that extend beyond its application within the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). The historical discussion and description of current strategy contained in Parts I, II and III are noted with interest. However, as stated in the memorandum which forwarded the TSG, "... this guidance, although!

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DOD/DEFENSE  
JCSM-57-71  
Case No. 12-X-6001  
T.S. No. 8  
Document No. 8

Office of the Secretary of Defense  
Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS  
Date: 21 Feb 2012 Authority: EO 13526  
Declassify: ☒ Deny in Full:  
Declassify in Part:  
Reason:  
MDR: 12-M-0457

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Authority: EO 13526  
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Date: 12-01-2012

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OSR DOC 15-3

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consistent with current strategy, is for future planning." Therefore, it is suggested that the FSGM clearly separate historical and current strategy from guidance for the future, and specifically state that the discussion of current strategy is not applicable to future steps of the PPBS. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have concentrated their comments and proposals for change on those portions of the TSG which deal with future strategy, with a view toward clarifying and increasing its effectiveness within the PPBS. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have provided, in the context of the Evaluation of the Military Risk in JSOP, Volume I, their views with regard to certain elements of the current strategy, and recently reaffirmed their view with reference to the 90-day initial conventional defense of NATO.

4. (79) The following subparagraphs provide the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to selected major topics in the TSG:

a. Resource Limitations and Conceptual Approach to Strategy.

The TSG adopts a conceptual approach in which available resources seem to predetermine strategy (page 3). More specifically, the TSG establishes, as a basic goal, a military force "that in peacetime would require no more than about 7 per cent of GNP and be made up of no more than 2.5 million volunteers" (pages 2 and 22). The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that US security interests and threats to those interests should be the prime factors in defining US military strategy. Thereafter, the military requirements of the strategy should be derived. Only after these two basic steps have been accomplished should resource constraints be imposed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize domestic fiscal realities, but believe that fiscal constraints should be applied selectively to resource requirements and in a manner which maximizes capabilities and minimizes risk. [Such a relationship between military requirements and fiscal constraints is provided for in the major steps of the PPBS.] Accordingly, it is believed that fiscal constraints should be imposed in the context of the fiscal guidance memorandum and not in the FSGM. As a related matter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that in future PPB cycles, the FSGM, without fiscal constraints, should be promulgated prior to development of JSOP, Volume II, Analyses and Force Tabulations, and fiscal constraints should be imposed subsequent thereto, as is provided for in DOD Instruction 7045.7.

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b. The Relationship of Deterrence to Flexible Response and Warfighting Capability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff concur in the principal thrust of the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence which seeks to deter war at all levels of conflict. They support the concept of exerting a "downward pressure continually on the probability of conflict." JSOP, Volume I, gives similar recognition to "credible deterrence" as one of the three interrelated elements of the strategic concept that forms the basis for the military strategy therein; the other two elements are "flexible response" and "collective security." In general, the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to collective security conform to the discussion of reliance on allies throughout the TSG. However, in the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, deterrence can best be achieved by maintaining both a full range of warfighting capabilities and a manifest national determination to use them when necessary, in order to make unmistakably clear to our adversaries that the price for aggression, at any level of conflict, would far outweigh any possible gain. Moreover, since there is an essential interdependence between all levels of deterrence, the possession of credible warfighting capabilities at all levels of conflict, i.e., a flexible response capability, is central to a credible strategy of realistic deterrence and should be included as a concept in the FSGM.

c. Definition of the "Shield." The Nixon Doctrine states that the United States "shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole." As a security issue, the TSG indicates a need to define "shield" under the Nixon Doctrine more clearly, i.e., "Nuclear? Nonnuclear? or both?" It is recognized that there are advantages to not revealing the exact nature of the US response to aggression. However, in the context of strategy guidance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the meaning of the shield should be more clearly defined. In their view the shield of the Nixon Doctrine is intended to deter all forms of aggression against US allies, and to some degree, virtually all US Forces contribute to that deterrence. Thus, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the FSGM should recognize that the shield is provided by the full range of US force capabilities, combined with the unmistakable will to employ these capabilities in defense of US allies.

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d. Criteria for Strategic Sufficiency. The discussion of "A New National Security Strategy" (pages 26-32) does not specifically address criteria for strategic sufficiency nor provide guidance with respect to satisfying these criteria. However, the 28 January 1970 Strategy Guidance Memorandum (SGM) did provide guidance concerning the four elements of criteria for strategic sufficiency set forth in NSDM-16. Subsequently, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reflected this guidance in JSOP, Volume I, which additionally reflected the view that strategic forces should possess the obvious capability to insure that the United States would emerge in a position of relative advantage from any level of nuclear warfare. Furthermore, since the sufficiency criteria pertain only to attacks on the United States, JSOP, Volume I, stated that strategic forces should be sufficient in their combined capability to make credible the US commitment to employ its strategic forces as may be necessary for the successful defense of NATO and other allied territories. In view of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the FSGM should include a discussion of the criteria for strategic sufficiency as well as the additional criteria set forth in JSOP, Volume I.

e. Mutually Supporting Strategic Forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note the TSG statement that future US force planning should "ease [the] requirement on three independent retaliatory forces" (page 31). Rather than focusing on the potential of each of the strategic offensive force components, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the guidance should focus on the importance of maintaining confidence in the deterrent capability of a mix of strategic offensive forces. The effectiveness of US strategic offensive forces in a nuclear exchange is dependent upon many factors, several of which are highly uncertain. These include the circumstances under which the exchange starts and continues, the degree of prior warning to US Forces that an attack is imminent, the future Soviet and CPR threats, and the performance of US strategic forces in an environment in which they have not been and will not be pretested. Because of these uncertainties, the United States attempts to maintain confidence in the capabilities of strategic offensive forces by having a deterrent capability provided by a mix of mutually supporting strategic forces; land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers. Such a force mix provides: (a) assurance that a technological breakthrough against any one element will not negate the effectiveness of the entire force; (b) a hedge against widespread failures of any element due to unanticipated nuclear

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weapons effects; (c) a compounding of Soviet offensive and defensive problems in attempting to defeat or defend against US Forces; and (d) reinforcement of the viability of each element by the presence of the others, thereby strengthening the credibility of the total deterrent posture. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the FSGM incorporate the views outlined above and reflect the requirement for a mix of mutually supporting strategic offensive forces.

f. Coupled Nuclear Deterrence. The discussion of the relationship between strategic nuclear forces and theater nuclear forces appears to be inconsistent in the TSG. On page 21, reference is made to "free world deterrent forces that are effective independently of strategic nuclear forces ...." However, reference is also made on page 27 to a "coupled" deterrent approach for nuclear weapons. Finally, the deterrent objectives for theater nuclear forces stated on page 45 imply a deterrent role decoupled from strategic nuclear forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that this apparent inconsistency be resolved by affirming the essential interdependent deterrent relationship between strategic and theater nuclear forces.

g. Service Responsibility for Geographic Regions. The TSG appears to assign primary responsibility for NATO to the Army and Air Force and primary responsibility for Asia to the Navy and Marine Corps (page 32). The meaning of "primary responsibility" as used in the TSG is not clear. It is uncertain, for example, whether assignment of operating responsibility is intended, whether a majority by force composition is intended, or whether some other meaning should be assumed. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the capabilities of the forces of all Services are complementary and that crises or conflicts in either Europe or Asia will require forces from all Services, carefully task organized, to deter or defeat aggression. Further, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that US regional command and operational responsibilities must continue to rest with the regional unified commanders, and that Service responsibilities should be as described in DOI Directive 5100.1 and as amplified in JCS Pub 2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). It would seem appropriate for the TSG to discuss the roles and capabilities of various Service force elements in geographic scenarios; however, determination of required force mix, task force composition, and similar questions should be resolved only after a thorough evaluation of the military considerations involved, including the recommendations of the regional unified commanders. For the foregoing reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that regional responsibilities not be identified for specific Services in the FSGM.

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h. The Role of US Forces in Asia. On page 47 the TSG states, "Do not plan on U.S. conducting large conventional land war in Asia." Later in the same paragraph the TSG states, "If a large land war occurs in Asia, we must plan on using subtheater-oriented conventional forces ... or those earmarked for NATO." The impression created by the foregoing, when considered in conjunction with the Navy/Marine Corps orientation in Asia, would suggest that the full range of US general purpose force capabilities would not be brought to bear in the event of CPR aggression in Asia. On that subject, in his report to the Congress, United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s, the President stated the following:

"In the effort to harmonize the doctrine and capability, we chose what is best described as the '1 1/2 war' strategy. Under it we will maintain in peacetime general purpose forces adequate for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere.

"To meet the requirements for the strategy we adopted, we will maintain the required ground and supporting tactical air forces in Europe and Asia, together with naval and air forces. At the same time, we will retain adequate active forces in addition to a full complement of reserve forces based in the United States...."

(1) Thus, the President reaffirmed the strategy guidance directed by NSDM-27. The "either Europe or Asia" feature of the Presidential strategy prohibits maintenance of major forces to conduct operations against the CPR and the Warsaw Pact simultaneously. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the President has directed planning for military operations against major communist aggression in Asia as well as Europe, but not for both simultaneously. Furthermore, in the above quotation, the President also stated that the United States will maintain ground, naval, and tactical air forces forward deployed in both Europe and Asia. For the reasons above, JSOP, Volume I, reflects the requirement to plan for major combat operations, in concert with allies, against a CPR aggression in Asia.

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(2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree with the thrust of the Nixon Doctrine as it looks "to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its own defense." However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that indigenous allied ground forces may not in all cases be capable of withstanding a non-CPR aggression. JSOP, Volume I, states that, in the event of a non-CPR or non-USSR aggression outside the NATO area, US Forces will "provide materiel, logistic, advisory, and intelligence support, and if necessary, backup air and naval, and minimum essential ground forces, to assist allies...." The failure to include appropriate recognition to requirements for all force elements could lead to restrictive military planning.

(3) Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that elements of the guidance should be broadened, and recommend that the FSGM reflect a requirement to plan to conduct major combat operations in concert with allies against a CPR aggression in Asia, and give adequate recognition to the contribution of all force elements in assisting an ally against a non-CPR aggression.

i. The Role of US Forces in NATO. The TSG tends to disassociate the Mediterranean from the Southern flank of NATO, fails to address the Northern flank, and overlooks the importance and relationship of the flanks to the overall security of the Alliance. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the guidance be broadened to include these important elements in the defense of NATO.

j. Mobility Forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that "perhaps the most difficult area to manage will be the range of situations ... requiring the positioning or use of conventional forces." The possibility of adjustments to the US overseas posture, combined with the Presidential reaffirmation that the United States will meet its commitments and continue the US role as a leading world power, lend credence to that judgment. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are concerned, however, that the TSG does not include sufficient force planning guidance for the mobility forces necessary to provide the flexibility to cope with the possible range of international politico-military crises. While improvements to conventional forces may enhance their mobility, an essential factor in the US security posture for the 1970s will be the availability of sufficient civil and military airlift and sealift resources, along with mobility support forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the FSGM reflect the requirement for adequate mobility forces and provide appropriate planning guidance relative to that requirement in the section titled "Specific Planning for the Military Spectrum."

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k. Defense of Lines of Communication (LOC). The TSG does not adequately recognize the criticality of the sea and air LOC in the event of aggression by the Warsaw Pact or CPR. The serious challenge to the LOC that would exist in either situation and the criticality of providing necessary reinforcement and support to forward deployed US Forces as well as to US allies make access to LOC vitally important. The United States must have the capability to defend these LOC against the most serious threat that exists. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the FSGM reflect the requirement to defend essential LOC.

l. Unilateral US Force Capabilities. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the TSG places considerable emphasis upon the contribution of allied capabilities to the achievement of US national security interests. They note also that these capabilities are to "form an integral part of our force planning for the future." These concepts require the acceptance of several critical assumptions, including an increase in allied capabilities, increased US military aid despite congressional pressure to the contrary, and increased effectiveness of nonmilitary instruments of US foreign policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff would caution against planning which could make national security excessively dependent on Allied forces or which could reduce the US capability to conduct unilateral military operations when such action is in the national interest and allied capabilities are inadequate or when allied interests diverge from those of the United States. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the FSGM reflect the requirement to maintain the capability to conduct unilateral military operations, while concurrently striving to improve allied capabilities so that US allies may, in the future, be capable of assuming a greater share of the burden of Free World security.

m. "Tailoring" of Forces for "Subtheater" Operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that subtheater warfare, as described in the TSG, embodies many of the features of what has been termed "assistance to allies" and/or "minor" contingencies, "where force commitments are of a minor nature but where their timeliness may be crucial," as described in JSOP, Volume I. It should be noted that existing general purpose forces of all Services are equipped, organized for, and have carefully developed operational procedures for

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conducting small-scale (subtheater) as well as large-scale operations, unilaterally, jointly with other Services, and/or in concert with allies. In addition, since forces for use in subtheater operations may also be tasked to participate in a major conflict, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it advisable to continue to develop general purpose forces primarily to meet the most dangerous threats to US security while building flexibility into these forces to the maximum extent possible.

n. Other Issues. Reference 1a states that "In some specific areas, new concepts and directions are provided. In others, some basic issues are raised." However, it is not clear in some cases which new concepts or issues constitute definitive guidance to the Services, and which "... should be addressed and clarified with a view to resolving them" during the forthcoming year. Some examples in the TSG include:

- (1) The role of theater nuclear weapons (pages 21, 27, 31, 32, 45, and 46);
- (2) The presumption of critical deficiencies in existing strategic offensive forces, the assessment of future threats to their survivability, and evaluation and endorsement of alternative responses to these threats (pages 31, 32, and 38-43);
- (3) Appropriate ballistic missile defense (pages 31, 32, 38, 41, and 42);
- (4) Austere versus balanced air defense for the United States (pages 39 and 42);
- (5) Provision of air support from ships other than large attack aircraft carriers (pages 57 and 58);
- (6) The concept of consolidation versus coordination of survivable command and control systems for strategic forces (pages 39 and 43); and
- (7) Incomplete and speculative examples of general purpose force structures and operational concepts which "could emerge," some of which are reflected in ongoing programs and others of which require considerable further evaluation (pages 31-34, 48, 51-53, and 56-58).

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To avoid prejudging the merits of issues currently under investigation or requiring detailed analysis, it is recommended that concepts which require further review be deleted from or specifically identified as conceptual in the FSGM.

5. (U) In forwarding JSOP, Volume I, to you, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated:

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff endorse fully your desire that 'Volume I of the JSOP will routinely reflect our military strategy and will require minimum revision in the process of the scheduled OSD review of the JSOP.' It would be most useful to that end if the SGM would focus on specific substantive differences with respect to the attached document, including the Evaluation of the Military Risks, without addressing topics on which there is general agreement."

Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the FSGM include an additional section, keyed specifically to JSOP, Volume I, which identifies and discusses substantive differences between your views and those set forth in JSOP, Volume I. That section of the FSGM will be most useful in preparing JSOP, Volume I, for FY 1974-1981 to be forwarded to you in June 1971.

6. (U) In view of the fact that the TSG represents a substantial change from the 28 January 1970 SGM, and further recognizing that other agencies will be making substantive comments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff request that they be provided an opportunity to review the FSGM prior to its issuance.

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Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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