



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

Doc. No. 376

JCSM-95-71
3 March 1971

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Ch. XV 16

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: FY 1973-1977 Tentative Fiscal Guidance (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to:

a. A memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 10 February 1971, which forwarded the FY 1973-1977 tentative fiscal guidance.

b. A memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 10 February 1971, which enclosed force and activity levels for Southeast Asia.

c. JCSM-251-70, dated 23 May 1970, subject: "Decremental Alternative Program to the Joint Force Memorandum, Fiscal Years 1972-1979 (U)."

2. ~~The~~ The views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the capabilities and risks inherent in a force structure at a total funding level somewhat similar to the tentative guidance

the impact on general purpose forces of the proposed outlay targets would be much more severe than the FY 1972-1979 Decremental Alternative Program not only because of the stipulation that base case total obligational authority (TOA) totals not be reduced for strategic programs and be maintained for intelligence and security and support to other nations, but also because of problems inherent in managing by outlays versus TOA. In this regard, the prior commitment of outlay to multi-

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OSD 3.3(b)(1)-(9)

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OSD 3.3(b)(1) - (9).

3. ~~3.3~~ While the Joint Chiefs of Staff appreciate the planning implications of the Strategic [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Further, a reduction of general purpose forces is inconsistent with recent Presidential decisions to insure a credible defense posture for deterrence and defense against conventional attack. These decisions have prompted improvement programs in conjunction with US allies to improve conventional capabilities. For these reasons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend [REDACTED]

4. ~~4.3~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff see only limited utility in preparing alternative programs at higher or at lower funding levels. Programs at higher levels are available in the 5 February 1971 FYDP update and in Volume II, Analyses and Force Tabulations, Joint Strategic [REDACTED] Through FY 1980 (JSOP FY 73-80) [REDACTED] have been examined previously and [REDACTED] meet national security objectives.

5. ~~5.3~~ In regard to the tentative guidance for materiel support planning, it is recognized that sound logistic planning requires the acceptance of certain basic assumptions concerning support levels and broad strategic guidance. However, the level of detail provided appears to exceed that degree of specificity [REDACTED]

Logistics should be planned to support the total capability of the JFM/POM force structure, as constrained by the approved strategy. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the language used in the final [REDACTED] needed to develop adequately the JFM and the POMs. The planning scenarios introduce operational planning assumptions on mobilization timing, sequence, and duration which are not in agreement [REDACTED]

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with recommendations submitted in the current JSOP. Of particular concern is the assumption that the Warsaw Pact and the United States begin mobilization simultaneously. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that a more reasonable basis for NATO planning is the assumption of a Pact lead in its own buildup, with short (a few days) or no NATO preparation prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The strategy reflected in the tentative guidance for materiel support planning must be consistent in all respects with the final strategy guidance. Logistic planning, restricted by these postulated scenarios, could prove inadequate if a different combination or timing of events occurred. Therefore, it is further recommended that the specified scenarios be deleted and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff develop such geographical force distribution and deployment/reinforcement schedules as required, based on the strategic concepts and force planning guidance in Volume I, Strategy and Force Planning Guidance, JSOP FY 73-80, as subsequently refined by the Strategy Guidance Memorandum.

6. ~~The~~ The tentative guidance for materiel support planning also raises a number of questions which require clarification. Specific comments are provided in the Appendix hereto.

[REDACTED]

Army, 8,400 Navy/Coast Guard, 38,506 Air Force, and 522 Marine Corps), and an end FY 1972 authorization in Thailand of 31,695 (6,800 Army, 395 Navy/Coast Guard/Marine Corps, and 24,500 Air Force). The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated that the field commanders' recommended levels are prudent planning goals at this time but that, since the situation in Southeast Asia is subject to change due to current operations, they will review FY 1972 US force and activity levels by 30 April. They would note also that the manpower levels cited in the force and activity levels for Southeast Asia for the Air Force in Thailand will not support the level of activity proposed therein. Regarding end FY 1973 and beyond, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, in providing the capability for an average of 300 B-52 sorties per month, the option of Thailand basing with associated operational efficiency and fiscal savings should not be excluded. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have not otherwise considered force

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and activity levels for end FY 1973 and beyond except in the context of directed in-country planning goals.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

[Handwritten signature]

T. H. MOORER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment

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Date: 02 May 2012 Authority: EO 13526
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