

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON D C 20301

23 OCT 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Defense Policy and Planning Guidance for FY 74-78

The FY 74 Defense Policy and Force Planning Guidance (PPG) provides the definitive guidance for Department of Defense force planning, including the development of JSOP Volume II. JSOP Volume I and all relevant Presidential guidance were taken into account in preparation of the PPG, and much of the format and content of JSOP Volume I has been retained.

For the missions and strategies specified in the PPG, JSOP Volume II should specify the required force levels together with the supporting analytical rationale. JSOP Volume II should also specify the risks that the Joint Chiefs consider inherent in the strategies contained in the PPG. Where the Joint Chiefs deem a risk associated with a strategy to be imprudent, JSOP Volume II should propose a modification to the PPG strategy. The effect of each proposed modification should be presented in terms of active and reserve force requirements and in terms of risk.

I intend to carefully review JSOP Volume II before issuing FY 74-78 fiscal guidance. The two force level cases described above, - (the forces associated with the PPG strategy and those associated with JCS strategic modifications) -, will be very helpful in determining what fiscal changes from the FYDE to direct in issuing fiscal guidance and requesting FY 74 POM development. These assessments will also be used in developing the design scenarios, force requirements and planning assumptions which will be part of my fiscally constrained Policy and Planning Guidance, which will be issued with the fiscal guidance in the first quarter of 1972.


Independent of JSOP Volume II, you are invited to comment on the PPG as you see fit. I would appreciate receiving your replies by 7 December.

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Enclosures

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~~SECRET~~DEFENSE POLICY GUIDANCE1. Introduction

This document sets forth the basic concepts, principles, and long-range objectives which comprise the assumptions upon which the Five-Year Defense Program is to be structured. The Force and Resource Planning Guidance provides further detail for force planning.

2. National Security Policy and Strategy

President Nixon's policy of peace, based on the principles of partnership, strength, and a willingness to negotiate, is designed to move our country and the rest of the world toward a generation of peace. This basic policy underlies and guides our new National Security Strategy of Realistic Deterrence.

Our goal is to prevent wars, to maintain a realistic and ready military force aimed at deterring aggression -- but adequate when combined with the forces of our allies to handle aggression should deterrence fail. ✓

3. General Concepts

Implementing our strategy of realistic deterrence requires more stress on some factors which were not as important in the past, including:

- a. A recognition that diplomacy and political action contribute directly to deterrence, especially in communicating with potential enemies. ✓
- b. A requirement that our allies in Europe and Asia do more for themselves. ✓
- c. A vigorous and effective International Security Assistance Program.
- d. The application of a "Total Force" concept to our planning to take account of current world realities. This includes both active and reserve components of the U.S. and the additional military capabilities of our allies that will be made available through local efforts or through provision of appropriate security assistance programs.
- e. The enunciation of a new policy with respect to Reserve forces. Members of the National Guard and Reserve, instead of draftees, will be the initial and primary source for augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces. ✓

Many of our allies are already economically prosperous; others are rapidly becoming so. We seek by the end of the 1970's a community of free nations who support each other in alliances against common threats according to their proportionate strengths while each bears the major responsibility for its own defense. The interest of every one of our allies in

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its own security should be greater than our interest, or the interest of any other foreign power, in its security. The test of this interest is a willingness to endure great sacrifice, if need be.

Certain fundamental concepts, which will not be restated in following sections, should be explicitly taken into account in planning within the guidance given in this document.

- a. To the extent possible, flexibility should be incorporated in Defense programs to hedge against failures in negotiations, increased threats or unexpected failures of U.S. systems, and to preserve the ability to capitalize on opportunities that arise. A corollary is that U.S. military systems should be diversified enough so that one adverse event is not likely to impact heavily on the U.S. deterrent posture.
- b. In planning Defense programs, the capabilities of potential adversaries should be examined with an objective of capitalizing on intrinsic weaknesses rather than trying to meet every threat head on.
- c. In planning measures to meet threats which face the U.S., all appropriate resources for deterrence -- active and reserve, military and nonmilitary, U.S. and Free World -- should be considered in order to capitalize on the potential of available assets. In particular, we should take explicit account of allied capabilities and to the extent feasible, pursue integrated long-range planning with allies including procurement, training and operations.
- d. In some cases the effectiveness of U.S. national security policy will depend on preserving and strengthening existing alliances. In other cases it will depend on U.S. friends and allies moving toward improved regional and bilateral security arrangements and increasing their identification of their interests with those of their Free World friends.
- e. Finally, success of the efforts described above may make adjustments in U.S. forces possible. Few such adjustments are likely to be toward larger forces in the foreseeable future. The possibility of smaller U.S. forces in the future implies that great emphasis be given to their readiness and effectiveness, including especially modernization, and to increased efficiency of all supporting activities: logistics, command, training, intelligence, communications, and research and development.
- f. Where appropriate, reductions in the active force can be offset by increasing the capability or modifying the structure of the Guard and Reserve forces. Modifications to Guard and Reserve structure will be made with a minimum of personnel turbulence.

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- g. The lower sustaining costs of nonactive duty forces make possible a great deal of flexibility in planning the total force structure. Under conditions of increased reliance on Guard and Reserve forces, the capability and mobilization readiness of Guard and Reserve units must be raised, where necessary, and maintained at required readiness levels.

The basic objective of our Strategy of Realistic Deterrence is to prevent armed conflict and eventually eliminate its use as a means by which one nation tries to impose its will upon another. But so long as the threat persists that other nations may use force, adequate military power must remain an essential element of our strategy.

4. Basic Criteria

The following basic criteria are established for national security planning for the decade of the 1970's:

- a. Preservation by the United States of a sufficient strategic nuclear capability as the cornerstone of the Free World's nuclear deterrent.
- b. Development and/or continued maintenance of Free World forces that are effective, and minimize the likelihood of requiring the employment of strategic nuclear forces should deterrence fail.
- c. An International Security Assistance Program that will enhance effective self-defense capabilities throughout the Free World, and, when coupled with diplomatic and other actions, will encourage regional security agreements among our friends and allies.

5. Planning Principles

In Defense planning, the Strategy of Realistic Deterrence emphasizes our need to plan for optimum use of all military and related resources available to meet the requirements of Free World security. These Free World diplomatic efforts and military resources -- or "Total Force" -- include both active and reserve components of the U.S., those of our allies and friends that will be made available through local efforts, or through provisions of appropriate security assistance programs.

In considering the spectrum of potential conflict, the following definitions and principles shall be applied for purposes of defense planning:

1. Strategic Nuclear Forces for Deterrence

- a. Definition. Strategic nuclear warfare occurs when the United States itself is attacked by enemy nuclear weapons.

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- b. Objective. The U.S. strategic forces should possess a level of strategic capability sufficient to deter nuclear attack on the United States. To achieve the foregoing, strategic forces must be of sufficient size and quality to meet the strategic sufficiency criteria approved by the President as amplified in the Force and Resource Planning Guidance.

Further, the President has stated that, in its broader political sense, sufficiency means the maintenance of forces adequate to prevent our allies, as well as the U.S., from being coerced. Therefore, strategic forces should be planned to be sufficient in their combined capability to deter attack upon the United States, and also to help our theater nuclear capabilities and the nuclear capabilities of our allies to deter nuclear attacks upon our allies in which the enemy uses strategic or other nuclear forces. The President has also stated a requirement for:

"... forces and procedures that provide us with alternatives appropriate to the nature and level of the provocation. This means having the plans and command and control capabilities necessary to enable us to select and carry out the appropriate response without necessarily having to resort to mass destruction."

- c. Responsibility. In deterring strategic nuclear war, primary reliance will continue to be placed on U.S. strategic forces.
- d. Strategic Arms Limitation. SALT seeks to preserve U.S. strategic sufficiency through negotiations rather than unconstrained competition, and to reduce the likelihood of strategic nuclear war between the U.S. and USSR. SALT derives from recognition of the rough strategic balance that now exists and a desire to avoid major increases in strategic forces. Thus far, we and the Soviets have agreed to seek limitations on both defensive and offensive systems. How extensive these will be and how soon they will be effective have yet to be worked out. Effective means for verifying each side's compliance are essential to any agreement.

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II. Theater Nuclear Forces for Deterrence

- a. Definition. Theater nuclear warfare involves the use of nuclear weapons against or by U.S. or allied forces, but not an attack on the United States itself.
- b. Objective. The desired objective of our theater nuclear forces is deterrence. If this deterrence is to be credible, our general purpose forces must possess a realistic and effective theater nuclear attack option, backed by U.S. strategic forces. Theater nuclear forces are designed to deter nuclear warfare, and they help to deter conventional aggression because of the uncertainty which surrounds the circumstances under which theater nuclear weapons might be employed.

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In addition, as the President stated in his Foreign Policy Report in both 1970 and 1971,

"the prospects for a coordinated two-front attack on our allies by Russia and China are low both because of the risks of nuclear war and the improbability of Sino-Soviet cooperation. In any event, we do not believe that such a coordinated attack should be met primarily by U.S. conventional forces;"

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Therefore, we would not plan U.S. forces to be capable of meeting primarily with conventional forces a PRC attack which occurred simultaneously with or after a Pact attack against NATO.

- c. Responsibility. The U.S. has primary responsibility for the theater nuclear deterrent, but certain of our allies are able to share this responsibility by virtue of their own nuclear capabilities. Specifically, as the President indicated in his Foreign Policy Report in 1971, "We will provide the nuclear shield of the Nixon Doctrine." This shield is designed to prevent a nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail which threatens the freedom of an ally or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

III. Theater Conventional Forces for Deterrence

- a. Definition. The term theater conventional war is used to describe a non-nuclear war involving direct conflict between the U.S. and the USSR or PRC.
- b. Objective. Our objective is to maintain ground, air and naval forces, active and Reserve, which, in conjunction with allied ground, air and naval forces, will deter such conflict through a capability to cope with major conventional conflict involving the USSR or China if aggression occurs by them against any country/area "vital" to our interests. Force planning to fulfill this objective shall include provisions for the following:
 - 1. An initial defense of NATO Europe or a joint defense of Asia (Korea or Southeast Asia).
 - 2. Acceptance of some degradation in U.S. capability to reinforce NATO in the event of conflict involving joint defense of Asia.
 - 3. Protection of shipping and naval forces.
 - 4. Denying to the Soviet Union an advantage from "Conflict at Sea" involving the U.S.
 - 5. Unilaterally intervening in a limited conflict not simultaneous with a NATO war, but with limited Soviet opposition.
 - 6. A strategic reserve.
- c. Responsibility. U.S. and allied forces share the responsibility for the theater conventional deterrent. This is true of air, ground and naval forces and U.S. force planning should reflect this allied interdependence.

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Primary emphasis in force planning should be given to European defense. The President has decided that the United States will continue to give support to the concept of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), and studies are now in progress. Until these and future studies which may be necessary have been reviewed by the President, general purpose force planning will not be required to take explicit account of the possibility of a future MBFR agreement. However, future U.S. force contributions to NATO may be affected by MBFR in Europe.

With regard to Asia, force planning should increasingly reflect complementary and supplementary rather than combined force planning (defined in paragraph VI following). Conventional ground forces of our Asian friends and allies, backed up by U.S. guarantees and security assistance, should increasingly constitute the primary conventional deterrent to PRC aggression. This policy incorporates two tenets:

1. We will allocate Security Assistance at levels Asian allies can absorb without undue economic penalty, in order to build to force levels which, assuming effective regional cooperation, appear adequate to deter PRC invasion forces. In this process, the ground forces of our Asian allies will receive first priority, but we will build towards a balanced force;
2. We will encourage regional cooperation at reasonably attainable levels, through security assistance and diplomacy.

IV. Deterrence of Sub-Theater Warfare and Localized Conflict

- a. Definition. Sub-theater conventional wars are wars which do not involve the U.S. in direct conflict with either the USSR or PRC. For example, these could result from aggressions by North Vietnam, North Korea, or a conflict in the Middle East between Arab States and Israel.
- b. Objective. Our objective is to shift primary responsibility to allies and friends for deterring or fighting sub-theater or localized conflict. U.S. help is to be primarily through assistance, but could include force deployments, either to provide a "presence" and/or a "quick response" for special circumstances.

Our primary means of creating a realistic deterrent to sub-theater wars will be our assistance programs. These programs will aid our allies in building military capabilities to translate their will to defend themselves into a realistic deterrent. In some cases, this deterrent will be strengthened if the possibility is left open that U.S. forces might back up local forces in response to aggression. Therefore, we will generally want to keep the precise use of U.S. forces unclear to our opponents.

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With regard to sub-theater warfare in general, our key objective will be to avoid committing the United States to a war of attrition. Our overall national security programs must be designed to shift the responsibility for fighting on the ground to our allies.

U.S. force planning to fulfill our objectives with respect to sub-theater and localized conflict shall emphasize military assistance to friends and allies. Our future planning for assistance to Allies in Asia against a non-PRC threat should be based on the assumption that we would provide only air, naval, intelligence, logistic and materiel support, except that for political and other reasons we should plan on retaining some U.S. ground forces in Korea.

- c. Responsibility. In deterring sub-theater or localized warfare, the country or ally which is threatened increasingly must bear the primary burden, particularly for providing manpower; but when U.S. interests or obligations are at stake, we must be prepared to provide help as appropriate through military and economic assistance to those nations willing to assume their share of the responsibility for their own defense. When required and appropriate, this help would consist of backup logistical support and sea and air combat support, and our planning should be based on this concept. It should be noted that the use of ground forces is not ruled out should such use be in our interest for any specific situation.
- d. The Middle East and NATO. Our European allies in NATO have legitimate interests which extend far beyond the Central Front in West Germany. Accordingly, it is in the best interests of our NATO allies to play a more active role in ensuring peace and stability in the Middle East/Mediterranean area. It is our policy to encourage our NATO allies in this regard.

V. Additional Considerations

- a. Forward Deployment. The primary purpose of U.S. forward deployment is to demonstrate to potential enemies and our allies our resolve to honor our commitments and defend our interests, thereby enhancing realistic deterrence.
- b. Forward Defense. The basic military strategy for the U.S. and its allies is forward defense. In implementing this strategy we will, to the greatest extent possible, place reliance on the forces of our allies to provide the initial capability for forward defense. U.S. forward deployed forces will enable the U.S. to assist allies in timely collective defense against an attack.

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- c. Vietnamization. We will continue to shift responsibility for the current sub-theater conflict in SEA to our Southeast Asia Allies and friends. Our objective continues to be to reduce U.S. direct involvement to zero while concurrently providing the South Vietnamese with a capability for self defense. The specific planning assumptions for Southeast Asia will be covered separately in detail.
- d. Mobilization. We should be prepared to mobilize all of the active National Guard, reserves and their associated units on warning of USSR or PRC aggression. In the event of a crisis not involving either the USSR or the PRC, we should be prepared to mobilize some Guard or reserve units on a case-by-case basis.
- e. Zero Draft. The President has directed that the Department of Defense develop an all-volunteer armed force. The Department of Defense fully supports this objective and has set a target of reducing its reliance on the draft to zero by the end of FY-73.

VI. Force Planning Under the Total Force Concept

In conducting force planning to implement these principles and concepts, the total force concept shall be applied with respect to both U.S. and Free World forces. Planning under the total force concept for the Free World, particularly with respect to conventional forces, should be considered in four general categories:

- a. Combined -- In which regional force planning is developed in close consultation with allies (e.g., at present, NATO, Korea and Vietnam) and reflects detailed consideration of all assets available to the various countries in fulfilling regional requirements for forces, both in conflict and in peacetime. The most important criterion should be overall allied capability in deterring or coping with aggression, rather than an individual nation's or individual service's respective capabilities.
- b. Complementary -- in which regional force planning is also developed in close consultation with friends and allies (e.g., Thailand, Japan, Korea long-term) but the primary consideration with regard to U.S. forces should be the role these forces would play in augmenting national forces in areas where indigenous capability is low or marginal. In general, primary reliance should be placed on use of indigenous manpower and development of self-sufficient local capabilities, with the U.S. providing specialized support and help, designed to augment local forces against large-scale external aggression.

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- c. Security Assistance, or Supplementary -- in which the role of the U.S. would be supplement local capabilities through the provisions of appropriate security assistance. Planning should emphasize making available the training, equipment, and supplies to local nations to improve their force effectiveness commensurate with national capabilities and resources (e.g., Middle East, Indonesia, Cambodia).
- d. Unilateral -- in which U.S. force planning, particularly for responding to minor contingencies, would reflect unilateral U.S. force capabilities and operations.

VII . Readiness

Whatever the overall level of our general purpose forces, active, Guard and reserve, we must ensure that they can deploy and engage quickly, and sustain in combat for whatever period is stated in our planning objectives. Visible readiness is a necessary component of Realistic Deterrence, since it renders our force effectiveness both real and credible.

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