



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

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Ch. XVII (6)

JCSM-503-71

22 November 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

OSD 3.3(b)(1)-(19)

Subject: Defense Policy and Planning Guidance for
FY 1974-1978 (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to:


a. JCSM-226-71, dated 13 May 1971, subject: "Planning and Programming Guidance for the FY 1973-1977 Defense Program (U)."

b. Your memorandum, dated 22 June 1971, subject: "Revised Guidance for Planning."

c. JCSM-291-71, dated 23 June 1971, subject: "Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1974 Through FY 1981, Volume I, Strategy and Force Planning Guidance (U)."

d. Your memorandum, dated 23 October 1971, subject as above, which invited the comments of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject guidance.

2. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the value of a continuing dialogue during the evolution of Defense programs and believe it enhances the overall effectiveness of the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS). They note that your Defense Policy and Planning Guidance (DPPG) for FY 1974-1978 is generally keyed to Volume I, Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1974 Through FY 1981 (JSOP FY 74-81), and consider the DPPG, together with Volume I, appropriate for the development of Volume II, Analyses and Force Tabulations, JSOP FY 74-81. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the timing of the guidance has created an element of uncertainty in the orderly development of Volume II, JSOP FY 74-81. To this end, they believe the utility of the DPPG would be con-



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3. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that US perception of Soviet goals is uncertain; while the Soviets demonstrate an apparent serious interest in arms control agreements with the United States, ~~_____~~

~~_____~~ Such ambiguity creates doubts as to Soviet views of the strategic balance and its ultimate intentions with regard to its strategic capabilities. Accordingly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff deem ~~_____~~ ✓

~~_____~~ this regard, they note that the design and structure of strategic forces to meet the criteria for strategic sufficiency and to retain the inherent capability for flexible response options ~~_____~~ ✓

~~_____~~ destroy or neutralize a comprehensive military target system; conduct selective attacks in response to any level of enemy attack or provocation; and contribute to US capabilities across the warfare spectrum to terminate hostilities under conditions advantageous to the United States. ~~_____~~ to expand a warfighting capability. ✓

~~_____~~ and, should a nuclear exchange take place, put the survival of the United States in jeopardy. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that a portion of the guidance states: "To the extent that redundant retaliatory capability is required to provide that assurance [i.e., retaliatory capability against urban/industrial targets], the excess capability may be targeted against military targets." ~~_____~~

~~_____~~ that US strategic options must not be limited to the indiscriminate mass destruction of enemy civilians.

4. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the DPPG draws a distinction between theater and tactical nuclear weapons, with emphasis being placed on theater nuclear retaliatory capability for the purpose of deterrence. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that total theater nuclear deterrence should be achieved by ~~_____~~

~~_____~~ which provides a variety of options that can be applied selectively for responding to, initiating, or waging nuclear warfare at all levels, should deterrence fail.

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5. (S) The achievement of the objective for security assistance planning, i.e., that by FY 1977 US Asian allies will be able to counter PRC ground threats without requiring US ground forces, is contingent upon such uncertain factors as congressional support of a vigorous and effective US security assistance program and the recipient country's force development plans, capabilities, and national interests.

[REDACTED]

6. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the DPPG assumes a more optimistic warning and mobilization period for a NATO contingency than that reflected in Volume I, JSOP FY 74-81. Volume II, JSOP FY 74-81, will therefore address both the DPPG assumption and the alternative assumption in Volume I, JSOP FY 74-81.

7. (S) US planning should provide for those capabilities which the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe necessary to support US national strategy, particularly with regard to NATO objectives established in MC 14/3. Limiting mobilization planning to "full" mobilization as stated in the DPPG fails to provide for those necessary capabilities. For example, a higher level of mobilization would be required to support the demanding effort necessary to fulfill the objectives of MC 14/3, notably restoration of the integrity and security of the North Atlantic Treaty area and the regaining of overrun territory in the event of a major Warsaw Pact attack. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that total mobilization planning has utility for postnuclear attack options. Therefore, they consider that mobilization contingency planning, including industrial preparedness planning for mobilization, should provide for the incremental generation of new forces and for support of those forces, up to and including total mobilization for war.

[REDACTED]

be given the widest latitude in selecting the mobilization level needed to serve the national interest at a given time under any circumstances.

8. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that, during the mid-range period, the most likely form of conflict will be [REDACTED] This consideration, coupled with the qualitative improvements being made in Soviet general purpose forces, emphasizes the necessity to maintain the US lead over the USSR in military technology, as well as those research and development requirements set forth in the DPPG.

OSD 3.3(b)(1)-(9)

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2. ~~✓~~ The above views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding selected major topics have strategy implications which will be reflected in the development of Volume II, JSOP FY 74-81. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff note that the guidance is predicated on several additional assumptions which, if proved invalid, could also impact on US strategy. These assumptions will be addressed as appropriate in Volume II, JSOP FY 74-81. This memorandum and Volume II, JSOP FY 74-81, with its supporting

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lation of your fiscally constrained Policy and Planning Guidance.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

T. H. Moorer

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Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

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