A. C. S. C.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE JCS MESSAGE CENTER

PRIORITY 2YUW RUVABMA1125 1491955 P 291750Z MAY 86 FM 193 SOG HIA MIDDLETOWN PA//DO// COMSOCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//CC// HO USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//DOS// INFO USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ3 SO// CINC USAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AEAGC PS// HQ USAF WASH DC//XOOS// HO MAC SCOTT AFB, IL//DOOX/DOOS// TAGPA ANNVILLE PA//ANG// 23AF SCOTT AFB-IL//DOOX// NGB WASH DC//XO// CDR 4 POG FT BRAGG NC//AFVS POG// JCS WASH DC//J33// 2AD HURLBURT FLD FL//DO//

SUBJ: 193 SOG AFTER ACTION REPORT ON JCRX FLINTLOCK 86 (U)
1. (\*) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
THE 193 SPECIAL OPERATIONS GROUP WAS DEPLOYED TO RHEIN-MAIN AIR BASE. GERMANY FROM 26 APRIL TO 11 MAY 1986 IN SUPPORT OF JCRX FLINTLOCK (&.

PAGEO2 RUVABNA1125 O THE 193 SOG INCLUDED EIGHT OFFICERS AND 37 ENLISTED; 16 WERE AIRCREW. AIR ASSETS EMPLOYED WERE ONE EC-130E VOLANT SOLO AND ONE EC-13DE ENROUTE SUPPORT AIRCRAFT. PSYCHOLOGICAL BROADCAST MISSIONS WERE FLOWN IN SUPPORT OF SUB-EXERCISES SCHWARZES PFERD AND TRABUCCO, KEY MATO AND U.S. PERSONNEL WERE BRIEFED ON PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND ON VOLANT SOLO, INCLUDING A TOUR OF THE MISSION AIRCRAFT. THESE BRIEFINGS AND STATIC DISPLAYS WERE HELD IN ITALY, BELGUIM, DENMARK, SPAIN AND TWO LOCATIONS IN GERMANY. ALTHOUGH THIS WAS A HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL DEPLOYMENT FOR THE 193 SOG, TWO PROBLEM AREAS MUST BE HIGHLIGHTED. FIRST, THERE WAS DIFFICULTY COMPLYING WITH THE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS OF SOCEURSUP TO JCS PUB 20. IN SOME CASES, TASKING MESSAGES FROM COMSOCEUR WERE RECEIVED MINUTES BEFORE TAKEOFF OR AFTER MISSIONS WERE COMPLETE. THUS, IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE 193 SOG TO SEND A MISSION CONCEPT MESSAGE 72 HOURS PRIOR TO EACH EVENT OR A MISSION SUPPORT CONFIRMATION MESSAGE 48 HOURS PRIOR. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT CONCEPTS AND CONFIRMATIONS WERE EMBODIED IN THUE 193 SOG EXERCISE SUPPLEMENT FOR FLINTLOCK 86, 1 APRIL 86, WHICH WAS FORWARDED TO HO USAFE/DOS, USCINCEUR/EC J3-FE AND 10 OTHER ADDRESSEES. SENDING MESSAGES WHICH HAVE GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATIONS OMITTED FROM ADDRESSEES PROVED TO BE A PROBLEM FOR THE COMMUNICA-

PAGEO3 RUVABMA1125 C C C PAGE CONTROL OF CON TIONS CENTER AT RHEIN-MAIN, GE, SINCE THEY DID NOT HAVE USCINCEUR MSG G215157 APR 86 WHICH LISTED THE ROUTING INDICATORS. SERIOUS TASKING PROBLEMS WOULD HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERED IF 193 SOG PARTICIPA-TION HAD NOT BEEN PREVIOUSLY FRAGGED BY CINCUSAREUR-AEAGC-PS AND USCINCEUR-EC J2/SO. THE SECOND PROBLEM AREA OCCURRED ON 9 MAY 86 WHEN THE VOLANT SOLO MISSION IN SUPPORT OF SUB-EXERCISE DESLING WAS NOT FLOWN BECAUSE NECESSARY PSYOP PRODUCTS (AND 10 TAPES) WERE NOT DELIVERED TO 193 SOG PERSONNEL. THE DELIVERY OF THE TAPES WAS COORDINATED THE PREVIOUS DAY BY NOBODY ARRIVED AT RHEIN-MAIN WITH THE TAPES. THE AIRCRAFT WAS IN COMMISSION WITH THE CREW IN THEIR

A. LO GENERAL:
DURING SUB-EXERCISE SCHWARZES PFERD THE PURPOSE WAS TO CONDUCT LINIT PSYOP ACTIVITIES UTILIZING ELEMENTS OF THE 4TH PSYOP GP AND AND EC-130 VOLANT SOLO AIRCRAFT. THE MAJOR PURPOSE WAS TO DEMONSTRATE VOLANT SOLO CAPABILITIES, VIA BRIEFING AND STATIC DISPLAYS, TO DIFFERENT NATO COUNTRIES. THE FIRST MISSION WAS DIRECTED TO THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT. THE VOLANT SOLO MISSION BRIEFING WAS GIVEN TO THE ITALIAN GENERAL STAFF. THREE GENERAL OFFICERS FLEW REAL TIME BROADCAST ON THE AIRCRAFT. THE SECOND MISSION WAS TO CHIEVRES

PAGEO4 RUVABNA1125 CON BELGUIM WHERE THE SHAPE PSYOP STAFF WERE BRIEFED AND THE AIRCRAFT DISPLAYED. MISSIONS THREE AND FOUR BRIEFED THE DANISH AND SPANISH STAFF (SUB-EXERCISE TRABUCCO) RESPECTIVELY, MISSION FIVE BRIEFED AND DISPLAYED VOLANT SOLO TO THE GERMAN PSYOPS BATTALION. MISSION SIX BRIEFED GENERAL OTIS AND THE DIRECTOR OF RADIO FREE EUROPE. DURING SCHWARZES PFERD FOUR REAL TIME BROADCASTS WERE MADE IN THE STUTTGART EXERCISE AREA. DURING THE SUB-EXERCISE TRABUCCO, ONE

ACTION CJCS(4) DJS:(1) J3(6) NIDS(1) CMB QC(1) INFO JSOA(1) +CHS-GRÍD/OCJCS

(U,B,F)

BROADCAST WAS MADE UTILIZING A SPANISH OFFICER WHO FLEW WITH VOLANT SLOL BETWEEN MORON AB AND GATEFE AB. A STATIC DISPLAY AND BRIEFING WAS GIVEN TO THE AFSOB AT MORON AB.

B. LET HIGHLIGHTS/PROBLEM AREAS: THE MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT WAS THAT VOLANT SOLO PARTICIPATED IN ALL SCHEDULED EVENTS EXCEPT OESLING. ALL TAKEOFFS/STATION TIMES WERE ON TIME AND THE AIRCRAFT REMAINED FULLY MISSION CAPABLE THROUGHOUT THE DEPLOYMENT. VOLANT SOLO CAPABILITIES WERE DEMONSTRATED FOR THE FIRST TIME TO THE GENERAL STAFF OF DEMMARK, ITALY, AND SPAIN. IT WAS ALSO THE FIRST TIME FOR SHAPE AND GERMAN PSYOPS PLANNERS TO LEARN THE UNITED STATES PYSOPS CAPABILITIES. OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE WAS THE BRIEFING WITH THE PRESIDENT OF RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERY AND GENERAL OTIS.

PAGEO5 RUVABMA1125 C O N F I D E N T I A L THE PROBLEM AREAS HAVE ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED. COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS MAY HAVE BEEN ALLEVIATED IF THE 193 SOG HAD DEPLOYED PERSON-NEL TO THE AFSOB AND COMSOCEUR. THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE DURING FL86 DUE TO LACK OF GUARDMEN AND BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, BUT WILL BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED NEXT YEAR. OVERALL FLINTLOCK 86 WAS AN EXCELLENT DEMONSTRATION OF THE UNITED STATES PSYOPS CAPABILITIES AND MAY HAVE A LONG LASTING EFFECT ON PSYOPS PARTICIPATION IN FUTURE EXERCISES. DECL: OADR BT

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Chief, RDD, ESD, WH Date: 17:Jul 2012 Declassify: X	
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Reason: MDR: <u>12-M-14</u>	86

12-M-148

## DECLASSIFIED IN FULL Authority: EO 13526

Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

Date: JUL 1 7 2012



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE UCS MESSAGE CENTER

PRIORITY P 1418032 JUN 84 --FM USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE //ECJ3-SO// JCS WASHINGTON DC //JSGA// INFO USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI USCINCRED MACDILL AFB FL USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA HO USAF WASH DC //XOO/XOX// CNO WASH DC CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//AGAGC-EX// CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UNITED KINGBOM CDP ARSOFE BAD TOELZ GE CDR 5TH SFG A FT BRAGG NC CDR 11TH SFR A FT MEADE MO COR DET A BERLIN BDE BERLIN GE 2 AD HURLBURT FLD FL //CC// 7TH SOS RHEIN MAIN AB GE //CC// NAVSPECWARGRU TWO NAVSPECWARUNIT TWO

USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PANAMA CINCHAC SCOTT AFB IL DA WASH DC HO USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//DO// CDR 1ST SOCOM FT BRAGG NC CDR 10TH SFG A FT DEVENS MA CDR 20TH SFG A BIRMINGHAM AL

CDR 4TH PSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC 1ST SOW HURLBURT FLD FL //CC//

ZYUW RUSHNOB3173 1661926

SECTION 001 OF 002

REPLY TO ECJ3

SUBJ: EXERCISE INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REPORT - FLINTLOCK 84 (U) JCS SM - 234 - 81, 8 APR 81 (U) NOTAL (AS AMENDED 4 MAY 81) 1. (U) REFERENCE REQUESTS AFTER ACTION REPORT ON JCS COGRDINATED EXERCISE ON MATTERS OF DOCTRINE, TACTICS AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WHICH WARRANT FURTHER ATTENTION/EVALUATION.

2. COMSCEUR CONTINUES TO HAVE NO RESOURCES DESIGNATED TO

PROVIDE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL WARTIME COMMUNICATIONS REQUIRED FOR COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COORDINATION OF SPECIAL OPERATORS IN SUPPORTS
OF SACEUR/USCINCEUR: THIS LONG-STANDING, CRITICAL DEFICIENCY
CONTINUES TO PRECLUBE REALISTIC EXERCISE AND EVALUATION OF USCINCEUR OPLAN 4304 DURING ANNUAL FLINTLOCK SERIES EXERCISES. AS IN ALL PREVIOUS FLINTLOCK EXERCISES. HO SOCEUR COMMUNICATIONS
SUPPORT MAS PROVIDED BY AN AD HOC COMBINATION OF RESOURCES, NONE
OF WHICH WOULD BE AVAILABLE TO SOCEUR IN WARTIME. HOWEVER, FOR
FLINTLOCK 84 HQ SOCEUR COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT WAS SPECIFICALLY
TATIODED TO STMILLATE THE CARABILITIES HAVE WOULD BE DEFUTED OF TAILORED TO SIMULATE THE CAPABILITIES WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED OF SOCEUR INITIAL COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT ELEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH USCINCEUR OPLAN 4304-83. THIS WAS ACHIEVED THROUGH A COMBINATION JOINT COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT ELEMENT (JCSE) AND USAREUR 72ND SIGN JOINT COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT ELEMENT (JCSE) AND USAREUR 72ND SIGN JOINT COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT ELEMENT (JCSE) AND USAREUR 72ND SIGN JOINT COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT ELEMENT (JCSE) AND EQUIDMENT AS WELL AS BATTALION (5TH SIGNAL COMMAND) PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT AS WELL AS JCMC LEVEL ONE UHF SATCOM TERMINALS AND TACTICAL FACSIMILES RELONGING TO HO SOCEUR.

A. WITHIN THE ABOVE CONSTRAINT, THE OVERALL SOCEUR COMMUNICATIONS OBJECTIVE FOR FL 84 WAS TO VALIDATE THE CONCEPTS

AND MINIMUM ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS SPECIFIED IN ANNEX K TO USCINCEUR OPLAN 4304-83. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES WERE:

(1) (C) TO EVALUATE CONCEPT OF PROVIDING REQUIRED EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS ACCESSES FOR COLLOCATED SOF HQ USING SHARED, JOINTLY MANNED COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES UNDER A SINGLE BASE COMMUNICATIONS MANAGER.

(2) 40 TO VALIDATE SPECIFIC REQUIRED CAPABILITIES AND DESIGN OBJECTIVES FOR A SOF CZ/LIAISON COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM BASED ON EVALUATION OF THE PROTOTYPE SF LIAISON ASSEMBLY DEVELOPED BY DARCOM AND CURRENT EQUIPMENT IN USE BY JCSE.

(3) (3) TO EVALUATE REPLACEMENT OF POINT-TO-POINT

CIRCUITS BY COMMON USER SYSTEMS.

(4) (U) TO DETERMINE SPECIFIC PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL SOCEUR COMMUNICATIONS.
B. (S) BASED ON INITIAL ANALYSIS OF FL 84 RESULTS, THE

CONCEPTS AND MINIMUM ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS IN ANNEX K TO USCINCEUR OPLAN 4304-83 ARE VALID. SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS ARE:

(1) (S) THE BASE COMMUNICATION CONCEPT CAN SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE BOTH COMMUNICATIONS AND AIRLIFT RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS. INITIAL PROBLEMS WERE DUE EXCLUSIVELY TO UNFAMILIARITY OF PERSONNEL WITH A NEW CONCEPT AND LACK OF PREESTABLISHED JOINT PROCEDURES.

(2) -(2) A SOF CZ/LIAISON COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM CONSISTING

MCN=84166/05660

ACTION JSGA(1) CJCS(4) DJS:(\*) J3:NMCC(\*) J3(6) NIDS(\*) J4(4) J5(2) CMB QC(1) C3S(5) COMMOFF(1) JDA:LO(1) SECDEF(9) USDP(15) USDP:DSAA(4) DC-3(1) +CHC CC WASHINGTON DC SECTIONAL(1)

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OF THREE INDEPENDENT, MAN-TRANSPORTABLE C2/LIAISON COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM MODULES (HF MODULE, UHF MODULE AND COMMON USER SYSTEM MODULE)
CAN PROVIDE MINIMUM ESSENTTAL COMMUNICATION FOR HO SOCEUR AND SUBORDINATE SOF BASIS DURING INITIAL PHASE OF GENERAL WAR AND DURING SUCCESSIS/CONTINGENCIES. SUCH A SYSTEM WILL MINIMIZE THE AIRLIFT AND PERSONNEL RESOURCESSIREQUIRED TO PROVIDE ESSENTIAL C3 FOR SOF.

(3) C) EFFICIENT, DISCIPLINED USE OF COMMON-USER SYSTEMS ELIMINATES THE NEED FOR RESOURCE INEFFICIENT

POINT-TO-POINT CLECUTS.

(4) HO SOCEUR INITIAL COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT ELEMENT (ICSE) REQUIREMENTS CAM BE MET BY A TAILORED UNIT CONSISTING OF 55 TO 80 PERSONNEL BASED ON WARTIME MANNING CRITERIA. THIS UNIT COULD ALSO EFFECTIVELY SUPPORT USEUCOM/SOCEUR INITIAL CONTINGENCY/CRISIS C3.

C. (U) IN ADDITION TO ABOVE CONCLUSIONS, THE FOLLOWING
COMMUNICATIONS LESSONS LEARNED ARE SIGNIFICANT:
(1) USE OF A COMBINED VOICE/FACSIMILE UNF SATCOM
COMMAND NET WAS FOUND TO BE VERY EFFECTIVE FOR PASSING TIME
SENSITIVE, HIGH PRECEDENCE TRAFFIC. HOMEVER, STRICT, DIRECTED NET
OPERATIONS WERE MANDATORY TO INSURE ALL USERS HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY
OF BASS TRAFFIC BASED ON DRECEDENCE

OPERATIONS WERE MANDATORY TO INSURE ALL USERS HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY
TO PASS TRAFFIC BASED ON PRECEDENCE,

(2) PRIOR TO AUTHORIZATION TO OPERATE IN A UHF
SATCOM NET, ALL USERS SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE AN
AFSATCOM/FLTSATCOM USER'S COURSE WHICH EMPHASIZES THE SEVERELY
LIMITED NATURE OF CURRENT SPACE SEGMENT, THE ESTABLISHED CONTROL
PROCEDURES, AND THE NEED FOR STRICT USER ADHERENCE TO OPERATING

PROCEDURES AND TO MET DISCIPLINE.

(3) C) AT SERVICK COMPONENT LEVEL, LACK OF FULLY
FIELDED JOINTLY INTEROPERABLE LIGHT WEIGHT HE BURST RADIO SYSTEM WITH ON-LINE ENCRYPTION IS MOST SERIOUS DEFICIENCY. CONTINUED AND INCREASED EMPHASIS MUST BE PLACED ON PROVIDING SOF FORCES, AT ALL LEVELS OF OPERATIONS, THE EQUIPMENT TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY TO

THEIR TASKING.

THEIR TASKING.

THEIR TASKING. SPECIAL OPERATIONS LOW LEVEL (SOLL) ATROPART EQUIPMENT AND


RESULTANT THREOMENT CAPABILITY.

A. \*\*\* PRESENT NIGHTTIME LOW-LEVEL TRAINING ALTITUDES (1000 FT ABOVE THE HIGHEST OBSTACLE WITHIN 5MM EITHER SIDE OF TRACK) PLACE THE AIRCRAFT AND CREWS IN A POSITION WHICH PREVENTS THEM FROM PENETRATING OR SURVIVING IN MOST DENIED AREAS DURING WAR. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE WITH REGARD TO ELECTRONIC DETECTION. SHORT OF EQUIPPING EACH AIRCRAFT WITH TERRAIN FOLLOWING RADAR, LESS EXPENSIVE MODIFICATIONS ARE POSSIBLE WHICH WOULD FACILITATE LOWERING NIGHT LOW-LEVEL ALTITUDES. THESE INCLUDE LOW LIGHT LEVEL TV AND/OR FORWARD LOOKING INFRA RED RECEIVERS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE THE CREWS VISUAL PRESENTATIONS DURING NIGHT OR SNOKE AND HAZE CON-DITIONS. ADDITIONALLY, INCREASED NAVIGATION ACCURACY THROUGH A STRAP DOWN INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR EXTENDED RANGE MISSIONS WHERE ACCURATE NAVIGATIONAL CHARTS DO NOT

EXIST. B. LAT CLANDESTINE DROP ZONE IDENTIFICATION IS CRITICAL TO ROTH GROUND PERSONNEL AND AIRCREW SAFETY. MAC SOLL AIRCREWS SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO WEAR NIGHT VISION GOGGLES (NVG) FOR ENROUTE NAVIGATION, TURN POINT IDENTIFICATION AND DROP ZONE AUTHENTICATION. SOLL AIRCREWS MUST BE TRAINED IN AND HAVE AVAILABLE FOR USE, NVGS

SOLE AIRCREMS MUST BE TRAINED IN AND HAVE AVAILABLE FOR USE, NVGS WHEN CONDUCTING SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS.

(S) FLINILOCE BA AGAIN DEMONSTRATED THE OVERALL CRITICAL SHORTFALL OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIR ASSETS. AGAIN THIS YEAR SOME INFILTRATION MISSIONS HAD TO BE DELAYED DUE TO TACK OF AIRFRAMES. THEATER ASSIGNED SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT ARE INSUFFICIENT TO MEET CONTINGENCY, GENERAL WAR, OR OVEN EXERCISE TASKING. NEED FOR





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PRIORITY ZYUW RUSNNOB3174 1661926 P 1418037 JUN 84 FM USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE //ECJ3-SO// JCS WASHINGTON DC //JSOA// INFO USCINCPAC HOMOLULU HI USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL USCINCRED MACDILL AFB FL USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PANAMA USCINCLANT NORFOLK VA CINCHAC SCOTT AFB IL HQ USAF WASH DC //XOO/XOX// DA WASH DC CNO WASH DC HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//DO// CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE//ABAGC-EX// CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UNITED KINGDOM CDR ARSOFE BAD TOELZ GE COR 1ST SOCOM FT BRAGG NC CDP 5TH SFG A FT BRAGG NC COR 10TH SFG A FT DEVENS MA COR 11TH SFR A FT MEADE MD CDR 20TH SFG A BIRMINGHAM AL CDR 4TH PSYOP GP FT BRAGG NC 1ST SOW HURLBURT FLD FL //CC// CDR DET A BERLIN BDE BERLIN GE 2 AD HURLBURT FLD FL //CC// 7TH SOS RHEIN MAIN AB GE //CC// NAVSPECWARGRU TWO

**DECLASSIFIED IN FULL** Authority: EO 13526 Chief, Records & Declass Div. WHS Date: JUL 1 7 2012

NAVSPECWARUNIT TWO FINAL SECTION OF 002 ADDITIONAL IN-THEATER COMBAT TALON (MC-130K) ASSETS UPGRADED TO MEET CENTRAL EUROPEAN ELECTRONIC ORDER OF BATTLE IS ESSENTIAL ADDITIONALLY, THIS THEATER REQUIRES LONG-RANGE VERTICAL LIFT CAPABILITY TO PROVIDE EXTRACTION/EXFILTRATION CAPABILITY. PRESENT ROTARY WING RANGE LIMITATIONS PRECLUDE THEIR SUPPORT TO MOST TEAM AREAS. ONGOING PROJECT TO DEVELOP JOINT VERTICAL LIFT AIRCRAFT AREAS. UNGUING PROJECT TO DEVELOP JOINT VERTICAL LIFT AIRCRAFT
(JVX) MEEDS CONTINUED FUNDING AND SUPPORT.

EXERCISE FLINTLOCK:84 IDENTIFIED THE NEED FOR GREATER
EMPHASIS ON SOF JOINT SERVICES. ANTEROPERABILITY DEFICIENCIKS
EXIST IN LEVEL OF JOINT SOF TRAINING STANDARDIZED JOINT SOF MANUALS
AMONG THE SERVICES, AND EXPEDITIOUS AVENUES TO IDENTIFY NEW CAPABILITIES AND CONDUCT TESTS FOR SUBSEQUENT IMPLEMENTATION. TO EXPEDITE
IMPROVING JOINT SOF INTEROPERABILITY RECOMMEND JOOA INITIATE
EFFORTS TO INCREASE PERIODIC JOINT TRAINING ANOME COMMISSIONS. EFFORTS TO INCREASE PERIODIC JOINT TRAINING AMONG CONUS BASED SOF UNITS, AND SPONSOR AN ANNUAL JOINT SOF MANUALS/TEST REVIEW. AS A RESULT OF CURRENT KNOWN WARTIME SOF AIRFRAME SHORT-FALLS, SPECIAL FORCES TEAMS PARTICIPATING IN FRG SUBEXERCISE SCHMARZES PEERD WERE OPERATIONALLY INFILTRATED UPON THE PREMISE THAT PREPLANNED RESUPPLY MISSIONS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE. THEREFORE, TEAMS WERE PARACHUTE INSERTED WITH EQUIPMENT, RATIONS AND PERSONAL GEAR NECESSARY FOR ENTIRE MISSION. SOME TEAMS ELECTED TO DISTRIBUTE ADDED ITEMS AMONG TEAM MEMBERS THEREBY INCREASING INDIVIDUAL LOADS CAUSING MUCH HEAVER RUCKSACKS. COMBINATION OF THIS FACTOR AND SEVERAL TEAMS LANDING OFF DESIGNATED DROP ZONES CAUSED THE PERSONNEL INJURY RATE IN FL 84 TO BE HIGHER THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS. THE VARIABLES THAT CAUSED HIGHER PERSONNEL INJURIES HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WITH ALL PARTICIPATING SOF COMMANDERS AND WILL BE ADDRESSED IN GREATER DETAIL IN FL 84 AFTER ACTION REPORT 7. THE EXERCISE ALSO IDENTIFIED A SIGNIFICANT LOGISTAC SHORTFALL IN POMCUS AND OPERATIONAL PROJECTS TO SUFFORT US ARMY RESERVE AND NATIONAL GUARD SO FORCES. LIMITED POMCUS STOCKS AND NATIONAL GUARD SO FORCES. LIMITED POMCUS STOCKS AND NATIONAL GUARD SO FORCES. INSUFFICIENT INTRA-THEATER AIRLIFT ASSETS TO MOVE REQUIRED EQUIPMENT FROM OTHER LOCATIONS REDUCED BASING OPTIONS AND RESTRICTS EMPLOYMENT/OPERATIONAL FLEXIBILITY. 8. (U) RESOLUTION OF THESE IDENTIFIED EXERCISE PROBLEMS WILL GREATLY ENHANCE THEATER PREPARATION AND TRAINING FOR ITS WARTIME MISSION. 9. LOT IN RESPONSE TO REF A REQUIREMENT, SOF COMMUNICATIONS AND AIRCRAFT SHORTFALLS/LINITATIONS MERIT ACTION BY JOINT CHIEFS OF

Office of the Secretary of Defense Chief, RDD, ESD, WHS Date: 17 Jul 2012 Authority: EO 13526 T Deny in Full: Declassify: Declassify in Part: Reason: MDR: 12-M- 1986

ACTION JSOA(1) INFO CJCS(4) DJS:(\*) J3:NMCC(\*) J3(8) NIDS(\*) J4(4) J5(2) CM8 QC(1) C3S(5) COMMOFF(1) JDA:LO(1) SECDEF(9) USDP(15) USDP:DSAA(4) DC-3(1) +CMC CC WASHINGTON DC SECTIONAL(1)

STAFF AND RECOMMEND INCLUSION IN UCS REMEDIAL ACTION PROGRAMS (RAP). DETAILED AFTER ACTION REPORT WILL FOLION RITHIN SO DAYS.

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USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY //ECJ3// JCS WASHINGTON DC //J3-SOD// INFO CINCPAC HONOLULU HI CINCREDCOM MACDILL AFB FL CINCLANT NORFOLK VA

HQ USAF WASH DC //XOO/XOX//

CINCCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL CINCSOUTH CINCNAC SCOTT AFB IL DA WASH DC

HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE //DO// CNO WASH DC CINCUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE //AEAGC-EX//

CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UNITED KINGDOM

REPLY TO ECJ3-FE

14271 JUN 83

SUBJ: EXERCISE INITIAL IMPRESSIONS REPORT - FLINTLOCK 83 (U) A. JCS SM - 234-81, 8 APR 81 (U) NOTAL (AS AMENDED 4 MAY 81) (U) REFERENCE REQUESTS AFTER ACTION REPORT ON JCS COORDINATED EXERCISES ON MATFERS OF DOCTRINE, TACTICS AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WHICH WARRANT FURTHER ATTENTION/EVALUATION. 9. FLINTLOCK 83 AGAIN HIGHLIGHTED TWO CRITICAL COMMUNICATIONS DEFICIENCIES WHICH SERIOUSLY DEGRADE EFFECTIVE COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES (SOF). AT SERVICE COMPONENT LEVEL LACK OF JOINTLY INTEROPERABLE, LIGHT MEIGHT, SUSTAINABLE HF BURST RADIO SYSTEM IS MOST SERIOUS DEFICIENCY. AT JUNTF LEVEL LACK OF DESIGNATED SOTFE COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT ELEMENT MANNED, EQUIPPED AND TRAINED TO ESTABLISH RAPIDLY MINIMUM ESSENTIAL C2 COMNECTIVITY IS MOST SERIOUS DEFICIENCY. CONTINUED AND INCREASED EMPHASIS MUST BE 9LACED ON PROVIDING SOF FORCES AT ALL LEVELS OF OPERATION THE EQUIPMENT TO RESPOND EFFECTIVELY TO FHEIR TASKING.
3. (S) FLINTLOCK 83 AGAIN DEMONSTRATED SHORTFALLS IN AIR ASSETS. TASKING MORE NEARLY SIMULATED WARTIME LEVELS THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS, TAXING AUGMENTED IN-THEATER AIR FORCE ASSETS TO EXTENF THAT SOME MISSIONS HAD TO BE DELAYED IN ORDER TO HAVE AIRFRAMES FOR SUPPORT. THEAFER ASSIGNED SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIRCRAFT ARE INSUFFICIENT TO MENT CONTINGENCY, GENERAL WAR, OR EVEN EXERCISE TASKING. MEED FOR ADDITIONAL IN-THEATER COMBAT TALON (MC-130) ASSETS IS ASSENTIAL. ADDITIONALLY, THIS THEATER REQUIRES LONG-RANGE HELO OR SHORT TAKEOFF AND LANDING (STOL) AIRCRAFT TO MEET FASKING IN MEDITERRANEAN LITTORAL AREAS. AIRCRAFT WITH CAPABILITIES OF PROPOSED JOINT VERTICAL LIFT AIRCRAFT (JVX) OR EVEN MASA'S QUIET SHORTHAUL RESEARCH AIRCRAFT (QSRA) MOULD PROVIDE QUANTUM LEAP IN SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITY.

4. FLINTLOCK 83 DEMONSTRATED SHORTCOMINGS IN MAC SPECIAL OPERATIONS LOW LEVEL (SOLL) TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, LIMITING THEIR

EMPLOYMENT CAPABILITY.

A. NIGHT FLYING ALTITUDE IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN PLACED AIRCRAFT IN A VULNERABLE ELECTRONIC DETECTION POSITION. EUROPEAN WEATHER ALONE REQUIRES LOWERING NIGHT SOLL TRAINING ALTITUDES

B. CLANDESTINE DROP ZONE IDENTIFICATION IS CRITICAL TO
BOTH TEAM AND AIRCRAFT SAFETY. MAC SOLL AIRCREWS SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED TO WEAR NIGHT VISION GOGGLES (NVG) FOR EN ROUTE NAVIGATION, TURN POINT IDENTIFICATION, AND DROP ZONE
AUTHENTICATION. SOLL AIRCREWS MUST BE TRAINED IN, AND HAVE
AVAILABLE FOR USE, NVGS WHEN CONDUCTING SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSIONS.

5. LIMITED ON-BOARD SYSTEMS ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO MAC SOLL
AIRCRAFF SULNERABILITY. LACK OF SECURE COMMUNICATION, INTERTIAL
MAUTICATION AND BOARD MADDIAN SYSTEMS CONTRIBUTED TO MAC SOLL
AMOUNT OF THE COMMUNICATION AND PARABLE MAUTICATION AND PARABLE MAUTICATI NAVIGATION AND RADAR WARNING SYSTEMS SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADES AIRCRAFT SURVIVABILITY. ALL THREE OF FHESE CAPABILITIES SHOULD BE ADAPTED TO AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT IN "STRAP-DOWN" CONFIGURATIONS. CONTINUED EMPHASIS ON OBTAINING SUCH EQUIPMENT IS NECESSARY FOR SUSTAINABILITY OF THE FORCE.

6. EXERCISE FLINTLOCK 83 DISCLOSED DEFICIENCIES IN USAF AND USA

SPECIAL FORCES JOINT SUPPORT ARENA. DUE TO LACK OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS AIR ASSE(S, ALTERNATE PLATFORMS FOR SUPPORTING UW TEAMS MUST BE AVAILABLE. CTU-2A RESUPPLY CONTAINERS ARE SPEED-LIMITED AND AS SUCH SIGNIFICANTLY REDUCE AIRCRAFT MANEUVERABILITY AND SURVIVABILITY: NEED FOR CONTAINER COMPATIBLE WITH VARIETY OF US AND ALLIED ATRCRAFT IS CTOTICAL TO TEAN SURVIVABILITY. (U) RESOLUTION OF THESE IDENTIFIED EXERCISE PROBLEMS WILL

ACTION <u>J3(8)</u>
INFO <u>CJCS(4)</u> DJS:(2) NIDS(1) J3:NMCC(1) J4(4) J5(2) C3S(5) COMMOFF(1) USCINCCENTLO(1) JDA:LO(1) SECDEF(9) USDP(15) +CMC CC WASHINGTON DC

GREAFLY ENHANCE THIS THEATER'S PREPARATION AND TRAINING FOR ITS WARTIME MISSION. 8. (C) IN RESPONSE TO REF A REQUIREMENT, COMMUNICATIONS AND AIRCRAFT SHORTFALLS/LIMITATIONS MERIT ACTION BY JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF. DETAILED AFTER ACTION REPORT TO FOLLOW WITYIN 90 DAYS.

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**DECLASSIFIED IN FULL** Authority: EO 13526 Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS Date: JUL 1 7 2012

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