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
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# DETAILED ANALYSIS REPORT EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83 (U)

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

Prepared by:  
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
OPERATIONAL DIRECTORATE FOR  
SECURITY

Department of State, A/CIS/NSA/SSP

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
28 APR 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

Subject: Exercise PROUD SABER 83 Detailed Analysis Report

1. The attached report represents the Joint Staff Operations Directorate's detailed analysis of the performance of selected OJCS systems and procedures that were examined during Exercise PROUD SABER 83.
2. This report is one of several efforts being conducted to document the findings of Exercise PROUD SABER 83. Familiarity with all the evaluative efforts is essential to gain a full appreciation of the progress made since previous exercises and to understand the actions underway to resolve identified problems.
3. Among the other efforts to document exercise findings are reports by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Defense University, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Additionally, the Joint Staff has established specific Remedial Action Projects (RAPs) to intensively pursue the major problems identified during the exercise.
4. In keeping with the announced "no fault" policy, no attempt was made to measure the performance of individuals or groups of individuals. The analysis results must be considered in light of exercise artificialities and, therefore, may not represent systems performance under real-world conditions.
5. Without attachment, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

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RICHARD L. PRELL  
Lieutenant General, USA  
Director for Operations

Attachment  
a/s

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(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. (U) Introduction and Exercise Synopsis

a. ~~(S)~~ Exercise PROUD SABER 83 (25 October - 5 November 1982) was a biennial, worldwide, command post exercise (CPX) sponsored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The exercise examined the plans, policies, procedures, and systems of the Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS). It was the third large-scale exercise designed to test mobilization and deployment in support of conventional war plans. The exercise emphasized a multiple threat, multiple theater, geopolitically influenced scenario. Two parallel exercises were conducted using the same scenario and coordinated objectives. Exercise MOBEX 82, sponsored by the Army, preceded the start of Exercise PROUD SABER 83 by 10 days. This enabled the Army to examine unique Army activities in greater detail. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) conducted Exercise REX 82 Bravo which examined the mobilization capabilities of selected Federal civil departments and agencies and the FEMA-DOD interface in a crisis setting.

b. ~~(S)~~ The scenario envisioned the world unstable because of inflation, commodity shortages, and political and religious upheavals. A series of aggressive Soviet foreign policy initiatives had brought the US and USSR to the brink of military confrontation in Southwest Asia, Korea, Central America, and Europe.

2. (U) Exercise Participation. The following commands and agencies participated in Exercise PROUD SABER 83.

a. (U) The National Security Council Staff formed an exercise council that was termed the Mobilization Crisis Action Group. This group participated as a surrogate National Security Council.

b. (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff implemented the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) at the start of the exercise (STARTEX). Joint Staff, Service, and Defense agency personnel participated as members of the Operations Planners Group (OPG) or appropriate response cells. A Space Response Cell was organized and participated in its first JCS-sponsored CPX.

c. (U) The prototype Crisis Management Organization (CMO) of the Office of the Secretary of Defense was exercised for

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EX-1

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the first time. The play of OSD principals was more extensive than in any previous exercise and contributed significantly to the realism of the exercise.

d. (U) Personnel from the Department of State, Military Services, Coast Guard, Civil and Defense Agencies, and FEMA participated in their expected roles for crisis situations. Participation by the Services was the most extensive of any JCS-sponsored exercise.

e. (U) ADCOM, MAC, MSC, MTMC, PACOM, USREDCOM, JDA, and RDJTF participated with normal battle staffs which functioned on a 24-hour basis. LANTCOM, USEUCOM, and USSOUTHCOM participated with modified staffs.

f. (U) The Joint Exercise Control Group (JECG) included representatives from OJCS, OSD, FEMA, and the Department of State.

g. (U) There was greater Reserve and National Guard forces participation than in any previous JCS-sponsored CPX.

### 3. (U) Scenario Synopsis

a. (U) General. Table EX-1 relates the key events and actions to the exercise period in which they occurred. At STARTEX, decisionmakers were faced with Cuban-backed guerrilla activity in Panama, threats to the US Naval Base at Guantanamo, Soviet forces in Poland and on the Iranian borders, and Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) troops poised to invade the Republic of Korea (ROK).

b. ~~(S)~~ Exercise Period (25-27 October). The most significant events and actions of the first three days included mobilization of the Reserve and the commencement of deployment to Southwest Asia (SWA). Congress authorized stop-loss actions to retain trained manpower while the President sent envoys to the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and Cuba in an attempt to defuze tensions.

c. ~~(S)~~ Exercise Period (28-30 October). In the next three days, DPRK military forces increased their readiness to the point that an attack appeared imminent. In response to the DPRK actions, the President authorized release of designated War Reserve Stocks to the ROK, and the Combined Forces Command (CFC) increased its alert condition to defense readiness condition 1 (DEFCON 1). Noncombatant evacuation operations focused on continental United States (CONUS) reception and processing of evacuees from Panama, Southwest Asia, and Korea.

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TABLE EX-1. (U) EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83 OVERVIEW OF  
SIGNIFICANT EXERCISE EVENTS AND ACTIONS

25-27 OCT 1982	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● STARTEX</li><li>● PARTIAL MOBILIZATION INITIATED</li><li>● DEPLOYMENT OF RDJTF COMMENCED</li><li>● CONGRESS AUTHORIZED STOP-LOSS</li><li>● ENVOYS SENT TO PRC AND CUBA</li><li>● CRAF STAGE III APPROVED</li><li>● CFC MOVED TO DEFCON 2</li></ul>
28-30 OCT 1982	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● DPRK POISED FOR ATTACK</li><li>● NEO FROM PANAMA, SWA, AND ROK</li><li>● WRSA RELEASED TO ROK</li><li>● CFC MOVED TO DEFCON 1</li></ul>
31 OCT - 2 NOV 1982	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● DPRK ATTACKED ROK</li><li>● SOVIETS INCREASED BUILDUP ON IRANIAN BORDERS</li><li>● CONGRESS ANNOUNCED STATE OF WAR</li><li>● CONGRESS DECLARED NATIONAL EMERGENCY WHICH AUTHORIZED FULL MOBILIZATION</li><li>● COAST GUARD TRANSFERRED TO NAVY</li><li>● FORCES ALLOCATED TO SUPPORT CFC</li><li>● SOVIETS INVADED IRAN</li></ul>
3-5 NOV 1982	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>● SOVIET ASATS DESTROYED TWO US SATELLITES</li><li>● CUBA ATTACKED CARIBBEAN SLOCS</li><li>● GUERRILLAS ATTACKED IN PANAMA</li><li>● JCS CONSIDERED OPTIONS FOR SWA</li><li>● US AND NATO INCREASED DEFCONS</li><li>● DECISION MADE TO MAINTAIN GUANTANAMO PRESENCE; NEUTRALIZE CUBAN ARMED FORCES IF ATTACKED</li><li>● ENDEX</li></ul>

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d. ~~(S)~~ Exercise Period (31 October - 2 November). During this period, overt hostilities began when the DPRK forces attacked across the demilitarized zone (DMZ) with heavy use of chemical weapons. Congress reacted to the DPRK invasion by announcing a state of war and declaring a national emergency which granted the authorities for full mobilization. Simultaneously, the Soviet threat to Iran increased.

e. ~~(S)~~ Exercise Period (3-5 November). In the final days of the exercise, the Soviets significantly increased the potential for world conflict by invading Iran and successfully launching ASATs against two US satellites. Open hostilities commenced with the sinking of four US ships in the Caribbean and guerrilla attacks on Howard Air Base in Panama. Decisions were made to maintain US presence at Guantanamo and to neutralize Cuba's offensive capability if Cuba attacked Guantanamo. The exercise ended on 5 November with open hostilities on three continents and senior decisionmakers facing increasingly complex allocation issues.

#### 4. (U) Exercise Considerations

a. (U) The data from Exercise PROUD SABER 83 were biased by exercise design, artificialities, and constraints that put serious limitations on the exercise findings as compared to real-world operations. Despite these limitations, the exercise provided opportunities for identifying and resolving weaknesses in doctrine, plans, ongoing command operations, and procedures. Major exercise artificialities are set forth below; others are detailed in the individual functional area analyses.

(1) (U) The injection of industrial surge requirements greatly expanded the scope of the initial exercise objective. Most of the activities in the surge of the industrial base prior to STARTEX were scripted events. Hence, a meaningful evaluation of major issues and the processes involved during the industrial surge period could not be accomplished.

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(4) (U) Prior to STARTER, the OJCS controllers directed that no noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO) reports be transmitted from overseas areas since all statistical reporting would be initiated by the Air Staff. This artificiality was designed to provide maximum exercise play for the Department of Health and Human Services.

b. (U) The impact of these artificialities was considered whenever possible in the analysis.

5. (U) Analysis Synopsis and Significant Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations

a. ~~(S)~~ Analysis Synopsis. Exercise PROUD SABER 83 provided deeper insight into problems and potential problems than previous joint mobilization and deployment exercises. A review of these exercises dating to Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78 shows that much progress has been made. The Nation has improved its mobilization and deployment processes, increased Federal interagency communications and coordination, and developed solutions to specific resource problems. Although the mobilization and deployment community has solved many problems identified in previous exercises, serious problems remain. The exercise analysis disclosed the following significant problems which require priority corrective action:

- (1) ~~(S)~~ Need for better understanding of mobilization procedures, legal authorities, statutes, directives, and the impact of force readiness on deployment capability
- (2) ~~(S)~~ Need for establishment of JCS strategy and theater priorities which influence mobilization and deployment decisions
- (3) ~~(S)~~ Need for improved industrial base surge and expansion capabilities

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(6) ~~(S)~~ Need for more detailed, and defined response for noncombatant evacuation operation planning and execution.

(7) ~~(S)~~ Need for improved health care capabilities.

b. (U) Significant Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations. The most significant findings, conclusions, and recommendations are listed below. Most of these findings were not affected by exercise data bias. Whenever this report identifies personnel by title the reader should recognize that the title refers to the surrogate player unless otherwise noted. The report also makes numerous references to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). On 1 January 1983 US Central Command (USCENTCOM) was activated, replacing the RDJTF. The pages referenced at the end of each paragraph indicate where detailed information is located.

(1) ~~(S)~~ Mobilization. Misunderstandings about the mobilization process persisted among DOD senior staff members. However, the transition from partial to full mobilization was not affected since the required Service call-up authorities consistently exceeded immediate personnel requirements. Lack of availability of the information on the readiness of Reserve Units was a major impediment in informing the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Service's capabilities. The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider incorporating Reserve Component readiness reporting in the JCS Alert System. The DOD Draft Master Mobilization Plan (MMP) provided a partial framework for mobilization decisions and management. The Office of the Secretary of Defense should complete and promulgate the section of the MMP which contains the Mobilization Planning Management System. (I-3)

(2) (U) Deployment

(a) ~~(S)~~ The Joint Deployment System (JDS) operated more effectively than in any previous exercise. The Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) demonstrated an improved capability to coordinate deployments, and the remainder of the Joint Deployment Community exhibited an increased knowledge of the policies and procedures of the JDS. Remote user packages, operational at 10 WWMCCS sites, improved greatly the timeliness of deployment information. The JDC encountered problems

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with deployment estimates which were generally incomplete and untimely. In another problem, MAC's automatic flow scheduling system (FLOGEN III) revealed serious limiting deficiencies in its program. Specifically, FLOGEN lacked needed flexibilities and the timeliness required of the system as JDS evolves and matures. The JDC needs improved and additional guidance and procedures that pertain to deployment estimating. (II-4)

(b) 

(3) ~~(S)~~ Industrial Surge and Mobilization. A preexercise field analysis of selected industrial capabilities revealed that a six month industrial surge would yield only a negligible increase in production. Surge capability is limited by the need for long-lead-time components, shortages of specialized equipment, and sole source production of pacing components by subcontractors. The exercise highlighted the need for improved planning, control, and management of industrial resource requirements within OSD and DOD components. (III-4)

(4) ~~(S)~~ Logistics. The exercise reaffirmed and highlighted critical logistical problems including severe shortages of many categories of ammunition, production and stockpile shortages of AIMS, and dangerous shortages of medical care personnel and facilities. (IV-11)

(5) ~~(S)~~ Crisis Action System. The exercise validated most of the established Crisis Action System procedures. Recently revised procedures to resolve competing requirements in a multiple OPLAN situation were not fully tested. The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider a full test of procedures to establish priorities and allocate resources in the next deployment exercise. (V-2)

(6) (U) NMCC Operations

(a) ~~(S)~~ Initially, NMCC briefings were not structured towards the kinds of comments, questions, and decisions that would be expected by our highest level military

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decisionmakers. The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider revising the current NMCC OI, "Briefing for Senior Defense Officials in the NMCC/NMIC" to reflect the briefing requirements when the Joint Chiefs of Staff operate using the emergency operating procedures. The Crisis Staffing Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CSP-JCS) will also be considered for revision to provide guidance for senior decision-maker briefings during the several steps described by the CSP-JCS. (VI-8)

(b) (U) A new message printer in the OPG administrative area provided a major improvement in the handling of messages. The Director of Support Services, OJCS, should consider permanent installation of a message printer in the OPG administrative area like that used during the exercise. (VI-13)

(7) (U) Civil-Military Interface

(a) ~~(S)~~ Regulations did not permit retention of key US civilians in theater during NEO. The loss of these civilians would severely degrade essential military support functions. The Office of the Secretary of Defense should consider establishing a policy that requires key civilians to sign contracts to remain. (VII-4)

(b) ~~(S)~~ There were no procedures to synchronize overseas NEO with CONUS repatriation operations. There was no DOD agency responsible for overall NEO planning and coordination. The Secretary of Defense should consider establishing an executive agent for coordinating all DOD NEO planning. (VII-4)

(c) (U) The new OSD Crisis Management Organization worked well in its first operational test. Problems were encountered however with liaison officer coordination, responsibilities, and procedures. (VII-8)

(8) (U) WWMCCS ADP and WIN Support. WWMCCS ADP and WIN provided good support throughout the exercise. Record volumes of data were exchanged between exercise participants but hardware and software failures periodically degraded performance. The Director for Command, Control and Communications, OJCS, should continue efforts to improve WIN technical reliability. (VIII-3)

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(9) (U) Communications & Message Traffic Analysis

(a) (U) When multiple OPLANS are executed, the limited JCS controlled communications assets must be allocated to those situations that need them the most. The Director for Plans and Policy, OJCS, should consider requiring commanders of unified and specified commands to submit specific information on the use of JCS-controlled communications assets, including the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), when submitting OPLANS for approval. The Director of Support Services, OJCS, should continue efforts to manage message distribution in the OPG intensively. As the focus of interest in the exercise changes, distribution should be changed to provide messages only to those who need to know. (IX-35)

(b) ~~(S)~~ Operations Security (OPSEC) was better than in any exercise in the past 2 years. Improper use of nonsecure telephones was the primary OPSEC deficiency noted. The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider installation of a soundproof area within the OPG where action officers can use nonsecure telephones when classified briefings are being given. (IX-39)

(10) ~~(S)~~ Space Operations. The exercise highlighted two major space problems; first, that the United States has no capability to respond in kind to an antisatellite attack and second, that the documentation describing command, control, and communications capabilities of existing satellite systems is fragmented and incomplete. The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider preparing a comprehensive inventory of existing space systems, their command and control elements, and the products that come from each system. (X-2)

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## GLOSSARY

A&DCP	Analysis and Data
AAC	Alaskan Air Comma
AB	Air Base
ACL	allowable cabin 1
ACP	Allied Communicat
ADCOM	Aerospace Defense
ADDO	Assistant Deputy
ADMIN	administration
ADP	automatic data pr
ADPLO	ADP liaison offic
AF	Air Force
AFB	air force base
AFGWC	AF Global Weather
AFFIS	Airfields Facilit
AFRED	AF (Component) Re
AFSC	Air Force Systems
AIG	address indicator
ALCE	airlift control e
ALOC	air line(s) of co
AMOPS	Army Mobilization System
ANMCC	Alternate Nationa
AO	action officer
AOBC	action officer br
APOD	aerial port of de
APOE	aerial port of em
APORTS	Aerial Ports and
ARDET	Ammunition Report
ASAT	Anti-Satellite
ASC	AUTODIN Switching
ASD (ISA)	Assistant Secreta tional Security A
ASD (MRAL)	Assistant Secreta
ASD (PA)	Reserve Affairs, Assistant Secreta Affairs)
ASP	ammunition supply
ASPPO	Armed Services Pr
ASSETS	Transportation As
ATH	Air Transportable
ATSD (LA)	Assistant to the (Legislative Affa
AUTODIN	Automatic Digital
AUTODIN-I	IEMATS transmitt
AUTOSEVOCOM	message center AU
AUTOVON	Automatic Secure Automatic Voice N

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AWC	Army War College
AWS	Air Weather Service
BIDE	Basic Identification Data Elements
BDE	brigade
BDPG	Base Development Plan Generator
BTR	Bureau of Trade Regulations
C2	command and control
C2I	command, control, and intelligence
C3	command, control, and communications
C3S	Command, Control, and Communications Systems Directorate
C and C	command and control
CAC	Current Action Center
CAF	Civil Air Fleet (NATO)
CAS	Crisis Action System
CASFDD	crisis action system force and deployment data
CAT	Crisis Action Team
CAWSS	Crisis Action Weather Support System
CCC	Consolidated Communications Center
CCOC	Command Center Operation Chief
CCPDS	Command Center Processing and Display System
CCSA	Command and Control Support Agency
CCTC	Command and Control Technical Center
CCTE	Crisis Closure Time Estimator
C DAY	the day deployment commences
CCTV	closed circuit television
CFC	Combined Forces Command
CHOP	change in operational control
CI	Critique Item
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIN	Cargo Increment Number
CINC	Commander in Chief
CINCAD	Commander in Chief, Aerospace Defense Command
CINCLANT	Commander in Chief, Atlantic
CINCCFC	Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command
CINCMAC	Commander in Chief, Military Airlift Command
CINCNORAD	Commander in Chief, North American Air Defense Command
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief, Pacific
CINCPACFLT	Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet
CINCSAC	Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command
CINCUNC/CFC	Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/ Combined Forces Command
CINCUSNAVEUR	Commander in Chief, US Navy Europe



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CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMBT	combat
CMC	Commandant of Marine Corps
CMD	command
CMIS	Crisis Management Intercommunication System
CMO	Crisis Management Organization
CNO	Chief of Naval Operations
COA	Course of Action
COINS	Community Online Intelligence System
COGARD	Coast Guard
COMAAC	Commander, Alaska Air Command
COMCOGARDLANT	Commander, US Coast Guard Atlantic
COMCOGARDPAC	Commander, US Coast Guard Pacific
COMCOGARDEUR	Commander, US Coast Guard Europe
COMDT COGARD	Commandant, US Coast Guard
COMINT	communications intelligence
COMM	communications
COMPES	Contingency Operation Mobility Planning and Execution System
COMRDJTF	Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
COMSEC	communications security
COMSPOT	Communications Spot Report
COMSTAT	Communications Status Report
COMUSKOREA	Commander, US Forces Korea
CONPLAN	operation plan in concept format
CONREP	Contingency Construction Plan
CONUS	continental United States
COPG	Chairman, Operations Planners Group
COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
COSIN	control staff instructions
CP	command post
CPX	command post exercise
CRAF	Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRAFREP	CRAF Report
CRE	Crisis Response Element
CRITIC	Critical Intelligence Communication
CRT	cathode ray tube
CSA	Chief of Staff, US Army
CSAF	Chief of Staff, US Air Force
CSP	crisis staffing procedures
CSR	current situation room
CWDE	Chemical Warfare Defense Equipment
CWO	Communications Watch Officer
DA	Department of the Army
DACG	departure airfield control group
DAT	Deployment Action Team
DCA	Defense Communications Agency
DCAOC	DCA Operations Center



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DCASR	Defense Contract Administration Services Region
DCS	Defense Communications System
DCSLOG	Deputy Chief of Staff Logistics
DDD	Direct Distance Dialing
DDO	Deputy Director for Operations
DEFCON	defense readiness condition
DEIS	Defense Energy Information System
DEMSTAT	Deployment/Employment Mobilization Status
DEP	deployment; Delayed Entry Program
DEPGUIDE	deployment guide
DEPLAN	deployment plan
DEPT	department
DET	detachment
DFSC	Defense Fuel Supply Center
DHHS	Department of Health and Human Services (formerly HEW)
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAOLS	DIA online system
DICO	Data Information and Coordination Office
DIN	Defense Intelligence Notice
DIPEC	Defense Industrial Plant Equipment Center
DISC	Defense Industrial Supply Center
DISIDS	Display and Information Distribution System
DL	Director for Logistics
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DLS	Data Link System
DMA	Defense Mapping Agency
DMAAC	DMA Aerospace Center
DMAHTC	DMA Hydrographic/Topographic Center
DMO	Defense Mobilization Order
DMS/DPS	Defense Materials System/Defense Priorities System
DMZ	demilitarized zone
DNA	Defense Nuclear Agency
DOAF	Department of Air Force
DOC	Department of Commerce
DOD	Department of Defense
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DOL	Department of Labor
DOMS	Director of Military Support
DON	Department of Navy
DOS	Department of State
DOT	Department of Transportation
DOT/OET	Department of Transportation, Office of Emergency Transportation
DPA	Defense Production Act
DPSC PAC	Data Processing Service Center Pacific
DPRK	Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea
DSAA	Defense Security Assistance Agency

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DTG	date time group
DTS	Diplomatic Telegraph System
EA	emergency action(s)
EAM	emergency action message
EAP	emergency action procedures
ECR	Emergency Conference Room
EEFI	Essential Elements of Friendly Information
EEI	Essential Elements of Information
ELG	European Liaison Group
EMAS	Exercise Message Analysis System
EMATS	Emergency Message Automatic Transmission System
EMPB	Emergency Mobilization Planning Board
ENDEX	end of exercise
EOP	Emergency Operating Procedures
EPC	Emergency Processing Center
EPW	Enemy Prisoners of War
ESVN	Executive Secure Voice Network
EUMEAF	Europe, Middle East, and Africa
EVAC	Evacuation File
EW	early warning
EX	executive officer
EXPLAN	exercise plan
FAA	Federal Aviation Administration
FAC	facility
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FLOGEN	Flow Generator
FLTCLINC	Navy Fleet Commander in Chief
FMMP	Federal Master Mobilization Plan
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FORSCOM	Forces Command
FRG	Force Requirements Generator; Federal Republic of Germany
FRN	force requirement number
FTS	File Transfer Service
GCOS	General Comprehensive Operating Supervisor
GEN	general
GENSER	general service communications
GEOFILE	Geolocation Code File
GEOLOC	geographical location
GEOREQ	Specified Geolocation Code Request
GFE	Government-Furnished Equipment
GFM	Government-Furnished Materiel
GMF	Generalized Monitoring Facility
GSA	General Services Administration
GSA/OP	GSA/Emergency Operating Center

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## GUARDS

## General Unified Ammunition Reporting Data System

HA  
HIS  
HNS  
HOTSIT  
HQ  
HQDA  
HQMC  
HQ USAF  
HRS  
HUD  
HUMINT

Health Affairs  
Honeywell Information System  
Host Nation Support  
hot situation message  
headquarters  
HQ Department of the Army  
Headquarters US Marine Corps  
Headquarters United States Air Force  
hours  
Dept of Housing and Urban Development  
human intelligence

ICAO  
ID  
IEB  
IEMATS  
IER  
IMA  
IMAPS  
IMP  
INCONREP  
INDIC  
INDICOM  
INF  
INFO  
INS  
INTEL  
INTSUM  
IPE  
IPP  
IRR  
ISA  
ITF  
ITO

International Civil Aviation Organization  
identification number  
Industry Evaluation Board  
Improved EMATS  
Industrial Equipment Reserve  
Individual Mobilization Augmentee  
Integrated Military Airlift Planning System  
interface message processor  
Intra-CONUS Movement Report  
indications report  
Indications Communications System  
infantry  
information  
Immigration and Naturalization Service  
Intelligence  
Intelligence Summary Report  
Industrial Plant Equipment  
Industrial Preparedness Program  
Individual Ready Reserve  
International Security Affairs  
Intelligence Task Force  
Installation Transportation Officer

J-1  
J-2  
J-3  
J-4  
JAI  
JADREP  
JCS  
JCSAN  
JCSE  
JCS MC  
JDA  
JDC

Personnel Directorate  
Intelligence Directorate  
Operations Directorate  
Logistics Directorate  
Joint Administrative Instruction  
Joint Resource Assessment Data Base Report  
Joint Chiefs of Staff  
JCS Alerting Network  
JCS Communications Support Element  
JCS Message Center  
Joint Deployment Agency  
Joint Deployment Community

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JDS	Joint Deployment System
JDSPM	Joint Deployment System Procedures Manual
JECG	Joint Exercise Control Group
JED	Joint Exercise Division
JMPAB	Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JOD	Joint Operations Division
JOPS	Joint Operation Planning System
JOPSREP	Joint Operation Planning System Report
JRS	Joint Reporting Structure
JSCO	Joint Strategic Communications Office
JSCP	Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JSPD	Joint Strategic Planning Document
JTB	Joint Transportation Board
JTF	Joint Task Force
JUWTF	Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force
LANTCOM	Atlantic Command
LCAF	Limited Care Afloat Facility
LDMX	Local Digital Message Exchange
LERTCON	alert condition (JCS Alert System)
LEST	Multics Linear Estimator
L HOUR	the hour that deployment commences
LNO	liaison officer
LO	liaison office
LOC	line(s) of communication
LOG	logistics
LOGAIR	Long-term Contract Airlift Services for the Army and Air Force
LRC	Logistics Readiness Center
LSMP	Logistic Support and Mobilization Plans
LST	landing ship, tank
LSWD	Large Screen Wall Display
M&R	Maintenance and Repair
MAC	Military Airlift Command
MAPS	Mobility Analysis and Planning System
MARAD	Maritime Administration
MC	message center
MCP	Marine Corps Capabilities Plan
M DAY	the day mobilization is to begin
MDC	Message Display Console
MEMO	memorandum
MEPS	Military Enlistment Processing Stations
METCON	Control of Meteorological Information
MED	medical
MEPS	Military Enlistment Processing Stations
MFR	memorandum for record
MHE	material handling equipment

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MI	military intelligence
MIL	military
MMP	DOD Master Mobilization Plan
MOBScope	Mobilization Shipments Configured for Operation Planning and Execution Memorandum of Policy
MOP	Monitoring Presence of US Personnel Abroad
MOPPA	Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan
MPLAN	Medical Planning Module
MPM	Military Postal Service Agency
MPSA	Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics
MRAL	movement requirements generator
MRG	Military Sealift Command
MSC	Military Support to Civil Defense
MSCD	Master Scenario Event List
MSEL	Minimum Sustaining Rate
MSR	Message Terminal Area
MTA	mean time between outage
MTBO	Military Traffic Management Command
MTMC	mean time of outage
MTOO	Master Urgency List
MUL	Worldwide Reporting Instructions for Con- trolled Air Munitions
MUNIREP	movement
MVMT	Missile Warning Display System
MWDS	
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVCOMPARS	Naval Communications Processing and Routing System
NAVTELCOM	Naval Telecommunications Command
NCA	National Command Authorities
NCB	Nuclear Contingency Branch
NCMP	Naval Capabilities and Mobilization Plan
NCO	noncommissioned officer
NCS/DCAOC	National Communications System/Defense Communications Agency Operations Center
NDRF	National Defense Reserve Fleet
NEACP	National Emergency Airborne Command Post
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operations
NGB	National Guard Bureau
NIDS	NMCS Information Display System
nm	nautical miles
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NMCS	National Military Command System
NMIC	National Military Intelligence Center
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Adminis- tration
NOC	Network Operations Center
NOIWON	National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers' Net

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NOPLAN	no plan
NORAD	North American Air Defense Command
NSA	National Security Agency
NSA/CSS	NSA/Central Security Service
NSMP	Navy Support and Mobilization Plan
NTCC	Naval Telecommunications Center
NUP	non-unit related personnel
NWSS	Navy WWMCCS Software Standardization
OASD (MRA&L)	Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics)
OCR	Optical Character Reader
ODASD (RA)	Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
ODCR	Operations Deputies' Conference Room
OET	Office of Emergency Transportation
OI	Operating Instructions
OJCS	Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
OLA	Operating Location "A"
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
ONPG	Operations Nuclear Planning Group
OPAREA	Operating Area
OPCON	operational control
OPG	Operations Planners Group
OPLAN	operation plan in complete format
OPNAV	Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
OPORD	operation order
OPR	Office of Primary Responsibility
OPREP	Commander's Operational Report
OPS	operations
OpsDepts	Operations Deputies
OPSCON	Operations Conference
OPSEC	operations security
OSCC	Operation Support Computer Center
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSHA	Occupational Safety and Health Administra- tion
OT	operations team
OUSDR&E (A)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (Acquisition Policy)
PA	Public Affairs
PACAF	Pacific Air Force
PACFLT	Pacific Fleet
PACOM	Pacific Command
PAX	passenger(s)
PBA	Production Base Analysis
PEP	Plant/Equipment Package
PGCP	Policy Guidance for Contingency Planning

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PIN	Plan Identification Number
PL	Public Law
POC	point of contact
POD	port of debarkation
POE	port of embarkation
POL	petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POLCAP	Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Capabilities Report
POMCUS	Prepositioned Overseas Material Configured to Unit Sets
PORTS	Port Characteristics File
PRC	Peoples Republic of China
PROB	problem
PSVP	Pilot Secure Voice Program
Pub	publication
PWRS	Pre-positioned War Reserve Stock
QUICKTRANS	Long-term Contract Airlift Services for the Navy and Marine Corps
R-1	Daily Airlift Summary
R-2	Sealift Movement Summary
R-3	Common User Airlift Availability
R-4	Common User Sealift Resource Availability
R-5	Common User Ocean Terminal Workload Status
R-6	CONUS APOE Workload Status Report
R-7	APOD Workload Status Report
R-8	SPOD Workload Status Report
RAP	Remedial Action Project
RC	Reserve Component
RDD	Required Delivery Date
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
RECAT	Residual Capability Assessment Team
RECCE	reconnaissance
RECON	JCS Reconnaissance Report
REP	representative; Reserve Enlisted Program
REPGEN	Reports Generator
REPOL	Petroleum Damage--Deficiency Report
REQ	requirements
ROK	Republic of Korea
ROMODNE	Reception and onward movement of DOD noncombatant evacuees
RPEP	Register of Planned Emergency Procedures
RRF	Ready Reserve Fleet
RUIC	Reserve Unit Identification Code
SA	Security Assistance
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAGE	Strategic Analysis, Guidance, and Estimates



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SARU	Search and Rescue Unit
SCARS	Status, Control, Alerting, and Reporting System
SCHED	scheduling
SDIN	Special Defense Intelligence Notice
SEACOPS	Strategic Sealift Contingency Planning System
SECT	Secretariat
SI	special intelligence
SIGINT	signal intelligence
SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan
SPM	System Planning Manual
SITE R	location site of the ANMCC
SITREP	Commander's Situation Report
SJCS	Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SLOC	sea line(s) of communication
SM	secretary's memorandum
SMCA	Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition
SOA	status of action
SOS	speed of service
SPIREP	Spot Intelligence Report
SPOD	seaport of debarkation
SPOE	seaport of embarkation
SPTD	supported
SR	senior
SRP	Sealift Readiness Program
SSO	Special Security Office(r)
SSS	Selective Service System
STARTEX	start of exercise
SUM	summary
SUPP	supplement
SVCS	Services
SWA	Southwest Asia
TAC	Tactical Air Command; tactical
TAD	time available for delivery
TC	team chief
TCC	telecommunications center
TDY	temporary duty
TELCON	telephone conference
TELEX	commercial TTY message
TELNET	WIN Telecommunications Network Program
TFE	Transportation Feasibility Estimator
TLCF	teleconference
TOA	Transportation Operating Agency
TOF	time of file
TOP	Time-Sensitive Operation Planning
TOR	terms of reference; time of receipt
TOT	time of transmission
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data

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TPFDL	time-phased force and deployment list
TPTRL	time-phased transportation requirements list
TTY	teletypewriter or teleprinter
TUCHA	type unit data file
TWIDS	Tactical Warning Information Display System
UCP	Unified Command Plan
UNC	UN Command
UNITREP	Unit Status and Identity Reporting System
UNMIL	UN Military Committee
UMMIPS	Uniform Materiel Movement and Issue Priority System
US	United States
USA	United States Army
USAF	United States Air Force
USAFE	USAF Europe
USAFORSCOM	US Army Forces Command
USAFSO	USAF South
USAREUR	USA Europe
USBRO	US Base Requirements Overseas
USC	US Code
USCENTCOM	US Central Command
USCG	US Coast Guard
USCINCEUR	US Commander in Chief, Europe
USCINCRD	Commander in Chief, US Readiness Command
USCINCSO	Commander in Chief, US Southern Command
USDA	US Dept. of Agriculture
USEUCOM	US European Command
USFK	US Forces Korea
USIB	US Intelligence Board
USMC	US Marine Corps
USN	US Navy
USNAVEUR	US Navy, Europe
USPHS	US Public Health Service
USREDCOM	US Readiness Command
USSOUTHCOM	US Southern Command
UTC	unit type code
VCOPG	Vice Chief OPG
VIP	Video Information Processor
VLFF	very low frequency
VOL	volume
WASHFAX	Washington Area Secure High Speed Facsimile System, formerly LDX
WASP	Wartime Air Service Program
WESTCOM	Western Command
WIN	WWMCCS Intercomputer Network
WISP	Wartime Information Security Program

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WLG	Washington Liaison Group
WMP	USAF War and Mobilization Plan
WRSR	War Reserve Stocks for Allies
WSPRS	WWMCCS Statistical Performance Reporting System
WWMCCS	Worldwide Military Command and Control System
XO	executive officer
Y	message indicator for FLASH precedence
Z	Greenwich time
ZULU	Greenwich time

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## SECTION I

### (U) MOBILIZATION

1. (U) Major Objective. Determine the adequacy of existing plans, systems, and procedures to support the mobilization process leading to full mobilization of the approved force.

2. (U) Synopsis. Past mobilization exercises illuminated numerous deficiencies in mobilization plans and procedures. During Exercise PROUD SABER 83 the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (OJCS), and the Services again tested the procedures and policies associated with partial and full mobilization. They found the policies and procedures to be adequate but many players did not understand particular elements of mobilization authorities, responsibilities, and status of actions. The conduct of Exercise PROUD SABER 83 made it clear that many corrective actions had taken place since the earlier exercises, but it revealed also that much remained to be finished. Foremost of unfinished business is the lack of an approved, integrated, mobilization plan for the Department of Defense (DOD). The events of Exercise PROUD SABER 83 showed also that although DOD and JCS mobilization-related plans, directives, checklists, and guides existed, many of them were old, vague, contained inaccuracies, and had important omissions. OSD and the Joint Staff can make some immediate improvements. OSD should complete and publish the long-scheduled DOD Master Mobilization Plan (MMP). From an operational standpoint, the Services and OJCS could realize gains by establishing a system to enhance Reserve Component (RC) readiness and to link such a system to the JCS Alert System. Other areas for improvement include linking stop-loss actions to specific mobilization events, screening Ready Reservists for designation as key employees, and establishing a more informative mobilization status reporting system.

3. (U) System Description. Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex G to COSIN of JCS EXPLAN 0022 contains a description of the mobilization process.

#### 4. (U) Analysis

a. (U) Exercise Consideration. Structured events and reduced participation by organizations during the exercise introduced

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artificialities and may have biased the analysis of the completeness and validity of effective policies, plans, and procedures. Examples are:

(1) (U) The processes leading to approval and implementation of the Presidential call-up of 100,000 Selected Reserves were scripted events prior to the start of exercise (STARTEX).

(2) (U) The approval and implementation of many events and authorities associated with a Presidential declaration of National Emergency and partial mobilization were also scripted events prior to STARTEX.

(3) (U) The level of participation by Service organizations, especially the RC, influenced the level and amount of data and information available.

b. (U) Specific Analysis Objectives

(1) (U) Determine the extent to which National Command Authorities (NCA) and OSD mobilization guidance is adequate and available to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services, and agencies.

(2) (U) Determine the effectiveness of the procedures used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for management of mobilization planning and execution.

(3) (U) Evaluate the degree to which the JCS Alert System contributed to the effectiveness of the mobilization process.

c. (U) Discussion

(1) (U) General. The multiple-OPLAN scenario of Exercise PROUD SABER 83 thoroughly stressed the mobilization plans and procedures of the Department of Defense and civil agencies. The analysis included the mobilization process, events, and reference material. Specific subjects examined during the analysis were:

(a) (U) Mobilization Plans, Publications, and Procedures

1. (U) MMP

2. (U) JCS Publication (Pub) 21, Mobilization Planning.

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(b) (U) Mobilization Execution

1. (U) 100,000 Selected Reserve Presidential call-up
2. (U) Mobilization events and declarations
3. (U) Stop-loss measures
4. (U) Reserve readiness and management of Reserve mobilization.

(2) (U) Mobilization Plans, Publications, and Procedures

(a) (U) MMP

1. (U) Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78, the first national level JCS-sponsored mobilization and deployment command post exercise (CPX), demonstrated that mobilization plans were a mixture of outdated and unconnected Presidential emergency orders, policies, regulations, and procedures. Each covered only one part of the process, and not all parts were addressed. The problems were described generally as inadequacies in the:

- a. (U) Formulation of a mobilization strategy
- b. (U) Promulgation of guidance
- c. (U) Articulation of information requirements
- d. (U) Establishment of responsibilities
- e. (U) Level of education of the OSD staff.

Exercise PROUD SPIRIT 80, the second national level JCS-sponsored mobilization and deployment CPX, revealed similar shortcomings.

2. (U) The scope of the foregoing deficiencies clearly pointed to the need for an integrated, all-encompassing mobilization plan for the DOD. The development of an MMP became Remedial Action Project (RAP) 25. Subsequently, other closely associated RAPs were integrated into RAP 25. They included in part projects relating to crisis

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management organizations, mobilization authorities, and options. Another pertained to outdated directives and instructions. The implied intent of RAP 25 was to consolidate under the MMP as much mobilization policy, guidance, strategy, and procedures as possible.

3. (U) Exercise PROUD SABER 83 showed that after more than 4 years since Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78 there was still no formally approved and published, comprehensive mobilization plan for DOD. On 1 June 1982, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics) (OASD(MRA&L)), as the office of primary responsibility for MMP development, promulgated the latest version of an evolving MMP. The 1 June 1982 version was in use for Exercise PROUD SABER 83. It contained four of seven proposed sections and four of seven proposed annexes. The included sections were Introduction, Mobilization Policy and Authorities, Mobilization Responsibilities, and Decision Options. The yet to be published sections were Guidance and Administrative Requirements; Exercises, Tests, and Evaluations; and Mobilization Planning Management System. The included annexes were Compendium of Legal Authorities, Mobilization Responsibilities and Related Tasks, Decision Option Papers, and Distribution. The Compendium of Legal Authorities was not a summary of the legal authorities relating to mobilization, but, rather two short paragraphs explaining who had responsibility for preparing and maintaining a compendium of emergency authorities. The annexes yet to be published were Glossary, Federal Agency Mobilization Roles, and Mobilization Organizations. (The OJCS recently completed a compilation of the mobilization roles of Federal agencies.) In contrast, the MMP version in use for Exercise PROUD SPIRIT 80 dated 5 November 1980 included two of six proposed sections and one of six proposed annexes.

4. (U) The MMP has made steady but very slow progress in becoming a useful document since its inception after Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78. While in its present form it contains information concerning significant matters, it remains a mobilization document without official sanction. To fulfill its purpose, the MMP must be a single-

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source reference providing mobilization managers a framework for making mobilization decisions and managing the mobilization process to support military operations. For example, it should specify who is responsible for establishing Service activation ceilings and how those ceilings should be managed and monitored. Players in Exercise PROUD SABER 83 experienced problems relating to these issues. Information concerning management of Service ceilings would be appropriate material for the yet to be published Mobilization Planning Management System section of the MMP.

5. (U) The June 1982 version of the MMP states: "The first level of mobilization planning is this Master Mobilization Plan (MMP). The MMP identifies mobilization responsibilities and describes the related tasks to be performed both in peacetime in preparation for a crisis and at the time of mobilization. Simply stated, the MMP describes what is to be done and who is to do it. How the various tasks are to be carried out is contained in subsequent levels of planning." According to the MMP, OSD-level staff elements and defense agencies, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Services, are to develop their plans at planning level II. At that level, detailed plans are supposed to describe how each organization will accomplish its assigned tasks and should identify procedures, criteria, and interfaces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have published JCS Pub 21. Each Service has published mobilization plans which are described in the System Description, Tab A to Appendix 1 to Annex G to Cosin of JCS EXPLAN 0022. The OSD-level Secretariats and Directorates did not have level II plans at the time of Exercise PROUD SABER 83. They did have some task plans or outlines that were used as inadequate substitutes. OASD(MRA&L) had taken an initial step in moving the OSD-level Secretariats toward completing level II plans. OASD(MRA&L) had initiated action to prepare a mobilization plan for OASD(MRA&L) and the development of a set of planning instructions for use by other OSD Secretariats, Directorates, and Agencies in preparing their level II mobilization plans.

6. (U) A review of the DOD Directive System Quarterly Index, DOD Instruction 5025.1, revealed in

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excess of 40 directives directly or indirectly related to mobilization. Some of the mobilization directives were issued in the last 2-3 years; others were issued over 5 years ago and are probably outdated in the light of the experience of Exercises NIFTY NUGGET 78 and PROUD SPIRIT 80. An example of an outdated directive is DOD Directive (DODD) 1235.10, Mobilization of the Ready Reserve, dated 27 October 1970. It has one published change, and it contains outdated information, policy, and guidance. Investigation revealed that the cited document was in the revision process, but it was in the revision process at the time of Exercise PROUD SPIRIT 80, 2 years ago.

(b) (U) JCS Publication 21, Mobilization Planning

1. (U) JCS (Pub) 21, under revision, is the basic mobilization planning document of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It identifies responsibilities and procedures for mobilization planning. It also identifies the interface of mobilization planning with deployment planning for those Operation Plans (OPLANS) requiring mobilization. The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the present version of JCS Pub 21 in September 1980. It was distributed November 1980, shortly after Exercise PROUD SPIRIT 80. Exercise PROUD SABER 83 was the first major mobilization and deployment exercise since Exercise PROUD SPIRIT 80 in which the current JCS Pub 21 was used as a planning and reference document.

2. (U) Most OJCS and Service players interviewed during the exercise indicated that they were aware of and used JCS Pub 21 for central guidance and direction in mobilization. JCS Pub 21 contained information concerning:

a. (U) The role of mobilization in national security

b. (U) Legal basis for mobilization of US Reserve Components

c. (U) Mobilization manpower

d. (U) Joint mobilization and deployment planning

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- e. (U) Mobilization execution
- f. (U) Management of Reserve Components
- g. (U) Responsibilities for mobilization planning and execution
- h. (U) Mobilization functions
- i. (U) Responsibilities and procedures for industrial preparedness planning.

(3) (U) Mobilization Execution

(a) (U) 100,000 Selected Reserve Presidential Call-Up

1. (U) Title 10 United States Code (USC), Section 673(b), permits the President to activate 100,000 Selected Reserves to meet operational commitments without declaring a national emergency. The President authorized the activation of 100,000 Selected Reserves on 11 October in response to events prior to STARTEX. The Services implemented the activation on 18 October. There was no evidence prior to STARTEX or during the exercise that the Services believed the 100,000 ceiling was inadequate. Neither was there evidence of Service dissatisfaction with the allocation of the 100,000. Both conditions were prevalent in past exercises. The extent to which the preexercise scripting of the 100,000 call-up event affected these two issues can not be determined. Of importance, however, is that the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan now contains three scenario dependent allocations for the 100,000 call-up. It did not for past exercises. The implementation of one of the pre-allocation mixes may have helped to eliminate or alleviate Service reservations similar to those expressed in earlier exercises.

2. (U) Since Exercise PROUD SPIRIT 80, the Services, under the guidance of the Secretary of Defense, converted many Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) mobilization designee billets on various DOD, Services, and agency staffs to Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) billets filled by Selected Reservists. This permitted many key Service and defense and civil sector organizational staff billets to be augmented during the

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100,000 call-up prior to partial and full mobilization implementation.

(b) (U) Mobilization Events and Declaration

1. (U) Figure I-1 depicts events in the mobilization process. Figure I-2 presents a sequence of key mobilization events experienced during the exercise. Generally, the events of the exercise coincided with the established mobilization process. The process cycled through the 100,000 call-up through partial mobilization and into the state of full mobilization.


2. (U) The exercise play disclosed that some senior civilian and military executives did not understand the mobilization process. Fortunately, that did not unduly hinder the mobilization process because the required authorities to deal with mobilization issues, in all cases, were anticipated by planners and exceeded Service requirements. There was a widespread belief that partial and full mobilization were discrete packages rather than aggregates of public law. In fact, degrees and states of mobilization are flexible and dynamic. They depend upon the laws, legislation authorities, and constraints authorized or imposed by the NCA or Congress. Lower-level executives and planners also had difficulties in understanding authorities and the mobilization process. For example, some Air Force Major Commands commenced mobilization before the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Air Force authorized mobilization. Similar events occurred during Exercise PROUD SPIRIT 80.

3. (U) The Congressional Declaration of National Emergency on 31 October, provided the full mobilization authorities to expand the Armed Forces up to the approved force structure. In practice, the Services did not automatically mobilize all Reservists but activated them as needed. Full mobilization only established the outer boundary of what had been authorized. By ENDEX not all Reservists expected to be called had been called.

4. (U) An essential element of analysis was to examine the dialogue among the NCA, OSD, and Joint Chiefs of Staff that occurred concerning total mobilization. Planners expected such a dialogue

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23 APR	INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION SURGED
11 OCT	PRESIDENT AUTHORIZED 100,000 CALL-UP
22	PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY
25	PARTIAL MOBILIZATION; M-DAY; CONGRESS AUTHORIZED STOP-LOSS
31	CONGRESS DECLARED A NATIONAL EMERGENCY
2 NOV	PRESIDENT DELEGATED FULL MOBILIZATION AUTHORITY TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE; COAST GUARD TRANSFERRED TO NAVY

Figure I-2. (U) Sequence and Times of Key Mobilization Events

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to occur during the final days of active exercise play. No dialogue related to total mobilization occurred by ENDEX. There seemed to be no compelling necessity to proceed beyond full mobilization.

(c) (U) Stop-Loss Measures

1. (U) Title 10 USC does not provide for the extension of enlistments of regular enlisted men except when war has been declared. Title 10 USC does permit, however, the extension of the terms of service of RC enlisted and regular and RC officers upon a declaration of war or national emergency by Congress. The applicable sections of 10 USC are 506, 511, 519, 565, 671, 672, 3313, 6386, and 8313.

2. (U) The OSD Manpower Board met on 18 October and recommended that the Secretary of Defense and President forward emergency standby stop-loss legislation to Congress. On 21 October, the Secretary of Defense sent such a legislative package to the President who forwarded it to the Congress. On 25 October, Congress enacted legislation authorizing specific stop-loss measures. Subsequently, OSD delegated these stop-loss authorities to the Service Secretaries. As was previously noted, a week earlier the President authorized the 100,000 call-up to enhance responsiveness and readiness of the Armed Forces. Authority to stop the discharge of active duty personnel should have been simultaneously available.

3. (U) Under law, DOD can implement stop-loss measures automatically upon a Congressional declaration of war. During this exercise, the Services received stop-loss authorities, short of war, by special legislation. This was an unwieldy process that absorbed an inordinate amount of the time available to planners and decisionmakers. Stop-loss authority for active duty enlisted and officers tied directly to the 100,000 call-up would have reduced the time spent on this issue. Moreover, stop-loss measures for both regular and Reserve, officer and enlisted, tied automatically to a Presidential declaration

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of national emergency would have reduced considerably the time spent on this issue. Regardless, those two situations neither existed for the exercise nor do they exist today. Permanent legislation may be appropriate. Until legislation is obtained, planners are obligated to be knowledgeable of all facets of stop-loss authorities. For example, a problem arose with respect to the Coast Guard. Until the Coast Guard is transferred to the Navy, mobilization authorities and related actions such as stop-loss would normally flow through the Secretary of Transportation. The special legislation of 25 October did not provide for stop-loss in the Coast Guard. DOD planners must take into consideration the Coast Guard whenever the planners are considering requesting the implementation of stop-loss measures. In Exercise PROUD SABER 83, they did not. The Coast Guard sought full mobilization and stop-loss authority on 2 November, when full mobilization was authorized. Transfer of the Coast Guard to the Navy also occurred on 2 November. The transfer automatically gave the Coast Guard the necessary authorities that had been delegated to the Secretary of the Navy, but between 25 October and 2 November, they had no authority to stop the outflow of Coast Guard members.

(d) (U) Reserve Readiness and Management of Reserve Mobilization

1. (U) The Joint Staff, based upon Mobilization Status Reports, monitored the progress of the Selected Reserve call-up. On 25 October, the NCA authorized the authorities which constitute partial mobilization. Partial mobilization is limited to a one million person call-up. The Joint Staff continued to manage the personnel apportionment, presumably acting for the Secretary of Defense and Service Secretaries, although there was no explicit delegation of authority.

2. (S) Because the Services were essentially reporting only personnel status in the Mobilization Status Report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff never received information on the availability and readiness of RC units. Neither did they receive information from the various active gaining commands. They only knew the availability and location of active forces through the Unit

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Status and Identity Report (UNITREP) system. RC units that have been activated lose their identity as RC units in UNITREP. Additionally, RC units that have not been activated appear only in a special UNITREP file. The Services update the data in that file only periodically; therefore, the data may be neither current nor adequate.

3. ~~(C)~~ The Mobilization Status Report content was deficient. It did not inform the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Services' capabilities. OSD and OJCS should have established a report format that would have informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff of not only the progress of personnel mobilization and numbers of units mobilized but also unit availability and the readiness status of units as well. The Services and commands to which RC units report for active duty have information on RC unit readiness and availability. That information becomes available to higher headquarters after the RC units report for active duty. An RC unit may not be ready for deployment or be able to meet its activation schedule. Either condition would affect plan execution and such information should be available to higher headquarters. The reporting systems could be modified to accommodate that need. The US Commander in Chief, Readiness Command (USCINCRD 102148Z Nov) emphasized that point saying: "An improved mobilization reporting system is desirable. One that would provide key department or agency decisionmakers and planners information concerning 100,000 call-up, partial, full, and total mobilization as well as identifying unit and current readiness status of mobilized Reserve and Guard forces."

4. ~~(C)~~ RC unit readiness and the reporting structure require improvement. RC units generally based reports on readiness of equipment and manning. When the Joint Chiefs of Staff initiated action to enhance the readiness posture of active forces using the JCS-Alert System Defense Readiness Condition (DEFCONs), RC forces remained relatively static because there were few to no linkages between DEFCONs and RC unit readiness. OSD has considered the design of a Ready Reserve Mobilization Action System and linkage of active and RC force readiness. OSD and the Services

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have taken no significant action to date. However, movement in that direction is evident in the 1985-1989 Defense Guidance.

5. ~~(S)~~ Activation of Guard and Reserve personnel posed the problems of the loss of key personnel and the loss of large numbers of people within selected occupations. Key defense installations rely heavily on Civil Service employees to carry out essential defense services upon mobilization. Many Civil Service employees are members of the National Guard and Reserve forces. Therefore, they would not be available to perform their civilian duties in the critical time immediately following mobilization. Some of these civilian employees are needed in the mobilization process. The full impact of their loss on defense services is unknown because there are no known studies or assessments that address the ability of key DOD organizations to perform their missions without the services of mobilized employees.

6. (U) The exercise revealed that each Service had an on-going program to screen Ready Reservists for designation as key employees. The effectiveness of these programs is questionable based on the numerous requests for exceptions and delay requested during the exercise. The screening program denies Reservists full participation in the Ready Reserve. Another reason may be that DODD 1235.10 27 October 1970 provides for exemption and delay of Ready Reserves. One criterion for delay is community hardship. Authority to approve a delay for community hardship is at the Secretary of the Military Department level. OSD is currently revising DODD 1235.10. The proposed directive is more detailed than the existing version and provides firm exemption, delay, and key employee criteria. It proposes no exemptions once mobilization has commenced and emphasizes the removal of key employees from the Ready Reserve. The proposed directive, however, has been in the development state since before Exercise PROUD SPIRIT 80. Action officers in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs) (ODASD(RA)) have had difficulty in obtaining concurrence with the proposed directive.

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7. (U) Retired personnel constitute a large pool of trained manpower. In this exercise, the Services recalled about 56,000 retired persons from a reported pool of 610,000. There was no program similar to the Ready Reserve to screen retired individuals for designation as key personnel.

On 2 November, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) raised the issue concerning the mobilization of retired personnel who were key employees. There is no evidence that the question was answered or even addressed by OSD, OJCS, or the Services.

8. (U) As crises evolved and mobilization progressed, the workload in overseas theaters increased. The US Army, Europe (USAREUR) raised the issue of whether it had authority to retain key DOD civilian employees rather than have them evacuated. This has been a recurring issue from exercise to exercise. The Army responded appropriately to USAREUR saying USAREUR could only persuade, that there was no legal basis for preventing civilian employees from executing their evacuation option. Section VII discusses this issue further under the subject of noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO).

9. (U) The Coast Guard has two categories of responsibilities, statutory and military. When the Coast Guard is transferred to the Navy, the statutory responsibilities remain with the Commandant who reports to the Secretary of the Navy. Examples of statutory responsibilities are aids to navigation, port security, and vessel safety. The Commandant of the Coast Guard loses operational command of forces that have military functions. Command passes to appropriate unified commanders. Transfer of the Coast Guard to the Navy Department went smoothly. There were, however, three issues that needed resolution.

a. (U) There was no agreement between the Department of Transportation and the Department of the Navy as to the transfer of Coast Guard monies. The issue was not resolved during the exercise. It will be addressed by Navy and DOT planners subsequently.

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b. (U) The Office of the Secretary of the Navy had no plan to incorporate and absorb the Coast Guard's statutory functions. A standby plan is needed.

c. (U) The final issue dealt with women serving aboard Coast Guard ships with military roles such as patrolling and convoying. Title 10 USC, Section 6015, is explicit with respect to women in the Army engaging in combat. It does not cover the other Services. The intent of the Congress for women not to serve in combat is clear, however. When the Coast Guard transferred, there was confusion as to the Coast Guard Headquarters' position concerning the women serving on-board ships coming under control of a unified command. The confusion was clarified subsequently by a Memorandum from the Commandant of the Coast Guard.

d. (U) Findings

(1) (U) Mobilization Plans and Publications

(a) (U) The MMP is incomplete. Existing mobilization plans and policies were a mixture of outdated, unconnected, or inaccurate orders, policies, regulations, and procedures. In general, inadequacies existed in:

1. (U) Formulation of guidance and administrative requirements
2. (U) Promulgation and utilization of a mobilization planning management system
3. (U) Integration of plans and procedures
4. (U) Confirmation of mobilization authorities
5. (U) Articulation of information requirements.

(b) (U) The OSD-level Secretariats and Directorates did not have level II mobilization plans.

(c) (U) By default, JCS Pub 21 became the source of central guidance for mobilization for many in DOD.

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(2) (U) Mobilization Execution

(a) (U) Generally, the mobilization process followed that process outlined in JCS Pub 21; however, components of one Service commenced mobilization before mobilization had been authorized.

(b) (U) There was no evidence of OJCS and Service dissatisfaction with the adequacy or the allocation of the 100,000 call-up.

(c) (U) There was a lack of understanding of the mobilization process at high and low executive and planner levels. Many believed partial and full mobilization were discrete packages and did not comprehend the legal authorities associated with mobilization activities.

(d) (U) The Services were provided a blanket stop-loss authority for both regular active duty and Reserve personnel a week after the Services initiated the 100,000 call-up.

(e) (U) The Coast Guard did not receive stop-loss authority until 2 November, seven days after the Services received stop-loss authorities.

(f) (U) Discussions and actions concerning stop-loss consumed much time of planners and decisionmakers.

(g) (U) The Joint Staff received little information concerning the readiness status of Reserve units being activated in response to mobilization events.

(h) (U) The Department of Defense had serious problems concerning the use of key civilian employees and the requirements for retention of civilian employees during mobilization.

1. (U) Many DOD civilian employees were members of the Reserve and National Guard and were no longer available as civilian employees on mobilization.

2. (U) No current comprehensive criteria or policy existed that defined a key or critical employee.

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3. ~~(C)~~ USAREUR would have had a critical skill shortage problem had civilian employees elected evacuation as noncombatants.

(i) ~~(C)~~ There are few linkages between systems for increasing the state of readiness of active forces and systems for increasing the state of readiness of Reserve Component forces during periods of rising tensions.

e. (U) Conclusions

(1) (U) Mobilization Plans and Procedures

(a) (U) The absence of a completed MMP constrained effective mobilization and planning at the national level. The exercise disclosed difficulties in determining responsibility, confirming authorities, and ascertaining and implementing policy and guidance. Similar deficiencies existed during Exercises NIFTY NUGGET 78 and PROUD SPIRIT 80.

(b) (U) OSD-level Secretariats and Directorates did not have completed level II mobilization plans. A contributing factor to that deficiency was the incomplete MMP on which the level II plans should be based. Another contributing factor was a lack of urgency by the Secretariats and Directorates to develop level II plans.

(c) (U) While not meant to be, JCS Pub 21 became the document accepted by many DOD and JCS personnel as the central guide for DOD-wide mobilization planning due to lack of a MMP. The Joint Chiefs of Staff published JCS Pub 21 to insure the interface of mobilization planning with deployment planning for OPLANS requiring mobilization.

(2) (U) Mobilization Execution

(a) (U) The magnitude and allocation of the 100,000 call-up provided the necessary balance in capability essential to crisis response for the scenario exercised.

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(b) (U) The exercise showed training programs needed revision and revitalization. The programs must provide planners and decisionmakers the requisite mobilization knowledge and experience to perform their duties, competently and expeditiously, in crisis and mobilization situations.

(c) (U) Title 10, USC was inconsistent in respect to stop-loss measures pertaining to regular or Reserve enlisted. Also, stop-loss measures were not tied automatically to programs to increase the size and strength of the active force. DOD needs legislation to tie together stop-loss of active duty personnel and the call-up of 100,000 Selected Reserve. The Services need consistent automatic stop-loss authorities which are implementable at the lowest levels of management.

(d) (U) During the exercise, planners had need for information they did not receive. JCS and unified and specified command planners needed improved and additional information pertaining to force readiness, availability, and deployability. OSD, OJCS, and the Services should determine what mobilization management information is needed for each, and whether it is obtainable with existing systems or new systems need to be developed.

(e) (U) The magnitude of the key civilian skills problems in mobilization was unknown. It will remain unknown until an effective key employee criterion is established and some comprehensive assessment is made to:

1. (U) Determine the number of DOD civilian employees who are members of the Reserve forces
2. (U) Determine the positions these civilian employees hold within key defense organizations
3. (U) Determine the impact on DOD organizations of the loss of the services of civilian employees who are mobilized.

(f) (U) In Exercise PROUD SABER 83, as in past exercises, USAREUR recognized the criticality of DOD civilian employees in Europe. OSD must address the critical issue of retaining US civilian employees in Europe during a period of rising tension or upon commencement of hostilities. At stake is whether

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USAREUR will or will not be able to fulfill its mission using its sophisticated equipment. The solution may require legislation that authorizes retention of key civilian employees in theater in some status even after hostilities begin.

(g) (U) Exercise results revealed a strong relationship among RC unit readiness and preparedness, OPLAN implementation, mobilization, and deployment planning and execution. The exercise also showed there is no overall effective system that serves to improve Reserve force readiness and deployability during a period of rising tensions. A way to accomplish this would be to link a period of rising tensions and increased RC readiness with actions that are an integral part of the JCS-Alert System.

f. (U) Recommendations

(1) (U) Mobilization Plans and Procedures

(a) (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider recommending to the Secretary of Defense that the completion of the MMP be given a higher priority than it now has.

(b) (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider recommending to the Secretary of Defense that OSD Secretariats and Directorates expedite the completion of level II mobilization plans.

(2) (U) Mobilization Execution

(a) (U) The Secretary of Defense should continue efforts to pursue legislation that would eliminate inconsistencies in the laws that pertain to stop-loss measures and would allow automatic implementation of stop-loss measures at the lowest management level when required. The legislation should include provisions that would tie together automatically stop-loss measures pertaining to active duty personnel and the 100,000 call-up. Similar legislation was proposed for the 97th Congress but was not acted upon.

(b) (U) OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services should identify the mobilization management information requirements needed to accomplish their missions. Subsequently, each should take action to insure the availability of the information when required.

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(c) (U) The Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Services should identify measures which may be taken during a period of rising tensions to increase the readiness of Reserve forces. The measures should become a part of the MMP, the JCS Alert System, and DOD and JCS crisis action procedures.

(d) (U) OSD and the Services should complete the program of screening key employees to remove them from the Ready Reserve. A definition of what constitutes a key employee is critical to success of the program.

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## SECTION II

### (U) DEPLOYMENT

1. (U) Major Objective. Determine the ability of the Joint Deployment Community (JDC) and the Joint Deployment System (JDS) to support the deployment of forces in a crisis environment involving a multiple OPLAN, multiple theater scenario.

### 2. (U) Synopsis

a. (U) The JDS concept provides a centralized system to support the deployment planning, coordinating, and movement monitoring processes. The system supports the transportation requirements of OPLANs submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by the commanders of unified or specified commands. The system also accommodates JCS-directed contingency or crisis operations when no plan (NOPLAN) exists.

b. (U) During the past several years, the JDS has experienced significant progress in conceptual development, expanded procedures, improved communications, and cohesive interrelationships within the JDC. It is, however, still an evolving system with modifications of requirements, procedures, and information flow anticipated.

c. ~~(U)~~ During Exercise PROUD SABER 83, the JDS was more effective than in any previous exercise. The Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) demonstrated an improved capability to coordinate deployments in a complex, multiple OPLAN and NOPLAN scenario. The JDC exhibited increased knowledge and more extensive use of the JDS and frequently sought JDA assistance in resolving deployment conflicts. For the most part, the JDC responded expeditiously to JDA requests for information or action. Unfortunately, there were problems also.

(1) ~~(U)~~ Strategic lift resources were fully committed quickly in the multiple plan, multiple theater crisis environment. The competition for limited lift resources prompted meetings of the Joint Transportation Board (JTB). By the end of the exercise (ENDEX), there was insufficient strategic lift to meet the requirements associated with the directed multiple deployments.

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(2) ~~(C)~~ As in past exercises, the JDA and transportation operating agencies (TOAs) needed more detailed and timely information to prepare accurate deployment estimates and lift schedules. They also needed more detailed and timely information to manage the complex variables of lift assets, transit times, and port loading and unloading required because of the limited resources that were available. In particular, they encountered significant difficulties concerning deployment estimating. The difficulties were attributable primarily to a lack of detailed and rolled-up data, such as short tons or measured tons of supply and out-sized and over-sized cargo, in the commander's estimates as well as in the crisis data bases. Hardware and software problems at Military Airlift Command (MAC) slowed airlift scheduling. That scheduling problem, coupled with the inability of JDA to disseminate automatic scheduling messages promptly, hindered the timely distribution of scheduling information and jeopardized units meeting departure dates.

(3) ~~(C)~~ Movement monitoring was a concern to the players throughout the exercise. Because the TOAs use a system of reporting movements by exception only, players felt uncertain of their ability to monitor, verify, and modify movements.

(4) ~~(C)~~ Players were concerned and confused about the location of specific selected air defense artillery and special forces groups. The confusion was attributable to differences in data bases resulting from insufficient preexercise coordination. Players spent an inordinate amount of their time and effort resolving the associated problems. The issue also tended to undermine the confidence in JDS of some players at some locations.

3. (U) System Description. Tab B to Appendix 1 to Annex G to COSIN to JCS EXPLAN 0022 contains a system description of the deployment process.

4. (U) Analysis

a. (U) Exercise Considerations. Structured events and reduced participation by organizations during the exercise introduced artificialities and may have biased the completeness of the analysis of policies, plans, and procedures.

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Army 1.4(a)  
3.3(b)(5)

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Examples are:

- (1) (U) European war plans were not exercised.
- (2) (U) Specific OPLANS were designated prior to STARTEX as candidates for implementation. They were:
  - (a) ~~(S)~~ COMRDJTF [REDACTED] (Warning, Alert, and Execute Orders were issued prior to STARTEX).
  - (b) ~~(S)~~ CINCLANT [REDACTED]
  - (c) ~~(S)~~ CINCAD/CINCNOAD [REDACTED]
  - (d) ~~(S)~~ CINCAD/CINCNOAD [REDACTED]
  - (e) ~~(S)~~ USCINCEUR [REDACTED]
  - (f) ~~(S)~~ CINCPAC [REDACTED] (Warning Order was issued prior to STARTEX).
  - (g) ~~(S)~~ USCINCSO [REDACTED]
  - (h) ~~(S)~~ USCINCRD [REDACTED]
  - (i) ~~(S)~~ COMJTF ALASKA [REDACTED]
- (3) (U) Prior to STARTEX, JDA prepared an exercise crisis data base from Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) provided by the proponent commanders for each OPLAN designated as a candidate plan for implementation. Very importantly, prior to STARTEX, the JDC purged most COMRDJTF [REDACTED] dual-committed forces from other candidate plans, thereby reducing competition among OPLANS for the same forces.
- (4) ~~(S)~~ Deployment areas designated prior to STARTEX to receive personnel and material were:
  - (a) ~~(S)~~ Caribbean.
  - (b) ~~(S)~~ Southwest Asia.
  - (c) ~~(S)~~ Korea.
- (5) (U) Reformer and Crested Cap forces (already deployed to Europe for annual exercises prior to STARTEX) remained in Europe.

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(6) (U) The NCA authorized the call-up of 100,000 Selected Reserves on 11 October 1982 prior to STARTEX.

(7) (U) USCINCEUR requested Prepositioned Overseas Material Configured to Unit Sets (POMCUS) and Prepositioned War Reserve Stock (PWRS) filled prior to STARTEX.

(8) (U) The Military Sealift Command (MSC) initiated sea-lift programs involving voluntary charters, the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF), and the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) prior to STARTEX.

(9) (U) CINCMAC authorized Civil Reserve Airfleet (CRAF) I prior to STARTEX.

(10) (U) The Secretary of Defense authorized CRAF II prior to STARTEX.

(11) (U) The President declared a National Emergency permitting the commencement of partial mobilization prior to STARTEX.

b. (U) Specific Analysis Objectives

(1) (U) Evaluate the capability of applicable plans to support the initial deployment of forces in a multiple OPLAN, multiple theater scenario.

(2) (U) Evaluate the Joint Deployment System responsiveness to data base change requirements resulting from the diversion, addition, or loss of strategic lift resources.

(3) (U) Identify incidents or OPLANs which generate competing requests for E-3A support. Evaluate the adequacy of procedures used to resolve resultant problems.

c. (U) Discussion

(1) (U) General

(a) ~~(C)~~ The JDS was more effective and was used more extensively by the JDC during Exercise PROUD SABER 83 than in any previous exercise. The JDA demonstrated an improved capability to coordinate deployments in a complex, multiple plan scenario, including a NOPLAN scenario. Further, the JDC demonstrated an ability to cope with augmented OPLAN requirements. The JDA anticipated problems that might have an adverse impact on deployment flow and worked to resolve those problems prior to plan execution. The JDC's confidence in JDA

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Army 1.4(a),(h)  
3.3(b)(5)


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was evident in how they frequently sought JDA's assistance in resolving deployment conflicts or problems and how they responded expeditiously, in most cases, to JDA's request for information or action.

(b) ~~(c)~~ The exercise showed that the JDS has experienced significant progress during the past several years in conceptual development, expanded procedures, improved communication, and cohesive interrelationships within the deployment community. It is, however, still an evolving system requiring improved procedures, more effective communications, and expanded capabilities.



(2) (U) The Joint Transportation Board

(a) 

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23 SEPT 82	CRAF I AUTHORIZED
11 OCT 82	100,000 CALLUP AUTHORIZED CRAF II AUTHORIZED
182353Z OCT 82	WARNING ORDER COMRDJTF [REDACTED]
181730Z OCT 82	ALERT ORDER COMRDJTF [REDACTED]
19-22 OCT 82	VOLUNTARY CHARTER, RRF, AND SRP SEALIFT PROGRAMS AUTHORIZED
23 OCT 82	PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY
231200Z OCT 82	EXECUTE ORDER COMRDJTF [REDACTED]
232100Z OCT 82	WARNING ORDER [REDACTED]
240001Z OCT 82	CRAF III AUTHORIZED
281200Z OCT 82	STARTEX
270216Z OCT 82	EXECUTE AUTHORIZATION CINCAD [REDACTED]
272330Z OCT 82	JCS APPROVES 5TFS FOR MED SLOC PROTECTION
281855Z OCT 82	EXECUTE AUTHORIZATION CINCAD [REDACTED]
282215Z OCT 82	WARNING ORDER CINCLANT [REDACTED]
282220Z OCT 82	WARNING ORDER CINCLANT [REDACTED]
300030Z OCT 82	EXECUTE ORDER [REDACTED] PHASE I
300850Z OCT 82	ALERT ORDER [REDACTED] (PHASES 2, 3 AND 4)
301415Z OCT 82	DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION ORDER CINCSO [REDACTED]
301420Z OCT 82	DEPLOYMENT ORDER CINCEUR [REDACTED]
301645Z OCT 82	CHANGE 1 EXECUTE ORDER [REDACTED] PHASE I
311637Z OCT 82	CHANGE 2 EXECUTE ORDER [REDACTED] PHASE I
012240Z NOV 82	DEPLOYMENT ORDER (ASSOCIATED W/CINCLANT FORCES) [REDACTED]
012250Z NOV 82	DEPLOYMENT ORDER [REDACTED] PHASE I AUGMENTATION (5 TFS TO KOREA)
021217Z NOV 82	DEPLOYMENT ORDER CINCEUR [REDACTED] (GIVES AIRLIFT PRIORITY/ALLOCATION INFORMATION)
021342Z NOV 82	ALERT ORDER CINCLANT [REDACTED]
021343Z NOV 82	DEPLOYMENT ORDER CINCSO [REDACTED] (AIR UNITS)
022245Z NOV 82	ALERT ORDER CINCLANT [REDACTED]
032030Z NOV 82	DEPLOYMENT ORDER (LAAM BN TO ALASKA FOR SUPPORT) [REDACTED]
040420Z NOV 82	DEPLOYMENT ORDER CINCSO [REDACTED] (GROUND UNITS)
050020Z NOV 82	DEPLOYMENT ORDER CINCLANT [REDACTED] (ICELAND FORCES)
051246Z NOV 82	DEPLOYMENT ORDER [REDACTED] AUGMENTATION (AIR REFUELERS FOR 5TFS)
051435Z NOV 82	DEPLOYMENT ORDER [REDACTED] AUGMENTATION (MINE COUNTERMEASURES)
051600Z NOV 82	EXECUTE ORDER CINCAD [REDACTED]
061700Z NOV 82	ENDX

Figure II-1. (U) Timeline of Deployment - Related Events

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The Joint Transportation Board (JTB) and the JTB Secretariat were active before STARTEX and during the exercise. As would be the case in a real developing crisis, particularly of the global proportions indicated in the Exercise PROUD SABER 83 "build-up" phase, the JTB Secretary anticipated a multiple theater scenario and a concomitant need to plan for the JTB to respond to various allocations problems. A set of hypothetical OPORD mixes with accompanying hypothetical proposed airlift allocations was forwarded to JDA and MAC for "what if" assessments. These hypothetical cases focused on concurrent support of COMRDJTF [REDACTED] and CINCPAC [REDACTED] because the aggregate of those two plans formed the greatest potential lift requirement. With players in the Pentagon and all commands focusing on STARTEX, in-depth preexercise cooperation was initially difficult to obtain. Busy exercise planners at JDA and MAC could not be expected to respond to JTB's taskings prior to STARTEX because the staffs had not yet convened for the exercise. Furthermore, the JDS data bases were in a state of flux, so analysis in response to "what ifs" would have been subject to considerable error. Moreover, current limitations in the JDS precluded fast turnaround of "what if" assessments. The limitations also negated parallel evaluation of important questions, such as an assessment of CINCPAC's requirements if a Marine Amphibious Battalion (MAB) were moved to the Aleutians as a pre-conflict measure prior to COMRDJTF [REDACTED] C-day versus post C-day. Notwithstanding the shortcomings encountered in conducting the "what if" styled analyses, the attempt was a first for the JTB and its supporting staff in the Logistics Directorate.

(b) (c) The JTB Secretariat staffed an initial airlift allocation recommendation from MAC prior to STARTEX to support worldwide MAC channel, air lines of communications (ALOC), special assignment airlift missions (SAAM), and the COMRDJTF flow. The JTB presented MAC's recommendation concurrently to the unified and specified commands and the Services. The JTB asked them to advise of non-concurrence and other recommendations if they did not agree with MAC's proposed allocations. Probably due to restricted player involvement prior to STARTEX, the JTB received no comments. The JTB Secretary solicited information by telephone, but he met with limited success in terms of knowledge of the subject by the respondents. The actual OPLAN airlift

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OSD 3.3(b)(5) allocation recommendation, which the JTB approved, turned out to be more than what was needed for the COMRDJTF time-phased requirements. The JTB Secretariat next staffed a second airlift allocation recommendation from MAC prior to STARTEX to address the addition of CINCPAC [REDACTED] Phase I, to the aggregate lift requirement. Because the action was prior to STARTEX, there was no exercise play strategic guidance for allocating lift resources between the two theaters involved at STARTEX. The JTB allocated support to COMRDJTF and CINCPAC on a 68 and 22 percent basis respectively. The JTB allocated the remaining 10 percent of the support to other proponent commands or missions. With this allocation, RDJTF's projected cargo delivery schedule was generally on time. PACOM's flow was projected to be 4-5 days late at the end of Phase I; that is, 19 days' requirements would take approximately 23-24 days to deliver.

(c) ~~(S)~~ Other OPLANS or associated OPLANS under consideration for execution were either implemented without a formal JTB allocation or were not implemented prior to ENDEX. In some cases, an allocation or prioritization from the JTB was needed. An example of this was the deployment order associated with USCINCEUR [REDACTED] (5 tactical fighter squadrons (TFS) for MEDSLOC protection). It contained no air priority or air allocation. As a result, several days after C-day for [REDACTED] no deployment in support of the plan had occurred because all airlift was committed. USCINCEUR had no airlift allocation. This example illustrated that hard decisions concerning how to support deployment requirements in a multiple OPLAN scenario were not undertaken or were late in being made. The lack of strategic prioritization was also evident.

(3) (U) Strategies and Prioritization

(a) ~~(S)~~ As set forth above, the exercise started with a 68 and 22 percent lift allocation to COMRDJTF and CINCPAC respectively. As the threat increased in Korea and in the Pacific and the threat remained somewhat the same in Southeast Asia (SWA), the initial allocation was no longer acceptable to CINCPAC. The problem that arose was the J-3 and J-4 planners and decisionmakers did not work out an impact analysis or prepare a decision briefing for the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would outline courses of action and recommend a reallocation of lift. Consequently, the

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STARTEX strategic mobility allocation decision remained unchanged throughout most of the exercise. There was no explicit strategic prioritization between support of COMRDTF and CINCPAC, even after war was declared in Korea and after the USSR entry into Iran. The absence of a formal JCS strategy and theater prioritization precluded many OJCS Logistics Directorate preemptive actions concerning critical lift and resource allocation. The lack of strategic guidance and delays in decisionmaking seriously hampered necessary JTB allocation decisions. Well into the exercise, the JTB Secretary presented a decision briefing to the OpsDepts to request such a prioritization. The OpsDepts declined to make a decision because they believed they had been presented insufficient information to determine the impact of revised airlift allocations upon either commander's combat capability. The same decision brief was provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The guidance received from the CJCS in response addressed how to refine airlift requirements by focusing on each commander's essential needs, that is, prosecuting the Korean War with air power and preparing to engage the USSR in Iran through force build-up. When aggregated requirements clearly exceeded the capability for timely support, a priority decision needs to be made. Strategic prioritization allows the JTB to allocate airlift within a given framework. Formal prioritization decisions between theaters should be made in the planning process. For example, when a decision is made to dispatch a Warning Order to a supported commander when other supported commanders already exist or are about to be announced, the Warning Order should include the theater and JTF alignments in priority order for logistic support and force allocation. The TOAs cannot provide deployment estimates without guidance on how much lift will be made available to support a contemplated deployment operation. Deployment estimates are needed by decisionmakers in selecting a preferred course of action.

(b) (c) Insufficient guidance concerning prioritization also existed at the unified and specified command level. In a multiple plan scenario, little flexibility exists to meet OPLAN add-on or non-TPFDD requirements. The movement of [REDACTED] in support of CINCPAC [REDACTED] was an example of such a move. When the decision is made to honor such a request for additive supplies (or forces), the requesting commander should be required to set a support priority. The supported commander should specify a required delivery

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date so that JDA can insert the new requirement into the OPLAN flow in accordance with its desires.

(4) (U) Deployment System Data Base, Use, and Management

(a) ~~(C)~~ The JDS Remote Users Packages (RUP), operational at 10 WWMCCS sites, greatly improved the timeliness and accuracy of the JDS data base. The JDC experienced periodic, but infrequent, problems arising from lack of data base synchronization and software defects. Some RUP associated problems existed between the CINCLANT RUP and JDA. Records were intermittently lost and had to be reentered, and the message "update accepted" was received but the information was not applied to the data base. JDA JDS analysts worked the problems during the exercise and identified most causes. In other cases, the JDS RUP network seemed not to update user data bases as frequently as desired. Confusion existed between PACOM and JDA as to whose data base was current. They exchanged teleconference messages on several occasions to resolve the problems.

(b) ~~(C)~~ Exercise PROUD SABER 83 again demonstrated that MSC lacks necessary ADP system support. Headquarters, MSC is the only MSC activity that is able to interact with JDS using WIN. The absence of WIN access at MSC area commands severely affects MSC's execution planning and response capabilities. The deficiency impacts on Headquarters, MSC and subordinate area commands' ability to provide timely and reliable deployment estimates. The absence of an automated scheduling capability necessitates labor-intensive, non-automated analyses. This shortcoming degrades severely MSC's capability to provide decisionmakers responsive deployment estimates and supportability determinations.

(c) ~~(C)~~ JDA monitored the JDS data base and identified in advance many data base discrepancies that would have had an adverse affect on flow scheduling. JDA determined the data base discrepancies by conducting a TOA pre-edit that identified Force Requirement Numbers (FRNs) which, unless corrected, would not be scheduled for movement. JDA then sent a discrepancy message to the JDC that described the missing or erroneous information. The messages requested that providing organizations review the discrepancies and make corrections to the JDS data base either on-line or by OPREP-1 message. Examples of typical discrepancies contained in the discrepancy notices were missing


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or invalid UICs, missing passenger or cargo information, and missing or invalid PODs or POEs. During the exercise, while JDA apparently monitored the data base in a thorough manner and reported discrepancies with sufficient lead time, the supported and supporting commands did not correct many of the identified discrepancies in a timely manner. Confusion among supported, supporting, and component commands as to who was responsible for correcting the data may have contributed to the slow response. Additionally, unfamiliarity with JDS procedures among some players, as well as occasional WIN slowdowns, may have contributed to the untimely resolution of discrepancies.


(d) ~~(c)~~ JDA experienced numerous instances wherein they could not pass or receive JDS data rapidly. The problem was prevalent whenever JDA hosted the deployment teleconference. Whenever JDA passed the responsibility to host the teleconference to another organization such as the ANMCC, JDA was able to pass and receive JDS data more rapidly. This indicated that the JDA computer was becoming saturated and a considerable amount of its capacity was being used to support the deployment teleconference.

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[REDACTED]

(i) ~~(c)~~ The JDS edit of movement requirements rejects all force movements not containing a UIC. Naval Reserve units are not registered in UNITREP with a UIC. This prevents Naval Reserve unit movement requirements from being automatically validated for TOA scheduling. This problem first arose in Exercise PROUD SPIRIT 80 and again in Exercises POLL STATION 81 and POTENT PUNCH 81. The problem was made Remedial Action Project (RAP) No. 135. The RAP Working Group closed RAP 135 on 10 June 1982 as the JDS had been modified to allow a user to enter into the data base UICs that were not current in the UNITREP file. The solution requires Chief of Naval Reserves (CHNAVRES) to validate manually each Naval Reserve unit's Reserve Unit Identification Code (RUIC) by the CHNAVRES WWMCCS terminal. During Exercise PROUD SABER 83, CHNAVRES encountered problems in accomplishing this manual routine because of the number of units needing validation, equipment limitations, entry time per unit, and down time at local WWMCCS sites. CHNAVRES, therefore, found it necessary to seek relief from this cumbersome and time-consuming procedure by requesting that JDA validate many Naval Reserve units. JDA did so on the basis that it was a one-time exception to normal procedures.

(5) (U) Movement Scheduling

(a) ~~(c)~~ JDA and MAC were unable to process and provide airflow schedules in accordance with existing procedures and time constraints. The criteria for movement notification by the JDS scheduling message is 72 hours. Generally, throughout the exercise, movement scheduling ran 24-48 hours behind. OJCS operational planning deficiencies and hardware and software failures at JDA and MAC impeded the timely production and dissemination of airlift schedule information to deploying units. First, on several occasions, the Joint Staff established C-day/L-hour for executed OPLANS with insufficient lead time to provide the desired notification time. Second, JDA discovered that the communications lines linking its H6000 computer with the AUTODIN were inoperative. JDA then activated a back-up system consisting of a tape that was hand carried to the AUTODIN facility. The tape would not

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interface with the AUTODIN. JDA resorted to transmitting the information by using punched cards. Lastly, MAC compounded and widened the problem. MAC reported on several occasions that the scheduled flow for a particular day would be forthcoming in a matter of hours, yet sometimes a day or more would pass before MAC would transmit the flow to JDA. On another occasion, MAC passed flow data to JDA and subsequently notified JDA that the data were invalid; JDA had already distributed the scheduling information. Elements that contributed to MAC's difficulties were hardware downtime, software deficiencies, and incorrect or improper data input to Flow Generator (FLOGEN), among others. The delay by MAC and JDA in issuing airflow schedules impeded the timely issuance of alert orders by Service component commands to subordinate commands to complete unit preparations for movement. The delays also jeopardized subordinate units meeting scheduled departure dates.

(b) ~~(C)~~ The JDA-produced automatic scheduling messages caused difficulties at several message centers. Initially, many of the scheduling messages contained the same date time group (DTG), the same time of file (TOF), did not contain breaks in format line 13, and included invalid plain language address symbols (PLAS). Further, many of the messages did not include declassification instructions. Messages with the same DTG and TOF caused confusion for numerous staffs when referencing the messages and increased the staff's work load by requiring service as a suspected duplicate. Messages with invalid PLAS, no break at Line 13, and lacking downgrade instructions necessitated manual processing. When JDA analysts became aware of the problems, they modified programs temporarily to eliminate duplicate DTGs and TOFs and to provide declassification instructions. The invalid PLAS and break problems involved complex programs that could not be corrected quickly during the exercise. JDA analysts intended to correct these and the other associated problems on a permanent basis subsequent to the exercise.

(c) 

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MAC reported that a deployment oriented execution system incorporating both hardware and software was under design.

(d) ~~(c)~~ When JDS is operating, the Master Force List (MFL) is being constantly updated until MAC pulls the list about four days prior to execution. Frequently, during the exercise, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not allocate critical units until after MAC had scheduled unit moves for the particular day involved, JDA had sent scheduling messages, and presumably units had moved. When an OPLAN has been ordered executed and a C-day/L-hour established, units in that plan will begin to deploy. To withhold or add units to that deployment requires JCS decisions five days prior to a unit's proposed scheduled deployment. A "no decision" or late decision is in fact a decision to deploy a unit as specified in the OPLAN. During Exercise PROUD SABER 83, JCS decisions about I-HAWK battalions and E-3As were made late and would have required redeployment of those forces from one overseas location to another, misusing substantial numbers of critical airlift sorties.

(6) (U) Movement Reporting and Status

(a) ~~(c)~~ The JDS relies presently on a system of exception reporting concerning the movement status of units and materiel. In the case of MAC, this means that if no deviation report is received concerning an FRN, it is assumed to have departed POE or arrived at POD within two hours of the scheduled time. Exception reporting created some difficulties during the

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exercise. The absence of positive reporting of the movement of units and cargo (FRNs and CINs) in the JDS denies the supported commander in-transit visibility of the actual deployment flow. Some commanders felt constrained because they believed they did not have the visibility they needed to divert forces and cargo to fit the developing situation in the joint operations area (JOA).

(b) 

(c) ~~(c)~~ MAC functions using a management philosophy of centralized planning and decentralized execution. That philosophy translates at HQ MAC into HQ MAC producing, through its Integrated Military Airlift Planning System (IMAPS), a workable general flight schedule. That schedule provides the scheduling of specific FRN and CINs to move from point X to point Y during a specific time frame. It does not provide what squadron will actually fly the mission in what specific aircraft (tail number). Neither does IMAPS provide for whether the actual mission departed or arrived as scheduled. Specific scheduling information and data and actual movement data pertaining to personnel and cargo are provided at the numbered Air Force, wing, or squadron levels. The information is available, however, to HQ MAC, through MAC's Military Air Integrated Reporting System (MAIRS). MAC does not report the actual movements. The JDA and some commanders were convinced of the need for a positive reporting system; MAC was not.

(d) ~~(d)~~ Exercise PROUD SABER 83 identified another issue that was similar to the positive reporting issue. This other issue concerned the questionable validity of the information that was being briefed or disseminated about the status of deployments. Table II-1 contains data concerning the divergent reported status of air deployments for COMRDJTF

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~~SECRET~~TABLE II-1. (U) REPORTED AIR DEPLOYMENT STATUSES  
FOR COMRDJTF [REDACTED]

DATE (1)	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	1	2	3	4
ORGANIZATION	CATEGORY - PASSENGERS										
JDA	2663	3907	6412	8584	10206	12607	15389	17570	22112	29823	34076
+/-	-1611	-3813	-2781	-3692	-3589	-3698	-3515	-2371	-2433	+1357	+1631
RDJTF	3670	6041	8181	10172	12592	15389	18379	22265	29987	34542	35721
+/-	-3864	-2925	-3820	-3445	-3444	-3515	-2619	-2146	+1665	+2221	+433
MAC	4120	8654	9333	11897	13577	16376	23334	29776	36294	40862	40566
+/-	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
OJCS( )	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	16144	(3)	(3)	32703	36208	39608	(3)
+/-	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
ORGANIZATION	CATEGORY - CARGO (SHORT TONS)										
JDA	4591	7805	12807	18520	23264	28370	32523	36791	40308	44548	48531
+/-	-82	-2842	-1077	+36	+868	-101	+100	+304	-1536	-4802	-3647
RDJTF	7631	12584	18155	22245	28351	32523	37453	40544	44848	48498	50228
+/-	-2945	-1280	-251	-72	+423	-100	-3235	-1740	-4656	-3834	-4866
MAC	8347	13663	20375	26541	29797	34204	45378	49820	53276	57185	52765
+/-	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)
OJCS( )	(3)	(3)	(3)	(3)	16305	(3)	(3)	33521	34690	38349	(3)
+/-	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)	(2)

- (1) AS OF TIME FOR DATES ARE JDA-1200Z, RDJTF-2400Z,  
MAC-2400Z, AND OJCS-2400Z.  
(2) OVER/SHORT OF REQUIREMENTS DATA NOT AVAILABLE  
(3) DATA NOT AVAILABLE  
\* DATA INVALID DUE TO FLOGEN ERRORS

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
[REDACTED] during Exercise PROUD SABER 83. JDA's data were briefed daily at the USREDCOM/JDA command brief. RDTJF's data were briefed at the daily RDJTF command brief. MAC's data were presented at the daily MAC command brief and reported in MAC's daily SITREP. The OJCS data were presented in briefings for the OpsDepts and the CJCS. The data from three of the organizations (RDJTF, MAC, and OJCS) were reported to be as of the same instant in time; that is, 2400Z of the given day. The data presented for JDA was reported to be as of 1200Z of the given day. Examination of the data reveals major differences in the reported status of air deployments for supposedly the same or nearly the same instant in time. Table II-1 shows that on 25 October the information at the JDA was that 2,663 passengers had been scheduled. The RDJTF showed 3,670 passengers had been scheduled. MAC reported 4,120 passengers had been scheduled. In the cases wherein data was presented concerning requirements versus what had been scheduled, the data reveals that there was no agreement concerning the numbers of PAX and tons of cargo that were supposed to have been scheduled. Table II-1 also shows that on 25 October, the information at JDA was that an additional 1,611 passengers should have been scheduled or the flow was behind requirements by that number. At the RDJTF, however, the information indicated an additional 3,864 passengers should have been scheduled or the flow was behind requirements by that number. Summing to obtain total requirements produces a requirement of total passengers to be scheduled of 4,274 at the JDA and 7,534 at RDJTF. The differences show serious questions regarding who or what organization really knew what the requirements were and what the scheduled or actual deployments were. It also raises the points as to whether there should be an official spokesman for the JDC for data presentation and should there be a specific time established for reporting deployment status.

(e) (c)

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(7) (U) Deployment Movement Shortfalls

(a) ~~(C)~~ When MAC flows a plan for a particular day, they "shortfall" certain requirements. Generally, shortfalls result from:

1. (U) Requirements which are not on a good MAC channel, that is the POE/POD is not at a location into or out of which MAC is generally flying in support of the plan being executed
2. (U) The load (PAX/cargo) does not meet minimum aircraft load criteria
3. (U) There are not enough aircraft
4. (U) FLOGEN rejects the mission because the aircraft fuel load is too low to allow the mission to be scheduled by FLOGEN.

(b) ~~(C)~~ MAC reports shortfalls to JDA. Upon receipt of the shortfall information from MAC, JDA coordinates appropriate changes of POE and POD with the providing organization and supported commander, respectively. The EAD-LAD window is adjusted as well, if necessary, to enter the requirement back into the flow at a later date. During Exercise PROUD SABER 83, JDA was able to resolve and reschedule the vast majority of identified shortfalls. A problem with the current procedures for resolving identified shortfalls is that it almost always requires slippage of the EAD-LAD windows for the shortfalled requirements. This is because they are identified during MAC's flowing process, and MAC will not generally reflow the same C-day again. JDA is planning to write an edit program which will identify potential shortfalls prior to MAC pulling the data, much in the same way that data base discrepancies are identified using the TOA edit. An edit routine of that nature should provide responsible organizations the information they need to make appropriate changes to POEs and PODs prior to MAC pull of the data, thereby substantially increasing the probability that the identified requirements will move as originally intended.

(c) ~~(C)~~ MAC can prevent shortfalls for fuel reason by using shorter mission legs in FLOGEN. Unfortunately, when MAC does not, the shortfall appears on the shortfall report as other shortfalls do and JDA attempts to resolve them. Procedures need to be

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implemented to identify and resolve pseudo shortfalls caused by automated programs or the parameters within the programs that are under user control.

(8) (U) Deployment (Closure) Estimates

(a) ~~(c)~~ The JDA and TOAs encountered significant problems in developing deployment estimates (formerly closure estimates). The Joint Chiefs of Staff issued CINCPAC a Warning Order (232900Z Oct) that required JDA to coordinate and submit TOA closure estimates by 262000Z October. JDA issued (251330Z Oct) coordinating instructions concerning that Warning Order and requested the TOAs provide closure estimates to JDA by 261800Z October. CINCPAC provided courses of action (COA) in a Commander's Estimate (260341Z Oct), but failed to provide the information needed for the TOAs to produce a deployment estimate for each course of action proposed. One TOA (MTMC 262245Z Oct) responded with a deployment estimate for all of CINCPAC [REDACTED] rather than for each course of action proposed in CINCPAC's Commander's Estimate. MAC's estimate arrived at the JDA along with CINCPAC's Commander's Estimate. Instead of providing a closure estimate for each COA, MAC provided a single estimate for CINCPAC [REDACTED]. JDA contacted MAC and told MAC DAT personnel to provide an estimate for each COA. MAC personnel responded that they could not as there was insufficient information. They had not attempted to obtain the needed data direct from the supported commander as provided for in JOPS IV and the JDS procedures manuals. Another TOA responded (MSC 272140Z Oct) late using data from a source not identified. The JDA, in collaboration with MAC and MSC, initiated a request (270147Z Oct) to CINCPAC to provide more definitive data concerning movement requirements than were provided in CINCPAC's Commander's Estimate. Specifically, JDA requested force sizing data for each unit to include mode, PAX, and cargo, broken down into bulk, oversize, outsize, and total in short tons for air movement and in measurement tons for surface movements. JDA pointed out that unless data as requested could be provided, accurate TOA closure estimates were not feasible. When CINCPAC received JDA's request, CINCPAC tasked its components to provide the information. They did, but considerably (days) after the suspense date for JDA to respond to OJCS.

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(c) (8) In other exercise exchanges relating to closure estimates, MSC revealed (312052Z Oct) that it had had serious difficulty in developing estimates for several reasons; however, a primary reason related to forecasting cargo availabilities. Initially movement tables developed during deliberate planning had been used for ship positioning. As movement requirements were adjusted by force allocation changes, ship requirement forecasting had to be done using the JDS data base. MSC found that even using the JDS data base, ship forecast requirements far exceeded "actual" exercise requirements based on cargo offerings and bookings against sealift resources. Because MSC had only daily 5 day forecasts of "actual" exercise cargo offerings under these conditions (MTMC R-5 reports), MSC found it nearly impossible to predict MSC's capability to support JCS proposed courses of action; i.e., JDS projected requirements excess to available shipping versus available shipping in excess of "actual" exercise bookings and requirements. MSC requested MTMC assistance to more accurately establish "actual"

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exercise shipping requirements. MSC requested MTMC provide a daily recurring updated 60 day forecast of cargo offerings to be made through the Military Export Cargo Offering and Booking Offices (MECOBO) for movement on common-user shipping. MSC recommended the report provide forecasts of cargo offerings by SPOE and by available to load date (ALD) at the SPOE. As an alternate to SPOE, MSC suggested a daily forecast by ALD on the US East Coast, Gulf Coast, and West Coast and major overseas locations; e.g., Hawaii, Japan, and Northern Europe, as minimum needs. MTMC was unable to provide MSC the data requested because MTMC does not receive shipping requirements 60 days in advance. The time frame for submission of routing requests is 144 hours (6 days) prior to departure date for rail moves and 96 hours (4 days) prior to departure date for motor. The transit time for even long moves is seldom over 6 days. This means the actual requirements data available to MTMC is usually for less than 12 days and most often only for 5 to 7 days. MTMC reported that when the requirements are received, they are used to update the JDS. To meet planning requirements, MTMC has developed an MDQ query which provides a summary report based on JDS actual and programmed data. It shows "rolled up" requirements by day, by POE, based on available to load at POE, or scheduled to load at POE. This query program is in an early developmental stage. Even though this would not provide the information rapidly nor in the desired form, MTMC offered to provide the program and appropriate training to MSC action officers and suggested that if the program proved useful, that MTMC and MSC could work together to optimize the program for both commands.

(d) ~~let~~ In another case, MAC provided deployment estimates for CINCPAC [REDACTED]. The estimate specified 172 days to move the requirements of the first 19 days of the OPLAN. The estimate was made erroneously against a requirement to move 27,651 short tons of outsize cargo. In reality, the requirement approximated 4,000 short tons.

(e) ~~let~~ The above discussion indicates a need to familiarize much of the JDC with existing guidance and the definition, informational requirements, development, and submission of deployment estimates. Moreover, the guidance and procedures contained in Annex C, JOPS IV are too general and vague. As a consequence, closure estimates submitted during the

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exercise were incomplete, inadequate, and untimely. During earlier exercises similar problems arose, and deployment estimates were made the subject of RAP 262. During the last RAP update, the OPR recommended that RAP 262 be closed, and subsequently, it has been closed.

(9) (U) Strategic Lift

(a) (U) Airlift

1. (U) An additional source of strategic airlift for the deployments was obtained by augmenting the MAC lift with aircraft from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) and the Wartime Air Service Program (WASP). MAC operates a fleet of approximately 350 long-range C-5 and C-141 military aircraft. Additional airlift capability is available in the MAC-operated extended-range C-130 aircraft of which there are about 270. CRAF consists of aircraft that commercial carriers have agreed to provide to DOD to meet contingency operations. The actual number and type of aircraft in the CRAF vary on a monthly basis. Generally, the commercial carriers have committed approximately 350 commercial aircraft to CRAF that may be activated in three stages. CINCMAC has authority to activate Stage I involving 50 aircraft. CINCMAC activated Stage I on 23 September as a prior to exercise event. The Secretary of Defense has authority to activate CRAF Stage II which involves approximately 50 additional aircraft. The Secretary of Defense authorized the activation of CRAF Stage II on 11 October as a preexercise event. The President may authorize the activation of CRAF Stage III following the declaration of a national emergency. CRAF Stage III involves approximately 250 additional aircraft. Prior to STARTEX, the President authorized the activation of CRAF Stage III effective 240001Z October.

2. (U) WASP consists of commercial aircraft not assigned to CRAF. WASP may be used only after CRAF Stage III has been activated. On a case by case basis, MAC, through the Joint Chiefs of Staff can request the Department of Transportation (DOT) to authorize the use of WASP assets. On several occasions during the exercise, MAC requested use of WASP assets. Formalized procedures for requesting and monitoring WASP aircraft did not exist

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and had to be developed during the exercise. OJCS, MAC, and DOT cooperation ensured resolution of the procedural deficiencies and emphasized the need for timely and accurate communications.

3. (U) Figure II-2 sets forth by day the reported number and category of aircraft committed to Exercise PROUD SABER 83 operation. The increase of C-130s on 31 October and their decline on 1 November can not be explained except perhaps to faulty reporting. The increases in C-5, C-141, and C-130 assets subsequent to 1 November are attributable to reduced number of aircraft in maintenance, aircraft removed from the training pool, and activated Guard and Reserve assets.

4. ~~(S)~~ MAC can obtain supplemental airlift capability through the charter of foreign flag carriers. The US has a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Republic of Korea for the use of Korea Air Line (KAL) aircraft for support to a Korean contingency. While the MOA has been signed, implementing instructions for the MOA are not fully staffed. As the situation deteriorated throughout the world, planners examined the possibility of implementing the Korean MOA. Some confusion existed because the implementation instructions are not fully developed and because KAL owns only 2 aircraft. No evidence was found that KAL flew missions under the MOA in support of CINCPAC [REDACTED] or CINCCFC [REDACTED]

5. ~~(S)~~ As airlift were fully committed to OPLANS, MAC, along with JDA, initiated an investigation to determine if it was feasible to activate Braniff Airlines to augment the airlift capability. Planners initially estimated that Braniff aircraft could be brought out of mothball status in 27 days. This estimate was revised to 5 days based on maximum efforts being applied. The Air Force did not pursue this course of action as the Braniff aircraft were not included in JSCP. MAC's position was that additional aircraft at that time would not solve the existing shortfall problem.

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


Figure II-2. (U) Aircraft Available for Use During Exercise PROUD SABER 83

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6. (U) When it appeared that cargo requirements would exceed airlift capability, MAC and the JDC initiated a program for converting CRAF PAX aircraft to cargo aircraft using 26 M-1 conversion kits.

7. (S) MAC responded to queries concerning implementation of multiple OPLANS. MAC reported that should COMRDTF [REDACTED] CINCPAC [REDACTED] and CINCLANT [REDACTED] be implemented simultaneously, all available military and CRAF airlift assets would be required. Moreover, MAC reported that substantial WASP augmentation would be needed to meet the requirements of CINCLANT [REDACTED]. Further, MAC reported that should simultaneous execution of the above OPLANS occur with the execution of CINCAD [REDACTED] USCINCEUR [REDACTED] CINCLANT [REDACTED] and USCINCRD [REDACTED] many additional aircraft would be needed. MAC estimated the additional aircraft requirement to be about 50 C-5s, 219 C-141s, 144 C-17s, 80 CRAF cargo wide-bodies, 57 CRAF cargo narrow-bodies, 169 CRAF passenger wide-bodies, and 7 CRAF passenger narrow-bodies.

8. (S) MAC reported that insufficient material handling equipment (MHE) impeded airlift operations. There was insufficient 463L equipment (nets, pallets, forklifts, etc.) to implement all OPLANS simultaneously. MAC noted that MHE shortfalls would limit wide body cargo aircraft to certain major APOEs and would increase the cargo onload and offload workload, require more transportation personnel, and generally increase ground times. This in turn would slow down the flow and extend closure times.

9. (S) Major theater OPLANS typically use 80-90 percent of the US airlift capability. This type planning assumes a threat in a single theater. In a multiple theater threat environment, when airlift requirements exceed airlift availability, planners and decisionmakers must establish priorities and allocate lift resources to competing plans. During Exercise PROUD SABER 83, airlift allocations were difficult to obtain and often did not occur until MAC made a recommendation. In the case of the deployment order for USCINCEUR [REDACTED] the Joint Staff provided no allocation. As a consequence, MAC and JDA were unable

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to plan, schedule, and execute the associated deployments because there were no unallocated aircraft. The Joint Staff made an allocation for [REDACTED] some 48 hours after the deployment order was issued. The message was not addressed to MAC. Some 24 hours later, MAC still had no airlift for [REDACTED] and at ENDEX no movements had occurred in support of USCINCEUR [REDACTED]

10. (S) The UTE rates used during this exercise were generally artificially high. For the first few days, MAC ran CRAF aircraft at a UTE rate above that provided for in JSCP. JSCP provides for a CRAF UTE rate of 10.0 hours per day per aircraft throughout a contingency. No surge rate exists. The UTE rates for 27-29 October are documented at 12.0 for several types of CRAF aircraft. Documentation is unavailable to substantiate the CRAF UTE rates for 25-26 October. Indications are that rates for some types of CRAF aircraft may have been as high as 14.0. While these rates were higher than the JSCP rates, FEMA reported (300602Z Oct) that a main concern of commercial carriers was the possibility of running out of crew time using the 10.0 hour rate. Several carriers stated that crew hours would be used up within the next 15 days at a rate of 10.0 hours per day per aircraft. The carriers recommended that UTE rates be reduced below 10.0 hours on flight segments with less than 70 percent priority traffic load factors. Determining an acceptable UTE rate is a problem area that may have to be dealt with in the future.

11. (S) Planners for execution planning and scheduling need a method for allocation of ramp space at onload, offload, and enroute facilities to preclude saturation by multiple command, multiple service use. For example, [REDACTED]

(b) (U) Sealift

1. (U) MSC augmented the MSC controlled fleet with shipping obtained through voluntary charter and tanker agreements, the SRP, the RRF, the National

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Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), and by requisitioning. The MSC controlled fleet consists of approximately 86 US Navy and 60 contract commercial ships including 28 scientific support ships which are not used to support contingency operations. Should a contingency require additional sealift, MSC's initial option is to solicit voluntary charters from commercial shippers. Such charter arrangements typically account for the bulk of MSC's tanker capability. The RRF is composed of approximately 25 NDRF ships. The Maritime Administration (MARAD) is responsible for maintaining RRF ships in sufficient readiness so that a given ship can become operational within five to ten days following RRF activation. The NDRF is composed of approximately 180 World War II vintage ships assigned to and maintained by MARAD. Current guidance presumes that NDRF ships can become operational within 60 days after the decision to activate. The SRP is a stand-by contractual arrangement. Basically, commercial operators have committed a percentage of their ships to the SRP. The President also has the authority to requisition US registered vessels and those US-owned ships registered under foreign flags called the Effective US Controlled (EUSC) fleet.

2. ~~(c)~~ Figure II-3 shows by day the number of ships committed to Exercise PROUD SABER 83 operations. As time passed, more ships would have been committed, but not enough to meet requirements of the OPLANs and deployment orders implemented. Scripted events prior to STARTEX involved the initiation of voluntary charter, RRF, and SRP sealift programs (19-22 Oct). MARAD and the Navy activated the NDRF upon receipt of authority to requisition ships contained in the Presidential proclamation of National Emergency promulgated on 23 October. At ENDEX, no NDRF ships were included in the ships committed to the exercise. NDRF ships were projected not to be available until about 1 February 1983, but delays in that date were expected due to insufficient shipyard capacity and the material condition of the NDRF ships.



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


Figure II-3. (U) Number of Ships Committed to Exercise PROUD SABER 83 Operations

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4. (C) In the execution of COMRDJTF and CINCPAC MSC was required to lift 25 million barrels of POL. In addition, support for a 60 day period of the unified and specified commands required nine million barrels of POL. At STARTEX, three million barrels were enroute or scheduled to be lifted and three million barrels were lifted to resupply stocks that were used to effect early closures. The entire lift for sixty days totalled 40 million barrels. The total lift was comprised of approximately 200 cargoes that required 110 point-to-point tankers under ideal circumstances. In addition, seven other tankers were needed, four tankers for NTPF support and three for the Iceland shuttle. The same rules used to determine vessel requirements in peacetime fleet sizing were applied to sizing the exercise fleet. These rules included predicting lost time during a voyage. The rules have proven highly accurate over many years of usage. The lost time factor increased the fleet requirements from 110 to 140 tankers. This means that 147 tankers were required to meet the POL shipping requirements if no chokepoint closures occurred. With a Suez Canal closure, the tanker requirement rose to 167 to maintain required POL delivery rates to SWA. The increased SLOC distance also drove an additional requirement for 18 handy-sized tanker equivalents supporting the movement around Africa. Further analysis revealed

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that if the Arabian Gulf fuel source was denied, the requirement for tankers would have exceeded 210. The tankers available to MSC were calculated as: US Flag - 77, MSC Fleet - 16, EUSC - 38, for a total of 131. These figures were based on JSCP Annex J FY 83. The projected tanker shortage was between 16 and 79 depending upon the scenario. In order to meet the immediate tanker requirement, MSC used foreign flag tankers. By C+12, 15 foreign flag tankers were in play. More foreign tankers would have been in use had the exercise continued.


5. ~~(S)~~ The lack of exercise play of dry cargo resupply resulted in an artificially low depiction of actual lift requirements. This is an important factor in evaluating strategic lift capability to sustain the forces. Even without resupply, insufficient dry cargo ships would have been available at the right time and place to satisfy the initial lift requirement required by deployment of forces to Iceland in addition to the deployments required by [REDACTED] MSC planners estimated that actual resupply would have resulted in a shortfall of cargo ships at approximately C+10 of the exercise and a shortfall of lift of up to one million tons of cargo could have existed by C+60. The inability of the US to provide sufficient sealift to support multiple OPLAN execution is evident in the dwindling numbers of US militarily useful hulls. A recent analysis by MSC has shown the consistently downward trend of the status of US dry cargo hulls over the past 29 years. Figure II-4 depicts the trend. The number of useful hulls is 36 percent of what it was in 1967 and 18 percent of what it was in 1953.

6. ~~(S)~~ COMRDJTF [REDACTED] play highlighted a shortage of shallow draft ships for use in the JOA. The scenario required shallow draft tankers and cargo ships for intra-theater lift between points in the Persian Gulf and for shuttling from larger host ships to shore discharge points. The scenario did not reach the point where significant numbers of shallow draft tankers and cargo ships were required in Korea; however, had it reached that point, the shortage would have been exacerbated. An alternative to shallow draft ships is tugs and barges, but they must be pre-positioned or repositioned during warning time. No barges

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Figure II-4. (U) US Dry Cargo Ship Resources Over Time

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were identified as available in or near the JOA during the exercise. Another alternative, although inefficient, is to use less-than-full loading to decrease the draft of shuttle ships.

7. (U) Deployment preparation and deployment orders (JCS 301415Z Oct and JCS 021343Z Nov respectively) for USCINCSO [REDACTED] were addressed to MAC and contained airlift guidance. Neither was addressed to MSC nor did they include sealift guidance. A sealift requirement existed. JCS planners must insure the inclusion of sealift requirements in deployment deliberations. Moreover, they should insure that deployment orders are addressed to MSC and that they contain appropriate sealift allocation and prioritization guidance.

8. ~~(C)~~ By ENDEX, MSC projected that over 100 merchant ships would be under direct MSC control in support of the exercise. The exercise reemphasized that no system currently exists to provide secure communications with these merchant ships in a rapid and timely manner. The slow and cumbersome off-line one time pad (OTP) system now in existence is not satisfactory for large scale use. Thus, MSC could not communicate critical instructions in a timely manner to non-convoyed ships in a wartime environment.

9. ~~(S)~~ The exercise demonstrated under-utilization of the US flag fleet container ships. Many of the 80 to 90 fast, large commercial US flag container ships were available for service under MSC control from C-day onward, but none were used. As an example, despite a critical shortage of shipping assets, non-self-sustaining SL-7s sat idle awaiting containerized cargo. Two primary influencing factors for non-use of container ships are the low percentage of unit equipment that can be containerized and the time required to supplement or establish a container handling capability in-theater. The trend of the US merchant marine to use container systems is irreversible. The JDC must plan to make better use of these sealift assets. Additionally, consideration should be given to expediting SL-7 conversion to roll-on/roll-off capability to support early OPLAN unit equipment movements by fast sealift.

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10. ~~(S)~~ Fleet support in crises or contingencies will require mobile logistic support force (MLSF) assets not currently on hand. In major contingencies, the naval MLSF must be augmented with large numbers of merchant ships specifically modified for their support missions. Only 13 US merchant ships are equipped for astern refueling and there are no astern refueling rigs in PWRS for additional ships. The two break-bulk ships required to support carrier battle groups could not be modified with underway replenishment delivery systems (sliding padeyes) and Merchant Ship Naval Augmentation Program (MSNAP) equipment until December 1982.

11. ~~(S)~~ The use of passenger ships is not provided for in OPLANs. During this exercise, unified and specified commands used passenger ships for Limited Medical Care Afloat Facilities (LCAF), noncombatant evacuation, and troop movement. If more or larger OPLANs were implemented, the requirements for support of this type might increase correspondingly. This would dictate heavy dependence on foreign flag assets due to the fact that there are only two US flag commercial passenger liners in service.

12. (U) An LCAF program was tested during the exercise using the British Falkland Island experience as a model. Except for the medical staff, the LCAF ships are manned and controlled by MSC. The LCAF program took into account the theater commander's evacuation policy for wounded personnel and provided a limited area facility for personnel who could reasonably be expected to return to duty in a few days. The LCAF acquisition, outfitting, and utilization was enthusiastically and realistically played and indicated the feasibility and worth of an LCAF program.

13. ~~(S)~~ Exercise events illustrated the need for efficient use of limited shipyard capacity. In a full mobilization, multiple OPLAN scenario, shipyards would have had to deal with reserve ship activations, conversion of merchant ships to naval auxiliaries, and the activation of laid-up commercial ships. During the same time, the shipyards also would have had to attempt to meet Navy combat shipbuilding, repair, and conversion requirements. With time, some expansion of the

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peacetime yard work capacity could be expected. With the rapid ship activation scenario played in this exercise, activation of the Office of the Coordinator of Repair and Conversion (OCRC) to prioritize competing critical requirements for yard work should have occurred. It did not. MSC estimated that the ship activations in the first 10 days of the exercise could not have been accomplished at the rate simulated in the exercise.

14. ~~let~~ Significant shortfalls in qualified US civilian merchant mariners and shipyard manpower would have occurred in a mobilization of the magnitude projected in Exercise PROUD SABER 83. Projected activations of the RRF, NDRF, and commercially laid-up ships in addition to work associated with combatant ship preparations would have required crew and support personnel requirements in excess of available or readily mobilized manpower. MSC and the military services would also have been competing with private industry and commercial shipyards for the available manpower resources. Although the total numbers of mariners required might be available, potential shortages in specific ratings or skills are likely to be a matter of concern. An early decision may be required to accelerate the output of maritime academies and union schools in order to obtain the manpower needed to crew the shipping and to satisfy the requirements of the shipyards in a multiple OPLAN environment.

15. (U) Another alleged manpower problem related to continued expansion of the MSC tanker fleet resulted when the use of foreign flag shipping was used for that expansion. The unwillingness of seamen of foreign flag vessels to participate in wartime operations on behalf of the United States was of concern to MSC. MARAD did not share MSC's concern in this matter.

(c) (U) Intra-CONUS Lift

1. (U) Analyses conducted by the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) revealed that when each plan under consideration was viewed in isolation, each plan was transportation feasible. Further, as single plans, sufficient modal operational capability existed to move the passengers, units,

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and materials from origin to the APOE/SPOEs. When MTMC analysts viewed the candidate plans for simultaneous implementation, their analyses indicated that all candidate plans were transportation feasible. Their analyses also indicated that when the candidate OPLANs were projected for simultaneous execution, there was sufficient modal operational capability to move known requirements.

2. ~~(S)~~ MTMC did experience some serious difficulties in determining transportation requirements. JCS Pub 6 does not require all DOD movement requirements to be reported. Examples are training ammunition, fuels for mobilization, IPP material, strategic materials, and plant equipment packages. Movement of this type material competes with other mobilization and deployment movement requirements for depot outload and use of feeder lines, aircraft, rail cars, trucks, roads, and waterways. Exercise PROUD SABER 83 demonstrated that such information is necessary. Without it, MTMC transportation planners were unable to determine the total intra-CONUS movement requirements during mobilization and deployment.

3. ~~(S)~~ MTMC also experienced some difficulties concerning movements of Unit Basic Load (UBL) and resupply. The problems pertained to the fact that the OPLAN movement tables for COMRDJTF [REDACTED] called for shipment of UBL and resupply ammunition on or shortly after C-day. Some did not move as scheduled.

a. (U) Some surface UBL did not arrive at the port of embarkation to meet deploying units. As a consequence, the 158th Inf Bn deployed from its SPOE without its basic load. Further, MAC was scheduled to move over 4300 short tons of ammunition shortly after C-day. MAC flew sorties in accordance with the OPLAN without actually having the ammunition on hand. These events showed that supply actions in support of early moving units and initial deployments must be completed prior to C-day, or C-day must be set sufficiently forward upon execution to permit the supply events to interface appropriately with deployment events.

b. (U) In another related situation, ammunition ships were placed on berth at Concord Naval

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Ammunition Depot or scheduled into other ammunition ports based on movement tables to load surface resupply. Due to the use of incorrect document identifier codes, the resupply requisitions were rejected by the automated requisition processing system. Requisitions were reprocessed as soon as this problem was corrected. Ammunition was seven days late to port and would have arrived in the area of operation up to one week late (depending on sailing time).

(10) (U) Deployments Prior to Execution

(a) ~~let~~ Delays by the Joint Staff in responding to a CINCPAC request to deploy a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB) to the Aleutians prior to execution of CINCPAC [REDACTED] resulted in a lost opportunity to deploy the MAB as an approved pre-conflict measure. Another prior-to-OPLAN execution measure that was missed was the movement of the Near Term Pre-positioned Force (NTPF) that is associated with COMRDJTF [REDACTED]. The loss of both of the pre-conflict measures resulted in intensified lift requirements when the OPLANs were subsequently implemented. In the case of missed COMRDJTF [REDACTED] pre-conflict measure, the result was F-111 munitions had to be airlifted from one beddown location to another because the NTPF was not in position on C-day. JSCP places a great deal of emphasis on pre-conflict measures and the Exercise PROUD SABER 83 scenario provided sufficient warning time to initiate those measures. Both cases were logical moves that could have been initiated without difficulty well in advance of C-day for their respective plans, but were not. The fact that they were not may have been the result of exercise artificialities. For example, C-day for COMRDJTF [REDACTED] was E-day, so any pre-conflict decision would have been a preexercise decision and there were no major players participating.

[REDACTED]


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(11) (U) E3A Aircraft

(a) ~~(S)~~ E-3A assets in a multiple OPLAN environment quickly became a major deployment and allocation issue. At STARTEX, there were 28 E-3A aircraft available and they were allocated as shown in Table II-2.

(b) ~~(S)~~ As the world situation worsened and as forces deployed, commanders of unified and specified commands requested their predetermined allocation of E-3A aircraft or what they believed was needed to support their operations. For example, NORAD reported that the 11 E-3As allocated to NORAD were insufficient for NORAD's wartime requirements. NORAD reported (301602Z Oct) its minimum requirement for survivable command and control as 19 E-3As. RDJTF reported (300932Z Oct) its requirement for sustained coverage as 9 AWACs. The requirements of these two commands alone depleted the entire inventory of E-3As. Other unified and specified commands also had AWACs requirements. This required early senior-level decisions concerning the allocation of these assets. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reallocated on 2 November making use of the Boeing test aircraft and a new production aircraft that became available on 31 October. Table II-3 shows the E3A allocation as of 2 November.

(c) ~~(S)~~ The new allocation did not satisfy requirements of the unified and specified commands, but according to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (041640Z Nov),

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TABLE II-2. (U) STARTEX ALLOCATION OF E3A AIRCRAFT

USCINCEUR	9	COMRDJTF	0
CINCLANT	2	USCINCRED	0
CINCPAC	4	Boeing Test	1
CINCNORAD	11	Depot Maintenance	<u>1</u>
		Inventory	28

TABLE II-3. (U) E3A ALLOCATION AS OF 2 NOVEMBER 1982

USCINCEUR	5	COMRDJTF	7
CINCLANT	2	USCINCRED	0
CINCPAC	5	Boeing Test	0
CINCNORAD	9	Depot Maintenance	<u>1</u>
		Inventory	29

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it provided the best use of the limited resources given the existing threat.

(12) (U) Coordination and Events Prior to STARTEX

(a) (U) The EXPLAN required the establishment on 1 October of an exercise UNITREP data base. Updating the UNITREP data base occurred in two phases. The first phase was to begin 2 October and end on 24 October. During Phase I, the data base was to be updated as the volume of transactions dictated. In Phase II, 25 October through ENDEX, updates were to occur as required.

(b) (U) Discrepancies in unit locations between FORSCOM's DEMSTAT and the JDS data base caused considerable problems. The basic problem was that DEMSTAT and the FORSCOM UNITREP had been updated during Phase I and indicated that the REFORGER units were deployed to Europe while the JDS data base indicated that REFORGER units assigned to the COMRDJTF [REDACTED] (183 PS) TPFDD were in CONUS. This conflict was due to FORSCOM participation in the Army MOBEX prior to STARTEX. Prior to STARTEX, JDA requested FORSCOM to provide OPREP updates to the JDS data base. FORSCOM did not do this. Close to STARTEX (24 Oct), FORSCOM informed JDA that it had several thousand transactions to pass to JDS. But by that time it was too late to pass the data for inclusion in the STARTEX TPFDD because in order to meet the 72 hour lead time requirement for notification, JDA had to pass the 183 PS TPFDD data to MAC some 5 days prior to STARTEX.

(c) ~~(S)~~ The side effects of the above were many of the problems associated with the disposition and movements of Air Defense Artillery (ADA) units and the 5th and 7th Special Forces Group during the exercise. The EXPLAN showed initially that the 5th SFG was in Europe for STARTEX as part of REFORGER. Prior to the beginning of Exercise PROUD SABER 83, to develop the JDS data base, units which were multiple tasked were identified. Using an order of priority established by the JCS, the Services were required to identify substitute units. The Army substituted two battalions of the 7th SFG for two battalions of the 5th SFG deployed to Europe for REFORGER. The 5th SFG is Europe-Southwest Asia oriented, whereas, the 7th SFG is PACOM oriented. Another disconnected preexercise event concerning the 5th SFG was that change 4 to the

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EXPLAN (JCS 192031Z Oct) substituted the 10 SFG for the 5th SFG in Europe, so that for exercise purposes at STARTEX, the EXPLAN showed that the 5th SFG was in CONUS and the 10th SFG was in Europe as part of REFORGER. Based on the need to deploy at the earliest strategic warning, the unconventional warfare (UW) forces were tasked to start moving. Because the 5th/7th SFG substitution issue had not been resolved, the COMRDJTF deployment order (202300Z Oct) advised USCINCRD to hold the 7th SFG in place. At the same time, through the JDS, the TOAs were tasked to begin force movement, and the TOAs moved the 7th SFG to SWA. Therein began numerous actions involving in excess of 30 messages and numerous briefing and memoranda at the headquarters of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Army, COMRDJTF, USCINCRD, USCINCEUR, CINCPAC, JDA, and CINCMAC, all of which attempted to solve or contribute to the solution of the location and deployment of the 5th and 7th SFGs. None of the actions included or even mentioned the 10 SFG. The Joint Chiefs of Staff solved the problem (040436Z Nov) by dictating that the moves for the 5th and 7th SFGs were to be simulated as having been completed and that the two groups had closed on SWA and PACOM, respectively.

(d) (U) Once an exercise has commenced, simulated deployment actions attained by fiat tend to defeat a major purpose of the mobility portion of an exercise. The significant impact on strategy caused by limited airlift assets cannot be fully recognized if competing airlift demands are "assumed away." Further, the entire 5th/7th SFG issue tended to undermine the RDJTF's confidence in the JDS data base and seemed to rush RDJTF personnel into an unnecessary manual drill concerning the affected units. In the 5th/7th SFG case, the entire problem had by 4 November consumed many hours, involved considerable research, and was close to reaching settlement. Failure to allow it to continue denied the JDC an opportunity to deal with unprogramed and unplanned events.

d. (U) Findings

(1) (U) General. The JDS was more effective and was used more extensively by the JDC in Exercise PROUD SABER 83 than in any previous exercise.

(2) (U) The Joint Transportation Board. The JTB and JTB Secretariat were active before STARTEX and during the exercise. They developed "what if" situations, attempted to allocate airlift, and sought development of guidance

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pertaining to strategy and prioritization. Their efforts had limited success.

(3) ~~(S)~~ Strategy and Prioritization. Exercise play demonstrated deficiencies in the Joint Staff efforts to address strategic and prioritization issues pertaining to crises involving a multiple OPLAN, multiple theater scenario.

(4) (U) Deployment System-Data Base, Use, and Management

(a) (U) The JDS experienced some synchronization problems with 10 RUPs which were operational during the exercise.

(b) (U) MSC lacks ADP system support.

(c) (U) The JDC did not correct identified data base discrepancies in a timely manner.

(d) (U) Whenever the deployment teleconference was hosted by the JDA, JDA was unable to send and receive JDS data as rapidly as when the teleconference was hosted by an organization other than JDA.

(e) (U) The use of exercise plan identification numbers was confusing to many players.

(f) (U) Some players displayed a lack of confidence in JDS.

(g) (U) Non-commonality of deployment data base elements caused manual manipulation of data to meet the requirements of other systems users.

(h) (U) All JDS on-line users had access to the JDS data base. All could change the data base, correctly or erroneously, without the changes being verified by JDA. Additionally, JDA could not trace data base change transactions back to their origin.

(i) (U) Validation of Naval Reserve unit movement requirements for TOA scheduling remained a problem during Exercise PROUD SABER 83.

(5) (U) Movement Scheduling

(a) (U) Flow scheduling did not provide the desired 72 hours movement notification.

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(b) (U) The JDA produced automatic scheduling messages caused difficulty in handling and servicing at several message centers.

(c) (U) MAC's FLOGEN III has serious limiting deficiencies.

(d) (U) Some JCS decisions to add to or to withhold forces from deployment flow were made after JDA and MAC had scheduled and published the deployment flow.

(6) (U) Movement Reporting and Status

(a) (U) The JDC depended on a system of exception reporting for tracking FRN and CIN departures from POEs and arrivals at PODs.

(b) (U) There were major differences in the information reported as the status of air deployments.

(c) (U) Some members of the JDC used inappropriate deployment factors and unrealistic assumptions.

(7) (U) Deployment Movement Shortfalls. Airlift shortfalls were reported to JDA for resolution, but frequently the resolution of the shortfalls required slippage of the EAD/LAD windows for some FRNs and CINs.

(8) ~~(S)~~ Deployment (Closure) Estimates. Deployment estimates were incomplete, inadequate, and untimely.

(9) (U) Strategic Lift

(a) ~~(S)~~ There was insufficient immediately available MAC and CRAF airlift to support nearly simultaneous multiple theater, multiple OPLAN airlift requirements.

(b) (U) Formal procedures for requesting and monitoring WASP aircraft did not exist at STARTEX.

(c) ~~(S)~~ A shortage of MHE impacted adversely on MAC's ability to execute multiple OPLANS simultaneously.

(d) (U) During much of Exercise PROUD SABER 83, the UTE rates used by MAC were artificially high for both military and civilian aircraft. The rates used for CRAF aircraft in some cases were higher than those established in JSCP. FEMA expressed concern regarding running out of crew time on CRAF aircraft at the JSCP established UTE rates.

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~~SECRET~~(e) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

(f) ~~(S)~~ There was insufficient immediately available sealift to support nearly simultaneous, multiple theater, multiple OPLAN sealift requirements. Moreover, there has been a serious downward trend in the number of ships available to the US over the last 29 years.

(g) ~~(S)~~ MSC lacked the capability to communicate in a secure mode with most commercial merchant ships.

(h) ~~(S)~~ There was concern that specific ship crew and support personnel requirements may exceed the available and readily mobilized manpower assets in a multiple plan, full mobilization environment.

(i) ~~(S)~~ A shortage of shallow draft ships existed, particularly tankers.

(j) ~~(S)~~ During the exercise, the JDC under-used the US flag fleet capability to move containerized cargo.

(k) (U) SL-7 vessels were not used to support early OPLAN movements.

(l) ~~(S)~~ Fleet support in crises and contingencies required augmentation by a large number of commercial ships specifically modified for fleet support. Only 13 merchant ships were equipped for astern refueling and 2 breakbulk ships required modification before they could be used for fleet support missions.

(m) (U) RDJTF, PACOM, and MSC examined the concept of LCAF during the exercise.

(n) (U) At the time of Exercise PROUD SABER 83, there were only two US flag commercial liners in service.

(o) (U) Shipyards would have had to deal with staggering workloads to meet the demands for ship activations in the Exercise PROUD SABER 83 multiple OPLAN, full mobilization scenario.

(p) (U) Sufficient intra-CONUS modal transportation was available to meet known transportation requirements.

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(q) (U) The transportation requirements and demands on depot outloading; feeder lines; and air, rail, highway, and waterway assets were incomplete.

(r) (U) Some UBL and resupply failed to arrive at the APOE/SPOEs as scheduled.

(10) (U) Deployments Prior to Execution

(a) ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not authorize the early implementation of pre-conflict measures in conjunction with Exercise PROUD SABER 83.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Confusion existed as to how to obtain SAAM support for movement of units and material that were pre-execution moves or NOPLAN execution moves.

(11) ~~(S)~~ E-3A Aircraft. There were insufficient E-3A aircraft to meet the needs of the unified and specified commands in the multiple theater, multiple threat environment.

(12) (U) Coordination Prior to STARTEX. There was evidence of a lack of coordination prior to exercise.

e. (U) Conclusions

(1) ~~(S)~~ Strategies and Prioritization. The JDC was unable to support the timely deployment of forces in the multiple theater, multiple OPLAN crisis environment in part because of a lack of strategic guidance and prioritization.

(2) (U) Deployment System-Data Base, Use, and Management

(a) (U) The RUP software packages had greatly enhanced the JDC's ability to maintain a near-real-time data base; however, synchronization problems interfered with the effectiveness of the RUP network.

(b) (U) MSC was unable to respond rapidly to deployment planning analyses and requirements because it lacks adequate ADP system support capabilities.

(c) (U) Unfamiliarity with procedures and failure to react promptly to the JDA data base discrepancy messages were contributing factors to the untimely resolution of data base discrepancies.

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(d) (U) Hosting the deployment teleconference on the JDA computer impeded JDA's ability to process JDS data expeditiously.

(e) (U) Non-commonality in system data bases created duplicate reporting, caused manual manipulation of deployment information, and precluded automated interfaces.

(f) (U) The integrity of the JDS data base was threatened by JDA's inability to review and authenticate changes to the data base and to trace changes back to their origin.

(g) (U) The recently established procedures for validating Naval Reserve units for TOA scheduling were too cumbersome and time consuming for efficient operations during the projected crisis situation.

(3) (U) Movement Scheduling

(a) ~~(S)~~ (U) The JDC did not receive air flow schedules in accordance with existing procedures and constraints because of message processing software difficulties at JDA and FLOGEN III software deficiencies at MAC.

(b) (U) Late decisions to add or withhold units from the deployment flow impacted adversely on the efficient utilization of airlift resources and effective management of transportation resources.

(c) (U) The late delivery of air schedules jeopardized the ability of units to meet their departure dates on schedule.

(4) (U) Movement Reporting and Status. The lack of a positive reporting system reduced the commander's visibility of the status of assigned forces and restricted his flexibility. Additionally, it contributed to the JDC's inability to present consistent reports of the status of deployments.

(5) (U) Deployment Movement Shortfalls. Movement shortfalls that resulted in slippage of EAD/LAD windows of FRNs and CINs disrupted plans for the ordered deployment and arrival of units and material.

(6) ~~(S)~~ (U) Deployment (Closure) Estimates. Deployment estimates were incomplete, inadequate, and untimely because

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existing guidance and procedures concerning deployment estimating are too general and vague.

(7) (U) Strategic Lift

(a) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

(b) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

(c) [REDACTED]

(d) (U) The need to develop procedures during the exercise for requesting and monitoring WASP aircraft was inefficient and may have delayed obtainment of WASP aircraft to meet requirements.

(e) ~~(S)~~ Exercise events surfaced the possibility that the JSCP established UTE rates for CRAF aircraft may be too high.

(f) ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED]

(g) ~~(S)~~ MSC's inability to communicate with merchant ships in a secure mode restricted MSC's ability to command, control, and communicate with ships under its control during OPLAN implementation.

(h) ~~(S)~~ Shortages of readily available trained personnel in specific ratings and skills impeded the fitting-out and crewing of activated and requisitioned shipping in the multiple OPLAN environment.

(i) ~~(S)~~ The lack of shallow draft ships for shuttling POL and cargo from large ships to shore affected adversely the US's ability to support operations logistically.

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(j) (U) Failure to take advantage of the US flag fleet's containership capability to move cargo was inefficient and unproductive.

(k) (U) Fleet support in crisis situations could have been augmented more quickly if additional commercial tankers modified for astern refueling and breakbulk ships modified with Naval Augmentation Program equipment were available.

(l) (U) Competing military and civilian ship renovation demands and the condition of the NDRF precluded activation of the NDRF ships within the 60 days established in the NDRF program.

(m) (U) Exercise PROUD SABER 83 indicated the feasibility of LCAF.

(n) (U) The lack of US flag passenger ships had an adverse impact on the development of a workable and practicable LCAF program.

(o) (U) Determination and analyses of the total intra-conus movement requirements in support of mobilization and deployment were incomplete because not all movement requirements are identified in the Joint Reporting System (JRS).

(p) (U) Some UBL and resupply requirements failed to arrive at the APOEs and SPOEs as scheduled because insufficient time existed to accomplish administrative supply tasks or because of errors committed in the accomplishment of supply functions.

(q) (U) Use of inappropriate planning factors and unrealistic assumptions by some JDC members impacted adversely on exercise results.

(8) (U) Deployments Prior to Execution

(a) (U) The Joint Staff could have reduced post C-day strategic lift problems by insuring that planned pre-conflict measures were initiated early.

(b) ~~(C)~~ The confusion that existed concerning obtaining SAAM airlift for pre-OPLAN execution moves or non-OPLAN moves during crisis situations would have delayed the closure of some forces.

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(9) ~~(S)~~ E-3A Aircraft. Until there is a sufficient inventory of special duty aircraft, senior JCS decisionmakers will be required to make early decisions concerning the allocation of these scarce resources.

(10) (U) Coordination Prior to STARTEX. Exercise play and results could have been improved if greater preexercise coordination had occurred concerning the interface of Exercise PROUD SABER 83 and MOBEX 83.

f. (U) Recommendations

(1) ~~(S)~~ Strategies and Priorities

a. ~~(S)~~ The Director, Joint Staff, should consider developing policies and procedures for dealing with theater strategies and priorities for forces deploying in a multiple threat, multiple theater environment.

b. ~~(S)~~ The Director, Joint Staff, should consider modifying the formats of Warning, Alert, Execute, and Deployment Orders as contained in JOPS Volume IV (CAS) to provide in each case for the allocation of airlift and sealift and an explicit statement of OPLAN priority. (A Recommended RAP)

(2) (U) Deployment System-Data Base, Use, and Management

(a) (U) The Director, JDA, in coordination with the members of the JDC, should continue to identify RUP software related deficiencies and take the necessary action to correct the shortcomings, to include more frequent updates of user data bases. Also, the Director, JDA, should consider expediting the installation of RUPs throughout the deployment community.

(b) (U) The Director, Joint Staff, should consider stressing the importance of the timely correction of the JDS data base in all future exercises and in JDC training.

(c) (U) The Director, Joint Staff, should consider reopening RAP 135 with the intent to develop a more efficient and if possible automated procedure for validating Naval Reserve movement requirements.

(d) (U) In a multiple OPLAN situation, the Director, JDA, should consider requesting that the deployment teleconference be hosted on a computer other than JDA's.

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(e) (U) The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commander, MSC should consider initiating action to obtain an adequate JDS ADP system support capability for MSC and its subordinate area commands.

(f) (U) The Director, Joint Staff, should consider initiating action to increase commonality in JCS and Service unique data bases that are used in OPLAN development and execution, particularly those data bases having deployment implications. (A Recommended RAP)

(g) (U) The Director, JDA, should consider incorporating into the JDS ADP software appropriate controls that would permit the JDA to audit, edit, and trace all data transactions. (A Recommended RAP)

(3) (U) Movement Scheduling

(a) (U) The Director, JDA, in coordination with CINCMAC, should consider examining JDS procedures, policies, and tools with an aim to providing, on a consistent basis, adequate and timely notification of air schedules. Specifically, the procedures should provide at least 72 hours of notice to deploying units.

(b) (U) The Director, JDA and CINCMAC should consider revising JDS scheduling procedures to make them more responsive to users in quick and late decision situations. (A Recommended RAP)

(4) (U) Movement Status and Reporting. The Director, Joint Staff, should consider investigating the need for and the requirements of a positive departures and arrivals reporting system for the JDS.

(5) (U) Deployment (Closure) Estimating. The Director, Joint Staff, should consider reopening RAP 262 and developing and disseminating improved guidance and procedures pertaining to deployment estimates. (A Recommended RAP)

(6) (U) Strategic Lift

(a) (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider requesting that the Department of Transportation coordinate with CINCMAC and develop, at the earliest possible date, formal procedures and implementing instructions needed to request and monitor WASP and foreign charter aircraft. (A Recommended RAP)

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(b) ~~(C)~~ The Chief of Staff, US Air Force, should consider a review of allocation of ramp space for MAC, SAC, TAC, and other Service use at constrained recovery bases during crisis situations.

(c) ~~(C)~~ The Director, Joint Staff, should consider reviewing and investigating the JSCP-established UTE rates for CRAF aircraft with the purpose of validating the established rates or adjusting them accordingly for surge and sustained operations.

(d) (U) The Director, Joint Staff; the Director, JDA; and CINCMAC should consider establishing or further defining the conditions, guidance, and procedures for obtaining SAAM lift during crisis situations.

(e) ~~(C)~~ The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Transportation, and the Chief of Naval Operations should consider examining the lack of secure communications between MSC and the merchant fleet that would be under MSC's control during OPLAN implementation to determine its impact and to recommend ways to reduce adverse impacts. (A Recommended RAP)

(f) (U) The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Transportation in coordination with the Administrator, MARAD, and the Chief of Naval Operations should consider appropriate action to stop the serious downward trend of ships available for deployment. Additionally, they should consider action to reduce the time necessary to obtain ships from the NDRF.

(g) ~~(C)~~ The Commander, MSC, should consider maintaining a listing of commercial barges or shallow draft ships available in the appropriate JOAs and being prepared to use the less-than-full ship loading method to provide shuttle capability. Additionally, MSC deployment planners should consider pre-positioning of barge assets early during a period of rising tensions.

(h) (U) The Director, JDA, should consider stressing containerization of unit equipment and cargo, particularly for follow-on or late deploying units and resupply.

(i) (U) The Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Naval Operations should consider reassessing the SL-7 modification program to expedite SL-7 conversion to roll-on/roll-off capability. (A Recommended RAP)

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(j) (U) The Director, Joint Staff, should consider changing JCS Pub 6 to require the reporting of all known intra-CONUS movement requirements. (A Recommended RAP)

(k) (U) The Director, Joint Staff; the Services; and supported and supporting commanders should consider stressing the importance of the correct and timely accomplishment of the supply related events associated with deployments. The Director, Joint Staff, should also consider insuring sufficient lead time is provided between announcement of C-day and C-day in OPLANs and crisis events to permit supply functions to occur in an orderly and timely manner.

(7) (U) Deployments Prior to Execution. The Director, Joint Staff, should consider insisting that Joint Staff and command planners and decisionmakers pay particular attention to planned pre-conflict measures of all OPLANs under consideration for implementation.

(8) ~~(S)~~ E-3A Aircraft. The Secretary of Defense; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Chief of Staff, US Air Force should consider obtaining or expediting the obtainment of additional special aircraft such as E-3As.

(9) (U) Coordination Prior to STARTEX. The Director, Joint Staff, should consider insuring that the JDC has agreed to CPX planning factors and assumptions prior to STARTEX for future exercises. The factors used should be consistent with existing published guidance and planning factors. In addition, the JDC should conduct intensive and extensive preexercise coordination in all cases where more than one exercise is occurring simultaneously.

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## SECTION III

## (U) INDUSTRIAL SURGE AND MOBILIZATION

1. (U) Major Objective. Evaluate the effectiveness of available plans and procedures to manage industrial mobilization requirements to include surge of the industrial base.

2. (U) Synopsis

a. ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff published a 6-month pre-exercise scenario designed to surge the industrial base starting in April 1982. During this phase, the Secretary of Defense approved the surge of industrial production in response to numerous requests for security assistance from friendly nations around the world.

b. ~~(S)~~ The exercise results showed that the 6-month surge of selected items would not yield significant improvement in production or the readiness state of US Forces. In fact, if security assistance requirements were to be satisfied from existing materiel assets during the 6-month period, the current US Forces capabilities would be further degraded.

c. (U) The expanded participation of OSD and civil agencies added realism to the exercise and provided considerable improvement in the level of inter-agency and inter-departmental play compared to previous exercises.

d. (U) Major problem areas addressed in this section are:

(1) ~~(S)~~ The lack of system production interdependency visibility within DOD

(2) ~~(S)~~ The need for additional information on industrial base limitations

(3) ~~(S)~~ The lack of an adequate management information system and data base of industrial production resources

(4) ~~(S)~~ The need for a more responsive budget and funding system to support industrial surge and mobilization activities

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- (5) ~~(C)~~ The requirements for improved identification and understanding of emergency authorities
- (6) ~~(C)~~ The need for clarification and evaluation of report data, terms, and procedures used in industrial preparedness planning
- (7) ~~(C)~~ The need for planning authority to consider support that can be provided by foreign producers in a crisis situation.

3. (U) System Description. Tab C to Appendix 1 to Annex G to the COSIN to JCS EXPLAN 0022 contains the description of procedures involved in the Industrial Preparedness Planning Program (IPPP), and in the accomplishment of activities related to the surge and mobilization of the industrial base. The system activities and procedures were still in evolution prior to the exercise and were not uniformly adopted by all DOD components. The Air Force and Navy were in the process of revising their supporting regulations and directives. The Army published its revised Industrial Preparedness Program (AR 700-90) 15 March 1982.

4. (U) Analysis

a. (U) Exercise Considerations

- (1) (U) Exercise considerations for this analysis area appear in Paragraph 3 of the tab referenced in Paragraph 3 above.
- (2) (U) The full scope of industrial mobilization could not be examined in the two week duration of Exercise PROUD SABER 83. As part of the 6-month preexercise play, a partial analysis was conducted of industry's capability to surge selected critical items and to establish resource claimancy problems requiring resolution. The analysis was supplemented by inputs obtained from Army-sponsored on-site visits and discussions with 19 industrial producers that were supporting multiple Government contracts. Representatives of the other DOD components and FEMA participated in the on-site visits.
- (3) (U) Interaction with industry during the exercise was limited to consideration of the industrial producer inputs obtained in the on-site visits. There was some limited exchange of producer information obtained by the Defense Logistics Agency, and telephone contacts by the Army.

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Consequently, exercise participants viewed major industrial production problems solely from the Government's perspective.

(4) (U) Most of the activities in the industrial base surge prior to the exercise were scripted events, hence, a detailed evaluation of issues and processes involved during the industrial surge period could not be accomplished.

(5) (U) There was insufficient exercise time to complete industrial mobilization processing activities. These activities require weeks and months to come to a conclusion, and involve participation extending down through Service and Agency logistics organizations and contracting officials to the planned industrial producers.

b. (U) Specific Analysis Objectives

(1) (U) Identify inter-Service dependencies on the same industrial production sources. Evaluate the adequacy of plans and procedures for resolution of conflicting requirements.

(2) (U) Assess the responsiveness of the PPBS and POM system to accommodate funding requests for the selected industrial surge requirements.

(3) (U) Evaluate the effectiveness of the information flow between the principal DOD components during the surge and mobilization of the industrial base. Identify problem areas that were encountered and how promptly they were identified.

(4) (U) Determine what emergency legislative authorities were needed and how effectively they were processed.

(5) (U) Determine the adequacy of report data available to management for periodic assessment of Service's industrial base surge and mobilization plans. Identify and evaluate actions management took to monitor or direct activities during the industrial surge period; during the industrial mobilization period.

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c. (U) Discussion

(1) (U) Inter-Service Dependencies on Same Industrial Producers

(a) ~~(S)~~ Two or more Services may require end items which employ the same components. For example, increased demand for the common module detector used by the Army's night vision systems would affect production of Air Force and Navy attack aircraft and helicopters equipped with night vision devices. Table III-1 provides other examples of system inter-dependencies presented to the senior decisionmakers at the industrial preparedness information briefing. No trade-off analysis of surging one Service's systems at the expense of another Service's systems was conducted.

(b) ~~(S)~~ After M-day, participants identified other system inter-dependency issues. USAF (010730Z Nov), requested inputs for an Emergency Resources Board (ERB) meeting to discuss expanding jet engine production capabilities. The message advised AFSC that engine production problems were unknown to the USAF. Also unknown was the contractor's capability to produce other type engines if tasked to surge selected jet engines. COMNAVSEASYSOM (311931Z Oct), responded to a Marine request regarding production requirements for the Landing Vehicle Tractor Personnel (LVTP-7). The message advised that the subcontractor production schedule for a diesel engine model for the landing vehicle could only be achieved if the engine was allocated production priority over all other DOD requirements. Some of these other requirements were Army vehicle systems and Coast Guard utility boats. The JMPAB met on 4 November to resolve a resource claimancy issue between the Services regarding the limitations on missile production capability at Hughes Aircraft. The issue involved production of the AIM-7, AIM-9, PHOENIX, and TOW missiles. The JMPAB determined that the Navy should seek a second production source for the PHOENIX missile.

(c) ~~(S)~~ Exercise participants recognized the lack of an automated industrial resources data base for assessing the capabilities of industrial producers to react to changing mobilization conditions. This lack made it difficult to arrive at timely and rational decisions on system interdependency issues.

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TABLE III-1. (U) SYSTEM INTERDEPENDENCE

FACILITY	SCOPE OF WORK	SYSTEMS
HUGHES AIRCRAFT	FINAL ASSEMBLY	AMRAAM MISSILE PHOENIX MISSILE MAVERICK MISSILE TOW MISSILE WASP MISSILE
HERCULES ABL	PROPELLANT ELEMENTS FOR ROCKET MOTORS	SPARROW MISSILE SIDEWINDER MISSILE TOW MISSILE CHAPPARAL MISSILE
HUGHES ELECTRO OPTICS	OPTICS	A6 AIRCRAFT BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE AH1S HELICOPTER TRIDENT SUBMARINE M1 TANK M60A3 TANK GROUND LAUNCHED LASER DESIGNATOR
SANTA BARBARA RESEARCH	THERMAL IMAGING SYSTEM	AH1S HELICOPTER AH64 HELICOPTER M1 TANK M60A3 TANK

SOURCE: INFORMATION BRIEFING - INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS BRIEFING,  
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Further, there was no significant interaction with industrial producers. Hence, a primary source for identifying or obtaining feedback information on the scope and impacts of system interdependencies was not available.

(2) (U) Responsiveness of the PPBS and POM System to Funding Requests

(a) ~~(C)~~ Funding requirements during the industrial surge period were handled as scripted events, and therefore could not be evaluated.

(b) ~~(C)~~ The Secretary of Defense requested OMB approval (FEMA SITREP 271812Z Oct) to obligate FY 83 program funds under the continuing resolution (PL 97-276) authority. Obligation authority not to exceed 228.7 billion dollars was sought. OSD subsequently informed the Services and DLA (DA SITREP 300600Z Oct) that FY 83 apportion values were increased to approximately 80 percent of the annual funding program to fund emergency requirements pending enactment of a supplemental budget. Since the exercise started in the beginning of the fiscal year, it was possible to initiate budget program adjustments. In a similar world crisis that might occur in the latter part of the fiscal year major program adjustments would be difficult to accomplish.

(c) ~~(C)~~ At STARTEX, the OASD Comptroller (Memorandum 25 Oct) requested justification from all DOD components for the FY 83 budget amendment to be forwarded to Congress. The OSD Comptroller intended that the amendment highlight the top ten weapons systems needed for full mobilization. No procurement priorities or funding constraints were provided in the instructions. OASD(C) (Memorandum 1 Nov) forwarded the budget amendment to the Secretary of Defense for submission to OMB. Congress approved the FY 83 budget amendment (J4EXPM-147-82, 3 Nov), approximately 230 billion dollars, for the balance of the full mobilization program.

(d) ~~(C)~~ The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) (271500Z Oct) reported to OSD that resources expended to support the current situation were quickly consuming all available obligation authority. DLA requested authority to obligate funds at a deficient rate. DLA follow-up (021525Z Nov) requested status of the OSD reply. There was no information to indicate that any action was taken by OSD on the request.

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(e) ~~(S)~~ There were no supporting data to indicate that funding requirements were seriously considered for industrial surge or mobilization activities. Service requirements were still in the definition phase at time of the directed budget amendment action, and the budget inputs were not directly related.

(3) (U) Effectiveness of Management Information Flow  
Between Principal DOD Components

(a) ~~(S)~~ The Services and the Defense Logistics Agency individually managed their industrial mobilization requirements, including industrial surge. The OJCS monitored and reacted to requirements and requests of the Services and OSD. The JMPAB met on 4 November and addressed Service resource claimancy concerning missile production. The JMPAB also met on three occasions (22, 28 October and 1 November) to address revisions to the priorities of materiel items in the existing Master Urgency List (MUL).

(b) (U) The revised draft DOD Master Mobilization Plan (MMP), 1 June 1982 was issued at midpoint in the surge planning period. The MMP option paper on industrial production for acceleration (surge) and base expansion described only the framework for coordination of recommendations. The DOD MMP contained no specific plans or procedures for managing industrial production requirements. Two chapters (Guidance and Administrative Requirements, and Mobilization Planning Management System) proposed for the final issue of the DOD MMP were not available.

(c) ~~(S)~~ Procedural differences existed among the Services in the implementation of industrial preparedness programs; i.e., the use of the DD 1519 process, the Industrial Preparedness Program List (IPPL), and the Critical Items List (CIL). As a result, OSD requests for information on status of selected programs did not obtain complete responses from all the Services. AFSC (281930Z Oct) and AFLC (292320Z Oct), in response to OSD's request for data on mobilization rates of IPPL and MUL items, reported the requested data were unavailable. The messages stated that the data were being developed as part of the revised Air Force Industrial Preparedness Program. CHNAVMAT (012053Z Nov) also reported the unavailability of requested data for similar reasons. The recommendations in the Summary Report of the DOD Task Force to Improve Industrial Responsiveness, March 1982, were

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still in the review and staffing process. The report contains revisions required to existing outdated DOD directives, instructions and manuals.

(4) (U) Emergency Legislative Authorities

(a) ~~(S)~~ There was no concerted effort prior to the exercise to identify a comprehensive listing of standby legislation the President would be requested to invoke. There was a widespread misunderstanding of the authorities available or required in the Presidential and Congressional Declarations of National Emergency. Some of the necessary authorities were invoked by the President in his Declaration of National Emergency on 25 October. Other authorities necessary to achieve full mobilization became available as a result of the Congressional Declaration of National Emergency on 31 October. Authorities available by the Congressional Declaration were delegated on 1 November to the Secretary of Defense, who further delegated them on the same day to the Service Secretaries. There were no data available to indicate when, or if, the Services invoked the authorities made available to them.

(b) ~~(S)~~ OJCS (EXM-8-82, 25 Oct) provided the Services the authorities OSD had submitted to FEMA for inclusion in the Presidential Declaration of National Emergency. The memorandum requested the Services identify any additional authorities required to amend both the Presidential and the anticipated Congressional Declaration. Service responses did not identify any additional amendments.

(c) ~~(S)~~ FEMA (271940Z Oct) responded to a Secretary of Defense inquiry regarding relief from environmental standards that might constrain production priorities during mobilization. FEMA informed the Secretary of Defense that initial review indicated case-by-case permit waivers would be required. The waivers would have to be processed by the contractor through State and Federal EPA activities. Further, FEMA advised that the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts contained provisions for exemption where the national security would be jeopardized. FEMA and EPA, however, did not recommend issuing a blanket exemption at the time. The cited FEMA message also stated EPA would be prepared to consider requests for waivers. This could have involved extensive delays which would extend to defense production and operations.

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(d) ~~(C)~~ Use of authorities under the Defense Production Act (DPA) provisions was limited during the exercise. FEMA (300428Z Oct) approved an OSD request to establish an aircraft maintenance voluntary agreement to expedite aircraft maintenance programs. The Army found that a voluntary agreement under the DPA was necessary when it attempted to convene railroad representatives to discuss mobilization movement requirements. Railroad representatives declined to convene unless assured of immunity from any prosecution under the Federal Antitrust laws. The Emergency Resources Board (ERB) met on 3 November and addressed a Secretary of Defense request (261330Z Oct) for establishment of an aircraft jet engine voluntary agreement. The agreement was sought to discuss methods of improving jet engine production techniques and scheduling issues. FEMA (021744Z Nov) informed the Secretary of Defense that a guaranteed purchase program of titanium for mobilization production would be recommended to the President. This authority was under Title III of the DPA.

(5) (U) Adequacy and Availability of Report Data for Management Assessments

(a) ~~(C)~~ The varied player actions and the absence of an established management information system precluded detailed assessments of industrial surge and mobilization activities. OSD needed data from the Services and DLA and in many cases the data were incomplete or unavailable. Further, the absence of significant industrial producer actions precluded use of a major data source in the industrial surge and mobilization activities. Most data addressed information requests or procedures only for selected segments of the industrial preparedness planning program; e.g., voluntary agreements, critical materials, plant equipment packages, and master urgency list. Data obtained were largely viewed from a vertical perspective, rather than a horizontal view of its impact on other surge or mobilization requirements. An example was the DARCOM request (271400Z Oct) to FEMA and the OSD (012151Z Nov) concerning release of 1,500 short tons of aluminum from the National Defense Stockpile. This action emphasized problem areas and the need to review release procedures. It should have also created an impact assessment of other Service requirements for aluminum. The FEMA reply (032320Z Nov) reported that the release would leave less than 500 tons of aluminum in the stockpile for other

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defense and civil sector needs. There was no provision made for inter and intra Services considerations of available reporting data.

(b) ~~(S)~~ OSD requests for data did not consider use of the data already available in the reporting system; e.g., the required annual status report on Plant Equipment Packages (PEP) and the report of excess government-owned equipment regularly reported to the Defense Industrial Plant Equipment Center (DIPEC). In these cases, the Services sent data reported in previously submitted reports.

(c) ~~(S)~~ FEMA (270119Z Oct) experienced difficulty in obtaining updated DOD industrial production requirements for their analysis of impacts on the civil sector. The Secretary of Defense (010333Z Nov) informed FEMA that data furnished during the pre-exercise period were still relevant. The data furnished FEMA, however, were not directly related to DOD requirements that arose after STARTEX. Representatives of the Services, DLA, Joint Staff Logistics Directorate, and OSD met with FEMA during the industrial surge phase, and established an agreed-to format of required industrial production schedules for the selected exercise items. Services filled in their requirements and OSD provided FEMA the data shortly before STARTEX for use and analysis in the REX 82-BRAVO play.

(d) ~~(S)~~ MTMC was not informed of transportation required for the industrial producers. The transportation requirements to move plant equipment packages, IPP tool and test equipment, and critical materials, were not reported to MTMC by the Services and DLA. Intra-CONUS transportation movement requirements reflected in the INCONREP report do not require inclusion of these data.

(e) ~~(S)~~ The Logistics Directorate (EXPM 30-82, 27 Oct) requested USD (R&E) to contact the Department of State and determine the willingness of allies to permit utilization of their industrial capabilities. This memorandum responded to a CJCS query on possible use of foreign industrial production capability to fill critical US military shortages. An earlier evaluation by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) indicated a large industrial base available ranging from AIM-9L missiles produced in Germany to M-16 rifles manufactured in Korea. A follow-up OJCS memorandum,

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30 October to USD (R&E), requested selected items be obtained from specific countries. The memorandum also raised the question of how and to what degree Services should participate in acquisitions given the existence of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). This action identified an apparent lack of knowledge of allied industrial capabilities in crisis situations. It also raised the issue of JCS and Services participation in the foreign source decision process.

(f) ~~(e)~~ Exercise players recognized the need for identification and prioritization of scarce resources for allocation among claimant requirements at the unified command, Services, Defense Logistics Agency, and industrial producer levels. These requirements, specifically allied requirements to be supported from the US industrial base, were not known.

(6) (U) Master Urgency List

(a) ~~(e)~~ Amendment to the Master Urgency List (MUL), initiated by USDR&E during exercise play, raised questions among some players as to its utility in crisis situations.

(b) (U) The DOD MUL (DODI4410.3) includes the systems and materiel items of the highest national priority or the highest DOD urgency categories. The instruction applies to all acquisition and contractual activities within the United States and its territories and possessions. It provides the basis for assigning production resources according to program priority. The MUL includes a BRICK-BAT category which must be approved by the President and is assigned the highest defense order priority rating. The CUE-CAP, DRY-DAY, and ELK-EAR categories contain items that must be approved by the Secretary of Defense. They are assigned defense priority ratings in descending order of priority within each category. The categories DRY-DAY and ELK-EAR were available for use in emergency conditions. They were not used in the exercise because the CUE-CAP category was deemed sufficient. Additionally, the CUE-CAP category includes items which are not necessarily high priority requirements but are considered likely to experience production problems.

(c) (U) Revisions to the exercise MUL were addressed on three occasions. The Secretary of Defense (031945Z Nov) announced the exercise MUL which was based on

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Service inputs and the recommendations of the JMPAB. The exercise MUL contained over 120 systems and materiel items in the BRICK-BAT and CUE-CAP categories.

(d) ~~(S)~~ The CMO Production Management Committee questioned whether the MUL included critical spare parts items. The discussion indicated that some participants felt it did not provide for inclusion of spare parts. The JCS (301519Z Oct) responded to the Secretary of Defense message (292141Z Oct) to review the MUL submission from the viewpoint of including some critical spare parts. The Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that acquisition of spare parts should be counted as an integral part of the program for systems and items in the approved MUL. There appeared to be a difference of opinion on the subject. In a second action, the Production Management Committee (261400 Oct) determined the MUL was inapplicable to international procurement; i.e., co-production programs. Consequently it was inadequate when domestic and foreign manufacturing sources were considered.

(e) ~~(S)~~ The Secretary of Defense (251900Z Oct) requested the Services report the percentage of total Industrial Preparedness Planning List (IPPL) items and MUL items that would reach the full mobilization production rates. Production rates were requested for M+6 and for each month thereafter thru M+36. Army (Memorandum, 4 Nov) provided production data on the Army selected items thru M+12, and pointed out that projections beyond that point would be highly volatile and uncertain. The memorandum also informed that production schedules requested for all 2,000 plus Army IPPL items were beyond the exercise scope. Air Force and Navy could not provide the requested data. There was also apparent confusion among some players as to the relationship of the various item listings referred to in the exercise; i.e., the IPPL items, MUL items, and the CIL (critical items list) of the Services and the unified and specified commanders.

(7) (U) Highlights of On-Site Visits to Industrial Producers During Surge Period

(a) ~~(S)~~ The capability of industrial producers to surge multiple systems simultaneously existed but it was limited. There would be a minimal production rate increase even if a surge period of six months was

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available to industry prior to mobilization. Trade-offs between systems would be necessary.

(b) (U) Problems quickly develop as producers compete for the same resources, particularly at the subtier contractor and vendor level. Analysis showed that vendors would be overwhelmed. This necessitates highly controlled management of industrial resources to insure war essential items continue to be produced in accordance with established priorities.

(c) (U) Several contractors were aware that production supporting civilian projects would be required but they did not know the magnitude of requirements. Mobilization requirements for non-DOD material were not included in mobilization planning. Effective planning for the industrial base requires that defense and civil sector needs be addressed together.

d. (U) Findings

(1) (U) Inter-Service Dependencies on Same Producer

(a) ~~(S)~~ No quick and accurate method or system existed for evaluation of the capabilities of industrial producers to react to changing surge or mobilization conditions.

(b) ~~(S)~~ There was no organization at the OJCS or OSD level responsible for monitoring military system interdependencies and analyzing the trade-offs in systems during industrial surge. There was a lack of visibility of system interdependencies within the DOD planning system.

(c) ~~(S)~~ Industrial production problems occurred at the subtier contractor and vendor levels during a surge of the industrial base.

(2) (U) Responsiveness of PPBS and POM System

(a) ~~(S)~~ Funding actions during the industrial surge were scripted events and no analysis of problem areas that would have been identified in a real world situation could be accomplished.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Funding requirements associated with decisions made or taken after STARTEX were not adequately addressed.

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(c) ~~(S)~~ The present PPBS and POM provisions were not responsive to accommodation of funding requirements for industrial surge or industrial mobilization activities.

(3) (U) Effectiveness of Management Information Flow

(a) ~~(S)~~ Current plans and procedures for implementation and management of the DOD Industrial Preparedness Planning Program were not adequate. There were no formal integrated plans or procedures to effectively control and manage the surge and mobilization of the industrial base.

(b) ~~(S)~~ The compressed exercise period and the response demand placed on the players hampered the timeliness and quality of the information exchanged among the DOD components. This did not provide sufficient time for a thorough evaluation of industrial surge and mobilization issues.

(c) (U) There did not exist within DOD a uniformly implemented Industrial Preparedness Planning System.

(4) (U) Legislative Authorities. Emergency authorities were examined more extensively than in previous exercises. There was a lack of familiarity with and understanding of key standby authorities. The need for packaging authorities pertinent to various stages of a crisis was readily apparent.

(5) (U) Adequacy and Availability of Data for Management

(a) (U) The exercise did not provide for significant interaction with industry. Hence, the capability and limitations of industrial producers to respond to increased military requirements could not be fully assessed.

(b) (U) FEMA and the civil resource agencies needed a clearer expression of DOD military requirements in a standardized format.

(c) ~~(S)~~ DOD planning did not provide for possible use of foreign industrial production capability to fill critical US military shortages.

(d) (U) The INCONREP did not address intra-CONUS mobilization movement requirements for IPP material, strategic materials, plant equipment packages, and

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other requirements associated with industrial production.

(e) ~~(C)~~ The current DOD mobilization planning system does not provide for a consolidated prioritization process for the review of US and allied requirements to be supported from the US industrial base.

(6) (U) Master Urgency List (MUL). The Master Urgency List (MUL) criteria were not applicable with respect to international procurement, and therefore were not adequate when foreign manufacturing sources were considered.

e. (U) Conclusions

(1) (U) Competition for similar resources and the production interdependency of critical weapon systems requires early centralized management of the industrial surge efforts in crisis or contingency situations.

(2) (U) An automated industrial resources data base and a data management plan would enhance industrial preparedness planning and provide timely and requisite information to decisionmakers.

(3) ~~(C)~~ The planning process should include provisions for developing a timely supplemental DOD budget to support mobilization of the industrial base. Policy guidance regarding procurement priorities, funding, and development of budget planning documents for full mobilization was not adequate.

(4) ~~(C)~~ The DOD MMP should provide more detailed guidance and information on implementing procedures for acceleration (surge) and expansion of the industrial base.

(5) (U) There was a general lack of understanding of the importance and utility of DPA provisions for dealing with priorities and allocations, voluntary agreements, and incentives for expansion of production capacity.

(6) (U) A need exists for a compendium of packaged authorities specifically tailored to surge, partial mobilization, and full mobilization situations in the DOD Master Mobilization Plan.

(7) (U) The utility of MUL items and their relationship to Industrial Preparedness Planning List (IPPL) items and the Critical Items List (CIL) should be re-examined. The

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relationship should be more clearly expressed in pertinent DOD directives and instructions.

(8) (U) There were no established procedures or formats for advising FEMA and other Federal civil agencies of DOD industrial surge and mobilization requirements. Hence, consideration and integration of competing resource demands for defense and civil sector requirements could not be accomplished effectively.

(9) (U) There was a lack of defense planning for use of allied industrial capabilities. There was a need for more detailed information on allied capabilities to support US military requirements in crisis or contingency situations.

(10) (U) JCS Pub 6 did not require all DOD movement requirements to be reported. Guidance excluded IPP materials, strategic materials, plant equipment packages, and other requirements related to surge or expansion of the industrial production base.

f. (U) Recommendations

(1) ~~(C)~~ The Joints Chiefs of Staff should consider recommending to the Secretary of Defense that he:

(a) (U) Develop and maintain an automated data base and data management system that provides for the ability to examine the effects of competing systems demands. (A Recommended RAP)

(b) (U) Expedite staffing the recommendations contained in the Summary Report of the DOD Task Force to Improve Industrial Responsiveness.

(c) (U) Expedite publication of the DOD Master Mobilization Plan, specifically the chapters, Guidance and Administrative Requirements and the Mobilization Planning Management System.

(d) (U) In coordination with the Services, examine the utility of the Master Urgency List (MUL) prescribed in DODI 4410.3. The relation to other materiel item listings in use among the industrial preparedness planning community should be clarified.

(e) (U) In coordination with the Services, the Defense Logistics Agency, and FEMA, develop a set of procedures and formats whereby industrial surge and mobilization

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defense requirements can be made available to Federal civil agencies.

(f) (U) Ensure that US industrial preparedness planning activities are expanded to include consideration of foreign producer sources.

(g) (U) Address changes required to the current PPBS and POM System to accommodate funding provisions for industrial surge and mobilization activities.

(h) (U) In conjunction with FEMA, take the lead in seeking relief from existing laws and regulations that hinder and delay industrial mobilization activities.

(i) (U) Direct the Services, in conjunction with OSD (General Counsel), to develop a listing of waivers required to current statutory provisions to maximize industrial production capabilities during crisis situations.

(2) (U) The Director, Joint Staff should consider the following:

(a) (U) In coordination with USDR&E, address the implications of the Services system interdependency among the industrial producers, and the adequacy of the existing OJCS structure to identify and analyze trade-offs in systems when one must be surged at the expense of other systems. (A Recommended RAP)

(b) (U) Direct modification of that part of JCS Pub 6 dealing with INCONREP. Services and defense agencies should be required to report their intra-CONUS movement requirements for IPP materials, strategic materials, plant equipment packages, and other requirements in support of industrial surge and mobilization.

(3) (U) The Director for Operations, OJCS, in conjunction with OSD, OJCS, FEMA, and the Services, will examine ways to better test industrial surge activities and problem areas in future exercises.

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#### SECTION IV

#### (U) LOGISTICS

1. (U) Major Objective. Determine the adequacy of logistic plans, systems, and procedures to support the mobilization and initial deployment process.

2. (U) Synopsis

a. ~~(S)~~ The logistical portion of Exercise PROUD SABER 83 was the most ambitious ever undertaken in the JCS CPX program. The logistical implications of a multiple theater, multiple OPLAN, full mobilization and deployment exercise were, in themselves, staggering. The addition of an extensive 6-month preexercise industrial surge effort involving the DOD, FEMA, and other civil agencies (Section III) further stressed a logistical chain that exercise logistic play demonstrated would be unsupportable. The exercise designers anticipated that several logistic problems would quickly be identified and would require decisions by military and civilian leaders at all levels of Government. Many of these decisions would involve allocation of resources that were interrelated. The selection of a given course of action would impinge upon other courses of action selected later, or selected at different locations.

b. ~~(S)~~ Shortages of certain types of munitions; major end items; and air, land, and sea carriers necessitated allocation of resources based on some established system of priorities. Resources committed for one course of action were weighed against requirements for resources needed for a later course of action. When resources (such as airlift or freight cars) were committed to one course of action the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to be prepared to address the implications of this commitment on other courses of action being considered.

c. ~~(S)~~ The problem of the allocation (and in some cases reallocation) of limited resources among commanders to support various OPLANS was recognized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their message (020035Z Nov) to the Services and the unified and specified commands, subject: "Logistic Analysis of Multiple OPLANS." Although the items identified in the JCS message were items of ordnance, it was recognized

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by two of the respondents (CSA and USCINCEUR) that other items and type units should also be considered. In the JCS message an attempt was made to establish a system of priorities. In fact, two "systems", or scenarios, were proposed and respondents were asked to consider each case. This effort met with little success. The Army overlooked or ignored the two scenarios and indicated in their response (CSA message 030340Z Nov) "Before any redistribution can be executed, a decision by JCS on OPLAN priority must be accomplished." CNO and CMC responses showed neither specific requirements or assets required for RDJTF EXPLAN 183PS nor intentions for redistribution of assets to support cases I and II outlined in the JCS message. Thus the single major attempt made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to establish a priority basis for decisionmaking and resource allocation was made too late to be helpful and was not supported by the Services.

3. (U) System Description. The exercise logistic system is described in the Exercise PROUD SABER 83 System Description, Appendix 1 to Annex G to COSIN to JCS EXPLAN 0022.

4. (U) Analysis

a. (U) Exercise Considerations

(1) ~~(C)~~ One of the major differences between Exercise PROUD SABER 83 and past mobilization and deployment exercises was the extensive preexercise play in industrial mobilization and industrial surge. Another major difference involved the worldwide nature of the threat and the execution of multiple OPLANS that did not include a major augmentation of forces in Europe after STARTEX.

(2) ~~(C)~~ For the first time in a JCS CPX the proposed RDJTF OPLAN was executed and had to compete for critical resources with other unified and specified commands as other OPLANS were executed.

(3) ~~(S)~~ The logistics analysis of the execution of any major OPLAN begins with the recognition that, in many classes of supply, the United States is critically short of essential items. It was asserted in Exercise PROUD SPIRIT 80 that in addition to stock shortages of many items there existed an equally serious shortfall in our industrial base and the ability to surge production of critical items. (See Section III for a discussion of

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industrial surge and mobilization.) In Exercise PROUD SABER 83, to compensate for both shortages and production capability, attempts were made to balance the needs of one command over another as critical developments caused attention to shift from Southwest Asia (SWA) to East Asia to Central America to Europe.

b. (U) Specific Analysis Objectives

(1) (U) Determine the effectiveness of logistic procedures established to resolve problems in shipping ammunition through CONUS ports; through overseas ports.

(2) (U) Evaluate the effectiveness of existing Service host nation support agreements in expediting the logistic support for deployed and deploying forces.

(3) (U) Evaluate the effectiveness of actions taken to resolve problems created by equipment, personnel, and facilities shortfalls identified during the exercise.

(4) (U) Evaluate the adequacy of DLA and Service logistic agencies responses to increasing requests for limited stocks of high demand items.

(5) (U) Evaluate the adequacy of unified and specified commands responses to increasing requests for limited stocks of high demand items.

(6) (U) Evaluate the adequacy of Military Postal Service Agency (MPSA) procedures to resolve the problems of transporting military mail during mobilization and deployment operations.

(7) (U) Identify any materiel handling equipment (MHE) shortfalls and evaluate the adequacy of procedures used to resolve them.

(8) (U) Identify any munitions shortages. Evaluate the adequacy of procedures used to resolve shortfall problems.

(9) (U) Identify any shortfalls in individual or organizational equipment. Evaluate the adequacy of procedures used to satisfy individual or unit equipment requirements.

(10) (U) Evaluate the procedures of the Joint Transportation Board (JTB) and the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB) and their capabilities to resolve competing resource allocation demands during periods of mobilization and initial deployment.

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(11) (U) Evaluate the responsiveness of the JTB and the JMPAB to requests for assistance in resolving competing claims for critical materiel and transportation resources.

(12) (U) Evaluate the effectiveness of administrative procedures established to process requests for JTB and JMPAB assistance. Evaluate the adequacy of JTB and JMPAB action on those requests.

(13) (U) Evaluate the plans and procedures to regulate security assistance programs and divert security assistance materiel during periods of mobilization and initial deployment.

c. (U) Discussion. As an introduction to the specific logistic items of interest and activity in Exercise PROUD SABER 83, the major objective in paragraph 1 above can be extended as follows: "Determine the adequacy of logistics plans, systems, and procedures to support the mobilization and initial deployment process [in a worldwide crisis situation involving multiple OPLAN execution]." Exercises NIFTY NUGGET 78 and PROUD SPIRIT 80 were both mobilization and deployment exercises; Exercise POTENT PUNCH 81 involved a partial mobilization; but none of these previous exercises developed into a worldwide, multiple OPLAN situation involving major force deployments to three separate theaters of operation. Based on the experience gained in the previous exercises a series of exercise objectives were established. These exercise objectives were designed to evaluate the amount of progress that has been made in each of the objective areas. The logistic objectives dealt with ammunition, POL, host nation support, security assistance, mail, materiel handling equipment, and the Joint Boards. Known shortages and other problems existed. The purpose of reviewing many of the problem areas was not to simply demonstrate again that a shortage or a problem exists. The purpose was to determine how much progress had been made in resolving the problem or shortage and how we have learned to deal with it.

(1) ~~(S)~~ Director for Operations/Director for Logistics Interface Procedures. Senior decisionmakers did not adequately consider the impact on logistics resources of the courses of action selected in PROUD SABER 83. Force allocation plans were made in meetings that often did not include a logistics planner, and decision briefings on force deployment were prepared without obtaining a logistical assessment from the LRC. Thus, even though logistics briefings were presented at most meetings of the OPSDEPS and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, these briefings were

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primarily updates on logistics activities rather than logistical assessments or impact analyses.

(2) ~~(S)~~ Host Nation Support (HNS). The Exercise POSITIVE LEAP 80 Detailed Analysis Report found that, although HNS agreements "...were essential to support RDJTF units...there were none existing at ENDEX." The report also found that "Service responses to a request for HNS requirements were neither adequate nor timely." USEUCOM had reported that "their experience in negotiating HNS agreements indicates that such negotiations are a time consuming process" often taking years to complete. As a result of that exercise, OJCS RAP 0130 was established and the Director for Logistics, OJCS, was designated OPR. He was directed to identify the HNS requirements for SWA.

(a) ~~(S)~~ Prior to the exercise the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a message to the commanders of unified and specified commands (211522Z Oct) asking them to identify "assistance required from Department of State and NCA to obtain HNS beyond that which is reasonably assured in present agreements." COMRDJTF responded (260111Z Oct) stating "at present RDJTF does not have any agreement which provides for assured HNS." On 26 October, CINCPACFLT forwarded (260517Z Oct) a refined list of HNS requirements for RDJTF [REDACTED] CINCLANT also identified (260606Z Oct) his HNS requirements for additional HNS from the Government of Iceland.

(b) ~~(S)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a message (290028Z Oct) to the Secretary of Defense asking for "immediate assistance in concluding HNS agreements required to support operations in SWA." These support requirements were stated in MJCS 192-81 28 September 1981. OSD responded (301317Z Oct) stating that of the eight countries listed in the referenced document "we have opened bilateral discussions on HNS with only two" (Egypt and Oman). The message also indicates that as a minimum, OSD requires "a description of the planned operation which the HNS is to support in sufficient detail to permit the host nation to effectively plan for this support." The provision of sufficiently detailed data to support stated HNS requirements is recognized as a necessary prerequisite to entering into HNS discussions with any potential host country. The lack of negotiated HNS agreements with countries in Southwest Asia stems from the political sensitivities of the region and Arab suspicions

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over US intentions. It is because of these sensitivities that the Department of State has not permitted HNS discussions with countries other than Egypt, Oman, and Bahrain. USCENTCOM, in coordination with the Joint Staff, OSD, and the Services, is prepared to open an HNS dialog with any country in Southwest Asia once permission to do so has been granted.

(3) (U) Joint Transportation Board (JTB) and Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB). The JMPAB is the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged with performing duties in matters referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff relating to the establishment of materiel priorities and the allocation of resources. The JTB is the agency that performs similar duties in matters relating to transportation assets. In all previous JCS-sponsored exercises the Secretariats of each Board handled all matters referred to their respective boards. In Exercise PROUD SABER 83, both the JTB and the JMPAB met to consider exercise issues.

(a) (S) Table IV-1 is a listing of the exercise-associated meetings of the JMPAB and the JTB prior to and during Exercise PROUD SABER 83. A review of exercise messages and memorandums and interviews with both board Secretaries indicates that board members and members of the Secretariats felt that they could have been more responsive if necessary operational policy decisions and guidance had been provided earlier. A primary example that was cited to demonstrate the need for guidance involved air transport allocations to the RDJTF and PACOM. During much of the exercise RDJTF [REDACTED] and PACOM [REDACTED] were competing for limited air and sea assets and the lack of "strategic guidance" was listed as an inhibiting factor by several Joint Staff personnel.

(b) (S) In a postexercise memorandum from the Director for Logistics to the Director for Operations the Director for Logistics stated "...the development of a global strategy and theater prioritization were inadequate during Exercise PROUD SABER 83. Because of this, it was not clear to the mobilization and mobility community what it was they were required to support, in what precedence. The priority of theaters and specific requirements of the Commanders of the unified and specified commands were never carried to the point where force structures, using available active and reserve component forces, were defined. This reflects the traditional single theater focus

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TABLE IV-1. (U) EXERCISE ASSOCIATED MEETINGS OF THE JTB AND THE JMPAB

DATE	ORGANIZATION	MATTERS DISCUSSED
29 SEP	JMPAB SECRETARIAT	EXERCISE MUL REVIEW
13 OCT	JMPAB SECRETARIAT	EXERCISE MUL REVIEW
14 OCT	JTB SECRETARIAT	AIRLIFT ALLOCATION, RDJTF DEPLOYMENT PLUS WORLDWIDE SAAM AND CHANNEL FLIGHTS
20 OCT	JMPAB	AMMUNITION ALLOCATION
25 OCT	JMPAB SECRETARIAT	WAR RESERVE; SURGE PRODUCTION (HUGHES TUCSON)
26 OCT	JTB SECRETARIAT	RDJTF AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS, WORLDWIDE SAAM AND CHANNEL FLIGHTS, AND PACOM [REDACTED] AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS
26 OCT	JMPAB	PWRMS FOR USAREUR
28 OCT	JMPAB	FMS AND SA PRIORITIZATION
1 NOV	JMPAB SECRETARIAT	EXERCISE MUL REVIEW
2 NOV	JMPAB SECRETARIAT	ALLOCATION OF AIR MUNITIONS
3 NOV	JMPAB	ALLOCATION OF AIR MUNITIONS
3 NOV	JTB	RESPONSE TO CINCPAC REQUEST TO REVIEW CINCPAC [REDACTED] AIRLIFT ALLOWANCES. (CINCPAC REQUEST FOR INCREASE DENIED.)
4 NOV	JMPAB SECRETARIAT	SURGE PRODUCTION (HUGHES TUCSON)

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of our planning and fails to recognize the urgent need for early NCA decisions on theater priority and strategies, and allocation actions on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The lesson to be learned is that in a mobilization procedural exercise, the strategy and theater prioritization must be established so that the mobilization community understand what it is they are required to support."

(c) (S) In the above quotation, the last sentence is particularly valid in any multiple theater, multiple threat situation involving the deployment and employment of US forces. It is evident that, if sound logistical assessments and impact statements are to be provided, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in support of priorities established by the NCA, must allocate limited resources and lift assets as early as possible in the crisis situation and the decisions must be clearly expressed to the OJCS and Service planners. These decisions must be reviewed as frequently as events dictate and support systems and planners must remain flexible enough to respond rapidly to reallocation decisions.


(4) (U) Military Postal Service Agency (MPSA). The MPSA was formed in June, 1980. DOD Directive 4525.6 May 1980, "Single Manager for Military Postal Service" contains policy and responsibilities and establishes a single manager of the MPS to operate under the broad policy guidance of the ASD (MRA&L). The Secretary of the Army is designated as the single manager and the MPSA is to be established and organized as a jointly staffed headquarters.

(a) (U) JCS RAP 0186 "Sustaining Movement of MPS Mail," emanated from Exercise PROUD SPIRIT 80. During that exercise it was recognized that the MPS moved both personal and official mail and it was further recognized that critical spare parts (particularly for EDP equipment) moved overseas by official mail.

(b) (U) On 25 October, MPSA received authority from the US Postmaster General to embargo all APO and FPO mail with the exception of official mail and personal first class letters, cards, and sound recorded correspondence. Embargo of mail from the APOs and FPOs was left to the discretion of the unified commander. MPSA also stated that requests for exceptions to the mail embargo should be addressed to the Executive Director, MPSA. This information was disseminated in MPSA message 251905Z Oct.

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(5) ~~(8)~~ Ammunition. On 30 September, prior to the exercise, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a message to the unified and specified commands (302327Z Sep) entitled "Proposed JCS Ammunition Allocation Policies and Procedures." The message stated, in part: "Worldwide shortfalls of conventional ammunition assets and the inability of the industrial base to satisfy consumer demands may require allocation or reallocation of PWRMS, retail or wholesale CONUS stocks, or industrial production capacity." There were known, previously exercised, and documented shortages in all types of conventional ammunition. The purpose of this message was to solicit comments on the proposed policies and procedures developed by an ad

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
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hoc joint Services, OJCS, and Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) working group. On 20 October, again prior to the exercise, the JMPAB met, approved the revised policies and procedures, and sent an implementing message that was to be the guidance for Exercise PROUD SABER 83.

(a) (U) The basic provisions of the policies adopted were:

1. (U) CJCS retains the authority to make combat allocations of conventional ammunition to commanders of unified and specified commands and to allocate critical Service-owned assets to the Military Services
2. (U) The JMPAB will act for the Joint Chiefs of Staff in all conventional ammunition allocation matters
3. (U) The Services retain responsibility for logistic support of their own forces, including those assigned to unified and specified commands
4. (U) The unified and specified commanders assume directive authority over all component stocks within their operating theater upon OPLAN execution.

(b) ~~(S)~~ On 27 October, DA sent a message to MTMC (271500Z Oct) asking MTMC to identify commercial ports in the US which could be used to augment the current dedicated ammunition ports. In previous exercises involving deployment of forces, the shipment of ammunition through commercial ports was a matter of concern to MTMC, the Coast Guard, and DARCOM. However, MTMC responded (022200Z Nov) that "exercise military ammunition outload requirements are well within the military ammunition ports capabilities." In addition, the message advised that MTMC and the Coast Guard have identified commercial facilities for ammunition shipment that could be used as a "last ditch alternative" if one or more of the military ammunition ports were lost.

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


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JS 3.3(b)(5), (g)



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JS 3.3(b)(S),(8)

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


Figure IV-1. (U) D to P and the Effect of Insufficient Assets  
(Active and WRM) on Combat Effort

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


Figure IV-2. (U) D to P and the Effect of Insufficient Assets  
(Active and WRM) on Combat Effort

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
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JS 3.3(b)(5), (d)  
Army 1.4(h)

OSD 3.3(b)(2)

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(d) ~~(S)~~ In the First Impressions message (122150Z Nov), CINCPAC reported that "...Some of the most involved play centered around the [REDACTED] There appears to be some confusion concerning responsibilities for initiating movement requests for the [REDACTED] CINCPAC 180207Z Jan 83 amplified the problem, stating that no specific guidance existed for the logistic aspects of [REDACTED] including responsibilities of unified commanders and the Services. The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied (272101Z Jan 83) that:

1. (U) The Secretary of the Army is the Single Manager for conventional ammunition (SMCA)

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2. (U) Chemical munitions are by definition conventional ammunition
3. (U) All conventional ammunition is Service owned
4. (U) Logistic procedures are coordinated between the Services and the SMCA
5. (U) Logistic procedures for chemical munitions are the same as for all other conventional munitions, except for some unique security and technical escort requirements.

In summarizing procedures the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that 'to facilitate rapid deployment:

1. (U) Close coordination is required between operational and logistic elements at all levels
2. (U) A command should request preparatory actions through normal Service logistic channels concurrently with a request for deployment authority
3. (U) The requesting command should confirm the preparatory request through Service logistic channels upon receipt of NCA release authority
4. (U) The Services and the SMCA will initiate required action through existing logistic procedures.

In conclusion, JCS 272101Z Jan advised that Annexes B (Logistics) and F (Chemical Warfare) of JSCP were under revision and that the OJCS intended to provide clarifying guidance in both annexes. Exercise PROUD SABER 83 play of chemical weapons movement began at 021122Z Nov with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The first aircraft load arrived at Kunsan just over 30 hours later at 031745Z Nov. A more rapid response would have been possible if some participants had a clearer understanding of responsibilities for initiating movement requests; e.g., if [REDACTED] had requested preparatory action through normal logistic channels concurrently with the 272154Z Oct request for deployment authority.

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(6) ~~(S)~~ Materiel Handling Equipment (MHE). JCS RAP 9001 deals with shortfalls in MHE. (For the purposes of this report, MHE includes all 463L system pallets and nets and 10K, 25K, and 40K loaders.) On 31 October, AFLC sent a message to MAC (310835Z Oct) asserting "There presently are substantial shortfalls in pallets, top nets, and side nets." Later on 31 October MAC corrected (31220Z Oct) the AFLC statement, advising "Current supply of 463L pallets and nets appears to be adequate to meet MAC movement requirements tasked by OPLANS in effect in the exercise."

(a) ~~(S)~~ HQ USAF logistic personnel indicated in post-exercise discussions that there are probably enough 25K and 40K loaders available worldwide to support MAC missions scheduled in support of OPLANS [REDACTED] USEUCOM [REDACTED] USSOUTHCOM [REDACTED] and ADCOM [REDACTED]. This is also probably true of fork lifts. Problems, if any, will come in the area of spare parts. Under the Contractor Operated Parts Stores (COPARS) concept, USAF supply depots do not store large amounts of the spare parts for MHE; operating bases contract directly with the manufacturer for parts for their own equipment. The problem is particularly complicated for fork lift equipment; this contract is rebid annually. It is possible to have parts from several different companies on comparable equipment.

(b) ~~(S)~~ HQ USAF logistic personnel wanted to exercise organizational procedures for securing spare parts and replacement units for MHE. Two unforeseen problems prevented this. The first involved MAC's forced play involving extremely high utilization rates for their aircraft and associated equipment (ground power and MHE). The second involved the failure of MSEL injectors to insert the MSELs at the required times. This also resulted in problems being solved (the shipment of 40K loaders to Bahrain and Dharan; RDAFFOR FORWARD message 310100Z Oct) before the problem was introduced into the exercise.

(c) (U) MAC personnel interviewed after the exercise indicated that spot shortages of pallets could develop in different locations but these should be temporary.

(7) ~~(S)~~ Security Assistance (SA). On 26 October, OSD sent a message (260045Z Oct) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services, and the commanders of unified and specified commands, summarizing Foreign Military Sales (FMS) actions taken prior to the exercise and designed to help surge

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industrial production prior to the exercise. Paragraph 4 of this message stated: "...the USG established a strategic policy to assist friends and allies by providing security and economic assistance...direct US military involvement was avoided in favor of assistance to friends and allies in order to provide regional deterrence and improved military posture in event hostilities broke out." Congress appropriated 10 billion dollars to support this effort. This represented a significant departure from previous exercise activities involving SA. In the past, the diversion of SA materiel from other countries to US Forces represented the main thrust of SA activities.

(a) ~~(S)~~ Diversion was still an option and was, in fact, considered. HQ USAF (260300Z Oct) asked AFLC, AFSC, MAC, and TAC for an inventory of certain aircraft and missiles in the FMS pipeline. RDJTF (280735Z Oct) pointed out that in some instances, SA sometimes consists of items of potential use to RDJTF "which appear to be in quantities beyond the nations current capability to employ, sustain, or maintain. Specific examples include: M60A3 tanks for Egypt; TOW or improved TOW missiles to Egypt and Saudi Arabia; and F-15 aircraft for Saudi Arabia." Buy-back of materiel in the pipeline or already delivered was also approved and local commanders were authorized to negotiate with host countries to buy back items urgently needed.

(b) ~~(S)~~ On 31 October, OSD sent a message (310208Z Oct) to the Services and the commanders of unified and specified commands advising them that 1 billion dollars had been authorized for drawdown of DOD stocks for foreign nations. Funds for the drawdown were authorized for the countries indicated US follows:

SAUDI ARABIA	\$200.M
EGYPT	150.M
PAKISTAN	150.M
MOROCCO	50.M
KOREA	200.M
JORDAN	50.M
LEBANON	50.M
THAILAND	50.M
ISRAEL	50.M
PANAMA	25.M
SHAPE	25.M

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(c) ~~(S)~~ On 3 November, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent a message (031920Z Nov) to the Services and the commanders of unified and specified commands containing new Secretary of Defense guidance concerning reprioritization of FMS/SA. A 2 November, critical military materials list was included which consisted mostly of missiles and aircraft and a "by country" breakout of items to be shifted, delayed, or continued for delivery.

(d) ~~(S)~~ In addition to providing FMS and SA to friendly countries, the possibility of purchasing equipment from friendly foreign countries for use by United States and Allied forces was also raised. There is no record that these actions were ever consummated.

(e) ~~(S)~~ JCS RAP 0266 deals with the release of WRSA supplies to the ROK. In past exercises, DA personnel were usually prepared [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] and assume payment problems would be resolved. HQ USAF personnel took a very different approach. They placed very little in-country and continually refused to provide a list of equipment included in the Air Force Project Contract Oak inventory. They pointed out that WRSA material is supposed to be surplus to the needs of the Services; therefore they could not determine what would be surplus at any point in the future nor could they guarantee that what is surplus today will still be surplus tomorrow. In March 1982 a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) was signed between the US and the ROK which provided for the promissory payment for WRSA stocks released to the ROK. In Exercise PROUD SABER 83 all [REDACTED] was declared.

(8) ~~(S)~~ Medical. At the time that Exercise PROUD SABER 83 was being planned, there were seven specific RAPs that dealt with medical problems. These included RAPs dealing with medical care facilities, medical equipment, and medical personnel shortages. Thus at STARTEX there were several documented medical shortfalls known to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition to the multiple OPLAN execution pressures placed on the Joint Staff, this exercise added a new theater of operations where HNS agreements were non-existent. In fact, during the exercise the Commander, RDJTF reminded the Joint Chiefs of Staff that previous combat operations by non-US forces in SWA have produced high levels of civilian casualties. Locally available medical resources have traditionally been unable

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to handle these civilian casualties and the RDJTF commander sought guidance on what medical assistance his forces could or should provide to civilians in the area of operations. Based on the existing severe shortage of medical care facilities for US combat personnel, RDJTF was advised that no medical care or services for indigenous personnel should be contemplated.

(a) ~~(S)~~ On 31 October, Commandant Marine Corps (CMC) requested that "the Joint Chiefs of Staff review the casualty evacuation policy and publish evacuation guidelines for the SWA and PACOM theaters." CMC's concerns dealt with fears that a zero-day theater evacuation policy might result "if departing aircraft were used as aeromedical evacuation aircraft of opportunity." Two serious outcomes of such a policy could include (1) the risk of death to patients not adequately stabilized for long flights, and, (2) the unnecessary evacuation of combatants who would otherwise be returned to duty. The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded to this request (312229Z Oct) and established a JOA 15-day theater evacuation policy and in a later message (DTG not available) a 15-day theater evacuation policy was also established for PACOM instead of 60 days. Cutting the evacuation period from 60 to 15 days meant that beds would become available faster and lessened the burden on theater medical facilities. CINCPAC (020542Z Nov) advised various Army organizations that this relief made it possible to divert one of two general hospitals deploying to Yokota. One would now be sent to Adak, Alaska to support JTF Aleutians.

(b) ~~(S)~~ In previous exercises, the possibility of using afloat facilities for supporting medical care was discussed but was never implemented. In Exercise PROUD SABER 83, approvals were given to secure four vessels (SS Volendam, Veendam, Constitution, and Independence) as Limited Care Afloat Facilities (LCAF). Two of these vessels (the Volendam and the Veendam) were contracted to support the RDJTF. In addition, RDJTF medical evacuees were scheduled for movement to USEUCOM facilities rather than returning them to CONUS hospitals. In fact, CONUS medical facilities were relatively unencumbered during this exercise. CMCHS, the Civilian Military Contingency Hospital System (which provides beds in civilian hospitals for military patients) was not exercised.

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(c) ~~(S)~~ The conscription of medical officers was a subject of discussion during the exercise and it was recommended that conscription of medical personnel be initiated.

(9) ~~(S)~~ POL. At the Exercise PROUD SABER 83 First Impressions Briefing, on 16 November, the National Security Council Representative acknowledged that the exercise was "superb; the best ever." He then observed that in POL "no serious problems surfaced" and he asked if this means we are semi-independent. At this same briefing (approximately 20 minutes later) the MSC Commander stated that if there was absolutely no attrition in ships or bunkering, the United States could "barely support" the exercise scenario. This statement by MSC is more striking when the major area of activity (SWA) is considered. This is the major oil reserve center of the world and still the United States could "barely support" the scenario.

(a) ~~(S)~~ In the primary area of operations the major problem that developed involved shallow draft tankers. In a summary message (251926Z Oct) MSC reminded CNO, FEMA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Maritime Administration (MARAD), OSD, and the Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC) that, since their first SITREP and in each subsequent SITREP the problem of intra-theater lift of POL was raised. Shallow draft assets were described as a "critical shortage." After a series of messages between MSC and RDJTF, the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicated (041858Z Nov) that 12 vessels had been identified in Singapore that, partially loaded, could alleviate the SWA shallow draft tanker requirement. These tankers were chartered by MSC.

(b) ~~(S)~~ In addition to the shallow draft tanker problem, MSC pointed out another problem (050423Z Nov) that involved US dependence on foreign flag tankers. After providing data on the total numbers of tankers required for different waterway scenarios (Suez Canal and Strait of Hormuz; open and closed) MSC summarized the situation as follows: "Analysis based on actual scheduling data for the entire exercise time frame adequately reveals that OPLANS [redacted] and [redacted] cannot be supported by US flag and EUSC tankers. The closing of either or both Suez and the Straits of Hormuz creates inordinate dependence on foreign flag tankers." (NOTE: EUSC is defined as Effective US Control vessels. These are vessels that are owned by US companies but registered under a foreign "flag of convenience." In emergencies the US Government

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(MARAD) has right of recall for mandatory contracting for the use of these vessels.)

(c) ~~(S)~~ The shortage of shallow draft tankers is also a potential problem in CINCPAC OPLANS. The need to solve this problem has been recognized for some time. In addition to the "partially loaded" solution referenced above, MSC in their message (050451Z Nov) to CNO discusses two other alternatives. The first involves the use of a system of bladders in Lighter Aboard Ship (LASH) barges and the second involves utilizing transportable off shore discharge systems for discharge from handy-size tankers. Both of these solutions require long range planning and actions to insure that the capability is available to meet contingency requirements.

(d) (U) On 4 November, USCINCRD notified the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and others) (040138Z Nov) "the USREDCOM CAT/J4 has entered selected DFSC/MSR tanker information for cargo movements" into the JDS data base. The purpose of this test was to provide Joint Petroleum Officers (JPO) with an example of the data management capability available. JDS users were advised how to retrieve the test data. In a response to this message the RDJTF stated (051100Z Nov) "We find no advantage to incorporation of MSR tanker movement in JDS. Current procedures are responsive to our needs and JDS provides nothing that is not otherwise available." OJCS logistic personnel stated the same position, citing the variety of reports currently established that provide the data. In an interview the Logistics Directorate representative indicated that all the unified and specific commands stated approximately the same thing.

d. (U) Findings

(1) ~~(S)~~ Director for Operations/Director for Logistics Interface. Logistics planners were frequently not included in the OPG force allocation planning meetings. The logistic implications of OPLANS and CONPLANS were therefore not adequately considered and were not briefed to senior decisionmakers.

(2) (U) HNS

(a) (U) The unified and specified commands and the Services were quick to respond to JCS requests for HNS requirements.

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(b) ~~(S)~~ HNS agreements varied in different areas of the world and for different scenarios. Agreements were nonexistent for SWA; generally satisfactory to support US Forces in the ROK.

(c) ~~(S)~~ There were no existing HNS agreements with any country in SWA. Discussions were on-going with Egypt and Oman.

(d) (U) The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State indicated that planned operational data must be provided if HNS agreements are to be negotiated.

(3) (U) JTB/JMPAB. During Exercise PROUD SABER 83 the JTB Secretariat met twice, the JMPAB Secretariat met six times, the JTB met once, and the JMPAB met four times.

(4) (U) MPSA. This was the first time that MPSA participated in a JCS CPX. Their participation was timely and effective.

(5) (U) Ammunition

(a) (U) At least six current active JCS RAPs deal with ammunition problems. The largest problem involves the shortage of improved munitions and AIMS.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Due to a critical shortage of several categories of ammunition the distribution and redistribution of these ammunition assets had to be monitored by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(c) (U) The JMPAB, as the agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, met on 20 October, 2 November, and 3 November to resolve ammunition problems.

(d) (U) Past exercise problems dealing with shipping ammunition through civilian ports did not occur in Exercise PROUD SABER 83.

(e) ~~(S)~~ The shortage of AIMS continued as one of the most pressing critical ammunition shortage problems.

(f) ~~(S)~~ Ammunition shortages are so severe that, in spite of a 12 month industrial surge, the production of ammunition would still fall short of requirements.

(g) ~~(S)~~ Movement of chemical weapons, once initiated, was timely, but CINCPAC identified a need for clearer

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understanding of responsibilities for initiating movement requests.

(h) ~~(S)~~ Serious and reasonably effective measures were agreed upon during the exercise (through cross-leveiling, fair share redistributions, and inter-service transfers) to try to fill the most critical needs.

(i) ~~(S)~~ All [REDACTED] and all FASTFILL requisitions were entered into the supply system.

(6) (U) MHE

(a) (U) Loaders and forklifts were sufficient to meet OPLAN requirements. Pallets and nets were probably sufficient to meet total planned needs but because of the continuous movement of many of these assets spot shortages would probably develop in any major OPLAN execution.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Spare parts for fork lifts represented a potential problem in supporting a multiple OPLAN execution. The ability to identify, locate, purchase, and ship these spares to a remote overseas location rapidly is a potential problem.

(c) ~~(S)~~ MACs use of skewed utilization rate figures for MAC assets prevented logistic personnel from exercising item (b) above.

(7) (U) SA

(a) (U) Security Assistance activities in Exercise PROUD SABER 83 progressed beyond the simple "divert needed items to US Forces" stage of previous exercises.

(b) (U) Drawdown funds for US stocks were provided and allocated, by country.

(c) (U) The purchase of equipment from foreign manufacturers was discussed during the exercise.

(8) ~~(S)~~ Medical. There were serious medical shortfalls in equipment, technicians, and medical officers. Theater evacuation policies were altered to reflect some of these shortfalls.

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(9) (U) POL

- (a) ~~(S)~~ The largest single problem in POL activities lay in the critical shortage of shallow draft tankers.
- (b) ~~(S)~~ The lack of HNS agreements in SWA required planners to ship millions of barrels of POL supplies into an area that has the world's largest production reserves.
- (c) ~~(S)~~ The United States was critically dependent upon two very narrow and very vulnerable waterways for the rapid movement of fuel: the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz.
- (d) ~~(S)~~ The United States was dependent on foreign flag tankers if more than one major ORLAN and theater of operations were involved.

e. (U) Conclusions

(1) (U) Director for Operations/Director for Logistics Interface. Senior decisionmakers needed better information on the logistic implications (mobility, resources, and mobilization) of the courses of action selected during the exercise. The lack of information resulted in untimely lift allocation among competing CINCs.

(2) (U) HNS

(a) ~~(S)~~ Although there have been improvements in HNS consciousness and awareness by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commanders of unified and specified commands, and the Services, HNS agreements were inadequate to support existing OPLANs.

(3) (U) JTB/JMPAB. The Boards were as responsive as possible to the matters that were referred to each board. If operational policy decisions and guidance had been provided, board actions might have been more responsive.

(4) (U) MPSA. There was a degree of uncertainty over who the MPSA is and what they were responsible for.

(5) (U) Ammunition

(a) ~~(S)~~ All DOD ammunition problems were a function of production and inventory problems. These could be solved with a large expenditure of money and long term contracts, or more gradually with a steady input of dollars to long term contracts.

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(b) ~~(S)~~ MTMC and US Coast Guard procedures, combined with increased military ammunition port capability, have succeeded in solving the previous ammunition port problems.

(c) ~~(C)~~ The participants in the exercise and the JMPAB demonstrated a professional approach to critical problem solving as far as ammunition play was concerned. However, some exercise participants did not clearly understand responsibilities for initiating chemical weapons movement requests.

(d) ~~(C)~~ The MOA between the US and the ROK was an effective adjunct to speeding the release of in-country WRSA stocks to the ROK.

(6) (U) MHE. The ability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to execute a major OPLAN was not hindered as a result of MHE problems.

(7) (U) SA. SA associated activities in Exercise PROUD SABER 83 extended into areas that were not explored in previous exercises.

(8) ~~(S)~~ Medical. The Joint Staff was advised that it would take \$2.8 billion and 2 years to bring medical care up to standards desired by the DOD.

(9) ~~(S)~~ POL. The Joint Chiefs of Staff should address the problems brought on by the shortage of shallow draft tankers. One or more of the solutions discussed above or other suitable solutions should be selected and the necessary financial planning accomplished to prevent US Forces finding themselves in an area without adequate POL resupply.

f. (U) Recommendations

(1) (U) Director for Operations/Director for Logistics Interface. The COPG should insure that all appropriate Joint Staff members are included in force allocation and other planning discussion. If operational requirements prohibit this, then the effected Joint Staff planner should be advised as soon as possible so that appropriate inputs or assessments can be prepared.

(2) (U) HNS. The Director, Joint Staff, should reaffirm OJCS RAP 0130. The requirements stated in MJCS 192-81 should be reviewed and efforts continued to conclude necessary agreements.

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(3) ~~(C)~~ JTB/JMPAB. Policy and prioritization guidance must be made and disseminated quickly in a developing crisis situation. It may not be possible to wait until all possible data is available before the Joint Staff and the commanders of unified and specified commands are given guidance and priorities.

(4) (U) MPSA. The Director, Joint Staff, should insure that military postal service functions be included in future JCS CPXs.

(5) (U) Ammunition

(a) ~~(C)~~ The Services should increase budget efforts to improve ammunition shortfalls in production and WRM.

(b) (U) The Director for Logistics should recommend that JCS RAP 0002 be closed.

(c) (U) The ASD(MRA&L) should recommend that JCS RAP 0266 be closed.

(d) ~~(S)~~ The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider a full test of chemical weapons movement procedures in the design of the next deployment exercise.

(6) (U) MHE. The Director, Joint Staff, should review JCS RAP 9001 and notify the OPR to make sure it reflects current inventories and requirements.

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## SECTION V

### (U) CRISIS ACTION SYSTEM

1. (U) Major Objective. Determine the extent to which the JCS Crisis Action System provides for adequate coordination among the OJCS, OSD, unified and specified commands, and Services to ensure effective planning and execution of mobilization and initial deployment.
2. (U) Synopsis. The United States is prepared to exert its military influence in a variety of conflict situations. Crisis or emergency situations which could require US military operations may develop with little or no warning. Such situations may require accelerated decisions by the National Command Authorities and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, mobilization of reserve forces, and the deployment of units and organizations to a threatened area. To assist in meeting these requirements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have developed a Crisis Action System (CAS).
  - a. (U) Exercise PROUD SABER 83 provided the first opportunity to evaluate newly published CAS procedures for multiple crisis situations. Unfortunately, the Joint Chiefs of Staff distributed the new guidance only a week before the exercise. Therefore, throughout the exercise, participants were learning new or revised procedures.
  - b. (S) Generally, Exercise PROUD SABER 83 validated established CAS procedures. New procedures for the resolution of competing OPLAN requirements in a multiple crisis environment require further testing. Participants expressed concern for delays in obtaining Secretary of Defense authority to change approved OPLAN assigned forces. The Joint Staff is evaluating user critique items pertaining to JOPS Volume IV as an issue separate from this analysis.
3. (U) System Description. Tab D to Appendix 1 to Annex G to the COSIN to JCS EXPLAN 0022 contains the system description for the Crisis Action System.
4. (U) Analysis
  - a. (U) Exercise Considerations. Exercise considerations for this analysis area appear in Paragraph 3 of the Tab described

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in Paragraph 3 above. An additional consideration is the distribution of a completely revised JOPS Volume IV a week before STARTEX. Late arrival of this new guidance prevented adequate training prior to the exercise. Therefore, participants did not have a thorough understanding of new CAS terms and procedures.

b. (U) Specific Analysis Objectives

- (1) (U) Determine the utility of the procedures contained in Volume IV, Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS), for a crisis in which multiple OPLANs are executed.
- (2) (U) Determine the effectiveness of the mobilization and deployment-related C<sup>2</sup> information flow among JDA, OJCS, OSD, Services, TOAs, and unified and specified commands.
- (3) (U) Determine the adequacy of CAS and time-sensitive operation planning (TOP) in providing information which gives the NCA sufficient time and information to consider available options prior to execution decision deadline time.
- (4) (U) Determine the effectiveness of OJCS interface with OSD and civil and Federal agencies in providing the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the timely authorization and information required to support OPLAN implementation.

c. (U) Discussion

- (1) (U) JOPS Volume IV. The Joint Staff uses CAS to guide the process whereby the operational need for US Forces is recognized and to then implement the plans to deploy or employ those forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff distributed a major revision of JOPS Volume IV (Crisis Action System-CAS) a week before STARTEX. The revision included TOP procedures previously issued separately and new procedures to be used in multiple crisis situations.
- (2) ~~(S)~~ Competing Requirements. Exercise participants employed some of the new procedures for the resolution of competing OPLAN requirements. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (020035Z Nov) requested that the Services and unified and specified commands comment on allocation of critical logistic resources. In accordance with multiple crisis procedures, responses were referred to the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board which essentially approved the Services' proposals on 3 November.

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(3) (U) Deployment and Employment Estimates. The revised CAS Warning Order format included "REQUEST PRELIMINARY DEPLOYMENT ESTIMATES AND EMPLOYMENT ESTIMATES BY (DTG)." The superseded format had called for "CLOSURE ESTIMATES" rather than deployment and employment estimates. The OJCS inserted the revised instructions in the Warning Orders for CINCLANT [REDACTED] and CINCLANT [REDACTED] with 16-hour response times specified. The impact of the revised format on the CAS community was in understanding the changed terms and the nuances of the reporting requirements. Some exercise time was consumed at various commands until participants became familiar with the changes.

(4) (U) NCA Authorizations. CAS formats for Alert, Deployment Preparation, Deployment, and Execute Orders required statements indicating authority from the NCA for issuing those orders. There were no specified formats or authority statement requirements for changes to CAS orders. The OJCS issued two changes (301645Z and 311537Z Oct) to the Execute Order for CINCPAC [REDACTED]. Neither contained an authority statement for the changes made. As a critique item, at least one player at PACOM suggested the advisability for a recipient of such messages to seek confirmation that the NCA had authorized the changes.

(5) (U) Crisis Situations. The OPG identified crisis situations in Southwest Asia (SWA), Korea, Panama, the Atlantic, Cuba, Europe, and CONUS. The Joint Staff considered the forces available to meet the crisis in all situations. The CAS status reached the Execution phase in three situations. These were:

(a) (U) The SWA crisis, for which [REDACTED] was executed prior to STARTEX

(b) (U) The Korean crisis, which processed through the execution of CINCPAC [REDACTED]

(c) (U) The CONUS crisis, culminating in the execution of CINCNOB/CINCAD [REDACTED]

(6) (U) CAS Phases. Figure V-1 depicts the estimated duration and sequence of CAS phases during the exercise.

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
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


Figure V-1. (U) Estimated Duration and Sequence of CAS Phases

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(a) (U) The three OPLANS that reached the Execution phase after STARTEX were:

1. (U) CINCPAC [REDACTED] (labeled E 0030 PHASE 1)
2. (U) CINCNORAD/CINCAD [REDACTED] (E 0216 and E 1855)
3. (U) CINCNORAD/CINCAD [REDACTED] (E 1600).

Phase V Execution Planning did not occur in each of these situations. The Execute Orders were issued concurrently with the NCA decisions, and Alert Orders to initiate execution planning were not used. As a result, only options in the published OPLANS could be executed.

(b) (S) The Execute Order for phase 1 of CINCPAC [REDACTED] (E 0030 PHASE 1) preceded the Alert Order for the hostilities phases (A 0650 PHASES 2, 3, 4). The latter did not state the applicable phases as did the former. Therefore, not all participants realized that the Alert Order applied only to the hostilities phases of the OPLAN.

(7) (S) Decisionmaking Delays. Participants at LANTCOM and PACOM noted delays in receiving decisions from higher authority and deployment estimates from supporting commanders. The following analysis shows the delays noted.

(a) (U) Figures V-2, V-3, and V-4 are key event timelines for CINCLANT [REDACTED], CINCLANT [REDACTED], and CINCPAC [REDACTED]. The timelines include the DTG for three pertinent CAS messages in each plan: the Warning Order, the Commander's Estimate, and the Alert Order. Time expended between each of these events formed the basis for the following figure and analysis.

(b) (S) Figure V-5 depicts the time intervals between the Warning Order (STARTEX for CINCPAC [REDACTED], the commander's estimate, and the Alert Order for each plan. STARTEX was the measure of player time in CINCPAC [REDACTED] since the Warning Order was sent prior to STARTEX. Intervals between Warning Orders (or STARTEX) and commanders' estimates spanned the CAS Course of Action Development phase. Intervals between commanders' estimates and Alert Orders represented the CAS Decision phase. The Course of Action Development phases for CINCLANT [REDACTED], CINCLANT [REDACTED] and CINCPAC [REDACTED] required over

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DTG (ZULU) OCT-NOV 1982	EVENT
292215	JCS WARNING ORDER
301912	CINCLANT COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE
021342	JCS ALERT ORDER
050020	JCS DEPLOYMENT ORDER

Figure V-2. (U) Timeline of Key Exercise Events:  
CINCLANT [REDACTED]

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DTG (ZULU) OCT-NOV 1982	EVENT
292220	JCS WARNING ORDER
300802	CINCLANT COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE
012240	JCS DEPLOYMENT ORDER
022245	JCS ALERT ORDER

Figure V-3: (U) Timeline of Key Exercise Events:  
CINCLANT [REDACTED]

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DTG (ZULU) OCT-NOV 1982	EVENT
232100	JCS WARNING ORDER
251200	STARTEX
260341	CINCPAC COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE
300030	JCS EXECUTE ORDER, PHASE 1 (PRE-CONFLICT MEASURES)
300430	JDA CLOSURE ESTIMATE
300650	JCS ALERT ORDER, PHASES 2,3,4 (HOSTILITIES)
310001	C-DAY, L-HOUR
012250	JCS DEPLOYMENT ORDER
032030	JCS DEPLOYMENT ORDER

Figure V-4. (U) Timeline of Key Exercise Events:

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


Figure V-5. (U) Time Intervals Between Warning Order, Commander's Estimate, and Alert Order


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20, 9, and 15 hours respectively. Figure V-5 shows that the elapsed times for the Decision phases were over 66, 86, and 99 hours. Therefore, LANTCOM and PACOM commanders' estimates responded in a timely manner to Warning Orders, but the OJCS required much more time to complete the Decision phases and issue Alert Orders.



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
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
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(9) ~~(S)~~ OPLAN Change Authority. Exercise PROUD SABER 83 demonstrated the likelihood of changing forces assigned to OPLANS and reallocating assets among unified commands during multiple crises. OJCS participants anticipated delays in processing recommended changes and reallocations through OSD using established procedures. The OPG drafted a memorandum requesting the Secretary of Defense to delegate authority to make such changes within approved guidance to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The OPG intended that this procedure be considered after the exercise, and therefore did not pursue it.

(10) (U) JOPS Volume IV Critiques. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have requested that users of the new JOPS Volume IV provide critiques of its procedures.

(11) (U) Topic Exclusions. Analyses of the following topic areas contained in the A&DCP for Exercise PROUD SABER 83 are discussed in Section VII:

(a) (U) Evaluate interactions between CAS/TOP and the OSD Crisis Management Organization (CMO).

(b) (U) Evaluate the degree to which the existence and functioning of the OSD CMO assist the OJCS in crisis management.

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d. (U) Findings

(1) (U) The exercise validated most established CAS procedures. However, it terminated before the full spectrum of OPLAN priority establishment and force or resource allocation could be tested.

(2) (U) The revised JOPS Volume IV contained needed guidance for a multiple crisis environment. However, its issuance immediately prior to the exercise precluded thorough user training and familiarization.

(3) (U) Recipients of changes to Alert and Execute Orders had no positive method to ensure that the changes were authorized by the NCA.

(4) ~~(S)~~ The fact that Execute Orders for certain phases of an OPLAN may preceded Alert Orders for other phases was not understood by all players. Some participants incorrectly considered it a procedural error for the CINCPAC [REDACTED] phase 1 Execute Order to precede the Alert Order for the remaining phases.

(5) ~~(S)~~ LANTCOM and PACOM Commanders' Estimates responded in a timely manner to Warning Orders but there were lengthy intervals before the OJCS issued Alert Orders. LANTCOM and PACOM participants perceived those intervals as decisionmaking delays. Some delay was attributable to required staffing through the OSD CMO (see Section VII). There are no established time standards in CAS.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(7) ~~(S)~~ The OPG anticipated delays in decisionmaking and proposed that the Secretary of Defense delegate to the CJCS authority to make OPLAN changes within approved guidance.

(8) (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff will evaluate JOPS Volume IV user critiques of procedures as an issue separate from this analysis.

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e. (U) Conclusions

- (1) (U) A complete test of the new CAS procedures for solving competing requirements in a multiple crisis environment was not accomplished.
- (2) (U) The short time that the revised JOPS Volume IV was available prior to STARTEX precluded a thorough understanding by players of new CAS terms.
- (3) (U) Revised CAS procedures do not address the requirement for NCA authority statements in changes to Alert and Execute Orders.
- (4) ~~(S)~~ Statement of the applicable phases would have enhanced understanding of the Alert Order for CINCPAC  


- (5) (U) Since the CAS includes the Decision phase, current CAS procedures may have contributed to decisionmaking delays perceived by exercise participants. However, there were insufficient data to determine causes for the delays.  


- (7) (U) The issue of the Secretary of Defense delegating OPLAN change authority to the CJCS was not resolved during the exercise, nor was it intended that it would be resolved.

f. (U) Recommendations

- (1) (U) The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider a full test of new CAS procedures regarding competing multiple crisis requirements in designing the next deployment exercise.
- (2) (U) The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider changing JOPS Volume IV to require:
  - (a) (U) Statements of authority in changes to Alert and Execute Orders
  - (b) (U) Originators of CAS messages to state in each message any deviation from full plan applicability; i.e., phase(s) or option(s).

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(3) (U) The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider examining CAS to identify any procedures that cause unnecessary delay in the decision process during multiple OPLAN implementation.

(4) (U) All commands and agencies participating in CAS should conduct training for the revised CAS procedures.

(5) (U) A command executing an OPLAN should state the plan's originator as well as its number in the text of the execution order, to avoid identification with similarly numbered plans.

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## SECTION VI

### (U) NMCC OPERATIONS

1. (U) Major Objective. Evaluate the extent to which the operating procedures of the National Military Command Center (NMCC) facilitate the JCS decisionmaking process.

2. (U) Synopsis. Members of the Operations Planners Group (OPG) were well prepared at STARTEX to accomplish their tasks. Guidelist Items from JAI 3000.1 had been reviewed and were a part of the 87 Status of Action (SOA) items that existed when play began. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff participated regularly along with other principals. The Secretary of Defense and his Deputy regularly reviewed and signed many of the exercise memorandums sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Having many principals in key decisionmaking positions gave a depth of experience and view that is frequently lacking in exercises. Players did not take advantage of this senior level play. Issues and problems were often buried in information briefings. Early exercise briefings provided information to principals and did not use the time available to have principals discuss central problems.

3. (U) System Description. The System Description for NMCC Operations is found in Tab E to Appendix 1 to Annex G to the COSIN to the JCS EXPLAN 0022.

#### 4. (U) Analysis

a. (U) Exercise Consideration. Operations security dictated that some voice conferences in the exercise be secure. Normally, the Deputy Director for Operations (DDO) would convene a nonsecure conference which would take a shorter period of time.

#### b. (U) Specific Analysis Objectives

(1) (U) Determine the adequacy of procedures for monitoring mobilization and deployment as well as internal Joint Staff communications and information flow to support decisionmaking within the Joint Staff. These procedures include information collecting, problem identification, and preparation of decision briefings (which include emphasis on option development and decision implementation).

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- (2) (U) Determine the adequacy of the OPG physical facility and JCS and Service OPG staffing to support action processing during a crisis.
- (3) (U) Determine the effectiveness of procedures used by the OPG to monitor implementation of required items in JAI 3000.1, Joint Readiness Actions Guidelists, and LERTCON Actions, Alert System of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (4) (U) Determine the degree to which decision presentations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and OSD highlighted the implications of key decisions on collateral matters. This includes the use of executive aids such as the AOBC.
- (5) (U) Determine the adequacy of the guidance provided to the Chairman's Briefing Staff by the OPG for the preparation and presentation of briefings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (6) (U) Determine the extent to which information presented in OJCS briefings contributed to the timeliness and quality of decisions made during the briefings.
- (7) (U) Determine the adequacy of established procedures to provide basic intelligence to support plan development and execution planning.

c. (U) Discussion

(1) (U) Status of Actions

(a) (U) The Crisis Staffing Procedures (CSP) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide a tracking scheme for actions directed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The OPG is the central point in the scheme and uses a Status of Action system to follow actions from receipt to completion. During the exercise, the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff (SJCS) and Director of Support Services (DSS) directed actions under their respective cognizance to the OPG.

(b) ~~(c)~~ All Exercise PROUD SABER 83 actions received by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were tasked to the OPG. The executive officer (XO), OPG recorded in the Status of Action (SOA) log those actions formally processed by the Joint Staff. There were 526 SOA items, of which 87 were assigned for action prior to STARTEX. Figure VI-1 shows the originator of the actions. The percentage of actions originated by principals

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is shown by the sections on Figure VI-1 labeled CJCS, DJS, J-3, J-4, COPG, and VCOPG. The RDJTF had a large number of action items as would be expected in a deployment to SWA. Not expected were the large numbers of actions originated by PACOM. Events in two areas, SWA and Korea, contributed to this. A significant number of actions, originated by the OPG team chief, were started and completed prior to STARTEX.

(c) ~~(S)~~ The XO, OPG received messages from a printer in the administrative area. These messages went to the team chief and sometimes to the Vice Chairman, OPG (VCOPG) for assignment as actions. A suspense time was assigned. Table VI-1 shows processing times for actions for several recent exercises.

1. ~~(S)~~ The 5 hour 50 minute average period for messages to be assigned in Exercise PROUD SABER 83 was the longest time in any recent exercise. Over 70 percent of messages assigned to the SOA were assigned in less than 6 hours. The median time was about 3 hours 30 minutes. About 50 percent more messages were assigned to the SOA during the PM shift (noon to midnight local) than the AM shift. The median assignment time for messages received during the AM shift was about 2 hours 20 minutes and during the PM shift 4 hours 40 minutes. Four messages had assignment times over 36 hours and 28 messages over 12 hours, which distorted the average assignment time. Normally messages become assigned as actions 2 to 3 hours after being received at the OPG printer.

2. ~~(S)~~ The average total elapsed time to process actions from receipt as a message to transmission of a reply was 31 hours and 5 minutes. This time is similar to that experienced in past mobilization exercises but almost twice as long as that experienced in other types of exercises.

(d) ~~(S)~~ Figure VI-2 shows the daily workload in the OPG. About 30 to 40 new actions were received daily. About 30 actions a day were completed. An expected drop in actions completed over the weekend, 30 and 31 October, did not occur. Such a drop was expected since no briefings for principals were scheduled.

(e) ~~(S)~~ During the exercise, there were 526 actions listed in the SOA summary. At ENDEX, 8 percent of all actions remained incomplete. Figure VI-3 provides


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NOTE: 1) OTHER INCLUDES 'STATE' (2.3%) AND 'CIA' (0.2%)  
2) SOURCE OF INFORMATION IS OPG SOA SUMMARY

Figure VI-1. (U) Origins of Actions in the Joint Chiefs of Staff

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TABLE VI-1. (U) PROCESSING TIMES FOR OPG ACTIONS

	AVERAGE ELAPSED TIME BETWEEN RECEIPT AND ASSIGNMENT	AVERAGE ELAPSE TIME BETWEEN ASSIGNED AND COMPLETION	TOTAL AVERAGE ELAPSED TIME
<u>MOBILIZATION EXERCISES</u>			
PROUD SABER 83	5 HR 50 MIN	25 HR 15 MIN	31 HR 5 MIN
PROUD SPIRIT 80	1 HR 46 MIN	26 HR 57 MIN	28 HR 55 MIN
NIFTY NUGGET 78	2 HR 54 MIN	18 HR* 36 MIN	30 HR 36 MIN
<u>SIOP EXERCISES</u>			
IVY LEAGUE 82	2 HR 10 MIN	10 HR 34 MIN	12 HR 11 MIN
PRIZE GAUNTLET 80	3 HR 3 MIN	10 HR 25 MIN	13 HR 28 MIN
<u>NATO EXERCISES</u>			
POLL STATION 81	2 HR 55 MIN	14 HR 22 MIN	17 HR 34 MIN
POWER PLAY 79	1 HR 21 MIN	14 HR 44 MIN	16 HR 5 MIN
<u>REGIONAL EXERCISE</u>			
POTENT PUNCH 81	2 HR 48 MIN	13 HR 43 MIN	16 HR 31 MIN

\* DOES NOT INCLUDE 12 HOUR DAILY NO PLAY PERIOD.

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



Figure VI-2. (U) Daily Number of OPG Actions Assigned and Completed

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THERE WERE 526 TOTAL SOA ITEMS.

- NOTE: 1) 'OTHER' INCLUDES 13 ACTIONS WITH DAILY SUSPENSES AND 2 ACTIONS HELD WITH NO FURTHER ACTION PENDING.  
2) ACTIONS WERE COMPLETED ON THE AVERAGE 4 HOURS AND 34 MINUTES LATE.

Figure VI-3. (U) Status of Actions in the OPG as Recorded in the Status of Actions Summary

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a summary of the final status of all OPG actions as noted in the SOA summary. On the average, actions were completed 4 hours and 34 minutes after their assigned suspense. Thirty-five percent of the completed actions were completed before their suspense.

(2) (U) Briefings to Decisionmakers

(a) ~~(S)~~ Each day, the COPG conducted information and decision briefings for the Operations Deputies and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a major exception to the daily briefings, there were no briefings 30 and 31 October (a weekend). The Secretary of Defense was included in an emergency briefing for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 1 November. Table VI-2 depicts the number of items discussed at senior levels during briefings. Also included is the number of daily Crisis Management Organization (CMO) board meetings. The SJCS published results of briefings indicating items considered and listing decisions and taskings made. Many of the taskings were recorded then on the SOA summary.

(b) (U) At the first JCS briefing, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff provided guidance on specific actions for the OPG to pursue in the early phases of the exercise. Until the Chairman's comments, there was little guidance to players about the focus of actions and briefings.

(c) (U) Although there was more discussion by principals than in earlier exercises, meetings and briefings in the first week of the exercise were oriented more toward problems and too little to problem solutions and guidance. There seemed to be little control of briefings and material presented. Issues and problems were buried in information briefings and separated from related material. Update briefings became longer and longer until the DJS placed a half-hour time limit on update and information briefings. Quality of graphics was as good or better than previous exercises. The briefings did not provide information required by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to carry out their responsibilities.

(d) (U) During the second week, changes were made to briefing procedures. A coordinated and integrated operations-intelligence update briefing was provided at the 1 November OpsDepts meeting. The COPG began an early review of the agenda and proposed material for that day's consideration. Agendas were reduced .

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TABLE VI-2. (U) SENIOR LEVEL DECISIONMAKER BRIEFINGS

		OCTOBER								NOVEMBER					
		25	26	27	28	29	30	31	1	2	3	4	5	TOTAL	
OPS DEPS	# ITEMS BRIEFED	2	4	4	6	6	X	X	12	6	5	5	4	54	
	# ITEMS CONSIDERED				4	3				4	2	1		14	
	# DECISIONS MADE		2	1	4	4				4	4	1		20	
	# TASKINGS MADE		5	2	5	7				9	4	1		33	
JCS	# ITEMS BRIEFED	4	1	4	2	3	X	X	11	X	3	4	X	32	
	# ITEMS CONSIDERED		3	1	1	1			7		1	1		15	
	# DECISIONS MADE	0	3	3	1	1			7		1	3		19	
	# TASKINGS MADE	6	2	4	1	2			2		1	1		19	
CMO	# MEETINGS HELD	5	5	2	4	1	X	X	3	2	2	4	1	29	

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to include only an update briefing and items carefully selected for consideration.

(3) (U) DEFCON Changes

(a) ~~(S)~~ At each anticipated DEFCON change, the Joint Staff had instructions to review certain items for possible action. This review is described in JAI 3000.1. Many of the early SOA items were a result of the review for ROUND HOUSE which was set on 10 October. No similar formal review was held prior to the change to FAST PACE.

(b) ~~(S)~~ At STARTEX, all commands except NORAD had been at ROUND HOUSE for 15 days. Figure VI-4 shows a time-line of the DEFCON changes that occurred during exercise play. Deteriorating conditions in Korea brought on the changes that led to CFC declaring COCKED PISTOL at 281615Z October. The Soviet invasion of Iran on 4 November caused all commands to go to FAST PACE on 4 November.

(c) (U) All commands except NORAD were at ROUND HOUSE at STARTEX. NORAD was held at DOUBLE TAKE to exercise the Canadian consultation procedures required to raise NORAD to a higher DEFCON. The Canadian Government was not convinced that the situation was serious enough to warrant increased readiness. Early actions included proposed memorandums to the Department of State to consult with the Canadian External Affairs Minister concerning the increased readiness for NORAD. Telephone calls were initiated at several levels with the Government of Canada (GOC) to expedite increased readiness. Such phone calls were being arranged when information was received from the National Defense Operations Center (NDOC) that the GOC cabinet was meeting shortly and expected to approve increased readiness. NORAD went to DOUBLE TAKE at 261600Z October. The delay in increasing the readiness of NORAD to DOUBLE TAKE resulted principally from a reluctance by the GOC to increase readiness based on information available to Canada.

(4) (U) ROK-CFC Command Relations

(a) ~~(S)~~ Exercise PROUD SABER 83 highlighted a problem previously recognized in Exercise POTENT PUNCH 81. Upon activation of the Air Component Command (ACC) of the CFC, the Commander, 5th Air Force, from Japan, moves to ROK and becomes the Commander, ACC. The

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


Figure VI-4. (U) Timeline of DEFCON Declarations

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Commander, 5th Air Force is also the Commander, US Forces Japan (COMUSJAPAN). While in the ROK, the duties of Commander, 5th Air Force and COMUSJAPAN must be performed by deputies in Japan. Although the US ambassador would take the lead in negotiations with the GOJ concerning support of US Forces by GOJ, the military position may well be the critical element. Although having the principal on the scene may not resolve all problems, it is important to have appropriate military advice when international issues are involved in military operations.

(b) ~~let~~ In Exercise PROUD SABER 83, PACAF requested that the peacetime COMUSJAPAN be returned to Japan from his wartime position as Commander, ACC, because of extremely critical negotiations required with the GOJ. CINCCFC urged the retention of his wartime ACC commander as critical to the needs of the CFC. On 31 October CINCPAC disapproved the return of the peacetime COMUSJAPAN to Japan. The situation in Japan regarding negotiations of possible additional US Force's rights was not resolved.

(5) (U) Crisis Organization and Operations

(a) (U) The exercise crisis organization began to function with the first SOA item, assigned on 6 October for action. The team chief continued to assign items for review and possible action. An in-depth briefing and review of the exercise scenario and crisis organization was conducted for OPG team members just prior to STARTEX. There were several changes in the OPG organization from previous exercises. These changes made the OPG more responsive.

1. (U) The OSD was represented by the new Crisis Management Organization (CMO). The OSD Liaison Office was not formed. The interface among the OJCS, OSD, and the participating civil agencies was managed by liaison officers in the OPG and the Crisis Coordination Group. There are further details concerning the interface between OJCS and the CMO in Section VII, Civil-Military Interface.

2. (U) A Director for Operations/DIA Crisis Briefing Information Area (CBIA) was set aside in the Current Action Center of the NMCC. Briefers in the CBIA provided current operations and intelligence information to senior players upon request. This arrangement was intended to replace briefing

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books normally prepared for principals prior to briefings. The arrangement of space and available briefing aids changed several times as requirements became better known. Since the CBIA was intended to provide only limited operations and intelligence updates, in-depth questions asked by senior players could not be answered by the briefers. The concept of the CBIA however was well received by senior players as a means to reduce formal briefing time.

(b) (U) OPG staffing was sufficient to process required actions. Procedures in the CSP-JCS provide for each agency or office in the OPG to have one Planner or representative, except the JCS Operations Directorate which has two. Actions are not worked in the OPG but are worked by players in the various response cells. Planners and representatives in the OPG used several means to manage the workload. The Operations Directorate used their two Planners to manage actions. In addition, NMCC Operations Teams personnel were integrated into the OPG. Team personnel knowledge of facilities and procedures greatly assisted operations in the OPG. The USAF Planner had an assistant in the OPG. Other Planners tasked their supporting response cell or headquarters to perform coordinating functions. There were problems in the interface between the LRC and the OPG which are described in Section IV, Logistics. The XO OPG used the SOA Summary showing incomplete actions to provide overall coordination of action processing for the OPG. Except for the large number of messages each player had to screen for actions, there were few complaints about the procedures used to process actions in the OPG.

(c) (U) The message distribution in the OPG administrative area was vastly improved from previous exercises. A multi-copy high-speed printer was moved from the JCS message center to the OPG to provide message service. This printer could be programmed to sort messages for up to 75 locations. Each location can be programmed to accept or reject messages based on keywords and other criteria provided by message recipients. Players remarked that the message processor was an outstanding improvement to OPG operations. Although no attempt was made to screen traffic by subject and distribute to those with an interest, experience from Exercise PROUD SABER 83 is to be used to program the message printer in future exercises.

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(d) (U) NIDS and WIN terminals were located in the OPG area. Discussion of their utility is found in Section VIII, WWMCCS ADP and WIN Support.

(e) (U) The closed circuit TV was not used for spot announcements or information on fast-breaking situations. This deprived the players of any sense of urgency or involvement in the tense situation in SWA and Korea. The closed circuit TV was only used to present the change-over shift briefings and to view the daily OpsDepts and JCS briefings.

(f) (U) The use by players in the OPG of ADP and WIN as operational tools appeared to have diminished when compared to previous exercises. Fewer WIN-passed messages circulated in the OPG than in the past. The primary use of the WWMCCS ADP terminals in the OPG was for maintenance of the status of actions. The capability for easy retrieval and distribution of a current SOA allowed the OPG to published the SOA in several different versions; e.g., a full list or by open items per OPR.

(6) (U) Topic Exclusions. No significant analysis could be made of the following topic areas contained in the A&DCP Exercise PROUD SABER 83.

(a) (U) Use of executive aids to support decision briefings

(b) (U) Adequacy of established procedures to provide basic intelligence.

d. (U) Findings

(1) (U) The guidance provided by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff for early exercise actions was more specific and timely than in any recent exercise.

(2) ~~(C)~~ Briefings were not structured toward the kinds of issues and decisions that would be expected by our highest level military decisionmakers. Briefers tended to spend too much time on detail and did not focus on world-wide priorities and strategy options.

(3) ~~(C)~~ Players in the Joint Staff were not familiar with consultation procedures with Canada when NORAD proposed an increased readiness posture. Some delays occurred while US players attempted to reach Canadian counterparts to convince them to increase NORAD's DEFCON.



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(4) ~~(C)~~ Wartime manning in the ROK of CFC staffs by US personnel creates significant high-ranking command vacancies in the PACOM area.

(5) (U) Status of Actions processing in the OPG was adequate and effective for monitoring the progress of actions assigned by the OPG. The average elapsed time for completion of action processing from receipt in the OPG was 31 hours and 5 minutes. This was similar to the 29 to 30 hours processing time found in earlier mobilization exercises.

(6) (U) A new message printer in the OPG administrative area provided a major improvement in the sorting of messages. All copies of all messages went to each player, but the printer can be programmed to provide only those kinds of messages each player needs.

(7) (U) The Crisis Briefing Information Area (CBIA) had limited success in performing its role of updating senior players prior to major briefings.

(8) (U) Closed circuit TV was not used for spot announcements or current events. Sufficient critical events occurred to have caused several urgent announcements.

(9) (U) WWMCCS ADP support, specifically the Status of Action Summary, provided significant assistance to the OPG.

### e. (U) Conclusions

(1) (U) Early guidance by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to JCS players provided a focus for matters to be resolved during the initial part of the exercise. Several times during the exercise, players used this guidance to assist in actions being staffed.

(2) ~~(C)~~ The briefings provided in the ECR would have been more effective if they had been structured to provide high-level decisionmakers the information they needed to make decisions.

(3) (U) The procedures in the OPG for controlling and processing actions worked. Some minor changes, however, were required to accommodate the few problems that developed during the exercise.

(4) ~~(C)~~ Although some players were not familiar with Canadian coordination procedures, most of the delay in,



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NORAD going to ROUND HOUSE was Canada's lack of conviction that the situation warranted the change.

(5) ~~(C)~~ COMUSJAPAN (Commander, 5th Air Force) may not be available for international negotiations in Japan due to the requirements of wartime manning for the US-ROK effort in Korea.

(6) (U) Further refinement is required in the operation of the Crisis Briefing Information Area to make it a more effective part of the crisis organization.

(7) (U) Compared to manual sorting of messages, the advantages of the multi-copy programable printer in the OPG were such that its permanent installation in the OPG administration area should be considered.

(8) (U) The closed circuit TV was underused as a capability for keeping players aware of the current situation and upcoming requirements.

## f. (U) Recommendations

(1) (U) The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider revising the current NMCC OI, "Briefing for Senior Defense Officials in the NMCC/NMIC" to reflect the briefing requirements when the Joint Chiefs of Staff use the emergency operating procedures. The Crisis Staffing Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, currently under revision, should provide guidance for development of briefings for senior decisionmakers.

(2) (U) The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider reviewing and revising the Crisis Staffing Procedures of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to:

(a) (U) Better define the use and functions of the Crisis Briefing Information Area

(b) (U) Resolve minor details in the administrative processing of Joint Staff actions.

(3) ~~(C)~~ The Services should consider reviewing wartime manning by senior officers in the Western Pacific to insure that appropriate senior officers are available to participate in US Wartime Base Rights negotiations with countries adjacent to any conflict.

(4) (U) The Director of Support Services, OJCS, should consider the permanent installation of a multi-copy,

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programable message printer, like that used during the exercise, in the OPG administrative area.

(5) (U) The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider the use of spot closed circuit TV announcements in the NMCC when significant changes occur in a crisis.

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## SECTION VII

### (U) CIVIL-MILITARY INTERFACE

1. (U) Major Objective. Determine the effectiveness of plans and procedures for noncombatant evacuation operations, procedures to respond to requests for military support for civil authorities, and civil-military coordination processes.
2. (U) Synopsis. In a crisis situation, civil-military interactions could range from normal operational coordination to full integration of the civilian and military sectors. In Exercise PROUD SABER 83 only three such systems were exercised. These systems were noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), military support for civil authorities, and the prototype OSD Crisis Management Organization (CMO). Two other civil-military interface areas, overflight rights and civil affairs, although not mentioned in the Analysis and Data Collection Plan are included in this analysis.
  - a. ~~(S)~~ Because of exercise design constraints, NEO reporting procedures could not be fully evaluated. However, the exercise data confirmed the need for a single DOD agency to be responsible for NEO planning on a total systems basis.
  - b. ~~(S)~~ Coordination of military support among civil and military agencies was not always effective. Some civil requests failed to reach the DOD executive agent for selected categories of military support. Senior exercise participants expressed concern for the vulnerability of the Nation's industrial sites and transportation and communications networks to sabotage.
  - c. (U) Exercise PROUD SABER 83 involved wide-spread OSD participation. OSD principals and their subordinates responded to actions through the CMO. The CMO played an important role in coordinating inter- and intra-DOD actions. Active play by OSD principals resulted in slower but more realistic response times than in previous exercises. These slower responses reflected real-world principals' difficulties of grappling with decisions on OJCS problems.
  - d. (U) Civil affairs includes the relationships of military forces with the civil authorities and people in an area where

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the forces are deployed. Exercise events disclosed a need to develop staffing action procedures for the JCS Joint Civil Affairs Committee.

e. (U) Potentially serious overflight rights problems were disclosed during the exercise but were not given sufficient attention by exercise participants.

3. (U) System Description. Tab F to Appendix 1 to Annex G to the COSIN to JCS EXPLAN 0022 contains the system descriptions for military support for civil authorities, NEO, and the CMO.

4. (U) Analysis

a. (U) Exercise Considerations. Exercise considerations for this analysis area appear in Paragraph 3 of the Tab described in Paragraph 3 above. Additional considerations were the OJCS controllers' decision for the Air Staff to initiate all statistical NEO reporting and the rescission of that artificiality in mid-exercise. The civilian-military NEO interface could not be examined thoroughly since not all NEO authorities participated in the exercise; e.g. the Department of State and embassies.

b. (U) Specific Analysis Objectives

(1) (U) Determine the effectiveness of the coordination processes among the OJCS, OSD, commanders of unified and specified commands, Services, DOD agencies, and Federal departments and agencies in a global crisis scenario.

(2) (U) Determine the effectiveness of the plans and procedures for the evacuation and CONUS reception and processing of noncombatants from selected theaters of operations.

(3) (U) Determine the effectiveness of DOD procedures to respond to requests for military support for civil authorities while maintaining force readiness for military operations.

(4) (U) Determine the effectiveness of the civil-military interface, traffic flow, safe haven arrangements, and accounting for evacuees.

(5) (U) Determine the adequacy and timeliness of reporting systems used to follow the status of NEO.

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(6) (U) Determine the adequacy of current regulations which would allow the theater to retain key US civilian personnel during NEO.

(7) (U) Determine the impact on theater forces of the depleted US civilian work force.

(8) (U) Determine the effectiveness of interfaces between civil and military representatives in processing requests for military support.

(9) (U) Identify any incidents where military support for civil authorities interfered with military operational readiness, and evaluate procedures used to resolve resultant conflicts.

(10) (U) Determine the degree to which the existence and functioning of the OSD CMO assist the OJCS in crisis management.

(11) (U) Determine the adequacy of consideration given overflight rights in the exercise.

(12) (U) Determine the usefulness of JCS procedures to deal with civil affairs matters.

c. (U) Discussion

(1) ~~(S)~~ NEO Responsibilities in Southwest Asia. Exercise PROUD SABER 83 demonstrated that command responsibilities for NEO in SWA are still not understood.

(a) ~~(S)~~ COMRDJTF (270350Z Oct) requested USCINCEUR to advise the status of SWA NEO. USCINCEUR (271447Z Oct) replied that the status was not known, as military assistance to the Department of State was COMRDJTF's responsibility, in accordance with the USCINCEUR-COMRDJTF Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) dated 5 April 1982.

(b) ~~(S)~~ COMRDJTF (290250Z Oct) then requested JCS authority to coordinate NEO in SWA. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (300245Z Oct) granted coordination authority and stated that responsibility for evacuation would pass to COMRDJTF when the JOA was operational and mutually agreed to by USCINCEUR and COMRDJTF. COMRDJTF (301745Z Oct) replied that COMRDJTF and USCINCEUR considered that responsibility had passed to COMRDJTF with JOA activation on C-day at 251800Z October.

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(c) ~~(S)~~ The USCINCEUR-COMRDJTF MOU states that prior to deployment of the RDJTF, USCINCEUR is responsible for NEO and retains that responsibility until the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct otherwise. While it recognizes COMRDJTF as the supported commander during deployment and employment, the MOU states that other command relationships will be determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(d) ~~(S)~~ Responsibility for NEO from Pakistan was not understood by all participants even though that country was included in the RDJTF JOA. The OJCS (312350Z Oct) requested CINCPAC to conduct NEO in Pakistan. CINCPAC (011510Z Nov) replied that with the JOA activated, CINCPAC's conduct of NEO in RDJTF JOA countries would be inappropriate. The OJCS (021941Z Nov) then requested COMRDJTF to assume responsibilities for such operations, with CINCPAC assisting as feasible.

(2) (U) Retention of Key Civilians

(a) ~~(S)~~ Exercise PROUD SPIRIT 80 discussed retaining US civilian employees in Europe during a rising tension period or upon hostilities commencing. RAP 222 was established in a prior exercise citing a need for authority to retain critical civilians in overseas theaters.

(b) ~~(S)~~ In Exercise PROUD SABER 83 MSEL 434, CINCUSAREUR (260930Z Oct) requested authority to retain key Department of the Army (DA) civilians overseas. CINCUSAREUR stated that those civilians were not currently bound by law to remain after mobilization. HQDA (271000Z Oct) replied that there was no authority for key civilian involuntary retention.

(c) ~~(S)~~ CINCUSAREUR (090730Z Nov) reported that "Loss of DA civilian incumbents in critical positions would severely downgrade support to the military mission...particularly in tactical support functions such as...intelligence...special weapons and ammunition surveillance, rear area security...logistics, finance and engineer...requirements."

(3) (U) NEO Planning and Coordination

(a) ~~(S)~~ Responding to a Secretary of Defense request, OJCS (011938Z Nov) requested USCINCEUR's concept of operations for voluntary NEO. USCINCEUR (030935Z Nov)

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replied that there was no established voluntary NEO concept of operations and suggested that injecting such action in the exercise scenario might be inappropriate.

(b) ~~(S)~~ A postexercise Department of State NEO critique stated "The authority for Noncombatant Operations in the Department of Defense is unclear. There does not seem to be a central clearing house for statistics, for command decisions, or for coordination among the commands."

(c) ~~(S)~~ The Director for Logistics, OJCS, First Impressions memorandum reported "The (NEO) program lacks overall coordination at all levels....At STARTEX, the JCS LRC received numerous NEO movement reports from diversified agencies....At the OJCS level, there was confusion as to how many noncombatants had been evacuated and from where....The NEO program needs to be addressed from top to bottom."

(d) ~~(S)~~ HQDA (110400Z Nov), stated "PROUD SABER revealed disconnects in DOD and Department of State planning. United States ability to evacuate large numbers of noncombatants simultaneously in a multiple contingency proved inadequate....There is no established mechanism to ensure that evacuation operations overseas are synchronized with repatriation operations in CONUS....Within the Department of Defense, no agency is assigned as overall executive agent responsible for evacuation/repatriation planning on a total systems basis."

(4) (U) NEO Reporting

(a) (U) The Joint Staff exercise controllers (JCS 161838Z Oct) directed that no NEO reports be transmitted from the overseas areas since all statistical reporting would be initiated by the Air Staff. This intentional artificiality was designed to provide maximum exercise play for the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). The message caused problems in subsequent NEO actions, however, since not all major participants were addressees.

(b) ~~(S)~~ On 27 October, it was stated at an OSD CMO briefing that 68,000 citizens had left SWA. The DA figure briefed to OJCS on the same day was 4,000.

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(c) ~~(S)~~ Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) (280230Z Oct) stated that many activities were involved in NEO with sometimes varying information. MTMC recommended establishing a focal point to issue coordinated instructions on the use of airlift and sealift. In this regard, the USCINCSO First Impression Report (121815Z Nov) stated that "...It was particularly frustrating...to be virtually surrounded with surface carriers and be told that for exercise purposes USSOUTHCOM could not utilize US shipping for its evacuation operations."

(d) ~~(S)~~ COMUSKOREA (290200Z Oct) reported "...It appears...that each originating activity is operating independently....no noncombatants have been evacuated ...however, according to PACAF, WESTCOM, Secretary of State, and HQDA, we've been evacuating noncombatants for over a week....uncoordinated initiatives have placed us in an awkward position....Request guidance as soon as possible."

(e) ~~(S)~~ CINCPAC (290735Z Oct) replied that JCS message 161838Z Oct (controller message) was the source of the problem and that neither COMUSKOREA nor CINCPAC were addressees.

(f) ~~(S)~~ On 29 October, DHHS reported to OSD that of 9,000 evacuees landing at McGuire AFB, 3,400 were foreign nationals. DHHS asked how those people were able to board the aircraft.

(g) (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff (310919Z Oct) rescinded JCS message 161838Z Oct and directed NEO reporting in accordance with routine practices.

(h) ~~(S)~~ The Secretary of State (022235Z Nov) reported that the number of evacuees remaining could be provided only if all commands provided data, but no data had been received.

(5) (U) Military Support for Civil Authorities

(a) ~~(S)~~ At the 291530Z October FEMA meeting of the Interagency Emergency Coordinating Group (IECG) the Department of the Treasury raised the issue of facility security since the National Guard was not available. The IECG considered establishment of a home guard.

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(b) ~~(S)~~ The Director for Logistics, OJCS, noted (Memorandum J4DM-674-82 3 Dec 82) that the exercise demonstrated inadequate security at critical points within the CONUS transportation network. COMDT COGARD First Impressions message (102132Z Nov) reported that "...There appears to be a void in planning for protection of CONUS transportation facilities..." Exercise play disclosed similar vulnerabilities in communications (DCA 030416Z Nov), hydroelectric power (TRADOC 251530Z Oct), and key industrial facilities (INSCOM 210800Z Oct). Consequently, terrorist attacks could have had an adverse impact on an actual mobilization and deployment effort.

(c) (U) On 27 October FEMA Headquarters informed HQDA that FEMA Region VI would request post-hurricane damage assessment assistance from Commander, Fifth US Army. Army coordinated with Air Force for aircraft, but FEMA's request specified no times or coordinates. The FEMA regional headquarters stated that a check of requirements would be made. The CONUS Army headquarters never received the requested information.

(d) ~~(S)~~ At the 301400Z October FEMA Headquarters briefing the FEMA Director was informed that FEMA did not have a complete picture of requests for military support.

(e) ~~(S)~~ Throughout the exercise HQDA was unable to establish secure voice communications with FEMA and had to use AUTODIN.

(f) ~~(S)~~ FEMA (010731Z Nov) reported requests for military support that were not coordinated with HQDA nor received by subordinate Army headquarters. HQDA (020509Z Nov) requested FEMA to confirm with the regions that the requests had in fact been referred to the appropriate CONUS Army headquarters. FEMA (021742Z Nov) stated that FEMA would work with its regional offices to assure continued coordination with appropriate CONUS Army headquarters.

(g) ~~(C)~~ USCINCREC anticipated possible transition to Military Support of Civil Defense (MSCD). On the first day of the exercise USCINCREC (252022Z Oct) asked DA and FORSCOM to inform USREDCOM of all military support requested. However, by the seventh day USCINCREC (312125Z Oct) reported that no information on military support requests had been received, even

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though FEMA situation reports were stating that such requests had been made.

(h) (U) The 2 November FEMA Emergency Information and Coordination Center situation summary indicated a procedural misunderstanding by FEMA. FEMA Region VIII had requested helicopters to inspect flood damage in North Dakota. Commander, Sixth US Army advised that Army Regulation 500-60 authorized responding to such a request from the Corps of Engineers. There was no authority to respond to the FEMA region's direct request.

(i) (S) Briefings for OJCS decisionmakers lacked information on the civil sector. A FEMA representative gave a short briefing on civil activities on the first day of the exercise. No other civil sector briefings were given until 4 November. On that date the operations briefer presented the civil situation in response to a Navy OpsDep request on 3 November. FEMA was prepared to provide information to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in similar format to the daily briefing provided to the Crisis Control Group of the CMO.

(j) (S) FEMA (310245Z Oct) requested DA to provide military assistance for traffic control in Massachusetts, Maryland, Virginia, and Florida. HQDA (311300Z Oct) passed action to Chief, National Guard Bureau and Commander, FORSCOM but encouraged the use of alternate sources such as the evacuees themselves for traffic control.

(k) (S) FEMA (042105Z Nov) stated that classified DOD message traffic hampered discussion of external security at critical commercial facilities. FEMA further recommended that the National Guard Bureau be given action for such security. But, by this point in mobilization, there were no longer any National Guard troops available.

(l) (S) In a 4 November memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the OJCS reported that commitments for civil support had no adverse impact on operations and plans. Virtually no troops had been diverted to civil support by that time since FEMA's reported regional requests had not been received by CONUS Army headquarters.

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(6) (U) Crisis Management Organization

(a) (U) The exercise provided the first opportunity to test the CMO. The exercise play demonstrated that the CMO concept is sound and that it offers an improvement in crisis management for OSD. A separate analysis report is being prepared by OSD to evaluate the CMO.

(b) (U) The play of OSD principals contributed significantly to the realism of the exercise. Issues requiring OSD action and coordination were staffed, if required, through the boards and committees of the CMO for decisions by the principals. Although this staffing caused time delays in getting decisions, the delays were shorter than previously experienced without the CMO.

(c) (U) The clearing house for action processing of the CMO is the Crisis Coordination Group (CCG). The CCG was useful for coordination among OSD components and between those components and external entities such as FEMA and the OJCS.

(d) (U) The information flow between the OJCS and OSD in a crisis would be similar to the information flow under normal circumstances with a modification caused by the activation of the CMO. The normal information flow between OJCS and OSD includes the sending of AUTODIN messages through the JCS MC, sending memorandums and other traffic through the Joint and OSD Secretariats to the OSD offices, and the interface between OJCS and OSD action officers. The OSD crisis management coordination system had OJCS crisis actions requiring OSD responses channeled through the CCG. The CCG was a function of the OSD executive secretariat, giving it responsibility for all actions similar to the OJCS OPG. However, the CCG had no decision authority like the OPG. As such, the CCG received all OSD crisis actions, accounted for those actions, and insured their proper staffing. During Exercise PROUD SABER 83 the CCG was used as both an action office and message center.

(e) (U) Liaison officers assigned to both the CCG and the OPG provided an additional information interface. The OSD liaison officer in the OPG was able to provide the CCG with a warning on high priority items. The liaison officer problems were two-fold: lack of a pneumatic tube and lack of secure telephones in the CCG. However, the liaison officer in the OPG sent a

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copy of the action or a note by pneumatic tube from the OPG to the JCS message center to OSD. The liaison officer contacted the CCG over non-secure lines to notify them of the sending of the message; a CCG officer would then pick up the item.


(f) (U) The CCG and the CMO boards and committees had staffing positions for OJCS liaison officers and representatives as shown in Figure VII-1. The responsibilities of these representatives, however, were not documented by either OSD or OJCS prior to the exercise. Thus, the OJCS representatives at the various boards and committees did not receive specific training or procedural guidance; e.g., checklists, guidelists, or forms. Procedures to receive and disseminate information discussed in a board or committee meeting were not developed within the OJCS. OJCS representatives had no procedures to elicit comparable senior level OJCS participation. Information had to enter the OJCS system at the action officer-level, not at the senior level.

(g) (U) OSD principals perceived the OJCS representatives as speaking for the Joint Chiefs of Staff when in fact the OJCS representative did not always have the authority to guarantee OJCS action. Interviews with OJCS representatives revealed their hesitancy to provide information on sensitive issues to the boards and committees without a point paper from OJCS.

(h) (U) The convening of CMO boards and committees did not take up a great deal of the OJCS representative's time. Meetings averaged one hour duration. Figure VII-2 illustrates the number of meetings by time and by board or committee.

(i) (U) The CMO concept provided for an exchange of liaison officers between the Crisis Coordination Group and the OJCS Operations Planners Group. A full-time liaison officer was provided to the OPG from the CCG, but OJCS liaison officers were not assigned full-time to the CCG. Inadequate OJCS representation in the CCG impeded CMO-OJCS coordination. For example, some uncertainty occurred when the CMO manpower board discussed full mobilization prior to a JCS recommendation for full mobilization. OJCS had the impression that the CMO was taking action on an issue that had not been recommended by the OJCS. The exchange of information between liaison officers did not clarify the problem. The problem was resolved when OSD provided

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


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Figure VII-1. (U) OSD Crisis Management Council (CMC) with OCS Representative

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Figure VII-1. (U) OSD Crisis Management Organization (CMO)



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	OCT. 25	OCT. 26	OCT. 27	OCT. 28	OCT. 29	OCT. 30-31	NOV. 1	NOV. 2	
CRISIS MANAGEMENT COUNCIL	*1515			1230					
POLITICO MILITARY BOARD							1430		
LOGISTICS AND MATERIAL BOARD			1530						
MANPOWER BOARD		1530							
HEALTH AFFAIRS BOARD		1400					1400		
POLICY GUIDANCE BOARD							1200		
FORCE EXPANSION COMMITTEE				1500					
ALLIED SUPPORT COMMITTEE									
SUPPLY AND MATERIAL MGMT COMMITTEE									
PRODUCTION MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE		1400						1400	
TRANSPORTATION MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE					1015				
INSTALLATIONS COMMITTEE									
SECURITY ASSISTANCE COMMITTEE	0900 1515	1000	0930	0900	(CANCELLED 0900)				
MILITARY MANPOWER ACCESSIONS COMMITTEE									(CA 1
CIVILIAN MANPOWER COMMITTEE	1300							1300	
MEDICAL MOBILIZATION AND DEPLOY- MENT STEERING COMMITTEE	1400			1400	(CANCELLED 1400)				
MOBILIZATION LEGAL COMMITTEE (DRAFT)		1000							
CRISIS COORDINATION GROUP	1100	1100	1100	1100	1100		1100	1100	
NUMBER OF MEETINGS BY DAY	6	6	3	5	2		4	3	

\* TIMES LOCAL

Figure VII-2. (U) Scheduling of CMO Boards and Committees



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OCT. 27	OCT. 28	OCT. 29	OCT. 30-31	NOV. 1	NOV. 2	NOV. 3	NOV. 4	NOV. 5	NO. OF MEETINGS
	1230			1430		1300			3
1530							1530		1
								1030	2
				1400			1000		2
				1200			1100		2
	1500						1300		1
									0
					1400				2
		1015							1
									0
0930	0900	(CANCELED 0900)				1545			6
						(CANCELED 1000)			0
					1300				2
	1400	(CANCELED 1400)							2
1100	1100	1100		1100	1100	1100	1100		9
3	5	2		4	3	3	5	1	38 TOTAL

Figure VII-2. (II) Scheduling of CMO Boards and Committees

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the OJCS with a briefing on the CMO concepts, components, and its functions.

(j) (U) A daily briefing was presented in the CCG to keep senior OSD officials apprised of current events and ongoing actions. Part of this daily briefing was an update on current JCS actions presented by a representative from OJCS. From the OSD perspective, they thought the daily JCS briefing was based on the briefing presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the CCG was presented with the OpsDeps pre-briefing information which did not necessarily parallel the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing. The OJCS provided a briefing officer from SAGA who briefed both the CCG and FEMA for their daily update briefings. His briefings did not reflect decisions by the OpsDeps or by the Joint Chiefs of Staff since the presentations were at about the same time. Time constraints and the scheduling of meetings prevented the OJCS briefer from providing the CCG with the official JCS briefing. The dual-tasking of the OJCS briefer prevented his attendance at the OpsDeps meeting which provided preparation for the Joint Chiefs of Staff briefing. OJCS briefings improved when an OJCS representative who attended the OpsDeps briefing attended the CCG briefing.

(7) (U) Overflight Rights

(a) ~~(S)~~ Each mobilization and deployment exercise has demonstrated the need for allied and third country military and political support. This support includes overflight rights and must be gained quickly prior to the deployment of forces. Few OPLANs reflect that overflight rights have been granted. Instead, commands must seek clearance on a case-by-case basis. Past crises and exercises demonstrate that when sensitive diplomatic issues are involved high-level Department of State assistance is required.

(b) ~~(S)~~ The Analysis Report for Exercise POSITIVE LEAP 80 recommended review and revision of procedures for obtaining diplomatic clearances in a crisis situation. JOPS Volume IV (Crisis Action System) provides for the statement of known operational constraints such as overflight in the Warning and Alert Order formats.

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(c) ~~(S)~~ Overflight rights activity in Exercise PROUD SABER 83 was limited. CINCPAC (272108Z Oct) requested assistance in obtaining overflight rights in SWA, but the message contained no specifics such as routes, times, or types of aircraft. The Joint Staff prepared a response requesting all planned and anticipated requirements.

(d) ~~(S)~~ CINCLANT perceived a threat to Iceland from Soviet surface forces. At 270039Z October CINCLANT requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate with the Department of State to obtain Government of Iceland permission to reinforce (includes overflight rights). DIA evaluated the Soviet forces as not a threat and the Joint Chiefs of Staff denied the CINCLANT request. Later development of a request which the Government of Iceland initially refused addressed reinforcement only.

(e) ~~(S)~~ At 251800Z October the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested impact statements on the Italian denial of overflight rights (MSEL 336). CINCUSNAVEUR (260743Z Oct) and CINCUSAFE (290906Z Oct) stated that such restrictions would seriously hamper COMRDTJTF support and deployment of forces. USCINCEUR (261752Z Oct) requested the Joint Chiefs of Staff to coordinate with the Department of State to obtain the required rights. The Plans and Policy Directorate, OJCS, prepared a memorandum to OSD containing a proposed memorandum to the Department of State, requesting assistance in obtaining Government of Italy approval. The Department of State later reported reversal of the Government of Italy position and the granting of overflight rights. At ENDEX, Joint Staff status of action records showed no further actions on allied or third country overflight rights.

(f) ~~(S)~~ Overflight of US territory by aircraft of a potential adversary was a related topic. HQ SAC (270111Z Oct) advised the OJCS of the security risks of such flights. A Soviet diplomatic flight had been allowed to overfly the United States enroute from Canada to Cuba. The Plans and Policy Directorate, OJCS, prepared a CJCS memorandum to the Secretary of Defense requesting that action be taken to discourage such flights. OSD coordinated with the Departments of State and Transportation, the CAB, and the FAA to deny rights of overflight of military installations. On 2 November, the Secretary of Defense advised the

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Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff that "...intergovernmental coordination of this request disclosed that no federal department or agency has the lead in these type activities. The proponent agency for the denials establishes an ad hoc working group from the offices listed above, works the problem until completed, and then disbands the ad hoc working group."

(8) (U) Joint Civil Affairs Committee

(a) (U) Civil affairs includes the relationships of military forces with the civil populace, institutions, and resources in an area where military forces are deployed. JCS Pub 2 authorizes a Joint Civil Affairs Committee when directed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. An Army general officer chairs the committee and general and flag officers from the other Services and the Joint Staff are members. No staffing action procedures for the committee are established, its charter stating that it will establish its own procedures. The Chief of Staff, US Army (CSA) is the executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for civil affairs planning.

(b) (U) An objective of establishing the Joint Civil Affairs Committee during Exercise PROUD SABER 83 was to test procedures developed by the committee, thereby validating the committee as a useful entity. The DA introductory briefer suggested using Joint Staff procedures rather than establishing new ones, and that suggestion was followed.

(c) (U) The committee agreed that it should be retained in its present form and constituted only when emergencies arise or are foreseen. It also agreed that Army should continue as peacetime executive agent for planning.

(9) (S) Declaration of a State of War. On 2 November the President announced that Congress had resolved that a state of war had existed between the DPRK and the United States since the initial DPRK attack on 1 November. SECDEF 030912Z Nov stated that there were substantial legal differences between a declaration of a state of war and a declaration of war, and that all communications should refer to a state of war. However, a DOD General Counsel memorandum on 3 November provided the authorities which would become available upon a declaration of war by Congress and stated that in Exercise PROUD SABER 83 they would apply in either a declaration of war or a declaration

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of a state of war. FEMA 040638Z Nov stated that the legal implications of a declaration of a state of war were identical to those of a declaration of war, which was correct. SECDEF 030912Z Nov was not rescinded and resulted in a time-consuming search by the PACOM staff for the legal differences. Apparently no command requested clarification and there is no record of NMCC involvement.

(10) (U) Topic Exclusions. No significant analyses could be made of the following topic areas contained in the A&DCP for Exercise PROUD SABER 83:

(a) (U) Evaluate the extent to which coordination required on questions of strategy delayed significant mobilization or deployment actions.

(b) (U) Evaluate the impact on transportation resources of the timing of each major decision concerning evacuation of noncombatants.

(c) (U) Evaluate the adequacy of military contingency plans related to military support for civil authorities.

(d) (U) Evaluate the interactions between CAS/TOP and the OSD Crisis Management Organization (CMO).

(e) (U) Evaluate the degree to which the OJCS interface with OSD and civil and Federal agencies provides the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the timely authorizations and information required to support OPLAN implementation. (See Section V.)

d. (U) Findings

(1) (U) NEO

(a) ~~(S)~~ Procedures for the transfer of responsibility for NEO from USCINCEUR to COMRDJTF in SWA were not clearly established.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Current regulations did not allow the unified commands to retain key US civilians in-theater during NEO.

(c) ~~(S)~~ There were no procedures to synchronize overseas NEO with CONUS repatriation operations.

(d) ~~(S)~~ There was no single DOD agency responsible for overall NEO planning and coordination.

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(e) ~~(S)~~ Because of the limited distribution of initial OJCS guidance, participants made numerous conflicting NEO movement reports. As a result, the OJCS was deprived of an accurate accounting for noncombatants evacuated from various locations.

(2) (U) Military Support for Civil Authorities

(a) ~~(S)~~ The CONUS transportation network and communications, power, and key industrial facilities were vulnerable to terrorist attacks that could disrupt mobilization and employment efforts.

(b) ~~(S)~~ The Secretary of the Army is the DOD executive agent for selected categories of military assistance. Nevertheless, FEMA reported many requests prepared within civil channels that failed to reach Army's Director of Military Support or the CONUS Army headquarters. HQDA determined that those requests had not in fact been made and therefore did not pass them to USREDCOM for information.

(c) ~~(S)~~ Briefings for OJCS decisionmakers lacked information on the civil sector.

(d) ~~(S)~~ FEMA recommended the use of National Guard resources to defend key facilities. In a full mobilization environment, these troops would probably not have been available.

(e) ~~(S)~~ The exercise did not fully test contingency plans and procedures for military support. Nor did it fully test procedures for the identification and processing of funding requirements and for the accountability for DOD materiel.

(3) (U) CMO

(a) (U) OSD play provided OJCS players with an accurate representation of OSD responses and the controversy inherent in crisis situations.

(b) (U) During Exercise PROUD SABER 83, the CCG functioned as a central point of contact for actions requiring OSD response. The CMO was able to accept and respond to crisis actions and meet suspenses for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(c) (U) The lack of adequate secure communications between the CCG and the OPG adversely affected the

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operations of the liaison officers at both the CCG and the OPG.

(d) (U) The CMO concept required OJCS staffing of boards and committees. OJCS provided representatives for all of the CMO boards and committees.

(e) (U) Selection of OJCS representatives to the boards and committees was not formalized. OJCS representatives to the boards and committees did not receive specific training or procedural guidance.

(f) (U) Procedures to obtain and disseminate board and committee information and integrate it into the OJCS system were not developed.

(g) (U) The scheduling of the OSD CCG, OJCS OpsDepts, and FEMA briefings prevented the OJCS briefer from providing the CCG with information from the OpsDepts briefing.

(4) (U) Overflight Rights

(a) ~~(S)~~ Warning and Alert Orders issued by the Joint Staff did not contain detailed information on overflight rights as recommended following Exercise POSITIVE LEAP 80.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Exercise participants did not examine in detail the potentially serious problem of overflight rights in SWA.

(5) (U) Joint Civil Affairs Committee

(a) (U) The Joint Civil Affairs Committee met for the first time during Exercise PROUD SABER 83 and acted within established Joint Staff procedures rather than developing new ones, which was an available option.

(b) (C) Time did not permit the committee to coordinate with the OSD CMO nor with the Department of State within normal staffing procedures.

(c) (U) JCS Fact Sheet #71 included a draft memorandum designating the members of the committee. Not all of the designated principal or alternate members attended the committee meeting.

(d) (U) The committee did not use or refer to the Joint Manual for Civil Affairs published in 1966.

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e. (U) Conclusions

(1) (U) NEO

(a) ~~(S)~~ Time could have been lost, lift could have been underused, and loss of life could have occurred because procedures for the transfer of NEO responsibility in SWA were not clear.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Without authority to retain key civilians in-theater, mission essential military support functions were severely downgraded.

(c) ~~(S)~~ There was a need for the identification of a single command or agency to coordinate DOD NEO responsibilities.

(d) (U) NEO reporting procedures could not be evaluated because of reports submitted in conflict with planned Air Staff reporting. Artificial preparation of all NEO reports by a single source should not be used when NEO reporting procedures are to be evaluated.

(2) (U) Military Support for Civil Authorities

(a) ~~(S)~~ Improved security procedures were needed at critical points in the CONUS transportation system and at important communications, power, and industrial facilities.

(b) (U) USCINCRD needed information with which to track units that might be committed to support civil authorities in order to be ready to assume MSCD responsibilities.

(c) ~~(S)~~ FEMA Headquarters and HQDA needed improvement in the coordination of military support requirements.

(d) ~~(S)~~ Participants apparently restrained the full play of resolving competing demands for military resources in order to avoid adversely affecting the mobilization scenario.

(3) (U) CMO

(a) (U) From an OJCS perspective the CMO worked extremely well in its first major operational test.

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Problems remained concerning interfaces, responsibilities, and procedures. CMO players worked effectively to provide guidance for the Department of Defense.

(b) (U) OSD exercise play provided players with an accurate appraisal of time and content of responses to actions.

(c) (U) The CCG required secure communications.

(d) (U) Formal OJCS staffing procedures for OJCS representatives to the CMO boards and committees were needed.

(e) (U) The concept of the OJCS liaison officer to the CCG was valid and needed to be reinforced. The duties and procedures of this position needed to be determined.

(f) (U) OJCS needed to formalize the flow of information collected by their liaison officers and representatives and disseminate it to senior level OJCS participants.

(g) (U) The OJCS briefer to the CCG should have attended the OJCS OpsDeps briefing prior to briefing the CCG.

(4) (U) Overflight Rights

(a) ~~(S)~~ Existing Joint Staff procedures for obtaining overflight rights were not fully used or tested.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Participants apparently did not fully address overflight problem areas such as SWA in order to avoid interference with exercise play.

(c) ~~(S)~~ Diplomatic problems associated with overflight rights were not adequately considered.

(5) (U) Joint Civil Affairs Committee

(a) (U) Joint Civil Affairs Committee staffing action procedures should not have been left for resolution by the members when first meeting. Time would have been saved if such administrative matters had been settled earlier.

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(b) (U) Committee coordination with the OSD CMO and the Department of State would have helped relate civil affairs policy to national objectives.

(c) (U) Attendance by all of the general and flag officers who constituted the committee would have emphasized the importance of civil affairs responsibilities.

f. (U) Recommendations

(1) (U) NEO

(a) (U) The Secretary of Defense should continue action to resolve RAP 222, Retention of Civilian Employees Overseas. A policy memorandum that would require key civilians to sign contracts to remain is under consideration within OSD.

(b) (U) The Secretary of Defense should consider establishing an executive agent for the coordination of all DOD NEO planning.

(c) (U) The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider requiring routine NEO reporting by the affected organizations in future exercises.

(2) (U) Military Support for Civil Authorities

(a) ~~(S)~~ (U) The Secretary of Defense should consider establishing a task force to identify required improvements in security for the CONUS transportation system and key communications, power, and industrial facilities.

(b) (U) To improve coordination of the transition to MSCD:

1. (U) Agencies requesting and commands reporting military support for civil authorities should include USCINCRED as a mandatory information addressee

2. (U) USCINCRED should consider temporarily assigning a liaison officer to HQDA during crises that could lead to MSCD.

(c) (U) HQDA and FEMA should consider exchanging liaison officers at the inception of a crisis to improve coordination.

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(d) (U) The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider including a complete test of procedures for military support in a future exercise.

(3) (U) CMO

(a) (U) The Secretary of Defense should consider continued play through the CMO in future exercises. Further exercise testing and training to refine procedures should be scheduled.

(b) (U) The Director, Joint Staff, should consider identifying and establishing duties and procedures for OJCS liaison officer(s) and representatives.

(c) (U) The Director, Joint Staff, should consider integrating the information exchange from the CMO boards and committees into the OJCS information system.

(4) (U) Overflight Rights. The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider including an in-depth examination of overflight rights procedures in the next deployment exercise.

(5) (U) Joint Civil Affairs Committee

(a) (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider revising the Joint Civil Affairs Committee charter to require use of Joint Staff procedures.

(b) (U) The Joint Civil Affairs Committee should coordinate, where appropriate, with the CMO and the Department of State to ensure that civil affairs actions reflect national policy.

(c) (U) The Director, Joint Staff, and the Services should consider encouraging the general and flag officer committee members to attend if possible.

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## SECTION VIII

### (U) WWMCCS ADP AND WIN SUPPORT

1. (U) Major Objective. Evaluate the adequacy of support provided the NCA, NMCS, and the unified and specified commands in a mobilization and initial deployment scenario by WWMCCS ADP and the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network.

2. (U) Synopsis. During the period 25 October to 5 November, exercise participants heavily used WWMCCS ADP and the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN) to support the mobilization and deployment actions of Exercise PROUD SABER 83. WIN recorded the highest data processing workloads ever experienced. All major participants used WWMCCS ADP applications systems extensively. Although low hardware and software reliability periodically degraded the support provided users, the performance of WWMCCS ADP and WIN improved markedly from Exercise IVY LEAGUE 82. The majority of users evaluated WWMCCS ADP and WIN performance as adequate or good. Improvements are necessary in equipment reliability, user interface software, and report contents.

3. (U) System Description. Tab G to Appendix 1 to Annex G to COSIN to JCS EXPLAN 0022 contains the system description of WWMCCS ADP and WIN support available during Exercise PROUD SABER 83. Figure VIII-1 illustrates the configuration of the WIN at STARTEX.

#### 4. (U) Analysis

a. (U) Exercise Considerations. The Exercise PROUD SABER 83 scenario called for extensive use of WWMCCS ADP and WIN to support the worldwide deployment of forces. WIN performance was unsatisfactory during Exercise IVY LEAGUE 82. The Director for Command, Control, and Communications Systems, OJCS, instituted a program to correct deficiencies. Improvement actions completed prior to Exercise PROUD SABER 83 were:

- (1) (U) The WIN Director developed revised procedures for WIN management during priority modes of operation and promulgated new management guidelines to all WIN sites


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Figure VIII-1. (U) WIN Configuration During Exercise PROUD SABER 83

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(2) (U) The Defense Communications Agency (DCA) reconfiguration of the WIN communications subnetwork, started in 1981 to increase circuit redundancy and evenly distribute traffic flows, was essentially 90 percent complete. Several major new communications trunks were available for use during Exercise PROUD SABER 83.

(3) (U) The Command and Control Technical Center (CCTC) completed major software improvements to the operating systems of all WWMCCS Standard H6000 host computers.

(4) (U) CCTC assigned technical assistance teams to six WWMCCS sites for Exercise PROUD SABER 83.

b. (U) Specific Analysis Objectives

(1) (U) Determine the use and effectiveness of WIN performance to include the communications subnetwork and host computers.

(2) (U) Evaluate the effectiveness of Exercise PROUD SABER 83 WIN performance by comparison with WIN performance in previous exercises.

(3) (U) Determine the use and adequacy of WWMCCS ADP applications software systems used by the NCA, NMCS, and other selected commands.

(4) (U) Identify requirements for additional WWMCCS ADP and WIN support as observed during the exercise.


c. (U) Discussion

(1) (U) WIN System Use. During the exercise, participants used the WIN to develop and exchange automated information among 19 WWMCCS sites. The average number of data packets processed daily exceeded those of the two most recent exercises by approximately 30 percent. Daily traffic volumes increased sharply during the first 4 days of the exercise as the JDA entered data for five operation plans into the network. The volume peaked on 29 October when the WIN processed a record high of 3.16 million data packets. Figure VIII-2 shows the daily traffic volumes and compares the average daily volumes experienced during the most recent exercises. Most WIN sites experienced increases in local workloads. The LANTCOM, MAC, PACOM, and JDA sites processed volumes in excess of 150 percent of those experienced during Exercise POTENT PUNCH 81. Table VIII-1 lists the mean daily workloads of individual

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Figure VIII-2. (U) Exercise PROUD SABER 83 Daily WIN Data Traffic Loads

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TABLE VIII-1. (U) MEAN DAILY WORKLOADS (THOUSANDS OF DATA PACKETS) FOR WWMCCS SITES DURING EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83

SITE	POTENT PUNCH	IVY LEAGUE	PROUD SABER
JDA	186	186	360
NMCC	256	278	280
USREDCOM	126	180	140
MAC	52	59	124
HQDA	66	117	96
PACOM	50	65	86
LANTCOM	38	38	81
USEUCOM	95	59	76
MTMC	11	48	62
OPNAV	31	29	47
USAFE	75	27	42
USAREUR	64	43	31

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WIN sites that participated in all three of the most recent exercises.

(2) ~~(C)~~ WIN Teleconference. Exercise participants established many teleconferences. The JDA established and operated the principal WIN teleconference entitled "PSABER". This teleconference had 137 participants who entered 892 messages during the exercise. The average number of daily operations messages on this teleconference was almost four times that recorded in previous exercises. The CCTC also established and operated a technical teleconference which had 62 participants who exchanged 424 messages. USEUCOM, MAC, and PACOM established teleconferences with their subordinate commands. Participants in the forgoing teleconferences entered a total of 1,591 messages into WIN during the exercise. This is the highest number of teleconference messages recorded for any exercise and approaches 15 percent of the entire AUTODIN message volume for the exercise. Chapter IX provides additional discussion on teleconference and AUTODIN message volumes. Figure VIII-3 displays WIN daily teleconference message volumes which peaked on 29 October. These high volumes of messages caused certain problems.


(a) ~~(C)~~ Teleconference Host Workloads. During the afternoon of 26 October, LANTCOM, USEUCOM, MAC, and PACOM reported difficulties in maintaining teleconference connectivity with JDA. Performance monitors at JDA indicated unstable Interface Message Processor (IMP), line, and host conditions. Technical diagnostics revealed that the JDA host computer was nearly saturated with WIN and JDS workloads. The JDA temporarily relocated the teleconference to the ANMCC and users reported a significant improvement in network performance. During the exercise, the JDA relocated the "PSABER" teleconference four times to three different host computers to maintain acceptable teleconference service. Administrative, technical, and operational delays encountered during these relocations caused temporary interruptions in service.

(b) ~~(C)~~ Teleconference Operational Use. The subject matter of WIN teleconference messages varied across a spectrum of administrative, operational, logistic, and technical areas. Message content and format ranged from brief informal operator remarks to readdressals of formal multiple-part AUTODIN messages. The procedures used at individual headquarters varied as to the internal handling and use of teleconference messages compared to AUTODIN communications. LANTCOM

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P173AT ■ TOTAL VOLUME OF USEUCOM, MAC, PACOM, JDA, AND CCTC HOSTED TELECONFERENCES

Figure VIII-3. (U) Exercise PROUD SABER 83 WIN Daily Teleconference Message Volumes

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noted a lack of consistency in the use of AUTODIN and WIN and recommended against using teleconference messages for operational tasking. The Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) reported the use of teleconference messages frequently required the transmission of additional AUTODIN messages to insure that all exercise participants were properly informed. USEUCOM recommended limiting the use of teleconference messages in future exercises to reduce workloads. This problem represented an intensification of a problem first observed in Exercise ELEGANT EAGLE 76 and reported in nearly every subsequent exercise. The absence of policy guidance on the desired operational use of the teleconference capability has led to its substitution for AUTODIN. There are wide disparities within individual commands in procedures for AUTODIN and WIN messages. This lack of uniformity has resulted in a requirement to promulgate a policy on WIN teleconference use.

(3) ~~(C)~~ WIN File Transfer. The total number of data files transferred among WIN sites during Exercise PROUD SABER 83 was 1,342. The average number of files transferred daily was 112 which represented a 300 percent increase over the average number of data files transferred during recent exercises. Figure VIII-4 shows the daily WIN file transfer activity and compares the average daily volumes of the most recent exercises. Users experienced periodic system outages that required retransmissions to transfer certain files successfully. The first attempt success rate for files of all sizes was 89 percent which is below the JCS performance criterion of 98 percent. Figure VIII-5 compares this file transfer success rate with previous exercises.


(4) (U) WIN Telecommunications Network Program. All WIN sites used the WIN Telecommunications Network Program (TELNET) to establish initial connectivity with other sites. Sites also used TELNET to update the JDS data base remotely. During the exercise, users attempted 11,307 TELNET connections. Approximately 70 percent of these were successful on the first attempt. Figure VIII-6 displays the volume of daily TELNET activity.

(5) ~~(C)~~ WIN Reliability Performance Criteria. JCS Pub 19, Volume IV, defines reliability as "the probability that the system or component will perform satisfactorily for

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Figure VIII-4. (U) Exercise PROUD SABER 83 WIN Daily File Transfer Activity


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■PERCENT FILES SUCCESSFULLY TRANSFERRED ON FIRST ATTEMPT

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Figure VIII-5. (U) Comparison of File Transfer Success Rate Experienced During Exercise PROUD SABER 83 With Previous Exercises

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


Figure VIII-6. (U) Exercise PROUD SABER 83 WIN Daily TELNET Activity

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a given time under stated conditions". It also establishes the following performance standards for WIN technical reliability during priority mode operations:

- (a) ~~(C)~~ WIN Host computer 97%
- (b) ~~(C)~~ WIN IMP 98%
- (c) ~~(C)~~ Overall WIN Site Network 95%
- (d) ~~(C)~~ IMP to IMP Circuits 99%

A detailed discussion of the considerations involved in computing reliability may be found in Annex G to Exercise POTENT PUNCH 81 Detailed Analysis Report 15 May 1982. The following discussion of WIN reliability uses data collected by the WIN Statistical Performance Reporting System (WSPRS) and computed in accordance with JCS Pub 19 methodology. Various operator logs and daily SITREPs provided additional details.

(6) ~~(C)~~ Host Reliability. The average host reliability for Exercise PROUD SABER 83 was 94.5 percent. The host includes the WWMCCS standard H6000 mainframe computer and the mainframe to IMP access circuits. The average host reliability during the exercise did not meet JCS Pub 19 performance standards of 97 percent. However, 8 of 19 hosts exceeded this goal. Individual host reliability ranged from a low of 82.2 percent at FORSCOM to a high of 98.7 percent at the NMCC. Table VIII-2 lists individual host reliabilities. FORSCOM experienced 65 host computer system failures between 25 October and 5 November. These failures severely degraded FORSCOM's capability during the exercise. Overall host reliability improved over Exercise IVY LEAGUE 82 and closely paralleled that of previous exercises. Figure VIII-7 compares average host reliabilities during recent exercises.

(7) ~~(C)~~ IMP Reliability. The mean IMP reliability was 98.5 percent during Exercise PROUD SABER 83. While the daily average IMP reliability did not meet the JCS performance criterion of 99 percent, 9 of 22 IMPs exceeded this threshold. Overall IMP reliability did not vary significantly from previous exercises. Figure VIII-8 compares average daily IMP reliability during Exercise PROUD SABER 83 with previous exercises.

(8) ~~(C)~~ Network Site Reliability. The mean daily reliability of all WIN sites during Exercise PROUD SABER 83 was 92.4 percent. The factors used in computing mean site

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TABLE VIII-2. (U) AVERAGE WWMCCS HOST RELIABILITY

SITE	RELIABILITY %*	SITE	RELIABILITY %*
ANMCC	98.4	LANTCOM	97.8
USAREUR	89.8	MAC	98.2
AWC	99.0	MTMC	97.8
CNO	94.3	NAVEUR	93.9
USEUCOM	98.7	NMCC	97.7
FCDNA	85.7	NMCC 2	95.9
FORSCOM	82.2	PACAF	92.9
HQDA	98.0	PACOM	95.9
HQUSAF	91.0	USREDCOM	98.2
JDA	95.1	TAC	91.1
KOREA	90.7	USAFE	93.1
* INCLUDES HOST AND HOST TO IMP ACCESS CIRCUIT			

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
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Figure VIII-7. (U) Comparison of Mean Host Computer Reliability

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


Figure VIII-8. (U) Comparison of Mean IMP Reliability

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reliability were host reliability, site IMP reliability, and the reliability of internal site communications. The mean was below the JCS criterion of 95 percent but 10 of 22 sites exceeded this criteria. Figure VIII-9 compares mean site reliability during Exercise PROUD SABER 83 with previous exercises. Daily site reliability dropped to a low of 88.5 percent on 29 October when WIN processing volumes peaked. Daily site reliability improved significantly during the last 7 days of the exercise. Figure VIII-10 shows daily site network reliability.


(9) ~~(C)~~ Line Reliability. The average daily IMP to IMP line reliability was 90.3 percent. This daily average circuit reliability did not meet the JCS performance criterion of 99 percent. The Defense Communications Agency Operations Center (DCAOC) deliberately removed secondary satellite circuits linking JDA, USREDCOM, and the NMCC from service on exercise day 5. This action reduced the failure rates of the JDA and USREDCOM IMPS and improved connectivity over the primary landline circuits. This removal significantly reduced the overall average line reliability statistics. The operational impact was minimal. The reconfigured network topology provided sufficient circuit redundancy to support the high volumes of data traffic experienced on exercise days 6 through 12. The reliability of 5 of the 23 IMP-to-IMP trunk lines exceeded the JCS criterion. Figure VIII-11 compares mean daily line reliability during Exercise PROUD SABER 83 with previous exercises. The WIN circuit reconfiguration also provided the DCAOC with the capability to patch alternate communications circuits around malfunctioning IMPS and lines rapidly. The DCAOC coordinated this procedure with the WIN Director as a standard practice. It prevented the network fragmentation and unsatisfactory performance experienced during Exercise IVY LEAGUE 82.

(10) ~~(C)~~ Network Connectivity. During Exercise PROUD SABER 83, many WIN sites experienced random failures in hosts, IMPS, and trunk lines. These failures reduced the TELNET connectivity rate to 71 percent and file transfer success rate to 89.6 percent. The failures also contributed to user perceptions of low WIN reliability. A survey of 133 operational users at 13 WIN sites revealed that 56 percent perceived that WIN failed to meet reliability requirements. Figure VIII-12 compares these perceptions with Exercise POTENT PUNCH 81. Approximately the same percentage of users perceived that WIN reliability requirements were not met. The percentage of those who

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Figure VIII-9. (U) Comparison of Mean Site Reliability

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



Figure VIII-10. (U) Daily WIN Site Network Reliability

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
Figure VIII-11. (U) Comparison of Mean Daily Line Reliability

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
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EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83



EXERCISE POTENT PUNCH 81

Figure VIII-12. (U) User Perceptions of WIN Reliability During Exercise PROUD SABER 83 and POTENT PUNCH 81

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considered the problems as major during Exercise PROUD SABER 83 decreased.

(11) (U) Network Slowdown. Users reported a general network slowdown condition on two occasions during Exercise PROUD SABER 83. Both times the NOC and on-site technical support teams identified the causes and cleared the problem before network performance was degraded seriously. CCTC technicians report they now know the causes of network slowdown. Software and procedural modifications will be required to permanently resolve the problem.

(12) (U) Network Management. Revised WIN management procedures became effective on 1 October. They place the WIN Director under the operational control of the Deputy Director for Operations, National Military Command Systems, OJCS, when priority mode operations commence. Exercise PROUD SABER 83 provided the first opportunity to evaluate these procedures. Prior to STARTEX, the WIN Director established a support office in the Command Support Operations Division offices to manage WIN operations. A 24-hour-a-day WIN Support Officer position was also manned. The rapid transition to priority mode operations and the high workloads sustained by the network indicate this organization was effective. The new management guidelines for all WWMCCS sites required each site to designate a local manager for ADP utilization. They also provided technical guidance for priority mode operations during Exercise PROUD SABER 83. Postexercise reports from the NMCC and 19 sites commented favorably on these managerial arrangements and guidance. Five sites reported they had instituted similar procedures during the past 2 years. Six sites commented favorably on the impact of CCTC technical support teams.

(13) (U) WWMCCS ADP Applications Software Systems. Automated WSPRS data, operator logs, reports, and user surveys revealed extensive use of certain WWMCCS ADP applications software systems. Figure VIII-13 displays the reported use of individual systems at 14 locations. The following discussion compares the performance of individual systems with functional goals contained in JCS Pub 19, Volume IV, and J3I 3000.10B.

(14) (U) Joint Deployment System. During Exercise PROUD SABER 83, 14 WWMCCS sites reported using the JDS to plan, manage, and monitor the deployment of forces. Approximately 60 percent of the users surveyed reported near continuous or hourly use. WWMCCS ADP processed 101,271 JDS data base transactions during the exercise. The

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SYSTEM ↓ LOCATION	JDS	JOPS	UNITREP	CAWSS	EVAC	AFFIS	SOA	NIDS
NMCC	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
HQDA	●	●	●					
OPNAV	●	●	●					
HQUSAF	●	●	●					
ADCOM	●	●	●					
LANTCOM	●	●	●		●	●		
USEUCOM	●	●		●				
MAC	●	●	●	●	●	●		
PACOM	●	●	●	●				
USREDCOM	●	●	●	●				
RDJTF	●	●	●					
JDA	●	●	●					
MTMC	●	●	●					
MSC	●	●						
TOTALS	14	14	12	5	3	3	1	1

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Figure VIII-13. (U) Reported Use of WWMCCS ADP Application Software Systems by Major Participants in Exercise PROUD SABER 83

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daily volume peaked on 27 October when players reviewed and updated data in the JDS for the following nine operation plans:

Figure VIII-14 summarizes the daily volumes of JDS transactions processed by WIN. WIN technical reliability did not meet JCS performance criteria and degraded JDS availability. JDS Remote Users Packages (RUPs) at 10 sites reduced the impact of temporary WIN outages. Approximately 61 percent of the users reported the JDS met the JCS responsiveness goal of 10 minutes. An average of 2,948 updating transactions were applied each day to the JDS data base to maintain its timeliness and accuracy. Approximately 70 percent of the users estimated the timeliness of the information to be 3 to 6 hours. The JCS criterion is 12 hours. Section II discussed the adequacy of the JDS in supporting the requirements of the exercise scenario and functional problems encountered. Three additional technical problems encountered are discussed below.

(a) (U) Data Base Synchronization. WIN failures and software deficiencies in JDS RUPs caused transient imbalances between the JDA central data base and local data bases. Users at 3 sites reported synchronization was lost for periods of 12 to 24 hours. When such conditions existed, users reported they usually were able to access the JDS central data base through WIN TELNET and obtain current information.

(b) (U) JDS Software. During the morning of 1 November, the accuracy of the JDS data base was degraded by incorrect remote JDS update procedures. Investigation revealed JDA had not incorporated adequate safeguards in the JDS software to prevent loss of large segments of the data base.

(c) (U) JDS Reports. The JDS produced numerous reports. Approximately 75 percent of the users evaluated these reports as adequate. Approximately 15 percent expressed a need for more analytic reports and displays with more summary data.

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


Figure VIII-14. (U) Joint Deployment System Daily Transaction Summary

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(16) ~~(S)~~ Unit Status and Identity Report System. Twelve WWMCCS sites used UNITREP for force management and to obtain briefing information. Exercise participants used the UNITREP Basic Identity Data Elements (BIDE) daily to provide input data to the JDS. Players also used ship position information frequently. Approximately 83 percent of users reported the JCS criterion for UNITREP responsiveness was met and evaluated UNITREP support as adequate. Exercise limitations precluded further evaluation of the timeliness, accuracy, and adequacy of UNITREP. Units that would normally report daily status information did not participate. Users encountered problems when they attempted to reconcile UNITREP data with JDS data bases that received daily about 3,000 update transactions. Section II discussed this problem.

(17) (U) Crisis Action Weather Support System. The Air Force Global Weather Command (AFGWC) provided real-world weather information to five WIN sites that used the Crisis Action Weather Support Systems (CAWSS). This information met JCS standards for timeliness and accuracy. AFGWC did not introduce artificial exercise information into CAWSS to avoid possible confusion. Environmental services personnel used the CAWSS to develop briefings. Interviews revealed users employed the CAWSS to augment environmental information from teletype and facsimile circuits. All users interviewed considered the timeliness and accuracy of CAWSS adequate, but WIN reliability problems and lack of local access to WIN terminals degraded its responsiveness.

(18) ~~(S)~~ Evacuation File. The Joint Staff updated the Evacuation File (EVAC) prior to the exercise with real-world data and made it available to all WIN sites. Surveys indicated exercise participants at the NMCC, LANTCOM, and MAC used the EVAC File. Users at these locations reported the EVAC file met JCS criteria for 10-minute

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responsiveness and 30-day data base timeliness. Artificial events introduced by the scenario precluded evaluation of the timeliness, accuracy, and adequacy of EVAC data.

(19) (U) Air Field Facilities Information System. Reports indicated three WWMCCS sites used the Air Field Facilities Information System (AFFIS) during the exercise. MAC used AFFIS two to three times a day for the entire period of active exercise play. The NMCC and LANTCOM reported weekly use to verify planning information. Users at all three sites evaluated AFFIS responsiveness, accuracy, and timeliness as adequate. MAC recommended expansion of AFFIS data elements to include International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) codes to facilitate detailed airlift planning.

(20) (U) Status of Action File. The SOA is a unique NMCC application. Twenty-six exercise participants in the NMCC reported they used SOA information on a daily basis. DICO records show the SOA met the JCS responsiveness criterion of 1 hour. All users reported the SOA met or exceeded JCS timeliness and accuracy goals of 12 hours and 98 percent. Users did not report significant problems.

(21) (U) NMCC Information Display System. The NIDS is unique to the NMCC and was used regularly throughout the exercise. Individual terminal use varied. The OPG used it daily for message retrievals. One LRC watch team used it almost continuously. The system demonstrated a mean reliability of 99.2 percent which met the JCS criterion. An outage on 2 November required use of the backup system to maintain service to the NMCC. All users reported near instantaneous responsiveness. Approximately 50 percent of the users reported some difficulties in operating NIDS terminals and stated needs for improved user interface software.

(22) (U) User Perceptions. User evaluations of the overall performance of WWMCCS ADP and WIN support during Exercise PROUD SABER 83 varied. Not one of 119 users at 14 WWMCCS sites evaluated the performance as unsatisfactory. Approximately 84 percent perceived performance as adequate or good. Figure VIII-15 illustrates the results of this survey.

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


Figure VIII-15. (U) User Perceptions of the Overall Adequacy of WWMCCS ADP and WIN Support During Exercise PROUD SABER 83

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d. (U) Findings

- (1) (U) The volumes of data packets processed by WIN exceeded those of the last two previous exercises by approximately 30 percent.
- (2) (U) Exercise participants used WIN teleconference capabilities extensively. The average number of daily teleconference messages was three times higher than during the last two exercises.
- (3) (U) The JDA relocated the PSABER teleconference host functions four times due to high associated workloads and WIN connectivity problems.
- (4) ~~(S)~~ Exercise participants used WIN file transfer capabilities to transfer an average of 112 data files a day. This is a 300 percent increase over the number of data files transferred during recent exercises.
- (5) ~~(S)~~ The WIN file transfer success rate did not meet the JCS performance criterion.
- (6) ~~(S)~~ The reliability of WIN host computers, IMPS, and trunk lines did not meet JCS performance criteria.
- (7) (U) Exercise participants used the JDS extensively at 14 WWMCCS sites. The JDS successfully maintained deployment data current for nine operation plans.
- (8) ~~(S)~~ The JDS experienced problems with data base synchronization and RUP software.
- (9) ~~(S)~~ Exercise participants used JOPS at 14 WWMCCS sites in conjunction with the JDS. JOPS reference files did not meet data timeliness requirements.
- (10) (U) Exercise participants at 12 WWMCCS sites used UNITREP. Units that normally would report unit status information did not participate in the exercise.
- (11) (U) Several WWMCCS sites used the CAWSS, EVAC, and AFFIS to a limited extent. Users encountered few problems with these systems which generally met JCS responsiveness, timeliness, and accuracy criteria.
- (12) (U) NMCC players used the SOA and NIDS regularly during the exercise. These systems met performance goals for responsiveness, timeliness, and accuracy.

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e. (U) Conclusions

(1) (U) WIN provided good operational support to exercise participants.

(2) ~~(C)~~ While WIN technical performance was greatly improved over Exercise IVY LEAGUE 82, low reliability and random hardware failures degraded its technical performance.

(3) ~~(C)~~ Processing workloads associated with WIN teleconference hosting have become a full time job during exercises. The volume of WIN teleconference messages indicates a need for policy guidance on the use of WIN and AUTODIN. This was an intensification of a problem first noted in Exercise ELEGANT EAGLE 76 and observed in nearly every exercise since then.

(4) (U) Revised WIN management procedures and technical assistance teams contributed significantly to the success of WIN operations. The rapid transition to priority mode operations and high workloads sustained by the network demonstrated the effectiveness of the new management organization.

(5) (U) The evolving JDS met performance goals and provided adequate support for exercise participants at all WWMCCS sites.

(6) (U) WWMCCS applications systems such as the CAWSS, EVAC, and AFFIS contained real-world information and provided only limited support to exercise participants.

(7) (U) The NIDS and SOA provided current information and good support to exercise participants throughout the exercise.

f. (U) Recommendations

(1) (U) The Director for Command, Control, and Communications Systems, OJCS, should continue programs to improve WIN reliability on a priority basis.

(2) (U) The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider promulgating policy guidance for the use of WIN teleconferencing and insure host processing functions are assigned to a site adequately equipped to handle the workload.

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(3) (U) The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider formally promulgating guidelines for WIN management during priority modes of operation.

(4) (U) The Director for Command, Control, and, Communications Systems, OJCS, should continue to use technical assistance teams during exercises until WIN reliability meets performance goals.

(5) (U) The Director, Joint Deployment Agency should continue the development of the JDS, and insure adequate data base protection features are incorporated in user interface software.

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SECTION IX

(U) COMMUNICATIONS AND MESSAGE TRAFFIC ANALYSIS

1. (U) Major Objective. Evaluate the performance of record communications and the ability of telecommunications to function when critical links are disrupted.

2. (U) Synopsis

a. (U) Telecommunications

(1) ~~(C)~~ Insufficient sophisticated communications equipment is available to support operations in a multiple plan environment. Many OPLANs rely upon the same resources, controlled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for communications contingencies. Information is not readily available in the OJCS to determine planned use of JCS-controlled communications assets by unified and specified commands.

(2) ~~(C)~~ Actual communications outages were played and some delays and backlogs were reported. However, none of the reported problems had an operational impact on the exercise.

b. ~~(C)~~ Operations Security. Operations Security (OPSEC) performance for Exercise PROUD SABER 83 was a vast improvement over previous exercises. The biggest problem identified was the use of nonsecure telephones in areas where classified TV, secure telephone, and classified discussions could be overheard.

3. (U) System Description. The System Description for telecommunications systems used during the exercise is Tab H, Communications and Message Traffic Analysis, to Appendix 1 to Annex G to the COSIN to JCS EXPLAN 0022.

4. (U) Analysis. The Joint OPSEC Analysis Center (JOAC) analyzed exercise OPSEC. A summary of their report is attached as Tab A.

a. (U) Exercise Considerations

(1) (U) Few subordinate operational commands participated, limiting the total volume of message traffic.

(2) (U) Higher echelons simulated play by some lower echelon operational units. As a result not all subordinate responses were made.

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(3) (U) Message flow must follow simulated communications interruptions so that the effects can be observed.

(4) (U) Report originators must use JRS message formats or EMAS will not identify all JRS reports.

b. (U) Specific Analysis Objectives

(1) (U) Evaluate the compliance of JRS reports with prescribed procedures, standards, and formats.

(2) (U) Evaluate the compliance of the various precedences of incoming messages with SOS objectives.

(3) (U) Evaluate the compliance of the length of FLASH and IMMEDIATE precedence messages with objectives established in ACP 121 US SUPP-1 (E).

c. (U) Discussion. In the following paragraphs there is reference to mobilization, SIOP, NATO, and regional type exercises. Table IX-1 provides a key to identify specific exercises by type.

(1) (U) Volume of Message Flow. All messages destined for the OJCS arrive at one of two central message processors. JCS message center operators, using message display terminals, and the message processor, using instructions provided it, scan message headings and determine OJCS message distribution. All exercise messages received were sent to the OPG either for action or information. For the exercise, special equipment was installed in the OPG to print and distribute all received messages. There was a printer in operation in the NMCC-LRC area for messages addressed to the LRC or the Logistics Directorate.

(a) (U) The special OPG printer has a capability to make distribution based on keywords. Without such programming a player who only needs certain messages receives them all regardless of content or usefulness to the player. Some messages, the COMSPOT for example, are of interest to usually one office (the OPR) but all get them and must screen them from those of interest. Less than 15 percent of the messages received by the OPG required immediate action.

(b) ~~(c)~~ Figure IX-1 depicts the total daily message flow by precedence. The daily totals include the daily volume of messages transmitted by the WIN teleconference. The largest daily message volume, 690 messages, was on 2 November. Details concerning the

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TABLE IX-1. (U) KEY TO EXERCISE TYPES

MOBILIZATION

EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83  
EXERCISE PROUD SPIRIT 80  
EXERCISE NIFTY NUGGET 78

SIOP - NUCLEAR WAR

EXERCISE IVY LEAGUE 82  
EXERCISE PRIZE GAUNTLET 80  
EXERCISE ELITE TROOPER 78

NATO - WINTEX RELATED

EXERCISE POLL STATION 81  
EXERCISE POWER PLAY 79  
EXERCISE PRIME TARGET 77

REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES

EXERCISE POTENT PUNCH 81  
EXERCISE POSITIVE LEAP 80  
EXERCISE NIGHT STRIKE 77  
EXERCISE ELEGANT EAGLE 76

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


Figure IX-1. (U) Daily Message Volume by Precedence and WIN

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WIN teleconference are found in Section VIII, WWMCCS ADP and WIN SUPPORT.

(c) (U) The average hourly message flow was calculated but no regular variations were found. No significant message flow reductions were found that might be a result of actual circuit denials. No information on the impact of the denials on circuit performance was available.

(d) (U) Table IX-2 shows the daily volume of messages received from major commands and agencies. By far the largest number of messages, 515, were received from CINCLANT Headquarters. The OJCS sent 387 messages.

(e) (U) Table IX-3 shows the types of messages received.

1. (U) Compliance with the format for the SITREP was poor. Daily SITREPs should arrive from each of the nine unified and specified commands. Other commands also use the SITREP for internal reporting. The line on Table IX-3 for SITREPs should have at least 9 SITREPs each day and over 100 total for the exercise. As described later, 77 SITREPs were found and analyzed for timeliness.

2. (U) Another report, the COMSPOT, with 139, was identified as the report most frequently submitted. This report has limited use in the Joint Staff, but is distributed to all players in the OPG.

(f) (U) The OPG received about 6,670 WIN and AUTODIN messages. Figure IX-2 depicts the categories of messages available in the OPG. In addition, about 10 percent of these messages were received again as duplicates.

1. (U) Each exercise message received by the OJCS had at least 40 copies made and distributed. This represents over 260,000 copies of messages and almost 30,000 duplicate copies of messages provided to exercise players. The use of the special printer in the OPG considerably reduced the administrative workload of copying and distributing messages. The capability to program the printer to selectively distribute messages was little used. Insufficient information was available to develop selection criteria. Players were still

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TABLE IX-2. (U) DAILY MESSAGES RECEIVED BY OJCS

COMMAND	25 OCT	26 OCT	27 OCT	28 OCT	29 OCT	30 OCT	31 OCT	01 NOV	02 NOV	03 NOV	04 NOV	05 NOV	TOTAL
AIR FORCE	10	35	21	29	23	14	8	12	12	19	10	6	199
ARMY	5	6	19	12	8	13	9	5	6	9	7	5	104
JTF-ALASKA	0	4	2	3	2	0	1	2	1	1	1	1	18
CINCLANT	14	24	25	46	40	53	47	46	58	74	52	36	515
CINCNOBAD	1	0	1	1	2	1	1	2	3	4	2	5	23
CINCPAC	9	22	29	28	21	31	29	19	26	23	22	9	268
CINCREB	2	4	9	6	7	7	14	8	16	7	14	4	98
CINCSAC	5	8	15	11	7	9	7	4	7	8	10	8	99
COAST GUARD	1	10	4	8	6	7	6	6	7	7	6	2	70
COMAAC	1	1	0	1	1	3	2	3	13	8	12	5	50
JCS	12	15	35	40	32	40	38	24	36	46	39	30	387
MAC	1	8	18	8	7	12	8	15	17	14	9	9	126
MARINE CORPS	0	9	6	3	2	2	5	2	4	2	1	3	39
MSC	14	7	22	16	18	28	13	22	27	22	22	20	231
MTMC	3	2	5	5	5	6	4	4	3	1	5	0	43
NAVY	4	6	9	5	6	16	7	3	9	13	9	4	91
SECDEF	0	11	5	7	18	11	4	7	8	12	7	2	92
STATE	1	2	8	10	4	8	6	0	4	5	5	4	57
USCINCEUR	11	24	11	25	23	18	13	11	8	12	14	4	174
USCINCSOUTH	3	4	5	5	1	0	7	1	12	5	7	10	60
TOTALS	97	202	249	269	233	279	229	196	277	292	254	167	2744

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TABLE IX-3. (U) DAILY MESSAGE TRAFFIC BY TYPE


REPORT TYPE	25 OCT	26 OCT	27 OCT	28 OCT	29 OCT	30 OCT	31 OCT	01 NOV	02 NOV	03 NOV	04 NOV	05 NOV	TOTAL
COMSPOT	3	10	13	13	11	6	4	20	33	19	6	1	139
COMSTAT	0	2	2	5	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	26
FORGEN	0	0	8	3	0	2	1	0	1	0	2	4	21
MEDMER	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
OPREP1	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	5
OPREP3	2	5	2	7	7	4	7	3	7	0	2	5	51
RECON3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
RELAR	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
SITREP	1	2	4	4	5	4	4	3	4	3	3	4	41
SPIREP	0	1	7	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12
EAM	0	2	3	1	0	4	0	1	1	0	1	12	25
OTHERS	196	394	507	542	518	524	405	363	519	498	493	252	5211
TOTAL	203	416	547	579	544	547	424	392	567	522	509	284	5534

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NOTE: THERE WERE 6,669 MESSAGES (AUTODIN AND WIN) AVAILABLE TO THE OPG.

Figure IX-2. (U) Percentage of Messages Available in the OPG by Category

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left with the problem of finding messages of interest in the volume of incoming messages. For example, about 3 out of 20 messages were addressed to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for action. The rest were sent for informational purposes only.

2. (U) About 16 percent of the messages had Address Indicator Groups (AIGs) as addressees. The AIG is an address designator that represents a predetermined list of action and information addressees. The Service, agency, or organization responsible for the assignment and control of allocated AIGs determines composition of the AIG and controls access to such lists. Without a copy of the AIG list, an action officer did not know whether his agency was an action or information addressee and who else had received a copy of the message. No current Joint publication lists all US AIGs. Players had to call the JCS message center for AIG information.

3. (U) Almost all incoming messages were readdressed. Over 4,200 messages, or over 80 percent of the JCS incoming messages, had been readdressed at least once. Exercise data showed that the JCS Message Center readdressed almost all messages to the Service headquarters.

(2) (U) Message Speed of Service. The originating telecommunications center assigns a time of file (TOF) to each AUTODIN message it sends. The time the message is sent to an appropriate printer is called time available for delivery (TAD). The difference between TOF and TAD is defined as speed of service (SOS). ACP-121 establishes SOS criteria for the various message precedences.

(a) ~~(C)~~ Figure IX-3 shows the SOS performance for JCS incoming messages. Fifty-eight percent of the incoming FLASH messages met the minimum criteria. Sixty-six percent of the incoming IMMEDIATE messages met minimum criteria.

(b) ~~(C)~~ Figure IX-4 compares communications performance, as measured by SOS, for recent mobilization exercises. Figures for other exercise types are shown. SOS performance is similar to other exercise types, except for NATO exercises where SOS performance is lower than typical exercise values.

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



Figure IX-3. (U) Cumulative Distribution by Percent of Messages Meeting SOS Objectives

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\*NOTE SEE TABLE IX-1 FOR EXERCISES KEY

Figure IX-4. (U) Comparison of FLASH and IMMEDIATE SOS Performance Among Recent Exercises

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(c) ~~(S)~~ Figure IX-5 portrays the percent of daily incoming messages that met SOS criteria. SOS for all messages declined somewhat during the exercise. Figures IX-6 and IX-7 show the percent of daily incoming FLASH and IMMEDIATE messages that met SOS criteria. The number of FLASH messages received on any day was small, so that a few messages not meeting criteria caused wide statistical variation. SOS performance for IMMEDIATE remained steady during the exercise.

(3) (U) Commander's Situation Reports. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and higher level decisionmakers require current information to assist in managing the situation. The commander's situation report (SITREP) accomplishes this goal. The report is to be received in Washington by 0400Z. This time allows OJCS action offices to have the most current information available for early morning briefings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During the exercise, each unified and specified command should have sent 11 SITREPs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not direct the Services to provide SITREPs. The Joint Staff did implement the JCS SITREP and planned for its release at 1000Z daily.

(a) ~~(S)~~ A daily schedule of briefings included a daily OpsDepts update (and decision) briefing at 1330Z (1430Z the second week). Figure IX-8 shows a timeline of average compliance with the desired SITREP arrival. Thirty-two percent of the JRS SITREPs arrived by the desired deadline. All the daily JRS SITREPs arrived in time for the daily update briefing. The JCS SITREP was transmitted 3 hours and 14 minutes after the planned release time. The unified and specified commands' SITREPs arrived, on the average, 1 hour and 45 minutes late. Late delivery reduced the time available. Table IX-4 shows the average for individual commands submitting SITREPs.

(b) (U) The JRS SITREP is an unformatted message except for the report identification line. This identification line was designed to aid machine processing of messages. Analysis of exercise SITREPs disclosed significant variations from the JRS report identification line format.

(c) (U) Figure IX-9 shows the percentage of JRS SITREPs which arrived in the NMCC by the 0400Z deadline as compared with earlier exercises. There is a downward trend in recent mobilization exercises of compliance with JRS SITREP deadlines.

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


Figure IX-5. (U) Daily Percent of JCS Incoming Messages Meeting SOS Objectives

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


Figure IX-6. (U) Daily Percent of JCS Incoming FLASH Messages Meeting SOS Objectives

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


Figure IX-7. (U) Daily Percent of JCS Incoming IMMEDIATE Messages Meeting SOS Objectives

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


Figure IX-8. (U) SITREP Timeliness Compliance of JRS SITREPs  
With Washington Arrival Times

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TABLE IX-4. (U) COMPLIANCE OF JRS SITREPS WITH JRS GUIDANCE, RECEIPT DEADLINE

COMMAND	NUMBER SAMPLED*	NUMBER ON TIME	PERCENT MEETING DEADLINE	MEAN TIME EARLY (-) LATE (+)
LANTCOM	11	9	82%	+0h 6m
USEUCOM	11	1	9%	+4h 36m
MAC	11	6	55%	+0h 54m
PACOM	11	1	9%	+2h 41m
USREDCOM	11	2	18%	+0h 46m
SAC	11	5	45%	+1h 0m
JCS	12	0**	0%	+3h 14m***
NORAD/ADC	11	1	9%	+1h 54m
TOTAL INCOMING PUB 6 SITREPS	77	25	32%	+1h 54m


\* ADDITIONAL PRE-EXERCISE SITREPS WERE NOT INCLUDED  
\*\* PLANNED RELEASE TIME FOR JCS SITREP WAS 1000Z  
\*\*\* NO STANDARD APPLICABLE FOR COMBINED COMMANDS, USED 0400Z

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\*SEE TABLE VIII-1 FOR KEY TO DEFINE EXERCISES

Figure IX-9. (U) Comparison Among Recent Exercises of Receipt of JRS SITREPs; Percent Reaching NMCC by 0400Z

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(4) (U) Precedence Usage

(a) (U) Precedence Criteria

1. (U) The message originator is responsible for assignment of the proper precedence to a message. A message should not be assigned a precedence higher than necessary to insure delivery in sufficient time to accomplish the intended action. In determining precedence, careful attention to time zone differences which may exist between the originator and the addressee must be considered. The precedence indicates the relative order in which one message is processed with respect to all others. Specifically precedence indicates:

a. (U) To the originator, the required speed of delivery to the addressee

b. (U) To telecommunications center personnel, the relative order of processing, transmissions, and delivery

c. (U) To the addressee, the relative order to note or take necessary action on the message.

2. (U) There are five precedence categories: EMERGENCY, FLASH, IMMEDIATE, PRIORITY, and ROUTINE.

(b) (U) Figure IX-10 summarizes the kinds of messages by classification and precedence. SECRET IMMEDIATE messages were the most common message type. Figure IX-11 shows a comparison of recent exercises. This type of message has composed about 40 percent of all messages for the past 5 years.

(c) (U) Figure IX-12 shows the percentage of FLASH messages transmitted. This percentage is less than half that experienced in nonmobilization types of exercises. One possible cause is the lack of war-fighting and the absence of associated urgent operational messages found in this type of exercise.

(d) (U) A random sample of incoming exercise messages was reviewed for proper precedence using criteria from ACP-121. Figure IX-13 shows the results of this review for recent mobilization exercises and others where data were available. Figure IX-14 highlights

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



Figure IX-10. (U) Kinds of JCS Incoming and Outgoing Messages by Precedence and Classification

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
\*SEE TABLE IX-1. FOR KEY TO DEFINE EXERCISES.

Figure IX-11. (U) Percent of Messages Classified as SECRET and Sent Using IMMEDIATE Precedence During Recent Exercises

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\*SEE TABLE IX-1. FOR KEY TO DEFINE EXERCISES.

Figure IX-12. (U) Percent of Messages Transmitted as FLASH During Recent Exercises

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



Figure IX-13. (U) Precedence Assignment, Comparison of Assignment in Accordance with Guidelines

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\*SEE TABLE VIII-1. FOR KEY TO DEFINE EXERCISE

Figure IX-14. (U) Assignment of "CORRECT" Precedence to Exercise Messages

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the percent of messages with precedence assigned in accordance with the guidelines. This percentage is the highest found in recent exercises.

(5) (U) Length of FLASH and IMMEDIATE Messages. ACP-121 and DSS message preparation instructions provide message length standards for high precedence messages. During crises FLASH messages should be less than 100 words and IMMEDIATE messages should be less than 200 words.

(a) (C) Table IX-5 shows the daily percent of JCS incoming and outgoing FLASH and IMMEDIATE messages that met length criteria. About 64 percent of the high precedence messages met the criteria. Figure IX-15 shows a comparison among recent exercises of compliance with length standards. Compliance with length standards for FLASH and IMMEDIATE messages was similar to earlier mobilization exercises and generally less than the compliance found in other types of exercises.

(b) (C) Figure IX-16 shows the distribution of message length for FLASH and IMMEDIATE messages. The mean message length for all Exercise PROUD SABER 83 messages was 208 words.

(6) (C) Statistical Data Comparison. Some of the information collected during the exercise provides a background with which to make comparisons with earlier exercises. Table IX-6 compares JRS reports and EAMS received in recent mobilization exercises.

(a) (U) The total daily message volume for Exercise PROUD SABER 83 is almost twice that found in the other two exercises shown. Considering the reduced reporting of JRS reports, the daily number of JRS reports has not changed significantly although the percentage of reports is down by 75 percent. The large reduction in OPREP-1 reports, used to report deployments, can be attributed to the almost exclusive use, now, of JDS and WIN for the reporting of deployment of forces.

(b) (U) Tables IX-7, IX-8, IX-9, and IX-10 provide statistical information on SIOP, NATO, and regional exercises and real-world crises.

(7) (U) Experimental Secure Video Link. The NMCC-RDJTF secure video link consisted of a slow-scan video portion and full-time sound portion. The video image could take several minutes to change completely. Equipment was

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
TABLE IX-5. (U) FLASH AND IMMEDIATE MESSAGE LENGTHS, PERCENT  
MEETING ACP-121 STANDARDS BY EXERCISE DAY

DAY	TOTAL NBR OF FLASH MSG	NBR OF FLASH MSG WITH < 600 CHARS	PERCENTAGE OF FLASH MSG WITH < 600 CHARS	TOTAL NBR OF IMMEDIATE MSG	NBR OF IMMEDIATE MSG WITH < 1200 CHARS	PERCENTAGE OF IMMEDIATE MSG WITH < 1200 CHARS
25	3	2	66%	61	44	72%
26	8	3	37%	158	108	68%
27	4	2	50%	244	146	59%
28	10	3	30%	279	195	69%
29	12	7	58%	254	175	68%
30	14	6	42%	259	173	66%
31	9	3	33%	232	150	64%
01	12	6	50%	221	136	61%
02	22	8	36%	320	221	69%
03	7	4	57%	319	205	64%
04	22	10	45%	312	195	62%
05	33	20	60%	173	94	54%
SUMMARY	156	74	47%	2832	1842	65%

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
\*NOTE. SEE TABLE IX-1 FOR EXERCISE KEY

Figure IX-15. (U) Percent of FLASH and IMMEDIATE Messages Meeting JCS Length Criteria

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NOTE: MEAN LENGTH OF ALL MESSAGES WAS 208 WORDS.

Figure IX-16. (U) FLASH and IMMEDIATE Message Length, Cumulative Distribution by Length

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TABLE IX-6. (U) COMPARISON OF AVERAGE DAILY NUMBER OF  
MESSAGES, BY TYPE, FOR RECENT MOBILIZATION  
EXERCISES

TYPE MESSAGE	PROUD SABER 83	PROUD SPIRIT 80	NIFTY NUGGET 78
OPREP-1	0.5	2.6	14.5
OPREP-2	0.0	0.2	1.2
OPREP-3	4.6	2.5	5.6
OPREP-4	0.0	0.1	1.3
OPREP-5	0.0	0.0	0.0
SITREP	3.7	17.8	20.0
SPIREP	0.0	0.4	3.2
INTSUM	0.0	0.2	3.7
COMSTAT	2.4	2.1	0.0
COMSPOT	12.6	0.0	0.0
OTHER JRS	3.3	7.3	6.9
TOTAL JRS	27.1 (5.4%)	33.2 (11.7%)	56.6 (20.5%)
TOTAL NON- JRS	473.7 (94.1%)	250.0 (88.3%)	218.0 (78.7%)
EA	2.3 (0.5%)	0.0 (0.0%)	2.3 (0.8%)
TOTALS	503.1 (100%)	283.2 (100%)	276.9 (100%)

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TABLE IX-7. (U) COMPARISON OF AVERAGE DAILY NUMBER OF  
MESSAGES, BY TYPE, FOR RECENT SIOP-NUCLEAR  
WAR EXERCISES

TYPE MESSAGE	IVY LEAGUE 82	PRIZE GAUNTLET 80	ELITE TROOPER 78
OPREP-1	0.6	0.7	11.0
OPREP-2	0.0	0.3	3.3
OPREP-3	28.0	12.3	44.7
OPREP-4	0.0	2.7	3.3
OPREP-5	0.0	0.0	0.0
SITREP	13.4	21.3	46.0
SPIREP	2.3	8.8	8.0
INTSUM	0.0	3.5	6.2
COMSTAT	4.8	0.2	3.5
COMSPOT	24.6	0.0	23.7
OTHER JRS	102.6	117.0	88.7
TOTAL JRS	176.3 (17.9%)	166.7 (26.1%)	238.5 (27.7%)
TOTAL NON- JRS	805.1 (81.9%)	470.0 (73.5%)	605.7 (70.2%)
EA	1.4 (0.1%)	2.3 (0.4%)	18.5 (2.1%)
TOTALS	982.9 (100.0%)	639.0 (100%)	862.7 (100%)

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TABLE IX-8. (U) COMPARISON OF AVERAGE DAILY NUMBER OF  
MESSAGES, BY TYPE, FOR RECENT NATO EXERCISES

TYPE MESSAGE	POLL STATION 81	POWER PLAY 79	PRIME TARGET 77
OPREP-1	0.6	24.5	4.8
OPREP-2	0.9	11.4	7.1
OPREP-3	16.2	20.2	4.7
OPREP-4	0.7	10.6	7.3
OPREP-5	0.0	0.2	0.0
SITREP	4.7	23.8	8.4
SPIREP	0.8	3.4	0.0
INTSUM	9.8	15.3	0.0
COMSTAT	3.0	2.2	1.1
COMSPOT	6.5	25.3	1.1
OTHER JRS	20.1	74.4	60.1
TOTAL JRS	62.9 (11.1%)	211.3 (36.6%)	114.0 (34.6%)
TOTAL NON- JRS	504.9 (88.6%)	357.7 (62.0%)	207.1 (62.8%)
EA	1.7 (0.3%)	8.5 (1.4%)	8.5 (2.6%)
TOTALS	569.5 (100%)	577.4 (100%)	329.6 (100%)

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TABLE IX-9. (U) COMPARISON OF AVERAGE DAILY NUMBER OF  
MESSAGES, BY TYPE, FOR RECENT REGIONAL  
CONTINGENCY EXERCISES

TYPE MESSAGE	POTENT PUNCH 81	NIGHT STRIKE 77	ELEGANT EAGLE 76
OPREP-1	2.5	5.8	54.3
OPREP-2	-	0.0	15.9
OPREP-3	1.8	1.4	13.2
OPREP-4	9.2	0.0	13.7
OPREP-5	-	0.0	0.5
SITREP	2.0	8.0	11.3
SPIREP	0.0	0.0	8.7
INTSUM	0.0	0.0	0.2
COMSTAT	2.0	1.0	7.2
COMSPOT	10.6	9.8	7.7
OTHER JRS	2.4	3.2	19.5
TOTAL JRS	30.4 (10.4%)	29.6 (21.5%)	152.0 (40.0%)
TOTAL NON- JRS	261.0 (88.9%)	108.2 (77.5%)	211.4 (55.5%)
EA	1.2 (0.4%)	1.4 (1.0%)	17.2 (4.5%)
TOTALS	293.5 (100%)	139.2 (100%)	380.6 (100%)

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TABLE IX-10. (U) COMPARISON OF AVERAGE DAILY NUMBER OF  
MESSAGES, BY TYPE, FOR SELECTED REAL-WORLD CRISES


TYPE MESSAGE	ZAIRE CRISIS 1978	FLUID DRIVE I 1976	CYPRUS 1974	YOM KIPPUR WAR 1973
OPREP-1	0.0	8.5	0.8	0.2
OPREP-2	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
OPREP-3	0.0	3.4	1.1	2.1
OPREP-4	0.0	0.3	1.2	0.2
OPREP-5	0.0	0.7	0.0	0.0
SITREP	6.8	1.0	7.3	16.1
SPIREP	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
INTSUM	0.8	0.0	1.1	0.8
COMSTAT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
COMSPOT	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
OTHER JRS	1.2	1.7	1.1	6.3
TOTAL JRS	8.8 (14.4%)	7.5 (15.4%)	12.9 (11.8%)	25.9 (11.9%)
TOTAL NON-JRS	53.0 (85.6%)	41.3 (84.6%)	205.5 (84.2%)	190.5 (88.1%)
EA	0.2 (0.0%)	0.0 (0.0%)	0.0 (0.0%)	0.0 (0.0%)
TOTALS	62.0 (100%)	48.8 (100%)	218.4 (100%)	216.4 (100%)

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installed in the NMCC and the RDJTF Headquarters. The system provided dedicated secure voice and "FAX" capability in addition to interactive graphics. The activities during Exercise PROUD SABER 83 concentrated on these capabilities. However, the benefit of the system rested primarily in its capability to allow interaction, in real time, on complex maps, graphs, and photographic material. Results of the exercise demonstrated the potential utility of an NMCC-to-unified and specified command secure video link. OJCS personnel used the capability for exchange of planning information for an upcoming manpower survey at the RDJTF. Graphic data on manpower strengths were exchanged and discussed over the link. In addition, the secure video link was used by other staff elements to display and discuss messages and address Exercise PROUD SABER 83 issues.

(8) ~~(C)~~ White House-Pentagon Secure TV. Several meetings of the Mobilization-Crisis Action Group (MCAG) at the White House used the secure TV link to the Pentagon for information briefings. On several occasions, weather conditions disrupted the TV link, and since there was no alternate link, the briefing stopped. Players at the White House Situation Room were dependent upon this link for current information on the crisis.



(10) (U) Topic Exclusions. No significant analyses could be made of the following topic areas contained in the Exercise PROUD SABER 83 A&DCP.

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(a) (U) Those topics that related to compliance, usage, and implementation of JRS reports were not analyzed.

(b) (U) Correlation between exercise events and message characteristics was not analyzed.

d. (U) Findings

(1) (U) Telecommunications

(a) ~~(C)~~ The daily volume of messages peaked on 2 November when the OPG received 690 messages.

(b) ~~(C)~~ On 29 October and 1 and 2 November, actual outages were planned for circuits carried by the DSCS satellite. At times, up to 50 percent of the overseas AUTODIN service was to be affected. There was little or no operational impact upon players in the NMCC as a result of actual circuit denials.

(c) (U) About 35 percent of the messages received by the Joint Chiefs of Staff were sent to the OPG for action. About 40 percent of these messages required immediate action by the OPG.

(d) (U) At least 40 copies were printed for each message received by the OJCS. Each player requiring messages was given a copy of virtually every message received.

(e) (U) With the use of a special printer in the OPG, message reproduction and distribution efforts were considerably reduced.

(f) (U) The percent of FLASH messages meeting SOS criteria has improved when compared with the last mobilization exercise, Exercise PROUD SPIRIT 80.

(g) (U) Less than 35 percent of the JRS SITREPs arrived in Washington by the desired time. All the JRS SITREPs arrived prior to the scheduled morning briefing.

(h) ~~(C)~~ The JCS MC transmitted the JCS SITREP on the average 3 hours and 14 minutes after the planned release time.

(i) ~~(C)~~ With some variations in percentages and times, the findings concerning SITREPs for this exercise were

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similar to results available from exercises since Exercise POWER PLAY 79.


(j) ~~(C)~~ About 52 percent of the exercise messages used FLASH or IMMEDIATE precedence. About 54 percent of the exercise messages sampled had precedence assigned in accordance with telecommunications economy and discipline policy.

(k) (U) During the last 5 years of JCS exercises, about 40 percent of exercise messages have been SECRET and IMMEDIATE.

(l) ~~(C)~~ The percent of FLASH and IMMEDIATE messages meeting length standards was similar to recent mobilization exercises but lower than other types of exercises.

(2) (U) Secure Video Link. The Joint Staff had favorable comments about the capabilities of the experimental video link between the NMCC and the RDJTF headquarters.

(3) ~~(C)~~ White House-Pentagon TV. The White House-Pentagon secure video link used during Exercise PROUD SABER 83 was undependable. There was no alternate link when weather conditions disrupted transmissions.



e. (U) Conclusions

(1) (U) Telecommunications

(a) (U) With the temporary installation of a special printer, there was an improvement in message distribution in the OPG.

(b) ~~(C)~~ Commands' compliance with the JRS requirements for the daily SITREP was poor. Only 32 percent of the SITREPs were timely and thus fully useful to the Joint Staff during preparation for daily decisionmakers' briefings. This situation was similar to that found in several recent exercises. The continuing low adherence to established SITREP reporting deadlines deprives decisionmakers of current information.

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(c) (U) Those who prepared messages did not always follow guidance in ACP 121 and DSS Message Preparation Guide when assigning precedence. Assigned precedence was higher than the guidelines would allow for the subject matter.

(d) (U) A majority of exercise messages use IMMEDIATE precedence instead of being divided among IMMEDIATE, PRIORITY, and ROUTINE. Under these circumstances, the more urgent messages may have been delayed by the volume of other messages.

(e) (U) Only 47 percent of the FLASH messages were shorter than 100 words. The text of FLASH messages should be limited to 100 words to promote clarity, brevity, and ease of transmission.

(2) ~~(c)~~ Communications Assets. When multiple OPLANs are executed, limited JCS controlled communications assets could not be allocated to those situations that need them most.

f. (U) Recommendations

(1) (U) Telecommunications. The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider updating that part of the JRS in JCS Pub 6, Part II, Chapter 5 concerning the Commander's Situation Reports. Current JRS report identification line instructions should be provided to assist machine identification of SITREPs.

(2) (U) Communications Assets. The Director for Plans and Policy, OJCS, should consider requiring commanders of unified and specified commands to submit specific information on the use of JCS-controlled communications assets when submitting OPLANs for approval. The submission should include a listing of all JCS controlled communications assets included in the TPFDD and an indication of its intended use. This information would be used to develop and analyze alternatives for the reallocation of resources when forces are dual tasked in the event of multiple OPLAN execution.

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Tab A to Section IX  
(U) Operations Security (OPSEC)

1. (C) Introduction. From 1 September to 5 November, operations security for Exercise PROUD SABER 83 was examined by the Joint OPSEC Analysis Center (JOAC), located in the National Military Command Center. The JOAC coordinated OPSEC support activities; examined the OPSEC of pre-exercise activities; analyzed OPSEC data from other commands; disseminated daily OPSEC summaries; gave OPSEC briefings and updates; disseminated hostile threat data; and coordinated communications security (COMSEC) monitoring and analysis at other commands. Members of the US Army Intelligence and Security Command, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the OJCS manned the JOAC.

2. (U) Findings. Analysis by the JOAC revealed the following significant OPSEC vulnerabilities.

a. (U) No classification guide was written for the JCS Exercise Plan. This is the third consecutive JCS sponsored exercise where this OPSEC deficiency was noted.

b. (C) Unclassified information associated Exercise PROUD SABER 83 with three prior exercises. This association may enable hostile intelligence services to expand upon previously gathered information, thereby possibly compromising friendly intentions or activities. This is a poor OPSEC practice, especially if exercise scenarios are similar.

c. (U) Sensitive exercise information was included in the unclassified subject line of many exercise messages. This information, coupled with the date time group (DTG) of the particular message, may reveal classified information about the exercise.

d. (U) A person requiring an escort was within audio range of a TOP SECRET briefing carried on closed circuit television in the NMCC.

e. (U) Nine percent of the 4,900 exercise messages reviewed by the JOAC had improper paragraph and subject heading classification markings.

f. (U) Several instances were noted where Federal Protective Services (FPS) Officers, after consulting appropriate access rosters, gave persons entering the NMCC identifying data and then asked the person if the information was correct. A person attempting unauthorized entry into the NMCC would probably confirm the officer's information without hesitation.

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g. (2) Nonsecure telephones were used near closed circuit televisions when classified briefings were being given. COMSEC telephone monitoring was able to record extremely sensitive information from the classified briefings through nonsecure telephones.

h. (2) COMSEC discipline in the NMCC was considerably better during Exercise PROUD SABER 83 than during Exercise IVY LEAGUE 82. Many telephone conversations were terminated before sensitive information was disclosed.

i. (U) Strict physical security measures at several locations heightened security awareness and reduced the possibility of compromise of exercise information.

3. (2) Conclusion. The OPSEC performance during Exercise PROUD SABER 83 showed considerable improvement over previous exercises. Counterintelligence activities revealed few OPSEC weaknesses. Strict physical security measures heightened security awareness and reduced the possibility of compromise. The improper use of nonsecure telephones was the primary OPSEC deficiency. One percent of the monitored calls revealed sensitive information. Thirty-three percent of nonsecure calls were terminated so that discussions could be resumed on secure telephones. This was a dramatic improvement over Exercise IVY LEAGUE 82, when only 3 percent of the conversations were transferred to secure telephones.

4. (U) Recommendations. The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider the following:

a. (U) Develop and disseminate an exercise classification guide. DOD 5200.1H, "Writing Security Classification Guidance," shows how a guide should be written

b. (U) Separate nonsecure telephones from secure telephones in the NMCC by at least three feet (National COMSEC Information Memorandum 5203)

c. (U) Install telephone receivers with push-to-talk buttons on all nonsecure telephones in JCS and NMCC areas

d. (U) Classify all exercise messages until at least the end of the exercise. Unclassified exercise information, coupled with the DTG of the message, may reveal classified information about the exercise

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e. (U) Instruct FPS officers controlling access into JCS and NMCC areas to:

(1) (U) Keep all unissued access badges out of the reach of unauthorized personnel

(2) (U) Require positive identification from persons entering restricted areas.

(3) (U) Examine access badges with ultraviolet lights where individuals can not see the special markings revealed by the light. This procedure would preclude an unauthorized person from taking note of a distinctive marking and reproducing it on a forged badge

(4) (U) Confiscate access badges when an individual's name and social security account number, as reflected on the exercise access roster, do not correspond to the individual's identification card.

f. (U) Institute procedures whereby the same date for declassification is applied to all portions of future exercise plans bearing the same level of classified information. This procedure would reduce confusion and streamline the declassification process

g. (U) Issue permanent JCS Access Badges to designated PCF personnel so that these personnel have the mobility and access to discuss OPSEC matters with JCS members throughout the year

h. (U) Install a small, soundproof area within the OPG where action officers can use nonsecure telephones when classified briefings are being given over closed circuit television.

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SECTION X

(U) SPACE OPERATIONS

1. (U) Major Objective. Evaluate the ability of the commands, staffs, and agencies within the DOD to assign priorities to, and allocate, DOD and approved civilian space resources in a crisis situation.

2. ~~(S)~~ Synopsis

a. ~~(S)~~ Exercise PROUD SABER 83 was the second major JCS CPX in which space operations were evaluated. It was the first JCS CPX in which an OJCS Space Response Cell (SRC) was activated. Exercise PROUD SABER 83 confirmed that there was no existing current and active inventory of space assets, nor was there an official definition of what constituted a space asset. There were, in fact, a series of interrelated space systems but there was no single existing description of what all these systems were, or how they were interrelated.

b. ~~(S)~~ The space operations analysis and evaluation below is divided into three paragraphs. The first two deal with the two major areas of space related activity that developed during the exercise: antisatellite (ASAT) activities, and sabotage of the Air Force Satellite Control Facility (AFSCF), Sunnyvale, California, and resulting difficulties. The third section deals with those other exercise objectives and related matters that received consideration during the exercise.

3. (U) System Description. As indicated above, there is no single existing authoritative description of the various space systems. Tab I, Appendix 1 to Annex G to COSIN to JCS EXPLAN 0022, is a partial description of many of the military assets with a brief description of the existing command and control elements.

4. (U) Analysis

a. ~~(S)~~ Exercise Considerations. During the exercise, members of the Joint Staff were briefed by SRC personnel that Exercise PROUD SABER 83 might confirm the following Exercise IVY LEAGUE 82 findings:

(1) ~~(C)~~ There is no JCS chain of command for space activity (except TW/AA). There are a variety of space systems

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that are controlled by agencies outside the standard military operational chain of command. This can prove to be cumbersome where time sensitive problems develop.

(2) (C) There are no prepared OPLANs for space initiatives or responses.

(3) (C) There is no existing plan to mobilize space assets.

(4) (S) It is important to note that the points raised in this analysis are NOT universally agreed to or accepted. There are members of the space operations community who think that a "chain of command" for all space operations may not be feasible. They also are not convinced that a single OPLAN, or a group of OPLANs are either necessary or desirable for responding to provocations in space.

b. (U) Specific Analysis Objectives

(1) (U) Evaluate the procedures used to resolve competing demands for space resources.

(2) (U) Evaluate the ability of the OJCS and the Services to surge the delivery and launch of space systems.

(3) (U) Evaluate the process for the transition to DOD control of commercial satellite communications resources.

c. (U) Discussion

(1) (S) ASAT Activities. On 2 November, the Secretary of Defense ordered an investigation into Soviet allegations that the United States had used laser weapons against Soviet satellites. In their protest the Soviets warned that this provocation might force them to take "appropriate action." Although the United States denied any laser activity against Soviet satellites the USSR had laid the groundwork for their subsequent activities.

(a) (S) The first Soviet ASAT attack occurred at 021429Z November. The ASAT attack was unsuccessful and was destroyed in flight. The second ASAT attack occurred at 031530Z November. This ASAT attack was also unsuccessful due to an in-flight failure. The SRC recommended that unless there were overriding political considerations, "no protest be made concerning the failed ASAT attack." The SRC also recommended that appropriate OJCS staff elements be tasked with preparing candidate responses against Soviet targets of equal value in the event of a successful ASAT

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attack. These recommendations were made some time after 031630Z November. (Note: SRC personnel stated in postexercise interviews that the OPG was considering a diplomatic protest but no action was taken.) At 041634Z November, US satellite (OPS 1982-X014A) was destroyed by a Soviet ASAT. At 041741Z November another satellite (US OPS 1982-X013A) was destroyed by a Soviet ASAT.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Following a series of space activity conferences, the conferees were asked to recommend actions that could be taken in response to the two satellite attacks. Since the United States did not then (and does not now) have an operational ASAT capability, an "in kind" response was not possible. A response of "equal value" was developed; it was decided that a Soviet BEAR reconnaissance aircraft would be shot down and the Russians advised as to why this was done.

(2) ~~(S)~~ AFSCF Explosion and Fire. At 311740Z November an explosion occurred at the AFSCF Sunnyvale. All operations ceased and there were many casualties. Sabotage was suspected and NORAD sent out a Space Advisory message (311805Z Oct). At 312150Z October a Space Cancel message from NORAD advised "Overall AFSCF green, Satellite Test Center green." During the 4 hours between the explosion and the notification that the facility was back to "green" there were a series of secure calls between California (Sunnyvale), Colorado (NORAD), and Washington (NMCC). Exercise participants seemed unsure how serious this fire might be. For instance, the SRC noted in their logs "Loss of control of several satellite systems (temporarily). Coordinate with Air Force Staff for determination of all potential impact. Coordinate with NORAD." At NORAD, the impact was equally unclear. Although the space systems personnel were certain back-up controls for all systems were available, no one could quickly determine:

(a) (U) Exactly how many satellites would be affected

(b) (U) How serious the effects would be

(c) (U) Where backup control for each system was located.

(3) (U) Other Space Related Activities

(a) ~~(S)~~ One of the lesser objectives of space activities was to test the ability of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the unified and specified commands, and the

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Services to react to satellite outages during crisis situations. On 31 October, DSP flight 10 (West) failed on orbit. At 311745Z October, NORAD advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that DSP flight 8 was being activated. DSP 8 had suffered star sensor degradation and had been replaced by DSP 10. At 311756Z October, the NORAD Emergency Action (EA) log notes "Flight 8 is active, sending data to ground station as of 1754Z." At 010308Z November, CINCAD asked HQ USAF and other space activities to prepare a replacement launch. At 011940Z November, Air Force Systems Command advised HQ USAF and CINCAD that the "earliest possible replacement launch is 210 days from now." Based on this information, the decision was made to move DSP 8 to provide coverage lost by the DSP West satellite.

(b) ~~(S)~~ Another objective of space activities in the exercise was to determine what actions would be taken to secure DOD control of civilian commercial space assets. HQ USAF (022249Z Nov) raised the question of DOD nationalizing commercial satellite communications. The Director for Command, Control, and Communications Systems, OJCS, submitted a point paper to the OPG for the OpsDeps briefing, 4 November, citing several shortcomings in the commercial satellite communications system including its inability to resist jamming, its lack of encryption capability, and its incompatibility with military satellite communications systems and terminals. It was alleged that "Inclusion of civil SATCOM under the (full) mobilization (declared by Congress) can be justified as in the national interest." Command, Control and Communications System Directorate personnel recommended that "If DCA confirms the situation globally, nationalization should be considered." At ENDEX, action had not been taken to accomplish or recommend this course of action to the President.

(c) ~~(S)~~ A final objective for space activities in Exercise PROUD SABER 83 was to determine what actions would be required to surge the delivery and launch of space systems. CINCPAC advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff (300444Z Oct) that "There has been a complete blackout of all weather data coming out of countries bordering the Persian Gulf region, North Korea, and the Soviet Union." CINCPAC stated tactical air operations in these areas were heavily dependent on weather data and requested the launch of DMSP-F7 as soon as possible. The Joint Chiefs of Staff advised CINCPAC

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(310115Z Oct) that the DMSP-F7 launch was scheduled for 4 January 1983 but that a USAF investigation of the "technical feasibility and risk of compressing normal launch preparation activities and availability of alternative data sources" was on-going. Finally, a JCS message (312240Z Oct) to CINCPAC advised that the current launch preparations for DMSP-F7 were accelerated and 4 January 1983 was the earliest launch date. CINCPAC was advised that they must rely on US civil polar orbiting satellites until launch of DMSP. While not DMSP quality, the civil satellites do provide "adequate global coverage."

d. (U) Findings

(1) (U) The space events in Exercise PROUD SABER 83 covered a full spectrum of realistic space operations and activities. Many of the activities progressed quickly and smoothly; e.g., the DSP satellite move and the DMSP expedited launch request.

(2) (~~S~~) Based on recommendations received from the SRC, the OpsDepts agreed not to respond to the two Soviet failed ASATs.

(3) (U) For 4 hours following the explosion at the AFSCF, there was a great deal of indecision over the actual effects of this action.

(4) (U) Space operations and activities were conducted at the highest levels (including the Exercise President) during the exercise. The addition of the SRC to the exercise benefited the OPG and other participants by limiting the search for how to respond to the various space activities.

e. (U) Conclusions

(1) (U) Military operations in space are expanding rapidly and will continue to expand in the foreseeable future.

(2) (U) Documentation describing the various systems that are interrelated in space operations is diverse and incomplete.

(3) (U) Command and control relationships in the various space activities is not clearly understood. This is true even in those commands and staffs that are related to, or are a part of, the space operations decisionmaking process. The fire at the SCF also uncovered shortfalls

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in determining the impact to operational users of satellites.

f. ~~48~~ Recommendation. The Director for Operations, OJCS, will consider developing additional procedures and documentation to deal with space operations. These should be written, exercised, and refined to meet the expanding requirements.

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## SECTION XI

### (U) REMEDIAL ACTION PROJECTS (RAPs)

1. (U) Purpose. This section provides a compilation of Exercise PROUD SABER 83 recommended RAPs identified by exercise participants at the JCS-sponsored postexercise critique conference 11-13 January 1983. The purpose of the conference was to evaluate and make appropriate disposition of the critique items submitted by exercise participants. To expedite processing of the critique items, four subgroups were formed to discuss items relevant to operations and intelligence; logistics; manpower; and command, control, and communications systems. The title and problem statements are recorded verbatim as submitted by exercise participants. Resolution of inaccuracies was deferred to the RAP Working Group. These RAPs will be presented to the RAP Working Group for final validation and Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) determination.

2. (U) Definitions. For the purpose of this report there are two sources for exercise deficiencies: those submitted by exercise participants and those subsequently derived from OJCS analysis results. The former are listed in this section. The latter are listed in Section XII. Each exercise deficiency reported by exercise participants is categorized as a RAP, Lesson Learned, Noted, or Single Agency Action.

a. (U) RAP. Problems of such magnitude that they require OJCS, Services, unified and specified commands, OSD, or other Federal agencies to initiate corrective action.

b. (U) Lessons Learned. Problems for which procedures existed but were not followed and which are considered to be of interest to OJCS, the Services, unified and specified commands, OSD, or other Federal agencies will be annotated in the critique conference minutes. Corrective action will be the responsibility of the appropriate office and will not be further monitored by this program.

c. (U) Single Agency Action. Problems that require internal action by only one agency, command or Service. These will be annotated in the critique conference minutes, and no further reports are required.

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d. (U) Noted. Critique items that do not require corrective action.

3. (U) Number of Categories. Conferees categorized the 567 critique items as follows:

a. (U) 182 critique items were recommended as RAPs, either individually, in various combinations with other items, or folded into existing RAPs.

b. (U) 111 critique items were classified as Single Agency Actions

c. (U) 91 critique items were classified as Lessons Learned

d. (U) 162 critique items were classified as Noted

e. (U) 21 critique items were discarded as duplicates or erroneous.

4. (U) Recommended RAPs. The following is a listing of the recommended RAPs submitted by participants at the critique conference. RAPs are categorized by Exercise Analysis Areas and OPR. Critique Item (CI) number refers to the number assigned to the recommended RAP in the JCS 1 January 1983 memorandum "Exercise PROUD SABER 83 Critique Items".

a. (U) Mobilization

(1) (U) Title. Exemption of Key Non-DOD Employees from Reserve Call-Up (CI 180).

(a) (U) Problem. Exemption procedures were not implemented in non-DOD Government Agencies, Government-Owned Contractor-Operator facilities, or private industry.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(2) (U) Title. Emergency Travel Warrant (CI 181).

(a) (U) Problem. The Joint Travel Regulations did not provide the authority for travel of military personnel via emergency travel warrant.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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(3) (U) Title. Vertical Perspective of Mobilization Issues (CIs 292 and 294).

(a) (U) Problem. Interests of a majority of Senior players appeared narrowly focused. Important issues were not addressed.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(4) (U) Title. Access to Non-Military Federal Agency Information Systems (CI 329).

(a) (U) Problem. The ability to rapidly notify and recall reserves to active duty was inhibited by lack of correct addresses. Access to data banks of other non-military federal agencies could have provided the information needed.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(5) (U) Title. DOD Mobilization Plans (CIs 228, 556 and 562 folded into RAP 0025).

(a) (U) Problem. There was a lack of a common mobilization terminology and definition of related terms within DOD and between DOD and other Federal Departments and Agencies. Additionally, there was insufficient knowledge of authorities needed for mobilization.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(6) (U) Title. Resource Allocation for Construction (CI 182 folded into RAP 0149).

(a) (U) Problem. Current mobilization planning relies heavily on premobilization construction of facilities to meet requirements. Because of the high costs involved, construction is unlikely to occur.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(7) (U) Title. Retiree Recall Program (CI 176 folded into RAP 0160).

(a) (U) Problem. There was no OSD policy requiring all DOD components to make retired military members serving in key civilian positions exempt from recall.

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(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(8) (U) Title. Establish Reserve Component Mobilization Management Information System (CI 74 folded into RAP 0191).

(a) (U) Problem. The status reporting of non-unit mobilization was hampered by the lack of JCS information requirements for this category.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(9) (U) Title. Civilian Workforce Mobilization (CI's 103, 150, 175, 177, 194, 199, 200, 287, 325, and 551 folded into RAP 0196).

(a) (U) Problem. There was no clear guidance on specific procedures for allocation and control of the distribution of civilian manpower resources among DOD components and defense related industry.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(10) (U) Title. Management of Mobilization Acquisition-ing and Processing (CIs 164 and 205 folded into RAP 0200).

(a) (U) Problem. There were no emergency plans for standby incentive programs to recruit volunteers from the pool of people who had completed their military service obligation.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(11) (U) Title. Retention of Federal Civilian Employees and Defense Contractor Employees in CONUS (CI 179 folded into RAP 0296).

(a) (U) Problem. Exclusions in life insurance coverage of injuries or death sustained by acts of war could deter retention of emergency-essential DOD civilians overseas in time of hostilities.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(12) (U) Title. Transportation Request Procedures (CI 234 folded into RAP 9136).

(a) (U) Problem. The proposed MOBSCOPE data base and procedures were not adequate for MTMC to provide

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prompt and accurate routings and ratings to the units and ITO's.

(b) (U) OPR. Military Transportation Management Command.

b. (U) Deployment

(1) (~~Q~~) Title. Commercial Air Support of the Industrial Base (CI 201).

(a) (~~Q~~) Problem. The criticality of commercial air support of the industrial base requires evaluation.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(2) (~~Q~~) Title. Commercial Augmentation of MAC and MSC (CI 207).

(a) (~~Q~~) Problem. Planned programs for commercial augmentation of MAC and MSC appeared inadequate.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(3) (U) Title. Outfitting of LCAFs (CI 284).

(a) (~~Q~~) Problem. In a crisis situation with competing priorities, it is questionable whether the ships could be outfitted as expeditiously as assumed in the exercise.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(4) (U) Title. C-day/L-hour (CI 55).

(a) (U) Problem. When C-day is announced less than 24 hours in advance, aircraft, passengers, and equipment cannot be moved by Required Delivery Date (RDD).

(b) (U) OPR. Operations Directorate.

(5) (U) Title. OPLAN Dual Tasking (CI 54, 382, 395).

(a) (U) Problem. The identification, control, and listing of dual tasked units and equipment continued to be a problem in mobilization and deployment operations.

(b) (U) OPR. Operations Directorate.

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(6) (U) Title. Deployment Validation OPLAN Disconnects (CI 83).

(a) ~~(S)~~ Problem. Correlation between OPLANs was non-existent relative to unit taskings.

(b) (U) OPR. Operations Directorate.

(7) (U) Title. "Below the Line" Dual Mission Units (CI 97).

(a) (U) Problem. Army assets are insufficient for all OPLAN requirements which are to be executed simultaneously in the Warsaw Pact general war scenario.

(b) (U) OPR. Operations Directorate.

(8) ~~(S)~~ Title. Inability to Transfer RDJTF Units to SW Asia in UNITREP (CI 167).

(a) ~~(S)~~ Problem. The Unified Command Plan did not designate a command responsible for Southwest Asia.

(b) (U) OPR. Operations Directorate.

(9) (U) Title. Positive Reporting in JDS (CIs 250, 334).

(a) ~~(S)~~ Problem. The current system of exception reporting did not assure that all diversions and deviations came to the attention of decisionmakers.

(b) (U) OPR. Operations Directorate.

(10) (U) Title. JCS Deployment Orders (CI 273).

(a) (U) Problem. JCS Deployment Orders did not always recognize sealift requirements.

(b) (U) OPR. Operations Directorate.

(11) ~~(S)~~ Title. NWSS UNITREP Date Base (CIs 345, 396, 459).

(a) ~~(S)~~ Problem. The CINCUSNAVEUR Movement Report Center had difficulty obtaining data on some units listed in the EXPLAN. UNITREP data was not played.

(b) (U) OPR. Operations Directorate.

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(12) (S) Title. Dual Tasking [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] of PACAF Air Transportable Hospitals (ATH) (CI 443).

(a) (S) Problem. The same two ATHs, one each from Clark AB and Yokota AB, were tasked to support [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

(b) (U) OPR. Logistics Directorate.

(13) (U) Title. Aleutian Defense (CI 462).

(a) (S) Problem. There were extreme difficulties in defending the Aleutians. The problems were exacerbated by the execution of [REDACTED] and the adverse impact on forces, lift, and logistic support available to PACOM for general war.

(b) (U) OPR. Plans and Policy Directorate.

(14) (S) Title. Shipyard Capacity Only Marginally Adequate (CIS 209, 366).

(a) (S) Problem. Shipyard capacity was marginally adequate for mobilization. The timeframe for implementation of the role of the Coordinator for Ship Repair and Conversion was unclear.

(b) (U) OPR. Navy.

(15) (U) Title. Data Base Differences (CIS 36, 335, 343, 376, 412).

(a) (S) Problem. There were discrepancies in the JDS data base and the RUPs elements, displays, reports, and synchronization. There were unacceptable delays between the entry of changes through the RUP and evidence of the changes in the data base.

(b) (U) OPR. Joint Deployment Agency.

(16) (U) Title. Unit Deployment Information (CI 39).

(a) (U) Problem. Software programs did not provide deployment data to USREDCOM on USAF forces and USREDCOM units under OPCON of the RDJTF.

(b) (U) OPR. Joint Deployment Agency.

(17) (S) Title. JDS Data Base Discrepancies (CIS 344, 377, 409, 457).

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(a) ~~(S)~~ Problem. Many FRNs with no or invalid Unit Identification Codes were not scheduled by MAC and JDA. This caused several unit moves to be delayed and others not to move at all.

(b) (U) OPR. Joint Deployment Agency.

(18) ~~(S)~~ Title. JDA Messages (CIs 371, 424).

(a) ~~(S)~~ Problem. Many JDA messages had the same date time group. Each JDA computer generated movement schedule OPORD contained errors which severely burdened the Camp Smith NTCC.

(b) (U) OPR. Joint Deployment Agency.

(19) (U) Title. Limited Merchant Marine Fleet (CIs 212, 279, 290, 291, and 301 are folded into RAP 9048).

(a) ~~(S)~~ Problem. There were critical sealift shortages in shallow draft tankers, handy size tankers, passenger transport ships, and heavy lift dry cargo ships.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(20) (U) Title. Deficiencies in Joint Systems (CIs 240, 281, 456, 467, 520, and 522 are folded into RAP 0178).

(a) ~~(S)~~ Problem. Joint systems deficiencies existed in UNITREP, sealift planning, command relationships, return of SAC assets, and airlift simulation.

(b) (U) OPR. Operations Directorate.

(21) (U) Title. Intra-CONUS Movement Reports (INCONREP) - Total Requirements (CIs 126, 233, and 356 are folded into RAP 0210).

(a) (U) Problem. Incomplete intra-CONUS commercial transportation movement requirements prevented MTMC, DOD, and DOT from completing wartime emergency planning.

(b) (U) OPR. Logistics Directorate.

(22) ~~(S)~~ Title. Operations of Ships in a Chemical Warfare Environment (CI 283 is folded in to RAP 0273).

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(a) ~~(S)~~ Problem. Merchant ships used in support of military operations lacked [REDACTED] defensive protection.

(b) (U) OPR. Navy.

(23) (U) Title. Joint Deployment System Interface (CIS 59, 71, and 518 are folded into RAP 0114).

(a) (U) Problem. There were no interfaces between the JDS data base and JOPS, Contingency Operation Mobility Planning and Execution System (COMPES), UNITREP, and Deployment/Employment Mobilization Status (DEMSTAT).

(b) (U) OPR. Joint Deployment Agency.

(24) (U) Title. Integrated Joint Deployment System (CI 63 is folded into RAP 9099).

(a) (U) Problem. The JDS and the JOPS were not interfaced.

(b) (U) OPR. Joint Deployment Agency.

(25) (U) Title. Sealift Readiness Program (SRP) (CI 303 is folded into RAP 0173).

(a) ~~(S)~~ Problem. The timely availability of the NDRF in response to meeting a multiplan situation was questionable.

(b) (U) OPR. Military Sealift Command.

c. (U) Industrial Surge and Mobilization

(1) (U) Title. Automated Industrial Resource Data Base (CIS 129, 130, 193)

(a) (U) Problem. Lack of a quick, accurate method to evaluate industrial capabilities to react to changing mobilization requirements made national policy decisionmaking difficult, if not impossible.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(2) (U) Title. Foreign Support of US Industrial Mobilization (CIS 131, 132, 160, 300, 478).

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- (a) (U) Problem. Potential foreign support of US industrial mobilization was not fully considered in US defense planning.
- (b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- (3) (U) Title. Mobilization Base Expansion (CI 148).
- (a) (~~C~~) Problem. There was no established priority system for allocation of the ammunition production base to reflect the demand of the Services, the competing demands of OPLANS, and the demand requirements of allies.
- (b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- (4) (U) Title. Tri-Service Demand on Limited Production Capacity (CIs 158 and 159).
- (a) (~~C~~) Problem. The Armed Services Production Planning Officers (ASPPOs) were unable to adequately load plants for mobilization planning because of lack of total Service mobilization requirements, and a prioritized critical items list.
- (b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- (5) (~~S~~) Title. Repair Parts (CI 214).
- (a) (~~S~~) Problem. The surge of the production base did not provide for a surge procurement of additional repair parts
- (b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- (6) (U) Title. Industrial Mobilization Exercise Play (CI 191).
- (a) (U) Problem. The short exercise did not provide time for a realistic examination of the industrial base capabilities and limitations to meet defense and civil sector requirements.
- (b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.
- (7) (U) Title. Requirement for Emergency Stand-By Legislation (CIs 106, 155, 156, 189 and 361 are folded into RAP 0149).

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(a) (U) Problems. OSHA standards are waived only upon declaration of war, not during periods of mobilization. As a result, medical facilities that do not meet OSHA standards cannot be used during mobilization. Clarification of authorities are needed regarding seizure of non-defense contractor plants and equipment.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(8) (U) Title. Industrial Mobilization Preparedness (CIs 121, 124, 125, 127, 128, 190 and 477 are folded into RAP 0218).

(a) (U) Problem. The Army had neither sufficient material and ammunition stockpiles nor sufficient industrial surge capability to equip the current force and sustain prolonged combat operations.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense

d. (U) Logistics

(1) (U) Title. Legislation Inhibiting Logistical Support (CI 109).

(a) (~~OP~~) Problem. DOD Directive 1130.2 prohibited granting engineering/logistics support to contract field technicians from the functional resources of the government agency.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(2) (U) Title. Exercise Capability of Inventory Management Systems (CI 196).

(a) (~~OP~~) Problem. Some inventory management systems did not have the capability to simultaneously process real world and exercise transactions.

(b) (U) OPS. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(3) (U) Title. Petroleum Industry Advisory Group (CI 203, 225).

(a) (U) Problem. An advisory committee of petroleum industry executives would be of benefit to DFSC in procuring petroleum products during emergency periods.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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(4) ~~(S)~~ Title. Bunkers for MSC Ships Supporting SWA SLOC (CI 210, 221).

(a) ~~(S)~~ Problem. Bunkers for MSC ships supporting SWA SLOC presented a problem, even adopting the assumption that 50 percent of the requirements would be satisfied by host nation support.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(5) (U) Title. Fuel Priorities and Allocations (CI 241).

(a) (U) Problem. DPA fuel priority and allocation procedures were vital to support CONUS movements prior to and during mobilization.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(6) (U) Title. Visibility Over Airfield Capacity Allocation (CI 505).

(a) (U) Problem. There was no centralized time-sensitive airfield status base to reflect ramp space allocation, activity saturation or refueling status.

(b) (U) OPR. Operations Directorate.

(7) (U) Title. R-5 Report (CONUS Terminal Workload Status) (CI 237, 503).

(a) (U) Problem. The non-ADP assisted R-5 reporting was extremely time consuming and highly susceptible to errors. JCS R-1 and R-6 reports should be deleted.

(b) (U) OPR. Logistics Directorate.

(8) (U) Title. JTB Resolution of Transportation Shortfalls (CI 309, 483, 506).

(a) (U) Problem. Detailed procedures were lacking for the resolution of transportation shortfalls.

(b) (U) OPR. Logistics Directorate.

(9) (U) Title. [REDACTED] Defense Equipment [REDACTED] (CI 469).

(a) ~~(S)~~ Problem. Required quantities of [REDACTED] were not available to support OPLAN taskings.

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(b) (U) OPR. Plans and Policy Directorate.

(10) (U) Title. Contracting Support (CI 365).

(a) ~~(C)~~ Problem. Neither contracting support responsibility nor personnel resources to support the RDF were defined.

(b) (U) OPR. USCENTCOM.

(11) (U) Title. Defense Industrial Supply Center (DISC) Destruction (CI 33, 219, 482).

(a) (U) Problem. Service logistic personnel failed to comprehend the significance of the destruction of the DISC.

(b) (U) OPR. Defense Logistics Agency.

(12) (U) Title. Fuel Additives for Commercial Jet Fuel (CI 223).

(a) (U) Problem. HNS fuel provided RDJTF [REDACTED] aircraft would be commercial grade rather than military fuel.

(b) (U) OPR. Defense Logistics Agency.

(13) (U) Title. Diversion of Security Assistance Material to Support US Forces (CIs 122, 123, 142, 147 and 319 are folded into RAP 0010).

(a) (U) Problem. Guidance and coordination on SA matters were untimely and inadequate.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(14) (U) Title. Medical Shortfall (CIs 120, 299, 414 and 563 are folded into RAP 0012).

(a) ~~(S)~~ Problem. The Services were not ready to medically support simultaneous combat operations.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(15) (U) Title. Medical Manpower Shortfalls (CI 111 is folded into RAP 0047).

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(a) (U) Problem. In addition to the equipment problems identified in RAP 0012 above, medical personnel shortfalls were also critically short.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(16) (U) Title. Wartime Information Security Program (WISP) (CI 118 is folded into RAP 0166).

(a) (U) Problem. There were no Army assets to provide WISP.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of Secretary of Defense.

(17) (U) Title. Defense Resource Needs for Mobilization (CIs 146, 192, and 224 are folded into RAP 0194).

(a) (U) Problem. Prioritization of scarce resources was not accomplished in a timely manner.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(18) (U) Title. Procedures for the Release of War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA). (CIs 135, 144, and 413 are folded into RAP 0266).

(a) (U) Problem. There were insufficient WRSA stocks available to support the planned ROK force level for 75 days as agreed to.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(19) (U) Title. Security Classification of Transportation Documentation (CI 239 is folded into RAP 0260).

(a) (U) Problem. Transportation movement tables were classified documents, but the ADP equipment used to process the requirements operated in an unclassified mode.

(b) (U) OPR. Logistics Directorate.

(20) (U) Title. Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) Program (CI 252 is folded into RAP 0076).

(a) (U) Problem. The questions of whether EPWs moving in CONUS should be restrained, and whether their guards would be armed were not resolved.

(b) (U) OPR. US Army.

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(21) (U) Title. Critical Munitions Shortfalls (CI 529 is folded into RAP 9064).

(a) ~~(S)~~ Problem. [REDACTED]

All subsequent CVs would require augmentation from JCS and CINCLANT reserves.

(b) (U) OPR. Navy.

e. (U) Crisis Action System

(1) (U) Title. JCS Priority Guidance (CI 274).

(a) (U) Problem. JCS Warning, Alert, and Deployment Orders did not establish priority guidance for sea-lift movements.

(b) (U) OPR. Operations Directorate.

(2) (U) Title. JOPS Medical Planning Module (MPM) (CI 415).

(a) (U) Problem. Use of JOPS MPM during crisis action planning, as currently designed, was cumbersome.

(b) (U) OPR. Logistics Directorate.

f. (U) NMCC Operations

(1) (U) Title. Formatting of Management Information (CI 561).

(a) (U) Problem. Briefings to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior OSD officials were not adequate to clearly lay out and compare options or to provide meaningful information on the status of mobilization and deployment operations.

(b) (U) OPR. Operations Directorate.

(2) (U) Title. Control of Meteorological Information (METCON) Impacts on USAREUR/NATO (CI 403 is folded into RAP 0238).

(a) ~~(S)~~ Problem. The concept of METCON was to protect meteorological information that could be of value to the enemy. Present unencrypted weather communications made METCON unrealistic because of vulnerability to enemy interception.

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(b) (U) OPR. Operations Directorate.

g. (U) Civil-Military Interface

(1) (U) Title. Transferring of Non-Military Health Beneficiaries to the Civilian Community (CI 109).

(a) (U) Problem. The suspension and curtailment of dependent and retiree medical care shifted the burden from military installations to the civilian community.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(2) (U) Title. Noncombatant Evacuation for Overseas (CIS 244, 400).

(a) (~~S~~) Problem. A serious control problem existed for movement of evacuees to safehaven/CONUS aerial ports of debarkation and for onward movement within CONUS.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(3) (U) Title. NEO Message Traffic Timing (CIS 510, 511, 514).

(a) (U) Problem. NEO traffic started too soon to permit immediate play by Federal, State, and local civilian agencies. The traffic arrived classified confidential, which negated use of telephonic coordination with the Emergency Processing Center (EPC).

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(4) (U) Title. Non-Combatant Evacuation (CI 557).

(a) (~~S~~) Problem. Current US policies and plans for NEO were incomplete and may not be workable.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(5) (U) Title. NEO Policy in NATO (CI 328 is folded into RAP 0193; NOTE: RAP 0014, Safehavens, was previously folded into RAP 0193).

(a) (U) Problem. Disruption of operational flows was likely because of post M-day NEO. Plans should identify the NEO effect on strategic transportation.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

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(6) (U) Title. Retention of Civilian Employees Overseas (CIs 5, 149, and 178 are folded into RAP 0222).

(a) ~~(C)~~ Problem. Echelons above Corps relied solely upon contractors to perform maintenance on all ADP equipment. There was a need for a policy governing retention and deployment of essential Logistic Assistance Program personnel in hostile areas. Life insurance exclusions may deter retention of essential civilians during hostilities.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(7) (U) Title. Crisis Management Within OSD (CI 198, 218, 324, 543, 558, 559, and 560 are folded into RP 0229).

(a) (U) Problem. The OSD CMO was not widely understood. The CMO did not provide adequate feedback to the committees; CMO organization and procedures need review.

(b) (U) OPR. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

(8) (U) Title. Military Support of Civil Defense-Residual Force Information (CIs 47, 229, and 245 are folded into RAP 0289).

(a) ~~(C)~~ Problem. Accurate identification and determination of the readiness of residual forces was needed during or subsequent to major deployments and mobilization.

(b) (U) OPR. Operations Directorate.

(9) ~~(C)~~ Title. Shortage of Field Medical Units (Hospital Beds) and Medical Filler Personnel (CI 327 is folded into RAP 9032).

(a) ~~(C)~~ Problem. Should medical evacuation policies be based on OPLAN requirements or real-world medical evacuation capability.

(b) (U) OPR. Logistics Directorate.

(10) (U) Title. Security of Mobilization Means (CIs 185, 304, 536 and 550 are folded into RAP 9056).

(a) ~~(S)~~ Problem. Security was inadequate within the CONUS transportation network and at key commercial facilities.

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(b) (U) OPR. Plans and Policy Directorate.

h. (U) WIN and WWMCCS ADP Support. WIN Reliability (CIs 25, 186, 378, 422, and 440 are folded into RAP 0179).

(1) (U) Problem. A need exists to publish standard guidance for WIN teleconference operations. Deficiencies in the management and accessibility of the WIN teleconference gave rise to delays in the availability of information required about the deployment.

(2) (U) OPR. Command, Control, and Communications Systems Directorate.

i. (U) Communications and Message Traffic Analysis

(1) (U) Title. Communications Equipment (CIs 6, 394, 554, 555).

(a) ~~(S)~~ Problem. The Joint Chiefs of Staff did not possess current data on location of JCS-controlled communications assets. The JOPS process did not permit effective management of these assets.

(b) (U) OPR. Command, Control, and Communications Systems Directorate.

(2) ~~(C)~~ Title. Lack of Secure Communications for Merchant Ships (CI 276).

(a) ~~(C)~~ There was no satisfactory system for providing merchant ships with secure communications capability.

(b) (U) OPR. Navy.

j. (U) Space Operations. JCS Response to Antisatellite (ASAT) Attacks (CI 480).

(1) ~~(S)~~ Problem. The United States did not possess an ASAT capability and JCS had not developed alternative responses to potential ASAT attacks.

(2) (U) OPR. Operations Directorate.

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## SECTION XII

### (U) PROPOSED REMEDIAL ACTION PROJECTS (RAPs)

1. (U) Purpose. This section provides a compilation of proposed Exercise PROUD SABER 83 RAPs derived from the OJCS analysis of the exercise subsequent to the critique conference.

2. (U) Definitions. There are two sources for exercise deficiencies: those submitted by exercise participants and those subsequently derived from the OJCS analysis results. The former are listed in Section XI. The latter are listed in this section exclusive of those already identified in Section XI. The exercise deficiencies in this section are derived from findings, conclusions, and recommendations in the first 10 sections that are recommended as RAPs.

a. (U) Finding. A finding is the result of an examination and analysis of data. A finding ties together the meaning and importance of the analysis which preceded and supported it. A finding is clearly tied to a specific analysis objective.

b. (U) Conclusion. A conclusion is a judgment, decision, or opinion formed after investigation or thought. A conclusion can result from one or more findings.

c. (U) Recommendation. A recommendation is a specific action which should be taken to correct a deficiency identified in the analysis. A recommendation can result from one or more conclusions.

### 3. (U) Proposed RAPs

a. (U) Introduction. Each of the preceding analysis sections contains the findings, conclusions, and recommendations resulting from the analysis. Recommendations which could not be identified with active RAPs were evaluated for possible inclusion in the RAP program. Where appropriate, a recommendation was made to that effect and annotated in parentheses following the recommendation.

b. (U) RAPs by Analysis Area. This section contains a listing by analysis area of the Exercise PROUD SABER 83 recommendations proposed for inclusion in the RAP program. Listing of a recommendation in this section does not mean

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that the recommendation will be a RAP. The recommendation may be assigned the status of Single Agency Action, Noted, or Lesson Learned. Coordination in accordance with SM 827-81 will determine the final status of the recommendation. This section focuses only on systems and procedures since the analysis of individual performance was not an objective. The page referenced at the end of each recommended RAP indicates the section and page where detailed information is located.

(1) (U) Deployment

(a) (U) The Secretary of Defense and the Chief of Naval Operations should consider reassessing the SL-7 modification program to expedite SL-7 conversion to roll-on/roll-off capability. (II-34)

(b) (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider requesting that the Department of Transportation coordinate with CINCMAC and develop, at the earliest possible date, formal procedures and implementing instructions needed to request and monitor WASP and foreign charter aircraft. (II-24)

(c) (U) The Director, Joint Staff, should consider:

1. (U) Initiating action to increase the commonality in JCS and Service-unique data bases that are used in OPLAN development and execution, particularly those data bases having deployment implications (II-12)

2. (U) Reopening RAP 262, and developing and disseminating improved guidance and procedures pertaining to deployment estimates (II-23)

3. (U) Modifying the formats of Warning, Alert, Execute, and Deployment Orders as contained in JOPS, Volume IV to provide in each case for the allocation of airlift and sealift and an explicit statement of OPLAN priority (II-9)

4. (U) Changing JCS Pub 6 to require the reporting of all known intra-CONUS movement requirements. (II-37)

(d) (U) The Director, JDA, should consider incorporating into the JDS ADP software appropriate controls that would permit the JDA to audit, edit, and trace all data transactions. (II-12)

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(e) (U) The Director, JDA and CINCMAC should consider revising JDS scheduling procedures to make them more responsive to users in quick and late decision situations. (II-14)

(2) (U) Industrial Surge and Mobilization

(a) (U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff should consider recommending to the Secretary of Defense that he initiate action to develop and maintain an automated data base and data management system that provides for the ability to examine the effects of competing systems demands. (III-4)

(b) (U) The Director, Joint Staff should consider, in coordination with USDR&E, addressing the implications of the Services system interdependency among the industrial producers, and the adequacy of the existing OJCS structure to identify and analyze trade-offs in systems when one must be surged at the expense of other systems. (III-4)

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SECTION XIII

(U) REMEDIAL ACTION PROJECT (RAP) ANALYSIS

1. (U) Purpose. This section compares proposed RAPs from Exercise PROUD SABER 83 to RAPs documented in reports from JCS-sponsored exercises since Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78. A trend analysis for each analysis area is included whenever possible.
2. (U) General. This section compares the RAPs identified in the preceding sections with applicable RAPs from prior JCS CPXs. A particular effort was made to review Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78 and Exercise PROUD SPIRIT 80 RAPs marked "closed" or recommended to be closed to determine if Exercise PROUD SABER 83 experience contradicted these decisions.
3. (U) Synopsis
  - a. ~~(C)~~ It is clear that much has been accomplished regarding prior applicable RAPs. It is equally clear that much remains to be done. The critique conference for Exercise PROUD SABER 83 identified 50 recommended new RAPs. An additional 35 recommended RAPs are to be folded into existing RAPs.
  - b. (U) The Department of Defense continues to emphasize the importance of the RAP program. The overall RAP program has gained credibility with members of the Joint Staff and the Services. This RAP analysis section for Exercise PROUD SABER 83 is an in-depth trend analysis of the credibility of actions taken in managing RAPs.
4. (U) Trend Analysis. This paragraph contains a subjective comparison by analysis objective on the status of systems or procedural improvements between past RAPs and Exercise PROUD SABER 83. Paragraph 5 contains a comparison of RAPs.
  - a. (U) Mobilization. The mobilization process was exercised thoroughly in Exercise PROUD SABER 83. The dialogue between the OSD and the Joint Chiefs of Staff was characterized in part by lack of understanding and imprecision. Understanding can be achieved and imprecision eliminated by improving mobilization plans. Reserve call-up and retired recall issues continue to be unresolved.
  - b. (U) Deployment. The JDS was more effective than in any previous exercise. The JDA demonstrated an improved capability to coordinate deployments in a complex, intense

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environment. The JDC exhibited increased knowledge and more extensive use of the JDS. A flexible, comprehensive JDS is evolving over time. Many of the improvements and increased capabilities exist because previous RAPs were corrected. Other RAPs remain open. Many show promise for system improvements in the immediate future. Other deployment related RAPs are unsolved because of funding or political constraints.

c. (U) Industrial Surge and Mobilization. Exercise PROUD SABER 83 was the first JCS-sponsored exercise designed to examine industrial surge and mobilization activities. The 6 month preexercise play provided the players a basis for considering industrial base capabilities and limitations at STARTEX. There was insufficient exercise time to completely examine all aspects of the industrial processing activities. Lack of interaction with the industrial producers resulted in viewing production problems solely from the Government's perspective. Ways to better test industrial surge activities and problem areas in future exercises remain to be determined.

d. (S) Logistics. There is a limited ability to deal with logistical shortfalls. The allocation or reallocation of scarce resources can solve some local shortages, provided the necessary guidance and priorities are established rapidly in a developing crisis. The United States does not have the ability to support forces logistically in the scenario portrayed in Exercise PROUD SABER 83.

e. (U) Crisis Action System. JOPS Volume IV contains procedures to be used in multiple crisis situations, a significant improvement since previous exercises. Time-sensitive operation planning procedures, previously issued separately, are also included.

f. (S) NMCC Operations. Since Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78, changes have been made in the CSP-JCS to speed processing of actions in the Joint Staff. Additional procedures have been developed and then modified to reflect exercise experience. RAPs have not been associated with these modifications. Adequate presentation of information to decision-makers in the NMCC has been a problem since Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78. A proposed RAP from this exercise has been identified to provide a solution to this situation.

g. (S) Civil-Military Interface. Many of the problems identified in Exercise PROUD SABER 83 occurred in previous exercises. Areas of concern include NEO, retention of key civilians overseas, and the vulnerability of commercial communications and transportation facilities to sabotage.

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h. ~~(C)~~ WWMCCS ADP and WIN. WIN performance during the exercise was better than during the previous four major JCS exercises. As reliability increases, deficiencies in operational guidelines and standard procedures become more important.

i. ~~(C)~~ Communications and Message Traffic Analysis. Few RAPs that relate to communications have been identified during the exercises since Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78. Communications play seldom had an operational impact that identified a specific problem. The play during Exercise PROUD SABER 83 identified two potential communications related RAPs. Neither problem relates to actual communications assets used during the exercise, but concern the assets needed by deploying and supporting forces. This was the first time that RAPs have been proposed for communications related problems associated with the deploying forces.

j. ~~(S)~~ Space Operations. In addition to the lack of a US ASAT capability, Exercise PROUD SABER 83 highlighted the fact that an analysis of space operations actually represents an analysis of a variety of systems and subsystems that make up the total US capability in space. The exercise also demonstrated the critical requirement that currently exists for a data base and focal point that can provide an inventory of resources and a description of the command and control elements associated with each system or subsystem.

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5. (U) Results of Comparison. The following are trend analysis discussions and supporting tables by analysis objectives showing comparisons of Exercise PROUD SABER 83 proposed RAPs with applicable past CPX RAPs.

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TABLE XIII-1. (U) MOBILIZATION

EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83 CRITIQUE ITEMS		PREVIOUS RAP			RELATIONSHIP		RAP TRENDS		
NUMBER	TITLE	NUMBER	TITLE	EXERCISE NAME	DIRECT	INDIRECT	PROBLEM MORE SEVERE	PROBLEM AS SEVERE	SITUATION IMPROVING
180	EXEMPTION OF KEY NON-DOD EMPLOYEES FROM RESERVE CALL-UP		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
181	EMERGENCY TRAVEL WARRANT		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
292	VERTICAL PERSPECTIVE OF MOBILIZATION ISSUES		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
293									
329	ACCESS TO NON-MILITARY FEDERAL AGENCY INFORMATION SYSTEMS		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
228	MOBILIZATION SEMANTICS	0025	DOD MOBILIZATION PLAN	NN78	X				X
556	MOBILIZATION AUTHORITIES			PS80	X				X
562	MOBILIZATION TERMINOLOGY AND EMERGENCY AUTHORITIES				X				X
176	EXEMPTION FROM RECALL OF NAVY AND AIR FORCE PER- SONNEL EMPLOYED AS DA CIVILIANS	0160	RETIREE RECALL PROGRAM	PS80		X		X	
74	NON-UNIT RESERVE MOBILI- ZATION INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS	0191	ESTABLISH RESERVE COMPONENT MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM	PS80	X				X
103	ARMY POSITION OCCUPIED BY RESERVISTS	0196	CIVILIAN WORKFORCE MOBILI- ZATION	NN78 PS80	X			X	
150	MANPOWER MOBILIZATION PLANNING INTERFACES-FEMA				X			X	
175	IMPACT OF 100K CALL-UP AND PARTIAL MOBILIZATION ON THE WORKFORCE				X			X	
177	ALLOCATION OF CIVILIAN MANPOWER RESOURCES AMONG DOD COMPONENTS				X			X	
194	INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS				X			X	
199	CRITICAL CIVILIAN SKILLS				X			X	
200	CREWING OF IDLE SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT					X		X	
287	ABILITY OF THE MARITIME LABOR FORCE TO MAN SHIPS IN AN EMERGENCY					X		X	
325	MILITARY RESERVISTS/ RETIREE EMPLOYED WITHIN GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES				X			X	
551	RECALL OF RESERVISTS FROM THE CIVIL SECTOR				X			X	
164	SSS AND DOD MOU	0200	MANAGEMENT OF THE MOBILIZA- TION ACQUISITIONING AND PROCESSING SYSTEM	PS80	X				X
205	PRIOR SERVICE RECRUITMENT				X				X
179	RETENTION OF EMERGENCY- ESSENTIAL CIVILIANS OVERSEAS	0296	RETENTION OF FEDERAL CIVILIAN AND DEFENSE CON- TRACTOR EMPLOYEES IN CONUS	IL82		X		X	

LEGEND-EXERCISE NAME  
EXERCISE NIFTY NUGGET 78 - NN78  
EXERCISE PROUD SPIRIT 80 - PS80  
EXERCISE IVY LEAGUE 82 - IL82

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a. (U) Mobilization

(1) (U) The Master Mobilization Plan can now be completed. Exercise PROUD SABER 83 exercised all facets of the mobilization process except total mobilization. The recommended RAP to be included in RAP 0025 explains the deficiencies in some detail.

(2) (U) Several reserve call-up and retired recall issues, carried over from previous exercises, were reaffirmed and remain valid RAPs.

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TABLE XIII-2. (U) DEPLOYMENT

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EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83 CRITIQUE ITEMS		PREVIOUS RAP			RELATIONSHIP		RAP TRENDS		
NUMBER	TITLE	NUMBER	TITLE	EXERCISE NAME	DIRECT	INDIRECT	PROBLEM MORE SEVERE	PROBLEM AS SEVERE	SITUATION IMPROVING
201	COMMERCIAL AIR SUP- PORT OF THE INDUSTRIAL BASE		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
207	COMMERCIAL AUGMENTA- TION OF MAC AND MSC		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
55	C-DAY/L-HOUR		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
54 382 395	OPERATION PLAN (OPLAN) DUAL-TASKING		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
83	DEPLOYMENT VALIDATION OPLAN DISCONNECTS		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
97	"BELOW THE LINE" DUAL MISSION UNITS		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
167	INABILITY TO TRANS- FER RDJTF UNITS TO SH ASIA IN UNITREP		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
250 334	POSITIVE REPORTING IN JDS		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
273	JCS DEPLOYMENT ORDERS		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
345 396 459	NWSS UNITREP DATA BASE		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
443	DUAL TASKING [REDACTED] AND [REDACTED] OF PACAF AIR TRANSPORTABLE HOSPITALS (ATH)		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
462	ALEUTIAN DEFENSE		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
209 366	SHIPYARD CAPACITY ONLY MARGINALLY ADEQUATE		NO PREVIOUS RAP						

LEGEND-EXERCISE NAME  
EXERCISE NIFTY NUGGET 78 - NN78  
EXERCISE PROUD SPIRIT 80 - PS80  
EXERCISE POSITIVE LEAP 80 - PL80  
EXERCISE POTENT PUNCH 81 - PP81  
EXERCISE IVY LEAGUE 82 - IL82

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TABLE XIII-2. (U) DEPLOYMENT (CONTINUED)

EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83 CRITIQUE ITEMS		PREVIOUS RAP			RELATIONSHIP		RAP TRENDS		
NUMBER	TITLE	NUMBER	TITLE	EXERCISE NAME	DIRECT	INDIRECT	PROBLEM MORE SEVERE	PROBLEM AS SEVERE	SITUATION IMPROVING
36 335 343 376 412	DATA BASE DIFFERENCES		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
39	UNIT DEPLOYMENT INFORMATION		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
344 377 409 457	JDS DATA BASE DISCREPANCIES		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
371 424	JDA MESSAGES		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
212 279 290 291 301	SHALLOW DRAFT PRO- DUCT TANKERS NON-AVAILABILITY OF TRANSPORTS (PASSENGER SHIP REQUIREMENTS VS AVAILABILITIES) HEAVY LIFT REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITIES DEPENDENCE ON FOREIGN FLAG ASSETS FOR PETROLEUM LIFT INTRATHEATER LIFT OF POL	9048	LIMITED MERCHANT MARINE FLEET	NH78	X X X X X		X X X X X		
240 281 456 467 520 522	AUTOMATED INTERFACES WHICH SUPPORT JDS JDS CAPABILITY SHORTFALL EXERCISE TASKINGS SAC EC-135C AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AIRLIFT SIMULATIONS	0178	DEFICIENCIES IN JOINT SYSTEMS	PS80, PP81		X X X X X		X X X X X	
126 233 356	INTRA-CONUS MOVEMENT PLANNING INCOMPLETE CONUS TRANS- PORTATION REQUIREMENTS NAVAL RESERVE INCONUS CARGO MOVEMENTS	0210	INTRA-CONUS MOVEMENTS REPORTS (INCONREP)	PS80, IL82	X X X			X X X	
283	PROTECTION FOR MER- CHANT SHIPS	0273	ENVIRONMENT	PP81	X			X	
59 71 518	DATA SYSTEM DISCONNECTS DATA BASE INTERFACES JDS/COMPES INTERFACE	0114	JOINT DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM INTERFACE	PL80	X X X			X X X	
63	JOINT DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM/ JOINT OPERATION PLANNING SYSTEM (JDS/JOPS) INTERFACE	9099	INTEGRATED JOINT DEPLOY- MENT SYSTEM	PL80	X			X	
303	NDRF AVAILABILITY	0173	SEALIFT READINESS PROGRAM (SRP)			X	X		
234	MOBILIZATION SHIPMENTS CONFIGURED FOR OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION (MOB SCOPE)	9136	TRANSPORTATION REQUEST PROCEDURES	PS80		X		X	

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b. (U) Deployment

(1) (U) The JDC is able to support deployment activities better than when the JDA was first established as a result of Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78. The JDS, under the guidance of the JDA, has experienced significant progress in conceptual development, expanded procedures, improved communications, and cohesive interrelationships among JDC members. The JDS, however, remains an evolving system in need of improvement and new or modified capabilities, procedures, policies, and guidance. Members of the JDC continue to uncover JDS deficiencies and shortcomings in the JDS interface with other systems. The fact that these shortcomings and deficiencies continue to be uncovered does not mean a worsening trend exists. What is occurring is that as old deficiencies and shortcomings are resolved, new ones surface because the system is able to go further and deeper into the deployment process. The JDS at this stage is truly an evolving system.

(2) ~~let~~ The shortage of shipping remains, and all indications are that it is worsening. A shortage of tankers and shallow draft vessels degrades the ability to deploy POL in support of US Forces. The serious downward trend of available dry cargo ships limits deployment activities. The inability of MARAD, the Navy, and MSC to activate and provide ships from the NDRF in a timely manner forces the United States to rely heavily on foreign shipping.

(3) (U) Difficulties in determining total intra-CONUS movement requirements continue and will until such time as all requirements are obliged to be reported in the JRS.

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TABLE XIII-3. (U) INDUSTRIAL SURGE AND MOBILIZATION

EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83 CRITIQUE ITEMS		PREVIOUS RAP			RELATIONSHIP		RAP TRENDS		
NUMBER	TITLE	NUMBER	TITLE	EXERCISE NAME	DIRECT	INDIRECT	PROBLEM MORE SEVERE	PROBLEM AS SEVERE	SITUATION IMPROVING
129 130 193	AUTOMATED INDUSTRIAL RESOURCES DATA BASE		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
131 132 160 300 478	FOREIGN SUPPORT OF US INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
148	MOBILIZATION BASE EXPANSION		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
158 159	TRI-SERVICE DEMAND ON LIMITED PRODUCTION CAPACITY		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
214	(S) REPAIR PARTS		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
191	INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION EXERCISE PLAY		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
106 155 156 189 361	OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT (OSHA) STAND- ARDS DURING MOBILIZATION ON THE SHELF LEGISLATION EXPEDITED PROCUREMENT ACTIONS STAND BY LEGISLATION, REGULATION, AND POLICY MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS- FEDERAL CONTRACT LAW	0149	REQUIREMENT FOR EMERGENCY STAND BY LEGISLATION	PS80	X X X X			X X X X	
121 124 125 127 128 190 477	MATERIAL AND AMMUNITION SHORTFALL INDUSTRIAL BASE POLICY WAR RESERVE AND INDUS- TRIAL RESPONSE STATUS WAR RESERVE AND INDUS- TRIAL RESPONSE STATUS MATERIAL AND AMMUNITION SHORTFALL ADEQUACY OF INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS PLANNING (IPP) INDUSTRIAL PREPAREDNESS PLANNING	0218	INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS	NN78, PL80, PS80	X X X X X			X X X X X	

LEGEND-EXERCISE NAME  
EXERCISE NIFTY NUGGET 78 - NN78  
EXERCISE PROUD SPIRIT 80 - PS80  
EXERCISE POSITIVE LEAP 80 - PL80

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c. (U) Industrial Surge and Mobilization

(1) (U) Three major problems were identified during the exercise:

(a) (U) The lack of an automated base to quickly evaluate the capabilities and limitations of industrial production resources

(b) (U) The need for early identification of tri-service interdependencies on the same production sources

(c) (U) Planning for the possible use of foreign industrial production capability to fill critical US military shortages.

(2) (U) The requirement for Emergency Stand-By Legislation identified in Exercise PROUD SPIRIT 80 continues. Exercise PROUD SABER 83 identified the need for relief from statutory requirements dictated by social and environmental legislation, and approval of special authority in emergency funding, defense contracting, civilian personnel, and increased industrial production.

(3) (U) Seven critique items reappeared in the industrial mobilization preparedness area, specifically in surge production capabilities. The Secretary of Defense Guidance of March 1982 addressed the need for improvement of the industrial preparedness program and provided policy guidance for improvement of the surge production capability for selected critical items. The establishment of a DOD Industrial Preparedness Planning Program and adherence to its provisions by all DOD components remains to be completed.

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TABLE XIII-4. (U) LOGISTICS

EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83 CRITIQUE ITEMS		PREVIOUS RAP			RELATIONSHIP		RAP TRENDS		
NUMBER	TITLE	NUMBER	TITLE	EXERCISE NAME	DIRECT	INDIRECT	PROBLEM MORE SEVERE	PROBLEM AS SEVERE	SITUATION IMPROVING
139	LEGISLATION INHIBITING LOGISTICAL SUPPORT		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
182	MOBILIZATION FACILITIES PLANNING	0152	MOBILIZATION APPROVAL AUTHORITIES/PREPOSITIONED PROCEDURES FOR OM AND MC PROJECTS	PS80, PS81, PP81		X		X	
196	EXERCISE CAPABILITY OF INVENTORY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
203 225	PETROLEUM INDUSTRY ADVISORY GROUP		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
210 221	BUNKERS FOR MSC SHIPS SUPPORTING SWA SLOC		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
241	FUEL PRIORITIES AND ALLOCATIONS		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
284	OUTFITTING OF LCAPS		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
505	VISIBILITY OVER AIR- FIELD CAPACITY ALLOCATION		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
237 503	R-5 REPORT (CONUS TERMINAL WORKLOAD STATUS)		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
309 483 506	JTB RESOLUTION OF TRANS- PORTATION SHORTFALLS		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
469	CHEMICAL WARFARE DEFENSE EQUIPMENT		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
365	CONTRACTING SUPPORT		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
33 219 482	DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY CENTER (DISC) DESTRUCTION		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
223	FUEL ADDITIVES FOR COMMER- CIAL JET FUEL		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
122 123 142 147 319	SECURITY ASSISTANCE GUIDANCE SECURITY ASSISTANCE COORDINATION SECURITY ASSISTANCE EMERGENCY ACTION PRO- CEDURES (EAP) FOREIGN MILITARY SALES/ SECURITY ASSISTANCE	0010	DIVERSION OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE MATERIEL TO SUPPORT US FORCES	NN78, PL80, PS81	X X X X X				X X X X X
120 299 414 563	MEDICAL SUPPORT MEDICAL READINESS MEDICAL SUPPORT SHORTFALLS MEDICAL REQUIREMENTS AND CAPABILITY DETERMINATION	0012	MEDICAL SHORTFALL	NN78, PS80, PS81	X X X X			X X X X	
111	SHORTAGE OF CIVILIAN MEDICAL PERSONNEL	0047	MEDICAL MANPOWER SHORTFALLS	NN78, PS80	X			X	
118	WARTIME INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM (WISP)	0166	WARTIME INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM (WISP)	PP79, PS80	X			X	

LEGEND-EXERCISE NAME  
EXERCISE NIFTY NUGGET 78 - NN78  
EXERCISE POWER PLAY 79 - PP79  
EXERCISE PROUD SPIRIT 80 - PS80  
EXERCISE POSITIVE LEAP 80 - PL80  
EXERCISE POLL STATION 81 - PS81  
EXERCISE POTENT PUNCH 81 - PP81

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TABLE XIII-4. (U) LOGISTICS (CONTINUED)

EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83 CRITIQUE ITEMS		PREVIOUS RAP			RELATIONSHIP		RAP TRENDS		
NUMBER	TITLE	NUMBER	TITLE	EXERCISE NAME	DIRECT	INDIRECT	PROBLEM MORE SEVERE	PROBLEM AS SEVERE	SITUATION IMPROVING
146 192 224	ALLOCATION OF MATERIEL PRIORITIZATION OF SCARCE RESOURCES IMPACT OF DIVERTING FUEL FROM THE CIVIL TO THE MILITARY SECTOR	0194	DEFENSE RESOURCE NEEDS FOR MOBILIZATION	PS80	X X X				X X X
135 144 413	SUPPORT OF KOREAN WRSA AMMUNITION REQUIREMENTS USING FMS PROCEDURES WAR RESERVE STOCKS FOR ALLIES WRSA TRANSFER TO KOREA	0266	PROCEDURES FOR THE RELEASE OF WAR RESERVE STOCKS FOR ALLIES (WRSA)	PS81	X X X				X X X
239	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSPORTATION DOCUMENTATION	0260	SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSPORTATION DOCUMENTATION	PP81	X			X	
252	ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR (EPW) MOVEMENTS WITHIN CONUS	0076	ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR (EPW) PROGRAM	PP79, IL82		X		X	
529		9064	CRITICAL MUNITIONS SHORT- FALLS	PP79	X			X	

LEGEND-EXERCISE NAME  
 EXERCISE POWER PLAY 79 - PP79  
 EXERCISE PROUD SPIRIT 80 - PS80  
 EXERCISE POLL STATION 81 - PS81  
 EXERCISE POTENT PUNCH 81 - PP81  
 EXERCISE IVY LEAGUE 82 - IL82

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d. (U) Logistics

(1) ~~(S)~~ Although the critique items cover a variety of subjects, it is apparent that fuel problems continue to represent a significant portion of the logistics problem. The three critique items dealing with the JTB reflect the continuing concern that the entire military community has with the application of limited air and sea transportation assets.

(2) ~~(S)~~ In the cases involving the critique items being folded into existing RAPS, two areas (Diversion of Security Assistance (SA) Materiel and Medical Shortfalls) account for half of the items. In the case of SA activities, it has been noted previously that Exercise PROUD SABER 83 SA activities were far more extensive than SA activities in previous exercises. The fact that so many new items arose is a reflection of this intensified effort. The same is true for medical participation.

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TABLE XIII-5. (U) CRISIS ACTION SYSTEMS

EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83 CRITIQUE ITEMS		PREVIOUS RAP		EXERCISE NAME	RELATIONSHIP		RAP TRENDS		
NUMBER	TITLE	NUMBER	TITLE		DIRECT	INDIRECT	PROBLEM MORE SEVERE	PROBLEM AS SEVERE	SITUATION IMPROVING
274	JCS PRIORITY GUIDANCE		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
415	JOPS MEDICAL PLANNING MODULE (MPM)		NO PREVIOUS RAP						

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e. (U) Crisis Action System. Two new problems were identified in Exercise PROUD SABER 83:

(1) (U) JCS Warning, Alert, and Deployment Orders establish airlift priorities but do not establish sealift priorities

(2) (U) The JOPS Medical Planning Module is cumbersome to use and does not produce exact results.

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TABLE XIII-6. (U) NMCC OPERATIONS

EXERCISE PROUD SABER 81 CRITIQUE ITEMS		PREVIOUS RAP			RELATIONSHIP		RAP TRENDS		
NUMBER	TITLE	NUMBER	TITLE	EXERCISE NAME	DIRECT	INDIRECT	PROBLEM MORE SEVERE	PROBLEM AS SEVERE	SITUATION IMPROVING
561	FORMATTING OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
403	NETCON - CONTROL OF METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION	0238	CONTROL OF METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION (NETCON) IMPACTS ON USAREUR (NATO)	PS81	X			X	

LEGEND-EXERCISE NAME  
EXERCISE POLL STATION 81 - PS81

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f. (U) NMCC Operations

(1) ~~(C)~~ Senior level briefings are not structured to provide the information needed by senior decisionmakers in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the OSD. A recommended RAP has been proposed to develop methods for providing this management information.

(2) ~~(C)~~ Currently, meteorological information is not encrypted. This information is especially vulnerable when received from overseas areas. The problem was first identified during Exercise POLL STATION 81. The critique item from Exercise PROUD SABER 83 shows no change in the situation.

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TABLE XIII-7. (U) CIVIL-MILITARY INTERFACE

EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83 CRITIQUE ITEMS		PREVIOUS RAP			RELATIONSHIP		RAP TRENDS		
NUMBER	TITLE	NUMBER	TITLE	EXERCISE NAME	DIRECT	INDIRECT	PROBLEM MORE SEVERE	PROBLEM AS SEVERE	SITUATION IMPROVING
109	TRANSFERRING OF NON-MILITARY HEALTH BENEFICIARIES TO THE CIVILIAN COMMUNITY		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
244 400	NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION FOR OVERSEAS		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
510 511 514	NEO MESSAGE TRAFFIC TIMING		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
557	NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
328	NONCOMBATANT EVACUATION OPERATIONS	0193	NEO POLICY IN NATO	NN78, PS80, PS81	X			X	
5	WARTIME AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING EQUIPMENT MAINTENANCE	0222	RETENTION OF CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES OVERSEAS	NN78, PS80, PP81, IL82	X			X	
149	RETENTION AND DEPLOYMENT OF ESSENTIAL LOGISTIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PERSONNEL IN HOSTILE AREAS				X			X	
178	RETENTION OF EMERGENCY-ESSENTIAL CIVILIANS OVERSEAS				X			X	
198	OSD CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION	0229	CRISIS MANAGEMENT WITHIN OSD	PS80	X				X
218	CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION				X				X
324	OSD CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION				X				X
543	OSD'S CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION				X				X
558	CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION				X				X
559	CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION				X				X
560	OSD AND OJCS DUPLICATE TASKING				X				X
47 229	RESIDUAL FORCE DATA MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVILIAN AUTHORITIES	0289	MILITARY SUPPORT OF CIVIL DEFENSE-RESIDUAL FORCE INFORMATION	IL82	X			X	
245	MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES					X		X	
327	MEDICAL EVACUATION POLICY	9032	SHORTAGE OF FIELD MEDICAL UNITS (HOSPITAL BEDS) AND MEDICAL FILLER PERSONNEL	NN78	X			X	
185	PROTECTION OF COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS FACILITIES	9056	SECURITY OF MOBILIZATION MEANS	NN78, PS80, PS81	X			X	
304	SECURITY OF CONUS TRANSPORTATION NETWORK				X			X	
536	SHIPMENT OF WAR RESERVE MATERIAL					X		X	
550	PROTECTION OF CONUS TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES				X			X	

LEGEND-EXERCISE NAME  
EXERCISE NIFTY NUGGET 78 - NN78  
EXERCISE PROUD SPIRIT 80 - PS80  
EXERCISE POLL STATION 81 - PS81  
EXERCISE POTENT PUNCH 81 - PP81  
EXERCISE IVY LEAGUE 82 - IL 82

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g. (U) Civil-Military Interface

(1) (U) Seven Exercise PROUD SABER 83 critique items identified new problems. The first concerned the increased medical care burden in civilian medical facilities. The other six involve noncombatant evacuation operations.

(2) (U) The likely disruption of operational transportation flows by competing priorities of NEO reappeared in Exercise PROUD SABER 83. This problem first appeared in Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78 and has been reaffirmed in every mobilization exercise since then.

(3) (U) Three critique items concern the retention of key civilians overseas during hostilities. This problem was also first identified in Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78.

(4) (U) Exercise PROUD SPIRIT 80 disclosed a need for improved crisis management preparation within OSD. The new OSD CMO, first tested in Exercise PROUD SABER 83, addressed that need. Seven critique items suggested further improvements in OSD crisis management procedures.

(5) (S) Four Exercise PROUD SABER 83 critique items describe the susceptibility of commercial communications and transportation facilities to sabotage. This problem was noted in Exercise NIFTY NUGGET 78 and has been identified as a concern in every mobilization exercise since then.

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TABLE XIII-8. (U) WWMCCS ADP AND WIN

EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83 CRITIQUE ITEMS		PREVIOUS RAP			RELATIONSHIP		RAP TRENDS		
NUMBER	TITLE	NUMBER	TITLE	EXERCISE NAME	DIRECT	INDIRECT	PROBLEM MORE SEVERE	PROBLEM AS SEVERE	SITUATION IMPROVING
25	COMPUTER TELECONFERENCE (TLCF)	0179	WIN RELIABILITY	IL82, PP81, PL80, PS80	X			X	
486	OPERATIONAL TELECONFERENCE MANAGEMENT (WWMCCS INTER- COMPUTER NET)					X	X		
378	WIN TELECONFERENCE					X		X	
422	STATUS OF THE JDA TELE- CONFERENCE				X				X
440	COMPUTER TELECONFERENCE				X				X

LEGEND-EXERCISE NAME  
EXERCISE PROUD SPIRIT 80 - PS80  
EXERCISE POSITIVE LEAP 80 - PL80  
EXERCISE POTENT PUNCH 81 - PP81  
EXERCISE IVY LEAGUE 82 - IL82

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h. (U) WWMCCS ADP and WIN. WIN hardware and software reliability remains the major problem with the WIN system. Additional Exercise PROUD SABER 83 critique items center on the need for guidance and procedures for the operational employment of WIN teleconference capabilities.

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TABLE XIII-9. (U) COMMUNICATIONS AND MTA

EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83 CRITIQUE ITEMS		PREVIOUS RAP			RELATIONSHIP		RAP TRENDS		
NUMBER	TITLE	NUMBER	TITLE	EXERCISE NAME	DIRECT	INDIRECT	PROBLEM MORE SEVERE	PROBLEM AS SEVERE	SITUATION IMPROVING
6 394 554 555	COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT CONTROL OF JCS-CONTROLLED COMMUNICATIONS ASSETS JCS CONTROLLED, REPORTABLE COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT MANAGEMENT OF JCS CON- TROLLED COMMUNICATIONS ASSETS		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
276	LACK OF SECURE COMMUNI- CATIONS FOR MERCHANT SHIPS		NO PREVIOUS RAP						
28	SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) FORMAT	0281	SITREP REPORTING	IL82		X		X	

LEGEND-EXERCISE NAME  
EXERCISE IVY LEAGUE 82 - IL82

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i. (U) Communications and Message Traffic Analysis

(1) ~~(S)~~ A major problem discovered during Exercise PROUD SABER 83 was a lack of information concerning the application of JCS-controlled communications assets by supporting and supported commanders. Specific information to aid the Joint Staff in allocating assets among competing OPLANs is not available in the OJCS. Four critique items were combined to form a new RAP to develop current information about JCS-controlled communications assets, including JCSE.

(2) ~~(C)~~ No rapid adequate means exists to provide the US merchant fleet with secure communications. A RAP has been recommended to develop solutions to this problem.

(3) (U) The JRS SITREP has no fixed format, so originators may provide any information they feel necessary. A critique item from Exercise PROUD SABER 83 will be combined with a previous RAP to investigate SITREP formats and suggest alternate means of furnishing the information.

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TABLE XIII-10. (U) SPACE OPERATIONS

EXERCISE PROUD SABER 83 CRITIQUE ITEMS		PREVIOUS RAP			RELATIONSHIP		RAP TRENDS		
NUMBER	TITLE	NUMBER	TITLE	EXERCISE NAME	DIRECT	INDIRECT	PROBLEM MORE SEVERE	PROBLEM AS SEVERE	SITUATION IMPROVING
480	JCS RESPONSE TO ANTI- SATELLITE (ASAT) ATTACKS		NO PREVIOUS RAP						

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j. (S) Space Operations. The problem identified in the critique item is a critical one that will not be resolved until an operational ASAT capability is in place. Until then, "equivalent measures" must be agreed upon for each Soviet attack and for each Soviet "shootdown."

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(7) (U) Intelligibility. The quality of information that is clear, comprehensive, and can be understood.

(8) (U) Reliability. The probability that the system will perform satisfactorily for a given time under stated conditions.

(9) (U) Responsiveness. The ability to react to the established time and quality criteria.

(10) (U) Timeliness. The quality of accomplishing an activity within a suitable and predictable time period.

(11) (U) Utility. The ability or attribute of an element to contribute to system effectiveness (not from JCS Pub 19).

b. (U) Where comparable data exist, this analysis includes a performance comparison of the analytic results of previous JCS-sponsored command post exercises.

#### 4. (U) Analysis Considerations

a. (U) During Exercise PROUD SABER 83 the following artificialities and constraints detracted from realism. Exercise planners accepted these artificialities to facilitate accomplishment of exercise objectives.

(1) (U) Surrogate players represented principals at various command or operation centers. Play by the less-experienced surrogates was quite different than it would have been if the principals had played. Also, some Government agencies did not participate fully.

(2) (U) There was very limited participation by subordinate operational units and various special activities below the command levels designated to play the exercise. This artificially affected turnaround times of requests for information and requests for approval of desired actions.

(3) ~~(U)~~ A unique exercise data base was constructed that essentially eliminated conflict of forces committed to multiple OPLANS. This situation precluded a complete analysis of TPFDD support for simultaneous execution of multiple OPLANS.

(4) ~~(U)~~ OPSEC considerations artificially affected the flow of communications. Communications which normally would be transmitted by nonsecure means had to be transmitted

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by secure methods. Actual hostile intelligence gathering capabilities required that all exercise telephone calls be conducted by secure means. This increased the time required to establish conference calls and adversely affected the flow of information within the WWMCCS.

b. (U) Sections I through X contain additional exercise analysis considerations applicable to specific analysis objectives.

5. (U) Analysis Approach. The process of relating analysis objectives and criteria to exercise data provides initial analysis results. Analysis of these results with examination of applicable prior exercise results provides findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Figure XIV-1 presents an overview of the analysis approach.

6. (U) Analysis and Data Collection

a. (U) Systems Description and Analysis and Data Collection Plan. The Joint Staff published the Systems Description and Analysis and Data Collection Plan as Appendices 1 and 2 to Annex G to the COSIN for JCS EXPLAN 0022 on 16 August 1982. JCS EXPLAN 0022 contained a list of exercise and analysis objectives for Exercise PROUD SABER 83. The Systems Description contained descriptions of the systems to be used in the exercise. The Analysis and Data Collection Plan contained a list of the analysis objectives; analysis criteria; analysis methodology and data presentation; and data collection locations, requirements, and forms.

b. (U) Data Collection. The OJCS assigned data collectors during the period 25 October through 5 November 1982 to the NMCC; ADCOM; LANTCOM; USEUCOM; MAC; MSC; MTMC; PACOM; USREDCOM; RDJTF; USSOUTHCOM; DLA; FEMA; JDA; and Service Headquarters of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Data collectors were trained on 15 October 1982, and debriefed during November 1982, December 1982, and January 1983.

c. (U) Data Collected. Data collectors interviewed players, completed forms and collected messages, computer printouts, memorandums, logs, copies of briefing scripts and slides, and other files at each participating command or operation center.

7. (U) Exercise Message Analysis System (EMAS). The EMAS assisted in collecting messages received or transmitted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The analysts used this system extensively to analyze message traffic during the exercise.

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


Figure XIV-1. (U) Analysis Approach

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